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COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH FOR SASKATCHEWAN
IN BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY

JUDICIAL CENTRE SASKATOON

IN THE MATTER OF THE RECEIVERSHIP OF FAMILY FITNESS INC.

BRIEF OF LAW OF THE RECEIVER, ALVAREZ & MARSAL CANADA INC.

(Sale and Investment Solicitation Process and Stalking Horse Agreement)

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PART I- INTRODUCTION

I. Overview

1. On October 13, 2020, Alvarez & Marsal Canada Inc. was appointed receiver and manager (the “**Receiver**”) over the present and after-acquired assets, undertakings and property (and its proceeds) of Family Fitness Inc. (“**Family Fitness**” or the “**Debtor**”), including any property relating to the operations of Family Fitness and the business name “Evolution Fitness Gym” (collectively, the “**Property**”), pursuant to section 243(1) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, RSC 1985, c B-3 (the “**BIA**”) and an order (the “**Consent Receivership Order**”) of this Court, as may be amended from time to time (such proceedings referred to herein as the “**Receivership Proceedings**”). The application commencing the Receivership Proceedings and appointing the Receiver was filed and brought forward by BTA Real Estate Group Inc. (a secured creditor of certain of the Property) (“**BTA Group**”).

2. The Debtor’s ability to conduct its business and generate revenue has been: (a) constrained by their high operating costs and comparatively low revenues; and (b) recently and seriously impaired by the sudden and rapidly spreading COVID-19 pandemic. The COVID-19 pandemic has severely limited the Debtor’s ability to operate its business as a result of gym closures, reduced activity, and the cancellation of memberships. The Debtor’s inability to generate revenues from ordinary course operations, among other factors, has created a liquidity crisis for the Debtor that has rendered it insolvent.

3. Pursuant to the Consent Receivership Order, the Receiver is empowered to, *inter alia*, “market any or all the Property, including advertising and soliciting offers in respect of the Property or any part or parts thereof and negotiating such terms and conditions of sale as the Receiver in its discretion may deem appropriate” (paragraph 3(k)), and “take any steps reasonably incidental to the exercise of these powers or the performance of any statutory obligations” (paragraph 3(s)). The Receiver is now in a position to commence the marketing process for the Property, and is seeking the Court’s approval of the SISP (as defined below).

4. The Receiver’s restructuring plan, while under the protection of the stay of proceedings brought on by the filing of the Receivership Proceedings, involves, among other things, efforts to undertake a sale and investment solicitation process that is structured to maximize the value of the Debtor’s business and property for the benefit of its stakeholders.

5. Following several weeks of arm's-length and good faith discussions and negotiations, the restructuring efforts led by the Receiver have culminated in the Stalking Horse Bidder's (as defined below) integrated restructuring proposal (the "**Restructuring Proposal**"), which consists of the following two (2) key interconnected components (with defined terms in each case as defined below):

- (a) a Stalking Horse Bid, which would in turn set the "floor price" for the acquisition of all or substantially all of the business and assets of the Debtor; and
- (b) a SISP that provides for a process to identify potentially higher and better offers than provided for by the Stalking Horse Bid.

6. The approval of the integrated Restructuring Proposal is the primary issue before this Court on this Application.

7. The Receiver, after considering other potential restructuring options that would maximize value for the benefit of the Debtor's stakeholders, submits that this Court's approval of the Restructuring Proposal is in the best interests of the Debtor and its stakeholders, and assists the Receiver's efforts to maximize value through these Receivership Proceedings.

II. RELIEF SOUGHT

8. In furtherance of their restructuring efforts, and to implement the Restructuring Proposal, the Receiver seeks an order (the "**SISP Order**"), among other things:

- (a) authorizing and directing the Receiver to negotiate, finalize and enter into a definitive "stalking horse" agreement of purchase and sale (such definitive agreement being the "**Stalking Horse Bid**"), substantially in the form attached as Appendix B to the Supplemental Report to the First Report of the Receiver filed November 19, 2020 (the "**Supplemental Report**"), with BTA Group, or its designated nominee, as purchaser (the "**Stalking Horse Bidder**");
- (b) approving a sale and investment solicitation process ("**SISP**"), substantially in the form attached as Appendix A to the Supplemental Report, with respect to the Debtor's business and assets which will, among other things, allow the Receiver to seek to identify any superior bid to the Stalking Horse Bid; and

- (c) authorizing the Receiver to reimburse the Stalking Horse Bidder for certain fees incurred by it in connection with the negotiation of the Stalking Horse Bid and the SISP and approving certain bid protections in favour of the Stalking Horse Bidder should the Stalking Horse Bidder become entitled to such protections in accordance with the Stalking Horse Bid or the SISP.

9. The Receiver further requests that this Court grant such relief as its counsel may advise at the hearing of this Application and that this Court considers to be just.

PART II- FACTS

I. BACKGROUND

10. Background facts relating to the commencement of these Receivership Proceedings are set out in the affidavit of Fazal Anwar, sworn October 8, 2020.

11. The facts related to the relief sought on this Application are set out in detail in Supplemental Report, in the following appendices:

- (a) Appendix A - the SISP; and
- (b) Appendix B - the Stalking Horse Bid.

II. SUMMARY OF THE RESTRUCTURING PROPOSAL

A. THE STALKING HORSE BID

12. The Stalking Horse Bid will include the acquisition of substantially all of the assets of the Debtor's business, subject to certain terms and conditions, and will include the following material terms (with capitalized terms utilized in the table below that are not otherwise defined in this Brief of Law having the meanings ascribed to them in the Stalking Horse Bid):

TERM	DETAILS
Purchase Price	The Purchase Price for the Subject Assets, exclusive of GST and PST where applicable, shall be equal to \$800,000.00, plus the assumption of the Assumed Liabilities (the "Purchase Price"). The Purchaser shall satisfy the Purchase Price, subject to adjustment in accordance with Section 3.4, by:

TERM	DETAILS
	(i) payment of the Wind Down Amount¹ to the Vendor; (ii) providing a credit to the Debtor in the amount of the Credit Agreement Bid Amount against the Debtor's obligations under the Credit Agreement; and (iii) assumption of the Assumed Liabilities.²
Transaction Structure	The transaction would be structured as a sale of assets by the Receiver and the assumption by the Stalking Horse Bidder of certain liabilities of the Debtor.
Employees	Subject to certain terms specified in the Stalking Horse Bid, the Stalking Horse Bidder anticipates that it will offer employment to all employees of the Debtor (with certain exceptions) and assume all employee benefit plans, and other employee arrangements on their existing terms.
Conditions	Closing of the transaction contemplated by the Stalking Horse Bid is subject to various conditions, including but not limited to (a) approval by this Court of the SISP; (b) an agreement acceptable to Receiver; (c) receipt of all Purchaser Consents; (d) Receiver determining in accordance with the SISP that the Stalking Horse Bid is the Successful Bid (as defined in the SISP); and (e) the approval and vesting order shall be Final Orders.
Closing and Outside Date	The parties will seek to close on the Closing Date. ³ The " Outside Date " for the closing of the contemplated transaction is January 25, 2021.

13. In addition to the terms outlined above, the Stalking Horse Bid provides that in certain circumstances, fees or reimbursements of costs will be paid to the Stalking Horse Bidder, in the amount of \$40,000 ("**Expense Reimbursement**" or the "**Break Fee**") as follows:

¹ "**Wind-Down Amount**" means an amount in excess of any Surplus Funds necessary to fund: (a) all accrued but unpaid fees and disbursements of the Receiver and its counsel subject to the Receiver's Charge as at the Closing Date, and (b) the costs to wind down and complete the Receivership Proceeding after the Closing Date (including costs associated with the Receiver terminating and/or disclaiming any agreements (including those related to the Leased Premises), which amount shall be subject to the Receiver's Charge.

² "**Assumed Liabilities**" means any and all outstanding liabilities related to the Subject Assets that are not vested off title to the Subject Assets in accordance with the Vesting Order.

³ "**Closing Date**" means the first to occur of (a) a Business Day to be designated by the Purchaser and reasonably acceptable to the Receiver after the satisfaction or waiver of all conditions set out in Sections 4.1(f) and (g) and 4.2(e) and (f) on notice of not fewer than five Business Days, and (b) the date that is 15 Business Days after the satisfaction or waiver of the conditions set out in Sections 4.1(f) and (g) and 4.2(e) and (f), unless otherwise agreed to by the Parties.

- (a) Reimbursement Payment. All expenditures and out-of-pocket expenses related to the Stalking Horse Bid will become payable upon signing of the Stalking Horse Bid, subject to a CAD \$40,000 cap;
- (b) Alternative Transaction. The Stalking Horse Bid contemplates the Debtor's ability to terminate the Stalking Horse Bid and consummate an "**Alternative Transaction**" in certain circumstances. Such Alternative Transaction must be a Successful Bid (as defined in the SISP and discussed below).
- (c) Break Fee and Expense Reimbursement. Pursuant to the terms of the Stalking Horse Bid a "Break Fee" of approximately 5% of the Purchase Price and a reimbursement of third party expenses in the aggregate amount of \$40,000 is payable to the Stalking Horse Bidder from the proceeds of sale of the Alternative Transaction provided that the Stalking Horse Bid is not terminated because of a breach by the Stalking Horse Bidder.

B. THE SISP

14. The SISP, which was negotiated with the Stalking Horse Bidder, forms part of the integrated Restructuring Proposal and sets out the parameters of the marketing process pursuant to which the Receiver will solicit offers to purchase the assets of the Debtor, and the requirements for the submission of the offers by interested parties.

15. The SISP is intended to solicit interest in, and opportunities for:

- (a) a sale of: (i) all or substantially all of the assets, property and undertakings of the Debtor; or (ii) some other portion of the assets, property and undertakings of the Debtor; or
- (b) an investment in, reorganization, recapitalization, primary equity issuance or other similar transaction or other form of reorganization of Family Fitness or its business.⁴

16. The SISP will be implemented by the Receiver.

⁴ Supplemental Report of the Receiver, at para 8.

17. An overview of the major components contemplated in the SISP is set out as follows (capitalized terms used but not defined below are intended to bear their meanings as defined in the SISP):⁵

- (a) the Receiver will prepare a non-confidential teaser describing the SISP and the opportunity and a confidentiality agreement (the “**CA**”);
- (b) advertisement of the SISP will be published in the Regina Leader Post and the Saskatoon Star Phoenix;
- (c) the Receiver will make it clear in the marketing documents that the consideration in any Qualified Bid (as defined below) must be in excess of the Purchase Price of \$800,000 as per the Stalking Horse Bid, the Break Fee of \$40,000, one Minimum Incremental Overbid plus any amounts the purchaser is obligated to pay under the Stalking Horse Bid;
- (d) all Potential Bidders that have executed the CA, in reasonable form acceptable to the Receiver, will be provided access to further due diligence materials in the Data Room, as deemed appropriate by the Receiver;
- (e) if a Qualified Bidder wishes to submit a bid (“**Bid**”), it must deliver a Definitive Sale Agreement to the Receiver by 12:00 p.m. noon MT on December 18, 2020 (the “**Bid Deadline**”);
- (f) immediately following the Bid Deadline, the Receiver will review the Bids to assess whether any of the Bids constitute a qualified bid as set out in the SISP (a “**Qualified Bid**”);
- (g) if the Receiver determines that: (a) no Qualified Bid was received; or (b) at least one Qualified Bid was received but is it not likely that the transactions (other than the Stalking Horse Bid) contemplated in any such Qualified Bids will provide greater consideration than the Stalking Horse Bid, the Stalking Horse Bid shall be deemed to be the Successful Bid and the Stalking Horse Bidder shall be the Successful Bidder, and the Receiver shall terminate the SISP and seek to implement the Stalking Horse Bid, including, by filing an application with the Court

⁵ Supplemental Report of the Receiver, at para 9.

within five (5) Business Days of such termination seeking approval to implement the Stalking Horse Bid;

- (h) if the Receiver determines that (i) one or more Qualified Bids were received, and (ii) it is likely that the transactions contemplated by one or more Qualified Bids will be consummated, the SISP will not be terminated and the Receiver will promptly notify all Qualified Bidders by no later than 5:00 p.m. MT on the day after the Bid Deadline, including the Stalking Horse Bidder, that they are entitled to participate in an auction (the “**Auction**”);
- (i) the Auction will take place on December 21, 2020 and contemplates a Minimum Incremental Bid of \$25,000;
- (j) following the results of the Auction and once a definitive agreement has been negotiated and settled in respect of the Successful Bid, the Receiver shall apply to this Honourable Court to have the Successful Bid approved.

PART III- ISSUES

18. The issues before this Court on this application are whether this Court should approve the SISP, including the provision for the Stalking Horse Bid and the Break-Up Fee and expense reimbursement provisions in the Stalking Horse Bid.

19. The Receiver submits that such relief should be approved, as it is necessary and appropriate in the circumstances.

PART IV- LAW AND ARGUMENT

I. THE RELIEF SOUGHT FURTHERS THE PURPOSE OF THE RECEIVERSHIP PROCEEDINGS

20. The Receivership Proceedings in the present case involve a mechanism by which the Debtor’s business and operations will be transferred to a new entity, through the SISP, as a going concern with minimal business interruption. By way of comparison, restructuring proceedings under the *Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act*, RSC 1985, c C-36 (“**CCAA**”) are intended to provide a means whereby the devastating social and economic effects of bankruptcy or creditor

initiated termination of ongoing business operations can be avoided while a court-supervised attempt to reorganize the financial affairs of the debtor company is made.⁶ While the subject statement was made in the Supreme Court of Canada case of *Century Services Inc. v Canada* (Attorney General), 2010 SCC 60, which involved CCAA proceedings, the Receiver respectfully submits that the Court has recognized that the CCAA is analogous restructuring legislation to the proposal provisions of the BIA.⁷

21. The Restructuring Proposal that is the subject of this Application and the other relief sought by the Receiver furthers the purpose of the Receivership Proceedings by, among other things:

- (a) providing for a Stalking Horse Bid that will give the Debtor's stakeholders certainty that the Stakeholder's business will continue as a going concern to the benefit of the employees and social and economic communities that rely upon the Debtor's business for their well-being; and
- (b) enhancing the fairness of the SISP through the Stalking Horse Bid including by allowing the Receiver to seek to identify any superior bid to the Stalking Horse Bid through the SISP.

22. For these reasons, and the further reasons set out below, the Receiver submits that this Court's granting of the relief sought by the Receiver will further the purpose of the Receivership Proceedings, is in the best interests of the Debtor and its stakeholders and assists the Receiver's efforts to maximize value through these Receivership Proceedings.

II. THE SISP AND STALKING HORSE BID

A. FACTORS FOR APPROVING "STALKING HORSE" SALES PROCESSES

23. A "stalking horse" sales process like that contemplated by the SISP and Stalking Horse Bid is a recognized type of sales process frequently utilized in insolvency proceedings to attempt to obtain the best price for the business or assets being sold.⁸ Stalking horse agreements are a popular and well-established approach in receivership proceedings. Stalking Horse agreements,

⁶ *Century Services Inc. v Canada (Attorney General)*, 2010 SCC 60 [*Century Services*] at para 59 [Tab 1], citing *Elan Corp. v Comiskey* (1990), 41 OAC 282, at para 57.

⁷ *Danier Leather Inc. (Re)*, 2016 ONSC 1044 [*Danier Leather*] at para 24 [Tab 2].

⁸ *CCM Master Qualified Fund Ltd v blutip Power Technologies Ltd*, 2012 ONSC 1750 [*CCM Master*] at para 7 [Tab 3]; *Brainhunter Inc. (Re)* (2009), 62 CBR (5th) 41 (Ont SCJ) [*Brainhunter*] at para 13; *Danier Leather* at para 20 [Tab 2].

including ones with conditionality, have been approved concurrently with sales processes in numerous receivership proceedings.

24. Court-appointed receivers have the powers set out in the orders appointing them. It is usual for receivers to be granted the power to market the property of a debtor, which in the Consent Receivership Order granted in this case authorizes the Receiver to “market any or all the Property, including advertising and soliciting offers in respect of the Property or any part or parts thereof and negotiating such terms and conditions of sale as the Receiver in its discretion may deem appropriate”,⁹ and “take any steps reasonably incidental to the exercise of these powers or the performance of any statutory obligations”.¹⁰

25. The core purpose behind using stalking horse agreements in sales processes is to establish a baseline or “floor” price and deal structure in an effort to generate superior bids to the stalking horse bid from interested parties, thereby maximizing the value of a business for the benefit of stakeholders while enhancing the fairness of the sale process.¹¹

26. The distinction between the approval of a sales process and the approval of an actual sale was more recently confirmed in *Danier Leather*.¹² In that case, which concerned the approval of a sales process in proposal proceedings under the BIA, the Court confirmed that section 65.13¹³ of the BIA “is engaged when the Court determines whether to approve a sale transaction arising

⁹ Paragraph 3(k).

¹⁰ Paragraph 3(s).

¹¹ *Danier Leather* at para 20 [Tab 2].

¹² *Danier Leather* at para 22 [Tab 2].

¹³ Section 65.13 of the BIA states:

Restriction on disposition of assets

65.13 (1) An insolvent person in respect of whom a notice of intention is filed under section 50.4 or a proposal is filed under subsection 62(1) may not sell or otherwise dispose of assets outside the ordinary course of business unless authorized to do so by a court. Despite any requirement for shareholder approval, including one under federal or provincial law, the court may authorize the sale or disposition even if shareholder approval was not obtained.

Factors to be considered

- (4) In deciding whether to grant the authorization, the court is to consider, among other things,
 - (a) whether the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition was reasonable in the circumstances;
 - (b) whether the trustee approved the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition;
 - (c) whether the trustee filed with the court a report stating that in their opinion the sale or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy;
 - (d) the extent to which the creditors were consulted;
 - (e) the effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties; and
 - (f) whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value.

as a result of a sale process, it does not necessarily address the factors that a court should consider when deciding whether to approve the sale process itself.”¹⁴

27. The distinction between the approval of a sales process and the approval of a sale transaction is important to the present case.

28. Approval of the Stalking Horse Bid is only being sought at this stage of these Receivership Proceedings for the purpose of establishing a baseline transaction for the SISP. The Stalking Horse Bid may, or may not, ultimately be the final or best bid at the end of the SISP. If the Stalking Horse Bid is ultimately selected as the “Successful Bid”, an application to this Court will be required.

29. The jurisprudence on the approval of sales and investment solicitation processes in the insolvency context, including those containing stalking horse bids, has elsewhere been summarized as also including the following additional considerations:

Although the decision to approve a particular form of sales process is distinct from the approval of a proposed sale, the reasonableness and adequacy of any sales process proposed by a court-appointed receiver must be assessed in light of the factors which a court will take into account when considering the approval of a proposed sale. Those factors were identified by the Court of Appeal in its decision in *Royal Bank v. Soundair*: (i) whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently; (ii) the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained; (iii) whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process; and, (iv) the interests of all parties. Accordingly, when reviewing a sales and marketing process proposed by a receiver a court should assess:

- i) the fairness, transparency and integrity of the proposed process;
- ii) the commercial efficacy of the proposed process in light of the specific circumstances facing the receiver; and,
- iii) whether the sales process will optimize the chances, in the particular circumstances, of securing the best possible price for the assets up for sale.

The use of stalking horse bids to set a baseline for the bidding process, including credit bid stalking horses, has been recognized by Canadian courts as a reasonable and useful element of a sales process. Stalking horse bids have been approved for use in other receivership proceedings, BIA proposals, and CCAA proceedings.¹⁵

30. The sale of the assets for the benefit of creditors is a principal objective of receivership proceedings, and stalking horse offers, combined with court-approved bidding procedures, are commonly used in insolvency scenarios to facilitate sales of businesses and assets. The Stalking Horse Bid is intended to establish a floor price and transactional structure for any potential

¹⁴ *Danier Leather* at para 22 [Tab 2].

¹⁵ *CCM Master* at paras 6-7 [Tab 3].

subsequent bids from interested parties. Brown J (as he then was) adopted the following comments:

To be effective for such stakeholders, the credit bid had to be put forward in a process that would allow a sufficient opportunity for interested parties to come forward with a superior offer, recognizing that a timetable for the sale of a business in distress is a fast track ride that requires interested parties to move quickly or miss the opportunity. The court has to balance the need to move quickly, to address the real or perceived deterioration of value of the business during a sale process or the limited availability of restructuring financing, with a realistic timetable that encourages and does not chill the auction process.¹⁶

31. The Honourable Mr. Justice Lloyd Houlden and Mr. Justice Geoffrey Morawetz, in their analysis of sales and auction processes in receiverships, explain as follows:

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice approved a sales/auction process ... Justice Brown held that the reasonableness and adequacy of a sales process proposed by a receiver must be assessed in light of factors that the Ontario Court of Appeal identified in *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 1991 CarswellOnt 205, 4 O.R (3d) 1, 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.), specifically, when reviewing a sales and marketing process proposed by a receiver, a court should assess: the fairness, transparency and integrity of the proposed process; the commercial efficacy of the proposed process in light of the specific circumstances facing the receiver; and whether the sales process will optimize the chances, in the particular circumstances, of securing the best possible price for the assets up for sale. The use of stalking horse bids to set a baseline for the bidding process, including credit bid stalking horses, has been recognized by Canadian courts as a reasonable element of a sales process. The court must balance the need to move quickly to address the real or perceived deterioration of value of the business during a sale process or the limited availability of restructuring financing, with a realistic timetable that encourages and does not chill the auction process. In light of the financial circumstances of the debtor and the lack of funding available to support operations during a sales process, Brown J. accepted the receiver's recommendation that a quick sales process was required in order to optimize the prospects of securing the best price for the assets. The court approved the stalking horse agreement for the purposes requested by the receiver.¹⁷ [Emphasis added]

32. As noted in the passage above, the use of stalking horse bids to set a baseline for the bidding process, including stalking horse credit bids, has been recognized by Canadian Courts as a reasonable element of a sales process, and so it is in the case at bar. The SISF provides interested parties with a fair and transparent process by which they may make a superior offer to purchase the assets and property of the Debtor and optimizes the prospects of achieving the best possible price for same.

33. The summary of the law set out above considers a process proposed by a receiver.

34. In addition to the factors set out above, courts will give due consideration to the “business judgement” rule and give weight to the recommendations of the Monitor when considering

¹⁶ CCM Master at paras 7-8 [Tab 3].

¹⁷ Houlden, Lloyd W. et al, *The 2019 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Toronto: Carswell, 2018), L20, citing CCM Master [Tab 4].

whether to approve a sales process.¹⁸ The Receiver respectfully submits that, as the recommendation of the Monitor carries great weight with the Court in any approval process, so should the recommendations of the Receiver, who is also a court-appointed officer and experienced in the insolvency field.

35. The caselaw is clear that the question to be asked is not whether a sales process is perfect, only whether it is reasonable.¹⁹

B. THE SISP AND STALKING HORSE BID SHOULD BE APPROVED

(i) The SISP and Stalking Horse Bid are warranted at this time

36. The SISP and Stalking Horse Bid are warranted at this time for several reasons.

37. First, the undertaking of a sale and investment solicitation process forms part of the Receiver's restructuring plans, and it is also the view of the Receiver that a sales and investment solicitation process needs to be run in the context of these Receivership Proceedings for the benefit of the Debtor's stakeholders.

38. Second, the fitness industry and pool of parties interested in and capable of acquiring the Debtor's assets is limited. Potential investors or purchasers that are interested in the Debtor's assets will, in the view of the Receiver, be able to participate in the SISP on the timelines set out therein.

39. Third, the SISP and Stalking Horse Bid are designed to be part of a process for assessing the viability and availability of a potential sale of the Debtor's assets in the context of these Receivership Proceedings that includes, among other things, the Receiver:

- (a) reviewing proposed operations and projected operating costs and cash flows of the Debtor;
- (b) identifying interested parties and/or potential acquirors of the Debtor's business and assets; and

¹⁸ 9286594 *Canada Inc. v Advance Engineering Products Ltd.*, 2015 SKQB 196 at para 35 [Tab 5]; *Bloom Lake, g.p.l., (Re)* 2015 QCCS 1920 [*Bloom Lake*] at para 28 [Tab 6].

¹⁹ *Sanjel Corporation (Re)*, 2016 ABQB 257 at para 80 [Tab 7].

- (c) developing a plan to contact potentially interested parties during the SISP that may have an interest in the Debtor's business or assets.

40. Fourth, it is the judgement of the Receiver that a sale transaction with respect to the Debtor's business and assets is warranted at this time and that the integrated, comprehensive nature of the Restructuring Proposal provides material value to the Debtor and is the best currently available executable restructuring option available to the Debtor in the context of these Receivership Proceedings.

41. Fifth, if the SISP is not implemented at this time, the Receiver will be required to incur additional borrowings to fund the costs of these Receivership Proceedings through an extended period of time, thereby decreasing recoveries for the Debtor's stakeholders.

42. The Receiver is of the view that the implementation of the SISP including the Stalking Horse Bid is warranted at this time. The Receiver is of the view that the SISP is a fair and transparent marketing process designed to identify the highest and best offers for the Debtor's assets and to maximize recoveries, by seeking offers superior to the Stalking Horse Bid.²⁰

(ii) The SISP and Stalking Horse Bid benefit the Debtor's economic community

43. While the Stalking Horse Bid may, or may not, be the final or best bid at the end of the SISP, it provides for stakeholder value maximization by, among other things, generating interest in the Debtor's assets, setting a "floor price" that will potentially be bested by any bids received under the SISP, and enhancing the fairness of the sale process.

44. The existence of the Stalking Horse Bid, and the support of the Stalking Horse Bidder, also provides value by demonstrating to, among others, the Debtor's employees, contractors, and creditors that they should have confidence in the Debtor and that the Debtor's business will survive as an ongoing business.

45. Stakeholder confidence in the ability of the Debtor's business to continue as a going concern is critical to ensuring that the Debtor's business can navigate the COVID-19 environment, restructure, and survive as a viable business.

46. The Stalking Horse Bid further contemplates that the Stalking Horse Bidder will assume significant operating liabilities of the Debtor, including all obligations of the Debtor under their

²⁰ Supplemental Report of the Receiver, at paras 8, 10 and 11.

operational contracts. In this regard, the value of the Stalking Horse Bid goes beyond the cash purchase price it provides. The Stalking Horse Bid gives real additional value to the Debtor's trade, employment, and other stakeholders.

47. The fact that the Stalking Horse Bid continues the employment of nearly all of the Debtor's employees is a significant benefit to those who depend on the Debtor's business operations for their livelihoods and economic well-being.

(iii) There is currently no better alternative to the SISP and Stalking Horse Bid

48. The Receiver has worked closely with the Debtor and Stalking Horse Bidder, to identify potential restructuring options that maximize value for the benefit of the Debtor's stakeholders. The Receiver does not believe that there are better viable alternatives to the transactions that are the subject of this Application and is of the view that pursuit of the SISP and Stalking Horse Bid is warranted at this time, is the appropriate course of action, and will benefit the Debtor and their stakeholders through value maximization and is an effective method to maximize the value of the Debtor.²¹

(iv) The SISP and Stalking Horse Bid provide for a fair and transparent sales process

49. The proposed SISP is consistent with similar sales processes approved in other Canadian insolvency proceedings.²²

50. The SISP affords flexibility to potential bidders who may submit bids with respect to one or more of an investment, restructuring, recapitalization, refinancing or other form of reorganization of the business and affairs of the Debtor as a going concern or a sale (or partial sales) of all, substantially all, or certain of the Debtor's property, or a combination thereof.

51. The Receiver similarly has flexibility to accept not only the bid that provides the most cash, but to also consider other factors as well, such as levels of conditionality and overall impact on stakeholders.

52. The timelines for the proposed SISP are based on the consideration of a number of factors, including that (a) the pool of potential purchasers with sufficient resources and expertise

²¹ Supplemental Report of the Receiver, at para 12.

²² Supplemental Report of the Receiver, at para 21(b).

to acquire and operate a fitness center; (b) discussions with potentially interested parties have already taken place; and (c) the *prima facie* need to advance the SISP as soon as possible given the Debtor's current liquidity position.

53. Further, as discussed above, the SISP will allow the Receiver to maximize value for the Debtor's business and assets by seeking offers superior to the Stalking Horse Bid. Only if a superior bid is not identified in the SISP will the Receiver seek approval of the Court to consummate the Stalking Horse Bid. For the reasons set forth herein, the Receiver believes that the Stalking Horse Bid provides substantial and immediate benefits to the Debtor and its stakeholders.

54. In the circumstances:

- (a) the marketing and advertisement contemplated in the SISP will ensure that the Debtor's assets are adequately exposed to the market;
- (b) the SISP will allow for the assessment of the legitimacy of the bidders and their ability to ultimately close on a transaction;
- (c) the due diligence period and information available through the Teaser and the Data Room (both terms as defined in the SISP), and the ability to meet with management of the Debtor provides potential purchasers with the time and information required to make an informed offer; and
- (d) the timelines set out in the SISP provide a reasonable opportunity for all interested parties to submit competing offers and the auction provisions allow for a fair and transparent process to solicit the best offer for the Debtor and its stakeholders.

55. The timeframe to solicit a purchaser or investor in the Debtor's business is also reasonable and appropriate in light of the Debtor's circumstances and the significant costs being incurred during these Receivership Proceedings. Advancing the SISP on the timelines proposed is necessary to preserve the Receiver's financial resources with a view to maximizing value for all stakeholders.

56. Notwithstanding the need to quickly advance the SISP, the proposed SISP does not tie the hands of the Receiver to the milestones contained therein. The Receiver may, subject to certain conditions, extend certain deadlines to such date or time as the Receiver may determine

appropriate. The Receiver may also waive compliance with the requirements specified in the SISP and deem a non-compliant bid to be compliant. The Receiver may further schedule the potential auction for another time and place other than as defined in the SISP. The process in the SISP expressly gives the Receiver flexibility to respond to any unforeseen circumstances to ensure that the process is responsive and designed to maximize value.

57. For these reasons, it is the judgement of the Receiver that the SISP will provide an appropriate test for whether the Stalking Horse Bid delivers the best possible result for all stakeholders and will result in a fair and reasonable process that will adequately canvass the market in order to maximize value for the Debtor's assets for the benefit of the Debtor's stakeholders.

58. The Receiver is also of the view that the SISP terms and timeframe are reasonable in the circumstances and afford the Debtor with an opportunity to achieve a successful restructuring transaction within the circumstances facing the Debtor and that time is of the essence to preserve the value within the Debtor's ongoing operations.²³

(v) The SISP and the Stalking Horse Bid are commercially efficacious in the circumstances

59. The Restructuring Proposal, as an integrated package, is the best currently available executable restructuring option available to the Debtor in the context of these Receivership Proceedings.

60. The Break Fee and expense reimbursement provisions in favour of the Stalking Horse Bidder are frequently approved in insolvency proceedings.²⁴ Such "break fees" do not merely reflect the cost to the purchaser of putting together the stalking horse bid. They may include the price of stability, and thus some premium over simply providing for out of pocket expenses is appropriate.²⁵

²³ Supplemental Report of the Receiver, at para 11.

²⁴ *CCM Master* at para 13 [Tab 3].

²⁵ *Danier Leather* at para 41 [Tab 2], citing Daniel R. Dowdall & Jane O. Dietrich, "Do Stalking Horses Have a Place in Intra-Canadian Insolvencies", 2005 ANNREVINSOLV 1 at 4; *CCM Master* at para 13 [Tab 3].

61. It is the Receiver's judgement that, when considered as part of an overall package, together with the SISP, the Break Fee and expense reimbursement provisions of the Stalking Horse Bid are in line with market terms and are commercially reasonable in the circumstances.²⁶

62. The Break Fee and expense reimbursement provisions in the Stalking Horse Bid fall well within the range of reasonableness, and as such should be approved in the circumstances.²⁷

63. The Receiver is of the view that reimbursing the Stalking Horse Bidder for certain fees and offering bid protections should a superior bid be selected in accordance with the SISP is reasonable in the circumstances. The Receiver has considered the Break Fee and expenses reimbursement provisions and is of the view that they are in line with market comparable transactions and are commercially reasonable in the circumstances.²⁸

PART V- CONCLUSION

64. The Receiver respectfully submits that the relief requested in the SISP Order is reasonable and necessary and ask that the SISP be granted by this Court.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 20th DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2020

TORYS LLP



Kyle Kashuba and Jessie Mann
Counsel to the Receiver

²⁶ Supplemental Report of the Receiver, at para 19.

²⁷ *Danier Leather* at para 44 [Tab 2]

²⁸ Supplemental Report of the Receiver, at paras 19 and 20.

LIST OF AUTHORITIES

TAB	DESCRIPTION
1	<i>Century Services Inc. v Canada (Attorney General)</i> , 2010 SCC 60
2	<i>Danier Leather Inc. (Re)</i> , 2016 ONSC 1044
3	<i>CCM Master Qualified Fund Ltd v blutip Power Technologies Ltd</i> , 2012 ONSC 1750
4	Houlden, Lloyd W. et al, <i>The 2019 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act</i> (Toronto: Carswell, 2018), L20
5	<i>9286594 Canada Inc. v Advance Engineering Products Ltd.</i> , 2015 SKQB 196
6	<i>Bloom Lake, g.p.l. (Re)</i> , 2015 QCCS 1920
7	<i>Sanjel Corporation (Re)</i> , 2016 ABQB 257

Century Services Inc. Appellant

v.

**Attorney General of Canada on behalf
of Her Majesty The Queen in Right of
Canada Respondent**

**INDEXED AS: CENTURY SERVICES INC. v. CANADA
(ATTORNEY GENERAL)**

2010 SCC 60

File No.: 33239.

2010: May 11; 2010: December 16.

Present: McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps,
Fish, Abella, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ.

**ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR
BRITISH COLUMBIA**

Bankruptcy and Insolvency — Priorities — Crown applying on eve of bankruptcy of debtor company to have GST monies held in trust paid to Receiver General of Canada — Whether deemed trust in favour of Crown under Excise Tax Act prevails over provisions of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act purporting to nullify deemed trusts in favour of Crown — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 18.3(1) — Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15, s. 222(3).

Bankruptcy and insolvency — Procedure — Whether chambers judge had authority to make order partially lifting stay of proceedings to allow debtor company to make assignment in bankruptcy and to stay Crown's right to enforce GST deemed trust — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 11.

Trusts — Express trusts — GST collected but unremitted to Crown — Judge ordering that GST be held by Monitor in trust account — Whether segregation of Crown's GST claim in Monitor's account created an express trust in favour of Crown.

Century Services Inc. Appelante

c.

**Procureur général du Canada au
nom de Sa Majesté la Reine du chef du
Canada Intimé**

**RÉPERTORIÉ : CENTURY SERVICES INC. c. CANADA
(PROCUREUR GÉNÉRAL)**

2010 CSC 60

N° du greffe : 33239.

2010 : 11 mai; 2010 : 16 décembre.

Présents : La juge en chef McLachlin et les juges Binnie,
LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron, Rothstein et
Cromwell.

**EN APPEL DE LA COUR D'APPEL DE LA
COLOMBIE-BRITANNIQUE**

Faillite et insolvabilité — Priorités — Demande de la Couronne à la société débitrice, la veille de la faillite, sollicitant le paiement au receveur général du Canada de la somme détenue en fiducie au titre de la TPS — La fiducie réputée établie par la Loi sur la taxe d'accise en faveur de la Couronne l'emporte-t-elle sur les dispositions de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies censées neutraliser ces fiducies? — Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies, L.R.C. 1985, ch. C-36, art. 18.3(1) — Loi sur la taxe d'accise, L.R.C. 1985, ch. E-15, art. 222(3).

Faillite et insolvabilité — Procédure — Le juge en cabinet avait-il le pouvoir, d'une part, de lever partiellement la suspension des procédures pour permettre à la compagnie débitrice de faire cession de ses biens en faillite et, d'autre part, de suspendre les mesures prises par la Couronne pour bénéficier de la fiducie réputée se rapportant à la TPS? — Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies, L.R.C. 1985, ch. C-36, art. 11.

Fiducies — Fiducies expresses — Somme perçue au titre de la TPS mais non versée à la Couronne — Ordonnance du juge exigeant que la TPS soit détenue par le contrôleur dans son compte en fiducie — Le fait que le montant de TPS réclamé par la Couronne soit détenu séparément dans le compte du contrôleur a-t-il créé une fiducie expresse en faveur de la Couronne?

The debtor company commenced proceedings under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA"), obtaining a stay of proceedings to allow it time to reorganize its financial affairs. One of the debtor company's outstanding debts at the commencement of the reorganization was an amount of unremitted Goods and Services Tax ("GST") payable to the Crown. Section 222(3) of the *Excise Tax Act* ("ETA") created a deemed trust over unremitted GST, which operated despite any other enactment of Canada except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* ("BIA"). However, s. 18.3(1) of the CCAA provided that any statutory deemed trusts in favour of the Crown did not operate under the CCAA, subject to certain exceptions, none of which mentioned GST.

Pursuant to an order of the CCAA chambers judge, a payment not exceeding \$5 million was approved to the debtor company's major secured creditor, Century Services. However, the chambers judge also ordered the debtor company to hold back and segregate in the Monitor's trust account an amount equal to the unremitted GST pending the outcome of the reorganization. On concluding that reorganization was not possible, the debtor company sought leave of the court to partially lift the stay of proceedings so it could make an assignment in bankruptcy under the BIA. The Crown moved for immediate payment of unremitted GST to the Receiver General. The chambers judge denied the Crown's motion, and allowed the assignment in bankruptcy. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on two grounds. First, it reasoned that once reorganization efforts had failed, the chambers judge was bound under the priority scheme provided by the ETA to allow payment of unremitted GST to the Crown and had no discretion under s. 11 of the CCAA to continue the stay against the Crown's claim. Second, the Court of Appeal concluded that by ordering the GST funds segregated in the Monitor's trust account, the chambers judge had created an express trust in favour of the Crown.

Held (Abella J. dissenting): The appeal should be allowed.

Per McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ.: The apparent conflict between s. 222(3) of the ETA and s. 18.3(1) of the CCAA can be resolved through an interpretation that properly recognizes the history of the CCAA, its function amidst the body of insolvency legislation enacted by

La compagnie débitrice a déposé une requête sous le régime de la *Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies* (« LACC ») et obtenu la suspension des procédures dans le but de réorganiser ses finances. Parmi les dettes de la compagnie débitrice au début de la réorganisation figurait une somme due à la Couronne, mais non versée encore, au titre de la taxe sur les produits et services (« TPS »). Le paragraphe 222(3) de la *Loi sur la taxe d'accise* (« LTA ») crée une fiducie réputée visant les sommes de TPS non versées. Cette fiducie s'applique malgré tout autre texte législatif du Canada sauf la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité* (« LFI »). Toutefois, le par. 18.3(1) de la LACC prévoyait que, sous réserve de certaines exceptions, dont aucune ne concerne la TPS, les fiducies réputées établies par la loi en faveur de la Couronne ne s'appliquaient pas sous son régime.

Le juge siégeant en son cabinet chargé d'appliquer la LACC a approuvé par ordonnance le paiement à Century Services, le principal créancier garanti du débiteur, d'une somme d'au plus cinq millions de dollars. Toutefois, il a également ordonné à la compagnie débitrice de retenir un montant égal aux sommes de TPS non versées et de le déposer séparément dans le compte en fiducie du contrôleur jusqu'à l'issue de la réorganisation. Ayant conclu que la réorganisation n'était pas possible, la compagnie débitrice a demandé au tribunal de lever partiellement la suspension des procédures pour lui permettre de faire cession de ses biens en vertu de la LFI. La Couronne a demandé par requête le paiement immédiat au receveur général des sommes de TPS non versées. Le juge siégeant en son cabinet a rejeté la requête de la Couronne et autorisé la cession des biens. La Cour d'appel a accueilli l'appel pour deux raisons. Premièrement, elle a conclu que, après que la tentative de réorganisation eut échoué, le juge siégeant en son cabinet était tenu, en raison de la priorité établie par la LTA, d'autoriser le paiement à la Couronne des sommes qui lui étaient dues au titre de la TPS, et que l'art. 11 de la LACC ne lui conférait pas le pouvoir discrétionnaire de maintenir la suspension de la demande de la Couronne. Deuxièmement, la Cour d'appel a conclu que, en ordonnant la ségrégation des sommes de TPS dans le compte en fiducie du contrôleur, le juge siégeant en son cabinet avait créé une fiducie expresse en faveur de la Couronne.

Arrêt (la juge Abella est dissidente) : Le pourvoi est accueilli.

La juge en chef McLachlin et les juges Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Charron, Rothstein et Cromwell : Il est possible de résoudre le conflit apparent entre le par. 222(3) de la LTA et le par. 18.3(1) de la LACC en les interprétant d'une manière qui tienne compte adéquatement de l'historique de la LACC, de la fonction de cette loi parmi

Parliament and the principles for interpreting the *CCAA* that have been recognized in the jurisprudence. The history of the *CCAA* distinguishes it from the *BIA* because although these statutes share the same remedial purpose of avoiding the social and economic costs of liquidating a debtor's assets, the *CCAA* offers more flexibility and greater judicial discretion than the rules-based mechanism under the *BIA*, making the former more responsive to complex reorganizations. Because the *CCAA* is silent on what happens if reorganization fails, the *BIA* scheme of liquidation and distribution necessarily provides the backdrop against which creditors assess their priority in the event of bankruptcy. The contemporary thrust of legislative reform has been towards harmonizing aspects of insolvency law common to the *CCAA* and the *BIA*, and one of its important features has been a cutback in Crown priorities. Accordingly, the *CCAA* and the *BIA* both contain provisions nullifying statutory deemed trusts in favour of the Crown, and both contain explicit exceptions exempting source deductions deemed trusts from this general rule. Meanwhile, both Acts are harmonious in treating other Crown claims as unsecured. No such clear and express language exists in those Acts carving out an exception for GST claims.

When faced with the apparent conflict between s. 222(3) of the *ETA* and s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA*, courts have been inclined to follow *Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp. (Re)* and resolve the conflict in favour of the *ETA*. *Ottawa Senators* should not be followed. Rather, the *CCAA* provides the rule. Section 222(3) of the *ETA* evinces no explicit intention of Parliament to repeal *CCAA* s. 18.3. Where Parliament has sought to protect certain Crown claims through statutory deemed trusts and intended that these deemed trusts continue in insolvency, it has legislated so expressly and elaborately. Meanwhile, there is no express statutory basis for concluding that GST claims enjoy a preferred treatment under the *CCAA* or the *BIA*. The internal logic of the *CCAA* appears to subject a GST deemed trust to the waiver by Parliament of its priority. A strange asymmetry would result if differing treatments of GST deemed trusts under the *CCAA* and the *BIA* were found to exist, as this would encourage statute shopping, undermine the *CCAA*'s remedial purpose and invite the very social ills that the statute was enacted to avert. The later in time enactment of the more general s. 222(3) of the *ETA* does not require application of the doctrine of implied repeal to the earlier and more specific s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* in the circumstances of this case. In any event,

l'ensemble des textes adoptés par le législateur fédéral en matière d'insolvabilité et des principes d'interprétation de la *LACC* reconnus dans la jurisprudence. L'historique de la *LACC* permet de distinguer celle-ci de la *LFI* en ce sens que, bien que ces lois aient pour objet d'éviter les coûts sociaux et économiques liés à la liquidation de l'actif d'un débiteur, la *LACC* offre plus de souplesse et accorde aux tribunaux un plus grand pouvoir discrétionnaire que le mécanisme fondé sur des règles de la *LFI*, ce qui rend la première mieux adaptée aux réorganisations complexes. Comme la *LACC* ne précise pas ce qui arrive en cas d'échec de la réorganisation, la *LFI* fournit la norme de référence permettant aux créanciers de savoir s'ils ont la priorité dans l'éventualité d'une faillite. Le travail de réforme législative contemporain a principalement visé à harmoniser les aspects communs à la *LACC* et à la *LFI*, et l'une des caractéristiques importantes de cette réforme est la réduction des priorités dont jouit la Couronne. Par conséquent, la *LACC* et la *LFI* contiennent toutes deux des dispositions neutralisant les fiducies réputées établies en vertu d'un texte législatif en faveur de la Couronne, et toutes deux comportent des exceptions expresses à la règle générale qui concernent les fiducies réputées établies à l'égard des retenues à la source. Par ailleurs, ces deux lois considèrent les autres créances de la Couronne comme des créances non garanties. Ces lois ne comportent pas de dispositions claires et expresses établissant une exception pour les créances relatives à la TPS.

Les tribunaux appelés à résoudre le conflit apparent entre le par. 222(3) de la *LTA* et le par. 18.3(1) de la *LACC* ont été enclins à appliquer l'arrêt *Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp. (Re)* et à trancher en faveur de la *LTA*. Il ne convient pas de suivre cet arrêt. C'est plutôt la *LACC* qui énonce la règle applicable. Le paragraphe 222(3) de la *LTA* ne révèle aucune intention explicite du législateur d'abroger l'art. 18.3 de la *LACC*. Quand le législateur a voulu protéger certaines créances de la Couronne au moyen de fiducies réputées et voulu que celles-ci continuent de s'appliquer en situation d'insolvabilité, il l'a indiqué de manière explicite et minutieuse. En revanche, il n'existe aucune disposition législative expresse permettant de conclure que les créances relatives à la TPS bénéficient d'un traitement préférentiel sous le régime de la *LACC* ou de la *LFI*. Il semble découler de la logique interne de la *LACC* que la fiducie réputée établie à l'égard de la TPS est visée par la renonciation du législateur à sa priorité. Il y aurait une étrange asymétrie si l'on concluait que la *LACC* ne traite pas les fiducies réputées à l'égard de la TPS de la même manière que la *LFI*, car cela encouragerait les créanciers à recourir à la loi la plus favorable, minerait les objectifs réparateurs de la *LACC* et risquerait de favoriser les maux sociaux que l'édiction de ce texte législatif visait justement à

recent amendments to the *CCAA* in 2005 resulted in s. 18.3 of the Act being renumbered and reformulated, making it the later in time provision. This confirms that Parliament's intent with respect to GST deemed trusts is to be found in the *CCAA*. The conflict between the *ETA* and the *CCAA* is more apparent than real.

The exercise of judicial discretion has allowed the *CCAA* to adapt and evolve to meet contemporary business and social needs. As reorganizations become increasingly complex, *CCAA* courts have been called upon to innovate. In determining their jurisdiction to sanction measures in a *CCAA* proceeding, courts should first interpret the provisions of the *CCAA* before turning to their inherent or equitable jurisdiction. Noteworthy in this regard is the expansive interpretation the language of the *CCAA* is capable of supporting. The general language of the *CCAA* should not be read as being restricted by the availability of more specific orders. The requirements of appropriateness, good faith and due diligence are baseline considerations that a court should always bear in mind when exercising *CCAA* authority. The question is whether the order will usefully further efforts to avoid the social and economic losses resulting from liquidation of an insolvent company, which extends to both the purpose of the order and the means it employs. Here, the chambers judge's order staying the Crown's GST claim was in furtherance of the *CCAA*'s objectives because it blunted the impulse of creditors to interfere in an orderly liquidation and fostered a harmonious transition from the *CCAA* to the *BIA*, meeting the objective of a single proceeding that is common to both statutes. The transition from the *CCAA* to the *BIA* may require the partial lifting of a stay of proceedings under the *CCAA* to allow commencement of *BIA* proceedings, but no gap exists between the two statutes because they operate in tandem and creditors in both cases look to the *BIA* scheme of distribution to foreshadow how they will fare if the reorganization is unsuccessful. The breadth of the court's discretion under the *CCAA* is sufficient to construct a bridge to liquidation under the *BIA*. Hence, the chambers judge's order was authorized.

prévenir. Le paragraphe 222(3) de la *LTA*, une disposition plus récente et générale que le par. 18.3(1) de la *LACC*, n'exige pas l'application de la doctrine de l'abrogation implicite dans les circonstances de la présente affaire. En tout état de cause, par suite des modifications apportées récemment à la *LACC* en 2005, l'art. 18.3 a été reformulé et renuméroté, ce qui en fait la disposition postérieure. Cette constatation confirme que c'est dans la *LACC* qu'est exprimée l'intention du législateur en ce qui a trait aux fiducies réputées visant la TPS. Le conflit entre la *LTA* et la *LACC* est plus apparent que réel.

