Form 27
[Rule 6.3]

Clerk's Stamp

COURT FILE NO.	1801-04745
COURT	COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH OF ALBERTA
JUDICIAL CENTRE	CALGARY
PLAINTIFF	HILLSBORO VENTURES INC.
DEFENDANT	CEANA DEVELOPMENT SUNRIDGE INC.
	IN THE MATTER OF THE RECEIVERSHIP OF CEANA DEVELOPMENT SUNRIDGE INC.
APPLICANT	SUKHDEEP DHALIWAL
DOCUMENT	**REPLY BRIEF OF LAW of the RECEIVER, Alvarez & Marsal Canada Inc., in its capacity as Court-appointed receiver and manager of Ceana Development Sunridge Inc.**

ADDRESS FOR SERVICE AND CONTACT INFORMATION OF PARTY FILING THIS DOCUMENT

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File No. 39108-2003

INTRODUCTION

1. This reply brief is filed by Alvarez & Marsal Canada Inc., in its capacity as Court-appointed receiver and manager (the "**Receiver**") of the assets, undertakings and properties of Ceana Development Sunridge Inc. ("**Ceana**" or the "**Debtor**"), pursuant to the receivership order granted on July 3, 2019, which was amended and restated on June 17, 2020, in response to an application filed by Sukhdeep Dhaliwal (the "**Applicant**"). Among other things, the Applicant is seeking an order that the Receiver disclose all previously sealed documentation including Confidential Appendices 1 to 3 to the First Report of the Receiver and Confidential Appendices 1 to 3 to the Second Report of the Receiver (collectively, the "**Confidential Appendices**"), denying the Receiver's proposed assignment of the seventeen (17) joint venture agreements (the "**JV Agreements**") to Hillsboro Ventures Inc. ("**Hillsboro**"), and that an investigation be initiated into the conduct of Ceana and any other party

involved in the Receivership Proceedings (as defined in the Seventh Report), including the Receiver (the "**Application**").

2. The Receiver respectfully submits that, while it is in the Court's hands with respect to the three noted issues, for the reasons noted below, the relief sought in connection with each of these issues, in the Receiver's respectful view, is not appropriate and/or there are other options available to the Applicant to deal with the issues noted in the Applicant's Brief of Law.

DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION MAY BE PREJUDICIAL TO THIRD PARTIES

3. The Applicant argues that the Receiver owes a duty to disclose information it holds to the creditors pursuant to its role as a court-appointed receiver. Notably, the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench statement in *SLP Resources Inc v Sorrel Resources Ltd*, 1987 CarswellAlta 317, 65 CBR (NS) 288 (*"**SLP Resources**"*) is relevant to this point – in that case, the role of a receiver in respect of the disclosure of information was succinctly stated at paragraph 8:

> The receiver-manager is clearly an officer of the court. It is not an agent or amanuensis of the creditor at whose instance it was appointed, nor an agent of the company, Sorrel, or its shareholders, officers or directors, or in fact of any other creditors or people involved in the receivership. The receiver-manager has a separate and substantive position with respect to the assets of the company in receivership and in respect of the relationship between the receiver and all of those who have interests in the receivership. That stems from the fact that the receiver is an officer of the court. There is no doubt on the authorities that a receiver-manager has a fiduciary relationship with people who are involved in the receivership and in this case that would presumably include SLP Resources and certainly would include Société Générale. **That relationship, in itself, does not in my view automatically entitle creditors or people in the position of SLP Resources and Société Générale access to all of the documents which come into the hands of the receiver-manager** and, in particular, legal opinions relating to the receiver's position and the validity, or otherwise, of various securities. [emphasis added]

- *SLP Resources* **[Tab 1]**

4. Consistent with the principles enunciated in *SLP Resources*, the Applicant is not entitled to access to all of the documents which come into the hands of the Receiver. In addition, it would not be appropriate to disclose the Confidential Appendices and in fact such a step would be highly prejudicial, as certain of the documents/information requested are either not relevant, are subject to confidentiality obligations, or are documents/information which the Applicant could obtain through other means, including by requesting the consent of the parties who may be disadvantaged/prejudiced should the Receiver disclose such documents/information.

- Receiver's counsel's letter to Madam Justice K.M. Eidsvik dated April 23, 2021 (the "**Receiver's Letter to Justice Eidsvik**") **[Tab 2]**

5. The Applicant argues that the sealing of the Confidential Appendices infringes on an applicant's right to a fair trial. The applicant states (Applicant's Brief of Law, para 26):

> "[a]lthough in the context of a civil proceeding this does not engage a *Charter* right, the right to a fair trial generally can be viewed as a fundamental principle of justice: *M. (A.) v. Ryan*, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157, at para. 84, *per* L'Heureux-Dubé J. (dissenting, but not on that point). Although this fair trial right is directly relevant to the appellant, there is also a general public interest in protecting the right to a fair trial. Indeed, as a general proposition, all disputes in the courts should be decided under a fair trial standard. The legitimacy of the judicial process alone demands as much. Similarly, courts have an interest in having all relevant evidence before them in order to ensure that justice is done."

6. Although the foregoing statement has not been cited, it appears to be taken directly from the Supreme Court of Canada's ("**SCC**") decision in *Sierra Club of Canada v Canada (Minister of Finance)*, 2002 SCC 41, [2002] 2 SCR 522 ("***Sierra Club***") at para 50).

- *Sierra Club* **[Tab 3]**

7. The Receiver does not dispute the general proposition of the above statement. The Receiver does, however, point to the context in which the SCC made that statement. *Sierra Club* involved an application by the appellant seeking a confidentiality order in respect of certain commercially sensitive documents it sought to file that were relevant to the litigation. In its statement, the SCC was referring to the potential injustice that the appellant could suffer if it was unable to file these documents confidentially, as the information contained in these documents was relevant to the defenses available to the appellant. This statement has clearly been taken out of context in the Applicant's Brief of Law. The Applicant is attempting to rely on the right to a fair trial to justify the disclosure of commercially sensitive information. In contrast, in *Sierra*, the SCC was alluding to the fact that a fair trial may necessitate that a confidentiality order be issued in respect of sensitive information. The Applicant has not provided any evidence nor compelling justification as to how the disclosure sought in respect of Confidential Appendices infringes its right to fair trial, or otherwise negatively impacts the public interest in protecting the right to a fair trial. In fact, the Receiver, as is evidenced by the various orders of this Court approving the actions and conduct of the Receiver, has gone above and beyond what is required of the Receiver and its counsel to attend to various stakeholders and consider their

unfortunate situations, including, without limitation, providing assistance to the Applicant and being available to attend to any queries or concerns the Applicant has raised.

8. The Applicant also references the two factors set out by the SCC in *Sierra Club* when determining whether a confidentiality order should be granted pursuant to section 151 of the *Federal Rules of Court, 1998* (Applicant's Brief of Law, para 27).

9. According to the SCC, a confidentiality order under Rule 151 should only be granted when:

> (a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and
>
> (b) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

- *Sierra Club* at para 53 **[Tab 3]**

10. Pursuant to the factors set forth above, the Applicant suggests that the sealing of the certain information held by the Receiver is not in the interest of the public or the court's "strategic priorities for the timely cost-effective access to information" (Applicant's Brief of Law, para 28). Given that this very Court restricted access to the Confidential Appendices in past Orders, we trust that that for the reasons noted herein, and the reasons for which such previous restricted court access orders / sealing orders were granted, are evidence that it is certainly in the public's interest to dismiss the request for the disclosure of the Confidential Appendices.

11. The Receiver notes that the factors above were articulated in the context of an application for a confidentiality order pursuant to the *Federal Rules of Court*, *1998*, and involved an appellant attempting to prevent the dissemination to the public of documents filed in the course of litigation. The test noted above is clearly, in part, intended to consider and protect the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings and the right to free expression. The context of the application before this Court is different. The impugned information is information that is held by the Receiver by virtue of its court-appointed mandated. Maintaining the confidentiality of this information will facilitate the Receiver in performing its court-appointed role.

12. The Receiver is prepared to provide the Applicant certain information, as noted in the Receiver's Seventh Report, at paragraph 25, subject to the Court's direction; however, as noted in the Receiver's Letter to Justice Eidsvik, and the Receiver's Seventh Report, certain of the requested information will

result in personal information such as, *inter alia*, home addresses and bank account information of individuals being disclosed, which may lead to a precedent being set that is harmful to the public's interest and reasonable expectation of some degree of privacy.

13. In addition, as noted in the Receiver's Letter to Justice Eidsvik and paragraph 25 of the Receiver's Seventh Report, certain of the information requested can be found in the numerous reports that the Receiver has filed in connection with these proceedings, or, at the very minimum, the Applicant is able to obtain the information that he requires to contact and further request the consent of the parties who may be prejudiced should the confidential information the Applicant has requested be disclosed, from the Receiver's reports and other Court materials that have been filed in connection with these proceedings.

14. As noted in paragraph 26 of the Receiver's Seventh Report, the Receiver has limited remaining funds in the estate to carry out its statutory obligations concerning the administration of these proceedings, and or any additional requests of the Court. The Receiver notes that should this Honourable Court direct the Receiver to gather and provide the required documents and information to the Applicant, above and beyond what has been provided by the Receiver in its reporting to this Court, there will be costs incurred by the Receiver and these costs should respectfully be borne by the Applicant and/or the investors that support the Applicant's application and requests.

15. Further, as noted in paragraph 4 of this Brief of Law, there are legitimate commercial interests in maintaining the confidentiality of the subject information. Confidential Appendices 1 to 3 of the First Report of the Receiver contain matters of a sensitive commercial nature, including proposals, valuations, realization analysis, and other sensitive information, including sensitive information of third parties. Confidential Appendices 1 to 3 to the Second Report of the Receiver contain sensitive commercial information provided by real estate brokerages, purchasers, and included in correspondence between the Debtor's former legal counsel and the lenders, or communications with other stakeholders. The publication or dissemination of the confidential information could result in harm and be highly prejudicial to the third parties whose confidential information and/or documentation form part of the confidential information, and/or may negatively impact potential realizations on the sale of the various units of the Project (as defined below) that was subject to the Receivership Proceedings. As such, the Receiver believes that it is fair and just in the circumstances to restrict public access to the confidential information, and that a sealing order is the least restrictive and least prejudicial means of accomplishing this.

ASSIGNMENT OF JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENTS

16. On April 13, 2021, the Receiver received a letter from Hillsboro requesting that the Receiver assign to Hillsboro the JV Agreements in respect of the commercial retail buildings and land project site located at 2255, 32nd Avenue NE, Calgary, Alberta (the "**Project**"). The Applicant submits that the JV Agreements should not be assigned to Hillsboro on the basis that the assignment could "expose the investors to further liability and unnecessary expense to already suffering families" (Applicant's Brief of Law, para 30).

17. A Court-appointed receiver represents neither the security holder nor the debtor, and has a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of all interested parties connected with the debtor's assets.

- *RoyNat Inc. v Allan*, 1989 CarswellAlta 367, [1989] AWLD 956 at para 17 **[Tab 4]**

18. The Receiver submits that it would be in the receivership estate's best interest to assign the JV Agreements. This is because in the event that the JV Rights (as defined in the Receiver's Seventh Report) are monetized by Hillsboro, there will be a direct corresponding benefit to the receivership estate in the manner of equal reduction to Hillsboro's secured deficiency claim.

19. While the Receiver is sympathetic towards the ill-fated circumstances of various stakeholders involved in these proceedings, given that the JV Agreements are commercial contracts (which outline their respective obligations, rights and liabilities) that the parties entered into with the option of obtaining legal advice, the Receiver is not in a position to re-write the bargain that the parties had agreed between themselves, even if that is now a bad bargain for one party. From the perspective of reducing deficiencies to the receivership estate, and in its capacity as a neutral Court-appointed officer, the Receiver submits that the proposed assignment is appropriate in the circumstances.

INVESTIGATIONS

20. The Applicant argues that, pursuant to section 67(2) of the *Civil Enforcement Act*, RSA 2000, c C-22 (the "**CEA**"), the Court has the authority to initiate an investigation into the conduct of the parties to the Project, the Receiver included. The Receiver respectfully submits that the subject citation is inaccurate. Section 67 of the CEA relates to, *inter alia*, enforcing a writ related to land.

21. The Receiver assumes that the Applicant intended to refer to section 67(2) of the *Condominium Property Act*, RSA 2000, c C-22 (the "**CPA**"). Section 67(2) of the CPA requires that "improper conduct" have taken place. The Receiver submits that no "improper conduct" has taken place within the meaning of the CPA, again, for the reasons noted above, and also due to the fact that the conduct and actions of

the Receiver have been approved by this Court on numerous occasions. Therefore, section 67(2) of the CPA does not apply in these circumstances and in the Receiver's respectful view, the Court would not be justified in ordering an independent investigation into the conduct of the Receiver.

- Section 67 of the CPA **[Tab 5]**

22. While the Receiver has no qualms with the Applicant initiating any investigations he feels are necessary against any other party, the Receiver respectfully submits, and as evidenced through the numerous court proceedings and materials the Receiver has filed in connection with the Receivership Proceedings, that the Receiver has diligently conducted analysis of the materials in its possession and issues that have been raised. Details of such efforts have been noted in the Receiver's seven reports filed with this Court, and the Receiver's conduct and activities have, without question, been approved by this Court on numerous occasions. In addition, should such relief be granted, any costs related thereto should respectfully be borne by the Applicant and/or the investors that support the Applicant's application and requests given the limited funds remaining in the receivership estate.

SUMMARY

23. In brief, for the reasons noted above, it would be unjust, inefficient and inequitable in the Receiver's respectful view, to grant certain of the relief sought by the Applicant, including an order requiring the disclosure of the Confidential Appendices, denying the Receiver's proposed assignment of the JV Agreements to Hillsboro and allowing for an investigation to be initiated into the conduct of the Receiver.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 17th DAY OF MAY, 2021.

TORYS LLP

Per: Kyle D. Kashuba

Table of Authorities

Tab	Authority
1.	*SLP Resources Inc. v Sorrel Resources Ltd*, 1987 Carswell Alta 317, 65 CBR (NS) 288
2.	Receiver's counsel's letter to Madam Justice Eidsvik dated April 23, 2021
3.	*Sierra Club of Canada v Canada (Minister of Finance)*, 2002 SCC 41, [2002] SCR 522
4.	*RoyNat Inc. v Allan*, 1989 CarswellAlta 367, [1989] AWLD 956
5.	*Condominium Property Act*, RSA 2000, c C-22

[Tab 1]

1987 CarswellAlta 317
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench

SLP Resources Inc. v. Sorrel Resources Ltd.

1987 CarswellAlta 317, 65 C.B.R. (N.S.) 288

SLP RESOURCES INC. and SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE (CANADA) v. SORREL RESOURCES LTD.

O'Leary J. [in Chambers]

Judgment: March 26, 1987
Docket: Calgary No. 8601-8004

Counsel: *E.M. Christopher*, for plaintiff.
M.J. Bondar, for Touche Ross Limited.
L.E. Allen, for applicant.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure
Related Abridgment Classifications
Debtors and creditors
VII Receivers
VII.7 Actions involving receiver
VII.7.e Practice and procedure
VII.7.e.iv Miscellaneous
Headnote
Receivers --- Actions by and against — Actions against receiver
Receivers — Actions — Production of legal opinion — Applicant attempting to obtain copy of legal opinion given to court-appointed receiver relating to security granted by debtor — Document privileged — Applicant not entitled to disclosure.
The receiver-manager of the defendant obtained a legal opinion relating to the validity of debenture and other security granted by the defendant to the plaintiff. The receiver-manager had been appointed by the plaintiff and the appointment was affirmed by the court. The receiver-manager refused to disclose the content of the opinion on the basis that it was privileged.
The applicant, who had a beneficial interest in certain oil and gas properties held by the defendant which may have formed part of the security granted to the plaintiff, sought disclosure of the contents of the legal opinion and was supported by the plaintiff.
Held:
Application dismissed.
The receiver-manager was an officer of the court and was in no different position than any other person with respect to the seeking of legal advice. Advice sought in confidence and given in confidence should be confidential and should be accorded solicitor-and-client privilege. The importance of that privilege in a receivership context is fundamental and it outweighs any claims which interested parties may have to obtain copies of a legal opinion.
The opinion in this case dealt with the technical validity of the security and recited various searches that had been conducted. It did not deal with the ownership or title of assets and only to a limited degree dealt with priorities as disclosed by the searches. It did not deal specifically with the applicant's interest in joint venture properties. The applicant, therefore, had no proprietary interest in the opinion similar to cases involving trustees and cestuis que trust.
Table of Authorities
Rules considered:
Alberta Rules of Court

R. 194(2)

Application to obtain disclosure of legal opinion.

O'leary J. **(orally):**

1 This is an application to compel Touche Ross Limited, the receiver-manager of Sorrel Resources Limited, to disclose the contents of a legal opinion obtained by Touche Ross from its solicitors. The opinion relates generally to the validity of debenture and other security granted by Sorrel to Société Générale at whose instance the receiver-manager was appointed. The applicant SLP Resources Inc. has a beneficial interest in certain oil and gas properties held by Sorrel and in respect of which Sorrel may have granted security interests to Société Générale.

2 The receiver-manager claims solicitor-and-client privilege for the legal opinion and refuses to disclose its contents. The applicant SLP Resources Inc. maintains that the privilege does not apply since the legal opinion deals with the security held by Société Générale, which includes interests in property in respect of which the applicant is a beneficial interest-holder. The applicant has cited a number of cases dealing with the relationship between a trustee and cestui que trust and the position of documents relating to the trust property and their privilege.

3 I have examined the legal opinion in question pursuant to R. 194(2) of the Rules of Court. The latter opinion is dated 19th November 1986 which was a date subsequent to the receiver-manager's appointment and its subsequent confirmation by court order. I have only examined the letter itself. It was apparently accompanied by copies of security documents and presumably in those security documents the specific properties are referred to, being properties in which the applicant SLP claims a beneficial interest. The application is supported by Société Générale on the basis that the security whose validity is being assessed in the legal opinion is in fact security granted to Société Générale and that therefore they have an interest in the opinion.

4 With respect to the letter, it appears to be a rather standard form letter and it recites that it is given pursuant to a request from the receiver-manager to its solicitors to assess the validity of the security given to Société Générale. The letter recites firstly a number of documents examined by the solicitors, including, and I believe limited to, security documents given by Sorrel to Société Générale. In particular, it refers to the debentures under which the receiver was appointed. It also recites numerous searches done in respect of that security, including searches of the corporate registry, the land titles offices in Edmonton and Calgary, the Bank of Canada office, the sheriff's office, and so on. All of these searches have a bearing on the validity of the security with respect to its proper registration. The let ter also deals with questions of priority to a very limited extent. That inquiry is quite limited and only with respect to obvious problems of priority that appear from the searches conducted. The letter expressly disclaims any inquiry or any opinion with respect to the ownership of the various properties which are referred to in the security documents. In other words, the opinion does not deal with the ownership of Sorrel or the title of Sorrel and its validity with respect to the various properties which are or may be covered by the security documents.

5 The letter goes on to consider the debenture security and the other security documents and to express opinions with respect to their formal validity and proper registration and things of that nature. As I have already mentioned, the opinion is qualified by stating that the opinion does not cover any questions of title of Sorrel to the property.

6 There is a reference in the letter to a joint venture agreement and it is under that agreement that I understand SLP Resources claims an interest in certain oil and gas properties. The reference to that joint venture agreement is brief and does not get into questions of title. It simply points out a possible fragility in respect of Sorrel's interest in certain property held pursuant to a joint venture agreement and the possibility that the terms of that agreement might operate to defeat Société Générale's security interest and presumably, although this is not stated in the letter, to defeat or otherwise adversely affect SLP's interest in joint venture properties. The foregoing comments, I believe, sum up very briefly the general thrust of the letter.

7 The legal opinion does not specifically mention any of the properties in which SLP claims an interest, except possibly by inference. It is not a trust document in the sense that it relates to property in which SLP has a beneficial interest which is being held by Sorrel as trustee. There may be some inferential or indirect reference to such property; however, it is far from direct and it is not the purpose of the letter to consider the respective positions of the trustee, that is Sorrel, and the cestui que trust, that is SLP. In my view, it is not a trust document in the sense that that phrase is used in the authorities cited by SLP. It follows

that the applicant has no proprietary interest in the legal opinion similar to the proprietary interest which is also discussed in the cases cited, involving trustees and cestuis que trust. In my view it boils down to a question of solicitor-and-client privilege.

8 The receiver-manager is clearly an officer of the court. It is not an agent or amanuensis of the creditor at whose instance it was appointed, nor an agent of the company, Sorrel, or its shareholders, officers or directors, or in fact of any other creditors or people involved in the receivership. The receiver-manager has a separate and substantive position with respect to the assets of the company in receivership and in respect of the relationship between the receiver and all of those who have interests in the receivership. That stems from the fact that the receiver is an officer of the court. There is no doubt on the authorities that a receiver-manager has a fiduciary relationship with people who are involved in the receivership and in this case that would presumably include SLP Resources and certainly would include Société Générale. That relationship, in itself, does not in my view automatically entitle creditors or people in the position of SLP Resources and Société Générale access to all of the documents which come into the hands of the receiver-manager and, in particular, legal opinions relating to the receiver's position and the validity, or otherwise, of various securities.

9 The receiver-manager is obviously going to have to obtain legal advice from time to time during the course of the receivership. This is certainly the case where the receiver-manager is court-appointed and must report to the court. It is also obviously a necessity where there are conflicting claims to assets and conflicting claims to priority of payment and things of that nature. I prefer the approach to solicitor-and-client privilege taken by the Supreme Court of Canada, which has tended to move away from the strict rules and to expand and entrench the solicitor-and-client privilege. In this particular case I do not believe that the receiver-manager is in any different position than any other individual or person with respect to the seeking of legal advice. Advice sought in confidence and given in confidence, in my view, should be confidential and should be accorded the solicitor-and-client privilege. The importance of that privilege in a receivership context, as in any other context, is fundamental and it outweighs, in my view, any claims which interested parties may have to obtain copies of legal opinions. As far as the privilege is concerned here, I am satisfied that the receiver-manager should be able to assert solicitor-and-client privilege in respect of legal opinions obtained by it. I do not want to generalize because obviously there are positions and situations where different factors might apply. In this case, however, having looked at the letter and having some appreciation of the positions of the applicants I do not see any reason for departing from the usual rules of solicitor-and-client privilege. This letter is obviously a fairly routine letter, but nevertheless it is one that is obtained in confidence by an officer of the court in order to put it in a position to administer this estate in the proper fashion and I think in those circumstances it should be accorded the privilege. I am therefore dismissing the application to compel disclosure of the legal opinion.

10 I am going to return the copy of the legal opinion to Mr. Bondar so that he can retain it in his confidence.

11 Are there any questions of costs arising in this application?

A discussion as to costs followed.

Application dismissed.

End of Document

[Tab 2]

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April 23, 2021

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Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta
Calgary Courts Centre
24th Floor, 601 - 5th Street SW
Calgary, AB T2P 5P7

Attention: The Honourable Madam Justice K.M. Eidsvik

Dear Madam Justice Eidsvik:

Re: In the Matter of the Receivership of Ceana Development Sunridge Inc.; Alberta Court of Queen's Bench Action No. 1801-04745; Receiver's position regarding the Application brought by Sukhdeep S. Dhaliwal, to be heard May 17, 2021

My office acts as counsel for Alvarez & Marsal Canada Inc., in its capacity as Court-appointed receiver and manager (the "**Receiver**") of the assets, undertakings and properties of Ceana Development Sunridge Inc.