L'exercice par les tribunaux de leurs pouvoirs discrétionnaires a fait en sorte que la *LACC* a évolué et s'est adaptée aux besoins commerciaux et sociaux contemporains. Comme les réorganisations deviennent très complexes, les tribunaux chargés d'appliquer la *LACC* ont été appelés à innover. Les tribunaux doivent d'abord interpréter les dispositions de la *LACC* avant d'invoquer leur compétence inhérente ou leur compétence en equity pour établir leur pouvoir de prendre des mesures dans le cadre d'une procédure fondée sur la *LACC*. À cet égard, il faut souligner que le texte de la *LACC* peut être interprété très largement. La possibilité pour le tribunal de rendre des ordonnances plus spécifiques n'a pas pour effet de restreindre la portée des termes généraux utilisés dans la *LACC*. L'opportunité, la bonne foi et la diligence sont des considérations de base que le tribunal devrait toujours garder à l'esprit lorsqu'il exerce les pouvoirs conférés par la *LACC*. Il s'agit de savoir si l'ordonnance contribuera utilement à la réalisation de l'objectif d'éviter les pertes sociales et économiques résultant de la liquidation d'une compagnie insolvable. Ce critère s'applique non seulement à l'objectif de l'ordonnance, mais aussi aux moyens utilisés. En l'espèce, l'ordonnance du juge siégeant en son cabinet qui a suspendu l'exécution des mesures de recouvrement de la Couronne à l'égard de la TPS contribuait à la réalisation des objectifs de la *LACC*, parce qu'elle avait pour effet de dissuader les créanciers d'entraver une liquidation ordonnée et favorisait une transition harmonieuse entre la *LACC* et la *LFI*, répondant ainsi à l'objectif — commun aux deux lois — qui consiste à avoir une seule procédure. Le passage de la *LACC* à la *LFI* peut exiger la levée partielle d'une suspension de procédures ordonnée en vertu de la *LACC*, de façon à permettre l'engagement des procédures fondées sur la *LFI*, mais il n'existe aucun hiatus entre ces lois étant donné qu'elles s'appliquent de concert et que, dans les deux cas, les créanciers examinent le régime de distribution prévu par la *LFI* pour connaître la situation qui serait la leur en cas d'échec de la réorganisation. L'ampleur du pouvoir discrétionnaire conféré au tribunal par la *LACC* suffit pour établir une passerelle vers une liquidation opérée sous le régime de la *LFI*. Le juge siégeant en son cabinet pouvait donc rendre l'ordonnance qu'il a prononcée.

No express trust was created by the chambers judge's order in this case because there is no certainty of object inferable from his order. Creation of an express trust requires certainty of intention, subject matter and object. At the time the chambers judge accepted the proposal to segregate the monies in the Monitor's trust account there was no certainty that the Crown would be the beneficiary, or object, of the trust because exactly who might take the money in the final result was in doubt. In any event, no dispute over the money would even arise under the interpretation of s. 18.3(1) of the CCAA established above, because the Crown's deemed trust priority over GST claims would be lost under the CCAA and the Crown would rank as an unsecured creditor for this amount.

Per Fish J.: The GST monies collected by the debtor are not subject to a deemed trust or priority in favour of the Crown. In recent years, Parliament has given detailed consideration to the Canadian insolvency scheme but has declined to amend the provisions at issue in this case, a deliberate exercise of legislative discretion. On the other hand, in upholding deemed trusts created by the *ETA* notwithstanding insolvency proceedings, courts have been unduly protective of Crown interests which Parliament itself has chosen to subordinate to competing prioritized claims. In the context of the Canadian insolvency regime, deemed trusts exist only where there is a statutory provision creating the trust and a CCAA or BIA provision explicitly confirming its effective operation. The *Income Tax Act*, the *Canada Pension Plan* and the *Employment Insurance Act* all contain deemed trust provisions that are strikingly similar to that in s. 222 of the *ETA* but they are all also confirmed in s. 37 of the CCAA and in s. 67(3) of the BIA in clear and unmistakable terms. The same is not true of the deemed trust created under the *ETA*. Although Parliament created a deemed trust in favour of the Crown to hold unremitted GST monies, and although it purports to maintain this trust notwithstanding any contrary federal or provincial legislation, it did not confirm the continued operation of the trust in either the BIA or the CCAA, reflecting Parliament's intention to allow the deemed trust to lapse with the commencement of insolvency proceedings.

L'ordonnance du juge siégeant en son cabinet n'a pas créé de fiducie expresse en l'espèce, car aucune certitude d'objet ne peut être inférée de cette ordonnance. La création d'une fiducie expresse exige la présence de certitudes quant à l'intention, à la matière et à l'objet. Lorsque le juge siégeant en son cabinet a accepté la proposition que les sommes soient détenues séparément dans le compte en fiducie du contrôleur, il n'existait aucune certitude que la Couronne serait le bénéficiaire ou l'objet de la fiducie, car il y avait un doute quant à la question de savoir qui au juste pourrait toucher l'argent en fin de compte. De toute façon, suivant l'interprétation du par. 18.3(1) de la LACC dégagee précédemment, aucun différend ne saurait même exister quant à l'argent, étant donné que la priorité accordée aux réclamations de la Couronne fondées sur la fiducie réputée visant la TPS ne s'applique pas sous le régime de la LACC et que la Couronne est reléguée au rang de créancier non garanti à l'égard des sommes en question.

Le juge Fish : Les sommes perçues par la débitrice au titre de la TPS ne font l'objet d'aucune fiducie réputée ou priorité en faveur de la Couronne. Au cours des dernières années, le législateur fédéral a procédé à un examen approfondi du régime canadien d'insolvabilité, mais il a refusé de modifier les dispositions qui sont en cause dans la présente affaire. Il s'agit d'un exercice délibéré du pouvoir discrétionnaire de légiférer. Par contre, en maintenant, malgré l'existence des procédures d'insolvabilité, la validité de fiducies réputées créées en vertu de la LTA, les tribunaux ont protégé indûment des droits de la Couronne que le Parlement avait lui-même choisi de subordonner à d'autres créances prioritaires. Dans le contexte du régime canadien d'insolvabilité, il existe une fiducie réputée uniquement lorsqu'une disposition législative crée la fiducie et qu'une disposition de la LACC ou de la LFI confirme explicitement l'existence de la fiducie. La *Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu*, le *Régime de pensions du Canada* et la *Loi sur l'assurance-emploi* renferment toutes des dispositions relatives aux fiducies réputées dont le libellé offre une ressemblance frappante avec celui de l'art. 222 de la LTA, mais le maintien en vigueur des fiducies réputées créées en vertu de ces dispositions est confirmé à l'art. 37 de la LACC et au par. 67(3) de la LFI en termes clairs et explicites. La situation est différente dans le cas de la fiducie réputée créée par la LTA. Bien que le législateur crée en faveur de la Couronne une fiducie réputée dans laquelle seront conservées les sommes recueillies au titre de la TPS mais non encore versées, et bien qu'il prétende maintenir cette fiducie en vigueur malgré les dispositions à l'effet contraire de toute loi fédérale ou provinciale, il ne confirme pas l'existence de la fiducie dans la LFI ou la LACC, ce qui témoigne de son intention de laisser la fiducie réputée devenir caduque au moment de l'introduction de la procédure d'insolvabilité.

Per Abella J. (dissenting): Section 222(3) of the *ETA* gives priority during *CCAA* proceedings to the Crown's deemed trust in unremitted GST. This provision unequivocally defines its boundaries in the clearest possible terms and excludes only the *BIA* from its legislative grasp. The language used reflects a clear legislative intention that s. 222(3) would prevail if in conflict with any other law except the *BIA*. This is borne out by the fact that following the enactment of s. 222(3), amendments to the *CCAA* were introduced, and despite requests from various constituencies, s. 18.3(1) was not amended to make the priorities in the *CCAA* consistent with those in the *BIA*. This indicates a deliberate legislative choice to protect the deemed trust in s. 222(3) from the reach of s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA*.

The application of other principles of interpretation reinforces this conclusion. An earlier, specific provision may be overruled by a subsequent general statute if the legislature indicates, through its language, an intention that the general provision prevails. Section 222(3) achieves this through the use of language stating that it prevails despite any law of Canada, of a province, or "any other law" other than the *BIA*. Section 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* is thereby rendered inoperative for purposes of s. 222(3). By operation of s. 44(f) of the *Interpretation Act*, the transformation of s. 18.3(1) into s. 37(1) after the enactment of s. 222(3) of the *ETA* has no effect on the interpretive queue, and s. 222(3) of the *ETA* remains the "later in time" provision. This means that the deemed trust provision in s. 222(3) of the *ETA* takes precedence over s. 18.3(1) during *CCAA* proceedings. While s. 11 gives a court discretion to make orders notwithstanding the *BIA* and the *Winding-up Act*, that discretion is not liberated from the operation of any other federal statute. Any exercise of discretion is therefore circumscribed by whatever limits are imposed by statutes other than the *BIA* and the *Winding-up Act*. That includes the *ETA*. The chambers judge in this case was, therefore, required to respect the priority regime set out in s. 222(3) of the *ETA*. Neither s. 18.3(1) nor s. 11 of the *CCAA* gave him the authority to ignore it. He could not, as a result, deny the Crown's request for payment of the GST funds during the *CCAA* proceedings.

La juge Abella (dissidente) : Le paragraphe 222(3) de la *LTA* donne préséance, dans le cadre d'une procédure relevant de la *LACC*, à la fiducie réputée qui est établie en faveur de la Couronne à l'égard de la TPS non versée. Cette disposition définit sans équivoque sa portée dans des termes on ne peut plus clairs et n'exclut que la *LFI* de son champ d'application. Les termes employés révèlent l'intention claire du législateur que le par. 222(3) l'emporte en cas de conflit avec toute autre loi sauf la *LFI*. Cette opinion est confortée par le fait que des modifications ont été apportées à la *LACC* après l'édiction du par. 222(3) et que, malgré les demandes répétées de divers groupes, le par. 18.3(1) n'a pas été modifié pour aligner l'ordre de priorité établi par la *LACC* sur celui de la *LFI*. Cela indique que le législateur a délibérément choisi de soustraire la fiducie réputée établie au par. 222(3) à l'application du par. 18.3(1) de la *LACC*.

Cette conclusion est renforcée par l'application d'autres principes d'interprétation. Une disposition spécifique antérieure peut être supplantée par une loi ultérieure de portée générale si le législateur, par les mots qu'il a employés, a exprimé l'intention de faire prévaloir la loi générale. Le paragraphe 222(3) accomplit cela de par son libellé, lequel précise que la disposition l'emporte sur tout autre texte législatif fédéral, tout texte législatif provincial ou « toute autre règle de droit » sauf la *LFI*. Le paragraphe 18.3(1) de la *LACC* est par conséquent rendu inopérant aux fins d'application du par. 222(3). Selon l'alinéa 44f) de la *Loi d'interprétation*, le fait que le par. 18.3(1) soit devenu le par. 37(1) à la suite de l'édiction du par. 222(3) de la *LTA* n'a aucune incidence sur l'ordre chronologique du point de vue de l'interprétation, et le par. 222(3) de la *LTA* demeure la disposition « postérieure ». Il s'ensuit que la disposition créant une fiducie réputée que l'on trouve au par. 222(3) de la *LTA* l'emporte sur le par. 18.3(1) dans le cadre d'une procédure fondée sur la *LACC*. Bien que l'art. 11 accorde au tribunal le pouvoir discrétionnaire de rendre des ordonnances malgré les dispositions de la *LFI* et de la *Loi sur les liquidations*, ce pouvoir discrétionnaire demeure assujéti à l'application de toute autre loi fédérale. L'exercice de ce pouvoir discrétionnaire est donc circonscrit par les limites imposées par toute loi autre que la *LFI* et la *Loi sur les liquidations*, et donc par la *LTA*. En l'espèce, le juge siégeant en son cabinet était donc tenu de respecter le régime de priorités établi au par. 222(3) de la *LTA*. Ni le par. 18.3(1), ni l'art. 11 de la *LACC* ne l'autorisaient à en faire abstraction. Par conséquent, il ne pouvait pas refuser la demande présentée par la Couronne en vue de se faire payer la TPS dans le cadre de la procédure introduite en vertu de la *LACC*.

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APPEAL from a judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal (Newbury, Tysoe and Smith J.J.A.), 2009 BCCA 205, 98 B.C.L.R. (4th) 242, 270 B.C.A.C. 167, 454 W.A.C. 167, [2009] 12 W.W.R. 684, [2009] G.S.T.C. 79, [2009] B.C.J. No. 918 (QL), 2009 CarswellBC 1195, reversing a judgment of Brenner C.J.S.C., 2008 BCSC 1805, [2008] G.S.T.C. 221, [2008] B.C.J. No. 2611 (QL), 2008 CarswellBC 2895, dismissing a Crown application for payment of GST monies. Appeal allowed, Abella J. dissenting.

Mary I. A. Buttery, Owen J. James and Matthew J. G. Curtis, for the appellant.

Gordon Bourgard, David Jacyk and Michael J. Lema, for the respondent.

The judgment of McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell J.J. was delivered by

[1] DESCHAMPS J. — For the first time this Court is called upon to directly interpret the provisions of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("CCAA"). In that respect, two questions are raised. The first requires reconciliation of provisions of the CCAA and the *Excise Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 ("ETA"), which lower courts have held to be in conflict with one another. The second concerns the scope of a court's discretion when supervising reorganization. The relevant statutory provisions are reproduced in the Appendix. On the first question, having considered the evolution of Crown priorities in the context of insolvency and the wording of the various statutes creating Crown priorities, I conclude that it is the CCAA and not the ETA that provides the rule. On the second question, I conclude that the broad discretionary jurisdiction conferred on the supervising judge must be interpreted having regard to the remedial nature of the CCAA and insolvency legislation generally. Consequently, the court had the discretion to partially lift a stay of proceedings to allow the debtor to make an assignment under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency*

POURVOI contre un arrêt de la Cour d'appel de la Colombie-Britannique (les juges Newbury, Tysoe et Smith), 2009 BCCA 205, 98 B.C.L.R. (4th) 242, 270 B.C.A.C. 167, 454 W.A.C. 167, [2009] 12 W.W.R. 684, [2009] G.S.T.C. 79, [2009] B.C.J. No. 918 (QL), 2009 CarswellBC 1195, qui a infirmé une décision du juge en chef Brenner, 2008 BCSC 1805, [2008] G.S.T.C. 221, [2008] B.C.J. No. 2611 (QL), 2008 CarswellBC 2895, qui a rejeté la demande de la Couronne sollicitant le paiement de la TPS. Pourvoi accueilli, la juge Abella est dissidente.

Mary I. A. Buttery, Owen J. James et Matthew J. G. Curtis, pour l'appelante.

Gordon Bourgard, David Jacyk et Michael J. Lema, pour l'intimé.

Version française du jugement de la juge en chef McLachlin et des juges Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Charron, Rothstein et Cromwell rendu par

[1] LA JUGE DESCHAMPS — C'est la première fois que la Cour est appelée à interpréter directement les dispositions de la *Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies*, L.R.C. 1985, ch. C-36 (« LACC »). À cet égard, deux questions sont soulevées. La première requiert la conciliation d'une disposition de la LACC et d'une disposition de la *Loi sur la taxe d'accise*, L.R.C. 1985, ch. E-15 (« LTA »), qui, selon des juridictions inférieures, sont en conflit l'une avec l'autre. La deuxième concerne la portée du pouvoir discrétionnaire du tribunal qui surveille une réorganisation. Les dispositions législatives pertinentes sont reproduites en annexe. Pour ce qui est de la première question, après avoir examiné l'évolution des priorités de la Couronne en matière d'insolvabilité et le libellé des diverses lois qui établissent ces priorités, j'arrive à la conclusion que c'est la LACC, et non la LTA, qui énonce la règle applicable. Pour ce qui est de la seconde question, je conclus qu'il faut interpréter les larges pouvoirs discrétionnaires conférés au juge en tenant compte de la nature réparatrice de la LACC et de la législation sur l'insolvabilité en général. Par conséquent, le tribunal avait le pouvoir

Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 (“*BIA*”). I would allow the appeal.

1. Facts and Decisions of the Courts Below

[2] Ted LeRoy Trucking Ltd. (“LeRoy Trucking”) commenced proceedings under the *CCAA* in the Supreme Court of British Columbia on December 13, 2007, obtaining a stay of proceedings with a view to reorganizing its financial affairs. LeRoy Trucking sold certain redundant assets as authorized by the order.

[3] Amongst the debts owed by LeRoy Trucking was an amount for Goods and Services Tax (“GST”) collected but unremitted to the Crown. The *ETA* creates a deemed trust in favour of the Crown for amounts collected in respect of GST. The deemed trust extends to any property or proceeds held by the person collecting GST and any property of that person held by a secured creditor, requiring that property to be paid to the Crown in priority to all security interests. The *ETA* provides that the deemed trust operates despite any other enactment of Canada except the *BIA*. However, the *CCAA* also provides that subject to certain exceptions, none of which mentions GST, deemed trusts in favour of the Crown do not operate under the *CCAA*. Accordingly, under the *CCAA* the Crown ranks as an unsecured creditor in respect of GST. Nonetheless, at the time LeRoy Trucking commenced *CCAA* proceedings the leading line of jurisprudence held that the *ETA* took precedence over the *CCAA* such that the Crown enjoyed priority for GST claims under the *CCAA*, even though it would have lost that same priority under the *BIA*. The *CCAA* underwent substantial amendments in 2005 in which some of the provisions at issue in this appeal were renumbered and reformulated (S.C. 2005, c. 47). However, these amendments only came into force on September 18, 2009. I will refer to the amended provisions only where relevant.

discrétionnaire de lever partiellement la suspension des procédures pour permettre au débiteur de faire cession de ses biens en vertu de la *Loi sur la faillite et l’insolvabilité*, L.R.C. 1985, ch. B-3 (« *LFI* »). Je suis d’avis d’accueillir le pourvoi.

1. Faits et décisions des juridictions inférieures

[2] Le 13 décembre 2007, Ted LeRoy Trucking Ltd. (« LeRoy Trucking ») a déposé une requête sous le régime de la *LACC* devant la Cour suprême de la Colombie-Britannique et obtenu la suspension des procédures dans le but de réorganiser ses finances. L’entreprise a vendu certains éléments d’actif excédentaires, comme l’y autorisait l’ordonnance.

[3] Parmi les dettes de LeRoy Trucking figurait une somme perçue par celle-ci au titre de la taxe sur les produits et services (« TPS ») mais non versée à la Couronne. La *LTA* crée en faveur de la Couronne une fiducie réputée visant les sommes perçues au titre de la TPS. Cette fiducie réputée s’applique à tout bien ou toute recette détenue par la personne qui perçoit la TPS et à tout bien de cette personne détenu par un créancier garanti, et le produit découlant de ces biens doit être payé à la Couronne par priorité sur tout droit en garantie. Aux termes de la *LTA*, la fiducie réputée s’applique malgré tout autre texte législatif du Canada sauf la *LFI*. Cependant, la *LACC* prévoit également que, sous réserve de certaines exceptions, dont aucune ne concerne la TPS, ne s’appliquent pas sous son régime les fiducies réputées qui existent en faveur de la Couronne. Par conséquent, pour ce qui est de la TPS, la Couronne est un créancier non garanti dans le cadre de cette loi. Néanmoins, à l’époque où LeRoy Trucking a débuté ses procédures en vertu de la *LACC*, la jurisprudence dominante indiquait que la *LTA* l’emportait sur la *LACC*, la Couronne jouissant ainsi d’un droit prioritaire à l’égard des créances relatives à la TPS dans le cadre de la *LACC*, malgré le fait qu’elle aurait perdu cette priorité en vertu de la *LFI*. La *LACC* a fait l’objet de modifications substantielles en 2005, et certaines des dispositions en cause dans le présent pourvoi ont alors été renumérotées et reformulées (L.C. 2005, ch. 47). Mais ces modifications ne sont entrées en vigueur que le 18 septembre 2009. Je ne me reporterai aux dispositions modifiées que lorsqu’il sera utile de le faire.

[4] On April 29, 2008, Brenner C.J.S.C., in the context of the CCAA proceedings, approved a payment not exceeding \$5 million, the proceeds of redundant asset sales, to Century Services, the debtor's major secured creditor. LeRoy Trucking proposed to hold back an amount equal to the GST monies collected but unremitted to the Crown and place it in the Monitor's trust account until the outcome of the reorganization was known. In order to maintain the *status quo* while the success of the reorganization was uncertain, Brenner C.J.S.C. agreed to the proposal and ordered that an amount of \$305,202.30 be held by the Monitor in its trust account.

[5] On September 3, 2008, having concluded that reorganization was not possible, LeRoy Trucking sought leave to make an assignment in bankruptcy under the BIA. The Crown sought an order that the GST monies held by the Monitor be paid to the Receiver General of Canada. Brenner C.J.S.C. dismissed the latter application. Reasoning that the purpose of segregating the funds with the Monitor was "to facilitate an ultimate payment of the GST monies which were owed pre-filing, but only if a viable plan emerged", the failure of such a reorganization, followed by an assignment in bankruptcy, meant the Crown would lose priority under the BIA (2008 BCSC 1805, [2008] G.S.T.C. 221).

[6] The Crown's appeal was allowed by the British Columbia Court of Appeal (2009 BCCA 205, 270 B.C.A.C. 167). Tysoe J.A. for a unanimous court found two independent bases for allowing the Crown's appeal.

[7] First, the court's authority under s. 11 of the CCAA was held not to extend to staying the Crown's application for immediate payment of the GST funds subject to the deemed trust after it was clear that reorganization efforts had failed and

[4] Le 29 avril 2008, le juge en chef Brenner de la Cour suprême de la Colombie-Britannique, dans le contexte des procédures intentées en vertu de la LACC, a approuvé le paiement à Century Services, le principal créancier garanti du débiteur, d'une somme d'au plus cinq millions de dollars, soit le produit de la vente d'éléments d'actif excédentaires. LeRoy Trucking a proposé de retenir un montant égal aux sommes perçues au titre de la TPS mais non versées à la Couronne et de le déposer dans le compte en fiducie du contrôleur jusqu'à ce que l'issue de la réorganisation soit connue. Afin de maintenir le statu quo, en raison du succès incertain de la réorganisation, le juge en chef Brenner a accepté la proposition et ordonné qu'une somme de 305 202,30 \$ soit détenue par le contrôleur dans son compte en fiducie.

[5] Le 3 septembre 2008, ayant conclu que la réorganisation n'était pas possible, LeRoy Trucking a demandé à la Cour suprême de la Colombie-Britannique l'autorisation de faire cession de ses biens en vertu de la LFI. Pour sa part, la Couronne a demandé au tribunal d'ordonner le paiement au receveur général du Canada de la somme détenue par le contrôleur au titre de la TPS. Le juge en chef Brenner a rejeté cette dernière demande. Selon lui, comme la détention des fonds dans le compte en fiducie du contrôleur visait à [TRADUCTION] « faciliter le paiement final des sommes de TPS qui étaient dues avant que l'entreprise ne débute les procédures, mais seulement si un plan viable était proposé », l'impossibilité de procéder à une telle réorganisation, suivie d'une cession de biens, signifiait que la Couronne perdrait sa priorité sous le régime de la LFI (2008 BCSC 1805, [2008] G.S.T.C. 221).

[6] La Cour d'appel de la Colombie-Britannique a accueilli l'appel interjeté par la Couronne (2009 BCCA 205, 270 B.C.A.C. 167). Rédigeant l'arrêt unanime de la cour, le juge Tysoe a invoqué deux raisons distinctes pour y faire droit.

[7] Premièrement, le juge d'appel Tysoe a conclu que le pouvoir conféré au tribunal par l'art. 11 de la LACC n'autorisait pas ce dernier à rejeter la demande de la Couronne sollicitant le paiement immédiat des sommes de TPS faisant l'objet de la fiducie réputée,

that bankruptcy was inevitable. As restructuring was no longer a possibility, staying the Crown's claim to the GST funds no longer served a purpose under the CCAA and the court was bound under the priority scheme provided by the *ETA* to allow payment to the Crown. In so holding, Tysoe J.A. adopted the reasoning in *Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp. (Re)* (2005), 73 O.R. (3d) 737 (C.A.), which found that the *ETA* deemed trust for GST established Crown priority over secured creditors under the CCAA.

[8] Second, Tysoe J.A. concluded that by ordering the GST funds segregated in the Monitor's trust account on April 29, 2008, the judge had created an express trust in favour of the Crown from which the monies in question could not be diverted for any other purposes. The Court of Appeal therefore ordered that the money held by the Monitor in trust be paid to the Receiver General.

2. Issues

[9] This appeal raises three broad issues which are addressed in turn:

- (1) Did s. 222(3) of the *ETA* displace s. 18.3(1) of the CCAA and give priority to the Crown's *ETA* deemed trust during CCAA proceedings as held in *Ottawa Senators*?
- (2) Did the court exceed its CCAA authority by lifting the stay to allow the debtor to make an assignment in bankruptcy?
- (3) Did the court's order of April 29, 2008 requiring segregation of the Crown's GST claim in the Monitor's trust account create an express trust in favour of the Crown in respect of those funds?

après qu'il fut devenu clair que la tentative de réorganisation avait échoué et que la faillite était inévitable. Comme la restructuration n'était plus une possibilité, il ne servait plus à rien, dans le cadre de la LACC, de suspendre le paiement à la Couronne des sommes de TPS et le tribunal était tenu, en raison de la priorité établie par la *LTA*, d'en autoriser le versement à la Couronne. Ce faisant, le juge Tysoe a adopté le raisonnement énoncé dans l'arrêt *Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp. (Re)* (2005), 73 O.R. (3d) 737 (C.A.), suivant lequel la fiducie réputée que crée la *LTA* à l'égard des sommes dues au titre de la TPS établissait la priorité de la Couronne sur les créanciers garantis dans le cadre de la LACC.

[8] Deuxièmement, le juge Tysoe a conclu que, en ordonnant la ségrégation des sommes de TPS dans le compte en fiducie du contrôleur le 29 avril 2008, le tribunal avait créé une fiducie expresse en faveur de la Couronne, et que les sommes visées ne pouvaient être utilisées à quelque autre fin que ce soit. En conséquence, la Cour d'appel a ordonné que les sommes détenues par le contrôleur en fiducie pour la Couronne soient versées au receveur général.

2. Questions en litige

[9] Le pourvoi soulève trois grandes questions que j'examinerai à tour de rôle :

- (1) Le paragraphe 222(3) de la *LTA* l'emporte-t-il sur le par. 18.3(1) de la LACC et donne-t-il priorité à la fiducie réputée qui est établie par la *LTA* en faveur de la Couronne pendant des procédures régies par la LACC, comme il a été décidé dans l'arrêt *Ottawa Senators*?
- (2) Le tribunal a-t-il outrepassé les pouvoirs qui lui étaient conférés par la LACC en levant la suspension des procédures dans le but de permettre au débiteur de faire cession de ses biens?
- (3) L'ordonnance du tribunal datée du 29 avril 2008 exigeant que le montant de TPS réclamé par la Couronne soit détenu séparément dans le compte en fiducie du contrôleur a-t-elle créé une fiducie expresse en faveur de la Couronne à l'égard des fonds en question?

3. Analysis

[10] The first issue concerns Crown priorities in the context of insolvency. As will be seen, the *ETA* provides for a deemed trust in favour of the Crown in respect of GST owed by a debtor “[d]espite . . . any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*)” (s. 222(3)), while the *CCAA* stated at the relevant time that “notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be [so] regarded” (s. 18.3(1)). It is difficult to imagine two statutory provisions more apparently in conflict. However, as is often the case, the apparent conflict can be resolved through interpretation.

[11] In order to properly interpret the provisions, it is necessary to examine the history of the *CCAA*, its function amidst the body of insolvency legislation enacted by Parliament, and the principles that have been recognized in the jurisprudence. It will be seen that Crown priorities in the insolvency context have been significantly pared down. The resolution of the second issue is also rooted in the context of the *CCAA*, but its purpose and the manner in which it has been interpreted in the case law are also key. After examining the first two issues in this case, I will address Tysoe J.A.’s conclusion that an express trust in favour of the Crown was created by the court’s order of April 29, 2008.

3.1 *Purpose and Scope of Insolvency Law*

[12] Insolvency is the factual situation that arises when a debtor is unable to pay creditors (see generally, R. J. Wood, *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law* (2009), at p. 16). Certain legal proceedings become available upon insolvency, which typically allow a debtor to obtain a court order staying its creditors’ enforcement actions and attempt to obtain

3. Analyse

[10] La première question porte sur les priorités de la Couronne dans le contexte de l’insolvabilité. Comme nous le verrons, la *LTA* crée en faveur de la Couronne une fiducie réputée à l’égard de la TPS due par un débiteur « [m]algré [. . .] tout autre texte législatif fédéral (sauf la *Loi sur la faillite et l’insolvabilité*) » (par. 222(3)), alors que selon la disposition de la *LACC* en vigueur à l’époque, « par dérogation à toute disposition législative fédérale ou provinciale ayant pour effet d’assimiler certains biens à des biens détenus en fiducie pour Sa Majesté, aucun des biens de la compagnie débitrice ne peut être considéré comme [tel] » (par. 18.3(1)). Il est difficile d’imaginer deux dispositions législatives plus contradictoires en apparence. Cependant, comme c’est souvent le cas, le conflit apparent peut être résolu au moyen des principes d’interprétation législative.

[11] Pour interpréter correctement ces dispositions, il faut examiner l’historique de la *LACC*, la fonction de cette loi parmi l’ensemble des textes adoptés par le législateur fédéral en matière d’insolvabilité et les principes reconnus dans la jurisprudence. Nous verrons que les priorités de la Couronne en matière d’insolvabilité ont été restreintes de façon appréciable. La réponse à la deuxième question repose aussi sur le contexte de la *LACC*, mais l’objectif de cette loi et l’interprétation qu’en a donnée la jurisprudence jouent également un rôle essentiel. Après avoir examiné les deux premières questions soulevées en l’espèce, j’aborderai la conclusion du juge Tysoe selon laquelle l’ordonnance rendue par le tribunal le 29 avril 2008 a eu pour effet de créer une fiducie expresse en faveur de la Couronne.

3.1 *Objectif et portée du droit relatif à l’insolvabilité*

[12] L’insolvabilité est la situation de fait qui se présente quand un débiteur n’est pas en mesure de payer ses créanciers (voir, généralement, R. J. Wood, *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law* (2009), p. 16). Certaines procédures judiciaires peuvent être intentées en cas d’insolvabilité. Ainsi, le débiteur peut généralement obtenir une ordonnance judiciaire

a binding compromise with creditors to adjust the payment conditions to something more realistic. Alternatively, the debtor's assets may be liquidated and debts paid from the proceeds according to statutory priority rules. The former is usually referred to as reorganization or restructuring while the latter is termed liquidation.

[13] Canadian commercial insolvency law is not codified in one exhaustive statute. Instead, Parliament has enacted multiple insolvency statutes, the main one being the *BIA*. The *BIA* offers a self-contained legal regime providing for both reorganization and liquidation. Although bankruptcy legislation has a long history, the *BIA* itself is a fairly recent statute — it was enacted in 1992. It is characterized by a rules-based approach to proceedings. The *BIA* is available to insolvent debtors owing \$1000 or more, regardless of whether they are natural or legal persons. It contains mechanisms for debtors to make proposals to their creditors for the adjustment of debts. If a proposal fails, the *BIA* contains a bridge to bankruptcy whereby the debtor's assets are liquidated and the proceeds paid to creditors in accordance with the statutory scheme of distribution.

[14] Access to the *CCAA* is more restrictive. A debtor must be a company with liabilities in excess of \$5 million. Unlike the *BIA*, the *CCAA* contains no provisions for liquidation of a debtor's assets if reorganization fails. There are three ways of exiting *CCAA* proceedings. The best outcome is achieved when the stay of proceedings provides the debtor with some breathing space during which solvency is restored and the *CCAA* process terminates without reorganization being needed. The second most desirable outcome occurs when the debtor's compromise or arrangement is accepted by its creditors and the reorganized company emerges from the *CCAA* proceedings as a going concern. Lastly, if the compromise or arrangement fails, either

ayant pour effet de suspendre les mesures d'exécution de ses créanciers, puis tenter de conclure avec eux une transaction à caractère exécutoire contenant des conditions de paiement plus réalistes. Ou alors, les biens du débiteur sont liquidés et ses dettes sont remboursées sur le produit de cette liquidation, selon les règles de priorité établies par la loi. Dans le premier cas, on emploie habituellement les termes de réorganisation ou de restructuration, alors que dans le second, on parle de liquidation.

[13] Le droit canadien en matière d'insolvabilité commerciale n'est pas codifié dans une seule loi exhaustive. En effet, le législateur a plutôt adopté plusieurs lois sur l'insolvabilité, la principale étant la *LFI*. Cette dernière établit un régime juridique autonome qui concerne à la fois la réorganisation et la liquidation. Bien qu'il existe depuis longtemps des mesures législatives relatives à la faillite, la *LFI* elle-même est une loi assez récente — elle a été adoptée en 1992. Ses procédures se caractérisent par une approche fondée sur des règles préétablies. Les débiteurs insolvables — personnes physiques ou personnes morales — qui doivent 1 000 \$ ou plus peuvent recourir à la *LFI*. Celle-ci comporte des mécanismes permettant au débiteur de présenter à ses créanciers une proposition de rajustement des dettes. Si la proposition est rejetée, la *LFI* établit la démarche aboutissant à la faillite : les biens du débiteur sont liquidés et le produit de cette liquidation est versé aux créanciers conformément à la répartition prévue par la loi.

[14] La possibilité de recourir à la *LACC* est plus restreinte. Le débiteur doit être une compagnie dont les dettes dépassent cinq millions de dollars. Contrairement à la *LFI*, la *LACC* ne contient aucune disposition relative à la liquidation de l'actif d'un débiteur en cas d'échec de la réorganisation. Une procédure engagée sous le régime de la *LACC* peut se terminer de trois façons différentes. Le scénario idéal survient dans les cas où la suspension des recours donne au débiteur un répit lui permettant de rétablir sa solvabilité et où le processus régi par la *LACC* prend fin sans qu'une réorganisation soit nécessaire. Le deuxième scénario le plus souhaitable est le cas où la transaction ou l'arrangement proposé par le débiteur est

the company or its creditors usually seek to have the debtor's assets liquidated under the applicable provisions of the *BIA* or to place the debtor into receivership. As discussed in greater detail below, the key difference between the reorganization regimes under the *BIA* and the *CCAA* is that the latter offers a more flexible mechanism with greater judicial discretion, making it more responsive to complex reorganizations.

[15] As I will discuss at greater length below, the purpose of the *CCAA* — Canada's first reorganization statute — is to permit the debtor to continue to carry on business and, where possible, avoid the social and economic costs of liquidating its assets. Proposals to creditors under the *BIA* serve the same remedial purpose, though this is achieved through a rules-based mechanism that offers less flexibility. Where reorganization is impossible, the *BIA* may be employed to provide an orderly mechanism for the distribution of a debtor's assets to satisfy creditor claims according to predetermined priority rules.

[16] Prior to the enactment of the *CCAA* in 1933 (S.C. 1932-33, c. 36), practice under existing commercial insolvency legislation tended heavily towards the liquidation of a debtor company (J. Sarra, *Creditor Rights and the Public Interest: Restructuring Insolvent Corporations* (2003), at p. 12). The battering visited upon Canadian businesses by the Great Depression and the absence of an effective mechanism for reaching a compromise between debtors and creditors to avoid liquidation required a legislative response. The *CCAA* was innovative as it allowed the insolvent debtor to attempt reorganization under judicial supervision outside the existing insolvency legislation which, once engaged, almost invariably resulted in liquidation (*Reference re Companies' Creditors*

accepté par ses créanciers et où la compagnie réorganisée poursuit ses activités au terme de la procédure engagée en vertu de la *LACC*. Enfin, dans le dernier scénario, la transaction ou l'arrangement échoue et la compagnie ou ses créanciers cherchent habituellement à obtenir la liquidation des biens en vertu des dispositions applicables de la *LFI* ou la mise sous séquestre du débiteur. Comme nous le verrons, la principale différence entre les régimes de réorganisation prévus par la *LFI* et la *LACC* est que le second établit un mécanisme plus souple, dans lequel les tribunaux disposent d'un plus grand pouvoir discrétionnaire, ce qui rend le mécanisme mieux adapté aux réorganisations complexes.

[15] Comme je vais le préciser davantage plus loin, la *LACC* — la première loi canadienne régissant la réorganisation — a pour objectif de permettre au débiteur de continuer d'exercer ses activités et, dans les cas où cela est possible, d'éviter les coûts sociaux et économiques liés à la liquidation de son actif. Les propositions faites aux créanciers en vertu de la *LFI* répondent au même objectif, mais au moyen d'un mécanisme fondé sur des règles et offrant moins de souplesse. Quand la réorganisation s'avère impossible, les dispositions de la *LFI* peuvent être appliquées pour répartir de manière ordonnée les biens du débiteur entre les créanciers, en fonction des règles de priorité qui y sont établies.

[16] Avant l'adoption de la *LACC* en 1933 (S.C. 1932-33, ch. 36), la liquidation de la compagnie débitrice constituait la pratique la plus courante en vertu de la législation existante en matière d'insolvabilité commerciale (J. Sarra, *Creditor Rights and the Public Interest: Restructuring Insolvent Corporations* (2003), p. 12). Les ravages de la Grande Dépression sur les entreprises canadiennes et l'absence d'un mécanisme efficace susceptible de permettre aux débiteurs et aux créanciers d'arriver à des compromis afin d'éviter la liquidation commandaient une solution législative. La *LACC* a innové en permettant au débiteur insolvable de tenter une réorganisation sous surveillance judiciaire, hors du cadre de la législation existante en matière d'insolvabilité qui, une fois entrée en jeu,

Arrangement Act, [1934] S.C.R. 659, at pp. 660-61; Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, at pp. 12-13).

[17] Parliament understood when adopting the CCAA that liquidation of an insolvent company was harmful for most of those it affected — notably creditors and employees — and that a workout which allowed the company to survive was optimal (Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, at pp. 13-15).

[18] Early commentary and jurisprudence also endorsed the CCAA's remedial objectives. It recognized that companies retain more value as going concerns while underscoring that intangible losses, such as the evaporation of the companies' goodwill, result from liquidation (S. E. Edwards, "Reorganizations Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act" (1947), 25 *Can. Bar Rev.* 587, at p. 592). Reorganization serves the public interest by facilitating the survival of companies supplying goods or services crucial to the health of the economy or saving large numbers of jobs (*ibid.*, at p. 593). Insolvency could be so widely felt as to impact stakeholders other than creditors and employees. Variants of these views resonate today, with reorganization justified in terms of rehabilitating companies that are key elements in a complex web of interdependent economic relationships in order to avoid the negative consequences of liquidation.

[19] The CCAA fell into disuse during the next several decades, likely because amendments to the Act in 1953 restricted its use to companies issuing bonds (S.C. 1952-53, c. 3). During the economic downturn of the early 1980s, insolvency lawyers and courts adapting to the resulting wave of insolvencies resurrected the statute and deployed it in response to new economic challenges. Participants in insolvency proceedings grew to recognize and appreciate the statute's distinguishing feature: a grant of broad and flexible authority to the supervising court to make

aboutissait presque invariablement à la liquidation (*Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, [1934] R.C.S. 659, p. 660-661; Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, p. 12-13).

[17] Le législateur comprenait, lorsqu'il a adopté la LACC, que la liquidation d'une compagnie insolvable causait préjudice à la plupart des personnes touchées — notamment les créanciers et les employés — et que la meilleure solution consistait dans un arrangement permettant à la compagnie de survivre (Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, p. 13-15).

[18] Les premières analyses et décisions judiciaires à cet égard ont également entériné les objectifs réparateurs de la LACC. On y reconnaissait que la valeur de la compagnie demeurait plus grande lorsque celle-ci pouvait poursuivre ses activités, tout en soulignant les pertes intangibles découlant d'une liquidation, par exemple la disparition de la clientèle (S. E. Edwards, « Reorganizations Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act » (1947), 25 *R. du B. can.* 587, p. 592). La réorganisation sert l'intérêt public en permettant la survie de compagnies qui fournissent des biens ou des services essentiels à la santé de l'économie ou en préservant un grand nombre d'emplois (*ibid.*, p. 593). Les effets de l'insolvabilité pouvaient même toucher d'autres intéressés que les seuls créanciers et employés. Ces arguments se font entendre encore aujourd'hui sous une forme un peu différente, lorsqu'on justifie la réorganisation par la nécessité de remettre sur pied des compagnies qui constituent des volets essentiels d'un réseau complexe de rapports économiques interdépendants, dans le but d'éviter les effets négatifs de la liquidation.

[19] La LACC est tombée en désuétude au cours des décennies qui ont suivi, vraisemblablement parce que des modifications apportées en 1953 ont restreint son application aux compagnies émettant des obligations (S.C. 1952-53, ch. 3). Pendant la récession du début des années 1980, obligés de s'adapter au nombre grandissant d'entreprises en difficulté, les avocats travaillant dans le domaine de l'insolvabilité ainsi que les tribunaux ont redécouvert cette loi et s'en sont servis pour relever les nouveaux défis de l'économie. Les participants aux

the orders necessary to facilitate the reorganization of the debtor and achieve the CCAA's objectives. The manner in which courts have used CCAA jurisdiction in increasingly creative and flexible ways is explored in greater detail below.

[20] Efforts to evolve insolvency law were not restricted to the courts during this period. In 1970, a government-commissioned panel produced an extensive study recommending sweeping reform but Parliament failed to act (see *Bankruptcy and Insolvency: Report of the Study Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency Legislation* (1970)). Another panel of experts produced more limited recommendations in 1986 which eventually resulted in enactment of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* of 1992 (S.C. 1992, c. 27) (see *Proposed Bankruptcy Act Amendments: Report of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency* (1986)). Broader provisions for reorganizing insolvent debtors were then included in Canada's bankruptcy statute. Although the 1970 and 1986 reports made no specific recommendations with respect to the CCAA, the House of Commons committee studying the BIA's predecessor bill, C-22, seemed to accept expert testimony that the BIA's new reorganization scheme would shortly supplant the CCAA, which could then be repealed, with commercial insolvency and bankruptcy being governed by a single statute (*Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Consumer and Corporate Affairs and Government Operations*, Issue No. 15, 3rd Sess., 34th Parl., October 3, 1991, at 15:15-15:16).

[21] In retrospect, this conclusion by the House of Commons committee was out of step with reality. It overlooked the renewed vitality the CCAA enjoyed in contemporary practice and the advantage that a

procédures en sont peu à peu venus à reconnaître et à apprécier la caractéristique propre de la loi : l'attribution, au tribunal chargé de surveiller le processus, d'une grande latitude lui permettant de rendre les ordonnances nécessaires pour faciliter la réorganisation du débiteur et réaliser les objectifs de la LACC. Nous verrons plus loin comment les tribunaux ont utilisé de façon de plus en plus souple et créative les pouvoirs qui leur sont conférés par la LACC.

[20] Ce ne sont pas seulement les tribunaux qui se sont employés à faire évoluer le droit de l'insolvabilité pendant cette période. En 1970, un comité constitué par le gouvernement a mené une étude approfondie au terme de laquelle il a recommandé une réforme majeure, mais le législateur n'a rien fait (voir *Faillite et insolvabilité : Rapport du comité d'étude sur la législation en matière de faillite et d'insolvabilité* (1970)). En 1986, un autre comité d'experts a formulé des recommandations de portée plus restreinte, qui ont finalement conduit à l'adoption de la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité* de 1992 (L.C. 1992, ch. 27) (voir *Propositions d'amendements à la Loi sur la faillite : Rapport du Comité consultatif en matière de faillite et d'insolvabilité* (1986)). Des dispositions à caractère plus général concernant la réorganisation des débiteurs insolvable ont alors été ajoutées à la loi canadienne relative à la faillite. Malgré l'absence de recommandations spécifiques au sujet de la LACC dans les rapports de 1970 et 1986, le comité de la Chambre des communes qui s'est penché sur le projet de loi C-22 à l'origine de la LFI a semblé accepter le témoignage d'un expert selon lequel le nouveau régime de réorganisation de la LFI supplanterait rapidement la LACC, laquelle pourrait alors être abrogée et l'insolvabilité commerciale et la faillite seraient ainsi régies par un seul texte législatif (*Procès-verbaux et témoignages du Comité permanent des Consommateurs et Sociétés et Administration gouvernementale*, fascicule n° 15, 3^e sess., 34^e lég., 3 octobre 1991, 15:15-15:16).

[21] En rétrospective, cette conclusion du comité de la Chambre des communes ne correspondait pas à la réalité. Elle ne tenait pas compte de la nouvelle vitalité de la LACC dans la pratique contemporaine,

flexible judicially supervised reorganization process presented in the face of increasingly complex reorganizations, when compared to the stricter rules-based scheme contained in the *BIA*. The “flexibility of the *CCAA* [was seen as] a great benefit, allowing for creative and effective decisions” (Industry Canada, Marketplace Framework Policy Branch, *Report on the Operation and Administration of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act* (2002), at p. 41). Over the past three decades, resurrection of the *CCAA* has thus been the mainspring of a process through which, one author concludes, “the legal setting for Canadian insolvency restructuring has evolved from a rather blunt instrument to one of the most sophisticated systems in the developed world” (R. B. Jones, “The Evolution of Canadian Restructuring: Challenges for the Rule of Law”, in J. P. Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2005* (2006), 481, at p. 481).

[22] While insolvency proceedings may be governed by different statutory schemes, they share some commonalities. The most prominent of these is the single proceeding model. The nature and purpose of the single proceeding model are described by Professor Wood in *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law*:

They all provide a collective proceeding that supersedes the usual civil process available to creditors to enforce their claims. The creditors’ remedies are collectivized in order to prevent the free-for-all that would otherwise prevail if creditors were permitted to exercise their remedies. In the absence of a collective process, each creditor is armed with the knowledge that if they do not strike hard and swift to seize the debtor’s assets, they will be beat out by other creditors. [pp. 2-3]

The single proceeding model avoids the inefficiency and chaos that would attend insolvency if each creditor initiated proceedings to recover its debt. Grouping all possible actions against the debtor into a single proceeding controlled in a single forum facilitates negotiation with creditors because it places them all on an equal footing,

ni des avantages qu’offrait, en présence de réorganisations de plus en plus complexes, un processus souple de réorganisation sous surveillance judiciaire par rapport au régime plus rigide de la *LFI*, fondé sur des règles préétablies. La « souplesse de la *LACC* [était considérée comme offrant] de grands avantages car elle permet de prendre des décisions créatives et efficaces » (Industrie Canada, Direction générale des politiques-cadres du marché, *Rapport sur la mise en application de la Loi sur la faillite et l’insolvabilité et de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies* (2002), p. 50). Au cours des trois dernières décennies, la résurrection de la *LACC* a donc été le moteur d’un processus grâce auquel, selon un auteur, [TRADUCTION] « le régime juridique canadien de restructuration en cas d’insolvabilité — qui était au départ un instrument plutôt rudimentaire — a évolué pour devenir un des systèmes les plus sophistiqués du monde développé » (R. B. Jones, « The Evolution of Canadian Restructuring : Challenges for the Rule of Law », dans J. P. Sarra, dir., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2005* (2006), 481, p. 481).

[22] Si les instances en matière d’insolvabilité peuvent être régies par des régimes législatifs différents, elles n’en présentent pas moins certains points communs, dont le plus frappant réside dans le modèle de la procédure unique. Le professeur Wood a décrit ainsi la nature et l’objectif de ce modèle dans *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law* :

[TRADUCTION] Elles prévoient toutes une procédure collective qui remplace la procédure civile habituelle dont peuvent se prévaloir les créanciers pour faire valoir leurs droits. Les recours des créanciers sont collectivisés afin d’éviter l’anarchie qui régnerait si ceux-ci pouvaient exercer leurs recours individuellement. En l’absence d’un processus collectif, chaque créancier sait que faute d’agir de façon rapide et déterminée pour saisir les biens du débiteur, il sera devancé par les autres créanciers. [p. 2-3]

Le modèle de la procédure unique vise à faire échec à l’inefficacité et au chaos qui résulteraient de l’insolvabilité si chaque créancier engageait sa propre procédure dans le but de recouvrer sa créance. La réunion — en une seule instance relevant d’un même tribunal — de toutes les actions possibles contre le débiteur a pour effet de faciliter la négociation avec

rather than exposing them to the risk that a more aggressive creditor will realize its claims against the debtor's limited assets while the other creditors attempt a compromise. With a view to achieving that purpose, both the *CCAA* and the *BIA* allow a court to order all actions against a debtor to be stayed while a compromise is sought.

[23] Another point of convergence of the *CCAA* and the *BIA* relates to priorities. Because the *CCAA* is silent about what happens if reorganization fails, the *BIA* scheme of liquidation and distribution necessarily supplies the backdrop for what will happen if a *CCAA* reorganization is ultimately unsuccessful. In addition, one of the important features of legislative reform of both statutes since the enactment of the *BIA* in 1992 has been a cutback in Crown priorities (S.C. 1992, c. 27, s. 39; S.C. 1997, c. 12, ss. 73 and 125; S.C. 2000, c. 30, s. 148; S.C. 2005, c. 47, ss. 69 and 131; S.C. 2009, c. 33, s. 25; see also *Quebec (Revenue) v. Caisse populaire Desjardins de Montmagny*, 2009 SCC 49, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 286; *Deputy Minister of Revenue v. Rainville*, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 35; *Proposed Bankruptcy Act Amendments: Report of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency*).

[24] With parallel *CCAA* and *BIA* restructuring schemes now an accepted feature of the insolvency law landscape, the contemporary thrust of legislative reform has been towards harmonizing aspects of insolvency law common to the two statutory schemes to the extent possible and encouraging reorganization over liquidation (see *An Act to establish the Wage Earner Protection Program Act, to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts*, S.C. 2005, c. 47; *Gauntlet Energy Corp., Re*, 2003 ABQB 894, 30 Alta. L.R. (4th) 192, at para. 19).

[25] Mindful of the historical background of the *CCAA* and *BIA*, I now turn to the first question at issue.

les créanciers en les mettant tous sur le même pied. Cela évite le risque de voir un créancier plus combatif obtenir le paiement de ses créances sur l'actif limité du débiteur pendant que les autres créanciers tentent d'arriver à une transaction. La *LACC* et la *LFI* autorisent toutes deux pour cette raison le tribunal à ordonner la suspension de toutes les actions intentées contre le débiteur pendant qu'on cherche à conclure une transaction.

[23] Un autre point de convergence entre la *LACC* et la *LFI* concerne les priorités. Comme la *LACC* ne précise pas ce qui arrive en cas d'échec de la réorganisation, la *LFI* fournit la norme de référence pour ce qui se produira dans une telle situation. De plus, l'une des caractéristiques importantes de la réforme dont ces deux lois ont fait l'objet depuis 1992 est la réduction des priorités de la Couronne (L.C. 1992, ch. 27, art. 39; L.C. 1997, ch. 12, art. 73 et 125; L.C. 2000, ch. 30, art. 148; L.C. 2005, ch. 47, art. 69 et 131; L.C. 2009, ch. 33, art. 25; voir aussi *Québec (Revenu) c. Caisse populaire Desjardins de Montmagny*, 2009 CSC 49, [2009] 3 R.C.S. 286; *Sous-ministre du Revenu c. Rainville*, [1980] 1 R.C.S. 35; *Propositions d'amendements à la Loi sur la faillite : Rapport du Comité consultatif en matière de faillite et d'insolvabilité*).

[24] Comme les régimes de restructuration parallèles de la *LACC* et de la *LFI* constituent désormais une caractéristique reconnue dans le domaine du droit de l'insolvabilité, le travail de réforme législative contemporain a principalement visé à harmoniser, dans la mesure du possible, les aspects communs aux deux régimes et à privilégier la réorganisation plutôt que la liquidation (voir la *Loi édictant la Loi sur le Programme de protection des salariés et modifiant la Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité, la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies et d'autres lois en conséquence*, L.C. 2005, ch. 47; *Gauntlet Energy Corp., Re*, 2003 ABQB 894, 30 Alta L.R. (4th) 192, par. 19).

[25] Ayant à l'esprit le contexte historique de la *LACC* et de la *LFI*, je vais maintenant aborder la première question en litige.

3.2 *GST Deemed Trust Under the CCAA*

[26] The Court of Appeal proceeded on the basis that the *ETA* precluded the court from staying the Crown's enforcement of the GST deemed trust when partially lifting the stay to allow the debtor to enter bankruptcy. In so doing, it adopted the reasoning in a line of cases culminating in *Ottawa Senators*, which held that an *ETA* deemed trust remains enforceable during *CCAA* reorganization despite language in the *CCAA* that suggests otherwise.

[27] The Crown relies heavily on the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in *Ottawa Senators* and argues that the later in time provision of the *ETA* creating the GST deemed trust trumps the provision of the *CCAA* purporting to nullify most statutory deemed trusts. The Court of Appeal in this case accepted this reasoning but not all provincial courts follow it (see, e.g., *Komunik Corp. (Arrangement relatif à)*, 2009 QCCS 6332 (CanLII), leave to appeal granted, 2010 QCCA 183 (CanLII)). Century Services relied, in its written submissions to this Court, on the argument that the court had authority under the *CCAA* to continue the stay against the Crown's claim for unremitted GST. In oral argument, the question of whether *Ottawa Senators* was correctly decided nonetheless arose. After the hearing, the parties were asked to make further written submissions on this point. As appears evident from the reasons of my colleague Abella J., this issue has become prominent before this Court. In those circumstances, this Court needs to determine the correctness of the reasoning in *Ottawa Senators*.

[28] The policy backdrop to this question involves the Crown's priority as a creditor in insolvency situations which, as I mentioned above, has evolved considerably. Prior to the 1990s, Crown claims

3.2 *Fiducie réputée se rapportant à la TPS dans le cadre de la LACC*

[26] La Cour d'appel a estimé que la *LTA* empêchait le tribunal de suspendre les mesures prises par la Couronne pour bénéficier de la fiducie réputée se rapportant à la TPS, lorsqu'il a partiellement levé la suspension des procédures engagées contre le débiteur afin de permettre à celui-ci de faire cession de ses biens. Ce faisant, la cour a adopté un raisonnement qui s'insère dans un courant jurisprudentiel dominé par l'arrêt *Ottawa Senators*, suivant lequel il demeure possible de demander le bénéfice d'une fiducie réputée établie par la *LTA* pendant une réorganisation opérée en vertu de la *LACC*, et ce, malgré les dispositions de la *LACC* qui semblent dire le contraire.

[27] S'appuyant largement sur l'arrêt *Ottawa Senators* de la Cour d'appel de l'Ontario, la Couronne plaide que la disposition postérieure de la *LTA* créant la fiducie réputée visant la TPS l'emporte sur la disposition de la *LACC* censée neutraliser la plupart des fiducies réputées qui sont créées par des dispositions législatives. Si la Cour d'appel a accepté ce raisonnement dans la présente affaire, les tribunaux provinciaux ne l'ont pas tous adopté (voir, p. ex., *Komunik Corp. (Arrangement relatif à)*, 2009 QCCS 6332 (CanLII), autorisation d'appel accordée, 2010 QCCA 183 (CanLII)). Dans ses observations écrites adressées à la Cour, Century Services s'est fondée sur l'argument suivant lequel le tribunal pouvait, en vertu de la *LACC*, maintenir la suspension de la demande de la Couronne visant le paiement de la TPS non versée. Au cours des plaidoiries, la question de savoir si l'arrêt *Ottawa Senators* était bien fondé a néanmoins été soulevée. Après l'audience, la Cour a demandé aux parties de présenter des observations écrites supplémentaires à ce sujet. Comme il ressort clairement des motifs de ma collègue la juge Abella, cette question a pris une grande importance devant notre Cour. Dans ces circonstances, la Cour doit statuer sur le bien-fondé du raisonnement adopté dans l'arrêt *Ottawa Senators*.

[28] Le contexte général dans lequel s'inscrit cette question concerne l'évolution considérable, signalée plus haut, de la priorité dont jouit la Couronne en tant que créancier en cas d'insolvabilité. Avant les

largely enjoyed priority in insolvency. This was widely seen as unsatisfactory as shown by both the 1970 and 1986 insolvency reform proposals, which recommended that Crown claims receive no preferential treatment. A closely related matter was whether the *CCAA* was binding at all upon the Crown. Amendments to the *CCAA* in 1997 confirmed that it did indeed bind the Crown (see *CCAA*, s. 21, as added by S.C. 1997, c. 12, s. 126).

[29] Claims of priority by the state in insolvency situations receive different treatment across jurisdictions worldwide. For example, in Germany and Australia, the state is given no priority at all, while the state enjoys wide priority in the United States and France (see B. K. Morgan, “Should the Sovereign be Paid First? A Comparative International Analysis of the Priority for Tax Claims in Bankruptcy” (2000), 74 *Am. Bankr. L.J.* 461, at p. 500). Canada adopted a middle course through legislative reform of Crown priority initiated in 1992. The Crown retained priority for source deductions of income tax, Employment Insurance (“EI”) and Canada Pension Plan (“CPP”) premiums, but ranks as an ordinary unsecured creditor for most other claims.

[30] Parliament has frequently enacted statutory mechanisms to secure Crown claims and permit their enforcement. The two most common are statutory deemed trusts and powers to garnish funds third parties owe the debtor (see F. L. Lamer, *Priority of Crown Claims in Insolvency* (loose-leaf), at §2).

[31] With respect to GST collected, Parliament has enacted a deemed trust. The *ETA* states that every person who collects an amount on account of GST is deemed to hold that amount in trust for the Crown (s. 222(1)). The deemed trust extends to other property of the person collecting the tax equal in value to the amount deemed to be in trust if that amount has not been remitted in accordance with the *ETA*. The deemed trust also extends to property

années 1990, les créances de la Couronne bénéficiaient dans une large mesure d’une priorité en cas d’insolvabilité. Cette situation avantageuse suscitait une grande controverse. Les propositions de réforme du droit de l’insolvabilité de 1970 et de 1986 en témoignent — elles recommandaient que les créances de la Couronne ne fassent l’objet d’aucun traitement préférentiel. Une question connexe se posait : celle de savoir si la Couronne était même assujettie à la *LACC*. Les modifications apportées à la *LACC* en 1997 ont confirmé qu’elle l’était bel et bien (voir *LACC*, art. 21, ajouté par L.C. 1997, ch. 12, art. 126).

[29] Les revendications de priorité par l’État en cas d’insolvabilité sont abordées de différentes façons selon les pays. Par exemple, en Allemagne et en Australie, l’État ne bénéficie d’aucune priorité, alors qu’aux États-Unis et en France il jouit au contraire d’une large priorité (voir B. K. Morgan, « Should the Sovereign be Paid First? A Comparative International Analysis of the Priority for Tax Claims in Bankruptcy » (2000), 74 *Am. Bankr. L.J.* 461, p. 500). Le Canada a choisi une voie intermédiaire dans le cadre d’une réforme législative amorcée en 1992 : la Couronne a conservé sa priorité pour les sommes retenues à la source au titre de l’impôt sur le revenu et des cotisations à l’assurance-emploi (« AE ») et au Régime de pensions du Canada (« RPC »), mais elle est un créancier ordinaire non garanti pour la plupart des autres sommes qui lui sont dues.

[30] Le législateur a fréquemment adopté des mécanismes visant à protéger les créances de la Couronne et à permettre leur exécution. Les deux plus courants sont les fiducies présumées et les pouvoirs de saisie-arrêt (voir F. L. Lamer, *Priority of Crown Claims in Insolvency* (feuilles mobiles), §2).

[31] Pour ce qui est des sommes de TPS perçues, le législateur a établi une fiducie réputée. La *LTA* précise que la personne qui perçoit une somme au titre de la TPS est réputée la détenir en fiducie pour la Couronne (par. 222(1)). La fiducie réputée s’applique aux autres biens de la personne qui perçoit la taxe, pour une valeur égale à la somme réputée détenue en fiducie, si la somme en question n’a pas été versée en conformité avec la *LTA*. La fiducie réputée vise

held by a secured creditor that, but for the security interest, would be property of the person collecting the tax (s. 222(3)).

[32] Parliament has created similar deemed trusts using almost identical language in respect of source deductions of income tax, EI premiums and CPP premiums (see s. 227(4) of the *Income Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) (“*ITA*”), ss. 86(2) and (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act*, S.C. 1996, c. 23, and ss. 23(3) and (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8). I will refer to income tax, EI and CPP deductions as “source deductions”.

[33] In *Royal Bank of Canada v. Sparrow Electric Corp.*, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 411, this Court addressed a priority dispute between a deemed trust for source deductions under the *ITA* and security interests taken under both the *Bank Act*, S.C. 1991, c. 46, and the *Alberta Personal Property Security Act*, S.A. 1988, c. P-4.05 (“*PPSA*”). As then worded, an *ITA* deemed trust over the debtor’s property equivalent to the amount owing in respect of income tax became effective at the time of liquidation, receivership, or assignment in bankruptcy. *Sparrow Electric* held that the *ITA* deemed trust could not prevail over the security interests because, being fixed charges, the latter attached as soon as the debtor acquired rights in the property such that the *ITA* deemed trust had no property on which to attach when it subsequently arose. Later, in *First Vancouver Finance v. M.N.R.*, 2002 SCC 49, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 720, this Court observed that Parliament had legislated to strengthen the statutory deemed trust in the *ITA* by deeming it to operate from the moment the deductions were not paid to the Crown as required by the *ITA*, and by granting the Crown priority over all security interests (paras. 27-29) (the “*Sparrow Electric* amendment”).

également les biens détenus par un créancier garanti qui, si ce n’était de la sûreté, seraient les biens de la personne qui perçoit la taxe (par. 222(3)).

[32] Utilisant pratiquement les mêmes termes, le législateur a créé de semblables fiducies réputées à l’égard des retenues à la source relatives à l’impôt sur le revenu et aux cotisations à l’AE et au RPC (voir par. 227(4) de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu*, L.R.C. 1985, ch. 1 (5^e suppl.) (« *LIR* »), par. 86(2) et (2.1) de la *Loi sur l’assurance-emploi*, L.C. 1996, ch. 23, et par. 23(3) et (4) du *Régime de pensions du Canada*, L.R.C. 1985, ch. C-8). J’emploierai ci-après le terme « retenues à la source » pour désigner les retenues relatives à l’impôt sur le revenu et aux cotisations à l’AE et au RPC.

[33] Dans *Banque Royale du Canada c. Sparrow Electric Corp.*, [1997] 1 R.C.S. 411, la Cour était saisie d’un litige portant sur la priorité de rang entre, d’une part, une fiducie réputée établie en vertu de la *LIR* à l’égard des retenues à la source, et, d’autre part, des sûretés constituées en vertu de la *Loi sur les banques*, L.C. 1991, ch. 46, et de la loi de l’Alberta intitulée *Personal Property Security Act*, S.A. 1988, ch. P-4.05 (« *PPSA* »). D’après les dispositions alors en vigueur, une fiducie réputée — établie en vertu de la *LIR* à l’égard des biens du débiteur pour une valeur égale à la somme due au titre de l’impôt sur le revenu — commençait à s’appliquer au moment de la liquidation, de la mise sous séquestre ou de la cession de biens. Dans *Sparrow Electric*, la Cour a conclu que la fiducie réputée de la *LIR* ne pouvait pas l’emporter sur les sûretés, au motif que, comme celles-ci constituaient des privilèges fixes grevant les biens dès que le débiteur acquérait des droits sur eux, il n’existait pas de biens susceptibles d’être visés par la fiducie réputée de la *LIR* lorsqu’elle prenait naissance par la suite. Ultérieurement, dans *First Vancouver Finance c. M.R.N.*, 2002 CSC 49, [2002] 2 R.C.S. 720, la Cour a souligné que le législateur était intervenu pour renforcer la fiducie réputée de la *LIR* en précisant qu’elle est réputée s’appliquer dès le moment où les retenues ne sont pas versées à la Couronne conformément aux exigences de la *LIR*, et en donnant à la Couronne la priorité sur toute autre garantie (par. 27-29) (la « modification découlant de l’arrêt *Sparrow Electric* »).

[34] The amended text of s. 227(4.1) of the *ITA* and concordant source deductions deemed trusts in the *Canada Pension Plan* and the *Employment Insurance Act* state that the deemed trust operates notwithstanding any other enactment of Canada, except ss. 81.1 and 81.2 of the *BIA*. The *ETA* deemed trust at issue in this case is similarly worded, but it excepts the *BIA* in its entirety. The provision reads as follows:

222. . . .

. . . .

(3) Despite any other provision of this Act (except subsection (4)), any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*), any enactment of a province or any other law, if at any time an amount deemed by subsection (1) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn in the manner and at the time provided under this Part, property of the person and property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust, is deemed

[35] The Crown submits that the *Sparrow Electric* amendment, added by Parliament to the *ETA* in 2000, was intended to preserve the Crown's priority over collected GST under the *CCAA* while subordinating the Crown to the status of an unsecured creditor in respect of GST only under the *BIA*. This is because the *ETA* provides that the GST deemed trust is effective "despite" any other enactment except the *BIA*.

[36] The language used in the *ETA* for the GST deemed trust creates an apparent conflict with the *CCAA*, which provides that subject to certain exceptions, property deemed by statute to be held in trust for the Crown shall not be so regarded.

[37] Through a 1997 amendment to the *CCAA* (S.C. 1997, c. 12, s. 125), Parliament appears to have,

[34] Selon le texte modifié du par. 227(4.1) de la *LIR* et celui des fiducies réputées correspondantes établies dans le *Régime de pensions du Canada* et la *Loi sur l'assurance-emploi* à l'égard des retenues à la source, la fiducie réputée s'applique malgré tout autre texte législatif fédéral sauf les art. 81.1 et 81.2 de la *LFI*. La fiducie réputée de la *LTA* qui est en cause en l'espèce est formulée en des termes semblables sauf que la limite à son application vise la *LFI* dans son entier. Voici le texte de la disposition pertinente :

222. . . .

. . . .

(3) Malgré les autres dispositions de la présente loi (sauf le paragraphe (4) du présent article), tout autre texte législatif fédéral (sauf la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité*), tout texte législatif provincial ou toute autre règle de droit, lorsqu'un montant qu'une personne est réputée par le paragraphe (1) détenir en fiducie pour Sa Majesté du chef du Canada n'est pas versé au receveur général ni retiré selon les modalités et dans le délai prévus par la présente partie, les biens de la personne — y compris les biens détenus par ses créanciers garantis qui, en l'absence du droit en garantie, seraient ses biens — d'une valeur égale à ce montant sont réputés

[35] La Couronne soutient que la modification découlant de l'arrêt *Sparrow Electric*, qui a été ajoutée à la *LTA* par le législateur en 2000, visait à maintenir la priorité de Sa Majesté sous le régime de la *LACC* à l'égard du montant de TPS perçu, tout en reléguant celle-ci au rang de créancier non garanti à l'égard de ce montant sous le régime de la *LFI* uniquement. De l'avis de la Couronne, il en est ainsi parce que, selon la *LTA*, la fiducie réputée visant la TPS demeure en vigueur « malgré » tout autre texte législatif sauf la *LFI*.

[36] Les termes utilisés dans la *LTA* pour établir la fiducie réputée à l'égard de la TPS créent un conflit apparent avec la *LACC*, laquelle précise que, sous réserve de certaines exceptions, les biens qui sont réputés selon un texte législatif être détenus en fiducie pour la Couronne ne doivent pas être considérés comme tels.

[37] Par une modification apportée à la *LACC* en 1997 (L.C. 1997, ch. 12, art. 125), le législateur

subject to specific exceptions, nullified deemed trusts in favour of the Crown once reorganization proceedings are commenced under the Act. The relevant provision reads:

18.3 (1) Subject to subsection (2), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

This nullification of deemed trusts was continued in further amendments to the *CCAA* (S.C. 2005, c. 47), where s. 18.3(1) was renumbered and reformulated as s. 37(1):

37. (1) Subject to subsection (2), despite any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as being held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

[38] An analogous provision exists in the *BIA*, which, subject to the same specific exceptions, nullifies statutory deemed trusts and makes property of the bankrupt that would otherwise be subject to a deemed trust part of the debtor's estate and available to creditors (S.C. 1992, c. 27, s. 39; S.C. 1997, c. 12, s. 73; *BIA*, s. 67(2)). It is noteworthy that in both the *CCAA* and the *BIA*, the exceptions concern source deductions (*CCAA*, s. 18.3(2); *BIA*, s. 67(3)). The relevant provision of the *CCAA* reads:

18.3 . . .

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act*

Thus, the Crown's deemed trust and corresponding priority in source deductions remain effective both in reorganization and in bankruptcy.

semble, sous réserve d'exceptions spécifiques, avoir neutralisé les fiducies réputées créées en faveur de la Couronne lorsque des procédures de réorganisation sont engagées sous le régime de cette loi. La disposition pertinente, à l'époque le par. 18.3(1), était libellée ainsi :

18.3 (1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (2) et par dérogation à toute disposition législative fédérale ou provinciale ayant pour effet d'assimiler certains biens à des biens détenus en fiducie pour Sa Majesté, aucun des biens de la compagnie débitrice ne peut être considéré comme détenu en fiducie pour Sa Majesté si, en l'absence de la disposition législative en question, il ne le serait pas.

Cette neutralisation des fiducies réputées a été maintenue dans des modifications apportées à la *LACC* en 2005 (L.C. 2005, ch. 47), où le par. 18.3(1) a été reformulé et renuméroté, devenant le par. 37(1) :

37. (1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (2) et par dérogation à toute disposition législative fédérale ou provinciale ayant pour effet d'assimiler certains biens à des biens détenus en fiducie pour Sa Majesté, aucun des biens de la compagnie débitrice ne peut être considéré comme tel par le seul effet d'une telle disposition.

[38] La *LFI* comporte une disposition analogue, qui — sous réserve des mêmes exceptions spécifiques — neutralise les fiducies réputées établies en vertu d'un texte législatif et fait en sorte que les biens du failli qui autrement seraient visés par une telle fiducie font partie de l'actif du débiteur et sont à la disposition des créanciers (L.C. 1992, ch. 27, art. 39; L.C. 1997, ch. 12, art. 73; *LFI*, par. 67(2)). Il convient de souligner que, tant dans la *LACC* que dans la *LFI*, les exceptions visent les retenues à la source (*LACC*, par. 18.3(2); *LFI*, par. 67(3)). Voici la disposition pertinente de la *LACC* :

18.3 . . .

(2) Le paragraphe (1) ne s'applique pas à l'égard des montants réputés détenus en fiducie aux termes des paragraphes 227(4) ou (4.1) de la *Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu*, des paragraphes 23(3) ou (4) du *Régime de pensions du Canada* ou des paragraphes 86(2) ou (2.1) de la *Loi sur l'assurance-emploi*

Par conséquent, la fiducie réputée établie en faveur de la Couronne et la priorité dont celle-ci jouit de ce fait sur les retenues à la source continuent de s'appliquer autant pendant la réorganisation que pendant la faillite.

[39] Meanwhile, in both s. 18.4(1) of the *CCAA* and s. 86(1) of the *BIA*, other Crown claims are treated as unsecured. These provisions, establishing the Crown's status as an unsecured creditor, explicitly exempt statutory deemed trusts in source deductions (*CCAA*, s. 18.4(3); *BIA*, s. 86(3)). The *CCAA* provision reads as follows:

18.4 . . .

. . . .

(3) Subsection (1) [Crown ranking as unsecured creditor] does not affect the operation of

(a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution

Therefore, not only does the *CCAA* provide that Crown claims do not enjoy priority over the claims of other creditors (s. 18.3(1)), but the exceptions to this rule (i.e., that Crown priority is maintained for source deductions) are repeatedly stated in the statute.

[40] The apparent conflict in this case is whether the rule in the *CCAA* first enacted as s. 18.3 in 1997, which provides that subject to certain explicit exceptions, statutory deemed trusts are ineffective under the *CCAA*, is overridden by the one in the *ETA* enacted in 2000 stating that GST deemed trusts operate despite any enactment of Canada except the *BIA*. With respect for my colleague Fish J., I do not think the apparent conflict can be resolved by denying it and creating a rule requiring both a statutory provision enacting the deemed trust, and a second statutory provision confirming it. Such a rule is unknown to the law. Courts must recognize

[39] Par ailleurs, les autres créances de la Couronne sont considérées par la *LACC* et la *LFI* comme des créances non garanties (*LACC*, par. 18.4(1); *LFI*, par. 86(1)). Ces dispositions faisant de la Couronne un créancier non garanti comportent une exception expresse concernant les fiducies réputées établies par un texte législatif à l'égard des retenues à la source (*LACC*, par. 18.4(3); *LFI*, par. 86(3)). Voici la disposition de la *LACC* :

18.4 . . .

. . . .

(3) Le paragraphe (1) [suivant lequel la Couronne a le rang de créancier non garanti] n'a pas pour effet de porter atteinte à l'application des dispositions suivantes :

a) les paragraphes 224(1.2) et (1.3) de la *Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu*;

b) toute disposition du *Régime de pensions du Canada* ou de la *Loi sur l'assurance-emploi* qui renvoie au paragraphe 224(1.2) de la *Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu* et qui prévoit la perception d'une cotisation

Par conséquent, non seulement la *LACC* précise que les créances de la Couronne ne bénéficient pas d'une priorité par rapport à celles des autres créanciers (par. 18.3(1)), mais les exceptions à cette règle (maintien de la priorité de la Couronne dans le cas des retenues à la source) sont mentionnées à plusieurs reprises dans la Loi.

[40] Le conflit apparent qui existe dans la présente affaire fait qu'on doit se demander si la règle de la *LTA* adoptée en 2000, selon laquelle les fiducies réputées visant la TPS s'appliquent malgré tout autre texte législatif fédéral sauf la *LFI*, l'emporte sur la règle énoncée dans la *LACC* — qui a d'abord été édictée en 1997 à l'art. 18.3 — suivant laquelle, sous réserve de certaines exceptions explicites, les fiducies réputées établies par une disposition législative sont sans effet dans le cadre de la *LACC*. Avec égards pour l'opinion contraire exprimée par mon collègue le juge Fish, je ne crois pas qu'on puisse résoudre ce conflit apparent

conflicts, apparent or real, and resolve them when possible.

[41] A line of jurisprudence across Canada has resolved the apparent conflict in favour of the *ETA*, thereby maintaining GST deemed trusts under the *CCAA*. *Ottawa Senators*, the leading case, decided the matter by invoking the doctrine of implied repeal to hold that the later in time provision of the *ETA* should take precedence over the *CCAA* (see also *Solid Resources Ltd., Re* (2002), 40 C.B.R. (4th) 219 (Alta. Q.B.); *Gauntlet*).

[42] The Ontario Court of Appeal in *Ottawa Senators* rested its conclusion on two considerations. First, it was persuaded that by explicitly mentioning the *BIA* in *ETA* s. 222(3), but not the *CCAA*, Parliament made a deliberate choice. In the words of MacPherson J.A.:

The *BIA* and the *CCAA* are closely related federal statutes. I cannot conceive that Parliament would specifically identify the *BIA* as an exception, but accidentally fail to consider the *CCAA* as a possible second exception. In my view, the omission of the *CCAA* from s. 222(3) of the *ETA* was almost certainly a considered omission. [para. 43]

[43] Second, the Ontario Court of Appeal compared the conflict between the *ETA* and the *CCAA* to that before this Court in *Doré v. Verdun (City)*, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862, and found them to be “identical” (para. 46). It therefore considered *Doré* binding (para. 49). In *Doré*, a limitations provision in the more general and recently enacted *Civil Code of Québec*, S.Q. 1991, c. 64 (“*C.C.Q.*”), was held to have repealed a more specific provision of the earlier Quebec *Cities and Towns Act*, R.S.Q., c. C-19, with which it conflicted. By analogy,

en niant son existence et en créant une règle qui exige à la fois une disposition législative établissant la fiducie présumée et une autre la confirmant. Une telle règle est inconnue en droit. Les tribunaux doivent reconnaître les conflits, apparents ou réels, et les résoudre lorsque la chose est possible.

[41] Un courant jurisprudentiel pancanadien a résolu le conflit apparent en faveur de la *LTA*, confirmant ainsi la validité des fiducies réputées à l’égard de la TPS dans le cadre de la *LACC*. Dans l’arrêt déterminant à ce sujet, *Ottawa Senators*, la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario a invoqué la doctrine de l’abrogation implicite et conclu que la disposition postérieure de la *LTA* devait avoir préséance sur la *LACC* (voir aussi *Solid Resources Ltd., Re* (2002), 40 C.B.R. (4th) 219 (B.R. Alb.); *Gauntlet*).

[42] Dans *Ottawa Senators*, la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario a fondé sa conclusion sur deux considérations. Premièrement, elle était convaincue qu’en mentionnant explicitement la *LFI* — mais pas la *LACC* — au par. 222(3) de la *LTA*, le législateur a fait un choix délibéré. Je cite le juge MacPherson :

[TRADUCTION] La *LFI* et la *LACC* sont des lois fédérales étroitement liées entre elles. Je ne puis concevoir que le législateur ait pu mentionner expressément la *LFI* à titre d’exception, mais ait involontairement omis de considérer la *LACC* comme une deuxième exception possible. À mon avis, le fait que la *LACC* ne soit pas mentionnée au par. 222(3) de la *LTA* était presque assurément une omission mûrement réfléchie de la part du législateur. [par. 43]

[43] Deuxièmement, la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario a comparé le conflit entre la *LTA* et la *LACC* à celui dont a été saisie la Cour dans *Doré c. Verdun (Ville)*, [1997] 2 R.C.S. 862, et les a jugés [TRADUCTION] « identiques » (par. 46). Elle s’estimait donc tenue de suivre l’arrêt *Doré* (par. 49). Dans cet arrêt, la Cour a conclu qu’une disposition d’une loi de nature plus générale et récemment adoptée établissant un délai de prescription — le *Code civil du Québec*, L.Q. 1991, ch. 64 (« *C.c.Q.* ») — avait eu pour effet d’abroger une disposition plus spécifique

the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the later in time and more general provision, s. 222(3) of the *ETA*, impliedly repealed the more specific and earlier in time provision, s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* (paras. 47-49).

[44] Viewing this issue in its entire context, several considerations lead me to conclude that neither the reasoning nor the result in *Ottawa Senators* can stand. While a conflict may exist at the level of the statutes' wording, a purposive and contextual analysis to determine Parliament's true intent yields the conclusion that Parliament could not have intended to restore the Crown's deemed trust priority in GST claims under the *CCAA* when it amended the *ETA* in 2000 with the *Sparrow Electric* amendment.

[45] I begin by recalling that Parliament has shown its willingness to move away from asserting priority for Crown claims in insolvency law. Section 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* (subject to the s. 18.3(2) exceptions) provides that the Crown's deemed trusts have no effect under the *CCAA*. Where Parliament has sought to protect certain Crown claims through statutory deemed trusts and intended that these deemed trusts continue in insolvency, it has legislated so explicitly and elaborately. For example, s. 18.3(2) of the *CCAA* and s. 67(3) of the *BIA* expressly provide that deemed trusts for source deductions remain effective in insolvency. Parliament has, therefore, clearly carved out exceptions from the general rule that deemed trusts are ineffective in insolvency. The *CCAA* and *BIA* are in harmony, preserving deemed trusts and asserting Crown priority only in respect of source deductions. Meanwhile, there is no express statutory basis for concluding that GST claims enjoy a preferred treatment under the *CCAA* or the *BIA*. Unlike source deductions, which are clearly and expressly dealt with under both these insolvency statutes, no such clear and express language exists

d'un texte de loi antérieur, la *Loi sur les cités et villes* du Québec, L.R.Q., ch. C-19, avec laquelle elle entrerait en conflit. Par analogie, la Cour d'appel de l'Ontario a conclu que le par. 222(3) de la *LTA*, une disposition plus récente et plus générale, abrogeait implicitement la disposition antérieure plus spécifique, à savoir le par. 18.3(1) de la *LACC* (par. 47-49).

[44] En examinant la question dans tout son contexte, je suis amenée à conclure, pour plusieurs raisons, que ni le raisonnement ni le résultat de l'arrêt *Ottawa Senators* ne peuvent être adoptés. Bien qu'il puisse exister un conflit entre le libellé des textes de loi, une analyse téléologique et contextuelle visant à déterminer la véritable intention du législateur conduit à la conclusion que ce dernier ne saurait avoir eu l'intention de redonner la priorité, dans le cadre de la *LACC*, à la fiducie réputée de la Couronne à l'égard de ses créances relatives à la TPS quand il a apporté à la *LTA*, en 2000, la modification découlant de l'arrêt *Sparrow Electric*.

[45] Je rappelle d'abord que le législateur a manifesté sa volonté de mettre un terme à la priorité accordée aux créances de la Couronne dans le cadre du droit de l'insolvabilité. Selon le par. 18.3(1) de la *LACC* (sous réserve des exceptions prévues au par. 18.3(2)), les fiducies réputées de la Couronne n'ont aucun effet sous le régime de cette loi. Quand le législateur a voulu protéger certaines créances de la Couronne au moyen de fiducies réputées et voulu que celles-ci continuent de s'appliquer en situation d'insolvabilité, il l'a indiqué de manière explicite et minutieuse. Par exemple, le par. 18.3(2) de la *LACC* et le par. 67(3) de la *LFI* énoncent expressément que les fiducies réputées visant les retenues à la source continuent de produire leurs effets en cas d'insolvabilité. Le législateur a donc clairement établi des exceptions à la règle générale selon laquelle les fiducies réputées n'ont plus d'effet dans un contexte d'insolvabilité. La *LACC* et la *LFI* sont en harmonie : elles préservent les fiducies réputées et établissent la priorité de la Couronne seulement à l'égard des retenues à la source. En revanche, il n'existe aucune disposition législative expresse permettant de conclure que les créances relatives à la

in those Acts carving out an exception for GST claims.

[46] The internal logic of the *CCAA* also militates against upholding the *ETA* deemed trust for GST. The *CCAA* imposes limits on a suspension by the court of the Crown's rights in respect of source deductions but does not mention the *ETA* (s. 11.4). Since source deductions deemed trusts are granted explicit protection under the *CCAA*, it would be inconsistent to afford a better protection to the *ETA* deemed trust absent explicit language in the *CCAA*. Thus, the logic of the *CCAA* appears to subject the *ETA* deemed trust to the waiver by Parliament of its priority (s. 18.4).

[47] Moreover, a strange asymmetry would arise if the interpretation giving the *ETA* priority over the *CCAA* urged by the Crown is adopted here: the Crown would retain priority over GST claims during *CCAA* proceedings but not in bankruptcy. As courts have reflected, this can only encourage statute shopping by secured creditors in cases such as this one where the debtor's assets cannot satisfy both the secured creditors' and the Crown's claims (*Gauntlet*, at para. 21). If creditors' claims were better protected by liquidation under the *BIA*, creditors' incentives would lie overwhelmingly with avoiding proceedings under the *CCAA* and not risking a failed reorganization. Giving a key player in any insolvency such skewed incentives against reorganizing under the *CCAA* can only undermine that statute's remedial objectives and risk inviting the very social ills that it was enacted to avert.

TPS bénéficient d'un traitement préférentiel sous le régime de la *LACC* ou de la *LFI*. Alors que les retenues à la source font l'objet de dispositions explicites dans ces deux lois concernant l'insolvabilité, celles-ci ne comportent pas de dispositions claires et expresses analogues établissant une exception pour les créances relatives à la TPS.

[46] La logique interne de la *LACC* va également à l'encontre du maintien de la fiducie réputée établie dans la *LTA* à l'égard de la TPS. En effet, la *LACC* impose certaines limites à la suspension par les tribunaux des droits de la Couronne à l'égard des retenues à la source, mais elle ne fait pas mention de la *LTA* (art. 11.4). Comme les fiducies réputées visant les retenues à la source sont explicitement protégées par la *LACC*, il serait incohérent d'accorder une meilleure protection à la fiducie réputée établie par la *LTA* en l'absence de dispositions explicites en ce sens dans la *LACC*. Par conséquent, il semble découler de la logique de la *LACC* que la fiducie réputée établie par la *LTA* est visée par la renonciation du législateur à sa priorité (art. 18.4).

[47] De plus, il y aurait une étrange asymétrie si l'interprétation faisant primer la *LTA* sur la *LACC* préconisée par la Couronne était retenue en l'espèce : les créances de la Couronne relatives à la TPS conserveraient leur priorité de rang pendant les procédures fondées sur la *LACC*, mais pas en cas de faillite. Comme certains tribunaux l'ont bien vu, cela ne pourrait qu'encourager les créanciers à recourir à la loi la plus favorable dans les cas où, comme en l'espèce, l'actif du débiteur n'est pas suffisant pour permettre à la fois le paiement des créanciers garantis et le paiement des créances de la Couronne (*Gauntlet*, par. 21). Or, si les réclamations des créanciers étaient mieux protégées par la liquidation sous le régime de la *LFI*, les créanciers seraient très fortement incités à éviter les procédures prévues par la *LACC* et les risques d'échec d'une réorganisation. Le fait de donner à un acteur clé de telles raisons de s'opposer aux procédures de réorganisation fondées sur la *LACC* dans toute situation d'insolvabilité ne peut que miner les objectifs réparateurs de ce texte législatif et risque au contraire de favoriser les maux sociaux que son édicton visait justement à prévenir.

[48] Arguably, the effect of *Ottawa Senators* is mitigated if restructuring is attempted under the *BIA* instead of the *CCAA*, but it is not cured. If *Ottawa Senators* were to be followed, Crown priority over GST would differ depending on whether restructuring took place under the *CCAA* or the *BIA*. The anomaly of this result is made manifest by the fact that it would deprive companies of the option to restructure under the more flexible and responsive *CCAA* regime, which has been the statute of choice for complex reorganizations.

[49] Evidence that Parliament intended different treatments for GST claims in reorganization and bankruptcy is scant, if it exists at all. Section 222(3) of the *ETA* was enacted as part of a wide-ranging budget implementation bill in 2000. The summary accompanying that bill does not indicate that Parliament intended to elevate Crown priority over GST claims under the *CCAA* to the same or a higher level than source deductions claims. Indeed, the summary for deemed trusts states only that amendments to existing provisions are aimed at “ensuring that employment insurance premiums and Canada Pension Plan contributions that are required to be remitted by an employer are fully recoverable by the Crown in the case of the bankruptcy of the employer” (Summary to S.C. 2000, c. 30, at p. 4a). The wording of GST deemed trusts resembles that of statutory deemed trusts for source deductions and incorporates the same overriding language and reference to the *BIA*. However, as noted above, Parliament’s express intent is that only source deductions deemed trusts remain operative. An exception for the *BIA* in the statutory language establishing the source deductions deemed trusts accomplishes very little, because the explicit language of the *BIA* itself (and the *CCAA*) carves out these source deductions deemed trusts and maintains their effect. It is however noteworthy that no equivalent language maintaining GST deemed trusts exists under either the *BIA* or the *CCAA*.

[48] Peut-être l’effet de l’arrêt *Ottawa Senators* est-il atténué si la restructuration est tentée en vertu de la *LFI* au lieu de la *LACC*, mais il subsiste néanmoins. Si l’on suivait cet arrêt, la priorité de la créance de la Couronne relative à la TPS différerait selon le régime — *LACC* ou *LFI* — sous lequel la restructuration a lieu. L’anomalie de ce résultat ressort clairement du fait que les compagnies seraient ainsi privées de la possibilité de se restructurer sous le régime plus souple et mieux adapté de la *LACC*, régime privilégié en cas de réorganisations complexes.

[49] Les indications selon lesquelles le législateur voulait que les créances relatives à la TPS soient traitées différemment dans les cas de réorganisations et de faillites sont rares, voire inexistantes. Le paragraphe 222(3) de la *LTA* a été adopté dans le cadre d’un projet de loi d’exécution du budget de nature générale en 2000. Le sommaire accompagnant ce projet de loi n’indique pas que, dans le cadre de la *LACC*, le législateur entendait élever la priorité de la créance de la Couronne à l’égard de la TPS au même rang que les créances relatives aux retenues à la source ou encore à un rang supérieur à celles-ci. En fait, le sommaire mentionne simplement, en ce qui concerne les fiducies réputées, que les modifications apportées aux dispositions existantes visent à « faire en sorte que les cotisations à l’assurance-emploi et au Régime de pensions du Canada qu’un employeur est tenu de verser soient pleinement recouvrables par la Couronne en cas de faillite de l’employeur » (Sommaire de la L.C. 2000, ch. 30, p. 4a). Le libellé de la disposition créant une fiducie réputée à l’égard de la TPS ressemble à celui des dispositions créant de telles fiducies relatives aux retenues à la source et il comporte la même formule dérogatoire et la même mention de la *LFI*. Cependant, comme il a été souligné précédemment, le législateur a expressément précisé que seules les fiducies réputées visant les retenues à la source demeurent en vigueur. Une exception concernant la *LFI* dans la disposition créant les fiducies réputées à l’égard des retenues à la source est sans grande conséquence, car le texte explicite de la *LFI* elle-même (et celui de la *LACC*) établit ces fiducies et maintient leur effet. Il convient toutefois de souligner que ni la *LFI* ni la *LACC* ne comportent de disposition équivalente assurant le maintien en vigueur des fiducies réputées visant la TPS.

[50] It seems more likely that by adopting the same language for creating GST deemed trusts in the *ETA* as it did for deemed trusts for source deductions, and by overlooking the inclusion of an exception for the *CCAA* alongside the *BIA* in s. 222(3) of the *ETA*, Parliament may have inadvertently succumbed to a drafting anomaly. Because of a statutory lacuna in the *ETA*, the GST deemed trust could be seen as remaining effective in the *CCAA*, while ceasing to have any effect under the *BIA*, thus creating an apparent conflict with the wording of the *CCAA*. However, it should be seen for what it is: a facial conflict only, capable of resolution by looking at the broader approach taken to Crown priorities and by giving precedence to the statutory language of s. 18.3 of the *CCAA* in a manner that does not produce an anomalous outcome.

[51] Section 222(3) of the *ETA* evinces no explicit intention of Parliament to repeal *CCAA* s. 18.3. It merely creates an apparent conflict that must be resolved by statutory interpretation. Parliament's intent when it enacted *ETA* s. 222(3) was therefore far from unambiguous. Had it sought to give the Crown a priority for GST claims, it could have done so explicitly as it did for source deductions. Instead, one is left to infer from the language of *ETA* s. 222(3) that the GST deemed trust was intended to be effective under the *CCAA*.

[52] I am not persuaded that the reasoning in *Doré* requires the application of the doctrine of implied repeal in the circumstances of this case. The main issue in *Doré* concerned the impact of the adoption of the *C.C.Q.* on the administrative law rules with respect to municipalities. While Gonthier J. concluded in that case that the limitation provision in art. 2930 *C.C.Q.* had repealed by implication a limitation provision in the *Cities and Towns Act*, he did so on the basis of more than a textual analysis. The conclusion in *Doré* was reached after thorough

[50] Il semble plus probable qu'en adoptant, pour créer dans la *LTA* les fiducies réputées visant la TPS, le même libellé que celui utilisé pour les fiducies réputées visant les retenues à la source, et en omettant d'inclure au par. 222(3) de la *LTA* une exception à l'égard de la *LACC* en plus de celle établie pour la *LFI*, le législateur ait par inadvertance commis une anomalie rédactionnelle. En raison d'une lacune législative dans la *LTA*, il serait possible de considérer que la fiducie réputée visant la TPS continue de produire ses effets dans le cadre de la *LACC*, tout en cessant de le faire dans le cas de la *LFI*, ce qui entraînerait un conflit apparent avec le libellé de la *LACC*. Il faut cependant voir ce conflit comme il est : un conflit apparent seulement, que l'on peut résoudre en considérant l'approche générale adoptée envers les créances prioritaires de la Couronne et en donnant préséance au texte de l'art. 18.3 de la *LACC* d'une manière qui ne produit pas un résultat insolite.

[51] Le paragraphe 222(3) de la *LTA* ne révèle aucune intention explicite du législateur d'abroger l'art. 18.3 de la *LACC*. Il crée simplement un conflit apparent qui doit être résolu par voie d'interprétation législative. L'intention du législateur était donc loin d'être dépourvue d'ambiguïté quand il a adopté le par. 222(3) de la *LTA*. S'il avait voulu donner priorité aux créances de la Couronne relatives à la TPS dans le cadre de la *LACC*, il aurait pu le faire de manière aussi explicite qu'il l'a fait pour les retenues à la source. Or, au lieu de cela, on se trouve réduit à inférer du texte du par. 222(3) de la *LTA* que le législateur entendait que la fiducie réputée visant la TPS produise ses effets dans les procédures fondées sur la *LACC*.

[52] Je ne suis pas convaincue que le raisonnement adopté dans *Doré* exige l'application de la doctrine de l'abrogation implicite dans les circonstances de la présente affaire. La question principale dans *Doré* était celle de l'impact de l'adoption du *C.c.Q.* sur les règles de droit administratif relatives aux municipalités. Bien que le juge Gonthier ait conclu, dans cet arrêt, que le délai de prescription établi à l'art. 2930 du *C.c.Q.* avait eu pour effet d'abroger implicitement une disposition de la *Loi sur les cités et villes* portant sur la prescription, sa conclusion n'était pas

contextual analysis of both pieces of legislation, including an extensive review of the relevant legislative history (paras. 31-41). Consequently, the circumstances before this Court in *Doré* are far from “identical” to those in the present case, in terms of text, context and legislative history. Accordingly, *Doré* cannot be said to require the automatic application of the rule of repeal by implication.

[53] A noteworthy indicator of Parliament’s overall intent is the fact that in subsequent amendments it has not displaced the rule set out in the *CCAA*. Indeed, as indicated above, the recent amendments to the *CCAA* in 2005 resulted in the rule previously found in s. 18.3 being renumbered and reformulated as s. 37. Thus, to the extent the interpretation allowing the GST deemed trust to remain effective under the *CCAA* depends on *ETA* s. 222(3) having impliedly repealed *CCAA* s. 18.3(1) because it is later in time, we have come full circle. Parliament has renumbered and reformulated the provision of the *CCAA* stating that, subject to exceptions for source deductions, deemed trusts do not survive the *CCAA* proceedings and thus the *CCAA* is now the later in time statute. This confirms that Parliament’s intent with respect to GST deemed trusts is to be found in the *CCAA*.

[54] I do not agree with my colleague Abella J. that s. 44(f) of the *Interpretation Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, can be used to interpret the 2005 amendments as having no effect. The new statute can hardly be said to be a mere re-enactment of the former statute. Indeed, the *CCAA* underwent a substantial review in 2005. Notably, acting consistently with its goal of treating both the *BIA* and the *CCAA* as sharing the same approach to insolvency, Parliament made parallel amendments to both statutes with respect to corporate proposals. In addition, new provisions were introduced regarding

fondée seulement sur une analyse textuelle. Il a en effet procédé à une analyse contextuelle approfondie des deux textes, y compris de l’historique législatif pertinent (par. 31-41). Par conséquent, les circonstances du cas dont était saisie la Cour dans *Doré* sont loin d’être « identiques » à celles du présent pourvoi, tant sur le plan du texte que sur celui du contexte et de l’historique législatif. On ne peut donc pas dire que l’arrêt *Doré* commande l’application automatique d’une règle d’abrogation implicite.