Further to Brent Dufault's email dated April 19, 2021, we confirm that Mr. Dhaliwal was granted access to CaseLines several months ago and Mr. Dhaliwal has confirmed that he has access to same. We have also uploaded Mr. Dhaliwal's recently filed Application and supporting Affidavit to CaseLines and we have asked Mr. Dhaliwal to, on a go forward basis, to upload any Court materials he files to CaseLines and have offered to provide him with assistance, should he require it.

Furthermore, in connection with the Application brought by Mr. Dhaliwal, which is to be heard by Your Ladyship on May 17, 2021 by WebEx videoconference at 3:00 p.m., and your request for the Receiver's position regarding same, we have set forth below a table, which includes certain of the documentation/information Mr. Dhaliwal has requested and the Receiver's comments and position as relates to each.

In brief, there are certain documents/information that the Receiver is willing provide further to the Court's advice and direction; however, the Receiver is of the view that certain of the documents/information requested are either not relevant, subject to confidentiality obligations, or which Mr. Dhaliwal could obtain by requesting the consent of the parties who may be disadvantaged/prejudiced should the Receiver disclose such information/documentation.

Item	Information Requested by Mr. Dhaliwal	Information in the Receiver's Possession	Receiver's Comments
1	Fiscal 2018 financial statements and general ledgers prepared by Ceana management.	Yes	Subject to this Court's advice and direction, the Receiver would be pleased to provide this information.
2	Bank statements received directly from ATB Financial and Canadian Western Bank (for the period of July 25,2015 to the receivership date) the Historical Bank Statements.	Yes	Subject to this Court's advice and direction, the Receiver would be pleased to provide this information; however, it may not be necessary since the Receiver has outlined all of the ATB and Canadian Western Bank transactions in Appendix F of the Third Report of the Receiver.
3	Supporting cheque and wire transfer scan(s) received from the Banks for all transactions in the Historical Bank Statements.	Yes	This information may be subject to implied confidentiality as certain of the cheque scans contain personal information such as home addresses, bank account information, etc. The Receiver queries if this additional supporting information is required since the transactions have been laid out in Appendix F of the Third Report and would be willing to disclose same subject to this Court's advice and direction.
4	A “Source and uses” schedule prepared by the Receiver utilizing the Historical Bank Statements, which itemizes and sorts the banking transaction into identifiable categories (as best as possible, where possible)	Yes	This Received provided this information in paragraph 43 and Appendix F of the Third Report.
5	Copies of all original General Contractor bids including selected bid(s).	Yes	This information may be subject to implied confidentiality as the bids were submitted to the Receiver as part of the general contractor bid process outlined in paragraphs 40 to 46 of the First Report of the Receiver. Given the foregoing, the Receiver is of the view that it is not appropriate to share these documents with Mr. Dhaliwal, particularly given that this may be highly prejudicial to the bidders. The Receiver would be pleased to provide Mr. Dhaliwal with the contact information of the four (4) general contractors included in the bid process if Mr. Dhaliwal should wish to contact them directly to request the bid information. In addition, the manner in which the general contractor was selected has been outlined in detail in the First Report of the Receiver and such conduct was approved by this Court, and the ultimate general contractor that was selected, namely EFC, was approved by multiple stakeholders - at no point did any party raise any concerns about the process and therefore, it is unclear why over a year later, Mr. Dhaliwal requires this information, which as noted, if disclosed, may be prejudicial to the bidders.
6	Copies of all invoices paid by "Ceana" to contractors and service providers prior to receivership.	No	The Receiver does not have copies of pre-receivership invoices paid by Ceana and is therefore unable to provide this information. The Receiver suggests that Mr. Dhaliwal reach out to Mr. Gaidhar to request the same.
7	Release copies of Simon Touchan (2035043 Alberta Ltd.) purchase and sale agreement for Building ‘C’ CRU 5&6).	Yes	Mr. Touchan's purchase and sale agreement is subject to implied confidentiality. The Receiver understands that Mr. Dhaliwal is in contact with Mr. Touchan and recommends that Mr. Dhaliwal request this information directly from him.
8	Documents of any agreements Ceana had signed with previous General Contractor (Fast Track Commercial Inc or its owner Dan Deilami, in relation to liens placed against or discharged for Ceana project(s).	No	The Receiver does not have copies of agreements Ceana had signed with Fast Track Commercial and is therefore unable to provide this information. The Receiver suggests that Mr. Dhaliwal contact Mr. Gaidhar for the same.

Moreover, the Receiver and its legal counsel arranged a call with Mr. Dhaliwal on Wednesday,

April 21, 2021 to obtain clarity regarding certain of his requests for disclosure as certain of these requests appeared to be irrelevant or related to confidential appendices, some of which are currently subject to Restricted Court Access Orders. While the Receiver and its counsel advised that they would consider whether these confidential appendices may be disclosed should the applicable Restricted Court Access Order no longer apply, for the sake of expediency and to avoid incurring costs to the receivership estate (especially given that Mr. Dhaliwal has other options available to him to obtain such information/documentation), the Receiver suggested that Mr. Dhaliwal consider directly contacting the parties who submitted such confidential appendices or whose information has been sealed from the public eye and obtain their consent for the release of such documents.

Below is a table which lists certain of the confidential appendices related to the subject receivership proceedings for which the Receiver sought a Restricted Court Access Order, and a brief summary of why the confidential appendices should remain confidential.

With respect to the confidential appendices attached to the Receiver's First Report and Second Report, the Receiver intends to bring forward an application (if necessary) seeking an extension of the Restricted Court Access Order to protect the confidentiality of the applicable parties for, *inter alia*, the reasons noted below.

Item	Confidential Appendices/Report	Receiver's Comments
1	Confidential Appendix 1 – Summary of Broker's Proposals, attached to Receiver's First Report	This information should remain confidential. It may be subject to implied confidentiality as the contracts were submitted to the Receiver as part of the commercial realty proposal process outlined in paragraphs 36 to 39 of the First Report of the Receiver. Given the foregoing, the Receiver is of the view that it is not appropriate to share these documents with Mr. Dhaliwal, particularly given that this may be highly prejudicial to the bidders. The Receiver would be pleased to provide Mr. Dhaliwal with the contact information of the five (5) commercial realty brokerages included in the bid process if Mr. Dhaliwal should wish to contact them directly to request the bid information.
2	Confidential Appendix 2 – Summary of General Contractor Proposal and the EFC Proposal, attached to Receiver's First Report	This information should remain confidential. It may be subject to implied confidentiality as the bids were submitted to the Receiver as part of the general contractor bid process outlined in paragraphs 40 to 46 of the First Report of the Receiver. Given the foregoing, the Receiver is of the view that it is not appropriate to share these documents with Mr. Dhaliwal, particularly given that this may be highly prejudicial to the bidders. The Receiver would be pleased to provide Mr. Dhaliwal with the contact information of the four (4) general contractors included in the bid process if Mr. Dhaliwal should wish to contact them directly to request the bid information.
3	Confidential Appendix 3 – Estimated Realization Analysis of the Project, attached to Receiver's First Report	This information should remain confidential as the release of this analysis may negatively impact potential realizations on the sale of the various units of the Project and may prejudice Hillsboro in its negotiation of sales transactions with interested parties.
4	Confidential Appendix 1 – Executed Barclay Street Listing Agreement, attached to the Receiver's Second Report	This information should remain confidential. Releasing this information to the public could impact Barclay Street as an organization and from a competitive advantage standpoint.
5	Confidential Appendix 2 – Purchase Deposit Summary, attached to the Receiver's Second Report	This information should remain confidential as it was derived from various purchase contracts, which may be subject to implied confidentiality. The Receiver suggests that Mr. Dhaliwal reach out to the purchasers using the contact information on the service list posted to the Receiver's website.
6	Confidential Appendix 3 – Communication with Bob Gaidhar (unredacted), attached to the Receiver's Second Report	This information should remain confidential as it relates to ongoing investigations of unresolved claims and discussions of expected realizations that may prejudice and negatively impact Hillsboro's sales process should this information be made public.

Item	Confidential Appendices/Report	Receiver's Comments
7	Confidential Appendix 1 – Gross Sales Analysis, attached to the Receiver's Fourth Report	This information should remain confidential as the release of this analysis may negatively impact potential realizations on the sale of the various units of the Project and may prejudice Hillsboro in its negotiation of sales transactions with interested parties.

With respect to the confidential appendices that other parties obtained a Restricted Court Access Order in connection with, we have asked Mr. Dhaliwal to contact such parties to disclose same to him and/or otherwise obtain the necessary information from such parties.

We have copied Mr. Dhaliwal on this correspondence and would appreciate it if he could kindly review the Receiver's comments and we invite Mr. Dhaliwal to contact the Receiver should he have any further questions or comments.

We trust that the foregoing is in order, but should you have any questions or concerns, relating to the above or otherwise, please do not hesitate to contact the undersigned to discuss the same.

Yours truly,

Kyle Kashuba

KDK/jw

cc: The Receiver, Alvarez & Marsal Canada Inc., Attention: Orest Konowalchuk & David Williams (via email)
Sukhdeep Dhaliwal (via email)

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[Tab 3]

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited *Appellant*

v.

Sierra Club of Canada *Respondent*

and

The Minister of Finance of Canada, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, the Minister of International Trade of Canada and the Attorney General of Canada *Respondents*

Énergie atomique du Canada Limitée *Appelante*

c.

Sierra Club du Canada *Intimé*

et

Le ministre des Finances du Canada, le ministre des Affaires étrangères du Canada, le ministre du Commerce international du Canada et le procureur général du Canada *Intimés*

Indexed as: Sierra Club of Canada *v.* Canada (Minister of Finance)

Neutral citation: 2002 SCC 41.

File No.: 28020.

2001: November 6; 2002: April 26.

Present: McLachlin C.J. and Gonthier, Iacobucci, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour and LeBel JJ.

Répertorié : Sierra Club du Canada *c.* Canada (Ministre des Finances)

Référence neutre : 2002 CSC 41.

N° du greffe : 28020.

2001 : 6 novembre; 2002 : 26 avril.

Présents : Le juge en chef McLachlin et les juges Gonthier, Iacobucci, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour et LeBel.

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL

Practice — Federal Court of Canada — Filing of confidential material — Environmental organization seeking judicial review of federal government's decision to provide financial assistance to Crown corporation for construction and sale of nuclear reactors — Crown corporation requesting confidentiality order in respect of certain documents — Proper analytical approach to be applied to exercise of judicial discretion where litigant seeks confidentiality order — Whether confidentiality order should be granted — Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106, r. 151.

Sierra Club is an environmental organization seeking judicial review of the federal government's decision to provide financial assistance to Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. ("AECL"), a Crown corporation, for the construction and sale to China of two CANDU reactors. The reactors are currently under construction in China, where AECL is the main contractor and project manager. Sierra Club maintains that the authorization of financial assistance

EN APPEL DE LA COUR D'APPEL FÉDÉRALE

Pratique — Cour fédérale du Canada — Production de documents confidentiels — Contrôle judiciaire demandé par un organisme environnemental de la décision du gouvernement fédéral de donner une aide financière à une société d'État pour la construction et la vente de réacteurs nucléaires — Ordonnance de confidentialité demandée par la société d'État pour certains documents — Analyse applicable à l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire judiciaire sur une demande d'ordonnance de confidentialité — Faut-il accorder l'ordonnance? — Règles de la Cour fédérale (1998), DORS/98-106, règle 151.

Un organisme environnemental, Sierra Club, demande le contrôle judiciaire de la décision du gouvernement fédéral de fournir une aide financière à Énergie atomique du Canada Ltée (« ÉACL »), une société de la Couronne, pour la construction et la vente à la Chine de deux réacteurs CANDU. Les réacteurs sont actuellement en construction en Chine, où ÉACL est l'entrepreneur principal et le gestionnaire de projet. Sierra Club soutient que

by the government triggered s. 5(1)(*b*) of the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act* ("*CEAA*"), requiring an environmental assessment as a condition of the financial assistance, and that the failure to comply compels a cancellation of the financial arrangements. AECL filed an affidavit in the proceedings which summarized confidential documents containing thousands of pages of technical information concerning the ongoing environmental assessment of the construction site by the Chinese authorities. AECL resisted Sierra Club's application for production of the confidential documents on the ground, *inter alia*, that the documents were the property of the Chinese authorities and that it did not have the authority to disclose them. The Chinese authorities authorized disclosure of the documents on the condition that they be protected by a confidentiality order, under which they would only be made available to the parties and the court, but with no restriction on public access to the judicial proceedings. AECL's application for a confidentiality order was rejected by the Federal Court, Trial Division. The Federal Court of Appeal upheld that decision.

Held: The appeal should be allowed and the confidentiality order granted on the terms requested by AECL.

In light of the established link between open courts and freedom of expression, the fundamental question for a court to consider in an application for a confidentiality order is whether the right to freedom of expression should be compromised in the circumstances. The court must ensure that the discretion to grant the order is exercised in accordance with *Charter* principles because a confidentiality order will have a negative effect on the s. 2(*b*) right to freedom of expression. A confidentiality order should only be granted when (1) such an order is necessary to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and (2) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings. Three important elements are subsumed under the first branch of the test. First, the risk must be real and substantial, well grounded in evidence, posing a serious threat to the commercial interest in question. Second, the important commercial interest must be one which can be expressed in terms of a public interest in confidentiality, where there is a general principle at stake. Finally, the judge is required to consider not only whether reasonable alternatives are available to such an order but also to restrict the order as much as is reasonably possible while preserving the commercial interest in question.

l'autorisation d'aide financière du gouvernement déclenche l'application de l'al. 5(1)*b*) de la *Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale* (« *LCÉE* ») exigeant une évaluation environnementale comme condition de l'aide financière, et que le défaut d'évaluation entraîne l'annulation des ententes financières. ÉACL dépose un affidavit qui résume des documents confidentiels contenant des milliers de pages d'information technique concernant l'évaluation environnementale du site de construction qui est faite par les autorités chinoises. ÉACL s'oppose à la communication des documents demandée par Sierra Club pour la raison notamment qu'ils sont la propriété des autorités chinoises et qu'elle n'est pas autorisée à les divulguer. Les autorités chinoises donnent l'autorisation de les communiquer à la condition qu'ils soient protégés par une ordonnance de confidentialité n'y donnant accès qu'aux parties et à la cour, mais n'imposant aucune restriction à l'accès du public aux débats. La demande d'ordonnance de confidentialité est rejetée par la Section de première instance de la Cour fédérale. La Cour d'appel fédérale confirme cette décision.

Arrêt : L'appel est accueilli et l'ordonnance demandée par ÉACL est accordée.

Vu le lien existant entre la publicité des débats judiciaires et la liberté d'expression, la question fondamentale pour la cour saisie d'une demande d'ordonnance de confidentialité est de savoir si, dans les circonstances, il y a lieu de restreindre le droit à la liberté d'expression. La cour doit s'assurer que l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire de l'accorder est conforme aux principes de la *Charte* parce qu'une ordonnance de confidentialité a des effets préjudiciables sur la liberté d'expression garantie à l'al. 2*b*). On ne doit l'accorder que (1) lorsqu'elle est nécessaire pour écarter un risque sérieux pour un intérêt important, y compris un intérêt commercial, dans le contexte d'un litige, en l'absence d'autres options raisonnables pour écarter ce risque, et (2) lorsque ses effets bénéfiques, y compris ses effets sur le droit des justiciables civils à un procès équitable, l'emportent sur ses effets préjudiciables, y compris ses effets sur la liberté d'expression qui, dans ce contexte, comprend l'intérêt du public dans la publicité des débats judiciaires. Trois éléments importants sont subsumés sous le premier volet de l'analyse. Premièrement, le risque en cause doit être réel et important, être bien étayé par la preuve et menacer gravement l'intérêt commercial en question. Deuxièmement, l'intérêt doit pouvoir se définir en termes d'intérêt public à la confidentialité, mettant en jeu un principe général. Enfin le juge doit non seulement déterminer s'il existe d'autres options raisonnables, il doit aussi restreindre l'ordonnance autant qu'il est raisonnablement possible de le faire tout en préservant l'intérêt commercial en question.

Applying the test to the present circumstances, the commercial interest at stake here relates to the objective of preserving contractual obligations of confidentiality, which is sufficiently important to pass the first branch of the test as long as certain criteria relating to the information are met. The information must have been treated as confidential at all relevant times; on a balance of probabilities, proprietary, commercial and scientific interests could reasonably be harmed by disclosure of the information; and the information must have been accumulated with a reasonable expectation of it being kept confidential. These requirements have been met in this case. Disclosure of the confidential documents would impose a serious risk on an important commercial interest of AECL, and there are no reasonably alternative measures to granting the order.

Under the second branch of the test, the confidentiality order would have significant salutary effects on AECL's right to a fair trial. Disclosure of the confidential documents would cause AECL to breach its contractual obligations and suffer a risk of harm to its competitive position. If a confidentiality order is denied, AECL will be forced to withhold the documents in order to protect its commercial interests, and since that information is relevant to defences available under the *CEAA*, the inability to present this information hinders AECL's capacity to make full answer and defence. Although in the context of a civil proceeding, this does not engage a *Charter* right, the right to a fair trial is a fundamental principle of justice. Further, the confidentiality order would allow all parties and the court access to the confidential documents, and permit cross-examination based on their contents, assisting in the search for truth, a core value underlying freedom of expression. Finally, given the technical nature of the information, there may be a substantial public security interest in maintaining the confidentiality of such information.

The deleterious effects of granting a confidentiality order include a negative effect on the open court principle, and therefore on the right to freedom of expression. The more detrimental the confidentiality order would be to the core values of (1) seeking the truth and the common good, (2) promoting self-fulfilment of individuals by allowing them to develop thoughts and ideas as they see fit, and (3) ensuring that participation in the political process is open to all persons, the harder it will be to justify the confidentiality order. In the hands of the parties and their experts, the confidential documents may be of great assistance in probing the truth of the Chinese environmental assessment process, which would assist the court in reaching accurate factual conclusions. Given the highly technical nature of the documents, the important value of the search for the truth which underlies

En l'espèce, l'intérêt commercial en jeu, la préservation d'obligations contractuelles de confidentialité, est suffisamment important pour satisfaire au premier volet de l'analyse, pourvu que certaines conditions soient remplies : les renseignements ont toujours été traités comme des renseignements confidentiels; il est raisonnable de penser que, selon la prépondérance des probabilités, leur divulgation compromettrait des droits exclusifs, commerciaux et scientifiques; et les renseignements ont été recueillis dans l'expectative raisonnable qu'ils resteraient confidentiels. Ces conditions sont réunies en l'espèce. La divulgation des documents confidentiels ferait courir un risque sérieux à un intérêt commercial important de ÉACL et il n'existe pas d'options raisonnables autres que l'ordonnance de confidentialité.

À la deuxième étape de l'analyse, l'ordonnance de confidentialité aurait des effets bénéfiques considérables sur le droit de ÉACL à un procès équitable. Si ÉACL divulguait les documents confidentiels, elle manquerait à ses obligations contractuelles et s'exposerait à une détérioration de sa position concurrentielle. Le refus de l'ordonnance obligerait ÉACL à retenir les documents pour protéger ses intérêts commerciaux et comme ils sont pertinents pour l'exercice des moyens de défense prévus par la *LCÉE*, l'impossibilité de les produire empêcherait ÉACL de présenter une défense pleine et entière. Même si en matière civile cela n'engage pas de droit protégé par la *Charte*, le droit à un procès équitable est un principe de justice fondamentale. L'ordonnance permettrait aux parties et au tribunal d'avoir accès aux documents confidentiels, et permettrait la tenue d'un contre-interrogatoire fondé sur leur contenu, favorisant ainsi la recherche de la vérité, une valeur fondamentale sous-tendant la liberté d'expression. Il peut enfin y avoir un important intérêt de sécurité publique à préserver la confidentialité de ce type de renseignements techniques.

Une ordonnance de confidentialité aurait un effet préjudiciable sur le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires et donc sur la liberté d'expression. Plus l'ordonnance porte atteinte aux valeurs fondamentales que sont (1) la recherche de la vérité et du bien commun, (2) l'épanouissement personnel par le libre développement des pensées et des idées et (3) la participation de tous au processus politique, plus il est difficile de justifier l'ordonnance. Dans les mains des parties et de leurs experts, les documents peuvent être très utiles pour apprécier la conformité du processus d'évaluation environnementale chinois, et donc pour aider la cour à parvenir à des conclusions de fait exactes. Compte tenu de leur nature hautement technique, la production des documents confidentiels en vertu de l'ordonnance demandée favoriserait mieux l'importante valeur de la recherche de la vérité, qui

both freedom of expression and open justice would be promoted to a greater extent by submitting the confidential documents under the order sought than it would by denying the order.

Under the terms of the order sought, the only restrictions relate to the public distribution of the documents, which is a fairly minimal intrusion into the open court rule. Although the confidentiality order would restrict individual access to certain information which may be of interest to that individual, the second core value of promoting individual self-fulfilment would not be significantly affected by the confidentiality order. The third core value figures prominently in this appeal as open justice is a fundamental aspect of a democratic society. By their very nature, environmental matters carry significant public import, and openness in judicial proceedings involving environmental issues will generally attract a high degree of protection, so that the public interest is engaged here more than if this were an action between private parties involving private interests. However, the narrow scope of the order coupled with the highly technical nature of the confidential documents significantly temper the deleterious effects the confidentiality order would have on the public interest in open courts. The core freedom of expression values of seeking the truth and promoting an open political process are most closely linked to the principle of open courts, and most affected by an order restricting that openness. However, in the context of this case, the confidentiality order would only marginally impede, and in some respects would even promote, the pursuit of these values. The salutary effects of the order outweigh its deleterious effects and the order should be granted. A balancing of the various rights and obligations engaged indicates that the confidentiality order would have substantial salutary effects on AECL's right to a fair trial and freedom of expression, while the deleterious effects on the principle of open courts and freedom of expression would be minimal.

Cases Cited

Applied: *Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General)*, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326; *Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General)*, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480; *Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.*, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835; *R. v. Mentuck*, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442, 2001 SCC 76; *M. (A.) v. Ryan*, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157; *Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General)*, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927; *R. v. Keegstra*, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697; **referred to:** *AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health and*

sous-tend à la fois la liberté d'expression et la publicité des débats judiciaires, que ne le ferait le refus de l'ordonnance.

Aux termes de l'ordonnance demandée, les seules restrictions ont trait à la distribution publique des documents, une atteinte relativement minime à la règle de la publicité des débats judiciaires. Même si l'ordonnance de confidentialité devait restreindre l'accès individuel à certains renseignements susceptibles d'intéresser quelqu'un, la deuxième valeur fondamentale, l'épanouissement personnel, ne serait pas touchée de manière significative. La troisième valeur joue un rôle primordial dans le pourvoi puisque la publicité des débats judiciaires est un aspect fondamental de la société démocratique. Par leur nature même, les questions environnementales ont une portée publique considérable, et la transparence des débats judiciaires sur les questions environnementales mérite généralement un degré élevé de protection, de sorte que l'intérêt public est en l'espèce plus engagé que s'il s'agissait d'un litige entre personnes privées à l'égard d'intérêts purement privés. Toutefois la portée étroite de l'ordonnance associée à la nature hautement technique des documents confidentiels tempère considérablement les effets préjudiciables que l'ordonnance de confidentialité pourrait avoir sur l'intérêt du public à la publicité des débats judiciaires. Les valeurs centrales de la liberté d'expression que sont la recherche de la vérité et la promotion d'un processus politique ouvert sont très étroitement liées au principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires, et sont les plus touchées par une ordonnance limitant cette publicité. Toutefois, en l'espèce, l'ordonnance de confidentialité n'entraverait que légèrement la poursuite de ces valeurs, et pourrait même les favoriser à certains égards. Ses effets bénéfiques l'emportent sur ses effets préjudiciables, et il y a lieu de l'accorder. Selon la pondération des divers droits et intérêts en jeu, l'ordonnance de confidentialité aurait des effets bénéfiques importants sur le droit de ÉACL à un procès équitable et à la liberté d'expression, et ses effets préjudiciables sur le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires et la liberté d'expression seraient minimes.

Jurisprudence

Arrêts appliqués : *Edmonton Journal c. Alberta (Procureur général)*, [1989] 2 R.C.S. 1326; *Société Radio-Canada c. Nouveau-Brunswick (Procureur général)*, [1996] 3 R.C.S. 480; *Dagenais c. Société Radio-Canada*, [1994] 3 R.C.S. 835; *R. c. Mentuck*, [2001] 3 R.C.S. 442, 2001 CSC 76; *M. (A.) c. Ryan*, [1997] 1 R.C.S. 157; *Irwin Toy Ltd. c. Québec (Procureur général)*, [1989] 1 R.C.S. 927; *R. c. Keegstra*, [1990] 3 R.C.S. 697; **arrêts mentionnés :** *AB Hassle c.*

Welfare), [2000] 3 F.C. 360, aff'g (1998), 83 C.P.R. (3d) 428; *Ethyl Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)* (1998), 17 C.P.C. (4th) 278; *R. v. Oakes*, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; *R. v. O.N.E.*, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 478, 2001 SCC 77; *F.N. (Re)*, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 880, 2000 SCC 35; *Eli Lilly and Co. v. Novopharm Ltd.* (1994), 56 C.P.R. (3d) 437.

Statutes and Regulations Cited

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 2(*b*).
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 37, ss. 5(1)(*b*), 8, 54, 54(2)(*b*).
Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106, rr. 151, 312.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal, [2000] 4 F.C. 426, 187 D.L.R. (4th) 231, 256 N.R. 1, 24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, [2000] F.C.J. No. 732 (QL), affirming a decision of the Trial Division, [2000] 2 F.C. 400, 178 F.T.R. 283, [1999] F.C.J. No. 1633 (QL). Appeal allowed.

J. Brett Ledger and *Peter Chapin*, for the appellant.

Timothy J. Howard and *Franklin S. Gertler*, for the respondent Sierra Club of Canada.

Graham Garton, *Q.C.*, and *J. Sanderson Graham*, for the respondents the Minister of Finance of Canada, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, the Minister of International Trade of Canada and the Attorney General of Canada.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by

IACOBUCCI J. —

I. Introduction

1 In our country, courts are the institutions generally chosen to resolve legal disputes as best they can through the application of legal principles to the facts of the case involved. One of the underlying principles of the judicial process is public openness, both in the proceedings of the dispute, and in the material that is relevant to its resolution. However, some material can be made the subject of a confidentiality order. This appeal raises the important

Canada (Ministre de la Santé nationale et du Bien-être social), [2000] 3 C.F. 360, conf. [1998] A.C.F. nº 1850 (QL); *Ethyl Canada Inc. c. Canada (Attorney General)* (1998), 17 C.P.C. (4th) 278; *R. c. Oakes*, [1986] 1 R.C.S. 103; *R. c. O.N.E.*, [2001] 3 R.C.S. 478, 2001 CSC 77; *F.N. (Re)*, [2000] 1 R.C.S. 880, 2000 CSC 35; *Eli Lilly and Co. c. Novopharm Ltd.* (1994), 56 C.P.R. (3d) 437.

Lois et règlements cités

Charte canadienne des droits et libertés, art. 1, 2*b*).
Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale, L.C. 1992, ch. 37, art. 5(1)*b*), 8, 54, 54(2) [abr. & rempl. 1993, ch. 34, art. 37].
Règles de la Cour fédérale (1998), DORS/98-106, règles 151, 312.

POURVOI contre un arrêt de la Cour d'appel fédérale, [2000] 4 C.F. 426, 187 D.L.R. (4th) 231, 256 N.R. 1, 24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, [2000] A.C.F. nº 732 (QL), qui a confirmé une décision de la Section de première instance, [2000] 2 C.F. 400, 178 F.T.R. 283, [1999] A.C.F. nº 1633 (QL). Pourvoi accueilli.

J. Brett Ledger et *Peter Chapin*, pour l'appelante.

Timothy J. Howard et *Franklin S. Gertler*, pour l'intimé Sierra Club du Canada.

Graham Garton, *c.r.*, et *J. Sanderson Graham*, pour les intimés le ministre des Finances du Canada, le ministre des Affaires étrangères du Canada, le ministre du Commerce international du Canada et le procureur général du Canada.

Version française du jugement de la Cour rendu par

LE JUGE IACOBUCCI —

I. Introduction

Dans notre pays, les tribunaux sont les institutions généralement choisies pour résoudre au mieux les différends juridiques par l'application de principes juridiques aux faits de chaque espèce. Un des principes sous-jacents au processus judiciaire est la transparence, tant dans la procédure suivie que dans les éléments pertinents à la solution du litige. Certains de ces éléments peuvent toutefois faire l'objet d'une ordonnance de confidentialité. Le

issues of when, and under what circumstances, a confidentiality order should be granted.

For the following reasons, I would issue the confidentiality order sought and accordingly would allow the appeal.

II. Facts

The appellant, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited ("AECL") is a Crown corporation that owns and markets CANDU nuclear technology, and is an intervener with the rights of a party in the application for judicial review by the respondent, the Sierra Club of Canada ("Sierra Club"). Sierra Club is an environmental organization seeking judicial review of the federal government's decision to provide financial assistance in the form of a $1.5 billion guaranteed loan relating to the construction and sale of two CANDU nuclear reactors to China by the appellant. The reactors are currently under construction in China, where the appellant is the main contractor and project manager.

The respondent maintains that the authorization of financial assistance by the government triggered s. 5(1)(*b*) of the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act*, S.C. 1992, c. 37 ("*CEAA*"), which requires that an environmental assessment be undertaken before a federal authority grants financial assistance to a project. Failure to undertake such an assessment compels cancellation of the financial arrangements.

The appellant and the respondent Ministers argue that the *CEAA* does not apply to the loan transaction, and that if it does, the statutory defences available under ss. 8 and 54 apply. Section 8 describes the circumstances where Crown corporations are required to conduct environmental assessments. Section 54(2)(*b*) recognizes the validity of an environmental assessment carried out by a foreign authority provided that it is consistent with the provisions of the *CEAA*.

In the course of the application by Sierra Club to set aside the funding arrangements, the appellant

pourvoi soulève les importantes questions de savoir à quel moment et dans quelles circonstances il y a lieu de rendre une ordonnance de confidentialité.

2 Pour les motifs qui suivent, je suis d'avis de rendre l'ordonnance de confidentialité demandée et par conséquent d'accueillir le pourvoi.

II. Les faits

3 L'appelante, Énergie atomique du Canada Limitée (« ÉACL »), société d'État propriétaire et vendeuse de la technologie nucléaire CANDU, est une intervenante ayant reçu les droits de partie dans la demande de contrôle judiciaire présentée par l'intimé, Sierra Club du Canada (« Sierra Club »), un organisme environnemental. Sierra Club demande le contrôle judiciaire de la décision du gouvernement fédéral de fournir une aide financière, sous forme de garantie d'emprunt de 1,5 milliard de dollars, pour la construction et la vente à la Chine de deux réacteurs nucléaires CANDU par l'appelante. Les réacteurs sont actuellement en construction en Chine, où l'appelante est entrepreneur principal et gestionnaire de projet.

4 L'intimé soutient que l'autorisation d'aide financière du gouvernement déclenche l'application de l'al. 5(1)*b*) de la *Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale*, L.C. 1992, ch. 37 (« *LCÉE* »), qui exige une évaluation environnementale avant qu'une autorité fédérale puisse fournir une aide financière à un projet. Le défaut d'évaluation entraîne l'annulation des ententes financières.

5 Selon l'appelante et les ministres intimés, la *LCÉE* ne s'applique pas à la convention de prêt et si elle s'y applique, ils peuvent invoquer les défenses prévues aux art. 8 et 54 de cette loi. L'article 8 prévoit les circonstances dans lesquelles les sociétés d'État sont tenues de procéder à des évaluations environnementales. Le paragraphe 54(2) reconnaît la validité des évaluations environnementales effectuées par des autorités étrangères pourvu qu'elles soient compatibles avec les dispositions de la *LCÉE*.

6 Dans le cadre de la requête de Sierra Club en annulation des ententes financières, l'appelante a

filed an affidavit of Dr. Simon Pang, a senior manager of the appellant. In the affidavit, Dr. Pang referred to and summarized certain documents (the "Confidential Documents"). The Confidential Documents are also referred to in an affidavit prepared by Mr. Feng, one of AECL's experts. Prior to cross-examining Dr. Pang on his affidavit, Sierra Club made an application for the production of the Confidential Documents, arguing that it could not test Dr. Pang's evidence without access to the underlying documents. The appellant resisted production on various grounds, including the fact that the documents were the property of the Chinese authorities and that it did not have authority to disclose them. After receiving authorization by the Chinese authorities to disclose the documents on the condition that they be protected by a confidentiality order, the appellant sought to introduce the Confidential Documents under Rule 312 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998*, SOR/98-106, and requested a confidentiality order in respect of the documents.

déposé un affidavit de M. Simon Pang, un de ses cadres supérieurs. Dans l'affidavit, M. Pang mentionne et résume certains documents (les « documents confidentiels ») qui sont également mentionnés dans un affidavit de M. Feng, un expert d'ÉACL. Avant de contre-interroger M. Pang sur son affidavit, Sierra Club a demandé par requête la production des documents confidentiels, au motif qu'il ne pouvait vérifier la validité de sa déposition sans consulter les documents de base. L'appelante s'oppose pour plusieurs raisons à la production des documents, dont le fait qu'ils sont la propriété des autorités chinoises et qu'elle n'est pas autorisée à les divulguer. Après avoir obtenu des autorités chinoises l'autorisation de communiquer les documents à la condition qu'ils soient protégés par une ordonnance de confidentialité, l'appelante a cherché à les produire en invoquant la règle 312 des *Règles de la Cour fédérale (1998)*, DORS/98-106, et a demandé une ordonnance de confidentialité à leur égard.

7 Under the terms of the order requested, the Confidential Documents would only be made available to the parties and the court; however, there would be no restriction on public access to the proceedings. In essence, what is being sought is an order preventing the dissemination of the Confidential Documents to the public.

Aux termes de l'ordonnance demandée, seules les parties et la cour auraient accès aux documents confidentiels. Aucune restriction ne serait imposée à l'accès du public aux débats. On demande essentiellement d'empêcher la diffusion des documents confidentiels au public.

8 The Confidential Documents comprise two Environmental Impact Reports on Siting and Construction Design (the "EIRs"), a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (the "PSAR"), and the supplementary affidavit of Dr. Pang which summarizes the contents of the EIRs and the PSAR. If admitted, the EIRs and the PSAR would be attached as exhibits to the supplementary affidavit of Dr. Pang. The EIRs were prepared by the Chinese authorities in the Chinese language, and the PSAR was prepared by the appellant with assistance from the Chinese participants in the project. The documents contain a mass of technical information and comprise thousands of pages. They describe the ongoing environmental assessment of the construction site by the Chinese authorities under Chinese law.

Les documents confidentiels comprennent deux Rapports d'impact environnemental (« RIE ») sur le site et la construction, un Rapport préliminaire d'analyse sur la sécurité (« RPAS ») ainsi que l'affidavit supplémentaire de M. Pang qui résume le contenu des RIE et du RPAS. S'ils étaient admis, les rapports seraient joints en annexe de l'affidavit supplémentaire de M. Pang. Les RIE ont été préparés en chinois par les autorités chinoises, et le RPAS a été préparé par l'appelante en collaboration avec les responsables chinois du projet. Les documents contiennent une quantité considérable de renseignements techniques et comprennent des milliers de pages. Ils décrivent l'évaluation environnementale du site de construction qui est faite par les autorités chinoises en vertu des lois chinoises.

As noted, the appellant argues that it cannot introduce the Confidential Documents into evidence without a confidentiality order, otherwise it would be in breach of its obligations to the Chinese authorities. The respondent's position is that its right to cross-examine Dr. Pang and Mr. Feng on their affidavits would be effectively rendered nugatory in the absence of the supporting documents to which the affidavits referred. Sierra Club proposes to take the position that the affidavits should therefore be afforded very little weight by the judge hearing the application for judicial review.

The Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division refused to grant the confidentiality order and the majority of the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. In his dissenting opinion, Robertson J.A. would have granted the confidentiality order.

III. Relevant Statutory Provisions

Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106

151. (1) On motion, the Court may order that material to be filed shall be treated as confidential.

(2) Before making an order under subsection (1), the Court must be satisfied that the material should be treated as confidential, notwithstanding the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

IV. Judgments Below

A. *Federal Court, Trial Division*, [2000] 2 F.C. 400

Pelletier J. first considered whether leave should be granted pursuant to Rule 312 to introduce the supplementary affidavit of Dr. Pang to which the Confidential Documents were filed as exhibits. In his view, the underlying question was that of relevance, and he concluded that the documents were relevant to the issue of the appropriate remedy. Thus, in the absence of prejudice to the respondent, the affidavit should be permitted to be served and filed. He noted that the respondent would be prejudiced by delay, but since both parties had brought

9 Comme je le note plus haut, l'appelante prétend ne pas pouvoir produire les documents confidentiels en preuve sans qu'ils soient protégés par une ordonnance de confidentialité, parce que ce serait un manquement à ses obligations envers les autorités chinoises. L'intimé soutient pour sa part que son droit de contre-interroger M. Pang et M. Feng sur leurs affidavits serait pratiquement futile en l'absence des documents auxquels ils se réfèrent. Sierra Club entend soutenir que le juge saisi de la demande de contrôle judiciaire devrait donc leur accorder peu de poids.

10 La Section de première instance de la Cour fédérale du Canada a rejeté la demande d'ordonnance de confidentialité et la Cour d'appel fédérale, à la majorité, a rejeté l'appel. Le juge Robertson, dissident, était d'avis d'accorder l'ordonnance.

III. Dispositions législatives

11 *Règles de la Cour fédérale (1998)*, DORS/98-106

151. (1) La Cour peut, sur requête, ordonner que des documents ou éléments matériels qui seront déposés soient considérés comme confidentiels.

(2) Avant de rendre une ordonnance en application du paragraphe (1), la Cour doit être convaincue de la nécessité de considérer les documents ou éléments matériels comme confidentiels, étant donné l'intérêt du public à la publicité des débats judiciaires.

IV. Les décisions antérieures

A. *Cour fédérale, Section de première instance*, [2000] 2 C.F. 400

12 Le juge Pelletier examine d'abord s'il y a lieu, en vertu de la règle 312, d'autoriser la production de l'affidavit supplémentaire de M. Pang auquel sont annexés les documents confidentiels. À son avis, il s'agit d'une question de pertinence et il conclut que les documents se rapportent à la question de la réparation. En l'absence de préjudice pour l'intimé, il y a donc lieu d'autoriser la signification et le dépôt de l'affidavit. Il note que des retards seraient préjudiciables à l'intimé mais que, puisque les deux parties ont présenté des requêtes

interlocutory motions which had contributed to the delay, the desirability of having the entire record before the court outweighed the prejudice arising from the delay associated with the introduction of the documents.

13 On the issue of confidentiality, Pelletier J. concluded that he must be satisfied that the need for confidentiality was greater than the public interest in open court proceedings, and observed that the argument for open proceedings in this case was significant given the public interest in Canada's role as a vendor of nuclear technology. As well, he noted that a confidentiality order was an exception to the rule of open access to the courts, and that such an order should be granted only where absolutely necessary.

14 Pelletier J. applied the same test as that used in patent litigation for the issue of a protective order, which is essentially a confidentiality order. The granting of such an order requires the appellant to show a subjective belief that the information is confidential and that its interests would be harmed by disclosure. In addition, if the order is challenged, then the person claiming the benefit of the order must demonstrate objectively that the order is required. This objective element requires the party to show that the information has been treated as confidential, and that it is reasonable to believe that its proprietary, commercial and scientific interests could be harmed by the disclosure of the information.

15 Concluding that both the subjective part and both elements of the objective part of the test had been satisfied, he nevertheless stated: "However, I am also of the view that in public law cases, the objective test has, or should have, a third component which is whether the public interest in disclosure exceeds the risk of harm to a party arising from disclosure" (para. 23).

16 A very significant factor, in his view, was the fact that mandatory production of documents was not in issue here. The fact that the application involved a voluntary tendering of documents to advance the

interlocutoires qui ont entraîné les délais, les avantages de soumettre le dossier au complet à la cour compensent l'inconvénient du retard causé par la présentation de ces documents.

Sur la confidentialité, le juge Pelletier conclut qu'il doit être convaincu que la nécessité de protéger la confidentialité l'emporte sur l'intérêt du public à la publicité des débats judiciaires. Il note que les arguments en faveur de la publicité des débats judiciaires en l'espèce sont importants vu l'intérêt du public envers le rôle du Canada comme vendeur de technologie nucléaire. Il fait aussi remarquer que les ordonnances de confidentialité sont une exception au principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires et ne devraient être accordées que dans des cas de nécessité absolue.

Le juge Pelletier applique le même critère que pour une ordonnance conservatoire en matière de brevets, qui est essentiellement une ordonnance de confidentialité. Pour obtenir l'ordonnance, le requérant doit démontrer qu'il croit subjectivement que les renseignements sont confidentiels et que leur divulgation nuirait à ses intérêts. De plus, si l'ordonnance est contestée, le requérant doit démontrer objectivement qu'elle est nécessaire. Cet élément objectif l'oblige à démontrer que les renseignements ont toujours été traités comme étant confidentiels et qu'il est raisonnable de croire que leur divulgation risque de compromettre ses droits exclusifs, commerciaux et scientifiques.

Ayant conclu qu'il est satisfait à l'élément subjectif et aux deux volets de l'élément objectif du critère, il ajoute : « J'estime toutefois aussi que, dans les affaires de droit public, le critère objectif comporte, ou devrait comporter, un troisième volet, en l'occurrence la question de savoir si l'intérêt du public à l'égard de la divulgation l'emporte sur le préjudice que la divulgation risque de causer à une personne » (par. 23).

Il estime très important le fait qu'il ne s'agit pas en l'espèce de production obligatoire de documents. Le fait que la demande vise le dépôt volontaire de documents en vue d'étayer la thèse de l'appelante,

appellant's own cause as opposed to mandatory production weighed against granting the confidentiality order.

In weighing the public interest in disclosure against the risk of harm to AECL arising from disclosure, Pelletier J. noted that the documents the appellant wished to put before the court were prepared by others for other purposes, and recognized that the appellant was bound to protect the confidentiality of the information. At this stage, he again considered the issue of materiality. If the documents were shown to be very material to a critical issue, "the requirements of justice militate in favour of a confidentiality order. If the documents are marginally relevant, then the voluntary nature of the production argues against a confidentiality order" (para. 29). He then decided that the documents were material to a question of the appropriate remedy, a significant issue in the event that the appellant failed on the main issue.

Pelletier J. also considered the context of the case and held that since the issue of Canada's role as a vendor of nuclear technology was one of significant public interest, the burden of justifying a confidentiality order was very onerous. He found that AECL could expunge the sensitive material from the documents, or put the evidence before the court in some other form, and thus maintain its full right of defence while preserving the open access to court proceedings.

Pelletier J. observed that his order was being made without having perused the Confidential Documents because they had not been put before him. Although he noted the line of cases which holds that a judge ought not to deal with the issue of a confidentiality order without reviewing the documents themselves, in his view, given their voluminous nature and technical content as well as his lack of information as to what information was already in the public domain, he found that an examination of these documents would not have been useful.

par opposition à une production obligatoire, joue contre l'ordonnance de confidentialité.

17 En soupesant l'intérêt du public dans la divulgation et le préjudice que la divulgation risque de causer à ÉACL, le juge Pelletier note que les documents que l'appelante veut soumettre à la cour ont été rédigés par d'autres personnes à d'autres fins, et il reconnaît que l'appelante est tenue de protéger la confidentialité des renseignements. À cette étape, il examine de nouveau la question de la pertinence. Si on réussit à démontrer que les documents sont très importants sur une question cruciale, « les exigences de la justice militent en faveur du prononcé d'une ordonnance de confidentialité. Si les documents ne sont pertinents que d'une façon accessoire, le caractère facultatif de la production milite contre le prononcé de l'ordonnance de confidentialité » (par. 29). Il conclut alors que les documents sont importants pour résoudre la question de la réparation à accorder, elle-même un point important si l'appelante échoue sur la question principale.

18 Le juge Pelletier considère aussi le contexte de l'affaire et conclut que, puisque la question du rôle du Canada comme vendeur de technologies nucléaires est une importante question d'intérêt public, la charge de justifier une ordonnance de confidentialité est très onéreuse. Il conclut qu'ÉACL pourrait retrancher les éléments délicats des documents ou soumettre à la cour la même preuve sous une autre forme, et maintenir ainsi son droit à une défense complète tout en préservant la publicité des débats judiciaires.

19 Le juge Pelletier signale qu'il prononce l'ordonnance sans avoir examiné les documents confidentiels puisqu'ils n'ont pas été portés à sa connaissance. Bien qu'il mentionne la jurisprudence indiquant qu'un juge ne devrait pas se prononcer sur une demande d'ordonnance de confidentialité sans avoir examiné les documents eux-mêmes, il estime qu'il n'aurait pas été utile d'examiner les documents, vu leur volume et leur caractère technique, et sans savoir quelle part d'information était déjà dans le domaine public.

20 Pelletier J. ordered that the appellant could file the documents in current form, or in an edited version if it chose to do so. He also granted leave to file material dealing with the Chinese regulatory process in general and as applied to this project, provided it did so within 60 days.

B. *Federal Court of Appeal*, [2000] 4 F.C. 426

(1) Evans J.A. (Sharlow J.A. concurring)

21 At the Federal Court of Appeal, AECL appealed the ruling under Rule 151 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998*, and Sierra Club cross-appealed the ruling under Rule 312.

22 With respect to Rule 312, Evans J.A. held that the documents were clearly relevant to a defence under s. 54(2)(*b*) which the appellant proposed to raise if s. 5(1)(*b*) of the *CEAA* was held to apply, and were also potentially relevant to the exercise of the court's discretion to refuse a remedy even if the Ministers were in breach of the *CEAA*. Evans J.A. agreed with Pelletier J. that the benefit to the appellant and the court of being granted leave to file the documents outweighed any prejudice to the respondent owing to delay and thus concluded that the motions judge was correct in granting leave under Rule 312.

23 On the issue of the confidentiality order, Evans J.A. considered Rule 151, and all the factors that the motions judge had weighed, including the commercial sensitivity of the documents, the fact that the appellant had received them in confidence from the Chinese authorities, and the appellant's argument that without the documents it could not mount a full answer and defence to the application. These factors had to be weighed against the principle of open access to court documents. Evans J.A. agreed with Pelletier J. that the weight to be attached to the public interest in open proceedings varied with context and held that, where a case raises issues of public significance, the principle of openness of judicial process carries greater weight as a factor in

Dans son ordonnance, le juge Pelletier autorise l'appelante à déposer les documents sous leur forme actuelle ou sous une version révisée, à son gré. Il autorise aussi l'appelante à déposer des documents concernant le processus réglementaire chinois en général et son application au projet, à condition qu'elle le fasse sous 60 jours.