[53] Un bon indice de l’intention générale du législateur peut être tiré du fait qu’il n’a pas, dans les modifications subséquentes, écarté la règle énoncée dans la *LACC*. D’ailleurs, par suite des modifications apportées à cette loi en 2005, la règle figurant initialement à l’art. 18.3 a, comme nous l’avons vu plus tôt, été reprise sous une formulation différente à l’art. 37. Par conséquent, dans la mesure où l’interprétation selon laquelle la fiducie réputée visant la TPS demeurerait en vigueur dans le contexte de procédures en vertu de la *LACC* repose sur le fait que le par. 222(3) de la *LTA* constitue la disposition postérieure et a eu pour effet d’abroger implicitement le par. 18.3(1) de la *LACC*, nous revenons au point de départ. Comme le législateur a reformulé et renuméroté la disposition de la *LACC* précisant que, sous réserve des exceptions relatives aux retenues à la source, les fiducies réputées ne survivent pas à l’engagement de procédures fondées sur la *LACC*, c’est cette loi qui se trouve maintenant à être le texte postérieur. Cette constatation confirme que c’est dans la *LACC* qu’est exprimée l’intention du législateur en ce qui a trait aux fiducies réputées visant la TPS.

[54] Je ne suis pas d’accord avec ma collègue la juge Abella pour dire que l’al. 44f) de la *Loi d’interprétation*, L.R.C. 1985, ch. I-21, permet d’interpréter les modifications de 2005 comme n’ayant aucun effet. La nouvelle loi peut difficilement être considérée comme une simple refonte de la loi antérieure. De fait, la *LACC* a fait l’objet d’un examen approfondi en 2005. En particulier, conformément à son objectif qui consiste à faire concorder l’approche de la *LFI* et celle de la *LACC* à l’égard de l’insolvabilité, le législateur a apporté aux deux textes des modifications allant dans le même sens en ce qui concerne les

the treatment of contracts, collective agreements, interim financing and governance agreements. The appointment and role of the Monitor was also clarified. Noteworthy are the limits imposed by CCAA s. 11.09 on the court's discretion to make an order staying the Crown's source deductions deemed trusts, which were formerly found in s. 11.4. No mention whatsoever is made of GST deemed trusts (see Summary to S.C. 2005, c. 47). The review went as far as looking at the very expression used to describe the statutory override of deemed trusts. The comments cited by my colleague only emphasize the clear intent of Parliament to maintain its policy that only source deductions deemed trusts survive in CCAA proceedings.

[55] In the case at bar, the legislative context informs the determination of Parliament's legislative intent and supports the conclusion that *ETA* s. 222(3) was not intended to narrow the scope of the CCAA's override provision. Viewed in its entire context, the conflict between the *ETA* and the CCAA is more apparent than real. I would therefore not follow the reasoning in *Ottawa Senators* and affirm that CCAA s. 18.3 remained effective.

[56] My conclusion is reinforced by the purpose of the CCAA as part of Canadian remedial insolvency legislation. As this aspect is particularly relevant to the second issue, I will now discuss how courts have interpreted the scope of their discretionary powers in supervising a CCAA reorganization and how Parliament has largely endorsed this interpretation. Indeed, the interpretation courts have given to the CCAA helps in understanding how the CCAA grew to occupy such a prominent role in Canadian insolvency law.

propositions présentées par les entreprises. De plus, de nouvelles dispositions ont été ajoutées au sujet des contrats, des conventions collectives, du financement temporaire et des accords de gouvernance. Des clarifications ont aussi été apportées quant à la nomination et au rôle du contrôleur. Il convient par ailleurs de souligner les limites imposées par l'art. 11.09 de la *LACC* au pouvoir discrétionnaire du tribunal d'ordonner la suspension de l'effet des fiducies réputées créées en faveur de la Couronne relativement aux retenues à la source, limites qui étaient auparavant énoncées à l'art. 11.4. Il n'est fait aucune mention des fiducies réputées visant la TPS (voir le Sommaire de la L.C. 2005, ch. 47). Dans le cadre de cet examen, le législateur est allé jusqu'à se pencher sur les termes mêmes utilisés dans la loi pour écarter l'application des fiducies réputées. Les commentaires cités par ma collègue ne font que souligner l'intention manifeste du législateur de maintenir sa politique générale suivant laquelle seules les fiducies réputées visant les retenues à la source survivent en cas de procédures fondées sur la *LACC*.

[55] En l'espèce, le contexte législatif aide à déterminer l'intention du législateur et conforte la conclusion selon laquelle le par. 222(3) de la *LTA* ne visait pas à restreindre la portée de la disposition de la *LACC* écartant l'application des fiducies réputées. Eu égard au contexte dans son ensemble, le conflit entre la *LTA* et la *LACC* est plus apparent que réel. Je n'adopterais donc pas le raisonnement de l'arrêt *Ottawa Senators* et je confirmerais que l'art. 18.3 de la *LACC* a continué de produire ses effets.

[56] Ma conclusion est renforcée par l'objectif de la *LACC* en tant que composante du régime réparateur instauré la législation canadienne en matière d'insolvabilité. Comme cet aspect est particulièrement pertinent à propos de la deuxième question, je vais maintenant examiner la façon dont les tribunaux ont interprété l'étendue des pouvoirs discrétionnaires dont ils disposent lorsqu'ils surveillent une réorganisation fondée sur la *LACC*, ainsi que la façon dont le législateur a dans une large mesure entériné cette interprétation. L'interprétation de la *LACC* par les tribunaux aide en fait à comprendre comment celle-ci en est venue à jouer un rôle si important dans le droit canadien de l'insolvabilité.

3.3 Discretionary Power of a Court Supervising a CCAA Reorganization

[57] Courts frequently observe that “[t]he CCAA is skeletal in nature” and does not “contain a comprehensive code that lays out all that is permitted or barred” (*Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (Re)*, 2008 ONCA 587, 92 O.R. (3d) 513, at para. 44, *per* Blair J.A.). Accordingly, “[t]he history of CCAA law has been an evolution of judicial interpretation” (*Dylex Ltd., Re* (1995), 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)), at para. 10, *per* Farley J.).

[58] CCAA decisions are often based on discretionary grants of jurisdiction. The incremental exercise of judicial discretion in commercial courts under conditions one practitioner aptly describes as “the hothouse of real-time litigation” has been the primary method by which the CCAA has been adapted and has evolved to meet contemporary business and social needs (see Jones, at p. 484).

[59] Judicial discretion must of course be exercised in furtherance of the CCAA’s purposes. The remedial purpose I referred to in the historical overview of the Act is recognized over and over again in the jurisprudence. To cite one early example:

The legislation is remedial in the purest sense in that it provides a means whereby the devastating social and economic effects of bankruptcy or creditor initiated termination of ongoing business operations can be avoided while a court-supervised attempt to reorganize the financial affairs of the debtor company is made.

(*Elan Corp. v. Comiskey* (1990), 41 O.A.C. 282, at para. 57, *per* Doherty J.A., dissenting)

[60] Judicial decision making under the CCAA takes many forms. A court must first of all provide the conditions under which the debtor can attempt to reorganize. This can be achieved by

3.3 Pouvoirs discrétionnaires du tribunal chargé de surveiller une réorganisation fondée sur la LACC

[57] Les tribunaux font souvent remarquer que [TRADUCTION] « [l]a LACC est par nature schématique » et ne « contient pas un code complet énonçant tout ce qui est permis et tout ce qui est interdit » (*Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (Re)*, 2008 ONCA 587, 92 O.R. (3d) 513, par. 44, le juge Blair). Par conséquent, [TRADUCTION] « [l]’histoire du droit relatif à la LACC correspond à l’évolution de ce droit au fil de son interprétation par les tribunaux » (*Dylex Ltd., Re* (1995), 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106 (C. Ont. (Div. gén.)), par. 10, le juge Farley).

[58] Les décisions prises en vertu de la LACC découlent souvent de l’exercice discrétionnaire de certains pouvoirs. C’est principalement au fil de l’exercice par les juridictions commerciales de leurs pouvoirs discrétionnaires, et ce, dans des conditions décrites avec justesse par un praticien comme constituant [TRADUCTION] « la pépinière du contentieux en temps réel », que la LACC a évolué de façon graduelle et s’est adaptée aux besoins commerciaux et sociaux contemporains (voir Jones, p. 484).

[59] L’exercice par les tribunaux de leurs pouvoirs discrétionnaires doit évidemment tendre à la réalisation des objectifs de la LACC. Le caractère réparateur dont j’ai fait état dans mon aperçu historique de la Loi a à maintes reprises été reconnu dans la jurisprudence. Voici l’un des premiers exemples :

[TRADUCTION] La loi est réparatrice au sens le plus pur du terme, en ce qu’elle fournit un moyen d’éviter les effets dévastateurs, — tant sur le plan social qu’économique — de la faillite ou de l’arrêt des activités d’une entreprise, à l’initiation des créanciers, pendant que des efforts sont déployés, sous la surveillance du tribunal, en vue de réorganiser la situation financière de la compagnie débitrice.

(*Elan Corp. c. Comiskey* (1990), 41 O.A.C. 282, par. 57, le juge Doherty, dissident)

[60] Le processus décisionnel des tribunaux sous le régime de la LACC comporte plusieurs aspects. Le tribunal doit d’abord créer les conditions propres à permettre au débiteur de tenter une réorganisation.

staying enforcement actions by creditors to allow the debtor's business to continue, preserving the *status quo* while the debtor plans the compromise or arrangement to be presented to creditors, and supervising the process and advancing it to the point where it can be determined whether it will succeed (see, e.g., *Chef Ready Foods Ltd. v. Hongkong Bank of Can.* (1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84 (C.A.), at pp. 88-89; *Pacific National Lease Holding Corp., Re* (1992), 19 B.C.A.C. 134, at para. 27). In doing so, the court must often be cognizant of the various interests at stake in the reorganization, which can extend beyond those of the debtor and creditors to include employees, directors, shareholders, and even other parties doing business with the insolvent company (see, e.g., *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*, 2000 ABQB 442, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 9, at para. 144, *per* Paperny J. (as she then was); *Air Canada, Re* (2003), 42 C.B.R. (4th) 173 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 3; *Air Canada, Re*, 2003 CanLII 49366 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 13, *per* Farley J.; Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, at pp. 181-92 and 217-26). In addition, courts must recognize that on occasion the broader public interest will be engaged by aspects of the reorganization and may be a factor against which the decision of whether to allow a particular action will be weighed (see, e.g., *Canadian Red Cross Society/Société Canadienne de la Croix Rouge, Re* (2000), 19 C.B.R. (4th) 158 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 2, *per* Blair J. (as he then was); Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, at pp. 195-214).

[61] When large companies encounter difficulty, reorganizations become increasingly complex. CCAA courts have been called upon to innovate accordingly in exercising their jurisdiction beyond merely staying proceedings against the debtor to allow breathing room for reorganization. They have been asked to sanction measures for which there is no explicit authority in the CCAA. Without exhaustively cataloguing the various measures taken under the authority of the CCAA, it is useful to refer briefly to a few examples to illustrate the flexibility the statute affords supervising courts.

Il peut à cette fin suspendre les mesures d'exécution prises par les créanciers afin que le débiteur puisse continuer d'exploiter son entreprise, préserver le statu quo pendant que le débiteur prépare la transaction ou l'arrangement qu'il présentera aux créanciers et surveiller le processus et le mener jusqu'au point où il sera possible de dire s'il aboutira (voir, p. ex., *Chef Ready Foods Ltd. c. Hongkong Bank of Can.* (1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84 (C.A.), p. 88-89; *Pacific National Lease Holding Corp., Re* (1992), 19 B.C.A.C. 134, par. 27). Ce faisant, le tribunal doit souvent déterminer les divers intérêts en jeu dans la réorganisation, lesquels peuvent fort bien ne pas se limiter aux seuls intérêts du débiteur et des créanciers, mais englober aussi ceux des employés, des administrateurs, des actionnaires et même de tiers qui font affaire avec la compagnie insolvable (voir, p. ex., *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*, 2000 ABQB 442, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 9, par. 144, la juge Paperny (maintenant juge de la Cour d'appel); *Air Canada, Re* (2003), 42 C.B.R. (4th) 173 (C.S.J. Ont.), par. 3; *Air Canada, Re*, 2003 CanLII 49366 (C.S.J. Ont.), par. 13, le juge Farley; Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, p. 181-192 et 217-226). En outre, les tribunaux doivent reconnaître que, à l'occasion, certains aspects de la réorganisation concernent l'intérêt public et qu'il pourrait s'agir d'un facteur devant être pris en compte afin de décider s'il y a lieu d'autoriser une mesure donnée (voir, p. ex., *Canadian Red Cross Society/Société Canadienne de la Croix Rouge, Re* (2000), 19 C.B.R. (4th) 158 (C.S.J. Ont.), par. 2, le juge Blair (maintenant juge de la Cour d'appel); Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, p. 195-214).

[61] Quand de grandes entreprises éprouvent des difficultés, les réorganisations deviennent très complexes. Les tribunaux chargés d'appliquer la LACC ont ainsi été appelés à innover dans l'exercice de leur compétence et ne se sont pas limités à suspendre les procédures engagées contre le débiteur afin de lui permettre de procéder à une réorganisation. On leur a demandé de sanctionner des mesures non expressément prévues par la LACC. Sans dresser la liste complète des diverses mesures qui ont été prises par des tribunaux en vertu de la LACC, il est néanmoins utile d'en donner brièvement quelques exemples, pour bien illustrer la marge de manœuvre que la loi accorde à ceux-ci.

[62] Perhaps the most creative use of CCAA authority has been the increasing willingness of courts to authorize post-filing security for debtor in possession financing or super-priority charges on the debtor's assets when necessary for the continuation of the debtor's business during the reorganization (see, e.g., *Skydome Corp., Re* (1998), 16 C.B.R. (4th) 118 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)); *United Used Auto & Truck Parts Ltd., Re*, 2000 BCCA 146, 135 B.C.A.C. 96, aff'g (1999), 12 C.B.R. (4th) 144 (S.C.); and generally, J. P. Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (2007), at pp. 93-115). The CCAA has also been used to release claims against third parties as part of approving a comprehensive plan of arrangement and compromise, even over the objections of some dissenting creditors (see *Metcalfe & Mansfield*). As well, the appointment of a Monitor to oversee the reorganization was originally a measure taken pursuant to the CCAA's supervisory authority; Parliament responded, making the mechanism mandatory by legislative amendment.

[63] Judicial innovation during CCAA proceedings has not been without controversy. At least two questions it raises are directly relevant to the case at bar: (1) What are the sources of a court's authority during CCAA proceedings? (2) What are the limits of this authority?

[64] The first question concerns the boundary between a court's statutory authority under the CCAA and a court's residual authority under its inherent and equitable jurisdiction when supervising a reorganization. In authorizing measures during CCAA proceedings, courts have on occasion purported to rely upon their equitable jurisdiction to advance the purposes of the Act or their inherent jurisdiction to fill gaps in the statute. Recent appellate decisions have counselled against

[62] L'utilisation la plus créative des pouvoirs conférés par la LACC est sans doute le fait que les tribunaux se montrent de plus en plus disposés à autoriser, après le dépôt des procédures, la constitution de sûretés pour financer le débiteur demeuré en possession des biens ou encore la constitution de charges super-prioritaires grevant l'actif du débiteur lorsque cela est nécessaire pour que ce dernier puisse continuer d'exploiter son entreprise pendant la réorganisation (voir, p. ex., *Skydome Corp., Re* (1998), 16 C.B.R. (4th) 118 (C. Ont. (Div. gén.)); *United Used Auto & Truck Parts Ltd., Re*, 2000 BCCA 146, 135 B.C.A.C. 96, conf. (1999), 12 C.B.R. (4th) 144 (C.S.); et, d'une manière générale, J. P. Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (2007), p. 93-115). La LACC a aussi été utilisée pour libérer des tiers des actions susceptibles d'être intentées contre eux, dans le cadre de l'approbation d'un plan global d'arrangement et de transaction, malgré les objections de certains créanciers dissidents (voir *Metcalfe & Mansfield*). Au départ, la nomination d'un contrôleur chargé de surveiller la réorganisation était elle aussi une mesure prise en vertu du pouvoir de surveillance conféré par la LACC, mais le législateur est intervenu et a modifié la loi pour rendre cette mesure obligatoire.

[63] L'esprit d'innovation dont ont fait montre les tribunaux pendant des procédures fondées sur la LACC n'a toutefois pas été sans susciter de controverses. Au moins deux des questions que soulève leur approche sont directement pertinentes en l'espèce : (1) Quelles sont les sources des pouvoirs dont dispose le tribunal pendant les procédures fondées sur la LACC? (2) Quelles sont les limites de ces pouvoirs?

[64] La première question porte sur la frontière entre les pouvoirs d'origine législative dont dispose le tribunal en vertu de la LACC et les pouvoirs résiduels dont jouit un tribunal en raison de sa compétence inhérente et de sa compétence en equity, lorsqu'il est question de surveiller une réorganisation. Pour justifier certaines mesures autorisées à l'occasion de procédures engagées sous le régime de la LACC, les tribunaux ont parfois prétendu se fonder sur leur compétence en equity dans le but

purporting to rely on inherent jurisdiction, holding that the better view is that courts are in most cases simply construing the authority supplied by the CCAA itself (see, e.g., *Skeena Cellulose Inc., Re*, 2003 BCCA 344, 13 B.C.L.R. (4th) 236, at paras. 45-47, *per* Newbury J.A.; *Stelco Inc. (Re)* (2005), 75 O.R. (3d) 5 (C.A.), at paras. 31-33, *per* Blair J.A.).

[65] I agree with Justice Georgina R. Jackson and Professor Janis Sarra that the most appropriate approach is a hierarchical one in which courts rely first on an interpretation of the provisions of the CCAA text before turning to inherent or equitable jurisdiction to anchor measures taken in a CCAA proceeding (see G. R. Jackson and J. Sarra, “Selecting the Judicial Tool to get the Job Done: An Examination of Statutory Interpretation, Discretionary Power and Inherent Jurisdiction in Insolvency Matters”, in J. P. Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2007* (2008), 41, at p. 42). The authors conclude that when given an appropriately purposive and liberal interpretation, the CCAA will be sufficient in most instances to ground measures necessary to achieve its objectives (p. 94).

[66] Having examined the pertinent parts of the CCAA and the recent history of the legislation, I accept that in most instances the issuance of an order during CCAA proceedings should be considered an exercise in statutory interpretation. Particularly noteworthy in this regard is the expansive interpretation the language of the statute at issue is capable of supporting.

[67] The initial grant of authority under the CCAA empowered a court “where an application is made under this Act in respect of a company . . . on the application of any person interested in the

de réaliser les objectifs de la Loi ou sur leur compétence inhérente afin de combler les lacunes de celle-ci. Or, dans de récentes décisions, des cours d’appel ont déconseillé aux tribunaux d’invoquer leur compétence inhérente, concluant qu’il est plus juste de dire que, dans la plupart des cas, les tribunaux ne font simplement qu’interpréter les pouvoirs se trouvant dans la LACC elle-même (voir, p. ex., *Skeena Cellulose Inc., Re*, 2003 BCCA 344, 13 B.C.L.R. (4th) 236, par. 45-47, la juge Newbury; *Stelco Inc. (Re)* (2005), 75 O.R. (3d) 5 (C.A.), par. 31-33, le juge Blair).

[65] Je suis d’accord avec la juge Georgina R. Jackson et la professeure Janis Sarra pour dire que la méthode la plus appropriée est une approche hiérarchisée. Suivant cette approche, les tribunaux procèdent d’abord à une interprétation des dispositions de la LACC avant d’invoquer leur compétence inhérente ou leur compétence en equity pour justifier des mesures prises dans le cadre d’une procédure fondée sur la LACC (voir G. R. Jackson et J. Sarra, « Selecting the Judicial Tool to get the Job Done : An Examination of Statutory Interpretation, Discretionary Power and Inherent Jurisdiction in Insolvency Matters », dans J. P. Sarra, dir., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2007* (2008), 41, p. 42). Selon ces auteures, pourvu qu’on lui donne l’interprétation téléologique et large qui s’impose, la LACC permettra dans la plupart des cas de justifier les mesures nécessaires à la réalisation de ses objectifs (p. 94).

[66] L’examen des parties pertinentes de la LACC et de l’évolution récente de la législation me font adhérer à ce point de vue jurisprudentiel et doctrinal : dans la plupart des cas, la décision de rendre une ordonnance durant une procédure fondée sur la LACC relève de l’interprétation législative. D’ailleurs, à cet égard, il faut souligner d’une façon particulière que le texte de loi dont il est question en l’espèce peut être interprété très largement.

[67] En vertu du pouvoir conféré initialement par la LACC, le tribunal pouvait, « chaque fois qu’une demande [était] faite sous le régime de la présente loi à l’égard d’une compagnie, [. . .] sur demande

matter, . . . subject to this Act, [to] make an order under this section” (*CCAA*, s. 11(1)). The plain language of the statute was very broad.

[68] In this regard, though not strictly applicable to the case at bar, I note that Parliament has in recent amendments changed the wording contained in s. 11(1), making explicit the discretionary authority of the court under the *CCAA*. Thus, in s. 11 of the *CCAA* as currently enacted, a court may, “subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, . . . make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances” (S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 128). Parliament appears to have endorsed the broad reading of *CCAA* authority developed by the jurisprudence.

[69] The *CCAA* also explicitly provides for certain orders. Both an order made on an initial application and an order on subsequent applications may stay, restrain, or prohibit existing or new proceedings against the debtor. The burden is on the applicant to satisfy the court that the order is appropriate in the circumstances and that the applicant has been acting in good faith and with due diligence (*CCAA*, ss. 11(3), (4) and (6)).

[70] The general language of the *CCAA* should not be read as being restricted by the availability of more specific orders. However, the requirements of appropriateness, good faith, and due diligence are baseline considerations that a court should always bear in mind when exercising *CCAA* authority. Appropriateness under the *CCAA* is assessed by inquiring whether the order sought advances the policy objectives underlying the *CCAA*. The question is whether the order will usefully further efforts to achieve the remedial purpose of the *CCAA* — avoiding the social and economic losses resulting from liquidation of an insolvent company. I would add that appropriateness extends not only to the purpose of the order, but also to the means it employs. Courts should be mindful that chances for successful reorganizations are enhanced where participants achieve common ground and all

d’un intéressé, [. . .] sous réserve des autres dispositions de la présente loi [. . .] rendre l’ordonnance prévue au présent article » (*LACC*, par. 11(1)). Cette formulation claire était très générale.

[68] Bien que ces dispositions ne soient pas strictement applicables en l’espèce, je signale à ce propos que le législateur a, dans des modifications récentes, apporté au texte du par. 11(1) un changement qui rend plus explicite le pouvoir discrétionnaire conféré au tribunal par la *LACC*. Ainsi, aux termes de l’art. 11 actuel de la *LACC*, le tribunal peut « rendre [. . .] sous réserve des restrictions prévues par la présente loi [. . .] toute ordonnance qu’il estime indiquée » (L.C. 2005, ch. 47, art. 128). Le législateur semble ainsi avoir jugé opportun de sanctionner l’interprétation large du pouvoir conféré par la *LACC* qui a été élaborée par la jurisprudence.

[69] De plus, la *LACC* prévoit explicitement certaines ordonnances. Tant à la suite d’une demande initiale que d’une demande subséquente, le tribunal peut, par ordonnance, suspendre ou interdire toute procédure contre le débiteur, ou surseoir à sa continuation. Il incombe à la personne qui demande une telle ordonnance de convaincre le tribunal qu’elle est indiquée et qu’il a agi et continue d’agir de bonne foi et avec la diligence voulue (*LACC*, par. 11(3), (4) et (6)).

[70] La possibilité pour le tribunal de rendre des ordonnances plus spécifiques n’a pas pour effet de restreindre la portée des termes généraux utilisés dans la *LACC*. Toutefois, l’opportunité, la bonne foi et la diligence sont des considérations de base que le tribunal devrait toujours garder à l’esprit lorsqu’il exerce les pouvoirs conférés par la *LACC*. Sous le régime de la *LACC*, le tribunal évalue l’opportunité de l’ordonnance demandée en déterminant si elle favorisera la réalisation des objectifs de politique générale qui sous-tendent la Loi. Il s’agit donc de savoir si cette ordonnance contribuera utilement à la réalisation de l’objectif réparateur de la *LACC* — à savoir éviter les pertes sociales et économiques résultant de la liquidation d’une compagnie insolvable. J’ajouterais que le critère de l’opportunité s’applique non seulement à l’objectif de l’ordonnance, mais aussi aux moyens utilisés. Les tribunaux

stakeholders are treated as advantageously and fairly as the circumstances permit.

[71] It is well established that efforts to reorganize under the *CCAA* can be terminated and the stay of proceedings against the debtor lifted if the reorganization is “doomed to failure” (see *Chef Ready*, at p. 88; *Philip’s Manufacturing Ltd., Re* (1992), 9 C.B.R. (3d) 25 (B.C.C.A.), at paras. 6-7). However, when an order is sought that does realistically advance the *CCAA*’s purposes, the ability to make it is within the discretion of a *CCAA* court.

[72] The preceding discussion assists in determining whether the court had authority under the *CCAA* to continue the stay of proceedings against the Crown once it was apparent that reorganization would fail and bankruptcy was the inevitable next step.

[73] In the Court of Appeal, Tysoe J.A. held that no authority existed under the *CCAA* to continue staying the Crown’s enforcement of the GST deemed trust once efforts at reorganization had come to an end. The appellant submits that in so holding, Tysoe J.A. failed to consider the underlying purpose of the *CCAA* and give the statute an appropriately purposive and liberal interpretation under which the order was permissible. The Crown submits that Tysoe J.A. correctly held that the mandatory language of the *ETA* gave the court no option but to permit enforcement of the GST deemed trust when lifting the *CCAA* stay to permit the debtor to make an assignment under the *BIA*. Whether the *ETA* has a mandatory effect in the context of a *CCAA* proceeding has already been discussed. I will now address the question of whether the order was authorized by the *CCAA*.

doivent se rappeler que les chances de succès d’une réorganisation sont meilleures lorsque les participants arrivent à s’entendre et que tous les intéressés sont traités de la façon la plus avantageuse et juste possible dans les circonstances.

[71] Il est bien établi qu’il est possible de mettre fin aux efforts déployés pour procéder à une réorganisation fondée sur la *LACC* et de lever la suspension des procédures contre le débiteur si la réorganisation est [TRADUCTION] « vouée à l’échec » (voir *Chef Ready*, p. 88; *Philip’s Manufacturing Ltd., Re* (1992), 9 C.B.R. (3d) 25 (C.A.C.-B.), par. 6-7). Cependant, quand l’ordonnance demandée contribue vraiment à la réalisation des objectifs de la *LACC*, le pouvoir discrétionnaire dont dispose le tribunal en vertu de cette loi l’habilite à rendre à cette ordonnance.

[72] L’analyse qui précède est utile pour répondre à la question de savoir si le tribunal avait, en vertu de la *LACC*, le pouvoir de maintenir la suspension des procédures à l’encontre de la Couronne, une fois qu’il est devenu évident que la réorganisation échouerait et que la faillite était inévitable.

[73] En Cour d’appel, le juge Tysoe a conclu que la *LACC* n’habilitait pas le tribunal à maintenir la suspension des mesures d’exécution de la Couronne à l’égard de la fiducie réputée visant la TPS après l’arrêt des efforts de réorganisation. Selon l’appelante, en tirant cette conclusion, le juge Tysoe a omis de tenir compte de l’objectif fondamental de la *LACC* et n’a pas donné à ce texte l’interprétation téléologique et large qu’il convient de lui donner et qui autorise le prononcé d’une telle ordonnance. La Couronne soutient que le juge Tysoe a conclu à bon droit que les termes impératifs de la *LTA* ne laissaient au tribunal d’autre choix que d’autoriser les mesures d’exécution à l’endroit de la fiducie réputée visant la TPS lorsqu’il a levé la suspension de procédures qui avait été ordonnée en application de la *LACC* afin de permettre au débiteur de faire cession de ses biens en vertu de la *LFI*. J’ai déjà traité de la question de savoir si la *LTA* a un effet contraignant dans une procédure fondée sur la *LACC*. Je vais maintenant traiter de la question de savoir si l’ordonnance était autorisée par la *LACC*.

[74] It is beyond dispute that the *CCAA* imposes no explicit temporal limitations upon proceedings commenced under the Act that would prohibit ordering a continuation of the stay of the Crown's GST claims while lifting the general stay of proceedings temporarily to allow the debtor to make an assignment in bankruptcy.

[75] The question remains whether the order advanced the underlying purpose of the *CCAA*. The Court of Appeal held that it did not because the reorganization efforts had come to an end and the *CCAA* was accordingly spent. I disagree.

[76] There is no doubt that had reorganization been commenced under the *BIA* instead of the *CCAA*, the Crown's deemed trust priority for the GST funds would have been lost. Similarly, the Crown does not dispute that under the scheme of distribution in bankruptcy under the *BIA* the deemed trust for GST ceases to have effect. Thus, after reorganization under the *CCAA* failed, creditors would have had a strong incentive to seek immediate bankruptcy and distribution of the debtor's assets under the *BIA*. In order to conclude that the discretion does not extend to partially lifting the stay in order to allow for an assignment in bankruptcy, one would have to assume a gap between the *CCAA* and the *BIA* proceedings. Brenner C.J.S.C.'s order staying Crown enforcement of the GST claim ensured that creditors would not be disadvantaged by the attempted reorganization under the *CCAA*. The effect of his order was to blunt any impulse of creditors to interfere in an orderly liquidation. His order was thus in furtherance of the *CCAA*'s objectives to the extent that it allowed a bridge between the *CCAA* and *BIA* proceedings. This interpretation of the tribunal's discretionary power is buttressed by s. 20 of the *CCAA*. That section provides that the *CCAA* "may be applied together with the provisions of any Act of Parliament . . . that authorizes or makes provision for the sanction of compromises or arrangements between a company and its shareholders or any class of them", such as

[74] Il n'est pas contesté que la *LACC* n'assujettit les procédures engagées sous son régime à aucune limite temporelle explicite qui interdirait au tribunal d'ordonner le maintien de la suspension des procédures engagées par la Couronne pour recouvrer la TPS, tout en levant temporairement la suspension générale des procédures prononcée pour permettre au débiteur de faire cession de ses biens.

[75] Il reste à se demander si l'ordonnance contribuait à la réalisation de l'objectif fondamental de la *LACC*. La Cour d'appel a conclu que non, parce que les efforts de réorganisation avaient pris fin et que, par conséquent, la *LACC* n'était plus d'aucune utilité. Je ne partage pas cette conclusion.

[76] Il ne fait aucun doute que si la réorganisation avait été entreprise sous le régime de la *LFI* plutôt qu'en vertu de la *LACC*, la Couronne aurait perdu la priorité que lui confère la fiducie réputée visant la TPS. De même, la Couronne ne conteste pas que, selon le plan de répartition prévu par la *LFI* en cas de faillite, cette fiducie réputée cesse de produire ses effets. Par conséquent, après l'échec de la réorganisation tentée sous le régime de la *LACC*, les créanciers auraient eu toutes les raisons de solliciter la mise en faillite immédiate du débiteur et la répartition de ses biens en vertu de la *LFI*. Pour pouvoir conclure que le pouvoir discrétionnaire dont dispose le tribunal ne l'autorise pas à lever partiellement la suspension des procédures afin de permettre la cession des biens, il faudrait présumer l'existence d'un hiatus entre la procédure fondée sur la *LACC* et celle fondée sur la *LFI*. L'ordonnance du juge en chef Brenner suspendant l'exécution des mesures de recouvrement de la Couronne à l'égard de la TPS faisait en sorte que les créanciers ne soient pas désavantagés par la tentative de réorganisation fondée sur la *LACC*. Cette ordonnance avait pour effet de dissuader les créanciers d'entraver une liquidation ordonnée et, de ce fait, elle contribuait à la réalisation des objectifs de la *LACC*, dans la mesure où elle établit une passerelle entre les procédures régies par la *LACC* d'une part et celles régies par la *LFI* d'autre part. Cette interprétation du pouvoir discrétionnaire du tribunal se trouve renforcée par

the *BIA*. Section 20 clearly indicates the intention of Parliament for the *CCAA* to operate *in tandem* with other insolvency legislation, such as the *BIA*.

[77] The *CCAA* creates conditions for preserving the *status quo* while attempts are made to find common ground amongst stakeholders for a reorganization that is fair to all. Because the alternative to reorganization is often bankruptcy, participants will measure the impact of a reorganization against the position they would enjoy in liquidation. In the case at bar, the order fostered a harmonious transition between reorganization and liquidation while meeting the objective of a single collective proceeding that is common to both statutes.

[78] Tysoe J.A. therefore erred in my view by treating the *CCAA* and the *BIA* as distinct regimes subject to a temporal gap between the two, rather than as forming part of an integrated body of insolvency law. Parliament's decision to maintain two statutory schemes for reorganization, the *BIA* and the *CCAA*, reflects the reality that reorganizations of differing complexity require different legal mechanisms. By contrast, only one statutory scheme has been found to be needed to liquidate a bankrupt debtor's estate. The transition from the *CCAA* to the *BIA* may require the partial lifting of a stay of proceedings under the *CCAA* to allow commencement of the *BIA* proceedings. However, as Laskin J.A. for the Ontario Court of Appeal noted in a similar competition between secured creditors and the Ontario Superintendent of Financial Services seeking to enforce a deemed trust, "[t]he two statutes are related" and no "gap" exists between the two statutes which would allow the enforcement of property interests at the conclusion of *CCAA* proceedings that would be

l'art. 20 de la *LACC*, qui précise que les dispositions de la Loi « peuvent être appliquées conjointement avec celles de toute loi fédérale [...] autorisant ou prévoyant l'homologation de transactions ou arrangements entre une compagnie et ses actionnaires ou une catégorie de ces derniers », par exemple la *LFI*. L'article 20 indique clairement que le législateur entend voir la *LACC* être appliquée *de concert* avec les autres lois concernant l'insolvabilité, telle la *LFI*.

[77] La *LACC* établit les conditions qui permettent de préserver le statu quo pendant qu'on tente de trouver un terrain d'entente entre les intéressés en vue d'une réorganisation qui soit juste pour tout le monde. Étant donné que, souvent, la seule autre solution est la faillite, les participants évaluent l'impact d'une réorganisation en regard de la situation qui serait la leur en cas de liquidation. En l'espèce, l'ordonnance favorisait une transition harmonieuse entre la réorganisation et la liquidation, tout en répondant à l'objectif — commun aux deux lois — qui consiste à avoir une seule procédure collective.

[78] À mon avis, le juge d'appel Tysoe a donc commis une erreur en considérant la *LACC* et la *LFI* comme des régimes distincts, séparés par un hiatus temporel, plutôt que comme deux lois faisant partie d'un ensemble intégré de règles du droit de l'insolvabilité. La décision du législateur de conserver deux régimes législatifs en matière de réorganisation, la *LFI* et la *LACC*, reflète le fait bien réel que des réorganisations de complexité différente requièrent des mécanismes légaux différents. En revanche, un seul régime législatif est jugé nécessaire pour la liquidation de l'actif d'un débiteur en faillite. Le passage de la *LACC* à la *LFI* peut exiger la levée partielle d'une suspension de procédures ordonnée en vertu de la *LACC*, de façon à permettre l'engagement des procédures fondées sur la *LFI*. Toutefois, comme l'a signalé le juge Laskin de la Cour d'appel de l'Ontario dans un litige semblable opposant des créanciers garantis et le Surintendant des services financiers de l'Ontario qui invoquait le bénéfice d'une fiducie réputée, [TRADUCTION] « [L]es deux lois sont

lost in bankruptcy (*Ivaco Inc. (Re)* (2006), 83 O.R. (3d) 108, at paras. 62-63).

[79] The Crown's priority in claims pursuant to source deductions deemed trusts does not undermine this conclusion. Source deductions deemed trusts survive under both the *CCAA* and the *BIA*. Accordingly, creditors' incentives to prefer one Act over another will not be affected. While a court has a broad discretion to stay source deductions deemed trusts in the *CCAA* context, this discretion is nevertheless subject to specific limitations applicable only to source deductions deemed trusts (*CCAA*, s. 11.4). Thus, if *CCAA* reorganization fails (e.g., either the creditors or the court refuse a proposed reorganization), the Crown can immediately assert its claim in unremitted source deductions. But this should not be understood to affect a seamless transition into bankruptcy or create any "gap" between the *CCAA* and the *BIA* for the simple reason that, regardless of what statute the reorganization had been commenced under, creditors' claims in both instances would have been subject to the priority of the Crown's source deductions deemed trust.

[80] Source deductions deemed trusts aside, the comprehensive and exhaustive mechanism under the *BIA* must control the distribution of the debtor's assets once liquidation is inevitable. Indeed, an orderly transition to liquidation is mandatory under the *BIA* where a proposal is rejected by creditors. The *CCAA* is silent on the transition into liquidation but the breadth of the court's discretion under the Act is sufficient to construct a bridge to liquidation under the *BIA*. The court must do so in a manner that does not subvert the scheme of distribution under the *BIA*. Transition

liées » et il n'existe entre elles aucun « hiatus » qui permettrait d'obtenir l'exécution, à l'issue de procédures engagées sous le régime de la *LACC*, de droits de propriété qui seraient perdus en cas de faillite (*Ivaco Inc. (Re)* (2006), 83 O.R. (3d) 108, par. 62-63).

[79] La priorité accordée aux réclamations de la Couronne fondées sur une fiducie réputée visant des retenues à la source n'affaiblit en rien cette conclusion. Comme ces fiducies réputées survivent tant sous le régime de la *LACC* que sous celui de la *LFI*, ce facteur n'a aucune incidence sur l'intérêt que pourraient avoir les créanciers à préférer une loi plutôt que l'autre. S'il est vrai que le tribunal agissant en vertu de la *LACC* dispose d'une grande latitude pour suspendre les réclamations fondée sur des fiducies réputées visant des retenues à la source, cette latitude n'en demeure pas moins soumise à des limitations particulières, applicables uniquement à ces fiducies réputées (*LACC*, art. 11.4). Par conséquent, si la réorganisation tentée sous le régime de la *LACC* échoue (p. ex. parce que le tribunal ou les créanciers refusent une proposition de réorganisation), la Couronne peut immédiatement présenter sa réclamation à l'égard des retenues à la source non versées. Mais il ne faut pas en conclure que cela compromet le passage harmonieux au régime de faillite ou crée le moindre « hiatus » entre la *LACC* et la *LFI*, car le fait est que, peu importe la loi en vertu de laquelle la réorganisation a été amorcée, les réclamations des créanciers auraient dans les deux cas été subordonnées à la priorité de la fiducie réputée de la Couronne à l'égard des retenues à la source.

[80] Abstraction faite des fiducies réputées visant les retenues à la source, c'est le mécanisme complet et exhaustif prévu par la *LFI* qui doit régir la répartition des biens du débiteur une fois que la liquidation est devenue inévitable. De fait, une transition ordonnée aux procédures de liquidation est obligatoire sous le régime de la *LFI* lorsqu'une proposition est rejetée par les créanciers. La *LACC* est muette à l'égard de cette transition, mais l'ampleur du pouvoir discrétionnaire conféré au tribunal par cette loi est suffisante pour établir une passerelle vers une liquidation opérée sous le régime

to liquidation requires partially lifting the *CCAA* stay to commence proceedings under the *BIA*. This necessary partial lifting of the stay should not trigger a race to the courthouse in an effort to obtain priority unavailable under the *BIA*.

[81] I therefore conclude that Brenner C.J.S.C. had the authority under the *CCAA* to lift the stay to allow entry into liquidation.

3.4 *Express Trust*

[82] The last issue in this case is whether Brenner C.J.S.C. created an express trust in favour of the Crown when he ordered on April 29, 2008, that proceeds from the sale of LeRoy Trucking's assets equal to the amount of unremitted GST be held back in the Monitor's trust account until the results of the reorganization were known. Tysoe J.A. in the Court of Appeal concluded as an alternative ground for allowing the Crown's appeal that it was the beneficiary of an express trust. I disagree.

[83] Creation of an express trust requires the presence of three certainties: intention, subject matter, and object. Express or "true trusts" arise from the acts and intentions of the settlor and are distinguishable from other trusts arising by operation of law (see D. W. M. Waters, M. R. Gillen and L. D. Smith, eds., *Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada* (3rd ed. 2005), at pp. 28-29, especially fn. 42).

[84] Here, there is no certainty to the object (i.e. the beneficiary) inferable from the court's order of April 29, 2008 sufficient to support an express trust.

de la *LFI*. Ce faisant, le tribunal doit veiller à ne pas perturber le plan de répartition établi par la *LFI*. La transition au régime de liquidation nécessite la levée partielle de la suspension des procédures ordonnée en vertu de la *LACC*, afin de permettre l'introduction de procédures en vertu de la *LFI*. Il ne faudrait pas que cette indispensable levée partielle de la suspension des procédures provoque une ruée des créanciers vers le palais de justice pour l'obtention d'une priorité inexistante sous le régime de la *LFI*.

[81] Je conclus donc que le juge en chef Brenner avait, en vertu de la *LACC*, le pouvoir de lever la suspension des procédures afin de permettre la transition au régime de liquidation.

3.4 *Fiducie expresse*

[82] La dernière question à trancher en l'espèce est celle de savoir si le juge en chef Brenner a créé une fiducie expresse en faveur de la Couronne quand il a ordonné, le 29 avril 2008, que le produit de la vente des biens de LeRoy Trucking — jusqu'à concurrence des sommes de TPS non remises — soit détenu dans le compte en fiducie du contrôleur jusqu'à ce que l'issue de la réorganisation soit connue. Un autre motif invoqué par le juge Tysoe de la Cour d'appel pour accueillir l'appel interjeté par la Couronne était que, selon lui, celle-ci était effectivement la bénéficiaire d'une fiducie expresse. Je ne peux souscrire à cette conclusion.

[83] La création d'une fiducie expresse exige la présence de trois certitudes : certitude d'intention, certitude de matière et certitude d'objet. Les fiducies expresses ou « fiducies au sens strict » découlent des actes et des intentions du constituant et se distinguent des autres fiducies découlant de l'effet de la loi (voir D. W. M. Waters, M. R. Gillen et L. D. Smith, dir., *Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada* (3^e éd. 2005), p. 28-29, particulièrement la note en bas de page 42).

[84] En l'espèce, il n'existe aucune certitude d'objet (c.-à-d. relative au bénéficiaire) pouvant être inférée de l'ordonnance prononcée le 29 avril 2008 par le tribunal et suffisante pour donner naissance à une fiducie expresse.

[85] At the time of the order, there was a dispute between Century Services and the Crown over part of the proceeds from the sale of the debtor's assets. The court's solution was to accept LeRoy Trucking's proposal to segregate those monies until that dispute could be resolved. Thus, there was no certainty that the Crown would actually be the beneficiary, or object, of the trust.

[86] The fact that the location chosen to segregate those monies was the Monitor's trust account has no independent effect such that it would overcome the lack of a clear beneficiary. In any event, under the interpretation of *CCAA* s. 18.3(1) established above, no such priority dispute would even arise because the Crown's deemed trust priority over GST claims would be lost under the *CCAA* and the Crown would rank as an unsecured creditor for this amount. However, Brenner C.J.S.C. may well have been proceeding on the basis that, in accordance with *Ottawa Senators*, the Crown's GST claim would remain effective if reorganization was successful, which would not be the case if transition to the liquidation process of the *BIA* was allowed. An amount equivalent to that claim would accordingly be set aside pending the outcome of reorganization.

[87] Thus, uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the *CCAA* restructuring eliminates the existence of any certainty to permanently vest in the Crown a beneficial interest in the funds. That much is clear from the oral reasons of Brenner C.J.S.C. on April 29, 2008, when he said: "Given the fact that [*CCAA* proceedings] are known to fail and filings in bankruptcy result, it seems to me that maintaining the status quo in the case at bar supports the proposal to have the monitor hold these funds in trust." Exactly who might take the money in the final result was therefore evidently in doubt. Brenner C.J.S.C.'s subsequent order of September 3, 2008 denying the Crown's application to enforce the trust once it was clear

[85] Au moment où l'ordonnance a été rendue, il y avait un différend entre Century Services et la Couronne au sujet d'une partie du produit de la vente des biens du débiteur. La solution retenue par le tribunal a consisté à accepter, selon la proposition de LeRoy Trucking, que la somme en question soit détenue séparément jusqu'à ce que le différend puisse être réglé. Par conséquent, il n'existait aucune certitude que la Couronne serait véritablement le bénéficiaire ou l'objet de la fiducie.

[86] Le fait que le compte choisi pour conserver séparément la somme en question était le compte en fiducie du contrôleur n'a pas à lui seul un effet tel qu'il suppléerait à l'absence d'un bénéficiaire certain. De toute façon, suivant l'interprétation du par. 18.3(1) de la *LACC* dégagée précédemment, aucun différend ne saurait même exister quant à la priorité de rang, étant donné que la priorité accordée aux réclamations de la Couronne fondées sur la fiducie réputée visant la TPS ne s'applique pas sous le régime de la *LACC* et que la Couronne est reléguée au rang de créancier non garanti à l'égard des sommes en question. Cependant, il se peut fort bien que le juge en chef Brenner ait estimé que, conformément à l'arrêt *Ottawa Senators*, la créance de la Couronne à l'égard de la TPS demeurerait effective si la réorganisation aboutissait, ce qui ne serait pas le cas si le passage au processus de liquidation régi par la *LFI* était autorisé. Une somme équivalente à cette créance serait ainsi mise de côté jusqu'à ce que le résultat de la réorganisation soit connu.

[87] Par conséquent, l'incertitude entourant l'issue de la restructuration tentée sous le régime de la *LACC* exclut l'existence d'une certitude permettant de conférer de manière permanente à la Couronne un intérêt bénéficiaire sur la somme en question. Cela ressort clairement des motifs exposés de vive voix par le juge en chef Brenner le 29 avril 2008, lorsqu'il a dit : [TRADUCTION] « Comme il est notoire que [des procédures fondées sur la *LACC*] peuvent échouer et que cela entraîne des faillites, le maintien du statu quo en l'espèce me semble militer en faveur de l'acceptation de la proposition d'ordonner au contrôleur de détenir ces fonds en fiducie. » Il y avait donc manifestement un doute quant à la question de savoir qui au juste pourrait toucher l'argent

that bankruptcy was inevitable, confirms the absence of a clear beneficiary required to ground an express trust.

4. Conclusion

[88] I conclude that Brenner C.J.S.C. had the discretion under the *CCAA* to continue the stay of the Crown's claim for enforcement of the GST deemed trust while otherwise lifting it to permit LeRoy Trucking to make an assignment in bankruptcy. My conclusion that s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* nullified the GST deemed trust while proceedings under that Act were pending confirms that the discretionary jurisdiction under s. 11 utilized by the court was not limited by the Crown's asserted GST priority, because there is no such priority under the *CCAA*.

[89] For these reasons, I would allow the appeal and declare that the \$305,202.30 collected by LeRoy Trucking in respect of GST but not yet remitted to the Receiver General of Canada is not subject to deemed trust or priority in favour of the Crown. Nor is this amount subject to an express trust. Costs are awarded for this appeal and the appeal in the court below.

The following are the reasons delivered by

FISH J. —

I

[90] I am in general agreement with the reasons of Justice Deschamps and would dispose of the appeal as she suggests.

[91] More particularly, I share my colleague's interpretation of the scope of the judge's discretion under s. 11 of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("*CCAA*").

en fin de compte. L'ordonnance ultérieure du juge en chef Brenner — dans laquelle ce dernier a rejeté, le 3 septembre 2008, la demande de la Couronne sollicitant le bénéfice de la fiducie présumée après qu'il fut devenu évident que la faillite était inévitable — confirme l'absence du bénéficiaire certain sans lequel il ne saurait y avoir de fiducie expresse.