B. *Cour d'appel fédérale*, [2000] 4 C.F. 426

(1) Le juge Evans (avec l'appui du juge Sharlow)

ÉACL fait appel en Cour d'appel fédérale, en vertu de la règle 151 des *Règles de la Cour fédérale (1998)*, et Sierra Club forme un appel incident en vertu de la règle 312.

Sur la règle 312, le juge Evans conclut que les documents en cause sont clairement pertinents dans une défense que l'appelante a l'intention d'invoquer en vertu du par. 54(2) si la cour conclut que l'al. 5(1)*b*) de la *LCÉE* doit s'appliquer, et pourraient l'être aussi pour l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire de la cour de refuser d'accorder une réparation dans le cas où les ministres auraient enfreint la *LCÉE*. Comme le juge Pelletier, le juge Evans est d'avis que l'avantage pour l'appelante et pour la cour d'une autorisation de déposer les documents l'emporte sur tout préjudice que le retard pourrait causer à l'intimé, et conclut par conséquent que le juge des requêtes a eu raison d'accorder l'autorisation en vertu de la règle 312.

Sur l'ordonnance de confidentialité, le juge Evans examine la règle 151 et tous les facteurs que le juge des requêtes a appréciés, y compris le secret commercial attaché aux documents, le fait que l'appelante les a reçus à titre confidentiel des autorités chinoises, et l'argument de l'appelante selon lequel, sans les documents, elle ne pourrait assurer effectivement sa défense. Ces facteurs doivent être pondérés avec le principe de la publicité des documents soumis aux tribunaux. Le juge Evans convient avec le juge Pelletier que le poids à accorder à l'intérêt du public à la publicité des débats varie selon le contexte, et il conclut que lorsqu'une affaire soulève des questions de grande importance pour le public, le principe de la publicité des débats a plus de poids

the balancing process. Evans J.A. noted the public interest in the subject matter of the litigation, as well as the considerable media attention it had attracted.

In support of his conclusion that the weight assigned to the principle of openness may vary with context, Evans J.A. relied upon the decisions in *AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare)*, [2000] 3 F.C. 360 (C.A.), where the court took into consideration the relatively small public interest at stake, and *Ethyl Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)* (1998), 17 C.P.C. (4th) 278 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)), at p. 283, where the court ordered disclosure after determining that the case was a significant constitutional case where it was important for the public to understand the issues at stake. Evans J.A. observed that openness and public participation in the assessment process are fundamental to the *CEAA*, and concluded that the motions judge could not be said to have given the principle of openness undue weight even though confidentiality was claimed for a relatively small number of highly technical documents.

Evans J.A. held that the motions judge had placed undue emphasis on the fact that the introduction of the documents was voluntary; however, it did not follow that his decision on the confidentiality order must therefore be set aside. Evans J.A. was of the view that this error did not affect the ultimate conclusion for three reasons. First, like the motions judge, he attached great weight to the principle of openness. Secondly, he held that the inclusion in the affidavits of a summary of the reports could go a long way to compensate for the absence of the originals, should the appellant choose not to put them in without a confidentiality order. Finally, if AECL submitted the documents in an expunged fashion, the claim for confidentiality would rest upon a relatively unimportant factor, i.e., the appellant's claim that it would suffer a loss of business if it breached its undertaking with the Chinese authorities.

Evans J.A. rejected the argument that the motions judge had erred in deciding the motion without

comme facteur à prendre en compte dans le processus de pondération. Le juge Evans note l'intérêt du public à l'égard de la question en litige ainsi que la couverture médiatique considérable qu'elle a suscitée.

24 À l'appui de sa conclusion que le poids accordé au principe de la publicité des débats peut varier selon le contexte, le juge Evans invoque les décisions *AB Hassle c. Canada (Ministre de la Santé nationale et du Bien-être social)*, [2000] 3 C.F. 360 (C.A.), où la cour a tenu compte du peu d'intérêt du public, et *Ethyl Canada Inc. c. Canada (Attorney General)* (1998), 17 C.P.C. (4th) 278 (C. Ont. (Div. gén.)), p. 283, où la cour a ordonné la divulgation après avoir déterminé qu'il s'agissait d'une affaire constitutionnelle importante et qu'il importait que le public comprenne ce qui était en cause. Le juge Evans fait remarquer que la transparence du processus d'évaluation et la participation du public ont une importance fondamentale pour la *LCÉE*, et il conclut qu'on ne peut prétendre que le juge des requêtes a accordé trop de poids au principe de la publicité des débats, même si la confidentialité n'est demandée que pour un nombre relativement restreint de documents hautement techniques.

25 Le juge Evans conclut que le juge des requêtes a donné trop de poids au fait que la production des documents était volontaire mais qu'il ne s'ensuit pas que sa décision au sujet de la confidentialité doive être écartée. Le juge Evans est d'avis que l'erreur n'entâche pas sa conclusion finale, pour trois motifs. Premièrement, comme le juge des requêtes, il attache une grande importance à la publicité du débat judiciaire. Deuxièmement, il conclut que l'inclusion dans les affidavits d'un résumé des rapports peut, dans une large mesure, compenser l'absence des rapports, si l'appelante décide de ne pas les déposer sans ordonnance de confidentialité. Enfin, si ÉACL déposait une version modifiée des documents, la demande de confidentialité reposerait sur un facteur relativement peu important, savoir l'argument que l'appelante perdrait des occasions d'affaires si elle violait son engagement envers les autorités chinoises.

26 Le juge Evans rejette l'argument selon lequel le juge des requêtes a commis une erreur en statuant

reference to the actual documents, stating that it was not necessary for him to inspect them, given that summaries were available and that the documents were highly technical and incompletely translated. Thus the appeal and cross-appeal were both dismissed.

(2) Robertson J.A. (dissenting)

27 Robertson J.A. disagreed with the majority for three reasons. First, in his view, the level of public interest in the case, the degree of media coverage, and the identities of the parties should not be taken into consideration in assessing an application for a confidentiality order. Instead, he held that it was the nature of the evidence for which the order is sought that must be examined.

28 In addition, he found that without a confidentiality order, the appellant had to choose between two unacceptable options: either suffering irreparable financial harm if the confidential information was introduced into evidence, or being denied the right to a fair trial because it could not mount a full defence if the evidence was not introduced.

29 Finally, he stated that the analytical framework employed by the majority in reaching its decision was fundamentally flawed as it was based largely on the subjective views of the motions judge. He rejected the contextual approach to the question of whether a confidentiality order should issue, emphasizing the need for an objective framework to combat the perception that justice is a relative concept, and to promote consistency and certainty in the law.

30 To establish this more objective framework for regulating the issuance of confidentiality orders pertaining to commercial and scientific information, he turned to the legal rationale underlying the commitment to the principle of open justice, referring to *Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General)*, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326. There, the Supreme Court of Canada held that open proceedings foster the search for the truth, and reflect the importance of public scrutiny of the courts.

sans avoir examiné les documents réels, affirmant que cela n'était pas nécessaire puisqu'il y avait des précis et que la documentation était hautement technique et partiellement traduite. L'appel et l'appel incident sont donc rejetés.

(2) Le juge Robertson (dissident)

Le juge Robertson se dissocie de la majorité pour trois raisons. En premier lieu, il estime que le degré d'intérêt du public dans une affaire, l'importance de la couverture médiatique et l'identité des parties ne devraient pas être pris en considération pour statuer sur une demande d'ordonnance de confidentialité. Selon lui, il faut plutôt examiner la nature de la preuve que protégerait l'ordonnance de confidentialité.

Il estime aussi qu'à défaut d'ordonnance de confidentialité, l'appelante doit choisir entre deux options inacceptables : subir un préjudice financier irréparable si les renseignements confidentiels sont produits en preuve, ou être privée de son droit à un procès équitable parce qu'elle ne peut se défendre pleinement si la preuve n'est pas produite.

Finalement, il dit que le cadre analytique utilisé par les juges majoritaires pour arriver à leur décision est fondamentalement défectueux en ce qu'il est fondé en grande partie sur le point de vue subjectif du juge des requêtes. Il rejette l'approche contextuelle sur la question de l'ordonnance de confidentialité, soulignant la nécessité d'un cadre d'analyse objectif pour combattre la perception que la justice est un concept relatif et pour promouvoir la cohérence et la certitude en droit.

Pour établir ce cadre plus objectif appelé à régir la délivrance d'ordonnances de confidentialité en matière de renseignements commerciaux et scientifiques, il examine le fondement juridique du principe de la publicité du processus judiciaire, en citant l'arrêt de notre Cour, *Edmonton Journal c. Alberta (Procureur général)*, [1989] 2 R.C.S. 1326, qui conclut que la publicité des débats favorise la recherche de la vérité et témoigne de l'importance de soumettre le travail des tribunaux à l'examen public.

Robertson J.A. stated that although the principle of open justice is a reflection of the basic democratic value of accountability in the exercise of judicial power, in his view, the principle that justice itself must be secured is paramount. He concluded that justice as an overarching principle means that exceptions occasionally must be made to rules or principles.

He observed that, in the area of commercial law, when the information sought to be protected concerns "trade secrets", this information will not be disclosed during a trial if to do so would destroy the owner's proprietary rights and expose him or her to irreparable harm in the form of financial loss. Although the case before him did not involve a trade secret, he nevertheless held that the same treatment could be extended to commercial or scientific information which was acquired on a confidential basis and attached the following criteria as conditions precedent to the issuance of a confidentiality order (at para. 13):

> (1) the information is of a confidential nature as opposed to facts which one would like to keep confidential; (2) the information for which confidentiality is sought is not already in the public domain; (3) on a balance of probabilities the party seeking the confidentiality order would suffer irreparable harm if the information were made public; (4) the information is relevant to the legal issues raised in the case; (5) correlatively, the information is "necessary" to the resolution of those issues; (6) the granting of a confidentiality order does not unduly prejudice the opposing party; and (7) the public interest in open court proceedings does not override the private interests of the party seeking the confidentiality order. The onus in establishing that criteria one to six are met is on the party seeking the confidentiality order. Under the seventh criterion, it is for the opposing party to show that a *prima facie* right to a protective order has been overtaken by the need to preserve the openness of the court proceedings. In addressing these criteria one must bear in mind two of the threads woven into the fabric of the principle of open justice: the search for truth and the preservation of the rule of law. As stated at the outset, I do not believe that the perceived degree of public importance of a case is a relevant consideration.

31 Selon le juge Robertson, même si le principe de la publicité du processus judiciaire reflète la valeur fondamentale que constitue dans une démocratie l'imputabilité dans l'exercice du pouvoir judiciaire, le principe selon lequel il faut que justice soit faite doit, à son avis, l'emporter. Il conclut que la justice vue comme principe universel signifie que les règles ou les principes doivent parfois souffrir des exceptions.

32 Il fait observer qu'en droit commercial, lorsque les renseignements qu'on cherche à protéger ont trait à des « secrets industriels », ils ne sont pas divulgués au procès lorsque cela aurait pour effet d'annihiler les droits du propriétaire et l'exposerait à un préjudice financier irréparable. Il conclut que, même si l'espèce ne porte pas sur des secrets industriels, on peut traiter de la même façon des renseignements commerciaux et scientifiques acquis sur une base confidentielle, et il établit les critères suivants comme conditions à la délivrance d'une ordonnance de confidentialité (au par. 13) :

> 1) les renseignements sont de nature confidentielle et non seulement des faits qu'une personne désire ne pas divulguer; 2) les renseignements qu'on veut protéger ne sont pas du domaine public; 3) selon la prépondérance des probabilités, la partie qui veut obtenir une ordonnance de confidentialité subirait un préjudice irréparable si les renseignements étaient rendus publics; 4) les renseignements sont pertinents dans le cadre de la résolution des questions juridiques soulevées dans le litige; 5) en même temps, les renseignements sont « nécessaires » à la résolution de ces questions; 6) l'octroi d'une ordonnance de confidentialité ne cause pas un préjudice grave à la partie adverse; 7) l'intérêt du public à la publicité des débats judiciaires ne prime pas les intérêts privés de la partie qui sollicite l'ordonnance de confidentialité. Le fardeau de démontrer que les critères un à six sont respectés incombe à la partie qui cherche à obtenir l'ordonnance de confidentialité. Pour le septième critère, c'est la partie adverse qui doit démontrer que le droit *prima facie* à une ordonnance de non-divulgation doit céder le pas au besoin de maintenir la publicité des débats judiciaires. En utilisant ces critères, il y a lieu de tenir compte de deux des fils conducteurs qui sous-tendent le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires : la recherche de la vérité et la sauvegarde de la primauté du droit. Comme je l'ai dit au tout début, je ne crois pas que le degré d'importance qu'on croit que le public accorde à une affaire soit une considération pertinente.

33 In applying these criteria to the circumstances of the case, Robertson J.A. concluded that the confidentiality order should be granted. In his view, the public interest in open court proceedings did not override the interests of AECL in maintaining the confidentiality of these highly technical documents.

34 Robertson J.A. also considered the public interest in the need to ensure that site plans for nuclear installations were not, for example, posted on a Web site. He concluded that a confidentiality order would not undermine the two primary objectives underlying the principle of open justice: truth and the rule of law. As such, he would have allowed the appeal and dismissed the cross-appeal.

V. Issues

35 A. What is the proper analytical approach to be applied to the exercise of judicial discretion where a litigant seeks a confidentiality order under Rule 151 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998*?

B. Should the confidentiality order be granted in this case?

VI. Analysis

A. *The Analytical Approach to the Granting of a Confidentiality Order*

(1) The General Framework: Herein the *Dagenais* Principles

36 The link between openness in judicial proceedings and freedom of expression has been firmly established by this Court. In *Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General)*, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480, at para. 23, La Forest J. expressed the relationship as follows:

> The principle of open courts is inextricably tied to the rights guaranteed by s. 2(*b*). Openness permits public access to information about the courts, which in turn permits the public to discuss and put forward opinions and criticisms of court practices and proceedings. While the freedom to express ideas and opinions about the operation of the courts is clearly within the ambit of the

Appliquant ces critères aux circonstances de l'espèce, le juge Robertson conclut qu'il y a lieu de rendre l'ordonnance de confidentialité. Selon lui, l'intérêt du public dans la publicité des débats judiciaires ne prime pas l'intérêt de ÉACL à préserver le caractère confidentiel de ces documents hautement techniques.

Le juge Robertson traite aussi de l'intérêt du public à ce qu'il soit garanti que les plans de site d'installations nucléaires ne seront pas, par exemple, affichés sur un site Web. Il conclut qu'une ordonnance de confidentialité n'aurait aucun impact négatif sur les deux objectifs primordiaux du principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires, savoir la vérité et la primauté du droit. Il aurait par conséquent accueilli l'appel et rejeté l'appel incident.

V. Questions en litige

A. Quelle méthode d'analyse faut-il appliquer à l'exercice du pouvoir judiciaire discrétionnaire lorsqu'une partie demande une ordonnance de confidentialité en vertu de la règle 151 des *Règles de la Cour fédérale (1998)*?

B. Y a-t-il lieu d'accorder l'ordonnance de confidentialité en l'espèce?

VI. Analyse

A. *Méthode d'analyse applicable aux ordonnances de confidentialité*

(1) Le cadre général : les principes de l'arrêt *Dagenais*

Le lien entre la publicité des procédures judiciaires et la liberté d'expression est solidement établi dans *Société Radio-Canada c. Nouveau-Brunswick (Procureur général)*, [1996] 3 R.C.S. 480. Le juge La Forest l'exprime en ces termes au par. 23 :

> Le principe de la publicité des débats en justice est inextricablement lié aux droits garantis à l'al. 2*b*). Grâce à ce principe, le public a accès à l'information concernant les tribunaux, ce qui lui permet ensuite de discuter des pratiques des tribunaux et des procédures qui s'y déroulent, et d'émettre des opinions et des critiques à cet égard. La liberté d'exprimer des idées et des opinions sur

freedom guaranteed by s. 2(*b*), so too is the right of members of the public to obtain information about the courts in the first place.

Under the order sought, public access and public scrutiny of the Confidential Documents would be restricted; this would clearly infringe the public's freedom of expression guarantee.

A discussion of the general approach to be taken in the exercise of judicial discretion to grant a confidentiality order should begin with the principles set out by this Court in *Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.*, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835. Although that case dealt with the common law jurisdiction of the court to order a publication ban in the criminal law context, there are strong similarities between publication bans and confidentiality orders in the context of judicial proceedings. In both cases a restriction on freedom of expression is sought in order to preserve or promote an interest engaged by those proceedings. As such, the fundamental question for a court to consider in an application for a publication ban or a confidentiality order is whether, in the circumstances, the right to freedom of expression should be compromised.

Although in each case freedom of expression will be engaged in a different context, the *Dagenais* framework utilizes overarching *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* principles in order to balance freedom of expression with other rights and interests, and thus can be adapted and applied to various circumstances. As a result, the analytical approach to the exercise of discretion under Rule 151 should echo the underlying principles laid out in *Dagenais*, although it must be tailored to the specific rights and interests engaged in this case.

Dagenais dealt with an application by four accused persons under the court's common law jurisdiction requesting an order prohibiting the broadcast of a television programme dealing with the physical and sexual abuse of young boys at

le fonctionnement des tribunaux relève clairement de la liberté garantie à l'al. 2*b*), mais en relève également le droit du public d'obtenir au préalable de l'information sur les tribunaux.

L'ordonnance sollicitée aurait pour effet de limiter l'accès du public aux documents confidentiels et leur examen public; cela porterait clairement atteinte à la garantie de la liberté d'expression du public.

37 L'examen de la méthode générale à suivre dans l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire d'accorder une ordonnance de confidentialité devrait commencer par les principes établis par la Cour dans *Dagenais c. Société Radio-Canada*, [1994] 3 R.C.S. 835. Cette affaire portait sur le pouvoir discrétionnaire judiciaire, issu de la common law, de rendre des ordonnances de non-publication dans le cadre de procédures criminelles, mais il y a de fortes ressemblances entre les interdictions de publication et les ordonnances de confidentialité dans le contexte des procédures judiciaires. Dans les deux cas, on cherche à restreindre la liberté d'expression afin de préserver ou de promouvoir un intérêt en jeu dans les procédures. En ce sens, la question fondamentale que doit résoudre le tribunal auquel on demande une interdiction de publication ou une ordonnance de confidentialité est de savoir si, dans les circonstances, il y a lieu de restreindre le droit à la liberté d'expression.

38 Même si, dans chaque cas, la liberté d'expression entre en jeu dans un contexte différent, le cadre établi dans *Dagenais* fait appel aux principes déterminants de la *Charte canadienne des droits et libertés* afin de pondérer la liberté d'expression avec d'autres droits et intérêts, et peut donc être adapté et appliqué à diverses circonstances. L'analyse de l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire sous le régime de la règle 151 devrait par conséquent refléter les principes sous-jacents établis par *Dagenais*, même s'il faut pour cela l'ajuster aux droits et intérêts précis qui sont en jeu en l'espèce.

39 L'affaire *Dagenais* porte sur une requête par laquelle quatre accusés demandaient à la cour de rendre, en vertu de sa compétence de common law, une ordonnance interdisant la diffusion d'une émission de télévision décrivant des abus physiques et

religious institutions. The applicants argued that because the factual circumstances of the programme were very similar to the facts at issue in their trials, the ban was necessary to preserve the accuseds' right to a fair trial.

40 Lamer C.J. found that the common law discretion to order a publication ban must be exercised within the boundaries set by the principles of the *Charter*. Since publication bans necessarily curtail the freedom of expression of third parties, he adapted the pre-*Charter* common law rule such that it balanced the right to freedom of expression with the right to a fair trial of the accused in a way which reflected the substance of the test from *R. v. Oakes*, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. At p. 878 of *Dagenais*, Lamer C.J. set out his reformulated test:

> A publication ban should only be ordered when:
>
> (a) Such a ban is necessary in order to prevent a real and substantial risk to the fairness of the trial, because reasonably available alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and
>
> (b) The salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects to the free expression of those affected by the ban. [Emphasis in original.]

41 In *New Brunswick*, *supra*, this Court modified the *Dagenais* test in the context of the related issue of how the discretionary power under s. 486(1) of the *Criminal Code*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, to exclude the public from a trial should be exercised. That case dealt with an appeal from the trial judge's order excluding the public from the portion of a sentencing proceeding for sexual assault and sexual interference dealing with the specific acts committed by the accused on the basis that it would avoid "undue hardship" to both the victims and the accused.

42 La Forest J. found that s. 486(1) was a restriction on the s. 2(*b*) right to freedom of expression in that it provided a "discretionary bar on public and media access to the courts": *New Brunswick*, at para. 33;

sexuels infligés à de jeunes garçons dans des établissements religieux. Les requérants soutenaient que l'interdiction était nécessaire pour préserver leur droit à un procès équitable, parce que les faits racontés dans l'émission ressemblaient beaucoup aux faits en cause dans leurs procès.

Le juge en chef Lamer conclut que le pouvoir discrétionnaire de common law d'ordonner l'interdiction de publication doit être exercé dans les limites prescrites par les principes de la *Charte*. Puisque les ordonnances de non-publication restreignent nécessairement la liberté d'expression de tiers, il adapte la règle de common law qui s'appliquait avant l'entrée en vigueur de la *Charte* de façon à établir un juste équilibre entre le droit à la liberté d'expression et le droit de l'accusé à un procès équitable, d'une façon qui reflète l'essence du critère énoncé dans *R. c. Oakes*, [1986] 1 R.C.S. 103. À la page 878 de *Dagenais*, le juge en chef Lamer énonce le critère reformulé :

> Une ordonnance de non-publication ne doit être rendue que si :
>
> a) elle est nécessaire pour écarter le risque réel et important que le procès soit inéquitable, vu l'absence d'autres mesures raisonnables pouvant écarter ce risque;
>
> b) ses effets bénéfiques sont plus importants que ses effets préjudiciables sur la libre expression de ceux qui sont touchés par l'ordonnance. [Souligné dans l'original.]

Dans *Nouveau-Brunswick*, précité, la Cour modifie le critère de l'arrêt *Dagenais* dans le contexte de la question voisine de l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire d'ordonner l'exclusion du public d'un procès en vertu du par. 486(1) du *Code criminel*, L.R.C. 1985, ch. C-46. Il s'agissait d'un appel d'une décision du juge du procès d'ordonner l'exclusion du public de la partie des procédures de détermination de la peine pour agression sexuelle et contacts sexuels portant sur les actes précis commis par l'accusé, au motif que cela éviterait un « préjudice indu » aux victimes et à l'accusé.

Le juge La Forest conclut que le par. 486(1) limite la liberté d'expression garantie à l'al. 2*b*) en créant un « pouvoir discrétionnaire permettant d'interdire au public et aux médias l'accès aux

however he found this infringement to be justified under s. 1 provided that the discretion was exercised in accordance with the *Charter*. Thus, the approach taken by La Forest J. at para. 69 to the exercise of discretion under s. 486(1) of the *Criminal Code*, closely mirrors the *Dagenais* common law test:

> (a) the judge must consider the available options and consider whether there are any other reasonable and effective alternatives available;
>
> (b) the judge must consider whether the order is limited as much as possible; and
>
> (c) the judge must weigh the importance of the objectives of the particular order and its probable effects against the importance of openness and the particular expression that will be limited in order to ensure that the positive and negative effects of the order are proportionate.