4. Conclusion

[88] Je conclus que le juge en chef Brenner avait, en vertu de la *LACC*, le pouvoir discrétionnaire de maintenir la suspension de la demande de la Couronne sollicitant le bénéfice de la fiducie réputée visant la TPS, tout en levant par ailleurs la suspension des procédures de manière à permettre à LeRoy Trucking de faire cession de ses biens. Ma conclusion selon laquelle le par. 18.3(1) de la *LACC* neutralisait la fiducie réputée visant la TPS pendant la durée des procédures fondées sur cette loi confirme que les pouvoirs discrétionnaires exercés par le tribunal en vertu de l'art. 11 n'étaient pas limités par la priorité invoquée par la Couronne au titre de la TPS, puisqu'il n'existe aucune priorité de la sorte sous le régime de la *LACC*.

[89] Pour ces motifs, je suis d'avis d'accueillir le pourvoi et de déclarer que la somme de 305 202,30 \$ perçue par LeRoy Trucking au titre de la TPS mais non encore versée au receveur général du Canada ne fait l'objet d'aucune fiducie réputée ou priorité en faveur de la Couronne. Cette somme ne fait pas non plus l'objet d'une fiducie expresse. Les dépens sont accordés à l'égard du présent pourvoi et de l'appel interjeté devant la juridiction inférieure.

Version française des motifs rendus par

LE JUGE FISH —

I

[90] Je souscris dans l'ensemble aux motifs de la juge Deschamps et je disposerais du pourvoi comme elle le propose.

[91] Plus particulièrement, je me rallie à son interprétation de la portée du pouvoir discrétionnaire conféré au juge par l'art. 11 de la *Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies*, L.R.C.

And I share my colleague's conclusion that Brenner C.J.S.C. did not create an express trust in favour of the Crown when he segregated GST funds into the Monitor's trust account (2008 BCSC 1805, [2008] G.S.T.C. 221).

[92] I nonetheless feel bound to add brief reasons of my own regarding the interaction between the CCAA and the *Excise Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 ("ETA").

[93] In upholding deemed trusts created by the *ETA* notwithstanding insolvency proceedings, *Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp. (Re)* (2005), 73 O.R. (3d) 737 (C.A.), and its progeny have been unduly protective of Crown interests which Parliament itself has chosen to subordinate to competing prioritized claims. In my respectful view, a clearly marked departure from that jurisprudential approach is warranted in this case.

[94] Justice Deschamps develops important historical and policy reasons in support of this position and I have nothing to add in that regard. I do wish, however, to explain why a comparative analysis of related statutory provisions adds support to our shared conclusion.

[95] Parliament has in recent years given detailed consideration to the Canadian insolvency scheme. It has declined to amend the provisions at issue in this case. Ours is not to wonder why, but rather to treat Parliament's preservation of the relevant provisions as a deliberate exercise of the legislative discretion that is Parliament's alone. With respect, I reject any suggestion that we should instead characterize the apparent conflict between s. 18.3(1) (now s. 37(1)) of the CCAA and s. 222 of the *ETA* as a drafting anomaly or statutory lacuna properly subject to judicial correction or repair.

1985, ch. C-36 (« *LACC* »). Je partage en outre sa conclusion suivant laquelle le juge en chef Brenner n'a pas créé de fiducie expresse en faveur de la Couronne en ordonnant que les sommes recueillies au titre de la TPS soient détenues séparément dans le compte en fiducie du contrôleur (2008 BCSC 1805, [2008] G.S.T.C. 221).

[92] J'estime néanmoins devoir ajouter de brefs motifs qui me sont propres au sujet de l'interaction entre la *LACC* et la *Loi sur la taxe d'accise*, L.R.C. 1985, ch. E-15 (« *LTA* »).

[93] En maintenant, malgré l'existence des procédures d'insolvabilité, la validité de fiducies réputées créées en vertu de la *LTA*, l'arrêt *Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp. (Re)* (2005), 73 O.R. (3d) 737 (C.A.), et les décisions rendues dans sa foulée ont eu pour effet de protéger indûment des droits de la Couronne que le Parlement avait lui-même choisi de subordonner à d'autres créances prioritaires. À mon avis, il convient en l'espèce de rompre nettement avec ce courant jurisprudentiel.

[94] La juge Deschamps expose d'importantes raisons d'ordre historique et d'intérêt général à l'appui de cette position et je n'ai rien à ajouter à cet égard. Je tiens toutefois à expliquer pourquoi une analyse comparative de certaines dispositions législatives connexes vient renforcer la conclusion à laquelle ma collègue et moi-même en arrivons.

[95] Au cours des dernières années, le législateur fédéral a procédé à un examen approfondi du régime canadien d'insolvabilité. Il a refusé de modifier les dispositions qui sont en cause dans la présente affaire. Il ne nous appartient pas de nous interroger sur les raisons de ce choix. Nous devons plutôt considérer la décision du législateur de maintenir en vigueur les dispositions en question comme un exercice délibéré du pouvoir discrétionnaire de légiférer, pouvoir qui est exclusivement le sien. Avec égards, je rejette le point de vue suivant lequel nous devrions plutôt qualifier l'apparente contradiction entre le par. 18.3(1) (maintenant le par. 37(1)) de la *LACC* et l'art. 222 de la *LTA* d'anomalie rédactionnelle ou de lacune législative susceptible d'être corrigée par un tribunal.

II

[96] In the context of the Canadian insolvency regime, a deemed trust will be found to exist only where two complementary elements co-exist: first, a statutory provision *creating* the trust; and second, a CCAA or *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 (“BIA”) provision *confirming* — or explicitly preserving — its effective operation.

[97] This interpretation is reflected in three federal statutes. Each contains a deemed trust provision framed in terms strikingly similar to the wording of s. 222 of the *ETA*.

[98] The first is the *Income Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) (“ITA”), where s. 227(4) *creates* a deemed trust:

(4) Every person who deducts or withholds an amount under this Act is deemed, notwithstanding any security interest (as defined in subsection 224(1.3)) in the amount so deducted or withheld, to hold the amount separate and apart from the property of the person and from property held by any secured creditor (as defined in subsection 224(1.3)) of that person that but for the security interest would be property of the person, in trust for Her Majesty and for payment to Her Majesty in the manner and at the time provided under this Act. [Here and below, the emphasis is of course my own.]

[99] In the next subsection, Parliament has taken care to make clear that this trust is unaffected by federal or provincial legislation to the contrary:

(4.1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (except sections 81.1 and 81.2 of that Act), any other enactment of Canada, any enactment of a province or any other law, where at any time an amount deemed by subsection 227(4) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not paid to Her Majesty in the manner and at the time provided under this Act, property of the person . . . equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust is deemed

(a) to be held, from the time the amount was deducted or withheld by the person, separate and

II

[96] Dans le contexte du régime canadien d’insolvabilité, on conclut à l’existence d’une fiducie réputée uniquement lorsque deux éléments complémentaires sont réunis : en premier lieu, une disposition législative qui *crée* la fiducie et, en second lieu, une disposition de la *LACC* ou de la *Loi sur la faillite et l’insolvabilité*, L.R.C. 1985, ch. B-3 (« *LFI* ») qui *confirme* l’existence de la fiducie ou la maintient explicitement en vigueur.

[97] Cette interprétation se retrouve dans trois lois fédérales, qui renferment toutes une disposition relative aux fiducies réputées dont le libellé offre une ressemblance frappante avec celui de l’art. 222 de la *LTA*.

[98] La première est la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu*, L.R.C. 1985, ch. 1 (5^e suppl.) (« *LIR* »), dont le par. 227(4) *crée* une fiducie réputée :

(4) Toute personne qui déduit ou retient un montant en vertu de la présente loi est réputée, malgré toute autre garantie au sens du paragraphe 224(1.3) le concernant, le détenir en fiducie pour Sa Majesté, séparé de ses propres biens et des biens détenus par son créancier garanti au sens de ce paragraphe qui, en l’absence de la garantie, seraient ceux de la personne, et en vue de le verser à Sa Majesté selon les modalités et dans le délai prévus par la présente loi. [Dans la présente citation et dans celles qui suivent, les soulignements sont évidemment de moi.]

[99] Dans le paragraphe suivant, le législateur prend la peine de bien préciser que toute disposition législative fédérale ou provinciale à l’effet contraire n’a aucune incidence sur la fiducie ainsi constituée :

(4.1) Malgré les autres dispositions de la présente loi, la *Loi sur la faillite et l’insolvabilité* (sauf ses articles 81.1 et 81.2), tout autre texte législatif fédéral ou provincial ou toute règle de droit, en cas de non-versement à Sa Majesté, selon les modalités et dans le délai prévus par la présente loi, d’un montant qu’une personne est réputée par le paragraphe (4) détenir en fiducie pour Sa Majesté, les biens de la personne [. . .] d’une valeur égale à ce montant sont réputés :

a) être détenus en fiducie pour Sa Majesté, à compter du moment où le montant est déduit ou retenu,

apart from the property of the person, in trust for Her Majesty whether or not the property is subject to such a security interest, . . .

séparés des propres biens de la personne, qu'ils soient ou non assujettis à une telle garantie;

. . . and the proceeds of such property shall be paid to the Receiver General in priority to all such security interests.

. . . et le produit découlant de ces biens est payé au receveur général par priorité sur une telle garantie.

[100] The continued operation of this deemed trust is expressly *confirmed* in s. 18.3 of the CCAA:

[100] Le maintien en vigueur de cette fiducie réputée est expressément *confirmé* à l'art. 18.3 de la LACC :

18.3 (1) Subject to subsection (2), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

18.3(1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (2) et par dérogation à toute disposition législative fédérale ou provinciale ayant pour effet d'assimiler certains biens à des biens détenus en fiducie pour Sa Majesté, aucun des biens de la compagnie débitrice ne peut être considéré comme détenu en fiducie pour Sa Majesté si, en l'absence de la disposition législative en question, il ne le serait pas.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act* . . .

(2) Le paragraphe (1) ne s'applique pas à l'égard des montants réputés détenus en fiducie aux termes des paragraphes 227(4) ou (4.1) de la *Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu*, des paragraphes 23(3) ou (4) du *Régime de pensions du Canada* ou des paragraphes 86(2) ou (2.1) de la *Loi sur l'assurance-emploi* . . .

[101] The operation of the *ITA* deemed trust is also confirmed in s. 67 of the *BIA*:

[101] L'application de la fiducie réputée prévue par la *LIR* est également confirmée par l'art. 67 de la *LFI* :

(2) Subject to subsection (3), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a bankrupt shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty for the purpose of paragraph (1)(a) unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

(2) Sous réserve du paragraphe (3) et par dérogation à toute disposition législative fédérale ou provinciale ayant pour effet d'assimiler certains biens à des biens détenus en fiducie pour Sa Majesté, aucun des biens du failli ne peut, pour l'application de l'alinéa (1)a), être considéré comme détenu en fiducie pour Sa Majesté si, en l'absence de la disposition législative en question, il ne le serait pas.

(3) Subsection (2) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act* . . .

(3) Le paragraphe (2) ne s'applique pas à l'égard des montants réputés détenus en fiducie aux termes des paragraphes 227(4) ou (4.1) de la *Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu*, des paragraphes 23(3) ou (4) du *Régime de pensions du Canada* ou des paragraphes 86(2) ou (2.1) de la *Loi sur l'assurance-emploi* . . .

[102] Thus, Parliament has first *created* and then *confirmed the continued operation* of the Crown's *ITA* deemed trust under *both* the CCAA and the *BIA* regimes.

[102] Par conséquent, le législateur a *créé*, puis *confirmé le maintien en vigueur* de la fiducie réputée établie par la *LIR* en faveur de Sa Majesté *tant* sous le régime de la *LACC* *que* sous celui de la *LFI*.

[103] The second federal statute for which this scheme holds true is the *Canada Pension Plan*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8 (“*CPP*”). At s. 23, Parliament creates a deemed trust in favour of the Crown and specifies that it exists despite all contrary provisions in any other Canadian statute. Finally, and in almost identical terms, the *Employment Insurance Act*, S.C. 1996, c. 23 (“*EIA*”), creates a deemed trust in favour of the Crown: see ss. 86(2) and (2.1).

[104] As we have seen, the survival of the deemed trusts created under these provisions of the *ITA*, the *CPP* and the *EIA* is confirmed in s. 18.3(2) of the *CCAA* and in s. 67(3) of the *BIA*. In all three cases, Parliament’s intent to enforce the Crown’s deemed trust through insolvency proceedings is expressed in clear and unmistakable terms.

[105] The same is not true with regard to the deemed trust created under the *ETA*. Although Parliament creates a deemed trust in favour of the Crown to hold unremitted GST monies, and although it purports to maintain this trust notwithstanding any contrary federal or provincial legislation, it does not *confirm* the trust — or expressly provide for its continued operation — in either the *BIA* or the *CCAA*. The second of the two mandatory elements I have mentioned is thus absent reflecting Parliament’s intention to allow the deemed trust to lapse with the commencement of insolvency proceedings.

[106] The language of the relevant *ETA* provisions is identical in substance to that of the *ITA*, *CPP*, and *EIA* provisions:

222. (1) Subject to subsection (1.1), every person who collects an amount as or on account of tax under Division II is deemed, for all purposes and despite any security interest in the amount, to hold the amount in trust for Her Majesty in right of Canada, separate and apart from the property of the person and from property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a

[103] La deuxième loi fédérale où l’on retrouve ce mécanisme est le *Régime de pensions du Canada*, L.R.C. 1985, ch. C-8 (« *RPC* »). À l’article 23, le législateur crée une fiducie réputée en faveur de la Couronne et précise qu’elle existe malgré les dispositions contraires de toute autre loi fédérale. Enfin, la *Loi sur l’assurance-emploi*, L.C. 1996, ch. 23 (« *LAE* »), crée dans des termes quasi identiques, une fiducie réputée en faveur de la Couronne : voir les par. 86(2) et (2.1).

[104] Comme nous l’avons vu, le maintien en vigueur des fiducies réputées créées en vertu de ces dispositions de la *LIR*, du *RPC* et de la *LAE* est confirmé au par. 18.3(2) de la *LACC* et au par. 67(3) de la *LFI*. Dans les trois cas, le législateur a exprimé en termes clairs et explicites sa volonté de voir la fiducie réputée établie en faveur de la Couronne produire ses effets pendant le déroulement de la procédure d’insolvabilité.

[105] La situation est différente dans le cas de la fiducie réputée créée par la *LTA*. Bien que le législateur crée en faveur de la Couronne une fiducie réputée dans laquelle seront conservées les sommes recueillies au titre de la TPS mais non encore versées, et bien qu’il prétende maintenir cette fiducie en vigueur malgré les dispositions à l’effet contraire de toute loi fédérale ou provinciale, il ne *confirme* pas l’existence de la fiducie — ni ne prévoit expressément le maintien en vigueur de celle-ci — dans la *LFI* ou dans la *LACC*. Le second des deux éléments obligatoires que j’ai mentionnés fait donc défaut, ce qui témoigne de l’intention du législateur de laisser la fiducie réputée devenir caduque au moment de l’introduction de la procédure d’insolvabilité.

[106] Le texte des dispositions en cause de la *LTA* est substantiellement identique à celui des dispositions de la *LIR*, du *RPC* et de la *LAE* :

222. (1) La personne qui perçoit un montant au titre de la taxe prévue à la section II est réputée, à toutes fins utiles et malgré tout droit en garantie le concernant, le détenir en fiducie pour Sa Majesté du chef du Canada, séparé de ses propres biens et des biens détenus par ses créanciers garantis qui, en l’absence du droit en garantie, seraient ceux de la personne, jusqu’à ce qu’il soit

security interest, would be property of the person, until the amount is remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn under subsection (2).

. . .

(3) Despite any other provision of this Act (except subsection (4)), any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*), any enactment of a province or any other law, if at any time an amount deemed by subsection (1) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn in the manner and at the time provided under this Part, property of the person and property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust, is deemed

(a) to be held, from the time the amount was collected by the person, in trust for Her Majesty, separate and apart from the property of the person, whether or not the property is subject to a security interest, . . .

. . .

. . . and the proceeds of the property shall be paid to the Receiver General in priority to all security interests.

[107] Yet no provision of the *CCAA* provides for the continuation of this deemed trust after the *CCAA* is brought into play.

[108] In short, Parliament has imposed *two* explicit conditions, or “building blocks”, for survival under the *CCAA* of deemed trusts created by the *ITA*, *CPP*, and *EIA*. Had Parliament intended to likewise preserve under the *CCAA* deemed trusts created by the *ETA*, it would have included in the *CCAA* the sort of confirmatory provision that explicitly preserves other deemed trusts.

[109] With respect, unlike Tysoe J.A., I do not find it “inconceivable that Parliament would specifically identify the *BIA* as an exception when enacting the current version of s. 222(3) of the *ETA* without considering the *CCAA* as a possible second exception” (2009 BCCA 205, 98 B.C.L.R. (4th) 242, at para. 37). *All* of the deemed trust

versé au receveur général ou retiré en application du paragraphe (2).

. . .

(3) Malgré les autres dispositions de la présente loi (sauf le paragraphe (4) du présent article), tout autre texte législatif fédéral (sauf la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité*), tout texte législatif provincial ou toute autre règle de droit, lorsqu'un montant qu'une personne est réputée par le paragraphe (1) détenir en fiducie pour Sa Majesté du chef du Canada n'est pas versé au receveur général ni retiré selon les modalités et dans le délai prévus par la présente partie, les biens de la personne — y compris les biens détenus par ses créanciers garantis qui, en l'absence du droit en garantie, seraient ses biens — d'une valeur égale à ce montant sont réputés :

a) être détenus en fiducie pour Sa Majesté du chef du Canada, à compter du moment où le montant est perçu par la personne, séparés des propres biens de la personne, qu'ils soient ou non assujettis à un droit en garantie;

. . .

. . . et le produit découlant de ces biens est payé au receveur général par priorité sur tout droit en garantie.

[107] Pourtant, aucune disposition de la *LACC* ne prévoit le maintien en vigueur de la fiducie réputée une fois que la *LACC* entre en jeu.

[108] En résumé, le législateur a imposé *deux* conditions explicites — ou « composantes de base » — devant être réunies pour que survivent, sous le régime de la *LACC*, les fiducies réputées qui ont été établies par la *LIR*, le *RPC* et la *LAE*. S'il avait voulu préserver de la même façon, sous le régime de la *LACC*, les fiducies réputées qui sont établies par la *LTA*, il aurait inséré dans la *LACC* le type de disposition confirmatoire qui maintient explicitement en vigueur d'autres fiducies réputées.

[109] Avec égards pour l'opinion contraire exprimée par le juge Tysoe de la Cour d'appel, je ne trouve pas [TRADUCTION] « inconcevable que le législateur, lorsqu'il a adopté la version actuelle du par. 222(3) de la *LTA*, ait désigné expressément la *LFI* comme une exception sans envisager que la *LACC* puisse constituer une deuxième exception » (2009 BCCA

provisions excerpted above make explicit reference to the *BIA*. Section 222 of the *ETA* does not break the pattern. Given the near-identical wording of the four deemed trust provisions, it would have been surprising indeed had Parliament not addressed the *BIA* at all in the *ETA*.

[110] Parliament's evident intent was to render GST deemed trusts inoperative upon the institution of insolvency proceedings. Accordingly, s. 222 mentions the *BIA* so as to *exclude* it from its ambit — rather than to *include* it, as do the *ITA*, the *CPP*, and the *EIA*.

[111] Conversely, I note that *none* of these statutes mentions the *CCAA* expressly. Their specific reference to the *BIA* has no bearing on their interaction with the *CCAA*. Again, it is the confirmatory provisions *in the insolvency statutes* that determine whether a given deemed trust will subsist during insolvency proceedings.

[112] Finally, I believe that chambers judges should not segregate GST monies into the Monitor's trust account during *CCAA* proceedings, as was done in this case. The result of Justice Deschamps's reasoning is that GST claims become unsecured under the *CCAA*. Parliament has deliberately chosen to nullify certain Crown super-priorities during insolvency; this is one such instance.

III

[113] For these reasons, like Justice Deschamps, I would allow the appeal with costs in this Court and in the courts below and order that the \$305,202.30 collected by LeRoy Trucking in respect of GST but not yet remitted to the Receiver General of Canada

205, 98 B.C.L.R. (4th) 242, par. 37). *Toutes les dispositions établissant des fiducies réputées qui sont reproduites ci-dessus font explicitement mention de la LFI. L'article 222 de la LTA ne rompt pas avec ce modèle. Compte tenu du libellé presque identique des quatre dispositions établissant une fiducie réputée, il aurait d'ailleurs été étonnant que le législateur ne fasse aucune mention de la LFI dans la LTA.*

[110] L'intention du législateur était manifestement de rendre inopérantes les fiducies réputées visant la TPS dès l'introduction d'une procédure d'insolvabilité. Par conséquent, l'art. 222 mentionne la *LFI* de manière à l'*exclure* de son champ d'application — et non de l'y *inclure*, comme le font la *LIR*, le *RPC* et la *LAE*.

[111] En revanche, je constate qu'*aucune* de ces lois ne mentionne expressément la *LACC*. La mention explicite de la *LFI* dans ces textes n'a aucune incidence sur leur interaction avec la *LACC*. Là encore, ce sont les dispositions confirmatoires que l'on trouve *dans les lois sur l'insolvabilité* qui déterminent si une fiducie réputée continuera d'exister durant une procédure d'insolvabilité.

[112] Enfin, j'estime que les juges siégeant en leur cabinet ne devraient pas, comme cela s'est produit en l'espèce, ordonner que les sommes perçues au titre de la TPS soient détenues séparément dans le compte en fiducie du contrôleur pendant le déroulement d'une procédure fondée sur la *LACC*. Il résulte du raisonnement de la juge Deschamps que les réclamations de TPS deviennent des créances non garanties sous le régime de la *LACC*. Le législateur a délibérément décidé de supprimer certaines superpriorités accordées à la Couronne pendant l'insolvabilité; nous sommes en présence de l'un de ces cas.

III

[113] Pour les motifs qui précèdent, je suis d'avis, à l'instar de la juge Deschamps, d'accueillir le pourvoi avec dépens devant notre Cour et devant les juridictions inférieures, et d'ordonner que la somme de 305 202,30 \$ — qui a été perçue par LeRoy Trucking

be subject to no deemed trust or priority in favour of the Crown.

The following are the reasons delivered by

[114] ABELLA J. (dissenting) — The central issue in this appeal is whether s. 222 of the *Excise Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 (“ETA”), and specifically s. 222(3), gives priority during *Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (“CCAA”), proceedings to the Crown’s deemed trust in unremitted GST. I agree with Tysoe J.A. that it does. It follows, in my respectful view, that a court’s discretion under s. 11 of the CCAA is circumscribed accordingly.

[115] Section 11¹ of the CCAA stated:

11. (1) Notwithstanding anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up Act*, where an application is made under this Act in respect of a company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make an order under this section.

To decide the scope of the court’s discretion under s. 11, it is necessary to first determine the priority issue. Section 222(3), the provision of the *ETA* at issue in this case, states:

¹ Section 11 was amended, effective September 18, 2009, and now states:

11. Despite anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, if an application is made under this Act in respect of a debtor company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

au titre de la TPS mais n’a pas encore été versée au receveur général du Canada — ne fasse l’objet d’aucune fiducie réputée ou priorité en faveur de la Couronne.

Version française des motifs rendus par

[114] LA JUGE ABELLA (dissidente) — La question qui est au cœur du présent pourvoi est celle de savoir si l’art. 222 de la *Loi sur la taxe d’accise*, L.R.C. 1985, ch. E-15 (« *LTA* »), et plus particulièrement le par. 222(3), donnent préséance, dans le cadre d’une procédure relevant de la *Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies*, L.R.C. 1985, ch. C-36 (« *LACC* »), à la fiducie réputée qui est établie en faveur de la Couronne à l’égard de la TPS non versée. À l’instar du juge Tysoe de la Cour d’appel, j’estime que tel est le cas. Il s’ensuit, à mon avis, que le pouvoir discrétionnaire conféré au tribunal par l’art. 11 de la *LACC* est circonscrit en conséquence.

[115] L’article 11¹ de la *LACC* disposait :

11. (1) Malgré toute disposition de la *Loi sur la faillite et l’insolvabilité* ou de la *Loi sur les liquidations*, chaque fois qu’une demande est faite sous le régime de la présente loi à l’égard d’une compagnie, le tribunal, sur demande d’un intéressé, peut, sous réserve des autres dispositions de la présente loi et avec ou sans avis, rendre l’ordonnance prévue au présent article.

Pour être en mesure de déterminer la portée du pouvoir discrétionnaire conféré au tribunal par l’art. 11, il est nécessaire de trancher d’abord la question de la priorité. Le paragraphe 222(3), la disposition de la *LTA* en cause en l’espèce, prévoit ce qui suit :

¹ L’article 11 a été modifié et le texte modifié, qui est entré en vigueur le 18 septembre 2009, est rédigé ainsi :

11. Malgré toute disposition de la *Loi sur la faillite et l’insolvabilité* ou de la *Loi sur les liquidations et les restructurations*, le tribunal peut, dans le cas de toute demande sous le régime de la présente loi à l’égard d’une compagnie débitrice, rendre, sur demande d’un intéressé, mais sous réserve des restrictions prévues par la présente loi et avec ou sans avis, toute ordonnance qu’il estime indiquée.

(3) Despite any other provision of this Act (except subsection (4)), any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*), any enactment of a province or any other law, if at any time an amount deemed by subsection (1) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn in the manner and at the time provided under this Part, property of the person and property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust, is deemed

(a) to be held, from the time the amount was collected by the person, in trust for Her Majesty, separate and apart from the property of the person, whether or not the property is subject to a security interest, and

(b) to form no part of the estate or property of the person from the time the amount was collected, whether or not the property has in fact been kept separate and apart from the estate or property of the person and whether or not the property is subject to a security interest

and is property beneficially owned by Her Majesty in right of Canada despite any security interest in the property or in the proceeds thereof and the proceeds of the property shall be paid to the Receiver General in priority to all security interests.

[116] Century Services argued that the CCAA's general override provision, s. 18.3(1), prevailed, and that the deeming provisions in s. 222 of the *ETA* were, accordingly, inapplicable during CCAA proceedings. Section 18.3(1) states:

18.3 (1) ... [N]otwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

[117] As MacPherson J.A. correctly observed in *Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp. (Re)* (2005), 73 O.R. (3d) 737 (C.A.), s. 222(3) of the *ETA* is in "clear conflict" with s. 18.3(1) of the CCAA (para. 31). Resolving the conflict between the two provisions is, essentially, what seems to me to be a relatively uncomplicated exercise in statutory

(3) Malgré les autres dispositions de la présente loi (sauf le paragraphe (4) du présent article), tout autre texte législatif fédéral (sauf la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité*), tout texte législatif provincial ou toute autre règle de droit, lorsqu'un montant qu'une personne est réputée par le paragraphe (1) détenir en fiducie pour Sa Majesté du chef du Canada n'est pas versé au receveur général ni retiré selon les modalités et dans le délai prévus par la présente partie, les biens de la personne — y compris les biens détenus par ses créanciers garantis qui, en l'absence du droit en garantie, seraient ses biens — d'une valeur égale à ce montant sont réputés :

a) être détenus en fiducie pour Sa Majesté du chef du Canada, à compter du moment où le montant est perçu par la personne, séparés des propres biens de la personne, qu'ils soient ou non assujettis à un droit en garantie;

b) ne pas faire partie du patrimoine ou des biens de la personne à compter du moment où le montant est perçu, que ces biens aient été ou non tenus séparés de ses propres biens ou de son patrimoine et qu'ils soient ou non assujettis à un droit en garantie.

Ces biens sont des biens dans lesquels Sa Majesté du chef du Canada a un droit de bénéficiaire malgré tout autre droit en garantie sur ces biens ou sur le produit en découlant, et le produit découlant de ces biens est payé au receveur général par priorité sur tout droit en garantie.

[116] Selon Century Services, la disposition dérogatoire générale de la *LACC*, le par. 18.3(1), l'emportait, et les dispositions déterminatives à l'art. 222 de la *LTA* étaient par conséquent inapplicables dans le cadre d'une procédure fondée sur la *LACC*. Le paragraphe 18.3(1) dispose :

18.3 (1) ... [P]ar dérogation à toute disposition législative fédérale ou provinciale ayant pour effet d'assimiler certains biens à des biens détenus en fiducie pour Sa Majesté, aucun des biens de la compagnie débitrice ne peut être considéré comme détenu en fiducie pour Sa Majesté si, en l'absence de la disposition législative en question, il ne le serait pas.

[117] Ainsi que l'a fait observer le juge d'appel MacPherson, dans l'arrêt *Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp. (Re)* (2005), 73 O.R. (3d) 737 (C.A.), le par. 222(3) de la *LTA* [TRADUCTION] « entre nettement en conflit » avec le par. 18.3(1) de la *LACC* (para. 31). Essentiellement, la résolution du conflit entre ces deux dispositions requiert à mon sens une

interpretation: Does the language reflect a clear legislative intention? In my view it does. The deemed trust provision, s. 222(3) of the *ETA*, has unambiguous language stating that it operates notwithstanding any law except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 (“*BIA*”).

[118] By expressly excluding only one statute from its legislative grasp, and by unequivocally stating that it applies despite any other law anywhere in Canada *except* the *BIA*, s. 222(3) has defined its boundaries in the clearest possible terms. I am in complete agreement with the following comments of MacPherson J.A. in *Ottawa Senators*:

The legislative intent of s. 222(3) of the *ETA* is clear. If there is a conflict with “any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*)”, s. 222(3) prevails. In these words Parliament did two things: it decided that s. 222(3) should trump all other federal laws and, importantly, it addressed the topic of exceptions to its trumping decision and identified a single exception, the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* The *BIA* and the *CCAA* are closely related federal statutes. I cannot conceive that Parliament would specifically identify the *BIA* as an exception, but accidentally fail to consider the *CCAA* as a possible second exception. In my view, the omission of the *CCAA* from s. 222(3) of the *ETA* was almost certainly a considered omission. [para. 43]

[119] MacPherson J.A.’s view that the failure to exempt the *CCAA* from the operation of the *ETA* is a reflection of a clear legislative intention, is borne out by how the *CCAA* was subsequently changed after s. 18.3(1) was enacted in 1997. In 2000, when s. 222(3) of the *ETA* came into force, amendments were also introduced to the *CCAA*. Section 18.3(1) was not amended.

[120] The failure to amend s. 18.3(1) is notable because its effect was to protect the legislative *status quo*, notwithstanding repeated requests from

opération relativement simple d’interprétation des lois : Est-ce que les termes employés révèlent une intention claire du législateur? À mon avis, c’est le cas. Le texte de la disposition créant une fiducie réputée, soit le par. 222(3) de la *LTA*, précise sans ambiguïté que cette disposition s’applique malgré toute autre règle de droit sauf la *Loi sur la faillite et l’insolvabilité*, L.R.C. 1985, ch. B-3 (« *LFI* »).

[118] En excluant explicitement une seule loi du champ d’application du par. 222(3) et en déclarant de façon non équivoque qu’il s’applique malgré toute autre loi ou règle de droit au Canada *sauf* la *LFI*, le législateur a défini la portée de cette disposition dans des termes on ne peut plus clairs. Je souscris sans réserve aux propos suivants du juge d’appel MacPherson dans l’arrêt *Ottawa Senators* :

[TRADUCTION] L’intention du législateur au par. 222(3) de la *LTA* est claire. En cas de conflit avec « tout autre texte législatif fédéral (sauf la *Loi sur la faillite et l’insolvabilité*) », c’est le par. 222(3) qui l’emporte. En employant ces mots, le législateur fédéral a fait deux choses : il a décidé que le par. 222(3) devait l’emporter sur tout autre texte législatif fédéral et, fait important, il a abordé la question des exceptions à cette préséance en en mentionnant une seule, la *Loi sur la faillite et l’insolvabilité* [. . .] La *LFI* et la *LACC* sont des lois fédérales étroitement liées entre elles. Je ne puis concevoir que le législateur ait pu mentionner expressément la *LFI* à titre d’exception, mais ait involontairement omis de considérer la *LACC* comme une deuxième exception possible. À mon avis, le fait que la *LACC* ne soit pas mentionnée au par. 222(3) de la *LTA* était presque assurément une omission mûrement réfléchie de la part du législateur. [par. 43]

[119] L’opinion du juge d’appel MacPherson suivant laquelle le fait que la *LACC* n’ait pas été soustraite à l’application de la *LTA* témoigne d’une intention claire du législateur est confortée par la façon dont la *LACC* a par la suite été modifiée après l’édiction du par. 18.3(1) en 1997. En 2000, lorsque le par. 222(3) de la *LTA* est entré en vigueur, des modifications ont également été apportées à la *LACC*, mais le par. 18.3(1) de cette loi n’a pas été modifié.

[120] L’absence de modification du par. 18.3(1) vaut d’être soulignée, car elle a eu pour effet de maintenir le statu quo législatif, malgré les

various constituencies that s. 18.3(1) be amended to make the priorities in the *CCAA* consistent with those in the *BIA*. In 2002, for example, when Industry Canada conducted a review of the *BIA* and the *CCAA*, the Insolvency Institute of Canada and the Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals recommended that the priority regime under the *BIA* be extended to the *CCAA* (Joint Task Force on Business Insolvency Law Reform, *Report* (March 15, 2002), Sch. B, proposal 71). The same recommendations were made by the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce in its 2003 report, *Debtors and Creditors Sharing the Burden: A Review of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*; by the Legislative Review Task Force (Commercial) of the Insolvency Institute of Canada and the Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals in its 2005 *Report on the Commercial Provisions of Bill C-55*; and in 2007 by the Insolvency Institute of Canada in a submission to the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce commenting on reforms then under consideration.

[121] Yet the *BIA* remains the only exempted statute under s. 222(3) of the *ETA*. Even after the 2005 decision in *Ottawa Senators* which confirmed that the *ETA* took precedence over the *CCAA*, there was no responsive legislative revision. I see this lack of response as relevant in this case, as it was in *Tele-Mobile Co. v. Ontario*, 2008 SCC 12, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 305, where this Court stated:

While it cannot be said that legislative silence is necessarily determinative of legislative intention, in this case the silence is Parliament's answer to the consistent urging of Telus and other affected businesses and organizations that there be express language in the legislation to ensure that businesses can be reimbursed for the reasonable costs of complying with evidence-gathering orders. I see the legislative history as reflecting Parliament's intention that compensation not be paid for compliance with production orders. [para. 42]

demandes répétées de divers groupes qui souhaitaient que cette disposition soit modifiée pour aligner l'ordre de priorité établi par la *LACC* sur celui de la *LFI*. En 2002, par exemple, lorsque Industrie Canada a procédé à l'examen de la *LFI* et de la *LACC*, l'Institut d'insolvabilité du Canada et l'Association canadienne des professionnels de l'insolvabilité et de la réorganisation ont recommandé que les règles de la *LFI* en matière de priorité soient étendues à la *LACC* (Joint Task Force on Business Insolvency Law Reform, *Report* (15 mars 2002), ann. B, proposition 71). Ces recommandations ont été reprises en 2003 par le Comité sénatorial permanent des banques et du commerce dans son rapport intitulé *Les débiteurs et les créanciers doivent se partager le fardeau : Examen de la Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité et de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies*, ainsi qu'en 2005 par le Legislative Review Task Force (Commercial) de l'Institut d'insolvabilité du Canada et de l'Association canadienne des professionnels de l'insolvabilité et de la réorganisation dans son *Report on the Commercial Provisions of Bill C-55*, et en 2007 par l'Institut d'insolvabilité du Canada dans un mémoire soumis au Comité sénatorial permanent des banques et du commerce au sujet de réformes alors envisagées.

[121] La *LFI* demeure néanmoins la seule loi soustraite à l'application du par. 222(3) de la *LTA*. Même à la suite de l'arrêt rendu en 2005 dans l'affaire *Ottawa Senators*, qui a confirmé que la *LTA* l'emportait sur la *LACC*, le législateur n'est pas intervenu. Cette absence de réaction de sa part me paraît tout aussi pertinente en l'espèce que dans l'arrêt *Société Télé-Mobile c. Ontario*, 2008 CSC 12, [2008] 1 R.C.S. 305, où la Cour a déclaré ceci :

Le silence du législateur n'est pas nécessairement déterminant quant à son intention, mais en l'espèce, il répond à la demande pressante de Telus et des autres entreprises et organisations intéressées que la loi prévoie expressément la possibilité d'un remboursement des frais raisonnables engagés pour communiquer des éléments de preuve conformément à une ordonnance. L'historique législatif confirme selon moi que le législateur n'a pas voulu qu'une indemnité soit versée pour l'obtempération à une ordonnance de communication. [par. 42]

[122] All this leads to a clear inference of a deliberate legislative choice to protect the deemed trust in s. 222(3) from the reach of s. 18.3(1) of the CCAA.

[123] Nor do I see any “policy” justification for interfering, through interpretation, with this clarity of legislative intention. I can do no better by way of explaining why I think the policy argument cannot succeed in this case, than to repeat the words of Tysoe J.A. who said:

I do not dispute that there are valid policy reasons for encouraging insolvent companies to attempt to restructure their affairs so that their business can continue with as little disruption to employees and other stakeholders as possible. It is appropriate for the courts to take such policy considerations into account, but only if it is in connection with a matter that has not been considered by Parliament. Here, Parliament must be taken to have weighed policy considerations when it enacted the amendments to the CCAA and ETA described above. As Mr. Justice MacPherson observed at para. 43 of *Ottawa Senators*, it is inconceivable that Parliament would specifically identify the BIA as an exception when enacting the current version of s. 222(3) of the ETA without considering the CCAA as a possible second exception. I also make the observation that the 1992 set of amendments to the BIA enabled proposals to be binding on secured creditors and, while there is more flexibility under the CCAA, it is possible for an insolvent company to attempt to restructure under the auspices of the BIA. [para. 37]

[124] Despite my view that the clarity of the language in s. 222(3) is dispositive, it is also my view that even the application of other principles of interpretation reinforces this conclusion. In their submissions, the parties raised the following as being particularly relevant: the Crown relied on the principle that the statute which is “later in time” prevails; and Century Services based its argument on the principle that the general provision gives way to the specific (*generalia specialibus non derogant*).

[122] Tout ce qui précède permet clairement d’inférer que le législateur a délibérément choisi de soustraire la fiducie réputée établie au par. 222(3) à l’application du par. 18.3(1) de la LACC.

[123] Je ne vois pas non plus de « considération de politique générale » qui justifierait d’aller à l’encontre, par voie d’interprétation législative, de l’intention aussi clairement exprimée par le législateur. Je ne saurais expliquer mieux que ne l’a fait le juge d’appel Tysoe les raisons pour lesquelles l’argument invoquant des considérations de politique générale ne peut, selon moi, être retenu en l’espèce. Je vais donc reprendre à mon compte ses propos à ce sujet :

[TRADUCTION] Je ne conteste pas qu’il existe des raisons de politique générale valables qui justifient d’inciter les entreprises insolvables à tenter de se restructurer de façon à pouvoir continuer à exercer leurs activités avec le moins de perturbations possibles pour leurs employés et pour les autres intéressés. Les tribunaux peuvent légitimement tenir compte de telles considérations de politique générale, mais seulement si elles ont trait à une question que le législateur n’a pas examinée. Or, dans le cas qui nous occupe, il y a lieu de présumer que le législateur a tenu compte de considérations de politique générale lorsqu’il a adopté les modifications susmentionnées à la LACC et à la LTA. Comme le juge MacPherson le fait observer au par. 43 de l’arrêt *Ottawa Senators*, il est inconcevable que le législateur, lorsqu’il a adopté la version actuelle du par. 222(3) de la LTA, ait désigné expressément la LFI comme une exception sans envisager que la LACC puisse constituer une deuxième exception. Je signale par ailleurs que les modifications apportées en 1992 à la LFI ont permis de rendre les propositions concordataires opposables aux créanciers garantis et que, malgré la plus grande souplesse de la LACC, il est possible pour une compagnie insolvable de se restructurer sous le régime de la LFI. [par. 37]

[124] Bien que je sois d’avis que la clarté des termes employés au par. 222(3) tranche la question, j’estime également que cette conclusion est même renforcée par l’application d’autres principes d’interprétation. Dans leurs observations, les parties indiquent que les principes suivants étaient, selon elles, particulièrement pertinents : la Couronne a invoqué le principe voulant que la loi « postérieure » l’emporte; Century Services a fondé son argumentation sur le principe de la préséance de la loi spécifique sur la loi générale (*generalia specialibus non derogant*).

[125] The “later in time” principle gives priority to a more recent statute, based on the theory that the legislature is presumed to be aware of the content of existing legislation. If a new enactment is inconsistent with a prior one, therefore, the legislature is presumed to have intended to derogate from the earlier provisions (Ruth Sullivan, *Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes* (5th ed. 2008), at pp. 346-47; Pierre-André Côté, *The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada* (3rd ed. 2000), at p. 358).

[126] The exception to this presumptive displacement of pre-existing inconsistent legislation, is the *generalia specialibus non derogant* principle that “[a] more recent, general provision will not be construed as affecting an earlier, special provision” (Côté, at p. 359). Like a Russian Doll, there is also an exception within this exception, namely, that an earlier, specific provision may in fact be “overruled” by a subsequent general statute if the legislature indicates, through its language, an intention that the general provision prevails (*Doré v. Verdun (City)*, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862).

[127] The primary purpose of these interpretive principles is to assist in the performance of the task of determining the intention of the legislature. This was confirmed by MacPherson J.A. in *Ottawa Senators*, at para. 42:

... the overarching rule of statutory interpretation is that statutory provisions should be interpreted to give effect to the intention of the legislature in enacting the law. This primary rule takes precedence over all maxims or canons or aids relating to statutory interpretation, including the maxim that the specific prevails over the general (*generalia specialibus non derogant*). As expressed by Hudson J. in *Canada v. Williams*, [1944] S.C.R. 226, ... at p. 239 ... :

The maxim *generalia specialibus non derogant* is relied on as a rule which should dispose of the question, but the maxim is not a rule of law but a rule of construction and bows to the intention of the

[125] Le principe de la préséance de la « loi postérieure » accorde la priorité à la loi la plus récente, au motif que le législateur est présumé connaître le contenu des lois alors en vigueur. Si, dans la loi nouvelle, le législateur adopte une règle inconciliable avec une règle préexistante, on conclura qu’il a entendu déroger à celle-ci (Ruth Sullivan, *Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes* (5^e éd. 2008), p. 346-347; Pierre-André Côté, *The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada* (3^e éd. 2000), p. 358).

[126] L’exception à cette supplantation présumée des dispositions législatives préexistantes incompatibles réside dans le principe exprimé par la maxime *generalia specialibus non derogant* selon laquelle une disposition générale plus récente n’est pas réputée déroger à une loi spéciale antérieure (Côté, p. 359). Comme dans le jeu des poupées russes, cette exception comporte elle-même une exception. En effet, une disposition spécifique antérieure peut dans les faits être « supplantée » par une loi ultérieure de portée générale si le législateur, par les mots qu’il a employés, a exprimé l’intention de faire prévaloir la loi générale (*Doré c. Verdun (Ville)*, [1997] 2 R.C.S. 862).

[127] Ces principes d’interprétation visent principalement à faciliter la détermination de l’intention du législateur, comme l’a confirmé le juge d’appel MacPherson dans l’arrêt *Ottawa Senators*, au par. 42 :

[TRADUCTION] ... en matière d’interprétation des lois, la règle cardinale est la suivante : les dispositions législatives doivent être interprétées de manière à donner effet à l’intention du législateur lorsqu’il a adopté la loi. Cette règle fondamentale l’emporte sur toutes les maximes, outils ou canons d’interprétation législative, y compris la maxime suivant laquelle le particulier l’emporte sur le général (*generalia specialibus non derogant*). Comme l’a expliqué le juge Hudson dans l’arrêt *Canada c. Williams*, [1944] R.C.S. 226, [...] à la p. 239 ... :

On invoque la maxime *generalia specialibus non derogant* comme une règle qui devrait trancher la question. Or cette maxime, qui n’est pas une règle de droit mais un principe d’interprétation, cède le pas

legislature, if such intention can reasonably be gathered from all of the relevant legislation.

(See also Côté, at p. 358, and Pierre-Andre Côté, with the collaboration of S. Beaulac and M. Devinat, *Interprétation des lois* (4th ed. 2009), at para. 1335.)

[128] I accept the Crown’s argument that the “later in time” principle is conclusive in this case. Since s. 222(3) of the *ETA* was enacted in 2000 and s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* was introduced in 1997, s. 222(3) is, on its face, the later provision. This chronological victory can be displaced, as Century Services argues, if it is shown that the more recent provision, s. 222(3) of the *ETA*, is a general one, in which case the earlier, specific provision, s. 18.3(1), prevails (*generalia specialibus non derogant*). But, as previously explained, the prior specific provision does not take precedence if the subsequent general provision appears to “overrule” it. This, it seems to me, is precisely what s. 222(3) achieves through the use of language stating that it prevails despite any law of Canada, of a province, or “any other law” other than the *BIA*. Section 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* is thereby rendered inoperative for purposes of s. 222(3).

[129] It is true that when the *CCAA* was amended in 2005,² s. 18.3(1) was re-enacted as s. 37(1) (S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 131). Deschamps J. suggests that this makes s. 37(1) the new, “later in time” provision. With respect, her observation is refuted by the operation of s. 44(f) of the *Interpretation Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, which expressly deals with the (non) effect of re-enacting, without significant substantive changes, a repealed provision (see *Attorney General of Canada v. Public Service Staff Relations Board*, [1977] 2 F.C. 663, dealing with the predecessor provision to s. 44(f)). It directs that new enactments not be construed as

devant l’intention du législateur, s’il est raisonnablement possible de la dégager de l’ensemble des dispositions législatives pertinentes.

(Voir aussi Côté, p. 358, et Pierre-André Côté, avec la collaboration de S. Beaulac et M. Devinat, *Interprétation des lois* (4^e éd. 2009), par. 1335.)

[128] J’accepte l’argument de la Couronne suivant lequel le principe de la loi « postérieure » est déterminant en l’espèce. Comme le par. 222(3) de la *LTA* a été édicté en 2000 et que le par. 18.3(1) de la *LACC* a été adopté en 1997, le par. 222(3) est, de toute évidence, la disposition postérieure. Cette victoire chronologique peut être neutralisée si, comme le soutient Century Services, on démontre que la disposition la plus récente, le par. 222(3) de la *LTA*, est une disposition générale, auquel cas c’est la disposition particulière antérieure, le par. 18.3(1), qui l’emporte (*generalia specialibus non derogant*). Mais, comme nous l’avons vu, la disposition particulière antérieure n’a pas préséance si la disposition générale ultérieure paraît la « supplanter ». C’est précisément, à mon sens, ce qu’accomplit le par. 222(3) de par son libellé, lequel précise que la disposition l’emporte sur tout autre texte législatif fédéral, tout texte législatif provincial ou « toute autre règle de droit » *sauf la LFI*. Le paragraphe 18.3(1) de la *LACC* est par conséquent rendu inopérant aux fins d’application du par. 222(3).

[129] Il est vrai que, lorsque la *LACC* a été modifiée en 2005², le par. 18.3(1) a été remplacé par le par. 37(1) (L.C. 2005, ch. 47, art. 131). Selon la juge Deschamps, le par. 37(1) est devenu, de ce fait, la disposition « postérieure ». Avec égards pour l’opinion exprimée par ma collègue, cette observation est réfutée par l’al. 44f) de la *Loi d’interprétation*, L.R.C. 1985, ch. I-21, qui décrit expressément l’effet (inexistant) qu’a le remplacement — sans modifications notables sur le fond — d’un texte antérieur qui a été abrogé (voir *Procureur général du Canada c. Commission des relations de travail dans la Fonction publique*, [1977] 2 C.F. 663, qui portait sur

2 The amendments did not come into force until September 18, 2009.

2 Les modifications ne sont entrées en vigueur que le 18 septembre 2009.

“new law” unless they differ in substance from the repealed provision:

44. Where an enactment, in this section called the “former enactment”, is repealed and another enactment, in this section called the “new enactment”, is substituted therefor,

. . .

(f) except to the extent that the provisions of the new enactment are not in substance the same as those of the former enactment, the new enactment shall not be held to operate as new law, but shall be construed and have effect as a consolidation and as declaratory of the law as contained in the former enactment;

Section 2 of the *Interpretation Act* defines an “enactment” as “an Act or regulation or any portion of an Act or regulation”.