In applying this test to the facts of the case, La Forest J. found that the evidence of the potential undue hardship consisted mainly in the Crown's submission that the evidence was of a "delicate nature" and that this was insufficient to override the infringement on freedom of expression.

This Court has recently revisited the granting of a publication ban under the court's common law jurisdiction in *R. v. Mentuck*, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442, 2001 SCC 76, and its companion case *R. v. O.N.E.*, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 478, 2001 SCC 77. In *Mentuck*, the Crown moved for a publication ban to protect the identity of undercover police officers and operational methods employed by the officers in their investigation of the accused. The accused opposed the motion as an infringement of his right to a fair and public hearing under s. 11(*d*) of the *Charter*. The order was also opposed by two intervening newspapers as an infringement of their right to freedom of expression.

The Court noted that, while *Dagenais* dealt with the balancing of freedom of expression on the one hand, and the right to a fair trial of the accused on the other, in the case before it, both the right of the

tribunaux » (*Nouveau-Brunswick*, par. 33). Il considère toutefois que l'atteinte peut être justifiée en vertu de l'article premier pourvu que le pouvoir discrétionnaire soit exercé conformément à la *Charte*. Donc l'analyse de l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire en vertu du par. 486(1) du *Code criminel*, décrite par le juge La Forest au par. 69, concorde étroitement avec le critère de common law établi par *Dagenais* :

> a) le juge doit envisager les solutions disponibles et se demander s'il existe d'autres mesures de rechange raisonnables et efficaces;
>
> b) il doit se demander si l'ordonnance a une portée aussi limitée que possible; et
>
> c) il doit comparer l'importance des objectifs de l'ordonnance et de ses effets probables avec l'importance de la publicité des procédures et l'activité d'expression qui sera restreinte, afin de veiller à ce que les effets positifs et négatifs de l'ordonnance soient proportionnels.

Appliquant cette analyse aux faits de l'espèce, le juge La Forest conclut que la preuve du risque de préjudice indu consiste principalement en la prétention de l'avocat du ministère public quant à la « nature délicate » des faits relatifs aux infractions et que cela ne suffit pas pour justifier l'atteinte à la liberté d'expression.

43 La Cour a récemment réexaminé la question des interdictions de publication prononcées par un tribunal en vertu de sa compétence de common law dans *R. c. Mentuck*, [2001] 3 R.C.S. 442, 2001 CSC 76, et l'arrêt connexe *R. c. O.N.E.*, [2001] 3 R.C.S. 478, 2001 CSC 77. Dans *Mentuck*, le ministère public demandait l'interdiction de publication en vue de protéger l'identité de policiers banalisés et leurs méthodes d'enquête. L'accusé s'opposait à la demande en soutenant que l'interdiction porterait atteinte à son droit à un procès public et équitable protégé par l'al. 11*d*) de la *Charte*. Deux journaux intervenants s'opposaient aussi à la requête, en faisant valoir qu'elle porterait atteinte à leur droit à la liberté d'expression.

44 La Cour fait remarquer que *Dagenais* traite de la pondération de la liberté d'expression, d'une part, et du droit de l'accusé à un procès équitable, d'autre part, tandis que dans l'affaire dont elle est saisie, le

accused to a fair and public hearing, and freedom of expression weighed in favour of denying the publication ban. These rights were balanced against interests relating to the proper administration of justice, in particular, protecting the safety of police officers and preserving the efficacy of undercover police operations.

45 In spite of this distinction, the Court noted that underlying the approach taken in both *Dagenais* and *New Brunswick* was the goal of ensuring that the judicial discretion to order publication bans is subject to no lower a standard of compliance with the *Charter* than legislative enactment. This goal is furthered by incorporating the essence of s. 1 of the *Charter* and the *Oakes* test into the publication ban test. Since this same goal applied in the case before it, the Court adopted a similar approach to that taken in *Dagenais*, but broadened the *Dagenais* test (which dealt specifically with the right of an accused to a fair trial) such that it could guide the exercise of judicial discretion where a publication ban is requested in order to preserve any important aspect of the proper administration of justice. At para. 32, the Court reformulated the test as follows:

A publication ban should only be ordered when:

(a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and

(b) the salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects on the rights and interests of the parties and the public, including the effects on the right to free expression, the right of the accused to a fair and public trial, and the efficacy of the administration of justice.

46 The Court emphasized that under the first branch of the test, three important elements were subsumed under the "necessity" branch. First, the risk in question must be a serious risk well grounded in the evidence. Second, the phrase "proper administration of justice" must be carefully interpreted so as not to

droit de l'accusé à un procès public et équitable tout autant que la liberté d'expression militent en faveur du rejet de la requête en interdiction de publication. Ces droits ont été soupesés avec l'intérêt de la bonne administration de la justice, en particulier la protection de la sécurité des policiers et le maintien de l'efficacité des opérations policières secrètes.

Malgré cette distinction, la Cour note que la méthode retenue dans *Dagenais* et *Nouveau-Brunswick* a pour objectif de garantir que le pouvoir discrétionnaire des tribunaux d'ordonner des interdictions de publication n'est pas assujetti à une norme de conformité à la *Charte* moins exigeante que la norme applicable aux dispositions législatives. Elle vise cet objectif en incorporant l'essence de l'article premier de la *Charte* et le critère *Oakes* dans l'analyse applicable aux interdictions de publication. Comme le même objectif s'applique à l'affaire dont elle est saisie, la Cour adopte une méthode semblable à celle de *Dagenais*, mais en élargissant le critère énoncé dans cet arrêt (qui portait spécifiquement sur le droit de l'accusé à un procès équitable) de manière à fournir un guide à l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire des tribunaux dans les requêtes en interdiction de publication, afin de protéger tout aspect important de la bonne administration de la justice. La Cour reformule le critère en ces termes (au par. 32) :

Une ordonnance de non-publication ne doit être rendue que si :

a) elle est nécessaire pour écarter le risque sérieux pour la bonne administration de la justice, vu l'absence d'autres mesures raisonnables pouvant écarter ce risque;

b) ses effets bénéfiques sont plus importants que ses effets préjudiciables sur les droits et les intérêts des parties et du public, notamment ses effets sur le droit à la libre expression, sur le droit de l'accusé à un procès public et équitable, et sur l'efficacité de l'administration de la justice.

La Cour souligne que dans le premier volet de l'analyse, trois éléments importants sont subsumés sous la notion de « nécessité ». En premier lieu, le risque en question doit être sérieux et bien étayé par la preuve. En deuxième lieu, l'expression « bonne administration de la justice » doit être interprétée

allow the concealment of an excessive amount of information. Third, the test requires the judge ordering the ban to consider not only whether reasonable alternatives are available, but also to restrict the ban as far as possible without sacrificing the prevention of the risk.

At para. 31, the Court also made the important observation that the proper administration of justice will not necessarily involve *Charter* rights, and that the ability to invoke the *Charter* is not a necessary condition for a publication ban to be granted:

> The [common law publication ban] rule can accommodate orders that must occasionally be made in the interests of the administration of justice, which encompass more than fair trial rights. As the test is intended to "reflec[t] the substance of the *Oakes* test", we cannot require that *Charter* rights be the only legitimate objective of such orders any more than we require that government action or legislation in violation of the *Charter* be justified exclusively by the pursuit of another *Charter* right. [Emphasis added.]

The Court also anticipated that, in appropriate circumstances, the *Dagenais* framework could be expanded even further in order to address requests for publication bans where interests other than the administration of justice were involved.

Mentuck is illustrative of the flexibility of the *Dagenais* approach. Since its basic purpose is to ensure that the judicial discretion to deny public access to the courts is exercised in accordance with *Charter* principles, in my view, the *Dagenais* model can and should be adapted to the situation in the case at bar where the central issue is whether judicial discretion should be exercised so as to exclude confidential information from a public proceeding. As in *Dagenais*, *New Brunswick* and *Mentuck*, granting the confidentiality order will have a negative effect on the *Charter* right to freedom of expression, as well as the principle of open and accessible court proceedings, and, as in those cases, courts must ensure that the discretion to grant the order is exercised in accordance with *Charter* principles.

judicieusement de façon à ne pas empêcher la divulgation d'un nombre excessif de renseignements. En troisième lieu, le critère exige non seulement que le juge qui prononce l'ordonnance détermine s'il existe des mesures de rechange raisonnables, mais aussi qu'il limite l'ordonnance autant que possible sans pour autant sacrifier la prévention du risque.

47 Au paragraphe 31, la Cour fait aussi l'importante observation que la bonne administration de la justice n'implique pas nécessairement des droits protégés par la *Charte*, et que la possibilité d'invoquer la *Charte* n'est pas une condition nécessaire à l'obtention d'une interdiction de publication :

> Elle [la règle de common law] peut s'appliquer aux ordonnances qui doivent parfois être rendues dans l'intérêt de l'administration de la justice, qui englobe davantage que le droit à un procès équitable. Comme on veut que le critère « reflète [. . .] l'essence du critère énoncé dans l'arrêt *Oakes* », nous ne pouvons pas exiger que ces ordonnances aient pour seul objectif légitime les droits garantis par la *Charte*, pas plus que nous exigeons que les actes gouvernementaux et les dispositions législatives contrevenant à la *Charte* soient justifiés exclusivement par la recherche d'un autre droit garanti par la *Charte*. [Je souligne.]

La Cour prévoit aussi que, dans les cas voulus, le critère de *Dagenais* pourrait être élargi encore davantage pour régir des requêtes en interdiction de publication mettant en jeu des questions autres que l'administration de la justice.

48 *Mentuck* illustre bien la souplesse de la méthode *Dagenais*. Comme elle a pour objet fondamental de garantir que le pouvoir discrétionnaire d'interdire l'accès du public aux tribunaux est exercé conformément aux principes de la *Charte*, à mon avis, le modèle *Dagenais* peut et devrait être adapté à la situation de la présente espèce, où la question centrale est l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire du tribunal d'exclure des renseignements confidentiels au cours d'une procédure publique. Comme dans *Dagenais*, *Nouveau-Brunswick* et *Mentuck*, une ordonnance de confidentialité aura un effet négatif sur le droit à la liberté d'expression garanti par la *Charte*, de même que sur le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires et, comme dans ces affaires, les tribunaux doivent veiller à ce que le

However, in order to adapt the test to the context of this case, it is first necessary to determine the particular rights and interests engaged by this application.

(2) The Rights and Interests of the Parties

49 The immediate purpose for AECL's confidentiality request relates to its commercial interests. The information in question is the property of the Chinese authorities. If the appellant were to disclose the Confidential Documents, it would be in breach of its contractual obligations and suffer a risk of harm to its competitive position. This is clear from the findings of fact of the motions judge that AECL was bound by its commercial interests and its customer's property rights not to disclose the information (para. 27), and that such disclosure could harm the appellant's commercial interests (para. 23).

50 Aside from this direct commercial interest, if the confidentiality order is denied, then in order to protect its commercial interests, the appellant will have to withhold the documents. This raises the important matter of the litigation context in which the order is sought. As both the motions judge and the Federal Court of Appeal found that the information contained in the Confidential Documents was relevant to defences available under the *CEAA*, the inability to present this information hinders the appellant's capacity to make full answer and defence, or, expressed more generally, the appellant's right, as a civil litigant, to present its case. In that sense, preventing the appellant from disclosing these documents on a confidential basis infringes its right to a fair trial. Although in the context of a civil proceeding this does not engage a *Charter* right, the right to a fair trial generally can be viewed as a fundamental principle of justice: *M. (A.) v. Ryan*, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157, at para. 84, *per* L'Heureux-Dubé J. (dissenting, but not on that point). Although this fair trial right is directly relevant to the appellant, there is also a general public interest in protecting the right to a fair trial. Indeed, as a general proposition, all disputes in the courts should be decided under a fair trial standard. The legitimacy of the judicial process alone

pouvoir discrétionnaire d'accorder l'ordonnance soit exercé conformément aux principes de la *Charte*. Toutefois, pour adapter le critère au contexte de la présente espèce, il faut d'abord définir les droits et intérêts particuliers qui entrent en jeu.

(2) Les droits et les intérêts des parties

L'objet immédiat de la demande d'ordonnance de confidentialité d'ÉACL a trait à ses intérêts commerciaux. Les renseignements en question appartiennent aux autorités chinoises. Si l'appelante divulguait les documents confidentiels, elle manquerait à ses obligations contractuelles et s'exposerait à une détérioration de sa position concurrentielle. Il ressort clairement des conclusions de fait du juge des requêtes qu'ÉACL est tenue, par ses intérêts commerciaux et par les droits de propriété de son client, de ne pas divulguer ces renseignements (par. 27), et que leur divulgation risque de nuire aux intérêts commerciaux de l'appelante (par. 23).

Indépendamment de cet intérêt commercial direct, en cas de refus de l'ordonnance de confidentialité, l'appelante devra, pour protéger ses intérêts commerciaux, s'abstenir de produire les documents. Cela soulève l'importante question du contexte de la présentation de la demande. Comme le juge des requêtes et la Cour d'appel fédérale concluent tous deux que l'information contenue dans les documents confidentiels est pertinente pour les moyens de défense prévus par la *LCÉE*, le fait de ne pouvoir la produire nuit à la capacité de l'appelante de présenter une défense pleine et entière ou, plus généralement, au droit de l'appelante, en sa qualité de justiciable civile, de défendre sa cause. En ce sens, empêcher l'appelante de divulguer ces documents pour des raisons de confidentialité porte atteinte à son droit à un procès équitable. Même si en matière civile cela n'engage pas de droit protégé par la *Charte*, le droit à un procès équitable peut généralement être considéré comme un principe de justice fondamentale : *M. (A.) c. Ryan*, [1997] 1 R.C.S. 157, par. 84, le juge L'Heureux-Dubé (dissidente, mais non sur ce point). Le droit à un procès équitable intéresse directement l'appelante, mais le public a aussi un intérêt général à la protection du droit à un procès équitable. À vrai dire, le principe

demands as much. Similarly, courts have an interest in having all relevant evidence before them in order to ensure that justice is done.

Thus, the interests which would be promoted by a confidentiality order are the preservation of commercial and contractual relations, as well as the right of civil litigants to a fair trial. Related to the latter are the public and judicial interests in seeking the truth and achieving a just result in civil proceedings.

In opposition to the confidentiality order lies the fundamental principle of open and accessible court proceedings. This principle is inextricably tied to freedom of expression enshrined in s. 2(*b*) of the *Charter*: *New Brunswick*, *supra*, at para. 23. The importance of public and media access to the courts cannot be understated, as this access is the method by which the judicial process is scrutinized and criticized. Because it is essential to the administration of justice that justice is done and is seen to be done, such public scrutiny is fundamental. The open court principle has been described as "the very soul of justice", guaranteeing that justice is administered in a non-arbitrary manner: *New Brunswick*, at para. 22.

(3) Adapting the *Dagenais* Test to the Rights and Interests of the Parties

Applying the rights and interests engaged in this case to the analytical framework of *Dagenais* and subsequent cases discussed above, the test for whether a confidentiality order ought to be granted in a case such as this one should be framed as follows:

A confidentiality order under Rule 151 should only be granted when:

(a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and

général est que tout litige porté devant les tribunaux doit être tranché selon la norme du procès équitable. La légitimité du processus judiciaire n'exige pas moins. De même, les tribunaux ont intérêt à ce que toutes les preuves pertinentes leur soient présentées pour veiller à ce que justice soit faite.

51 Ainsi, les intérêts que favoriserait l'ordonnance de confidentialité seraient le maintien de relations commerciales et contractuelles, de même que le droit des justiciables civils à un procès équitable. Est lié à ce dernier droit l'intérêt du public et du judiciaire dans la recherche de la vérité et la solution juste des litiges civils.

52 Milite contre l'ordonnance de confidentialité le principe fondamental de la publicité des débats judiciaires. Ce principe est inextricablement lié à la liberté d'expression constitutionnalisée à l'al. 2*b*) de la *Charte* : *Nouveau-Brunswick*, précité, par. 23. L'importance de l'accès du public et des médias aux tribunaux ne peut être sous-estimée puisque l'accès est le moyen grâce auquel le processus judiciaire est soumis à l'examen et à la critique. Comme il est essentiel à l'administration de la justice que justice soit faite et soit perçue comme l'étant, cet examen public est fondamental. Le principe de la publicité des procédures judiciaires a été décrit comme le « souffle même de la justice », la garantie de l'absence d'arbitraire dans l'administration de la justice : *Nouveau-Brunswick*, par. 22.

(3) Adaptation de l'analyse de *Dagenais* aux droits et intérêts des parties

53 Pour appliquer aux droits et intérêts en jeu en l'espèce l'analyse de *Dagenais* et des arrêts subséquents précités, il convient d'énoncer de la façon suivante les conditions applicables à une ordonnance de confidentialité dans un cas comme l'espèce :

Une ordonnance de confidentialité en vertu de la règle 151 ne doit être rendue que si :

a) elle est nécessaire pour écarter un risque sérieux pour un intérêt important, y compris un intérêt commercial, dans le contexte d'un litige, en l'absence d'autres options raisonnables pour écarter ce risque;

(b) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

b) ses effets bénéfiques, y compris ses effets sur le droit des justiciables civils à un procès équitable, l'emportent sur ses effets préjudiciables, y compris ses effets sur la liberté d'expression qui, dans ce contexte, comprend l'intérêt du public dans la publicité des débats judiciaires.

54 As in *Mentuck*, I would add that three important elements are subsumed under the first branch of this test. First, the risk in question must be real and substantial, in that the risk is well grounded in the evidence, and poses a serious threat to the commercial interest in question.

Comme dans *Mentuck*, j'ajouterais que trois éléments importants sont subsumés sous le premier volet de l'analyse. En premier lieu, le risque en cause doit être réel et important, en ce qu'il est bien étayé par la preuve et menace gravement l'intérêt commercial en question.

55 In addition, the phrase "important commercial interest" is in need of some clarification. In order to qualify as an "important commercial interest", the interest in question cannot merely be specific to the party requesting the order; the interest must be one which can be expressed in terms of a public interest in confidentiality. For example, a private company could not argue simply that the existence of a particular contract should not be made public because to do so would cause the company to lose business, thus harming its commercial interests. However, if, as in this case, exposure of information would cause a breach of a confidentiality agreement, then the commercial interest affected can be characterized more broadly as the general commercial interest of preserving confidential information. Simply put, if there is no general principle at stake, there can be no "important commercial interest" for the purposes of this test. Or, in the words of Binnie J. in *F.N. (Re)*, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 880, 2000 SCC 35, at para. 10, the open court rule only yields "where the public interest in confidentiality outweighs the public interest in openness" (emphasis added).

De plus, l'expression « intérêt commercial important » exige une clarification. Pour être qualifié d'« intérêt commercial important », l'intérêt en question ne doit pas se rapporter uniquement et spécifiquement à la partie qui demande l'ordonnance de confidentialité; il doit s'agir d'un intérêt qui peut se définir en termes d'intérêt public à la confidentialité. Par exemple, une entreprise privée ne pourrait simplement prétendre que l'existence d'un contrat donné ne devrait pas être divulguée parce que cela lui ferait perdre des occasions d'affaires, et que cela nuirait à ses intérêts commerciaux. Si toutefois, comme en l'espèce, la divulgation de renseignements doit entraîner un manquement à une entente de non-divulgation, on peut alors parler plus largement de l'intérêt commercial général dans la protection des renseignements confidentiels. Simplement, si aucun principe général n'entre en jeu, il ne peut y avoir d'« intérêt commercial important » pour les besoins de l'analyse. Ou, pour citer le juge Binnie dans *F.N. (Re)*, [2000] 1 R.C.S. 880, 2000 CSC 35, par. 10, la règle de la publicité des débats judiciaires ne cède le pas que « dans les cas où le droit du public à la confidentialité l'emporte sur le droit du public à l'accessibilité » (je souligne).

56 In addition to the above requirement, courts must be cautious in determining what constitutes an "important commercial interest". It must be remembered that a confidentiality order involves an infringement on freedom of expression. Although the balancing of the commercial interest with freedom of expression takes place under the second

Outre l'exigence susmentionnée, les tribunaux doivent déterminer avec prudence ce qui constitue un « intérêt commercial important ». Il faut rappeler qu'une ordonnance de confidentialité implique une atteinte à la liberté d'expression. Même si la pondération de l'intérêt commercial et de la liberté d'expression intervient à la deuxième étape

branch of the test, courts must be alive to the fundamental importance of the open court rule. See generally Muldoon J. in *Eli Lilly and Co. v. Novopharm Ltd.* (1994), 56 C.P.R. (3d) 437 (F.C.T.D.), at p. 439.

Finally, the phrase "reasonably alternative measures" requires the judge to consider not only whether reasonable alternatives to a confidentiality order are available, but also to restrict the order as much as is reasonably possible while preserving the commercial interest in question.

B. *Application of the Test to this Appeal*

(1) Necessity

At this stage, it must be determined whether disclosure of the Confidential Documents would impose a serious risk on an important commercial interest of the appellant, and whether there are reasonable alternatives, either to the order itself, or to its terms.

The commercial interest at stake here relates to the objective of preserving contractual obligations of confidentiality. The appellant argues that it will suffer irreparable harm to its commercial interests if the Confidential Documents are disclosed. In my view, the preservation of confidential information constitutes a sufficiently important commercial interest to pass the first branch of the test as long as certain criteria relating to the information are met.

Pelletier J. noted that the order sought in this case was similar in nature to an application for a protective order which arises in the context of patent litigation. Such an order requires the applicant to demonstrate that the information in question has been treated at all relevant times as confidential and that on a balance of probabilities its proprietary, commercial and scientific interests could reasonably be harmed by the disclosure of the information: *AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare)* (1998), 83 C.P.R. (3d) 428 (F.C.T.D.), at p. 434. To this I would add the requirement proposed

de l'analyse, les tribunaux doivent avoir pleinement conscience de l'importance fondamentale de la règle de la publicité des débats judiciaires. Voir généralement *Eli Lilly and Co. c. Novopharm Ltd.* (1994), 56 C.P.R. (3d) 437 (C.F. 1re inst.), p. 439, le juge Muldoon.

57 Enfin, l'expression « autres options raisonnables » oblige le juge non seulement à se demander s'il existe des mesures raisonnables autres que l'ordonnance de confidentialité, mais aussi à restreindre l'ordonnance autant qu'il est raisonnablement possible de le faire tout en préservant l'intérêt commercial en question.

B. *Application de l'analyse en l'espèce*

(1) Nécessité

58 À cette étape, il faut déterminer si la divulgation des documents confidentiels ferait courir un risque sérieux à un intérêt commercial important de l'appelante, et s'il existe d'autres solutions raisonnables que l'ordonnance elle-même, ou ses modalités.

59 L'intérêt commercial en jeu en l'espèce a trait à la préservation d'obligations contractuelles de confidentialité. L'appelante fait valoir qu'un préjudice irréparable sera causé à ses intérêts commerciaux si les documents confidentiels sont divulgués. À mon avis, la préservation de renseignements confidentiels est un intérêt commercial suffisamment important pour satisfaire au premier volet de l'analyse dès lors que certaines conditions relatives aux renseignements sont réunies.

60 Le juge Pelletier souligne que l'ordonnance sollicitée en l'espèce s'apparente à une ordonnance conservatoire en matière de brevets. Pour l'obtenir, le requérant doit démontrer que les renseignements en question ont toujours été traités comme des renseignements confidentiels et que, selon la prépondérance des probabilités, il est raisonnable de penser que leur divulgation risquerait de compromettre ses droits exclusifs, commerciaux et scientifiques : *AB Hassle c. Canada (Ministre de la Santé nationale et du Bien-être social)*, [1998] A.C.F. no 1850 (QL) (C.F. 1re inst.), par. 29-30. J'ajouterais à cela

by Robertson J.A. that the information in question must be of a "confidential nature" in that it has been "accumulated with a reasonable expectation of it being kept confidential" as opposed to "facts which a litigant would like to keep confidential by having the courtroom doors closed" (para. 14).

61 Pelletier J. found as a fact that the *AB Hassle* test had been satisfied in that the information had clearly been treated as confidential both by the appellant and by the Chinese authorities, and that, on a balance of probabilities, disclosure of the information could harm the appellant's commercial interests (para. 23). As well, Robertson J.A. found that the information in question was clearly of a confidential nature as it was commercial information, consistently treated and regarded as confidential, that would be of interest to AECL's competitors (para. 16). Thus, the order is sought to prevent a serious risk to an important commercial interest.

62 The first branch of the test also requires the consideration of alternative measures to the confidentiality order, as well as an examination of the scope of the order to ensure that it is not overly broad. Both courts below found that the information contained in the Confidential Documents was relevant to potential defences available to the appellant under the *CEAA* and this finding was not appealed at this Court. Further, I agree with the Court of Appeal's assertion (at para. 99) that, given the importance of the documents to the right to make full answer and defence, the appellant is, practically speaking, compelled to produce the documents. Given that the information is necessary to the appellant's case, it remains only to determine whether there are reasonably alternative means by which the necessary information can be adduced without disclosing the confidential information.

63 Two alternatives to the confidentiality order were put forward by the courts below. The motions judge suggested that the Confidential Documents could be expunged of their commercially sensitive contents, and edited versions of the documents could be

l'exigence proposée par le juge Robertson que les renseignements soient « de nature confidentielle » en ce qu'ils ont été « recueillis dans l'expectative raisonnable qu'ils resteront confidentiels », par opposition à « des faits qu'une partie à un litige voudrait garder confidentiels en obtenant le huis clos » (par. 14).

Le juge Pelletier constate que le critère établi dans *AB Hassle* est respecté puisque tant l'appelante que les autorités chinoises ont toujours considéré les renseignements comme confidentiels et que, selon la prépondérance des probabilités, leur divulgation risque de nuire aux intérêts commerciaux de l'appelante (par. 23). Le juge Robertson conclut lui aussi que les renseignements en question sont clairement confidentiels puisqu'il s'agit de renseignements commerciaux, uniformément reconnus comme étant confidentiels, qui présentent un intérêt pour les concurrents d'ÉACL (par. 16). Par conséquent, l'ordonnance est demandée afin de prévenir un risque sérieux de préjudice à un intérêt commercial important.

Le premier volet de l'analyse exige aussi l'examen d'options raisonnables autres que l'ordonnance de confidentialité, et de la portée de l'ordonnance pour s'assurer qu'elle n'est pas trop vaste. Les deux jugements antérieurs en l'espèce concluent que les renseignements figurant dans les documents confidentiels sont pertinents pour les moyens de défense offerts à l'appelante en vertu de la *LCÉE*, et cette conclusion n'est pas portée en appel devant notre Cour. De plus, je suis d'accord avec la Cour d'appel lorsqu'elle affirme (au par. 99) que vu l'importance des documents pour le droit de présenter une défense pleine et entière, l'appelante est pratiquement forcée de les produire. Comme les renseignements sont nécessaires à la cause de l'appelante, il ne reste qu'à déterminer s'il existe d'autres options raisonnables pour communiquer les renseignements nécessaires sans divulguer de renseignements confidentiels.

Deux options autres que l'ordonnance de confidentialité sont mentionnées dans les décisions antérieures. Le juge des requêtes suggère de retrancher des documents les passages commercialement délicats et de produire les versions ainsi modifiées.

filed. As well, the majority of the Court of Appeal, in addition to accepting the possibility of expungement, was of the opinion that the summaries of the Confidential Documents included in the affidavits could go a long way to compensate for the absence of the originals. If either of these options is a reasonable alternative to submitting the Confidential Documents under a confidentiality order, then the order is not necessary, and the application does not pass the first branch of the test.

There are two possible options with respect to expungement, and in my view, there are problems with both of these. The first option would be for AECL to expunge the confidential information without disclosing the expunged material to the parties and the court. However, in this situation the filed material would still differ from the material used by the affiants. It must not be forgotten that this motion arose as a result of Sierra Club's position that the summaries contained in the affidavits should be accorded little or no weight without the presence of the underlying documents. Even if the relevant information and the confidential information were mutually exclusive, which would allow for the disclosure of all the information relied on in the affidavits, this relevancy determination could not be tested on cross-examination because the expunged material would not be available. Thus, even in the best case scenario, where only irrelevant information needed to be expunged, the parties would be put in essentially the same position as that which initially generated this appeal, in the sense that, at least some of the material relied on to prepare the affidavits in question would not be available to Sierra Club.

Further, I agree with Robertson J.A. that this best case scenario, where the relevant and the confidential information do not overlap, is an untested assumption (para. 28). Although the documents themselves were not put before the courts on this motion, given that they comprise thousands of pages of detailed information, this assumption is at best optimistic. The expungement alternative would be further complicated by the fact that the Chinese

La majorité en Cour d'appel estime que, outre cette possibilité d'épuration des documents, l'inclusion dans les affidavits d'un résumé des documents confidentiels pourrait, dans une large mesure, compenser l'absence des originaux. Si l'une ou l'autre de ces deux options peut raisonnablement se substituer au dépôt des documents confidentiels aux termes d'une ordonnance de confidentialité, alors l'ordonnance n'est pas nécessaire et la requête ne franchit pas la première étape de l'analyse.

64 Il existe deux possibilités pour l'épuration des documents et, selon moi, elles comportent toutes deux des problèmes. La première serait que ÉACL retranche les renseignements confidentiels sans divulguer les éléments retranchés ni aux parties ni au tribunal. Toutefois, dans cette situation, la documentation déposée serait encore différente de celle utilisée pour les affidavits. Il ne faut pas perdre de vue que la requête découle de l'argument de Sierra Club selon lequel le tribunal ne devrait accorder que peu ou pas de poids aux résumés sans la présence des documents de base. Même si on pouvait totalement séparer les renseignements pertinents et les renseignements confidentiels, ce qui permettrait la divulgation de tous les renseignements sur lesquels se fondent les affidavits, l'appréciation de leur pertinence ne pourrait pas être mise à l'épreuve en contre-interrogatoire puisque la documentation retranchée ne serait pas disponible. Par conséquent, même dans le meilleur cas de figure, où l'on n'aurait qu'à retrancher les renseignements non pertinents, les parties se retrouveraient essentiellement dans la même situation que celle qui a donné lieu au pourvoi, en ce sens qu'au moins une partie des documents ayant servi à la préparation des affidavits en question ne serait pas mise à la disposition de Sierra Club.

65 De plus, je partage l'opinion du juge Robertson que ce meilleur cas de figure, où les renseignements pertinents et les renseignements confidentiels ne se recoupent pas, est une hypothèse non confirmée (par. 28). Même si les documents eux-mêmes n'ont pas été produits devant les tribunaux dans le cadre de la présente requête, parce qu'ils comprennent des milliers de pages de renseignements détaillés, cette hypothèse est au mieux optimiste. L'option de

authorities require prior approval for any request by AECL to disclose information.

66 The second option is that the expunged material be made available to the court and the parties under a more narrowly drawn confidentiality order. Although this option would allow for slightly broader public access than the current confidentiality request, in my view, this minor restriction to the current confidentiality request is not a viable alternative given the difficulties associated with expungement in these circumstances. The test asks whether there are reasonably alternative measures; it does not require the adoption of the absolutely least restrictive option. With respect, in my view, expungement of the Confidential Documents would be a virtually unworkable and ineffective solution that is not reasonable in the circumstances.

67 A second alternative to a confidentiality order was Evans J.A.'s suggestion that the summaries of the Confidential Documents included in the affidavits "may well go a long way to compensate for the absence of the originals" (para. 103). However, he appeared to take this fact into account merely as a factor to be considered when balancing the various interests at stake. I would agree that at this threshold stage to rely on the summaries alone, in light of the intention of Sierra Club to argue that they should be accorded little or no weight, does not appear to be a "reasonably alternative measure" to having the underlying documents available to the parties.

68 With the above considerations in mind, I find the confidentiality order necessary in that disclosure of the Confidential Documents would impose a serious risk on an important commercial interest of the appellant, and that there are no reasonably alternative measures to granting the order.

(2) The Proportionality Stage

69 As stated above, at this stage, the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the appellant's right to a fair trial, must be weighed against the deleterious effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right to free

l'épuration serait en outre compliquée par le fait que les autorités chinoises exigent l'approbation préalable de toute demande de divulgation de renseignements de la part d'ÉACL.

La deuxième possibilité serait de mettre les documents supprimés à la disposition du tribunal et des parties en vertu d'une ordonnance de confidentialité plus restreinte. Bien que cela permettrait un accès public un peu plus large que ne le ferait l'ordonnance de confidentialité sollicitée, selon moi, cette restriction mineure à la requête n'est pas une option viable étant donné les difficultés liées à l'épuration dans les circonstances. Il s'agit de savoir s'il y a d'autres options raisonnables et non d'adopter l'option qui soit absolument la moins restrictive. Avec égards, j'estime que l'épuration des documents confidentiels serait une solution virtuellement impraticable et inefficace qui n'est pas raisonnable dans les circonstances.

Une deuxième option autre que l'ordonnance de confidentialité serait, selon le juge Evans, l'inclusion dans les affidavits d'un résumé des documents confidentiels pour « dans une large mesure, compenser [leur] absence » (par. 103). Il ne semble toutefois envisager ce fait qu'à titre de facteur à considérer dans la pondération des divers intérêts en cause. Je conviens qu'à cette étape liminaire, se fonder uniquement sur les résumés en connaissant l'intention de Sierra Club de plaider leur faiblesse ou l'absence de valeur probante, ne semble pas être une « autre option raisonnable » à la communication aux parties des documents de base.

Vu les facteurs susmentionnés, je conclus que l'ordonnance de confidentialité est nécessaire en ce que la divulgation des documents confidentiels ferait courir un risque sérieux à un intérêt commercial important de l'appelante, et qu'il n'existe pas d'autres options raisonnables.

(2) L'étape de la proportionnalité

Comme on le mentionne plus haut, à cette étape, les effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance de confidentialité, y compris ses effets sur le droit de l'appelante à un procès équitable, doivent être pondérés avec ses effets préjudiciables, y compris ses effets sur le droit

expression, which in turn is connected to the principle of open and accessible court proceedings. This balancing will ultimately determine whether the confidentiality order ought to be granted.

(a) *Salutary Effects of the Confidentiality Order*

As discussed above, the primary interest that would be promoted by the confidentiality order is the public interest in the right of a civil litigant to present its case, or, more generally, the fair trial right. Because the fair trial right is being invoked in this case in order to protect commercial, not liberty, interests of the appellant, the right to a fair trial in this context is not a *Charter* right; however, a fair trial for all litigants has been recognized as a fundamental principle of justice: *Ryan*, *supra*, at para. 84. It bears repeating that there are circumstances where, in the absence of an affected *Charter* right, the proper administration of justice calls for a confidentiality order: *Mentuck*, *supra*, at para. 31. In this case, the salutary effects that such an order would have on the administration of justice relate to the ability of the appellant to present its case, as encompassed by the broader fair trial right.

The Confidential Documents have been found to be relevant to defences that will be available to the appellant in the event that the *CEAA* is found to apply to the impugned transaction and, as discussed above, the appellant cannot disclose the documents without putting its commercial interests at serious risk of harm. As such, there is a very real risk that, without the confidentiality order, the ability of the appellant to mount a successful defence will be seriously curtailed. I conclude, therefore, that the confidentiality order would have significant salutary effects on the appellant's right to a fair trial.

Aside from the salutary effects on the fair trial interest, the confidentiality order would also have a beneficial impact on other important rights and interests. First, as I discuss in more detail below, the confidentiality order would allow all parties and the court access to the Confidential Documents, and

à la liberté d'expression, qui à son tour est lié au principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires. Cette pondération déterminera finalement s'il y a lieu d'accorder l'ordonnance de confidentialité.

a) *Les effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance de confidentialité*

70 Comme nous l'avons vu, le principal intérêt qui serait promu par l'ordonnance de confidentialité est l'intérêt du public à la protection du droit du justiciable civil de faire valoir sa cause ou, de façon plus générale, du droit à un procès équitable. Puisque l'appelante l'invoque en l'espèce pour protéger ses intérêts commerciaux et non son droit à la liberté, le droit à un procès équitable dans ce contexte n'est pas un droit visé par la *Charte*; toutefois, le droit à un procès équitable pour tous les justiciables a été reconnu comme un principe de justice fondamentale : *Ryan*, précité, par. 84. Il y a lieu de rappeler qu'il y a des circonstances où, en l'absence de violation d'un droit garanti par la *Charte*, la bonne administration de la justice exige une ordonnance de confidentialité : *Mentuck*, précité, par. 31. En l'espèce, les effets bénéfiques d'une telle ordonnance sur l'administration de la justice tiennent à la capacité de l'appelante de soutenir sa cause, dans le cadre du droit plus large à un procès équitable.

71 Les documents confidentiels ont été jugés pertinents en ce qui a trait aux moyens de défense que l'appelante pourrait invoquer s'il est jugé que la *LCÉE* s'applique à l'opération attaquée et, comme nous l'avons vu, l'appelante ne peut communiquer les documents sans risque sérieux pour ses intérêts commerciaux. De ce fait, il existe un risque bien réel que, sans l'ordonnance de confidentialité, la capacité de l'appelante à mener à bien sa défense soit gravement réduite. Je conclus par conséquent que l'ordonnance de confidentialité aurait d'importants effets bénéfiques pour le droit de l'appelante à un procès équitable.

72 En plus des effets bénéfiques pour le droit à un procès équitable, l'ordonnance de confidentialité aurait aussi des incidences favorables sur d'autres droits et intérêts importants. En premier lieu, comme je l'exposerai plus en détail ci-après, l'ordonnance de confidentialité permettrait aux parties ainsi qu'au

permit cross-examination based on their contents. By facilitating access to relevant documents in a judicial proceeding, the order sought would assist in the search for truth, a core value underlying freedom of expression.

73 Second, I agree with the observation of Robertson J.A. that, as the Confidential Documents contain detailed technical information pertaining to the construction and design of a nuclear installation, it may be in keeping with the public interest to prevent this information from entering the public domain (para. 44). Although the exact contents of the documents remain a mystery, it is apparent that they contain technical details of a nuclear installation, and there may well be a substantial public security interest in maintaining the confidentiality of such information.

(b) *Deleterious Effects of the Confidentiality Order*

74 Granting the confidentiality order would have a negative effect on the open court principle, as the public would be denied access to the contents of the Confidential Documents. As stated above, the principle of open courts is inextricably tied to the s. 2(*b*) *Charter* right to freedom of expression, and public scrutiny of the courts is a fundamental aspect of the administration of justice: *New Brunswick*, *supra*, at paras. 22-23. Although as a general principle, the importance of open courts cannot be overstated, it is necessary to examine, in the context of this case, the particular deleterious effects on freedom of expression that the confidentiality order would have.

75 Underlying freedom of expression are the core values of (1) seeking the truth and the common good; (2) promoting self-fulfilment of individuals by allowing them to develop thoughts and ideas as they see fit; and (3) ensuring that participation in the political process is open to all persons: *Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General)*, [1989] 1 S.C.R.

tribunal d'avoir accès aux documents confidentiels, et permettrait la tenue d'un contre-interrogatoire fondé sur leur contenu. En facilitant l'accès aux documents pertinents dans une procédure judiciaire, l'ordonnance sollicitée favoriserait la recherche de la vérité, qui est une valeur fondamentale sous-tendant la liberté d'expression.

En deuxième lieu, je suis d'accord avec l'observation du juge Robertson selon laquelle puisque les documents confidentiels contiennent des renseignements techniques détaillés touchant la construction et la conception d'une installation nucléaire, il peut être nécessaire, dans l'intérêt public, d'empêcher que ces renseignements tombent dans le domaine public (par. 44). Même si le contenu exact des documents demeure un mystère, il est évident qu'ils comprennent des détails techniques d'une installation nucléaire et il peut bien y avoir un important intérêt de sécurité publique à préserver la confidentialité de ces renseignements.

b) *Les effets préjudiciables de l'ordonnance de confidentialité*

Une ordonnance de confidentialité aurait un effet préjudiciable sur le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires, puisqu'elle priverait le public de l'accès au contenu des documents confidentiels. Comme on le dit plus haut, le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires est inextricablement lié au droit à la liberté d'expression protégé par l'al. 2*b*) de la *Charte*, et la vigilance du public envers les tribunaux est un aspect fondamental de l'administration de la justice : *Nouveau-Brunswick*, précité, par. 22-23. Même si, à titre de principe général, l'importance de la publicité des débats judiciaires ne peut être sous-estimée, il faut examiner, dans le contexte de l'espèce, les effets préjudiciables particuliers que l'ordonnance de confidentialité aurait sur la liberté d'expression.

Les valeurs fondamentales qui sous-tendent la liberté d'expression sont (1) la recherche de la vérité et du bien commun; (2) l'épanouissement personnel par le libre développement des pensées et des idées; et (3) la participation de tous au processus politique : *Irwin Toy Ltd. c. Québec (Procureur général)*, [1989] 1 R.C.S. 927, p. 976; *R. c. Keegstra*, [1990]

927, at p. 976; *R. v. Keegstra*, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, at pp. 762-64, *per* Dickson C.J. *Charter* jurisprudence has established that the closer the speech in question lies to these core values, the harder it will be to justify a s. 2(*b*) infringement of that speech under s. 1 of the *Charter*: *Keegstra*, at pp. 760-61. Since the main goal in this case is to exercise judicial discretion in a way which conforms to *Charter* principles, a discussion of the deleterious effects of the confidentiality order on freedom of expression should include an assessment of the effects such an order would have on the three core values. The more detrimental the order would be to these values, the more difficult it will be to justify the confidentiality order. Similarly, minor effects of the order on the core values will make the confidentiality order easier to justify.

Seeking the truth is not only at the core of freedom of expression, but it has also been recognized as a fundamental purpose behind the open court rule, as the open examination of witnesses promotes an effective evidentiary process: *Edmonton Journal*, *supra*, at pp. 1357-58, *per* Wilson J. Clearly the confidentiality order, by denying public and media access to documents relied on in the proceedings, would impede the search for truth to some extent. Although the order would not exclude the public from the courtroom, the public and the media would be denied access to documents relevant to the evidentiary process.

However, as mentioned above, to some extent the search for truth may actually be promoted by the confidentiality order. This motion arises as a result of Sierra Club's argument that it must have access to the Confidential Documents in order to test the accuracy of Dr. Pang's evidence. If the order is denied, then the most likely scenario is that the appellant will not submit the documents with the unfortunate result that evidence which may be relevant to the proceedings will not be available to Sierra Club or the court. As a result, Sierra Club will not be able to fully test the accuracy of Dr. Pang's evidence on cross-examination. In addition, the court will not have the benefit of this cross-examination or

3 R.C.S. 697, p. 762-764, le juge en chef Dickson. La jurisprudence de la *Charte* établit que plus l'expression en cause est au cœur de ces valeurs fondamentales, plus il est difficile de justifier, en vertu de l'article premier de la *Charte*, une atteinte à l'al. 2*b*) à son égard : *Keegstra*, p. 760-761. Comme l'objectif principal en l'espèce est d'exercer un pouvoir discrétionnaire dans le respect des principes de la *Charte*, l'examen des effets préjudiciables de l'ordonnance de confidentialité sur la liberté d'expression devrait comprendre une appréciation des effets qu'elle aurait sur les trois valeurs fondamentales. Plus l'ordonnance de confidentialité porte préjudice à ces valeurs, plus il est difficile de la justifier. Inversement, des effets mineurs sur les valeurs fondamentales rendent l'ordonnance de confidentialité plus facile à justifier.

76 La recherche de la vérité est non seulement au cœur de la liberté d'expression, elle est aussi reconnue comme un objectif fondamental de la règle de la publicité des débats judiciaires, puisque l'examen public des témoins favorise l'efficacité du processus de présentation de la preuve : *Edmonton Journal*, précité, p. 1357-1358, le juge Wilson. À l'évidence, en enlevant au public et aux médias l'accès aux documents invoqués dans les procédures, l'ordonnance de confidentialité nuirait jusqu'à un certain point à la recherche de la vérité. L'ordonnance n'exclurait pas le public de la salle d'audience, mais le public et les médias n'auraient pas accès aux documents pertinents quant à la présentation de la preuve.

77 Toutefois, comme nous l'avons vu plus haut, la recherche de la vérité peut jusqu'à un certain point être favorisée par l'ordonnance de confidentialité. La présente requête résulte de l'argument de Sierra Club selon lequel il doit avoir accès aux documents confidentiels pour vérifier l'exactitude de la déposition de M. Pang. Si l'ordonnance est refusée, le scénario le plus probable est que l'appelante s'abstiendra de déposer les documents, avec la conséquence fâcheuse que des preuves qui peuvent être pertinentes ne seront pas portées à la connaissance de Sierra Club ou du tribunal. Par conséquent, Sierra Club ne sera pas en mesure de vérifier complètement l'exactitude de la preuve de M. Pang en contre-

documentary evidence, and will be required to draw conclusions based on an incomplete evidentiary record. This would clearly impede the search for truth in this case.

78 As well, it is important to remember that the confidentiality order would restrict access to a relatively small number of highly technical documents. The nature of these documents is such that the general public would be unlikely to understand their contents, and thus they would contribute little to the public interest in the search for truth in this case. However, in the hands of the parties and their respective experts, the documents may be of great assistance in probing the truth of the Chinese environmental assessment process, which would in turn assist the court in reaching accurate factual conclusions. Given the nature of the documents, in my view, the important value of the search for truth which underlies both freedom of expression and open justice would be promoted to a greater extent by submitting the Confidential Documents under the order sought than it would by denying the order, and thereby preventing the parties and the court from relying on the documents in the course of the litigation.

79 In addition, under the terms of the order sought, the only restrictions on these documents relate to their public distribution. The Confidential Documents would be available to the court and the parties, and public access to the proceedings would not be impeded. As such, the order represents a fairly minimal intrusion into the open court rule, and thus would not have significant deleterious effects on this principle.

80 The second core value underlying freedom of speech, namely, the promotion of individual self-fulfilment by allowing open development of thoughts and ideas, focusses on individual expression, and thus does not closely relate to the open court principle which involves institutional expression. Although the confidentiality order would

interrogatoire. De plus, le tribunal ne bénéficiera pas du contre-interrogatoire ou de cette preuve documentaire, et il lui faudra tirer des conclusions fondées sur un dossier de preuve incomplet. Cela nuira manifestement à la recherche de la vérité en l'espèce.