[130] Section 37(1) of the current CCAA is almost identical to s. 18.3(1). These provisions are set out for ease of comparison, with the differences between them underlined:

37. (1) Subject to subsection (2), despite any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as being held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

18.3 (1) Subject to subsection (2), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

[131] The application of s. 44(f) of the *Interpretation Act* simply confirms the government’s clearly expressed intent, found in Industry Canada’s clause-by-clause review of Bill C-55, where s. 37(1) was identified as “a technical amendment to re-order the provisions of this Act”. During second reading, the Hon. Bill Rompkey, then the Deputy Leader of the Government in the

la disposition qui a précédé l’al. 44f)). Cet alinéa précise que le nouveau texte ne doit pas être considéré de « droit nouveau », sauf dans la mesure où il diffère au fond du texte abrogé :

44. En cas d’abrogation et de remplacement, les règles suivantes s’appliquent :

. . .

f) sauf dans la mesure où les deux textes diffèrent au fond, le nouveau texte n’est pas réputé de droit nouveau, sa teneur étant censée constituer une refonte et une clarification des règles de droit du texte antérieur;

Le mot « texte » est défini ainsi à l’art. 2 de la *Loi d’interprétation* : « Tout ou partie d’une loi ou d’un règlement. »

[130] Le paragraphe 37(1) de la LACC actuelle est pratiquement identique quant au fond au par. 18.3(1). Pour faciliter la comparaison de ces deux dispositions, je les ai reproduites ci-après :

37. (1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (2) et par dérogation à toute disposition législative fédérale ou provinciale ayant pour effet d’assimiler certains biens à des biens détenus en fiducie pour Sa Majesté, aucun des biens de la compagnie débitrice ne peut être considéré comme tel par le seul effet d’une telle disposition.

18.3 (1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (2) et par dérogation à toute disposition législative fédérale ou provinciale ayant pour effet d’assimiler certains biens à des biens détenus en fiducie pour Sa Majesté, aucun des biens de la compagnie débitrice ne peut être considéré comme détenu en fiducie pour Sa Majesté si, en l’absence de la disposition législative en question, il ne le serait pas.

[131] L’application de l’al. 44f) de la *Loi d’interprétation* vient tout simplement confirmer l’intention clairement exprimée par le législateur, qu’a indiquée Industrie Canada dans l’analyse du Projet de loi C-55, où le par. 37(1) était qualifié de « modification d’ordre technique concernant le réaménagement des dispositions de la présente loi ». Par ailleurs, durant la deuxième lecture du projet de loi

Senate, confirmed that s. 37(1) represented only a technical change:

On a technical note relating to the treatment of deemed trusts for taxes, the bill [*sic*] makes no changes to the underlying policy intent, despite the fact that in the case of a restructuring under the CCAA, sections of the act [*sic*] were repealed and substituted with renumbered versions due to the extensive reworking of the CCAA.

(*Debates of the Senate*, vol. 142, 1st Sess., 38th Parl., November 23, 2005, at p. 2147)

[132] Had the substance of s. 18.3(1) altered in any material way when it was replaced by s. 37(1), I would share Deschamps J.'s view that it should be considered a new provision. But since s. 18.3(1) and s. 37(1) are the same in substance, the transformation of s. 18.3(1) into s. 37(1) has no effect on the interpretive queue, and s. 222(3) of the *ETA* remains the "later in time" provision (Sullivan, at p. 347).

[133] This means that the deemed trust provision in s. 222(3) of the *ETA* takes precedence over s. 18.3(1) during *CCAA* proceedings. The question then is how that priority affects the discretion of a court under s. 11 of the *CCAA*.

[134] While s. 11 gives a court discretion to make orders notwithstanding the *BIA* and the *Winding-up Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. W-11, that discretion is not liberated from the operation of any other federal statute. Any exercise of discretion is therefore circumscribed by whatever limits are imposed by statutes *other* than the *BIA* and the *Winding-up Act*. That includes the *ETA*. The chambers judge in this case was, therefore, required to respect the priority regime set out in s. 222(3) of the *ETA*. Neither s. 18.3(1) nor s. 11 of the *CCAA* gave him the authority to ignore it. He could not, as a result, deny the Crown's request

au Sénat, l'honorable Bill Rompkey, qui était alors leader adjoint du gouvernement au Sénat, a confirmé que le par. 37(1) représentait seulement une modification d'ordre technique :

Sur une note administrative, je signale que, dans le cas du traitement de fiducies présumées aux fins d'impôt, le projet de loi ne modifie aucunement l'intention qui sous-tend la politique, alors que dans le cas d'une restructuration aux termes de la LACC, des articles de la loi ont été abrogés et remplacés par des versions portant de nouveaux numéros lors de la mise à jour exhaustive de la LACC.

(*Débats du Sénat*, vol. 142, 1^{re} sess., 38^e lég., 23 novembre 2005, p. 2147)

[132] Si le par. 18.3(1) avait fait l'objet de modifications notables sur le fond lorsqu'il a été remplacé par le par. 37(1), je me rangerais à l'avis de la juge Deschamps qu'il doit être considéré comme un texte de droit nouveau. Mais comme les par. 18.3(1) et 37(1) ne diffèrent pas sur le fond, le fait que le par. 18.3(1) soit devenu le par. 37(1) n'a aucune incidence sur l'ordre chronologique du point de vue de l'interprétation, et le par. 222(3) de la *LTA* demeure la disposition « postérieure » (Sullivan, p. 347).

[133] Il s'ensuit que la disposition créant une fiducie réputée que l'on trouve au par. 222(3) de la *LTA* l'emporte sur le par. 18.3(1) dans le cadre d'une procédure fondée sur la *LACC*. La question qui se pose alors est celle de savoir quelle est l'incidence de cette préséance sur le pouvoir discrétionnaire conféré au tribunal par l'art. 11 de la *LACC*.

[134] Bien que l'art. 11 accorde au tribunal le pouvoir discrétionnaire de rendre des ordonnances malgré les dispositions de la *LFI* et de la *Loi sur les liquidations*, L.R.C. 1985, ch. W-11, ce pouvoir discrétionnaire demeure assujéti à l'application de toute autre loi fédérale. L'exercice de ce pouvoir discrétionnaire est donc circonscrit par les limites imposées par toute loi *autre* que la *LFI* et la *Loi sur les liquidations*, et donc par la *LTA*. En l'espèce, le juge siégeant en son cabinet était donc tenu de respecter le régime de priorités établi au par. 222(3) de la *LTA*. Ni le par. 18.3(1) ni l'art. 11 de la *LACC* ne l'autorisaient à en faire abstraction. Par conséquent,

for payment of the GST funds during the CCAA proceedings.

[135] Given this conclusion, it is unnecessary to consider whether there was an express trust.

[136] I would dismiss the appeal.

APPENDIX

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (as at December 13, 2007)

11. (1) [Powers of court] Notwithstanding anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up Act*, where an application is made under this Act in respect of a company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make an order under this section.

. . .

(3) [Initial application court orders] A court may, on an initial application in respect of a company, make an order on such terms as it may impose, effective for such period as the court deems necessary not exceeding thirty days,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in subsection (1);

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and

(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of or proceeding with any other action, suit or proceeding against the company.

(4) [Other than initial application court orders] A court may, on an application in respect of a company other than an initial application, make an order on such terms as it may impose,

il ne pouvait pas refuser la demande présentée par la Couronne en vue de se faire payer la TPS dans le cadre de la procédure introduite en vertu de la *LACC*.

[135] Vu cette conclusion, il n'est pas nécessaire d'examiner la question de savoir s'il existait une fiducie expresse en l'espèce.

[136] Je rejetterais le présent pourvoi.

ANNEXE

Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies, L.R.C. 1985, ch. C-36 (en date du 13 décembre 2007)

11. (1) [Pouvoir du tribunal] Malgré toute disposition de la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité* ou de la *Loi sur les liquidations*, chaque fois qu'une demande est faite sous le régime de la présente loi à l'égard d'une compagnie, le tribunal, sur demande d'un intéressé, peut, sous réserve des autres dispositions de la présente loi et avec ou sans avis, rendre l'ordonnance prévue au présent article.

. . .

(3) [Demande initiale — ordonnances] Dans le cas d'une demande initiale visant une compagnie, le tribunal peut, par ordonnance, aux conditions qu'il peut imposer et pour une période maximale de trente jours :

a) suspendre, jusqu'à ce qu'il rende une nouvelle ordonnance à l'effet contraire, les procédures intentées contre la compagnie au titre des lois mentionnées au paragraphe (1), ou qui pourraient l'être;

b) surseoir, jusqu'à ce qu'il rende une nouvelle ordonnance à l'effet contraire, au cours de toute action, poursuite ou autre procédure contre la compagnie;

c) interdire, jusqu'à ce qu'il rende une nouvelle ordonnance à l'effet contraire, d'intenter ou de continuer toute action, poursuite ou autre procédure contre la compagnie.

(4) [Autres demandes — ordonnances] Dans le cas d'une demande, autre qu'une demande initiale, visant une compagnie, le tribunal peut, par ordonnance, aux conditions qu'il peut imposer et pour la période qu'il estime indiquée :

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, for such period as the court deems necessary, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in subsection (1);

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and

(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of or proceeding with any other action, suit or proceeding against the company.

. . . .

(6) [Burden of proof on application] The court shall not make an order under subsection (3) or (4) unless

(a) the applicant satisfies the court that circumstances exist that make such an order appropriate; and

(b) in the case of an order under subsection (4), the applicant also satisfies the court that the applicant has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence.

11.4 (1) [Her Majesty affected] An order made under section 11 may provide that

(a) Her Majesty in right of Canada may not exercise rights under subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* or any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, in respect of the company if the company is a tax debtor under that subsection or provision, for such period as the court considers appropriate but ending not later than

(i) the expiration of the order,

(ii) the refusal of a proposed compromise by the creditors or the court,

(iii) six months following the court sanction of a compromise or arrangement,

a) suspendre, jusqu'à ce qu'il rende une nouvelle ordonnance à l'effet contraire, les procédures intentées contre la compagnie au titre des lois mentionnées au paragraphe (1), ou qui pourraient l'être;

b) surseoir, jusqu'à ce qu'il rende une nouvelle ordonnance à l'effet contraire, au cours de toute action, poursuite ou autre procédure contre la compagnie;

c) interdire, jusqu'à ce qu'il rende une nouvelle ordonnance à l'effet contraire, d'intenter ou de continuer toute action, poursuite ou autre procédure contre la compagnie.

. . . .

(6) [Preuve] Le tribunal ne rend l'ordonnance visée aux paragraphes (3) ou (4) que si :

a) le demandeur le convainc qu'il serait indiqué de rendre une telle ordonnance;

b) dans le cas de l'ordonnance visée au paragraphe (4), le demandeur le convainc en outre qu'il a agi — et continue d'agir — de bonne foi et avec toute la diligence voulue.

11.4 (1) [Suspension des procédures] Le tribunal peut ordonner :

a) la suspension de l'exercice par Sa Majesté du chef du Canada des droits que lui confère le paragraphe 224(1.2) de la *Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu* ou toute disposition du *Régime de pensions du Canada* ou de la *Loi sur l'assurance-emploi* qui renvoie à ce paragraphe et qui prévoit la perception d'une cotisation, au sens du *Régime de pensions du Canada*, ou d'une cotisation ouvrière ou d'une cotisation patronale, au sens de la *Loi sur l'assurance-emploi*, et des intérêts, pénalités ou autres montants y afférents, à l'égard d'une compagnie lorsque celle-ci est un débiteur fiscal visé à ce paragraphe ou à cette disposition, pour une période se terminant au plus tard :

(i) à l'expiration de l'ordonnance rendue en application de l'article 11,

(ii) au moment du rejet, par le tribunal ou les créanciers, de la transaction proposée,

(iii) six mois après que le tribunal a homologué la transaction ou l'arrangement,

(iv) the default by the company on any term of a compromise or arrangement, or

(v) the performance of a compromise or arrangement in respect of the company; and

(b) Her Majesty in right of a province may not exercise rights under any provision of provincial legislation in respect of the company where the company is a debtor under that legislation and the provision has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a “province providing a comprehensive pension plan” as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a “provincial pension plan” as defined in that subsection,

for such period as the court considers appropriate but ending not later than the occurrence or time referred to in whichever of subparagraphs (a)(i) to (v) may apply.

(2) [When order ceases to be in effect] An order referred to in subsection (1) ceases to be in effect if

(a) the company defaults on payment of any amount that becomes due to Her Majesty after the order is made and could be subject to a demand under

(i) subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(ii) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee’s premium, or employer’s premium,

(iv) au moment de tout défaut d’exécution de la transaction ou de l’arrangement,

(v) au moment de l’exécution intégrale de la transaction ou de l’arrangement;

b) la suspension de l’exercice par Sa Majesté du chef d’une province, pour une période se terminant au plus tard au moment visé à celui des sous-alinéas a)(i) à (v) qui, le cas échéant, est applicable, des droits que lui confère toute disposition législative de cette province à l’égard d’une compagnie, lorsque celle-ci est un débiteur visé par la loi provinciale et qu’il s’agit d’une disposition dont l’objet est semblable à celui du paragraphe 224(1.2) de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu*, ou qui renvoie à ce paragraphe, dans la mesure où elle prévoit la perception d’une somme, et des intérêts, pénalités ou autres montants y afférents, qui :

(i) soit a été retenue par une personne sur un paiement effectué à une autre personne, ou déduite d’un tel paiement, et se rapporte à un impôt semblable, de par sa nature, à l’impôt sur le revenu auquel les particuliers sont assujettis en vertu de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu*,

(ii) soit est de même nature qu’une cotisation prévue par le *Régime de pensions du Canada*, si la province est « une province instituant un régime général de pensions » au sens du paragraphe 3(1) de cette loi et si la loi provinciale institue un « régime provincial de pensions » au sens de ce paragraphe.

(2) [Cessation] L’ordonnance cesse d’être en vigueur dans les cas suivants :

a) la compagnie manque à ses obligations de paiement pour un montant qui devient dû à Sa Majesté après l’ordonnance et qui pourrait faire l’objet d’une demande aux termes d’une des dispositions suivantes :

(i) le paragraphe 224(1.2) de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu*,

(ii) toute disposition du *Régime de pensions du Canada* ou de la *Loi sur l’assurance-emploi* qui renvoie au paragraphe 224(1.2) de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu* et qui prévoit la perception d’une cotisation, au sens du *Régime de pensions du Canada*, ou d’une cotisation ouvrière ou

as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(iii) under any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

(A) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(B) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a “province providing a comprehensive pension plan” as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a “provincial pension plan” as defined in that subsection; or

(b) any other creditor is or becomes entitled to realize a security on any property that could be claimed by Her Majesty in exercising rights under

(i) subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(ii) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee’s premium, or employer’s premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(iii) any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

(A) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person

d’une cotisation patronale, au sens de la *Loi sur l’assurance-emploi*, et des intérêts, pénalités ou autres montants y afférents,

(iii) toute disposition législative provinciale dont l’objet est semblable à celui du paragraphe 224(1.2) de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu*, ou qui renvoie à ce paragraphe, dans la mesure où elle prévoit la perception d’une somme, et des intérêts, pénalités ou autres montants y afférents, qui :

(A) soit a été retenue par une personne sur un paiement effectué à une autre personne, ou déduite d’un tel paiement, et se rapporte à un impôt semblable, de par sa nature, à l’impôt sur le revenu auquel les particuliers sont assujettis en vertu de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu*,

(B) soit est de même nature qu’une cotisation prévue par le *Régime de pensions du Canada*, si la province est « une province instituant un régime général de pensions » au sens du paragraphe 3(1) de cette loi et si la loi provinciale institue un « régime provincial de pensions » au sens de ce paragraphe;

b) un autre créancier a ou acquiert le droit de réaliser sa garantie sur un bien qui pourrait être réclamé par Sa Majesté dans l’exercice des droits que lui confère l’une des dispositions suivantes :

(i) le paragraphe 224(1.2) de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu*,

(ii) toute disposition du *Régime de pensions du Canada* ou de la *Loi sur l’assurance-emploi* qui renvoie au paragraphe 224(1.2) de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu* et qui prévoit la perception d’une cotisation, au sens du *Régime de pensions du Canada*, ou d’une cotisation ouvrière ou d’une cotisation patronale, au sens de la *Loi sur l’assurance-emploi*, et des intérêts, pénalités ou autres montants y afférents,

(iii) toute disposition législative provinciale dont l’objet est semblable à celui du paragraphe 224(1.2) de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu*, ou qui renvoie à ce paragraphe, dans la mesure où elle prévoit la perception d’une somme, et des intérêts, pénalités ou autres montants y afférents, qui :

(A) soit a été retenue par une personne sur un paiement effectué à une autre personne,

and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(B) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a “province providing a comprehensive pension plan” as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a “provincial pension plan” as defined in that subsection.

(3) [Operation of similar legislation] An order made under section 11, other than an order referred to in subsection (1) of this section, does not affect the operation of

(a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee’s premium, or employer’s premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(c) any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a “province providing a comprehensive pension plan” as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a “provincial pension plan” as defined in that subsection,

and for the purpose of paragraph (c), the provision of provincial legislation is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same

ou déduite d’un tel paiement, et se rapporte à un impôt semblable, de par sa nature, à l’impôt sur le revenu auquel les particuliers sont assujettis en vertu de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu*,

(B) soit est de même nature qu’une cotisation prévue par le *Régime de pensions du Canada*, si la province est « une province instituant un régime général de pensions » au sens du paragraphe 3(1) de cette loi et si la loi provinciale institue un « régime provincial de pensions » au sens de ce paragraphe.

(3) [Effet] Les ordonnances du tribunal, autres que celles rendues au titre du paragraphe (1), n’ont pas pour effet de porter atteinte à l’application des dispositions suivantes :

a) les paragraphes 224(1.2) et (1.3) de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu*;

b) toute disposition du *Régime de pensions du Canada* ou de la *Loi sur l’assurance-emploi* qui renvoie au paragraphe 224(1.2) de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu* et qui prévoit la perception d’une cotisation, au sens du *Régime de pensions du Canada*, ou d’une cotisation ouvrière ou d’une cotisation patronale, au sens de la *Loi sur l’assurance-emploi*, et des intérêts, pénalités ou autres montants y afférents;

c) toute disposition législative provinciale dont l’objet est semblable à celui du paragraphe 224(1.2) de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu*, ou qui renvoie à ce paragraphe, dans la mesure où elle prévoit la perception d’une somme, et des intérêts, pénalités ou autres montants y afférents, qui :

(i) soit a été retenue par une personne sur un paiement effectué à une autre personne, ou déduite d’un tel paiement, et se rapporte à un impôt semblable, de par sa nature, à l’impôt sur le revenu auquel les particuliers sont assujettis en vertu de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu*,

(ii) soit est de même nature qu’une cotisation prévue par le *Régime de pensions du Canada*, si la province est « une province instituant un régime général de pensions » au sens du paragraphe 3(1) de cette loi et si la loi provinciale institue un « régime provincial de pensions » au sens de ce paragraphe.

Pour l’application de l’alinéa c), la disposition législative provinciale en question est réputée avoir, à l’encontre de tout créancier et malgré tout texte législatif fédéral ou

effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(i), or as subsection 23(2) of the *Canada Pension Plan* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(ii), and in respect of any related interest, penalties or other amounts.

18.3 (1) [Deemed trusts] Subject to subsection (2), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

(2) [Exceptions] Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act* (each of which is in this subsection referred to as a “federal provision”) nor in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under any law of a province that creates a deemed trust the sole purpose of which is to ensure remittance to Her Majesty in right of the province of amounts deducted or withheld under a law of the province where

(a) that law of the province imposes a tax similar in nature to the tax imposed under the *Income Tax Act* and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as the amounts referred to in subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, or

(b) the province is a “province providing a comprehensive pension plan” as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan*, that law of the province establishes a “provincial pension plan” as defined in that subsection and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as amounts referred to in subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan*,

and for the purpose of this subsection, any provision of a law of a province that creates a deemed trust is, notwithstanding any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as the corresponding federal provision.

provincial et toute règle de droit, la même portée et le même effet que le paragraphe 224(1.2) de la *Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu* quant à la somme visée au sous-alinéa c)(i), ou que le paragraphe 23(2) du *Régime de pensions du Canada* quant à la somme visée au sous-alinéa c)(ii), et quant aux intérêts, pénalités ou autres montants y afférents, quelle que soit la garantie dont bénéficie le créancier.

18.3 (1) [Fiducies présumées] Sous réserve du paragraphe (2) et par dérogation à toute disposition législative fédérale ou provinciale ayant pour effet d'assimiler certains biens à des biens détenus en fiducie pour Sa Majesté, aucun des biens de la compagnie débitrice ne peut être considéré comme détenu en fiducie pour Sa Majesté si, en l'absence de la disposition législative en question, il ne le serait pas.

(2) [Exceptions] Le paragraphe (1) ne s'applique pas à l'égard des montants réputés détenus en fiducie aux termes des paragraphes 227(4) ou (4.1) de la *Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu*, des paragraphes 23(3) ou (4) du *Régime de pensions du Canada* ou des paragraphes 86(2) ou (2.1) de la *Loi sur l'assurance-emploi* (chacun étant appelé « disposition fédérale » au présent paragraphe) ou à l'égard des montants réputés détenus en fiducie aux termes de toute loi d'une province créant une fiducie présumée dans le seul but d'assurer à Sa Majesté du chef de cette province la remise de sommes déduites ou retenues aux termes d'une loi de cette province, dans la mesure où, dans ce dernier cas, se réalise l'une des conditions suivantes :

a) la loi de cette province prévoit un impôt semblable, de par sa nature, à celui prévu par la *Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu*, et les sommes déduites ou retenues aux termes de la loi de cette province sont de même nature que celles visées aux paragraphes 227(4) ou (4.1) de la *Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu*;

b) cette province est « une province instituant un régime général de pensions » au sens du paragraphe 3(1) du *Régime de pensions du Canada*, la loi de cette province institue un « régime provincial de pensions » au sens de ce paragraphe, et les sommes déduites ou retenues aux termes de la loi de cette province sont de même nature que celles visées aux paragraphes 23(3) ou (4) du *Régime de pensions du Canada*.

Pour l'application du présent paragraphe, toute disposition de la loi provinciale qui crée une fiducie présumée est réputée avoir, à l'encontre de tout créancier du failli et malgré tout texte législatif fédéral ou provincial et toute règle de droit, la même portée et le même effet que la disposition fédérale correspondante, quelle que soit la garantie dont bénéficie le créancier.

18.4 (1) [Status of Crown claims] In relation to a proceeding under this Act, all claims, including secured claims, of Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province or any body under an enactment respecting workers' compensation, in this section and in section 18.5 called a "workers' compensation body", rank as unsecured claims.

. . .

(3) [Operation of similar legislation] Subsection (1) does not affect the operation of

(a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(c) any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

and for the purpose of paragraph (c), the provision of provincial legislation is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(i), or as subsection 23(2) of the *Canada Pension Plan* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(ii), and

18.4 (1) [Réclamations de la Couronne] Dans le cadre de procédures intentées sous le régime de la présente loi, toutes les réclamations de Sa Majesté du chef du Canada ou d'une province ou d'un organisme compétent au titre d'une loi sur les accidents du travail, y compris les réclamations garanties, prennent rang comme réclamations non garanties.

. . .

(3) [Effet] Le paragraphe (1) n'a pas pour effet de porter atteinte à l'application des dispositions suivantes :

a) les paragraphes 224(1.2) et (1.3) de la *Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu*;

b) toute disposition du *Régime de pensions du Canada* ou de la *Loi sur l'assurance-emploi* qui renvoie au paragraphe 224(1.2) de la *Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu* et qui prévoit la perception d'une cotisation, au sens du *Régime de pensions du Canada*, ou d'une cotisation ouvrière ou d'une cotisation patronale, au sens de la *Loi sur l'assurance-emploi*, et des intérêts, pénalités ou autres montants y afférents;

c) toute disposition législative provinciale dont l'objet est semblable à celui du paragraphe 224(1.2) de la *Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu*, ou qui renvoie à ce paragraphe, dans la mesure où elle prévoit la perception d'une somme, et des intérêts, pénalités ou autres montants y afférents, qui :

(i) soit a été retenue par une personne sur un paiement effectué à une autre personne, ou déduite d'un tel paiement, et se rapporte à un impôt semblable, de par sa nature, à l'impôt sur le revenu auquel les particuliers sont assujettis en vertu de la *Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu*,

(ii) soit est de même nature qu'une cotisation prévue par le *Régime de pensions du Canada*, si la province est « une province instituant un régime général de pensions » au sens du paragraphe 3(1) de cette loi et si la loi provinciale institue un « régime provincial de pensions » au sens de ce paragraphe.

Pour l'application de l'alinéa c), la disposition législative provinciale en question est réputée avoir, à l'encontre de tout créancier et malgré tout texte législatif fédéral ou provincial et toute règle de droit, la même portée et le même effet que le paragraphe 224(1.2) de la *Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu* quant à la somme visée au sous-alinéa c)(i), ou que le paragraphe 23(2) du *Régime de pensions du Canada* quant à la somme visée au sous-alinéa c)(ii),

in respect of any related interest, penalties or other amounts.

20. [Act to be applied conjointly with other Acts] The provisions of this Act may be applied together with the provisions of any Act of Parliament or of the legislature of any province, that authorizes or makes provision for the sanction of compromises or arrangements between a company and its shareholders or any class of them.

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (as at September 18, 2009)

11. [General power of court] Despite anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, if an application is made under this Act in respect of a debtor company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

11.02 (1) [Stays, etc. — initial application] A court may, on an initial application in respect of a debtor company, make an order on any terms that it may impose, effective for the period that the court considers necessary, which period may not be more than 30 days,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*;

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and

(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of any action, suit or proceeding against the company.

(2) [Stays, etc. — other than initial application] A court may, on an application in respect of a debtor company other than an initial application, make an order, on any terms that it may impose,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, for any period that the court considers necessary, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in paragraph (1)(a);

et quant aux intérêts, pénalités ou autres montants y afférents, quelle que soit la garantie dont bénéficie le créancier.

20. [La loi peut être appliquée conjointement avec d'autres lois] Les dispositions de la présente loi peuvent être appliquées conjointement avec celles de toute loi fédérale ou provinciale, autorisant ou prévoyant l'homologation de transactions ou arrangements entre une compagnie et ses actionnaires ou une catégorie de ces derniers.

Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies, L.R.C. 1985, ch. C-36 (en date du 18 septembre 2009)

11. [Pouvoir général du tribunal] Malgré toute disposition de la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité* ou de la *Loi sur les liquidations et les restructurations*, le tribunal peut, dans le cas de toute demande sous le régime de la présente loi à l'égard d'une compagnie débitrice, rendre, sur demande d'un intéressé, mais sous réserve des restrictions prévues par la présente loi et avec ou sans avis, toute ordonnance qu'il estime indiquée.

11.02 (1) [Suspension : demande initiale] Dans le cas d'une demande initiale visant une compagnie débitrice, le tribunal peut, par ordonnance, aux conditions qu'il peut imposer et pour la période maximale de trente jours qu'il estime nécessaire :

a) suspendre, jusqu'à nouvel ordre, toute procédure qui est ou pourrait être intentée contre la compagnie sous le régime de la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité* ou de la *Loi sur les liquidations et les restructurations*;

b) surseoir, jusqu'à nouvel ordre, à la continuation de toute action, poursuite ou autre procédure contre la compagnie;

c) interdire, jusqu'à nouvel ordre, l'introduction de toute action, poursuite ou autre procédure contre la compagnie.

(2) [Suspension : demandes autres qu'initiales] Dans le cas d'une demande, autre qu'une demande initiale, visant une compagnie débitrice, le tribunal peut, par ordonnance, aux conditions qu'il peut imposer et pour la période qu'il estime nécessaire :

a) suspendre, jusqu'à nouvel ordre, toute procédure qui est ou pourrait être intentée contre la compagnie sous le régime des lois mentionnées à l'alinéa (1)a);

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and

(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of any action, suit or proceeding against the company.

(3) [Burden of proof on application] The court shall not make the order unless

(a) the applicant satisfies the court that circumstances exist that make the order appropriate; and

(b) in the case of an order under subsection (2), the applicant also satisfies the court that the applicant has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence.

. . .

11.09 (1) [Stay — Her Majesty] An order made under section 11.02 may provide that

(a) Her Majesty in right of Canada may not exercise rights under subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* or any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, in respect of the company if the company is a tax debtor under that subsection or provision, for the period that the court considers appropriate but ending not later than

(i) the expiry of the order,

(ii) the refusal of a proposed compromise by the creditors or the court,

(iii) six months following the court sanction of a compromise or an arrangement,

(iv) the default by the company on any term of a compromise or an arrangement, or

(v) the performance of a compromise or an arrangement in respect of the company; and

(b) Her Majesty in right of a province may not exercise rights under any provision of provincial legislation in respect of the company if the company is a debtor under that legislation and the provision has a purpose similar to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income*

b) surseoir, jusqu'à nouvel ordre, à la continuation de toute action, poursuite ou autre procédure contre la compagnie;

c) interdire, jusqu'à nouvel ordre, l'introduction de toute action, poursuite ou autre procédure contre la compagnie.

(3) [Preuve] Le tribunal ne rend l'ordonnance que si :

a) le demandeur le convainc que la mesure est opportune;

b) dans le cas de l'ordonnance visée au paragraphe (2), le demandeur le convainc en outre qu'il a agi et continue d'agir de bonne foi et avec la diligence voulue.

. . .

11.09 (1) [Suspension des procédures : Sa Majesté] L'ordonnance prévue à l'article 11.02 peut avoir pour effet de suspendre :

a) l'exercice par Sa Majesté du chef du Canada des droits que lui confère le paragraphe 224(1.2) de la *Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu* ou toute disposition du *Régime de pensions du Canada* ou de la *Loi sur l'assurance-emploi* qui renvoie à ce paragraphe et qui prévoit la perception d'une cotisation, au sens du *Régime de pensions du Canada*, ou d'une cotisation ouvrière ou d'une cotisation patronale, au sens de la *Loi sur l'assurance-emploi*, ainsi que des intérêts, pénalités et autres charges afférents, à l'égard d'une compagnie qui est un débiteur fiscal visé à ce paragraphe ou à cette disposition, pour la période se terminant au plus tard :

(i) à l'expiration de l'ordonnance,

(ii) au moment du rejet, par le tribunal ou les créanciers, de la transaction proposée,

(iii) six mois après que le tribunal a homologué la transaction ou l'arrangement,

(iv) au moment de tout défaut d'exécution de la transaction ou de l'arrangement,

(v) au moment de l'exécution intégrale de la transaction ou de l'arrangement;

b) l'exercice par Sa Majesté du chef d'une province, pour la période que le tribunal estime indiquée et se terminant au plus tard au moment visé à celui des sous-alinéas a)(i) à (v) qui, le cas échéant, est applicable, des droits que lui confère toute disposition

Tax Act, or refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, and the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a “province providing a comprehensive pension plan” as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a “provincial pension plan” as defined in that subsection,

for the period that the court considers appropriate but ending not later than the occurrence or time referred to in whichever of subparagraphs (a)(i) to (v) that may apply.

(2) [When order ceases to be in effect] The portions of an order made under section 11.02 that affect the exercise of rights of Her Majesty referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b) cease to be in effect if

(a) the company defaults on the payment of any amount that becomes due to Her Majesty after the order is made and could be subject to a demand under

(i) subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(ii) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee’s premium, or employer’s premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(iii) any provision of provincial legislation that has a purpose similar to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the

législative de cette province à l’égard d’une compagnie qui est un débiteur visé par la loi provinciale, s’il s’agit d’une disposition dont l’objet est semblable à celui du paragraphe 224(1.2) de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu*, ou qui renvoie à ce paragraphe, et qui prévoit la perception d’une somme, ainsi que des intérêts, pénalités et autres charges afférents, laquelle :

(i) soit a été retenue par une personne sur un paiement effectué à une autre personne, ou déduite d’un tel paiement, et se rapporte à un impôt semblable, de par sa nature, à l’impôt sur le revenu auquel les particuliers sont assujettis en vertu de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu*,

(ii) soit est de même nature qu’une cotisation prévue par le *Régime de pensions du Canada*, si la province est une province instituant un régime général de pensions au sens du paragraphe 3(1) de cette loi et si la loi provinciale institue un régime provincial de pensions au sens de ce paragraphe.

(2) [Cessation d’effet] Les passages de l’ordonnance qui suspendent l’exercice des droits de Sa Majesté visés aux alinéas (1)a) ou b) cessent d’avoir effet dans les cas suivants :

a) la compagnie manque à ses obligations de paiement à l’égard de toute somme qui devient due à Sa Majesté après le prononcé de l’ordonnance et qui pourrait faire l’objet d’une demande aux termes d’une des dispositions suivantes :

(i) le paragraphe 224(1.2) de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu*,

(ii) toute disposition du *Régime de pensions du Canada* ou de la *Loi sur l’assurance-emploi* qui renvoie au paragraphe 224(1.2) de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu* et qui prévoit la perception d’une cotisation, au sens du *Régime de pensions du Canada*, ou d’une cotisation ouvrière ou d’une cotisation patronale, au sens de la *Loi sur l’assurance-emploi*, ainsi que des intérêts, pénalités et autres charges afférents,

(iii) toute disposition législative provinciale dont l’objet est semblable à celui du paragraphe 224(1.2) de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu*, ou qui renvoie à ce paragraphe, et qui prévoit la

collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, and the sum

(A) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(B) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a “province providing a comprehensive pension plan” as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a “provincial pension plan” as defined in that subsection; or

(b) any other creditor is or becomes entitled to realize a security on any property that could be claimed by Her Majesty in exercising rights under

(i) subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(ii) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee’s premium, or employer’s premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(iii) any provision of provincial legislation that has a purpose similar to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, and the sum

(A) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(B) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a “province providing a comprehensive pension plan” as defined in subsection

perception d’une somme, ainsi que des intérêts, pénalités et autres charges afférents, laquelle :

(A) soit a été retenue par une personne sur un paiement effectué à une autre personne, ou déduite d’un tel paiement, et se rapporte à un impôt semblable, de par sa nature, à l’impôt sur le revenu auquel les particuliers sont assujettis en vertu de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu*,

(B) soit est de même nature qu’une cotisation prévue par le *Régime de pensions du Canada*, si la province est une province instituant un régime général de pensions au sens du paragraphe 3(1) de cette loi et si la loi provinciale institue un régime provincial de pensions au sens de ce paragraphe;

b) un autre créancier a ou acquiert le droit de réaliser sa garantie sur un bien qui pourrait être réclamé par Sa Majesté dans l’exercice des droits que lui confère l’une des dispositions suivantes :

(i) le paragraphe 224(1.2) de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu*,

(ii) toute disposition du *Régime de pensions du Canada* ou de la *Loi sur l’assurance-emploi* qui renvoie au paragraphe 224(1.2) de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu* et qui prévoit la perception d’une cotisation, au sens du *Régime de pensions du Canada*, ou d’une cotisation ouvrière ou d’une cotisation patronale, au sens de la *Loi sur l’assurance-emploi*, ainsi que des intérêts, pénalités et autres charges afférents,

(iii) toute disposition législative provinciale dont l’objet est semblable à celui du paragraphe 224(1.2) de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu*, ou qui renvoie à ce paragraphe, et qui prévoit la perception d’une somme, ainsi que des intérêts, pénalités et autres charges afférents, laquelle :

(A) soit a été retenue par une personne sur un paiement effectué à une autre personne, ou déduite d’un tel paiement, et se rapporte à un impôt semblable, de par sa nature, à l’impôt sur le revenu auquel les particuliers sont assujettis en vertu de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu*,

(B) soit est de même nature qu’une cotisation prévue par le *Régime de pensions du Canada*, si la province est une province instituant un régime général de pensions au sens

3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a “provincial pension plan” as defined in that subsection.

(3) [Operation of similar legislation] An order made under section 11.02, other than the portions of that order that affect the exercise of rights of Her Majesty referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), does not affect the operation of

(a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee’s premium, or employer’s premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(c) any provision of provincial legislation that has a purpose similar to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, and the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a “province providing a comprehensive pension plan” as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a “provincial pension plan” as defined in that subsection,

and for the purpose of paragraph (c), the provision of provincial legislation is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(i), or as subsection 23(2) of the *Canada Pension Plan* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(ii), and in respect of any related interest, penalties or other amounts.

du paragraphe 3(1) de cette loi et si la loi provinciale institue un régime provincial de pensions au sens de ce paragraphe.

(3) [Effet] L’ordonnance prévue à l’article 11.02, à l’exception des passages de celle-ci qui suspendent l’exercice des droits de Sa Majesté visés aux alinéas (1)a) ou b), n’a pas pour effet de porter atteinte à l’application des dispositions suivantes :

a) les paragraphes 224(1.2) et (1.3) de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu*;

b) toute disposition du *Régime de pensions du Canada* ou de la *Loi sur l’assurance-emploi* qui renvoie au paragraphe 224(1.2) de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu* et qui prévoit la perception d’une cotisation, au sens du *Régime de pensions du Canada*, ou d’une cotisation ouvrière ou d’une cotisation patronale, au sens de la *Loi sur l’assurance-emploi*, ainsi que des intérêts, pénalités et autres charges afférents;

c) toute disposition législative provinciale dont l’objet est semblable à celui du paragraphe 224(1.2) de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu*, ou qui renvoie à ce paragraphe, et qui prévoit la perception d’une somme, ainsi que des intérêts, pénalités et autres charges afférents, laquelle :

(i) soit a été retenue par une personne sur un paiement effectué à une autre personne, ou déduite d’un tel paiement, et se rapporte à un impôt semblable, de par sa nature, à l’impôt sur le revenu auquel les particuliers sont assujettis en vertu de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu*,

(ii) soit est de même nature qu’une cotisation prévue par le *Régime de pensions du Canada*, si la province est une province instituant un régime général de pensions au sens du paragraphe 3(1) de cette loi et si la loi provinciale institue un régime provincial de pensions au sens de ce paragraphe.

Pour l’application de l’alinéa c), la disposition législative provinciale en question est réputée avoir, à l’encontre de tout créancier et malgré tout texte législatif fédéral ou provincial et toute autre règle de droit, la même portée et le même effet que le paragraphe 224(1.2) de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu* quant à la somme visée au sous-alinéa c)(i), ou que le paragraphe 23(2) du *Régime de pensions du Canada* quant à la somme visée au sous-alinéa c)(ii), et quant aux intérêts, pénalités et autres charges afférents, quelle que soit la garantie dont bénéficie le créancier.

37. (1) [Deemed trusts] Subject to subsection (2), despite any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as being held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

(2) [Exceptions] Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act* (each of which is in this subsection referred to as a “federal provision”), nor does it apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under any law of a province that creates a deemed trust the sole purpose of which is to ensure remittance to Her Majesty in right of the province of amounts deducted or withheld under a law of the province if

(a) that law of the province imposes a tax similar in nature to the tax imposed under the *Income Tax Act* and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as the amounts referred to in subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, or

(b) the province is a “province providing a comprehensive pension plan” as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan*, that law of the province establishes a “provincial pension plan” as defined in that subsection and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as amounts referred to in subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan*,

and for the purpose of this subsection, any provision of a law of a province that creates a deemed trust is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as the corresponding federal provision.

Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 (as at December 13, 2007)

222. (1) [Trust for amounts collected] Subject to subsection (1.1), every person who collects an amount as or on account of tax under Division II is deemed, for all purposes and despite any security interest in the amount, to hold the amount in trust for Her Majesty in right of Canada, separate and apart from the property of the person and from property held by any secured

37. (1) [Fiducies présumées] Sous réserve du paragraphe (2) et par dérogation à toute disposition législative fédérale ou provinciale ayant pour effet d’assimiler certains biens à des biens détenus en fiducie pour Sa Majesté, aucun des biens de la compagnie débitrice ne peut être considéré comme tel par le seul effet d’une telle disposition.

(2) [Exceptions] Le paragraphe (1) ne s’applique pas à l’égard des sommes réputées détenues en fiducie aux termes des paragraphes 227(4) ou (4.1) de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu*, des paragraphes 23(3) ou (4) du *Régime de pensions du Canada* ou des paragraphes 86(2) ou (2.1) de la *Loi sur l’assurance-emploi* (chacun étant appelé « disposition fédérale » au présent paragraphe) ou à l’égard des sommes réputées détenues en fiducie aux termes de toute loi d’une province créant une fiducie présumée dans le seul but d’assurer à Sa Majesté du chef de cette province la remise de sommes déduites ou retenues aux termes d’une loi de cette province, si, dans ce dernier cas, se réalise l’une des conditions suivantes :

a) la loi de cette province prévoit un impôt semblable, de par sa nature, à celui prévu par la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu*, et les sommes déduites ou retenues au titre de cette loi provinciale sont de même nature que celles visées aux paragraphes 227(4) ou (4.1) de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu*;

b) cette province est une province instituant un régime général de pensions au sens du paragraphe 3(1) du *Régime de pensions du Canada*, la loi de cette province institue un régime provincial de pensions au sens de ce paragraphe, et les sommes déduites ou retenues au titre de cette loi provinciale sont de même nature que celles visées aux paragraphes 23(3) ou (4) du *Régime de pensions du Canada*.

Pour l’application du présent paragraphe, toute disposition de la loi provinciale qui crée une fiducie présumée est réputée avoir, à l’encontre de tout créancier de la compagnie et malgré tout texte législatif fédéral ou provincial et toute règle de droit, la même portée et le même effet que la disposition fédérale correspondante, quelle que soit la garantie dont bénéficie le créancier.

Loi sur la taxe d’accise, L.R.C. 1985, ch. E-15 (en date du 13 décembre 2007)

222. (1) [Montants perçus détenus en fiducie] La personne qui perçoit un montant au titre de la taxe prévue à la section II est réputée, à toutes fins utiles et malgré tout droit en garantie le concernant, le détenir en fiducie pour Sa Majesté du chef du Canada, séparé de ses propres biens et des biens détenus par ses créanciers garantis qui, en l’absence du droit en garantie, seraient ceux de la

creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, until the amount is remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn under subsection (2).

(1.1) [Amounts collected before bankruptcy] Subsection (1) does not apply, at or after the time a person becomes a bankrupt (within the meaning of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*), to any amounts that, before that time, were collected or became collectible by the person as or on account of tax under Division II.

. . .

(3) [Extension of trust] Despite any other provision of this Act (except subsection (4)), any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*), any enactment of a province or any other law, if at any time an amount deemed by subsection (1) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn in the manner and at the time provided under this Part, property of the person and property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust, is deemed

(a) to be held, from the time the amount was collected by the person, in trust for Her Majesty, separate and apart from the property of the person, whether or not the property is subject to a security interest, and

(b) to form no part of the estate or property of the person from the time the amount was collected, whether or not the property has in fact been kept separate and apart from the estate or property of the person and whether or not the property is subject to a security interest

and is property beneficially owned by Her Majesty in right of Canada despite any security interest in the property or in the proceeds thereof and the proceeds of the property shall be paid to the Receiver General in priority to all security interests.

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 (as at December 13, 2007)

67. (1) [Property of bankrupt] The property of a bankrupt divisible among his creditors shall not comprise

personne, jusqu'à ce qu'il soit versé au receveur général ou retiré en application du paragraphe (2).

(1.1) [Montants perçus avant la faillite] Le paragraphe (1) ne s'applique pas, à compter du moment de la faillite d'un failli, au sens de la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité*, aux montants perçus ou devenus percevables par lui avant la faillite au titre de la taxe prévue à la section II.

. . .

(3) [Non-versement ou non-retrait] Malgré les autres dispositions de la présente loi (sauf le paragraphe (4) du présent article), tout autre texte législatif fédéral (sauf la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité*), tout texte législatif provincial ou toute autre règle de droit, lorsqu'un montant qu'une personne est réputée par le paragraphe (1) détenir en fiducie pour Sa Majesté du chef du Canada n'est pas versé au receveur général ni retiré selon les modalités et dans le délai prévus par la présente partie, les biens de la personne — y compris les biens détenus par ses créanciers garantis qui, en l'absence du droit en garantie, seraient ses biens — d'une valeur égale à ce montant sont réputés :

a) être détenus en fiducie pour Sa Majesté du chef du Canada, à compter du moment où le montant est perçu par la personne, séparés des propres biens de la personne, qu'ils soient ou non assujettis à un droit en garantie;

b) ne pas faire partie du patrimoine ou des biens de la personne à compter du moment où le montant est perçu, que ces biens aient été ou non tenus séparés de ses propres biens ou de son patrimoine et qu'ils soient ou non assujettis à un droit en garantie.

Ces biens sont des biens dans lesquels Sa Majesté du chef du Canada a un droit de bénéficiaire malgré tout autre droit en garantie sur ces biens ou sur le produit en découlant, et le produit découlant de ces biens est payé au receveur général par priorité sur tout droit en garantie.

Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité, L.R.C. 1985, ch. B-3 (en date du 13 décembre 2007)

67. (1) [Biens du failli] Les biens d'un failli, constituant le patrimoine attribué à ses créanciers, ne comprennent pas les biens suivants :

(a) property held by the bankrupt in trust for any other person,

(b) any property that as against the bankrupt is exempt from execution or seizure under any laws applicable in the province within which the property is situated and within which the bankrupt resides, or

(b.1) such goods and services tax credit payments and prescribed payments relating to the essential needs of an individual as are made in prescribed circumstances and are not property referred to in paragraph (a) or (b),

but it shall comprise

(c) all property wherever situated of the bankrupt at the date of his bankruptcy or that may be acquired by or devolve on him before his discharge, and

(d) such powers in or over or in respect of the property as might have been exercised by the bankrupt for his own benefit.

(2) [Deemed trusts] Subject to subsection (3), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a bankrupt shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty for the purpose of paragraph (1)(a) unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

(3) [Exceptions] Subsection (2) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act* (each of which is in this subsection referred to as a “federal provision”) nor in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under any law of a province that creates a deemed trust the sole purpose of which is to ensure remittance to Her Majesty in right of the province of amounts deducted or withheld under a law of the province where

(a) that law of the province imposes a tax similar in nature to the tax imposed under the *Income Tax Act* and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as the amounts referred to in subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, or

a) les biens détenus par le failli en fiducie pour toute autre personne;

b) les biens qui, à l'encontre du failli, sont exempts d'exécution ou de saisie sous le régime des lois applicables dans la province dans laquelle sont situés ces biens et où réside le failli;

b.1) dans les circonstances prescrites, les paiements au titre de crédits de la taxe sur les produits et services et les paiements prescrits qui sont faits à des personnes physiques relativement à leurs besoins essentiels et qui ne sont pas visés aux alinéas a) et b),

mais ils comprennent :

c) tous les biens, où qu'ils soient situés, qui appartiennent au failli à la date de la faillite, ou qu'il peut acquérir ou qui peuvent lui être dévolus avant sa libération;

d) les pouvoirs sur des biens ou à leur égard, qui auraient pu être exercés par le failli pour son propre bénéfice.

(2) [Fiducies présumées] Sous réserve du paragraphe (3) et par dérogation à toute disposition législative fédérale ou provinciale ayant pour effet d'assimiler certains biens à des biens détenus en fiducie pour Sa Majesté, aucun des biens du failli ne peut, pour l'application de l'alinéa (1)a), être considéré comme détenu en fiducie pour Sa Majesté si, en l'absence de la disposition législative en question, il ne le serait pas.

(3) [Exceptions] Le paragraphe (2) ne s'applique pas à l'égard des montants réputés détenus en fiducie aux termes des paragraphes 227(4) ou (4.1) de la *Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu*, des paragraphes 23(3) ou (4) du *Régime de pensions du Canada* ou des paragraphes 86(2) ou (2.1) de la *Loi sur l'assurance-emploi* (chacun étant appelé « disposition fédérale » au présent paragraphe) ou à l'égard des montants réputés détenus en fiducie aux termes de toute loi d'une province créant une fiducie présumée dans le seul but d'assurer à Sa Majesté du chef de cette province la remise de sommes déduites ou retenues aux termes d'une loi de cette province, dans la mesure où, dans ce dernier cas, se réalise l'une des conditions suivantes :

a) la loi de cette province prévoit un impôt semblable, de par sa nature, à celui prévu par la *Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu*, et les sommes déduites ou retenues aux termes de la loi de cette province sont de même nature que celles visées aux paragraphes 227(4) ou (4.1) de la *Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu*;

(b) the province is a “province providing a comprehensive pension plan” as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan*, that law of the province establishes a “provincial pension plan” as defined in that subsection and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as amounts referred to in subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan*,

and for the purpose of this subsection, any provision of a law of a province that creates a deemed trust is, notwithstanding any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as the corresponding federal provision.

86. (1) [Status of Crown claims] In relation to a bankruptcy or proposal, all provable claims, including secured claims, of Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province or of any body under an Act respecting workers’ compensation, in this section and in section 87 called a “workers’ compensation body”, rank as unsecured claims.

. . .

(3) [Exceptions] Subsection (1) does not affect the operation of

(a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*;

(b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee’s premium, or employer’s premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts; or

(c) any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

b) cette province est « une province instituant un régime général de pensions » au sens du paragraphe 3(1) du *Régime de pensions du Canada*, la loi de cette province institue un « régime provincial de pensions » au sens de ce paragraphe, et les sommes déduites ou retenues aux termes de la loi de cette province sont de même nature que celles visées aux paragraphes 23(3) ou (4) du *Régime de pensions du Canada*.

Pour l’application du présent paragraphe, toute disposition de la loi provinciale qui crée une fiducie présumée est réputée avoir, à l’encontre de tout créancier du failli et malgré tout texte législatif fédéral ou provincial et toute règle de droit, la même portée et le même effet que la disposition fédérale correspondante, quelle que soit la garantie dont bénéficie le créancier.

86. (1) [Réclamations de la Couronne] Dans le cadre d’une faillite ou d’une proposition, les réclamations prouvables — y compris les réclamations garanties — de Sa Majesté du chef du Canada ou d’une province ou d’un organisme compétent au titre d’une loi sur les accidents du travail prennent rang comme réclamations non garanties.

. . .

(3) [Effet] Le paragraphe (1) n’a pas pour effet de porter atteinte à l’application des dispositions suivantes :

a) les paragraphes 224(1.2) et (1.3) de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu*;

b) toute disposition du *Régime de pensions du Canada* ou de la *Loi sur l’assurance-emploi* qui renvoie au paragraphe 224(1.2) de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu* et qui prévoit la perception d’une cotisation, au sens du *Régime de pensions du Canada*, ou d’une cotisation ouvrière ou d’une cotisation patronale, au sens de la *Loi sur l’assurance-emploi*, et des intérêts, pénalités ou autres montants y afférents;

c) toute disposition législative provinciale dont l’objet est semblable à celui du paragraphe 224(1.2) de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu*, ou qui renvoie à ce paragraphe, dans la mesure où elle prévoit la perception d’une somme, et des intérêts, pénalités ou autres montants y afférents, qui :

(i) soit a été retenue par une personne sur un paiement effectué à une autre personne, ou déduite d’un tel paiement, et se rapporte à un impôt semblable, de par sa nature, à l’impôt sur le revenu auquel les particuliers sont assujettis en vertu de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu*,

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a “province providing a comprehensive pension plan” as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a “provincial pension plan” as defined in that subsection,

and for the purpose of paragraph (c), the provision of provincial legislation is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(i), or as subsection 23(2) of the *Canada Pension Plan* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(ii), and in respect of any related interest, penalties or other amounts.

Appeal allowed with costs, ABELLA J. dissenting.

Solicitors for the appellant: Fraser Milner Casgrain, Vancouver.

Solicitor for the respondent: Attorney General of Canada, Vancouver.

(ii) soit est de même nature qu’une cotisation prévue par le *Régime de pensions du Canada*, si la province est « une province instituant un régime général de pensions » au sens du paragraphe 3(1) de cette loi et si la loi provinciale institue un « régime provincial de pensions » au sens de ce paragraphe.

Pour l’application de l’alinéa c), la disposition législative provinciale en question est réputée avoir, à l’encontre de tout créancier et malgré tout texte législatif fédéral ou provincial et toute règle de droit, la même portée et le même effet que le paragraphe 224(1.2) de la *Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu* quant à la somme visée au sous-alinéa c)(i), ou que le paragraphe 23(2) du *Régime de pensions du Canada* quant à la somme visée au sous-alinéa c)(ii), et quant aux intérêts, pénalités ou autres montants y afférents, quelle que soit la garantie dont bénéficie le créancier.

Pourvoi accueilli avec dépens, la juge ABELLA est dissidente.

Procureurs de l’appelante : Fraser Milner Casgrain, Vancouver.

Procureur de l’intimé : Procureur général du Canada, Vancouver.

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

IN THE MATTER OF INTENTION TO MAKE A PROPOSAL OF DANIER LEATHER INC.

BEFORE: Penny J.

COUNSEL: *Jay Swartz and Natalie Renner* for Danier

Sean Zweig for the Proposal Trustee

Harvey Chaiton for the Directors and Officers

Jeffrey Levine for GA Retail Canada

David Bish for Cadillac Fairview

Linda Galessiere for Morguard Investment, 20 ULC Management, SmartReit and
Ivanhoe Cambridge

Clifton Prophet for CIBC

HEARD: February 8, 2016

ENDORSEMENT

The Motion

[1] On February 8, 2016 I granted an order approving a SISP in respect of Danier Leather Inc., with reasons to follow. These are those reasons.

[2] Danier filed a Notice of Intention to make a proposal under the BIA on February 4, 2016. This is a motion to :

- (a) approve a stalking horse agreement and SISP;
- (b) approve the payment of a break fee, expense reimbursement and signage costs obligations in connection with the stalking horse agreement;
- (c) authorize Danier to perform its obligations under engagement letters with its financial advisors and a charge to secure success fees;

- (d) approve an Administration Charge;
- (e) approve a D&O Charge;
- (f) approve a KERP and KERP Charge; and
- (g) grant a sealing order in respect of the KERP and a stalking horse offer summary.

Background

[3] Danier is an integrated designer, manufacturer and retailer of leather and suede apparel and accessories. Danier primarily operates its retail business from 84 stores located throughout Canada. It does not own any real property. Danier employs approximately 1,293 employees. There is no union or pension plan.

[4] Danier has suffered declining revenues and profitability over the last two years resulting primarily from problems implementing its strategic plan. The accelerated pace of change in both personnel and systems resulting from the strategic plan contributed to fashion and inventory miscues which have been further exacerbated by unusual extremes in the weather and increased competition from U.S. and international retailers in the Canadian retail space and the depreciation of the Canadian dollar relative to the American dollar.

[5] In late 2014, Danier implemented a series of operational and cost reduction initiatives in an attempt to return Danier to profitability. These initiatives included reductions to headcount, marketing costs, procurement costs and capital expenditures, renegotiating supply terms, rationalizing Danier's operations, improving branding, growing online sales and improving price management and inventory mark downs. In addition, Danier engaged a financial advisor and formed a special committee comprised of independent members of its board of directors to explore strategic alternatives to improve Danier's financial circumstances, including soliciting an acquisition transaction for Danier.

[6] As part of its mandate, the financial advisor conducted a seven month marketing process to solicit offers from interested parties to acquire Danier. The financial advisor contacted approximately 189 parties and provided 33 parties with a confidential information memorandum describing Danier and its business. Over the course of this process, the financial advisor had meaningful conversations with several interested parties but did not receive any formal offers to provide capital and/or to acquire the shares of Danier. One of the principal reasons that this process was unsuccessful is that it focused on soliciting an acquisition transaction, which ultimately proved unappealing to interested parties as Danier's risk profile was too great. An acquisition transaction did not afford prospective purchasers the ability to restructure Danier's affairs without incurring significant costs.

[7] Despite Danier's efforts to restructure its financial affairs and turn around its operations, Danier has experienced significant net losses in each of its most recently completed fiscal years and in each of the two most recently completed fiscal quarters in the 2016 fiscal year. Danier currently has approximately \$9.6 million in cash on hand but is projected to be cash flow

negative every month until at least September 2016. Danier anticipated that it would need to borrow under its loan facility with CIBC by July 2016. CIBC has served a notice of default and indicate no funds will be advanced under its loan facility. In addition, for the 12 months ending December 31, 2015, 30 of Danier's 84 store locations were unprofitable. If Danier elects to close those store locations, it will be required to terminate the corresponding leases and will face substantial landlord claims which it will not be able to satisfy in the normal course.

[8] Danier would not have had the financial resources to implement a restructuring of its affairs if it had delayed a filing under the BIA until it had entirely used up its cash resources. Accordingly, on February 4, 2016, Danier commenced these proceedings for the purpose of entering into a stalking horse agreement and implementing the second phase of the SISP.

The Stalking Horse Agreement

[9] The SISP is comprised of two phases. In the first phase, Danier engaged the services of its financial advisor to find a stalking horse bidder. The financial advisor corresponded with 22 parties, 19 of whom had participated in the 2015 solicitation process and were therefore familiar with Danier. In response, Danier received three offers and, with the assistance of the financial advisor and the Proposal Trustee, selected GA Retail Canada or an affiliate (the "Agent") as the successful bid. The Agent is an affiliate of Great American Group, which has extensive experience in conducting retail store liquidations.

[10] On February 4, 2016, Danier and the Agent entered into the stalking horse agreement, subject to Court approval. Pursuant to the stalking horse agreement, the Agent will serve as the stalking horse bid in the SISP and the exclusive liquidator for the purpose of disposing of Danier's inventory. The Agent will dispose of the merchandise by conducting a "store closing" or similar sale at the stores.

[11] The stalking horse agreement provides that Danier will receive a net minimum amount equal to 94.6% of the aggregate value of the merchandise, provided that the value of the merchandise is no less than \$22 million and no more than \$25 million. After payment of this amount and the expenses of the sale, the Agent is entitled to retain a 5% commission. Any additional proceeds of the sale after payment of the commission are divided equally between the Agent and Danier.

[12] The stalking horse agreement also provides that the Agent is entitled to (a) a break fee in the amount of \$250,000; (b) an expense reimbursement for its reasonable and documented out-of-pocket expenses in an amount not to exceed \$100,000; and (c) the reasonable costs, fees and expenses actually incurred and paid by the Agent in acquiring signage or other advertising and promotional material in connection with the sale in an amount not to exceed \$175,000, each payable if another bid is selected and the transaction contemplated by the other bid is completed. Collectively, the break fee, the maximum amount payable under the expense reimbursement and the signage costs obligations represent approximately 2.5% of the minimum consideration payable under the stalking horse agreement. Another liquidator submitting a successful bid in the course of the SISP will be required to purchaser the signage from the Agent at its cost.

[13] The stalking horse agreement is structured to allow Danier to proceed with the second phase of the SISP and that process is designed to test the market to ascertain whether a higher or better offer can be obtained from other parties. While the stalking horse agreement contemplates liquidating Danier's inventory, it also establishes a floor price that is intended to encourage bidders to participate in the SISP who may be interested in going concern acquisitions as well.

The SISP

[14] Danier, in consultation with the Proposal Trustee and financial advisor, have established the procedures which are to be followed in conducting the second phase of the SISP.

[15] Under the SISP, interested parties may make a binding proposal to acquire the business or all or any part of Danier's assets, to make an investment in Danier or to liquidate Danier's inventory and furniture, fixtures and equipment.

[16] Danier, in consultation with the Proposal Trustee and its financial advisors, will evaluate the bids and may (a) accept, subject to Court approval, one or more bids, (b) conditionally accept, subject to Court approval, one or more backup bids (conditional upon the failure of the transactions contemplated by the successful bid to close, or (c) pursue an auction in accordance with the procedures set out in the SISP.

[17] The key dates of the second phase of the SISP are as follows:

- (1) The second phase of the SISP will commence upon approval by the Court
- (2) Bid deadline: February 22, 2016
- (3) Advising interested parties whether bids constitute "qualified bids":
No later than two business days after bid deadline
- (4) Determining successful bid and back-up bid (if there is no auction):
No later than five business days after bid deadline
- (5) Advising qualified bidders of auction date and location (if applicable):
No later than five business days after bid deadline
- (6) Auction (if applicable): No later than seven business days after bid deadline
- (7) Bringing motion for approval: Within five business days following
determination by Danier of the successful bid (at auction or otherwise)
- (8) Back-Up bid expiration date: No later than 15 business days after the bid
deadline, unless otherwise agreed
- (9) Outside date: No later than 15 business days after the bid deadline

[18] The timelines in the SISP have been designed with regard to the seasonal nature of the business and the fact that inventory values will depreciate significantly as the spring season approaches. The timelines also ensure that any purchaser of the business as a going concern has the opportunity to make business decisions well in advance of Danier's busiest season, being fall/winter. These timelines are necessary to generate maximum value for Danier's stakeholders and are sufficient to permit prospective bidders to conduct their due diligence, particularly in light of the fact that is expected that many of the parties who will participate in the SISP also participated in the 2015 solicitation process and were given access to a data room containing non-public information about Danier at that time.

[19] Danier does not believe that there is a better viable alternative to the proposed SISP and stalking horse agreement.

[20] The use of a sale process that includes a stalking horse agreement maximizes value of a business for the benefit of its stakeholders and enhances the fairness of the sale process. Stalking horse agreements are commonly used in insolvency proceedings to facilitate sales of businesses and assets and are intended to establish a baseline price and transactional structure for any superior bids from interested parties, *CCM Master Qualified Fund Ltd. v. blutip Power Technologies*, 2012 ONSC 1750 at para. 7 [Commercial List].

[21] The Court's power to approve a sale of assets in a proposal proceeding is codified in section 65.13 of the BIA, which sets out a list of non-exhaustive factors for the Court to consider in determining whether to approve a sale of the debtor's assets outside the ordinary course of business. This Court has considered section 65.13 of the BIA when approving a stalking horse sale process under the BIA, *Re Colossus Minerals Inc.*, 2014 CarswellOnt 1517 at paras. 22-26 (S.C.J.).

[22] A distinction has been drawn, however, between the approval of a sale process and the approval of an actual sale. Section 65.13 is engaged when the Court determines whether to approve a sale transaction arising as a result of a sale process, it does not necessarily address the factors a court should consider when deciding whether to approve the sale process itself.

[23] In *Re Brainhunter*, the Court considered the criteria to be applied on a motion to approve a stalking horse sale process in a restructuring proceeding under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*. Citing his decision in *Nortel*, Justice Morawetz (as he then was) confirmed that the following four factors should be considered by the Court in the exercise of its discretion to determine if the proposed sale process should be approved:

- (1) Is a sale transaction warranted at this time?
- (2) Will the sale benefit the whole "economic community"?
- (3) Do any of the debtors' creditors have a bona fide reason to object to a sale of the business?
- (4) Is there a better viable alternative?

Re Brainhunter, 2009 CarswellOnt 8207 at paras. 13-17 (S.C.J. [Commercial List]); *Re Nortel Networks Corp.*, 2009 CarswellOnt 4467 at para. 49 (S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

[24] While *Brainhunter* and *Nortel* both dealt with a sale process under the CCAA, the Court has recognized that the CCAA is an analogous restructuring statute to the proposal provisions of the BIA, *Re Ted Leroy Trucking [Century Services] Ltd.*, 2010 SCC 60 at para 24; *Re Indalex Ltd.*, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 271 at paras. 50-51.

[25] Furthermore, in *Mustang*, this Court applied the *Nortel* criteria on a motion to approve a sale process backstopped by a stalking horse bid in a proposal proceeding under the BIA, *Re Mustang GP Ltd.*, 2015 CarswellOnt 16398 at paras. 37-38 (S.C.J.).

[26] These proceedings are premised on the implementation of a sale process using the stalking horse agreement as the minimum bid intended to maximize value and act as a baseline for offers received in the SISP. In the present case, Danier is seeking approval of the stalking horse agreement for purposes of conducting the SISP only.

[27] The SISP is warranted at this time for a number of reasons.

[28] First, Danier has made reasonable efforts in search of alternate financing or an acquisition transaction and has attempted to restructure its operations and financial affairs since 2014, all of which has been unsuccessful. At this juncture, Danier has exhausted all of the remedies available to it outside of a Court-supervised sale process. The SISP will result in the most viable alternative for Danier, whether it be a sale of assets or the business (through an auction or otherwise) or an investment in Danier.

[29] Second, Danier projects that it will be cash flow negative for the next six months and it is clear that Danier will be unable to borrow under the CIBC loan facility to finance its operations (CIBC gave notice of default upon Danier's filing of the NOI). If the SISP is not implemented in the immediate future, Danier's revenues will continue to decline, it will incur significant costs and the value of the business will erode, thereby decreasing recoveries for Danier's stakeholders.

[30] Third, the market for Danier's assets as a going concern will be significantly reduced if the SISP is not implemented at this time because the business is seasonal in nature. Any purchaser of the business as a going concern will need to make decisions about the raw materials it wishes to acquire and the product lines it wishes to carry by March 2016 in order to be sufficiently prepared for the fall/winter season, which has historically been Danier's busiest.

[31] Danier and the Proposal Trustee concur that the SISP and the stalking horse agreement will benefit the whole of the economic community. In particular:

- (a) the stalking horse agreement will establish the floor price for Danier's inventory, thereby maximizing recoveries;
- (b) the SISP will subject the assets to a public marketing process and permit higher and better offers to replace the Stalking horse agreement; and

- (c) should the SISP result in a sale transaction for all or substantially all of Danier's assets, this may result in the continuation of employment, the assumption of lease and other obligations and the sale of raw materials and inventory owned by Danier.

[32] There have been no expressed creditor concerns with the SISP as such. The SISP is an open and transparent process. Absent the stalking horse agreement, the SISP could potentially result in substantially less consideration for Danier's business and/or assets.

[33] Given the indications of value obtained through the 2015 solicitation process, the stalking horse agreement represents the highest and best value to be obtained for Danier's assets at this time, subject to a higher offer being identified through the SISP.

[34] Section 65.13 of the BIA is also indirectly relevant to approval of the SISP. In deciding whether to grant authorization for a sale, the court is to consider, among other things:

- (a) whether the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition was reasonable in the circumstances;
- (b) whether the trustee approved the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition;
- (c) whether the trustee filed with the court a report stating that in their opinion the sale or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy;
- (d) the extent to which the creditors were consulted;
- (e) the effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties; and
- (f) whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value.

[35] In the present case, in addition to satisfying the *Nortel* criteria, the SISP will result in a transaction that is at least capable of satisfying the 65.13 criteria. I say this for the following reasons.

[36] The SISP is reasonable in the circumstances as it is designed to be flexible and allows parties to submit an offer for some or all of Danier's assets, make an investment in Danier or acquire the business as a going concern. This is all with the goal of improving upon the terms of the stalking horse agreement. The SISP also gives Danier and the Proposal Trustee the right to extend or amend the SISP to better promote a robust sale process.

[37] The Proposal Trustee and the financial advisor support the SISP and view it as reasonable and appropriate in the circumstances.

[38] The duration of the SISP is reasonable and appropriate in the circumstances having regard to Danier's financial situation, the seasonal nature of its business and the fact that many potentially interested parties are familiar with Danier and its business given their participation in the 2015 solicitation process and/or the stalking horse process.

[39] A sale process which allows Danier to be sold as a going concern would likely be more beneficial than a sale under a bankruptcy, which does not allow for the going concern option.

[40] Finally, the consideration to be received for the assets under the stalking horse agreement appears at this point, to be *prima facie* fair and reasonable and represents a fair and reasonable benchmark for all other bids in the SISP.

The Break Fee

[41] Break fees and expense and costs reimbursements in favour of a stalking horse bidder are frequently approved in insolvency proceedings. Break fees do not merely reflect the cost to the purchaser of putting together the stalking horse bid. A break fee may be the price of stability, and thus some premium over simply providing for out of pocket expenses may be expected, Daniel R. Dowdall & Jane O. Dietrich, "Do Stalking Horses Have a Place in Intra-Canadian Insolvencies", 2005 ANNREVINSOLV 1 at 4.

[42] Break fees in the range of 3% and expense reimbursements in the range of 2% have recently been approved by this Court, *Re Nortel Networks Corp.*, [2009] O.J. No. 4293 at paras. 12 and 26 (S.C.J. [Commercial List]); *Re W.C. Wood Corp. Ltd.*, [2009] O.J. No. 4808 at para. 3 (S.C.J. [Commercial List], where a 4% break fee was approved.

[43] The break fee, the expense reimbursement and the signage costs obligations in the stalking horse agreement fall within the range of reasonableness. Collectively, these charges represent approximately 2.5% of the minimum consideration payable under the stalking horse agreement. In addition, if a liquidation proposal (other than the stalking horse agreement) is the successful bid, Danier is not required to pay the signage costs obligations to the Agent. Instead, the successful bidder will be required to buy the signage and advertising material from the Agent at cost.

[44] In the exercise of its business judgment, the Board unanimously approved the break fee, the expense reimbursement and the signage costs obligations. The Proposal Trustee and the financial advisor have both reviewed the break fee, the expense reimbursement and the signage costs obligations and concluded that each is appropriate and reasonable in the circumstances. In reaching this conclusion, the Proposal Trustee noted, among other things, that:

- (i) the maximum amount of the break fee, expense reimbursement and signage costs obligations represent, in the aggregate 2.5% of the imputed value of the consideration under the stalking horse agreement, which is within the normal range for transactions of this nature;

- (ii) each stalking horse bidder required a break fee and expense reimbursement as part of their proposal in the stalking horse process;
- (iii) without these protections, a party would have little incentive to act as the stalking horse bidder; and
- (iv) the quantum of the break fee, expense reimbursement and signage costs obligations are unlikely to discourage a third party from submitting an offer in the SISP.

[45] I find the break fee to be reasonable and appropriate in the circumstances.

Financial Advisor Success Fee and Charge

[46] Danier is seeking a charge in the amount of US\$500,000 to cover its principal financial advisor's (Consensus) maximum success fees payable under its engagement letter. The Consensus Charge would rank behind the existing security, *pari passu* with the Administration Charge and ahead of the D&O Charge and KERP Charge.

[47] Orders approving agreements with financial advisors have frequently been made in insolvency proceedings, including CCAA proceedings and proposal proceedings under the BIA. In determining whether to approve such agreements and the fees payable thereunder, courts have considered the following factors, among others:

- (a) whether the debtor and the court officer overseeing the proceedings believe that the quantum and nature of the remuneration are fair and reasonable;
- (b) whether the financial advisor has industry experience and/or familiarity with the business of the debtor; and
- (c) whether the success fee is necessary to incentivize the financial advisor.

Re Sino-Forest Corp., 2012 ONSC 2063 at paras. 46-47 [Commercial List]; *Re Colossus Minerals Inc.*, *supra*.

[48] The SISP contemplates that the financial advisor will continue to be intimately involved in administering the SISP.

[49] The financial advisor has considerable experience working with distressed companies in the retail sector that are in the process of restructuring, including seeking strategic partners and/or selling their assets. In the present case, the financial advisor has assisted Danier in its restructuring efforts to date and has gained a thorough and intimate understanding of the business. The continued involvement of the financial advisor is essential to the completion of a successful transaction under the SISP and to ensuring a wide-ranging canvass of prospective bidders and investors.

[50] In light of the foregoing, Danier and the Proposal Trustee are in support of incentivizing the financial advisor to carry out the SISP and are of the view that the quantum and nature of the remuneration provided for in the financial advisor's engagement letter are reasonable in the circumstances and will incentivize the Financial advisor.

[51] Danier has also engaged OCI to help implement the SISP in certain international markets in the belief that OCI has expertise that warrants this engagement. OCI may be able to identify a purchaser or strategic investor in overseas markets which would result in a more competitive sales process. OCI will only be compensated if a transaction is originated by OCI or OCI introduces the ultimate purchaser and/or investor to Danier.

[52] Danier and the Proposal Trustee believe that the quantum and nature of the success fee payable under the OCI engagement letter is reasonable in the circumstances. Specifically, because the fees payable to OCI are dependent on the success of transaction or purchaser or investor originated by OCI, the approval of this fee is necessary to incentivize OCI.

[53] Accordingly, an order approving the financial advisor and OCI engagement letters is appropriate.

[54] A charge ensuring payment of the success fee is also appropriate in the circumstances, as noted below.

Administration Charge

[55] In order to protect the fees and expenses of each of the Proposal Trustee, its counsel, counsel to Danier, the directors of Danier and their counsel, Danier seeks a charge on its property and assets in the amount of \$600,000. The Administration Charge would rank behind the existing security, *pari passu* with the Consensus Charge and ahead of the D&O Charge and KERP Charge. It is supported by the Proposal Trustee.

[56] Section 64.2 of the BIA confers on the Court the authority to grant a charge in favour of financial, legal or other professionals involved in proposal proceedings under the BIA.

[57] Administration and financial advisor charges have been previously approved in insolvency proposal proceedings, where, as in the present case, the participation of the parties whose fees are secured by the charge is necessary to ensure a successful proceeding under the BIA and for the conduct of a sale process, *Re Colossus Minerals Inc.*, 2014 CarswellOnt 1517 at paras. 11-15 (S.C.J.).

[58] This is an appropriate circumstance for the Court to grant the Administration Charge. The quantum of the proposed Administration Charge is fair and reasonable given the nature of the SISP. Each of the parties whose fees are to be secured by the Administration Charge has played (and will continue to play) a critical role in these proposal proceedings and in the SI. The Administration Charge is necessary to secure the full and complete payment of these fees. Finally, the Administration Charge will be subordinate to the existing security and does not prejudice any known secured creditor of Danier.

D&O Charge

[59] The directors and officers have been actively involved in the attempts to address Danier's financial circumstances, including through exploring strategic alternatives, implementing a turnaround plan, devising the SISP and the commencement of these proceedings. The directors and officers are not prepared to remain in office without certainty with respect to coverage for potential personal liability if they continue in their current capacities.

[60] Danier maintains directors and officers insurance with various insurers. There are exclusions in the event there is a change in risk and there is potential for there to be insufficient funds to cover the scope of obligations for which the directors and officers may be found personally liable (especially given the significant size of the Danier workforce).

[61] Danier has agreed, subject to certain exceptions, to indemnify the directors and officers to the extent that the insurance coverage is insufficient. Danier does not anticipate it will have sufficient funds to satisfy those indemnities if they were ever called upon.

[62] Danier seeks approval of a priority charge to indemnify its directors and officers for obligations and liabilities they may incur in such capacities from and after the filing of the NOI. It is proposed that the D&O Charge be in an amount not to exceed \$4.9 million and rank behind the existing security, the Administration Charge and the Consensus Charge but ahead of the KERP Charge.

[63] The amount of the D&O Charge is based on payroll obligations, vacation pay obligations, employee source deduction obligations and sales tax obligations that may arise during these proposal proceedings. It is expected that all of these amounts will be paid in the normal course as Danier expects to have sufficient funds to pay these amounts. Accordingly, it is unlikely that the D&O charge will be called upon.

[64] The Court has the authority to grant a directors' and officers' charge under section 64.1 of the BIA.

[65] In *Colossus Minerals* and *Mustang*, *supra*, this Court approved a directors' and officers' charge in circumstances similar to the present case where there was uncertainty that the existing insurance was sufficient to cover all potential claims, the directors and officers would not continue to provide their services without the protection of the charge and the continued involvement of the directors and officers was critical to a successful sales process under the BIA.

[66] I approve the D&O Charge for the following reasons.

[67] The D&O Charge will only apply to the extent that the directors and officers do not have coverage under the existing policy or Danier is unable to satisfy its indemnity obligations.

[68] The directors and officers of Danier have indicated they will not continue their involvement with Danier without the protection of the D&O Charge yet their continued involvement is critical to the successful implementation of the SISP.

[69] The D&O Charge applies only to claims or liabilities that the directors and officers may incur after the date of the NOI and does not cover misconduct or gross negligence.

[70] The Proposal Trustee supports the D&O Charge, indicating that the D&O Charge is reasonable in the circumstances.

[71] Finally, the amount of the D&O Charge takes into account a number of statutory obligations for which directors and officers are liable if Danier fails to meet these obligations. However, it is expected that all of these amounts will be paid in the normal course. Danier expects to have sufficient funds to pay these amounts. Accordingly, it is unlikely that the D&O charge will be called upon.

Key Employee Retention Plan and Charge

[72] Danier developed a key employee retention plan (the "KERP") that applies to 11 of Danier's employees, an executive of Danier and Danier's consultant, all of whom have been determined to be critical to ensuring a successful sale or investment transaction. The KERP was reviewed and approved by the Board.

[73] Under the KERP, the key employees will be eligible to receive a retention payment if these employees remain actively employed with Danier until the earlier of the completion of the SISP, the date upon which the liquidation of Danier's inventory is complete, the date upon which Danier ceases to carry on business, or the effective date that Danier terminates the services of these employees.

[74] Danier is requesting approval of the KERP and a charge for up to \$524,000 (the "KERP Charge") to secure the amounts payable thereunder. The KERP Charge will rank in priority to all claims and encumbrances other than the existing security, the Administration Charge, the Consensus Charge and the D&O Charge.

[75] Key employee retention plans are approved in insolvency proceedings where the continued employment of key employees is deemed critical to restructuring efforts, *Re Nortel Networks Corp. supra*.

[76] In *Re Grant Forest Products Inc.*, Newbould J. set out a non-exhaustive list of factors that the court should consider in determining whether to approve a key employee retention plan, including the following:

- (a) whether the court appointed officer supports the retention plan;
- (b) whether the key employees who are the subject of the retention plan are likely to pursue other employment opportunities absent the approval of the retention plan;
- (c) whether the employees who are the subject of the retention plan are truly "key employees" whose continued employment is critical to the successful restructuring of Danier;

- (d) whether the quantum of the proposed retention payments is reasonable; and
- (e) the business judgment of the board of directors regarding the necessity of the retention payments.

Re Grant Forest Products Inc., [2009] O.J. No. 3344 at paras. 8-22 (S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

[77] While *Re Grant Forest Products Inc.* involved a proceeding under the CCAA, key employee retention plans have frequently been approved in proposal proceedings under the BIA, see, for example, *In the Matter of the Notice of Intention of Starfield Resources Inc.*, Court File No. CV-13-10034-00CL, Order dated March 15, 2013 at para. 10.

[78] The KERP and the KERP Charge are approved for the following reasons:

- (i) the Proposal Trustee supports the granting of the KERP and the KERP Charge;
- (ii) absent approval of the KERP and the KERP Charge, the key employees who are the subject of the KERP will have no incentive to remain with Danier throughout the SISP and are therefore likely to pursue other employment opportunities;
- (iii) Danier has determined that the employees who are the subject of the KERP are critical to the implementation of the SISP and a completion of a successful sale or investment transaction in respect of Danier;
- (iv) the Proposal Trustee is of the view that the KERP and the quantum of the proposed retention payments is reasonable and that the KERP Charge will provide security for the individuals entitled to the KERP, which will add stability to the business during these proceedings and will assist in maximizing realizations; and
- (v) the KERP was reviewed and approved by the Board.

Sealing Order

[79] There are two documents which are sought to be sealed: 1) the details about the KERP; and 2) the stalking horse offer summary.

[80] Section 137(2) of the *Courts of Justice Act* provides the court with discretion to order that any document filed in a civil proceeding can be treated as confidential, sealed, and not form part of the public record.

[81] In *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*, the Supreme Court of Canada held that courts should exercise their discretion to grant sealing orders where:

- (1) the order is necessary to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and

- (2) the salutary effects of the order outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right of free expression, which includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

[2002] S.C.J. No. 42 at para. 53 (S.C.C.).

[82] In the insolvency context, courts have applied this test and authorized sealing orders over confidential or commercially sensitive documents to protect the interests of debtors and other stakeholders, *Re Stelco Inc.*, [2006] O.J. No. 275 at paras. 2-5 (S.C.J. [Commercial List]); *Re Nortel Networks Corp.*, *supra*.

[83] It would be detrimental to the operations of Danier to disclose the identity of the individuals who will be receiving the KERP payments as this may result in other employees requesting such payments or feeling underappreciated. Further, the KERP evidence involves matters of a private, personal nature.

[84] The offer summary contains highly sensitive commercial information about Danier, the business and what some parties, confidentially, were willing to bid for Danier's assets. Disclosure of this information could undermine the integrity of the SISP. The disclosure of the offer summary prior to the completion of a final transaction under the SISP would pose a serious risk to the SISP in the event that the transaction does not close. Disclosure prior to the completion of a SISP would jeopardize value-maximizing dealings with any future prospective purchasers or liquidators of Danier's assets. There is a public interest in maximizing recovery in an insolvency that goes beyond each individual case.

[85] The sealing order is necessary to protect the important commercial interests of Danier and other stakeholders. This salutary effect greatly outweighs the deleterious effects of not sealing the KERPs and the offer summary, namely the lack of immediate public access to a limited number of documents filed in these proceedings.

[86] As a result, the *Sierra Club* test for a sealing order has been met. The material about the KERP and the offer summary shall not form part of the public record pending completion of these proposal proceedings.

Penny J.

Date: February 10, 2016

CITATION: CCM Master Qualified Fund v. blutip Power Technologies, 2012 ONSC 1750
COURT FILE NO.: CV-12-9622-00CL
DATE: 20120315

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

COMMERCIAL LIST

RE: CCM Master Qualified Fund, Ltd., Applicant

AND:

blutip Power Technologies Ltd., Respondent

BEFORE: D. M. Brown J.

COUNSEL: L. Rogers and C. Burr, for the Receiver, Duff & Phelps Canada Restructuring Inc.

A. Cobb and A. Lockhart, for the Applicant

HEARD: March 15, 2012

REASONS FOR DECISION

I. Receiver’s motion for directions: sales/auction process & priority of receiver’s charges

[1] By Appointment Order made February 28, 2012, Duff & Phelps Canada Restructuring Inc. (“D&P”) was appointed receiver of blutip Power Technologies Ltd. (“Blutip”), a publicly listed technology company based in Mississauga which engages in the research, development and sale of hydrogen generating systems and combustion controls. Blutip employs 10 people and, as the Receiver stressed several times in its materials, the company does not maintain any pension plans.

[2] D&P moves for orders approving (i) a sales process and bidding procedures, including the use of a stalking horse credit bid, (ii) the priority of a Receiver’s Charge and Receiver’s Borrowings Charge, and (iii) the activities reported in its First Report. Notice of this motion was given to affected persons. No one appeared to oppose the order sought. At the hearing today I granted the requested Bidding Procedures Order; these are my Reasons for so doing.

II. Background to this motion

[3] The Applicant, CCM Master Qualified Fund, Ltd. (“CCM”), is the senior secured lender to Blutip. At present Blutip owes CCM approximately \$3.7 million consisting of (i) two

convertible senior secured promissory notes (October 21, 2011: \$2.6 million and December 29, 2011: \$800,000), (ii) \$65,000 advanced last month pursuant to a Receiver's Certificate, and (iii) \$47,500 on account of costs of appointing the Receiver (as per para. 30 of the Appointment Order). Receiver's counsel has opined that the security granted by Blutip in favour of CCM creates a valid and perfected security interest in the company's business and assets.

[4] At the time of the appointment of the Receiver Blutip was in a development phase with no significant sources of revenue and was dependant on external sources of equity and debt funding to operate. As noted by Morawetz J. in his February 28, 2012 endorsement:

In making this determination [to appoint a receiver] I have taken into account that there is no liquidity in the debtor and that it is unable to make payroll and it currently has no board. Stability in the circumstances is required and this can be accomplished by the appointment of a receiver.

[5] As the Receiver reported, it does not have access to sufficient funding to support the company's operations during a lengthy sales process.

III. Sales process/bidding procedures

A. General principles

[6] Although the decision to approve a particular form of sales process is distinct from the approval of a proposed sale, the reasonableness and adequacy of any sales process proposed by a court-appointed receiver must be assessed in light of the factors which a court will take into account when considering the approval of a proposed sale. Those factors were identified by the Court of Appeal in its decision in *Royal Bank v. Soundair*: (i) whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently; (ii) the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained; (iii) whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process; and, (iv) the interests of all parties.¹ Accordingly, when reviewing a sales and marketing process proposed by a receiver a court should assess:

(i) the fairness, transparency and integrity of the proposed process;

(ii) the commercial efficacy of the proposed process in light of the specific circumstances facing the receiver; and,

(iii) whether the sales process will optimize the chances, in the particular circumstances, of securing the best possible price for the assets up for sale.

¹ (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.).

[7] The use of stalking horse bids to set a baseline for the bidding process, including credit bid stalking horses, has been recognized by Canadian courts as a reasonable and useful element of a sales process. Stalking horse bids have been approved for use in other receivership proceedings,² BIA proposals,³ and CCAA proceedings.⁴

[8] Perhaps the most well-known recent example of the use of a stalking horse credit bid was that employed in the Canwest Publishing Corp. CCAA proceedings where, as part of a sale and investor solicitation process, Canwest's senior lenders put forward a stalking horse credit bid. Ultimately a superior offer was approved by the court. I accept, as an apt description of the considerations which a court should take into account when deciding whether to approve the use of a stalking horse credit bid, the following observations made by one set of commentators on the Canwest CCAA process:

To be effective for such stakeholders, the credit bid had to be put forward in a process that would allow a sufficient opportunity for interested parties to come forward with a superior offer, recognizing that a timetable for the sale of a business in distress is a fast track ride that requires interested parties to move quickly or miss the opportunity. The court has to balance the need to move quickly, to address the real or perceived deterioration of value of the business during a sale process or the limited availability of restructuring financing, with a realistic timetable that encourages and does not chill the auction process.⁵

B. The proposed bidding process

B.1 The bid solicitation/auction process

[9] The bidding process proposed by the Receiver would use a Stalking Horse Offer submitted by CCM to the Receiver, and subsequently amended pursuant to negotiations, as a baseline offer and a qualified bid in an auction process. D&P intends to distribute to prospective purchasers an interest solicitation letter, make available a confidential information memorandum to those who sign a confidentiality agreement, allow due diligence, and provide interested parties with a copy of the Stalking Horse Offer.

[10] Bids filed by the April 16, 2012 deadline which meet certain qualifications stipulated by the Receiver may participate in an auction scheduled for April 20, 2012. One qualification is that the minimum consideration in a bid must be an overbid of \$100,000 as compared to the

² *Re Graceway Canada Co.*, 2011 ONSC 6403, para. 2.

³ *Re Parlay Entertainment Inc.*, 2011 ONSC 3492, para. 15.

⁴ *Re Brainhunter* (2009), 62 C.B.R. (5th) 41 (Ont. S.C.J.), para. 13; *Re White Birch Paper Holding Co.*, 2010 QCCS 4382, para. 3; *Re Nortel Networks Corp.* (2009), 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J.), para. 2, and (2009), 56 C.B.R. (5th) 74 (Ont. S.C.J.); *Re Indalex Ltd.*, 2009 CarswellOnt 4262 (S.C.J.).

⁵ Pamela Huff, Linc Rogers, Douglas Bartner and Craig Culbert, "Credit Bidding – Recent Canadian and U.S. Themes", in Janis P. Sarra (ed.), *2010 Annual Review of Insolvency Law* (Toronto: Carswell, 2011), p. 16.

Stalking Horse Offer. The proposed auction process is a standard, multi-round one designed to result in a Successful Bid and a Back-Up Bid. The rounds will be conducted using minimum incremental overbids of \$100,000, subject to reduction at the discretion of the Receiver.

B.2 Stalking horse credit bid

[11] The CCM Stalking Horse Offer, or Agreement, negotiated with the Receiver contemplates the acquisition of substantially all the company's business and assets on an "as is where is" basis. The purchase price is equal to: (i) Assumed Liabilities, as defined in the Stalking Horse Offer, plus (ii) a credit bid of CCM's secured debt outstanding under the two Notes, the Appointment Costs and the advance under the Receiver's Certificate. The purchase price is estimated to be approximately \$3.744 million before the value of Assumed Liabilities which will include the continuation of the employment of employees, if the offer is accepted.

[12] The Receiver reviewed at length, in its Report and in counsel's factum, the calculation of the value of the credit bid. Interest under both Notes was fixed at 15% per annum and was prepaid in full. The Receiver reported that if both Notes were repaid on May 3, 2012, the anticipated closing date, the effective annual rate of interest (taking into account all costs which could be categorized as "interest") would be significantly higher than 15% per annum - 57.6% on the October Note and 97.4% on the December Note. In order that the interest on the Notes considered for purposes of calculating the value of the credit bid complied with the interest rate provisions of the *Criminal Code*, the Receiver informed CCM that the amount of the secured indebtedness under the Notes eligible for the credit bid would have to be \$103,500 less than the face value of the Notes. As explained in detail in paragraphs 32 through to 39 of its factum, the Receiver is of the view that such a reduction would result in a permissible effective annual interest rate under the December Note. The resulting Stalking Horse Agreement reflected such a reduction.

[13] The Stalking Horse Offer does not contain a break-fee, but it does contain a term that in the event the credit bid is not the Successful Bid, then CCM will be entitled to reimbursement of its expenses up to a maximum of \$75,000, or approximately 2% of the value of the estimated purchase price. Such an amount, according to the Receiver, would fall within the range of reasonable break fees and expense reimbursements approved in other cases, which have ranged from 1.8% to 5% of the value of the bid.⁶

C. Analysis

[14] Given the financial circumstances of Blutip and the lack of funding available to the Receiver to support the company's operations during a lengthy sales process, I accept the Receiver's recommendation that a quick sales process is required in order to optimize the

⁶ *Re Parlay Entertainment*, 2011 ONSC 3492, para. 12; *Re White Birch Paper Holding Co.*, 2010 QCCS 4915, paras. 4 to 7; *Re Nortel Networks Corp.* (2009), 56 C.B.R. (5th) 74 (Ont. S.C.J.), para. 12.

prospects of securing the best price for the assets. Accordingly, the timeframe proposed by the Receiver for the submission of qualifying bids and the conduct of the auction is reasonable. The marketing, bid solicitation and bidding procedures proposed by the Receiver are likely to result in a fair, transparent and commercially efficacious process in the circumstances.

[15] In light of the reduction in the face value of the Notes required by the Receiver for the purposes of calculating the value of the credit bid and the reasonable amount of the Expense Reimbursement, I approved the Stalking Horse Agreement for the purposes requested by the Receiver. I accept the Receiver's assessment that in the circumstances the terms of the Stalking Horse Offer, including the Expense Reimbursement, will not discourage a third party from submitting an offer superior to the Stalking Horse Offer.

[16] Also, as made clear in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Bidding Procedures Order, the Stalking Horse Agreement is deemed to be a Qualified Bid and is accepted solely for the purposes of CCM's right to participate in the auction. My order did not approve the sale of Blutip's assets on the terms set out in the Stalking Horse Agreement. As the Receiver indicated, the approval of the sale of Blutip's assets, whether to CCM or some other successful bidder, will be the subject of a future motion to this Court. Such an approach is consistent with the practice of this Court.⁷

[17] For those reasons I approved the bidding procedures recommended by the Receiver.

IV. Priority of receiver's charges

[18] Paragraphs 17 and 20 of the Appointment Order granted some priority for the Receiver's Charge and Receiver's Borrowings Charge. However, as noted by the Receiver in section 3.1 of its First Report, because that hearing was brought on an urgent, *ex parte* basis, priority over existing perfected security interests and statutory encumbrances was not sought at that time. The Receiver now seeks such priority.

[19] As previously noted, the Receiver reported that Blutip does not maintain any pension plans. In section 3.1 of its Report the Receiver identified the persons served with notice of this motion: (i) parties with registered security interests pursuant to the *PPSA*; (ii) those who have commenced legal proceedings against the Company; (iii) those who have asserted claims in respect of intellectual property against the Company; (iv) the Company's landlord, and (v) standard government agencies. Proof of such service was filed with the motion record. No person appeared on the return of the motion to oppose the priority sought by the Receiver for its charges.

[20] Although the Receiver gave notice to affected parties six days in advance of this motion, not seven days as specified in paragraph 31 of the Appointment Order, I was satisfied that

⁷ *Re Indalex Ltd.*, 2009 CarswellOnt 4262 (S.C.J.), para. 7; *Re Graceway Canada Co.*, 2011 ONSC 6403, para. 5; *Re Parlay Entertainment Inc.*, 2011 ONSC 3492, para. 58.

secured creditors who would be materially affected by the order had been given reasonable notice and an opportunity to make representations, as required by section 243(6) of the *BIA*, that abridging the notice period by one day, as permitted by paragraph 31 of the Appointment Order, was appropriate and fair in the circumstances, and I granted the priority charges sought by the Receiver.

[21] I should note that the Appointment Order contains a standard “come-back clause” (para. 31). Recently, in *First Leaside Wealth Management Inc. (Re)*, a proceeding under the *CCAA*, I wrote:

[49] In his recent decision in *Timminco Limited (Re)* (“Timminco I”) Morawetz J. described the commercial reality underpinning requests for Administration and D&O Charges in *CCAA* proceedings:

In my view, in the absence of the court granting the requested super priority and protection, the objectives of the *CCAA* would be frustrated. It is not reasonable to expect that professionals will take the risk of not being paid for their services, and that directors and officers will remain if placed in a compromised position should the Timminco Entities continue *CCAA* proceedings without the requested protection. The outcome of the failure to provide these respective groups with the requested protection would, in my view, result in the overwhelming likelihood that the *CCAA* proceedings would come to an abrupt halt, followed, in all likelihood, by bankruptcy proceedings.

...

[51] In my view, absent an express order to the contrary by the initial order applications judge, the issue of the priorities enjoyed by administration, D&O and DIP lending charges should be finalized at the commencement of a *CCAA* proceeding. Professional services are provided, and DIP funding is advanced, in reliance on super-priorities contained in initial orders. To ensure the integrity, predictability and fairness of the *CCAA* process, certainty must accompany the granting of such super-priority charges. When those important objectives of the *CCAA* process are coupled with the Court of Appeal’s holding that parties affected by such priority orders be given an opportunity to raise any paramountcy issue, it strikes me that a judge hearing an initial order application should directly raise with the parties the issue of the priority of the charges sought, including any possible issue of paramountcy in respect of competing claims on the debtor’s property based on provincial legislation.⁸

[22] In my view those comments regarding the need for certainty about the priority of charges for professional fees or borrowings apply, with equal force, to priority charges sought by a

⁸ 2012 ONSC 1299 (CanLII).

receiver pursuant to section 243(6) of the *BIA*. Certainty regarding the priority of administrative and borrowing charges is required as much in a receivership as in proceedings under the *CCAA* or the proposal provisions of the *BIA*.

[23] In the present case the issues of the priority of the Receiver's Charge and Receiver's Borrowings Charge were deferred from the return of the initial application until notice could be given to affected parties. I have noted that Blutip did not maintain pension plans. I have found that reasonable notice now has been given and no affected person appeared to oppose the granting of the priority charges. Consequently, it is my intention that the Bidding Procedures Order constitutes a final disposition of the issue of the priority of those charges (subject, of course, to any rights to appeal the Bidding Procedures Order). I do not regard the presence of a "come-back clause" in the Appointment Order as leaving the door open a crack for some subsequent challenge to the priorities granted by this order.

V. Approval of the Receiver's activities

[24] The activities described by the Receiver in its First Report were reasonable and fell within its mandate, so I approved them.

[25] May I conclude by thanking Receiver's counsel for a most helpful factum.