De plus, il importe de rappeler que l'ordonnance de confidentialité ne restreindrait l'accès qu'à un nombre relativement peu élevé de documents hautement techniques. La nature de ces documents est telle que le public en général est peu susceptible d'en comprendre le contenu, de sorte qu'ils contribueraient peu à l'intérêt du public à la recherche de la vérité en l'espèce. Toutefois, dans les mains des parties et de leurs experts respectifs, les documents peuvent être très utiles pour apprécier la conformité du processus d'évaluation environnementale chinois, ce qui devrait aussi aider le tribunal à tirer des conclusions de fait exactes. À mon avis, compte tenu de leur nature, la production des documents confidentiels en vertu de l'ordonnance de confidentialité sollicitée favoriserait mieux l'importante valeur de la recherche de la vérité, qui sous-tend à la fois la liberté d'expression et la publicité des débats judiciaires, que ne le ferait le rejet de la demande qui aurait pour effet d'empêcher les parties et le tribunal de se fonder sur les documents au cours de l'instance.

De plus, aux termes de l'ordonnance demandée, les seules restrictions imposées à l'égard de ces documents ont trait à leur distribution publique. Les documents confidentiels seraient mis à la disposition du tribunal et des parties, et il n'y aurait pas d'entrave à l'accès du public aux procédures. À ce titre, l'ordonnance représente une atteinte relativement minime à la règle de la publicité des débats judiciaires et elle n'aurait donc pas d'effets préjudiciables importants sur ce principe.

La deuxième valeur fondamentale sous-jacente à la liberté d'expression, la promotion de l'épanouissement personnel par le libre développement de la pensée et des idées, est centrée sur l'expression individuelle et n'est donc pas étroitement liée au principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires qui concerne l'expression institutionnelle. Même

restrict individual access to certain information which may be of interest to that individual, I find that this value would not be significantly affected by the confidentiality order.

si l'ordonnance de confidentialité devait restreindre l'accès individuel à certains renseignements susceptibles d'intéresser quelqu'un, j'estime que cette valeur ne serait pas touchée de manière significative.

The third core value, open participation in the political process, figures prominently in this appeal, as open justice is a fundamental aspect of a democratic society. This connection was pointed out by Cory J. in *Edmonton Journal*, *supra*, at p. 1339:

> It can be seen that freedom of expression is of fundamental importance to a democratic society. It is also essential to a democracy and crucial to the rule of law that the courts are seen to function openly. The press must be free to comment upon court proceedings to ensure that the courts are, in fact, seen by all to operate openly in the penetrating light of public scrutiny.

81 La troisième valeur fondamentale, la libre participation au processus politique, joue un rôle primordial dans le pourvoi puisque la publicité des débats judiciaires est un aspect fondamental de la société démocratique. Ce lien est souligné par le juge Cory dans *Edmonton Journal*, précité, p. 1339 :

> On voit que la liberté d'expression est d'une importance fondamentale dans une société démocratique. Il est également essentiel dans une démocratie et fondamental pour la primauté du droit que la transparence du fonctionnement des tribunaux soit perçue comme telle. La presse doit être libre de commenter les procédures judiciaires pour que, dans les faits, chacun puisse constater que les tribunaux fonctionnent publiquement sous les regards pénétrants du public.

Although there is no doubt as to the importance of open judicial proceedings to a democratic society, there was disagreement in the courts below as to whether the weight to be assigned to the open court principle should vary depending on the nature of the proceeding.

Même si on ne peut douter de l'importance de la publicité des débats judiciaires dans une société démocratique, les décisions antérieures divergent sur la question de savoir si le poids à accorder au principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires devrait varier en fonction de la nature de la procédure.

On this issue, Robertson J.A. was of the view that the nature of the case and the level of media interest were irrelevant considerations. On the other hand, Evans J.A. held that the motions judge was correct in taking into account that this judicial review application was one of significant public and media interest. In my view, although the public nature of the case may be a factor which strengthens the importance of open justice in a particular case, the level of media interest should not be taken into account as an independent consideration.

82 Sur ce point, le juge Robertson estime que la nature de l'affaire et le degré d'intérêt des médias sont des considérations dénuées de pertinence. Le juge Evans estime quant à lui que le juge des requêtes a eu raison de tenir compte du fait que la demande de contrôle judiciaire suscite beaucoup d'intérêt de la part du public et des médias. À mon avis, même si la nature publique de l'affaire peut être un facteur susceptible de renforcer l'importance de la publicité des débats judiciaires dans une espèce particulière, le degré d'intérêt des médias ne devrait pas être considéré comme facteur indépendant.

Since cases involving public institutions will generally relate more closely to the core value of public participation in the political process, the public nature of a proceeding should be taken into consideration when assessing the merits of a confidentiality order. It is important to note that this core value will always be engaged where the open court

83 Puisque les affaires concernant des institutions publiques ont généralement un lien plus étroit avec la valeur fondamentale de la participation du public au processus politique, la nature publique d'une instance devrait être prise en considération dans l'évaluation du bien-fondé d'une ordonnance de confidentialité. Il importe de noter que cette valeur

principle is engaged owing to the importance of open justice to a democratic society. However, where the political process is also engaged by the substance of the proceedings, the connection between open proceedings and public participation in the political process will increase. As such, I agree with Evans J.A. in the court below where he stated, at para. 87:

> While all litigation is important to the parties, and there is a public interest in ensuring the fair and appropriate adjudication of all litigation that comes before the courts, some cases raise issues that transcend the immediate interests of the parties and the general public interest in the due administration of justice, and have a much wider public interest significance.

84 This motion relates to an application for judicial review of a decision by the government to fund a nuclear energy project. Such an application is clearly of a public nature, as it relates to the distribution of public funds in relation to an issue of demonstrated public interest. Moreover, as pointed out by Evans J.A., openness and public participation are of fundamental importance under the *CEAA*. Indeed, by their very nature, environmental matters carry significant public import, and openness in judicial proceedings involving environmental issues will generally attract a high degree of protection. In this regard, I agree with Evans J.A. that the public interest is engaged here more than it would be if this were an action between private parties relating to purely private interests.

85 However, with respect, to the extent that Evans J.A. relied on media interest as an indicium of public interest, this was an error. In my view, it is important to distinguish public interest, from media interest, and I agree with Robertson J.A. that media exposure cannot be viewed as an impartial measure of public interest. It is the public nature of the proceedings which increases the need for openness, and this public nature is not necessarily reflected by the media desire to probe the facts of the case.

fondamentale sera toujours engagée lorsque sera mis en cause le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires, vu l'importance de la transparence judiciaire dans une société démocratique. Toutefois, le lien entre la publicité des débats judiciaires et la participation du public dans le processus politique s'accentue lorsque le processus politique est également engagé par la substance de la procédure. Sous ce rapport, je suis d'accord avec ce que dit le juge Evans (au par. 87) :

> Bien que tous les litiges soient importants pour les parties, et qu'il en va de l'intérêt du public que les affaires soumises aux tribunaux soient traitées de façon équitable et appropriée, certaines affaires soulèvent des questions qui transcendent les intérêts immédiats des parties ainsi que l'intérêt du public en général dans la bonne administration de la justice, et qui ont une signification beaucoup plus grande pour le public.

La requête est liée à une demande de contrôle judiciaire d'une décision du gouvernement de financer un projet d'énergie nucléaire. La demande est clairement de nature publique, puisqu'elle a trait à la distribution de fonds publics en rapport avec une question dont l'intérêt public a été démontré. De plus, comme le souligne le juge Evans, la transparence du processus et la participation du public ont une importance fondamentale sous le régime de la *LCÉE*. En effet, par leur nature même, les questions environnementales ont une portée publique considérable, et la transparence des débats judiciaires sur les questions environnementales mérite généralement un degré élevé de protection. À cet égard, je suis d'accord avec le juge Evans pour conclure que l'intérêt public est en l'espèce plus engagé que s'il s'agissait d'un litige entre personnes privées à l'égard d'intérêts purement privés.

J'estime toutefois avec égards que, dans la mesure où il se fonde sur l'intérêt des médias comme indice de l'intérêt du public, le juge Evans fait erreur. À mon avis, il est important d'établir une distinction entre l'intérêt du public et l'intérêt des médias et, comme le juge Robertson, je note que la couverture médiatique ne peut être considérée comme une mesure impartiale de l'intérêt public. C'est la nature publique de l'instance qui accentue le besoin de transparence, et cette nature publique ne se reflète

I reiterate the caution given by Dickson C.J. in *Keegstra*, *supra*, at p. 760, where he stated that, while the speech in question must be examined in light of its relation to the core values, "we must guard carefully against judging expression according to its popularity".

Although the public interest in open access to the judicial review application as a whole is substantial, in my view, it is also important to bear in mind the nature and scope of the information for which the order is sought in assigning weight to the public interest. With respect, the motions judge erred in failing to consider the narrow scope of the order when he considered the public interest in disclosure, and consequently attached excessive weight to this factor. In this connection, I respectfully disagree with the following conclusion of Evans J.A., at para. 97:

> Thus, having considered the nature of this litigation, and having assessed the extent of public interest in the openness of the proceedings in the case before him, the Motions Judge cannot be said in all the circumstances to have given this factor undue weight, even though confidentiality is claimed for only three documents among the small mountain of paper filed in this case, and their content is likely to be beyond the comprehension of all but those equipped with the necessary technical expertise.

Open justice is a fundamentally important principle, particularly when the substance of the proceedings is public in nature. However, this does not detract from the duty to attach weight to this principle in accordance with the specific limitations on openness that the confidentiality order would have. As Wilson J. observed in *Edmonton Journal*, *supra*, at pp. 1353-54:

> One thing seems clear and that is that one should not balance one value at large and the conflicting value in its context. To do so could well be to pre-judge the issue by placing more weight on the value developed at large than is appropriate in the context of the case.

pas nécessairement dans le désir des médias d'examiner les faits de l'affaire. Je réitère l'avertissement donné par le juge en chef Dickson dans *Keegstra*, précité, p. 760, où il dit que même si l'expression en cause doit être examinée dans ses rapports avec les valeurs fondamentales, « nous devons veiller à ne pas juger l'expression en fonction de sa popularité ».

86 Même si l'intérêt du public à la publicité de la demande de contrôle judiciaire dans son ensemble est important, à mon avis, il importe tout autant de prendre en compte la nature et la portée des renseignements visés par l'ordonnance demandée, lorsqu'il s'agit d'apprécier le poids de l'intérêt public. Avec égards, le juge des requêtes a commis une erreur en ne tenant pas compte de la portée limitée de l'ordonnance dans son appréciation de l'intérêt du public à la communication et en accordant donc un poids excessif à ce facteur. Sous ce rapport, je ne partage pas la conclusion suivante du juge Evans (au par. 97) :

> Par conséquent, on ne peut dire qu'après que le juge des requêtes eut examiné la nature de ce litige et évalué l'importance de l'intérêt du public à la publicité des procédures, il aurait dans les circonstances accordé trop d'importance à ce facteur, même si la confidentialité n'est demandée que pour trois documents parmi la montagne de documents déposés en l'instance et que leur contenu dépasse probablement les connaissances de ceux qui n'ont pas l'expertise technique nécessaire.

La publicité des débats judiciaires est un principe fondamentalement important, surtout lorsque la substance de la procédure est de nature publique. Cela ne libère toutefois aucunement de l'obligation d'apprécier le poids à accorder à ce principe en fonction des limites particulières qu'imposerait l'ordonnance de confidentialité à la publicité des débats. Comme le dit le juge Wilson dans *Edmonton Journal*, précité, p. 1353-1354 :

> Une chose semble claire et c'est qu'il ne faut pas évaluer une valeur selon la méthode générale et l'autre valeur en conflit avec elle selon la méthode contextuelle. Agir ainsi pourrait fort bien revenir à préjuger de l'issue du litige en donnant à la valeur examinée de manière générale plus d'importance que ne l'exige le contexte de l'affaire.

87 In my view, it is important that, although there is significant public interest in these proceedings, open access to the judicial review application would be only slightly impeded by the order sought. The narrow scope of the order coupled with the highly technical nature of the Confidential Documents significantly temper the deleterious effects the confidentiality order would have on the public interest in open courts.

88 In addressing the effects that the confidentiality order would have on freedom of expression, it should also be borne in mind that the appellant may not have to raise defences under the *CEAA*, in which case the Confidential Documents would be irrelevant to the proceedings, with the result that freedom of expression would be unaffected by the order. However, since the necessity of the Confidential Documents will not be determined for some time, in the absence of a confidentiality order, the appellant would be left with the choice of either submitting the documents in breach of its obligations, or withholding the documents in the hopes that either it will not have to present a defence under the *CEAA*, or that it will be able to mount a successful defence in the absence of these relevant documents. If it chooses the former option, and the defences under the *CEAA* are later found not to apply, then the appellant will have suffered the prejudice of having its confidential and sensitive information released into the public domain, with no corresponding benefit to the public. Although this scenario is far from certain, the possibility of such an occurrence also weighs in favour of granting the order sought.

89 In coming to this conclusion, I note that if the appellant is not required to invoke the relevant defences under the *CEAA*, it is also true that the appellant's fair trial right will not be impeded, even if the confidentiality order is not granted. However, I do not take this into account as a factor which weighs in favour of denying the order because, if the order is granted and the Confidential Documents are not required, there will be no deleterious effects on either the public interest in freedom of expression or the appellant's commercial interests or fair trial right. This neutral result is in contrast with the

À mon avis, il importe de reconnaître que, malgré l'intérêt significatif que porte le public à ces procédures, l'ordonnance demandée n'entraverait que légèrement la publicité de la demande de contrôle judiciaire. La portée étroite de l'ordonnance associée à la nature hautement technique des documents confidentiels tempère considérablement les effets préjudiciables que l'ordonnance de confidentialité pourrait avoir sur l'intérêt du public à la publicité des débats judiciaires.

Pour traiter des effets qu'aurait l'ordonnance de confidentialité sur la liberté d'expression, il faut aussi se rappeler qu'il se peut que l'appelante n'ait pas à soulever de moyens de défense visés par la *LCÉE*, auquel cas les documents confidentiels perdraient leur pertinence et la liberté d'expression ne serait pas touchée par l'ordonnance. Toutefois, puisque l'utilité des documents confidentiels ne sera pas déterminée avant un certain temps, l'appelante n'aurait plus, en l'absence d'ordonnance de confidentialité, que le choix entre soit produire les documents en violation de ses obligations, soit les retenir dans l'espoir de ne pas avoir à présenter de défense en vertu de la *LCÉE* ou de pouvoir assurer effectivement sa défense sans les documents pertinents. Si elle opte pour le premier choix et que le tribunal conclut par la suite que les moyens de défense visés par la *LCÉE* ne sont pas applicables, l'appelante aura subi le préjudice de voir ses renseignements confidentiels et délicats tomber dans le domaine public sans que le public n'en tire d'avantage correspondant. Même si sa réalisation est loin d'être certaine, la possibilité d'un tel scénario milite également en faveur de l'ordonnance sollicitée.

En arrivant à cette conclusion, je note que si l'appelante n'a pas à invoquer les moyens de défense pertinents en vertu de la *LCÉE*, il est également vrai que son droit à un procès équitable ne sera pas entravé même en cas de refus de l'ordonnance de confidentialité. Je ne retiens toutefois pas cela comme facteur militant contre l'ordonnance parce que, si elle est accordée et que les documents confidentiels ne sont pas nécessaires, il n'y aura alors aucun effet préjudiciable ni sur l'intérêt du public à la liberté d'expression ni sur les droits commerciaux ou le droit de l'appelante à un procès

scenario discussed above where the order is denied and the possibility arises that the appellant's commercial interests will be prejudiced with no corresponding public benefit. As a result, the fact that the Confidential Documents may not be required is a factor which weighs in favour of granting the confidentiality order.

In summary, the core freedom of expression values of seeking the truth and promoting an open political process are most closely linked to the principle of open courts, and most affected by an order restricting that openness. However, in the context of this case, the confidentiality order would only marginally impede, and in some respects would even promote, the pursuit of these values. As such, the order would not have significant deleterious effects on freedom of expression.

VII. Conclusion

In balancing the various rights and interests engaged, I note that the confidentiality order would have substantial salutary effects on the appellant's right to a fair trial, and freedom of expression. On the other hand, the deleterious effects of the confidentiality order on the principle of open courts and freedom of expression would be minimal. In addition, if the order is not granted and in the course of the judicial review application the appellant is not required to mount a defence under the *CEAA*, there is a possibility that the appellant will have suffered the harm of having disclosed confidential information in breach of its obligations with no corresponding benefit to the right of the public to freedom of expression. As a result, I find that the salutary effects of the order outweigh its deleterious effects, and the order should be granted.

Consequently, I would allow the appeal with costs throughout, set aside the judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal, and grant the confidentiality order on the terms requested by the appellant under Rule 151 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998*.

équitable. Cette issue neutre contraste avec le scénario susmentionné où il y a refus de l'ordonnance et possibilité d'atteinte aux droits commerciaux de l'appelante sans avantage correspondant pour le public. Par conséquent, le fait que les documents confidentiels puissent ne pas être nécessaires est un facteur en faveur de l'ordonnance de confidentialité.

90 En résumé, les valeurs centrales de la liberté d'expression que sont la recherche de la vérité et la promotion d'un processus politique ouvert sont très étroitement liées au principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires, et sont les plus touchées par une ordonnance limitant cette publicité. Toutefois, dans le contexte en l'espèce, l'ordonnance de confidentialité n'entraverait que légèrement la poursuite de ces valeurs, et pourrait même les favoriser à certains égards. À ce titre, l'ordonnance n'aurait pas d'effets préjudiciables importants sur la liberté d'expression.

VII. Conclusion

91 Dans la pondération des divers droits et intérêts en jeu, je note que l'ordonnance de confidentialité aurait des effets bénéfiques importants sur le droit de l'appelante à un procès équitable et sur la liberté d'expression. D'autre part, les effets préjudiciables de l'ordonnance de confidentialité sur le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires et la liberté d'expression seraient minimes. En outre, si l'ordonnance est refusée et qu'au cours du contrôle judiciaire l'appelante n'est pas amenée à invoquer les moyens de défense prévus dans la *LCÉE*, il se peut qu'elle subisse le préjudice d'avoir communiqué des renseignements confidentiels en violation de ses obligations sans avantage correspondant pour le droit du public à la liberté d'expression. Je conclus donc que les effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance l'emportent sur ses effets préjudiciables, et qu'il y a lieu d'accorder l'ordonnance.

92 Je suis donc d'avis d'accueillir le pourvoi avec dépens devant toutes les cours, d'annuler l'arrêt de la Cour d'appel fédérale, et d'accorder l'ordonnance de confidentialité selon les modalités demandées par l'appelante en vertu de la règle 151 des *Règles de la Cour fédérale (1998)*.

Appeal allowed with costs.

Solicitors for the appellant: Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt, Toronto.

Solicitors for the respondent Sierra Club of Canada: Timothy J. Howard, Vancouver; Franklin S. Gertler, Montréal.

Solicitor for the respondents the Minister of Finance of Canada, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, the Minister of International Trade of Canada and the Attorney General of Canada: The Deputy Attorney General of Canada, Ottawa.

Pourvoi accueilli avec dépens.

Procureurs de l'appelante : Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt, Toronto.

Procureurs de l'intimé Sierra Club du Canada : Timothy J. Howard, Vancouver; Franklin S. Gertler, Montréal.

Procureur des intimés le ministre des Finances du Canada, le ministre des Affaires étrangères du Canada, le ministre du Commerce international du Canada et le procureur général du Canada : Le sous-procureur général du Canada, Ottawa.

[Tab 4]

1989 CarswellAlta 367
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench

RoyNat Inc. v. Allan

1989 CarswellAlta 367, [1989] A.W.L.D. 956, [1989] C.L.D. 1258, [1989] A.J. No. 842, [1990] 1 W.W.R. 698, 17 A.C.W.S. (3d) 589, 70 Alta. L.R. (2d) 231, 77 C.B.R. (N.S.) 133, 99 A.R. 370

ROYNAT INC. v. ALLAN

Waite J.

Judgment: September 28, 1989
Docket: Calgary No. 8401-21885

Counsel: *S. Carscallen* , for plaintiff.
N.C. Wittmann, Q.C. , and *S. Ross* , for defendant.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency
Related Abridgment Classifications
Debtors and creditors
VII Receivers
VII.6 Conduct and liability of receiver
VII.6.c Duties
VII.6.c.vi Particular parties
Debtors and creditors
VII Receivers
VII.6 Conduct and liability of receiver
VII.6.d Liabilities
Headnote
Receivers --- Conduct and liability of receiver — Duties
Receivers --- Conduct and liability of receiver — Liabilities
In circumstances defendant not under special duty to plaintiff to avoid incurring obligation to pay commission.
Indemnities not applying to action against defendant brought by plaintiff.
The plaintiff held a chattel mortgage against a drilling rig owned by O., a limited partnership. On 3rd September 1982 O. obtained an order appointing the defendant receiver of O. Five days later, the plaintiff advised the defendant that T. was interested in purchasing the rig. However, the defendant did not act on this information. On 8th October 1982 the defendant sent a world-wide mailing offering a commission if an agent secured an offer which was accepted, or if a sale resulted from the introduction of a prospective purchaser. T. was the only party which made offers to purchase, initially doing so in November 1982 through V., which acted on behalf of an undisclosed principal. T. eventually made an offer which was accepted by the defendant and the court.
V. commenced an action against the plaintiff and the defendant seeking to recover the commission. At one point prior to the trial of that action, V. would have accepted $30,000 in full settlement of its $100,000 claim. However, at that time T. was also proceeding with an action to recover the amount of the commission, and the continued existence of that claim was a primary reason for the plaintiff's decision not to settle V.'s claim. In V.'s action the court held that it was entitled to the commission. The court found that V. had introduced the eventual purchaser to the defendant, that the introduction resulted in the sale, and that much of the efforts of V. were made prior to 8th October 1982.
The plaintiff commenced an action against the defendant, seeking to recover its share of the commission on the grounds that the defendant had been negligent in failing to act in a timely manner. The plaintiff had granted the defendant two indemnities under which it indemnified the defendant against all actions, claims, and debts made against the defendant as a result of its

appointment as receiver or from the payment of the net proceeds of the sale to the plaintiff, and the defendant counterclaimed based on the indemnities. During examination for discovery the plaintiff conceded that, because of the variety of tasks he had to perform before being in a position to seek the best possible price for the equipment, the defendant was not in a position to follow up with the information as to T.'s interest in the rig until at least 8th October.

Held:

Action and counterclaim dismissed.

A court-appointed receiver is under a general duty to act in the best interests of all interested parties connected with the debtor's assets. Here, the defendant was under a duty to take possession and sell the assets of the limited partnership, securing a price that was the best possible in all the circumstances. In the circumstances of this case the defendant owed no special duty to the plaintiff to conduct himself so as to avoid the payment of a sales commission. Accordingly, the defendant did not breach any duty owed to the plaintiff. In any event, even if the defendant had been under a duty to avoid the payment of the commission if possible, the admissions of the plaintiff negated any breach prior to 8th October, and given the findings in the action by V. to recover the commission, once the commission was offered on 8th October, no one but V. could have claimed it if T. was the eventual purchaser.

Had the defendant been found liable, the plaintiff was not in breach of its duty to mitigate: the defendant has the onus of establishing such a breach, and the evidence here as to V.'s offer to settle fell short of satisfying that onus. Finally, the indemnities given by the plaintiff did not extend to claims against the defendant brought by the plaintiff itself. Accordingly, the indemnity agreements were not applicable.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered:

Great West. Ry. Co. v. James Durnford & Sons Ltd., [1928] All E.R. Rep. 89 (H.L.) — *referred to*

Mobil Oil Can. Ltd. v. Beta Well Service Ltd., [1974] 3 W.W.R. 273, 43 D.L.R. (3d) 745 , affirmed 50 D.L.R. (3d) 158n, 2 A.R. 183, 13 N.R. 127 (S.C.C.) — *referred to*

Authorities considered:

Bennett on Receiverships (1985), pp. 117-18.

Action in negligence to recover sale commission paid to agent; Counterclaim under agreements of indemnity.

Waite J. **:**

1 The plaintiff is a financial institution that held chattel mortgage security against one of three drilling rigs owned by a limited partnership ("Omni"). On 3rd September 1982 Omni obtained an order appointing the defendant as receiver of Omni. In his capacity as receiver, the defendant sold two Omni drilling rigs, one of which was the one secured to the plaintiff, and paid a commission of $100,250 (of which $48,541.05 was the plaintiff's share) to the agent ("Viking") who had introduced the purchaser ("Terroco") to the equipment. The plaintiff alleges that if the receiver had acted in a timely manner he could have effected a sale to Terroco before any agent became entitled to a sale commission. The receiver's tardiness is said to constitute negligence entitling the plaintiff to recover the commission paid to the agent.

2 The defendant denies any breach of duty. Alternatively, the defendant says that the plaintiff's claim is defeated by either one or both of two indemnities given by the plaintiff to the receiver, one at the commencement of the receivership and one at the time the order approving the sale to Terroco was obtained from the court. Additionally, the defendant alleges that the plaintiff's loss was not caused by the defendant's negligence and, in any event, the plaintiff failed to mitigate its loss by not settling the claim of the agent at 30 per cent of value when that settlement was offered to it.

3 The defendant filed a counterclaim based on the indemnities.

4 Both claim and counterclaim are dismissed.

5 The plaintiff's claim is based on the fact that on 8th September, five days after the order appointing the receiver, it gave to the receiver a memorandum (Ex. 1, Tab 1) of 11th August, produced from its own files, containing the information that Terroco was

interested in purchasing a variety of industrial and construction equipment including a "used drilling rig in the 7,500 foot depth range". In its simplest terms the plaintiff's allegation is that if the receiver had contacted Terroco with reasonable promptitude the receiver could have avoided the payment of a commission to Viking. The salient facts in that respect are these:

> 1. The plaintiff gave to the receiver on 8th September the information concerning Terroco's interest.
>
> 2. The equipment was offered for sale to the market on 8th October. That was by way of a world-wide mail-out by the receiver to 750 prospective purchasers. Prior to that mail-out the receiver had not held out to anyone the offer of a commission for the sale of any of the equipment of Omni.
>
> 3. The defendant did not send a copy of the offering to Terroco.
>
> 4. Terroco was the only firm to submit an offer to purchase. Its first written offer was delivered to the defendant on 2nd November.
>
> 5. The defendant did not contact Terroco until 3rd November. At that time he learned that the offer of 2nd November, submitted by Viking on behalf of an undisclosed principal, was in fact the offer of Terroco.

Those facts favour the plaintiff.

6 In support of the defendant's position there are two principal factors.

7 The first factor is found in the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Mr. Justice Sulatycky in an action brought by Viking to recover commission [*Viking Oilfield Supply Ltd. v. Allan* , Alta. Q.B., No. 8301-27178, 12th June 1986 (unreported)]. That action was against, inter alia, the receiver, the plaintiff and Terroco. In that action the plaintiff and the receiver united in a joint defence. The substantive issue in that action was whether Viking had either secured the offer that was accepted or, alternatively, had introduced the prospective purchaser whose offer was accepted. The appropriate language is contained in this clause from the offer:

> A commission will be paid to any broker or agent securing an offer for any or all of the rigs if such offer is accepted by the Receiver and approved by the Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta as required by the terms of the Court Order appointing the undersigned as Receiver. This commission will also be payable if a broker or agent introduces a prospective purchaser and an offer is made and accepted by the Receiver and the Court as a result of such introduction. The commission will be an amount based on the following formula:
>
> 5% of the first $2,000,000 of the selling price of each rig and 3% of the excess selling price over $2,000,000 of each rig.

8 At p. 9 of the reasons for judgment in that case, Mr. Justice Sulatycky said:

> The conclusion I reach is that Viking introduced the eventual purchaser to the receiver, and that that introduction resulted in the sale which was eventually made and approved by the court.

9 In that action both the plaintiff and defendant herein were defendants. As such, they are bound by the findings of fact made by Mr. Justice Sulatycky to the extent that those findings of fact were necessary for the decision in that case. The relevant findings of Mr. Justice Sulatycky commence at the bottom of p. 2 of the reasons for judgment and continue to p. 7 in the following terms:

> On 30th June 1982 Mr. O'Connor, the president of Terroco Oilfield Services Ltd., met with the president and a salesperson employed by Viking Oilfield Supply Ltd., the plaintiff. Mr. O'Connor, during that meeting, informed the representatives of the plaintiff that Terroco was interested in constructing an oil rig. Mr. Guthrie, the salesman, thereafter, contacted Mr. Ewing, a person known to him to be well experienced in construction of oil rigs. Mr. Ewing and Mr. Guthrie met sometime later. I do not want to specify the dates here because I do not consider them to be of particular importance. There is some dispute in the evidence as to what date this meeting actually took place but, as I say, I do not consider it to be crucial.

Mr. Ewing arrived at that meeting with photographs and an inventory pertaining to rigs 2 and 3 owned by the Omni #1 partnership. Ewing and Guthrie then proceeded to meet with O'Connor. O'Connor was shown the photographs and the inventory, of which he took a copy, and Ewing and Guthrie advised O'Connor that at the then current state of affairs, it would be cheaper to purchase an oil rig than to build one.

The receiver was appointed on 3rd September. On 8th September he met with a representative of RoyNat, who provided the receiver with a memo relating to Terroco indicating that Terroco had an interest in purchasing certain types of equipment, including a drilling rig. RoyNat had received this information early in the month of August from one of its representatives in the Red Deer area. The receiver did not act on this information. He did not contact Terroco in any way. When it was determined by the receiver that he would send out information to potential purchasers of the Omni assets, Terroco was not included in that mailing. Some 750 addressees were compiled and the mailing was forwarded to them. It is in that mailing that the receiver stipulated that a commission will be paid in accordance with the part of the offering which I have already read.

After Guthrie had been informed by Terroco that Terroco was interested in inspecting the rigs, Guthrie contacted Ewing, who knew where the rigs were, who had been involved in the manufacture of the rigs and who, by all accounts, knew more about those rigs than anyone else, and requested that Ewing contact O'Connor to facilitate the inspection of the rigs by O'Connor. That inspection took place on 13th and 14th September. Thereafter, Ewing and Guthrie attempted to obtain an offer from Terroco, and Ewing informed the receiver that he was expecting an offer to be delivered to the receiver. Ewing did not inform the receiver of the identity of the prospective offeror. Ewing did not deal directly in this case with Terroco because he was introduced to Terroco by Guthrie, an employee of the plaintiff Viking. He considered that Terroco was a client of Viking's.

Eventually, on 2nd November 1982, Viking did deliver an offer to the receiver. The offer was made by Viking on behalf of an undisclosed principal. Terroco requested Viking to make the offer in that form because Terroco wished to remain anonymous. The offer was rejected, and on 3rd November the receiver, acting on information earlier received from RoyNat, phoned Mr. Amundson at Terroco. During that telephone conversation, the receiver was informed by Mr. Amundson that the offer placed through Viking was in fact Terroco's offer. He asked the receiver to keep that information confidential. The receiver did so.

On 12th November Viking made a further offer on behalf of Terroco, still not disclosing its principal, although the principal at that time was known to the receiver but that fact was not known to Viking.

Before the 12th November offer was made, Terroco had contacted one Karaki and asked Karaki to contact the receiver on the pretext that Karaki had a potential offeror and to obtain information from the receiver. Karaki advised Terroco of the commission that would be payable by the receiver in certain circumstances. The offer made 12th November by Viking was rejected that day by the receiver. On 15th November Karaki made an offer to the receiver on behalf of an undisclosed principal. That principal was Terroco. It was Terroco's intention, by submitting offers through two different agents, to attempt to manipulate the receiver to its advantage.

On 16th November Amundson, on behalf of Terroco, contacted the receiver directly and thereafter there were numerous conversations between the receiver and Amundson, the general manager of Terroco, culminating in an offer accepted by the receiver from Terroco on 26th November 1982. That offer was for $2,005,000 substantially higher than either of the first two offers made by Terroco through Viking but not significantly different than the purchase price which the plaintiff, through its employee Guthrie with the assistance of Ewing, had advised Terroco would likely result in an acceptance of an offer.

The question here is whether Viking introduced a prospective purchaser to the receiver and as a result of such introduction, an offer was made and accepted by the receiver and the court.

> The fact that Terroco's interest in purchasing an oil rig had been made known to the receiver as early as 8th September is of no consequence here because the receiver took no steps to follow that lead until after Viking had made an offer on behalf of Terroco. I am also of the view that the fact that much of the efforts of Viking were made prior to 8th October 1982, the earliest date on which they could have been aware of the receiver's offer of a commission is immaterial.
>
> I agree with counsel for the plaintiff that the introduction contemplated in the receiver's offer made in notice of 8th October 1982 was a process, which process commenced well before 8th October. It commenced when Viking became aware from Terroco that it wished to build a rig.
>
> Viking then brought together Ewing, the rig builder and Terroco, and during the course of that meeting, Ewing, who was acting through Viking, and in that sense it was Viking which was providing information to Terroco, convinced Terroco that it would be more advantageous to purchase a rig. So that about the time the receiver was appointed, Viking had already been convinced that it ought to consider purchasing a rig and specifically rigs 2 and 3.
>
> Guthrie continued to maintain contact with Terroco after the inspection trip of 13th and 14th September and continued to encourage Terroco to make an offer. That process culminated on 2nd November with the offer.

10 The second factor favouring the respondent is the plaintiff's concession on its examination for discovery, and adopted at trial, that the receiver was not in a position to follow up on the Terroco memorandum of 11th August until at least 8th October. At p. 54 of the transcript the following questions and answers appear:

> Q. You didn't expect him to go out the next day, September 9th, September 14th or any particular date? You didn't expect him to follow up with Terroco until the preliminary matters were out of the way and he was in a position to market the rigs?
>
> A. No, certainly not September 9th and not until he was ready to deal.
>
> Q. Okay. I take it that the company admits that he was not ready to deal until October the 8th, 1982? You're not suggesting it was any time before that?
>
> A. I don't think he was.

That concession properly and reasonably reflects the variety of tasks that the receiver had to perform before he could be in a position to seek the best possible price for the equipment. Those tasks included:

11 1. Locating all of the equipment of Omni;

12 2. Determining the condition and value of the equipment;

13 3. Ascertaining the usual insurance and title aspects of that equipment;

14 4. Considering the position of alleged commission contracts said to be in the hands of various agents for sale pursuant to arrangements made before the appointment of the receiver;

15 5. Compiling a list of world-wide prospective purchasers; and

16 6. A variety of routine other matters.

17 The office and duty of a court-appointed receiver is specified in Bennett on Receiverships (1985, Carswell), pp. 117-18, in these terms:

> **Court Appointment**

A court-appointed receiver and manager represents neither the security holder nor the debtor. As an officer of the court, he is not an agent but a principal entrusted to discharge the powers granted to him *bona fide* . Accordingly, he has a fiduciary duty to comply with such powers provided in the order and to act in the best interests of all interested parties connected with the debtor's assets. His primary duty is to account for the assets under his control and in his possession. This duty is owed to the court and all persons having an interest in the debtor's assets, including the debtor and shareholders where the debtor is a corporation. The court-appointed receiver owes no duty to any individual creditor who may attempt to interfere in the receivership. His position is classically described in the leading Canadian case of *Parsons v. Sovereign Bank of Canada* , by Viscount Haldane:

> A receiver and manager appointed, ... is the agent neither of the debenture-holders, whose credit he cannot pledge, nor of the company, which cannot control him. He is an officer of the Court put in to discharge certain duties prescribed by the order appointing him: duties which in the present case extended to the continuation and management of the business.

Notwithstanding that the receiver and manager is an officer of the court, his fiduciary duty to all extends to a standard of care in the running of the business comparable to the "reasonable care, supervision and control as an ordinary man would give to the business were it his own". Where he fails to provide such a standard of care, he may be liable for his negligence.

This standard of care is somewhat different than the standard of care imposed upon a privately appointed receiver. As a fiduciary to all, the court-appointed receiver must manage and operate the debtor's business as though it were his own. He cannot therefore, without court approval, close the business down or repudiate executory contracts.

Throughout the receivership, any interested person may apply to the court if the court-appointed receiver is failing to perform his duties properly or is otherwise abusing them. It is incumbent upon the person alleging the abuse to prove it. The court will presume that the receiver is acting honestly and in good faith unless it is otherwise established.

In view of the fact that a court-appointed receiver is a principal, he will be personally liable to others in respect of torts committed by him and his employees in the performance of their duties. He will also be personally liable with those whom he enters into contracts unless he has expressly excluded his liability. However such liability is usually indemnified from the property under his administration, except perhaps in situations where the receiver or his employees were negligent or not qualified to perform the tasks they undertook.

18 The plaintiff's claim fails for the reason that the defendant did not breach any duty of care he owed to the plaintiff. The duty of care is not to be determined retrospectively as a duty to avoid the incurring of commission on the sale of any assets secured to the plaintiff. The duty was the general duty described in Bennett on Receiverships. It was a duty to act "in the best interests of all interested parties connected with the debtor's assets". Those "interested parties" encompassed the plaintiff and other secured creditors like the plaintiff, other creditors, and the limited partners. It was a duty to take into possession and sell the assets of the limited partnership, securing therefore a price that was the best possible in all the circumstances and one that would secure the approval of the court. In the circumstances of this case, the receiver owed no special duty to the plaintiff to so conduct himself to avoid the payment of sales commission. Only in retrospect could such a duty even be considered.

19 Moreover, and in any event, had there been such a special duty owed to the plaintiff the evidence does not establish any breach of that duty. The discovery admissions of the plaintiff deny any breach of duty prior to 8th October. Those admissions exonerate the receiver from having characterized as negligence his failure to contact Terroco prior to 8th October. Had the receiver contacted Terroco during the three-week period between 8th October and receipt of the first written offer on 2nd November, he would have been advised, as in fact he was on 3rd November, that Terroco was working through the agent Viking. As Sulatycky J. found, that agent introduced Terroco to the drilling rig in issue on or about 30th June, and the agent's activities with Terroco continued both before and after 8th October until the first written offer was in fact submitted on 2nd November. Keeping in mind the findings of Sulatycky J. and the other evidence in this case, the labour of Viking that earned the commission

was a continuous process that started before 8th October and continued thereafter. Once the commission was offered on 8th October no one but Viking could claim it if the ultimate purchaser was Terroco.

20 Accordingly, the plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

21 However, if the plaintiff's claim had succeeded, it would have been necessary to consider two special defences raised by the receiver.

22 One defence was the plea that the plaintiff failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate its damage. That plea relates to the action taken by Viking to recover commission, being the action that was decided by Sulatycky J. At one pre-trial point in that action, Viking would have accepted the sum of $30,000 in full settlement of its $100,000 claim. If that settlement had been concluded, the plaintiff's contribution would have been the sum of $14,512.10. That amount is to be contrasted to its actual payment of $48,541.05 plus costs as a result of the judgment of Sulatycky J. The plaintiff declined to participate in the settlement, and the action proceeded to trial. The defendant says that the plaintiff's rejection of the settlement offer was a breach of its duty to mitigate its damage and the plaintiff's recovery should be restricted to what its loss would have been if the settlement had been concluded.

23 The defendant has the onus of establishing that breach of duty. The evidence falls short of satisfying that onus. The Viking action was not the only action that had been commenced involving the commission of $100,000. Terroco had also commenced an action to recover an amount equal to the value of the commission. Those two actions were proceeding side by side and were going to be tried together. At the trial of this action, the plaintiff presented testimony from a lawyer who represented one of the common defendants in the Viking and Terroco actions. That lawyer testified that at the time the proposed settlement of $30,000 was being considered and rejected, Viking had a good cause of action and the proposed settlement was a reasonable disposition of the case from the standpoint of the defendants. The effect of his testimony was that the settlement failed solely because of the unreasonable rejection of it by RoyNat. He said that the continuing existence of the Terroco claim, a claim which he characterized as frivolous, was not a factor in settlement considerations. However, the effect of that testimony is substantially, and adversely, limited by the submissions made before Sulatycky J. when, at the conclusion of his reasons for judgment in open court, the question of costs was being discussed (Ex. 2, pp. 13-15 and 17). It seems clear from that discussion that the continued existence of the Terroco action was a primary reason for not settling the Viking claim. In the result, the plea of mitigation fails.

24 The second specific defence relates to two indemnities taken by the defendant from the plaintiff. Both are in writing. One was obtained from the plaintiff on 8th September, five days after the commencement of the receivership, and reads in part as follows (see Ex. 1, Tab 5):

> RoyNat Inc., a Canadian Corporation having offices in the City of Calgary, in the Province of Alberta, does hereby indemnify and save harmless Collins Barrow and J. Stephens Allan, and their respective partners, employees, officers, directors, agents and servants from and against all actions, causes of action, claims, debts, dues, fees, disbursements, sums of money, demands and suits of whatever nature and kind made against them or any of them as a result of the appointment of J. Stephens Allan as Receiver of all the undertakings, property and assets of the Omni Drilling Rig Partnership #1 and the performance by J. Stephens Allan of his duties as Receiver under such appointment, excepting only actions or omissions of the Receiver constituting wilful negligence or misconduct which will be the responsibility of J. Stephens Allan ...

That is a standard form of indemnity intended to protect the receiver against third party claims. It does not extend to claims against the receiver brought by the indemnitor itself. That interpretation is supported by these cases: *Mobil Oil Can. Ltd. v. Beta Well Service Ltd.*, [1974] 3 W.W.R. 273, 43 D.L.R. (3d) 745 at 748 -49, affirmed by S.C.C. 50 D.L.R. (3d) 158n, 2 A.R. 183, 13 N.R. 127 , and *Great West. Ry. Co. v. James Durnford & Sons Ltd.*, [1928] All E.R. Rep. 89 (H.L.) .

25 This court also adopts the language of Conrad J. in interlocutory proceedings in this action [reported 61 Alta. L.R. (2d) 165 at 175, [1988] 6 W.W.R. 156, 69 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245, *(*sub nom. *RoyNat Inc. v. Omni Drilling Rig Partnership No. 1 (Receivership))* 90 A.R. 173] when she stated:

The issue here is whether or not the applicant contracted to indemnify the respondent in these particular circumstances. I would find it hard to interpret such a clause as intending to protect the receivers from claims by RoyNat as opposed to simply third party claims. Indeed, if that were the intention, it would seem simple enough for RoyNat to undertake not to sue for anything except wilful negligence. It is hard to accept that the parties intended such a cumbersome procedure for achieving that end.

26 The second indemnity is dated 21st December 1982, the material portion of which is in these terms:

RoyNat Inc., a financial Institution having offices in the City of Calgary, in the Province of Alberta, does hereby indemnify and save harmless Collins Barrow and J. Stephen Allan, and their respective partners, employees, officers, agents and servants from and against all actions, causes of action, claims, debts, dues, fees (including any legal fees incurred by said Receiver in defending any action against said Receiver as a result of said payment to RoyNat Inc.), disbursements, sums of money, demands, suits of whatever nature and kind and any and all claims for any consequential damages arising out of the payment to RoyNat Inc. by Collins Barrow and J. Stephens Allan of the net proceeds of sale of Omni Drilling Rig No. 3 to Terroco Oilfield Supply Ltd. The net proceeds of sale is defined as the gross selling price of $970,630.00 less those items which the Court of Queen's Bench directs J. Stephens Allan and Collins Barrow to pay including all Receivers and agents fees and all expenses paid by the Receiver in preserving Omni Drilling Rig No. 3.

This Indemnity is given by RoyNat Inc., in consideration of the payment of net proceeds of the sale of Omni Drilling Rig No. 3 by J. Stephens Allan to RoyNat Inc.

This indemnity was not pleaded in the statement of defence and counterclaim. At trial counsel for the receiver applied to amend the pleadings so that they would be deemed to contain an appropriate reference to this indemnity. That amendment was allowed on the basis that any pleading response by the plaintiff appropriate to the indemnity would also be deemed to be included in the pleadings.

27 The defence based on this amendment fails for the same reasons applicable to the first indemnity.

28 In the result, the defendant's counterclaim also fails.

29 The defendant is entitled to its costs calculated on a solicitor/client basis. If those costs cannot be settled by agreement they shall be taxed as on a solicitor/client taxation.

30 There shall be no costs to any party on the counterclaim.

Action and counterclaim dismissed.

[Tab 5]

Province of Alberta

CONDOMINIUM PROPERTY ACT

Revised Statutes of Alberta 2000
Chapter C-22

Current as of March 26, 2021

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Miscellaneous

Petition to Court

66(1) Repealed 2009 c53 s40.

(2) On an application to the Court under this Act, notice shall be served on the persons the Court directs.

(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2), the Court may dispense with notice.

(4) The Court may direct the trial of an issue and may give any directions as to all matters, including filing of pleadings, that appear necessary and proper for the final hearing of the application.

RSA 2000 cC-22 s66;2009 c53 s40

Court ordered remedy

67(1) In this section,

(a) "improper conduct" means

(i) non-compliance with this Act, the regulations or the bylaws by a developer, a corporation, an employee of a corporation, a member of a board or an owner,

(ii) the conduct of the business affairs of a corporation in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the interests of an interested party,

(iii) the exercise of the powers of the board in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the interests of an interested party,

(iii.1) the conduct of an owner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to the corporation, a member of the board or another owner,

(iv) the conduct of the business affairs of a developer in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the interests of an interested party or a purchaser or a prospective purchaser of a unit, or

(v) the exercise of the powers of the board by a developer in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the interests of an interested party or a purchaser or a prospective purchaser of a unit;

(b) "interested party" means an owner, a corporation, a member of the board, a registered mortgagee or any other person who has a registered interest in a unit.

(2) Where on an application by an interested party the Court is satisfied that improper conduct has taken place, the Court may do one or more of the following:

(a) direct that an investigator be appointed to review the improper conduct and report to the Court;

(b) direct that the person carrying on the improper conduct cease carrying on the improper conduct;

(c) give directions as to how matters are to be carried out so that the improper conduct will not reoccur or continue;

(d) if the applicant suffered loss due to the improper conduct, award compensation to the applicant in respect of that loss;

(e) award costs;

(f) give any other directions or make any other order that the Court considers appropriate in the circumstances.

(3) The Court may grant interim relief under subsection (2) pending the final determination of the matter by the Court.

RSA 2000 cC-22 s67;2009 c53 s40;
2014 c10 s45

Variation of order

68 The Court may from time to time vary any order made by it under this Act.

RSA 1980 cC-22 s61

Alternate dispute resolution

69(1) Any dispute respecting any matter arising under this Act or in respect of the bylaws of a corporation may, with the agreement of the parties to the dispute,

(a) be dealt with by means of mediation, conciliation or similar techniques to encourage settlement of the dispute, or

(b) be arbitrated under the *Arbitration Act*.

(2) Nothing in subsection (1) shall be construed so as to prohibit a dispute from being arbitrated subsequent to an unsuccessful attempt to deal with the dispute by means of mediation, conciliation or a similar technique.

1996 c12 s52