(original signed by)

D. M. Brown J.

Date: March 15, 2012

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Dr. Janis P. Sarra, B.A., M.A., LL.B., LL.M., S.J.D.
of University of British Columbia
Faculty of Law and the Ontario Bar

The Honourable Geoffrey B. Morawetz, B.A., LL.B.
of the Superior Court of Justice

The Honourable L. W. Houlden, B.A., LL.B.
1922-2012, formerly a Judge of the Court of Appeal for Ontario

STATUTES OF CANADA ANNOTATED



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was not sufficient to accept information provided by the debtor, where a related party is purchaser, without taking steps to verify the information. A sale approval order, if granted, provides a degree of comfort to a receiver and other parties that the court has considered the issues and has concluded that circumstances are such that the sale can be said to be fair and reasonable. The receiver provided a supplemental report that addressed the above referenced concerns and Morawetz J. was satisfied that the sale was reasonable in the circumstances: *Toronto Dominion Bank v. Canadian Starter Drives Inc.* (2011), 2011 CarswellOnt 15140, 90 C.B.R. (5th) 152, 2011 ONSC 8004 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice approved a sales/auction process and priority of receiver's charges. The reasonableness and adequacy of a sales process proposed by a receiver must be assessed in light of factors that the Ontario Court of Appeal identified in *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 1991 CarswellOnt 205, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.). The use of stalking horse bids to set a baseline for the bidding process, including credit bid stalking horses, has been recognized by Canadian courts as a reasonable element of a sales process. The court must balance the need to move quickly to address the real or perceived deterioration of value of the business during a sale process or the limited availability of restructuring financing, with a realistic timetable that encourages and does not chill the auction process. In light of the financial circumstances of the debtor and the lack of funding available to support operations during a sales process, Brown J. accepted the receiver's recommendation that a quick sales process was required in order to optimize the prospects of securing the best price for the assets. Reasonable notice had been provided to affected persons and the requested relief was granted: *CCM Master Qualified Fund Ltd. v. blutip Power Technologies Ltd.* (2012), 2012 CarswellOnt 3158, 90 C.B.R. (5th) 74, 2012 ONSC 1750 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice dismissed an application to appoint a receiver and manager and to approve a "quick flip" where the applicant secured creditor, debtor and purchaser were related entities, sharing common ownership. The court held that the circumstances typically necessitating the appointment of a receiver were not present in this case and the applicant did not lead evidence identifying the need for a court order in order to ensure that the receiver could do its job. Justice Brown concluded that the reason for the sought after court appointment of a receiver had more to do with the terms of the proposed sale, effectively dispensing with the requirement to comply with Part V of the Ontario *PPSA*, which would apply in the case of an appointment of a private receiver. A court will consider (i) whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not act improvidently, (ii) the interests of all parties, (iii) the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained, and (iv) whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process. The duty of a receiver is to place before the court sufficient evidence to enable the court to understand the implications for all parties of any proposed sale and, in the case of a sale to related party, the overall fairness of the proposed related-party transaction. Brown J. was not satisfied that there was evidence demonstrating that close scrutiny had been made by the proposed receiver of the validity of the security. The lack of such evidence was particularly troublesome because a proposal under the *BIA* was reported as not a viable option because that creditor was unwilling to compromise its secured debt. Finally, the court was concerned that no valuation of the assets was filed, and concluded that there was a lack of evidence to assess whether the proposed receiver acted to get the best price and did not act improvidently. The dismissal was on a without prejudice basis to the ability of the applicant to reapply on better evidence: *9-Ball Interests Inc. v. Traditional Life Sciences Inc.*, 2012 CarswellOnt 5829, 89 C.B.R. (5th) 78, 2012 ONSC 2788 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

QUEEN'S BENCH FOR SASKATCHEWAN

Citation: 2015 SKQB 196

Date: 2015 06 30
Docket: QBG 454 of 2015
Judicial Centre: Saskatoon

2015 SKQB 196 (CanLII)

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*,
RSC 1985, c C-36, AS AMENDED
AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF
ADVANCE ENGINEERING PRODUCTS LTD.

BETWEEN:

9286594 CANADA INC., MPSN INDUSTRIES, FEDERATED
CO-OPERATIVES LIMITED, GARY BATTLE, EDMONTON
TRAILER SALES AND LEASING LTD. (collectively referred to as the
"Consortium"),

Applicants

- and -

ADVANCE ENGINEERING PRODUCTS LTD., ERNST & YOUNG
INC., as Receiver/Monitor of the Corporation, ROYAL BANK OF
CANADA (RBC), in its capacity as agents for itself, Bank of Montreal
and Canadian Western Bank (collectively referred to as the "Senior
Lenders"), and GHOST TRANSPORTATION SERVICES,

Respondents

Appearances:

Christopher D. Simard	for the applicants
Jeffrey M. Lee, Q.C., and Michael J. Russell	for Advance Engineering Products Ltd.
M. Kim Anderson, Q.C.	for Ernst & Young
John F. Grieve	for the Senior Lenders
Dallas Beal	for Ghost Transportation Services Ltd.

FIAT
June 30, 2015

GABRIELSON J.

Introduction

[1] This is an application by the Consortium for an order that they be

treated as a qualified bidder with respect to the sales process proposed by the monitor Ernst & Young [Monitor] in respect to the sale of the assets of Advance Engineered Products Ltd. [AEPL].

[2] The grounds for the application as listed in the notice of application follow, including:

[1.] The Consortium has been involved in the informal sale [sic] process that has been conducted to date by Ernst & Young Inc., the Court-appointed Monitor of the Applicant (the “Monitor”).

[2.] There has been no formal, Court-supervised sales process for the assets of the Applicant.

[3.] The Monitor has previously advised the Consortium, this Court and the Applicant’s stakeholders, that the informal sale [sic] process could be followed by a formal stalking horse sale [sic] process or a formal tender process.

[4.] The Sale [sic] Process that is now being proposed by the Applicant includes the following elements, without sufficient evidence or justification therefor:

- (a) it seeks to limit the number of “Qualified Bidders” to four parties, excluding the Consortium;
- (b) it is not a formal process at all, neither a formal stalking horse sale [sic] process, nor a formal tender process; and
- (c) it does not involve open and transparent steps that would enable this Honourable Court to meaningfully supervise the process.

[5.] The Consortium’s bid in a formal, Court-supervised process, could be the bid that best maximizes value for all stakeholders (and there is no evidence to the contrary).

[6.] The Monitor’s disqualification of the Consortium is based on incorrect and irrelevant assumptions and speculations, unrelated to relevant considerations such as price, ability to close and preservation of stakeholder interests.

[3] A hearing of this application was held concurrent to the application by counsel for AEPL for approval of the sales process. Both applications were heard on

April 16, 2015. I made an interim order granting both applications with reasons to follow. These are my reasons.

Background

[4] AEPL was founded in Regina in 1984 as a state-of-the-art manufacturer of truck tanks, trailers and vacuum truck equipment. It operated a specialized plant in Regina for over 30 years. While its head office remained in Regina, AEPL added divisions and businesses in Alberta (Westech Vac Systems Ltd.), Quebec (Lazer Inox Inc.) and White City, Saskatchewan (Dumur Industries). AEPL also provides services for its customers at locations in Quebec, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia. It carries on business from one owned location and eleven leased locations in the four previously mentioned provinces.

[5] AEPL is indebted to a syndicate of lenders comprised of Royal Bank of Canada [RBC], Bank of Montreal and Canadian Western Bank [Senior Lenders]. RBC acts as the representative for the Senior Lenders. As a result of a sharp downturn in the oil and gas sector that caused customers of AEPL to either cancel or fail to place anticipated orders, AEPL advised the Senior Lenders that it would be in breach of its financial covenants for the quarter ending March 31, 2015. After meeting with the Senior Lenders and their advisors on April 6, 2015, AEPL consented to the immediate enforcement of the lenders' security, and on April 9, 2015, the Board of Directors for AEPL resigned. On April 10, 2015, AEPL filed an application pursuant to ss. 9, 10, 11, 11.2 and 11.7 of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, RSC 1985, c C-36 [CCAA].

[6] On April 10, 2015, I granted AEPL's application and abridged the time for service of the notice of application, declared AEPL to be a party to which the CCAA applies, appointed Ernst & Young as an officer of the Court to monitor the

assets, business and affairs of AEPL, stayed all other proceedings taken in respect to AEPL, authorized AEPL to obtain certain interim financing [DIP], and provided a priority charge for such DIP financing and other ancillary matters in connection thereto. The initial order was set to expire on May 8, 2015, unless further extended.

[7] On May 8, 2015, I granted an extension of the stay period to June 19, 2015.

[8] On June 11, 2015, AEPL applied to extend the initial order from June 19, 2015, to July 31, 2015. AEPL also sought approval of an executive retention plan, approval of a claims process and approval of a sales process.

[9] On June 16, 2015, AEPL's application came before me in chambers and was heard at the same time as the Consortium's application to be deemed a qualified bidder in respect to the sales process proposed by AEPL.

[10] On June 16, 2015, I granted AEPL's application for an extension of the stay period to July 31, 2015. I also approved the executive retention plan, as well as the executive retention plan charge, and I approved the claims process. Approval of the sales process and the Consortium's application to be designated as a qualified bidder were reserved. On June 18, 2015, I granted the application for approval of the sales process subject to the Consortium being added as a qualified bidder, all with reasons to follow.

Positions of the Parties

[11] The position of AEPL as outlined by its counsel was that the sales process proposed was a recommendation by the Monitor, who was a court-appointed officer, and that the Court should be reluctant to second guess the considered business

decisions proposed by the Monitor. Furthermore, counsel submitted that there were valid business reasons why the offer of the Consortium had not been deemed by the Monitor to be sufficient to recommend the Consortium as a qualified bidder going forward. Finally, counsel questioned the standing of an offeror to intervene in the sales process. AEPL's position was supported by counsel for the Monitor and counsel for the Senior Lenders. Counsel cited the cases of *Royal Bank of Canada v Soundair Corp.* (1991), 83 DLR (4th) 76 (Ont CA) [*Soundair Corp.*]; *Re Bloom Lake g.p.l.*, 2015 QCCS 1920; *Bank of Nova Scotia v Mustard Capital Inc.*, 2012 SKQB 325, 97 CBR (5th) 165 [*Mustard Capital Inc.*]; *Toronto-Dominion Bank v 101142701 Saskatchewan Ltd.*, 2012 SKQB 289, 96 CBR (5th) 162 [*101142701 Saskatchewan*]; *Re Timminco Limited*, 2012 ONSC 506, 85 CBR (5th) 169; *PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc. v Poultry 2.0 Farms Ltd.*, 2011 SKQB 422, 386 Sask R 16 [*Poultry 2.0 Farms*]; *AbitibiBowater inc. (Arrangement relatif à)*, 2010 QCCS 1742, 71 CBR (5th) 220 [*AbitibiBowater* (2010)]; *AbitibiBowater inc. (Arrangement relatif à)*, 2009 QCCS 6460 [*AbitibiBowater* (2009)]; and *Re Grant Forest Products Inc.* (2009), 57 CBR (5th) 128 (Ont Sup Ct).

[12] Counsel for the Consortium submitted that the informal sales process that had been carried out by the Monitor prior to its court application had been unfair to the Consortium. He submitted that the Consortium had been misled by the information provided by the Monitor, such that the Consortium submitted its Letter of Intent [LOI] believing that there would be a second round of bids to be taken later either by way of a stalking horse or tender process. Counsel submitted that it was in the best interests of all stakeholders, including the unsecured creditors, to include the Consortium among the qualified bidders as the Consortium has the financial resources to ensure that the best price is obtained for the benefit of all creditors. Counsel cited the case of *Leslie & Irene Dube Foundation Inc. v P218 Enterprises Ltd.*, 2014 BCSC 1855, 17 CBR (6th) 41 [*Dube Foundation Inc.*], and *Soundair Corp.* as authorities for

its position. This position was supported by counsel for Federated Co-op.

[13] The Consortium's position was also supported by Dallas Beal on behalf of Ghost Transportation Services. He submitted that obtaining a high sale price would be the only chance that unsecured creditors would have to get paid and that the more bidders involved, the greater the likelihood of a high sale price.

Analysis

[14] There are two issues to be considered in these applications:

1. Does the Consortium have standing to oppose the sales process proposed by the Monitor on behalf of AEPL?
2. Is it appropriate to disregard the recommendation of the Monitor concerning the sales process and to order that the Consortium be included as a qualified bidder?

1. *Does the Consortium have standing to oppose the sales process proposed by the Monitor on behalf of AEPL?*

[15] Generally speaking, a prospective purchaser, if participating in a sales process, must acquire a legal right or interest in the sales process before it has standing to object to the confirmation of a sale to a successful bidder. In the case of *Skyepharmaceutical plc v Hyal Pharmaceutical Corp.* (2000), 47 OR (3d) 234 (Ont CA) [*Skyepharmaceutical*], the Court gave a rationale for this policy and the limited exceptions to it. At paragraphs 29 and 30, the Court stated:

[29] In limited circumstances, a prospective purchaser may become entitled to participate in a sale approval motion. For that to happen, it must be shown that the prospective purchaser acquired a legal right

or interest from the circumstances of a particular sale process and that the nature of the right or interest is such that it could be adversely affected by the approval order. A commercial interest is not sufficient.

[30] There is a sound policy reason for restricting, to the extent possible, the involvement of prospective purchasers in sale approval motions. There is often a measure of urgency to complete court approved sales. This case is a good example. When unsuccessful purchasers become involved, there is a potential for greater delay and additional uncertainty. This potential may, in some situations, create commercial leverage in the hands [of] a disappointed would be purchaser which could be counterproductive to the best interests of those for whose benefit the sale is intended.

[16] The *Skyepharma* case was cited by Rothery J. in the case of *Poultry 2.0 Farms*. In that case, Rothery J. held that following the reasoning in *Skyepharma*, while disgruntled purchasers would normally not have a legal right to participate in the sale approval motion, in the unique circumstances of that case where the receiver made a mistake in reading the offer, the disgruntled purchaser had standing to oppose confirmation of the sale, although Rothery J. ultimately held that there had been no unfairness in the process and approved the sale.

[17] In the *Mustard Capital Inc.* decision, the Court refused to grant standing to unsuccessful bidders and held that the unsuccessful bidders did not acquire a right or interest in the sale approval process simply by making an offer.

[18] It should be noted, however, that in each of the above cases, the application which the Court was considering was for approval of a specific sale of assets rather than an approval of a process pursuant to which the assets would be sold as is the situation in the application before me. Here, although the Monitor referred to an intended process in the first Monitor's report, the Monitor did not seek or obtain the Court's approval of that process. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the Consortium, as an interested party seeking to purchase the assets of AEPL, does have standing to bring an application to determine whether the process previously followed was fair to

it as a prospective purchaser. As well, based upon its participation in the previous process, I am also satisfied that the Consortium has standing to make submissions as to whether the sales process now proposed is appropriate.

2. *Is it appropriate to disregard the recommendation of the Monitor concerning the sales process and to order that the Consortium be included as a qualified bidder?*

[19] Generally speaking, the Court will accept the recommendations of the Monitor who is, after all, a court-appointed officer. The seminal case in this regard is *Soundair Corp.* In that case, the Ontario Court of Appeal was considering two issues. Firstly, did the receiver act properly when it entered into an agreement to sell Air Toronto to a subsidiary of Canadian Airlines International? And secondly, what effect did the support of the secured creditors have on an alternate offer by an Air Canada subsidiary? At paragraph 14, the Court stated:

[14] ... the sale of an airline as a going concern is a very complex process. The best method of selling an airline at the best price is something far removed from the expertise of a court. When a court appoints a receiver to use its commercial expertise to sell an airline, it is inescapable that it intends to rely upon the receiver's expertise and not upon its own. Therefore, the court must place a great deal of confidence in the actions taken and in the opinions formed by the receiver. It should also assume that the receiver is acting properly unless the contrary is clearly shown. The second observation is that the court should be reluctant to second-guess, with the benefit of hindsight, the considered business decisions made by its receiver. The third observation which I wish to make is that the conduct of the receiver should be reviewed in the light of the specific mandate given to him by the court.

[20] Again, at paragraph 46, the Court stated:

[46] It is my opinion that the court must exercise extreme caution before it interferes with the process adopted by a receiver to sell an unusual asset. It is important that prospective purchasers know that, if they are acting in good faith, bargain seriously with a receiver and

enter into an agreement with it, a court will not lightly interfere with the commercial judgment of the receiver to sell the asset to them.

[21] Similar judicial restraint was referred to in the case of *AbitibiBowater* (2010) where the Court stated at paragraphs 71 and 72:

[71] A court will not lightly interfere with the exercise of this commercial and business judgment in the context of an asset sale where the marketing and sale process was fair, reasonable, transparent and efficient. This is certainly not a case where it should.

[72] In prior decisions rendered in similar context, courts in this province have emphasized that they should intervene only where there is clear evidence that the Monitor failed to act properly. A subsequent, albeit higher, bid is not necessarily a valid enough reason to set aside a sale process short of any evidence of unfairness.

[22] As indicated previously, however, there are factual distinctions between the *Soundair Corp.* and *AbitibiBowater* cases and that of the case before me in that I am not being asked to approve a sale but, rather, to approve a sales process which would ultimately come back to the Court for final approval before a sale can be completed. The sales process proposed was initially described at paragraphs 75 to 78 of the first report of the Monitor dated May 6, 2015, as follows:

75. It is the Monitor's intent to provide those parties that are currently active in due diligence a deadline of Friday, May 29, 2015 to complete their analysis, preliminary due diligence and submit to the Monitor for its consideration a formal non-binding LOI [Letter of Intent].
76. The LOIs received from interested parties will be reviewed by the Monitor in regard to, *inter alia*, the following criteria:
 - a. indicative values for AEPL's assets; i.e. the overall purchase price;
 - b. the purchase price allocation, and specifically, values attributed to AEPL's business enterprise including goodwill and plant, property and equipment and AEPL's various working capital assets;
 - c. the value attributed to AEPL's investment in Dumur;

- d. closing conditions; and
 - e. the timeline for closing.
77. Following a thorough review of the LOIs received and benchmarking thereof, the Monitor expects it will require a period of approximately two to three weeks to formulate a recommendation to this Honourable Court respecting the disposition of AEPL's assets, which may include, *inter alia*, the conduct of further marketing procedures, either by way of a formal:
- a. stalking horse sales process with one or more (in the case of discrete parcels) of the parties that submitted an LOI; or
 - b. tendering process.
78. Accordingly, the Monitor anticipates that it will be in a position to provide this Honourable Court with a recommendation with respect to the foregoing within a period of no more than six weeks; and AEPL is seeking an extension of the Stay Period which mirrors that period, being up to and including June 19, 2015.

[23] Although AEPL sought and obtained extensions of the Court's initial order based upon the Monitor's first report, it did not seek an order confirming the sales process proposed by the Monitor in its first report. Even though Court approval of a sales process had not been obtained, the Monitor proceeded to solicit LOIs from interested parties. I am not being critical of AEPL or the Monitor for not seeking earlier approval of the sales process but, rather, just pointing out that the Court has not had an opportunity to comment upon or approve the sales process. Notwithstanding this lack of approval, interested purchasers were given the Monitor's first report and would have relied upon it.

[24] The Consortium takes the position that it was misled by the Monitor's report and the information which had been provided to it by the Monitor. The Consortium says its belief was that if an LOI was submitted within the qualifying period and a percentage deposit was submitted, the Consortium would then be in a position to take part in the additional marketing procedures either by way of a stalking

horse sales process or a tendering process.

[25] One of the documents attached to the Roberts' affidavit filed in support of the Consortium's application as Exhibit "A" was an exchange of emails passing between a representative of the Consortium, Gilles Cantin, and a representative of the Monitor, Russell Henderson. In an email dated April 22, 2015, Mr. Cantin asked for clarification of the process being undertaken. He stated:

Then I should understand that your approach is the following:

1. Let's say that there are 5 bidders interested. Each of them will file before (May 8th?) a LOI concerning their respective bid. I the [sic] presume that before going to the judge, we must have a firm offer (not a LOI with moving targets subjects [sic] to due dill [sic]).
2. You go to the judge, present the 5 bids and suggest [to] the judge a stalking horse process and candidate, with or without a due dill [sic] period.

Please clarify.

[26] Mr. Henderson on behalf of the Monitor responded:

A sale of part or all of AEPL would require the approval of Court. The Monitor is required to satisfy the Court that a process has been undertaken to maximize the value associated with AEPL's assets.

In that regard, we are soliciting expressions of interest from a select group of prospective purchasers to proceed with an initial bid pursuant to a stalking horse sale process. Only one stalking horse bid would be brought to court for approval, but the bid would be subject to a further marketing protocol with a break fee.

[27] However, the sales process as contained in the Monitor's second report, and which the Court is being asked to approve in the application now before me, does not have a stalking horse sales process. It also has added two criteria and limited the final sale negotiations to four parties. Paragraphs 40 and 41 of the Monitor's second report provides as follows:

40. The Monitor received approximately 10 LOIs by the LOI Deadline and prepared a side-by-side comparison of those LOIs (the “LOI Comparison”) having regard to:
 - a. indicative values for AEPL’s assets; i.e. the overall purchase price;
 - b. The purchase price allocation, and specifically, values attributed to AEPL’s business enterprise including goodwill and plant, property and equipment and AEPL’s various working capital assets;
 - c. the nature and complexity of the interested party;
 - d. the value attributed to AEPL’s investment in Dumur;
 - e. closing conditions;
 - f. the level of due diligence conducted by the interested party prior to the LOI Deadline; and
 - g. the timeline for closing.
41. Based on the foregoing, the Monitor recommends the following Sales Process for the assets of AEPL:
 - a. qualify the four parties who, in the Monitor’s view, submitted superior LOIs for final due diligence (the “Qualified Bidders”);
 - b. concurrent with final due diligence procedures, negotiate the terms of asset purchase agreement (“APA”) with each of the Qualified Bidders; and
 - c. execute a definitive agreement with the Qualified Bidder, which in the Monitor’s view, achieves the best outcome from the perspective of AEPL’s stakeholders (the “Definitive Agreement”). [Emphasis added]

[28] Counsel for the Consortium submits that the two underlined additional criteria and the limitation of further negotiations to four “qualified bidders” were not contemplated in the original sales process referred to in the Monitor’s first report which had been distributed to interested parties. Counsel for the Consortium submits that the process thereby became unfair to the Consortium and that, as a result, the Consortium was misled and should be added to the proposed list of qualified bidders.

[29] The leading statement of the law in respect to approval of a sale of property which requires Court approval is set out in the *Soundair Corp.* decision at paragraph 16:

[16] As did Rosenberg J., I adopt as correct the statement made by Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg* (1986), 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526 (H.C.J.), at pp. 92-94 O.R., pp. 531-33 D.L.R., of the duties which a court must perform when deciding whether a receiver who has sold a property acted properly. When he set out the court's duties, he did not put them in any order of priority, nor do I. I summarize those duties as follows:

1. It should consider whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently.
2. It should consider the interests of all parties.
3. It should consider the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained.
4. It should consider whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

[30] This four-part test was adopted by courts in Saskatchewan in the *Poultry 2.0 Farms* and *Mustard Capital Inc.* cases.

[31] In the circumstances of this case, counsel for the Consortium refers to the fourth part in the *Soundair Corp.* case and submits that the process to date has been unfair to the Consortium on the following bases:

- (a) They were misled as to the nature of the process, which they believed would be a two-phased process, the first phase which would be to determine the interest of legitimate bidders, and a second phase involving a stalking horse process or further tender process as described in the Monitor's first report.

- (b) They were not told that after the first phase, which involved the informal identification of interested parties' stage, the group of bidders would be reduced to four parties.

[32] No evidence was provided as to the valid business reasons for these changes. I have already dealt with this issue in respect to the issue of standing and held that the Consortium was misled. I held that this gave rise to an unfairness such as to give the Consortium standing to challenge the sales process. That is not to say that the Consortium was intentionally misled by the Monitor only to say that I accept that it was misled. As a result of my finding that the Consortium was misled, I also find that it may have experienced prejudice as a result. Its initial offer may have been higher or different had it known that there would be additional criteria for the next round of the sales process. I therefore grant the Consortium's application to be included in the group of qualified bidders referred to in the proposed sales process.

[33] The alternate position of counsel for the Consortium, which was supported by Ghost Transportation Services, was that the process selected should consider the interests of all parties and ensure that the best possible price will be obtained by virtue of the sales process proposed. Counsel for the Consortium refers to the *Dube Foundation Inc.* case where the Court refused to approve the sales process proposed by the receiver (which was a stalking horse bid) because the receiver had not demonstrated that it was in the best interests of the creditors as a whole, even if it might have been in the best interests of the secured creditors.

[34] On the basis of the information currently before me, I do not accept that the process proposed by the Monitor, and which it followed in the first round of marketing the assets of AEPL, was unreasonable or that it did not consider the interests of all parties. As was stated in the *AbitibiBowater* (2009) case

at paragraph 59:

[59] ... The recommendation of the Monitor, a court-appointed officer experienced in the insolvency field, carries great weight with the Court in any approval process. Absent some compelling, exceptional factor to the contrary, a Court should accept an applicant's proposed sale process where it is recommended by the Monitor and supported by the stakeholders.

[35] I am also not prepared to second guess the Monitor with respect to the sales process which the Monitor now proposes. The recommendation of the Monitor, a court-appointed officer experienced in the insolvency field, carries great weight with the Court in any approval process. Absent some compelling, exceptional factor to the contrary, the Court should accept the applicant's proposed sales process where it is recommended by the Monitor and supported by the stakeholders.

[36] In conclusion, I am satisfied that the sales process now proposed by the Monitor should be amended to include the Consortium as a qualified bidder and that the Consortium be allowed to take part in the second round of negotiations. In all other aspects, I approve the sales process proposed by the Monitor and AEPL. I do not have sufficient evidence before me to comment upon or in any way change the criteria as identified in the Monitor's second report. I await the results of the second round of negotiations with the qualified bidders and the Monitor's submissions and recommendation for Court approval of any sale.

"N.G. Gabrielson" J.
N.G. Gabrielson

SUPERIOR COURT
Commercial Division

CANADA
PROVINCE OF QUEBEC
DISTRICT OF MONTREAL

No: 500-11-048114-157

DATE: April 27, 2015

PRESIDED BY: THE HONOURABLE STEPHEN W. HAMILTON, J.S.C.

**IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C.
1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED:**

**BLOOM LAKE GENERAL PARTNER LIMITED
QUINTO MINING CORPORATION
8568391 CANADA LIMITED
CLIFFS QUÉBEC IRON MINING ULC**
Petitioners

And

**THE BLOOM LAKE IRON ORE MINE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
BLOOM LAKE RAILWAY COMPANY LIMITED**
Mises-en-cause

And

FTI CONSULTING CANANDA INC.
Monitor

And

9201955 Canada inc.
Mise-en-cause

And

**EABAMETOONG FIRST NATION
GINOOGAMING FIRST NATION
CONSTANCE LAKE FIRST NATION and
LONG LAKE # 58 FIRST NATION
AROLAND FIRST NATION
MARTEN FALLS FIRST NATION**
Objectors

And

8901341 CANADA INC.

CANADIAN DEVELOPMENT AND MARKETING CORPORATION

Interveners

JUDGMENT ON PETITIONERS' AMENDED MOTION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF AN
APPROVAL AND VESTING ORDER WITH RESPECT TO THE SALE OF THE
CHROMITE SHARES (#82)

INTRODUCTION

[1] The Petitioners have made an Amended Motion for the Issuance of an Approval and Vesting Order with respect to the Sale of the Chromite Shares (#82 on the plumitif; the original motion was #65). Objections were filed by (1) six First Nation bands (#85, as amended at the hearing) and (2) 8901341 Canada Inc. and Canadian Development and Marketing Corporation (together, CDM) (#87).

CONTEXT

[2] On January 27, 2015, Mr. Justice Castonguay issued an Initial Order placing the Petitioners and the Mises-en-cause under the protection of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.¹ The ultimate parent of the Petitioners and the Mises-en-cause is Cliffs Natural Resources Inc. (Cliffs), which is neither a Petitioner nor a Mise-en-cause.

[3] The Petitioner Cliffs Québec Iron Mining ULC (CQIM) owns, through two subsidiaries, a 100% interest in the Black Thor and Black Label chromite mining projects and a 70% interest in the Big Daddy chromite mining project. All three projects form part of the Ring of Fire, a mining district in northern Ontario.

[4] Other entities related to Cliffs but which are not parties to the CCAA proceedings own other mining interests in the Ring of Fire.

[5] The proposed transaction with respect to which the Petitioners are seeking an approval and vesting order involves the sale of those various interests, including in particular the sale of CQIM's shares in the subsidiaries described above.

[6] Cliffs and its affiliates paid approximately US\$350 million to acquire their interests in the Ring of Fire projects, and invested a further US\$200 million in developing these projects.

[7] By 2013, Cliffs had suspended all activities related to the Ring of Fire and began making general inquiries with potential interested parties with a view to selling its interests in the Ring of Fire. No material interest resulted from these efforts.

¹ R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended.

[8] By September 2014, Cliffs's desire to sell its interests in the Ring of Fire was publicly known.² It hired Moelis & Company LLC to assist with the sale process for various assets including the Ring of Fire in October 2014.³

[9] The sale process will be described in greater detail below. It resulted in the execution of a letter of intent with Noront on February 13, 2015.⁴

[10] While the sellers were negotiating the Share Purchase Agreement with Noront, CDM sent an unsolicited letter of intent to acquire the Ring of Fire interests on March 14, 2015.⁵ That letter of intent was analyzed by the sellers, Moelis and the Monitor and was rejected.⁶ Two revised letters of intent followed and were also rejected.⁷

[11] The sellers executed the initial Share Purchase Agreement with Noront on March 22, 2015, which provided for a price of US \$20 million.⁸ Noront issued a press release describing the transaction on March 23, 2015.⁹

[12] The initial SPA provided in Section 7.1 a "Superior Proposal" mechanism that allowed the sellers to accept an unsolicited and superior offer from a third party.

[13] On April 2, 2015, the Petitioners made a motion for the issuance of an approval and vesting order with respect to the initial SPA. Four First Nations bands who live and exercise their Aboriginal and treaty rights in and on the land and territories surrounding the Ring of Fire filed an objection to the motion. CDM did not. Instead, on April 13, 2015, CDM made an unsolicited offer for the interests in the Ring of Fire which included a purchase price of US \$23 million.¹⁰

[14] CDM's offer was considered by the sellers, Moelis and the Monitor to be a "Superior Proposal" as defined in Section 7.1 of the initial SPA. As a result, they advised Noront,¹¹ which expressed an interest in making a new offer.

[15] The sellers, after consulting Moelis and the Monitor, developed the Supplemental Bid Process to give each party the chance to submit its best and final offer.¹²

[16] Both Noront and CDM participated in the Supplemental Bid Process and submitted new offers, with Noront's offer at US \$27.5 million and CDM's at US \$25.275 million.¹³

² An article from the Globe & Mail dated September 17, 2014 was produced as Exhibit R-7.

³ The CCAA Parties formally engaged Moelis by engagement letter dated March 23, 2015, and the Court approved the engagement of Moelis by order dated April 17, 2015.

⁴ Exhibit R-9.

⁵ Exhibit R-17.

⁶ Exhibit R-18.

⁷ Exhibits R-19 to R-22.

⁸ Exhibit R-3 (redacted) and R-4 (unredacted).

⁹ The press release was provided to the Court during argument and was not given an exhibit number.

¹⁰ Exhibit R-23.

¹¹ Exhibit R-24.

¹² Exhibits R-25 and R-26.

¹³ Exhibits R-29 and R-30.

[17] The sellers accepted the Noront offer and entered into a revised SPA with Noront on April 17, 2015.¹⁴ The Petitioners then amended their motion to allege the additional facts since April 2, 2015 and to seek the issuance of an approval and vesting order with respect to the revised SPA.

[18] The First Nations bands maintained their objection (#85)¹⁵ and CDM filed a Declaration of Intervention and Contestation with respect to the amended motion (#87).

POSITION OF THE PARTIES

[19] The Petitioners argue that the revised SPA should be approved because:

1. the marketing and sales process was fair, reasonable, transparent and efficient;
2. the price offered by Noront was the highest binding offer received in the process;
3. CQIM exercised its commercial and business judgment with assistance from Moelis;
4. the Monitor assisted and advised CQIM throughout the process and recommends the approval of the motion.

[20] Moreover, they argue that no creditor has opposed the motion, and that the First Nations bands and CDM do not have legal standing to oppose the motion.

[21] The Monitor and Noront supported the position put forward by the Petitioners.

[22] The First Nations bands argued the following points:

1. they have a legitimate interest and standing to contest the motion as an “other interested party” under Section 36 of the CCAA, because they have Aboriginal and treaty rights that are affected by the change in control of the Ring of Fire interests;
2. there was a duty on the part of the sellers and their advisers to consult with and advise the First Nations bands about the sale process. Instead, the First Nations bands were ignored and did not even learn of the existence of the sale process until March 23, 2015;
3. the sale process was not open, fair or transparent and did not recognize the rights of the First Nations bands;
4. there was no sales process order; and
5. there is no urgency and they should be given the opportunity to present an offer.

[23] Finally, CDM argued as follows:

¹⁴ Exhibit R-11 (redacted) and R-12 (unredacted).

¹⁵ It was amended at the hearing to add two First Nations bands as objectors.

1. the sellers were required to accept the “Superior Proposal” made by CDM on April 13, 2015;
2. the Supplemental Bid Process did not treat the two parties fairly;
3. the Monitor’s support of the process is not determinative;
4. it had the necessary interest to intervene in the CCAA proceedings and contest the motion.

ISSUES

[24] The Court will analyze the following issues:

1. Was the sale process “fair, reasonable, transparent and efficient”?

In the context of the analysis of this issue, the Court will consider various sub-issues, including the business judgement rule, the importance of the Monitor’s recommendation, and the interpretation of Section 7.1 of the initial SPA.

2. Do the First Nations bands have other grounds on which to object to the proposed transaction?
3. Do the First Nations bands and CDM have legal standing to raise there issues?

ANALYSIS

- 1. Was the sale process “fair, reasonable, transparent and efficient”?**

[25] Section 36 of the CCAA provides in part as follows:

36. (1) A debtor company in respect of which an order has been made under this Act may not sell or otherwise dispose of assets outside the ordinary course of business unless authorized to do so by a court. Despite any requirement for shareholder approval, including one under federal or provincial law, the court may authorize the sale or disposition even if shareholder approval was not obtained.

...

(3) In deciding whether to grant the authorization, the court is to consider, among other things,

(a) whether the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition was reasonable in the circumstances;

(b) whether the monitor approved the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition;

(c) whether the monitor filed with the court a report stating that in their opinion the sale or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy;

(d) the extent to which the creditors were consulted;

(e) the effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties; and

(f) whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value.

(6) The court may authorize a sale or disposition free and clear of any security, charge or other restriction and, if it does, it shall also order that other assets of the company or the proceeds of the sale or disposition be subject to a security, charge or other restriction in favour of the creditor whose security, charge or other restriction is to be affected by the order.

...

[26] The criteria in Section 36(3) of the CCAA have been held not to be cumulative or exhaustive. The Court must look at the proposed transaction as a whole and decide whether it is appropriate, fair and reasonable:

[48] The elements which can be found in Section 36 CCAA are, first of all, not limitative and secondly they need not to be all fulfilled in order to grant or not grant an order under this section.

[49] The Court has to look at the transaction as a whole and essentially decide whether or not the sale is appropriate, fair and reasonable. In other words, the Court could grant the process for reasons others than those mentioned in Section 36 CCAA or refuse to grant it for reasons which are not mentioned in Section 36 CCAA.¹⁶

[27] Further, in the context of one of the asset sales in *AbitibiBowater*, Mr. Justice Gascon, then of this Court, adopted the following list of relevant factors:

[36] The Court has jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets in the course of CCAA proceedings, notably when such a sale of assets is in the best interest of the stakeholders generally.

[37] In determining whether to authorize a sale of assets under the CCAA, the Court should consider, amongst others, the following key factors:

- have sufficient efforts to get the best price been made and have the parties acted providently;
- the efficacy and integrity of the process followed;
- the interests of the parties; and
- whether any unfairness resulted from the working out process.

¹⁶ *White Birch Paper Holding Company (Arrangement relatif à)*, 2010 QCCS 4915 (leave to appeal refused: 2010 QCCA 1950), par. 48-49.

[38] These principles were enunciated in *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* They are equally applicable in a CCAA sale situation.¹⁷

[28] The Court must give due consideration to two further elements in assessing whether the sale should be approved under Section 36 CCAA:

1. the business judgment rule:

[70] That being so, it is not for this Court to second-guess the commercial and business judgment properly exercised by the Petitioners and the Monitor.

[71] A court will not lightly interfere with the exercise of this commercial and business judgment in the context of an asset sale where the marketing and sale process was fair, reasonable, transparent and efficient. This is certainly not a case where it should.¹⁸

2. the weight to be given to the recommendation of the Monitor:

The recommendation of the Monitor, a court-appointed officer experienced in the insolvency field, carries great weight with the Court in any approval process. Absent some compelling, exceptional factor to the contrary, a Court should accept an applicant's proposed sale process where it is recommended by the Monitor and supported by the stakeholders.¹⁹

[29] Debtors often ask the Court to authorize the sale process in advance. This has the advantage of ensuring that the process is clear and of reducing the likelihood of a subsequent challenge. In the present matter, the Petitioners did seek the Court's authorization with respect to a sale process for their other assets, but they did not seek the Court's authorization with respect to the sale process for the Ring of Fire interests because that sale process was already well under way before the CCAA filing. There is no legal requirement that the sale process be approved in advance, but it creates the potential for the process being challenged after the fact, as in this case.

[30] The Court will therefore review the sale process in light of these factors.

(1) From October 2014 to the execution of the Noront letter of intent on February 13, 2015

[31] The sale process began in earnest in October 2014 when Cliffs engaged Moelis.

[32] Moelis identified a group of eighteen potential buyers and strategic partners, with the assistance of CQIM and Cliffs. The group included traders, resource buyers,

¹⁷ *AbitibiBowater inc. (Arrangement relatif à)*, 2009 QCCS 6460, par. 36-38. See also *White Birch*, *supra* note 16, par. 53-54, and *Aveos Fleet Performance Inc. (Arrangement relatif à)*, 2012 QCCS 4074, par. 50.

¹⁸ *AbitibiBowater inc. (Arrangement relatif à)*, 2010 QCCS 1742, par. 70-71. See also *White Birch Paper Holding Company (Arrangement relatif à)*, 2011 QCCS 7304, par. 68-70.

¹⁹ *AbitibiBowater*, *supra* note 17, par. 59. See also *White Birch*, *supra* note 18, par. 73-74.

financial sector participants, local strategic partners, and market participants, as well as parties who had previously expressed an interest in the Ring of Fire.

[33] Moelis began contacting the potential interested parties to solicit interest in purchasing the Ring of Fire project. It sent a form of non-disclosure agreement to fifteen parties. Fourteen executed the agreement and were given access to certain confidential information.

[34] Negotiations ensued with seven of the interested parties, and six were given access to the data room that was established in November 2014.

[35] By January 21, 2015, non-binding letters of intent were received from Noront and from a third party. There were also two verbal expressions of interest, but neither resulted in a letter of intent.

[36] The Noront letter of intent was determined by the sellers in consultation with Moelis and the Monitor to be the better offer. Moelis then contacted all parties who had indicated a preliminary level of interest to give them the opportunity to submit a letter of intent in a price range superior to the Noront letter of intent, but no such letter was received.

[37] Negotiations continued with Noront and a letter of intent was executed with Noront on February 13, 2015.²⁰

[38] With respect to this portion of the process, CDM does not raise any issue but the First Nations bands complain that they were not included in the list of potential interested parties and were not otherwise consulted.

[39] The Court will discuss the special status of the First Nations bands in the next section of this judgment. At this stage, it is sufficient to note that the sale process must be reasonable, but is not required to be perfect. Even if the initial list of eighteen potential buyers and strategic partners omitted some potential buyers, this is not a basis for the Court to intervene, provided that the sellers, with Moelis and the Monitor, took reasonable steps.²¹ The Court is satisfied that this test was met.

(2) From letter of intent to initial SPA

[40] Between February 13, 2015 and March 22, 2015, the sellers negotiated the SPA with Noront and signed the initial SPA. In that same period, CDM expressed an interest in the Ring of Fire interests and sent three separate offers, all of which were refused by the sellers.

[41] CDM does not contest the reasonability of the sellers' actions in this period. In fact, CDM did not contest the original motion to approve the initial SPA, but chose instead to make a new offer.

(3) The initial SPA and the "Superior Proposal"

[42] The initial SPA with Noront dated March 22, 2015 provided for a purchase price of US \$20 million.

²⁰ Exhibit R-9.

²¹ *Terrace Bay Pulp Inc. (Re)*, 2012 ONSC 4247, par. 48.

[43] Section 7.1 of the initial SPA allowed the sellers to pursue a “Superior Proposal”, defined as an unsolicited offer from a third party which appeared to be more favourable to the sellers. In that eventuality, the sellers had the right to terminate the initial SPA upon reimbursing Noront’s expenses up to \$250,000.

[44] CDM made a new offer on April 13, 2015.²² The sellers, in consultation with their advisers and the Monitor, concluded that it was a Superior Proposal.

[45] CDM argues that in those circumstances, the sellers had the obligation to terminate the initial SPA and to accept the CDM offer.

[46] The Court does not agree.

[47] On its face, the language in Section 7.1 is permissive and not mandatory. It says that the sellers “may” terminate the initial SPA and enter into an agreement with the new offeror. It does not require them to do so.

[48] CDM argued that Section 7.1 does not provide for a right to match, which is found in other agreements of this nature. That may be true, but a right to match is different. Specific language would be necessary to contractually require the sellers to accept an offer from Noront that matched the new offer. No language was required to give Noront the right to make a new offer. Further, specific language would be required to remove the possibility of Noront making a new offer. There is no such language. It would be surprising to find such language: why would Noront give up the right to make another offer, and why would the sellers prevent Noront from making another offer? Any such language would be to the detriment of the two contracting parties and for the exclusive benefit of an unknown third party. As the Monitor pointed out, Section 12.2 of the initial SPA specifies that the SPA is for the sole benefit of the parties and is not intended to give any rights, benefits or remedies to a third party.

[49] As a result, the sellers had no obligation to accept the April 13 offer from CDM.

(4) The Supplemental Bid Process

[50] Once the sellers, their advisers and the Monitor determined that the April 13 offer from CDM was a Superior Proposal, they had to decide how to manage the process. They had two interested parties and they decided to give them both the chance to make their best and final offer through a process that they created for the purpose, which is referred to as the Supplemental Bid Process. This was a very reasonable decision, in the best interests of the creditors, although probably not one that either offeror was very happy with.

[51] The sellers, their advisers and the Monitor established a series of rules, and they sent the rules to the two offerors at the same time:

1. Each of the Bidders’ best and final offer is to be delivered in the form of an executed Share Purchase Agreement (the “Final Bid”), together with a blackline mark-up against the March 22 SPA to show proposed changes.

²² Exhibit R-23.

2. Final Bids can remove section 7.1(d) and the related provisions of the March 22 SPA.
3. Final bids are to be received by Moelis by no later than 5:00 p.m. (Toronto time) on Wednesday, April 15, 2015 in accordance with paragraph 7 below.
4. Final Bids may be accompanied by a cover letter setting any additional considerations that the Bidder wishes to be considered in connection with its Final Bid but such cover letter should not amend or modify any of the terms and conditions contained in the executed SPA.
5. Final Bids will be reviewed by the Sellers in consultation with moelis and the Monitor. A determination of the Superior Proposal will be made as soon as practicable and communicated to the Bidders.
6. Any clarifications or other communications with respect to this process should be made in writing to the Sale Advisor, with a copy to the Monitor.
7. Final Bids are to be submitted to the Sale Advisor c/o Carlo De Giroloamo by email at carlo.degirolamo@moelis.com.
8. All initially capitalized terms used herein unless otherwise defined shall have the meanings given to them in the March 22 SPA.²³

[52] They declined a request from Noront to modify the rules.²⁴

[53] Both Noront and CDM decided to participate in the Supplemental Bid Process and both submitted offers.

[54] All parties agree that the CDM offer was in compliance with the rules of the Supplemental Bid Process.

[55] Noront's offer was received at 5:00 p.m. on April 15.²⁵ CDM argues that the offer was not in compliance with the rules:

- The cover email states that final approvals are still required (presumably from Franco-Nevada which was advancing the funds for the transaction and Resource Capital Fund (RCF) which was the principal lender to Noront) and that Noront expected to receive them within the next hour;
- The cover letter was not signed;
- The cover letter stated that the revised offer was effective only if the sellers received another offer; and
- The email did not include an executed SPA, but only a blackline mark-up of the SPA.

[56] Subsequent to 5:00 p.m., Noront completed the requirements:

²³ Exhibits R-25 and R-26.

²⁴ Exhibit CDM-1.

²⁵ Exhibit R-30A.

- At 5:34 p.m., Noront sent a signed cover letter. A paragraph was added to explain that “certain representations and warranties and conditions to the advance of the loan with Franco-Nevada have been reduced in order to provide certainty on Noront’s financing” and that the signature pages for the SPA and the fully executed loan agreement would be sent separately;²⁶
- At 8:50 p.m., Noront’s counsel sent the executed SPA and the amended and restated loan agreement. The executed SPA included some changes described as “cleanup” and “not substantive” since 5:00 p.m. Among those changes, Noront deleted RCF from Exhibit C (Required Consents), suggesting that it had obtained that consent;²⁷
- At 10:00 p.m., Moelis asked Noront for confirmation of the RCF consent and an executed copy of it, an explanation for the source of the additional funds, and clarification of the deadline for the vesting order;²⁸
- At 10:35 p.m., Noront provided the executed RCF consent and an explanation of the funding;²⁹ and
- At 1:25 p.m. on April 16, Noront agreed to extend the date for the vesting order from April 20 to April 27.³⁰

[57] The Noront offer was the higher of the two offers in terms of the purchase price. The issue is whether these issues are such as to invalidate the process such that the Court should require the sellers to start over.

[58] The Court considers that these issues are relatively minor and that they do not invalidate the process:

- Noront submitted its offer on time;
- The offer was not amended in any substantive way after 5:00 p.m. In particular, the purchase price was not amended;
- The lack of a signature on the cover letter was irrelevant;
- The condition that the revised offer was effective only if the sellers received another offer had already been fulfilled before Noront submitted its offer. Noront did not know this, but the sellers, Moelis and the Monitor did;
- The missing third party consents were not within Noront’s control. Noront said at 5:00 p.m. that it expected to receive them within the next hour. In fact, it provided the consents to Moelis at 8:50 p.m.;

²⁶ Exhibit CDM-3.

²⁷ Exhibit CDM-4.

²⁸ Exhibit CDM-4.

²⁹ Exhibit CDM-4.

³⁰ Exhibit CDM-4.

- The executed SPA was provided at 8:50 p.m. The delay appears to be related to the missing consents. There is no evidence that Noront was using this as a means to preserve an out from the offer; and
- The questions with respect to the source of the funding and the date were clarifications requested by Moelis for its evaluation of the offer and were not elements missing from the offer.

[59] This is not a case where there is a fundamental flaw in the process, such as the parties having unequal access to information or one party seeking to amend its offer after it had knowledge of the other offers. The process was fair. It was not perfect, but the Courts do not require perfection.

(5) Conclusion

[60] As a result, the Court concludes that the sale process was reasonable within Section 36(3)(a) of the CCAA. Moreover, the other factors in Section 36(3) favour the approval of the sale:

- The monitor approved the process and was involved throughout;
- The monitor filed a report with the Court in which he recommends the approval of the sale;
- The creditors were not consulted, but the motion and amended motion were served on the service list and no creditor has objected to the sale;
- The consideration appears to be fair, given that it is the result of a reasonable process. The Court gives weight to the business judgment of the sellers and their advisers.

[61] For all of these reasons, the Court dismisses CDM's contestation of the motion.

[62] There remain the issues raised by the First Nations bands.

2. Do the First Nations bands have other grounds on which to object to the transaction?

[63] The First Nations bands raise issues of two natures.

[64] First, they argue that they were denied the opportunity to participate in the sale process and they ask for time to examine the possibility of presenting an offer for the Ring of Fire interests.

[65] Second, they argue that the transaction has an impact on their Aboriginal and treaty rights protected under Section 35 of the *Constitution Act, 1982*.

[66] The Court has already concluded that the process of identifying potential buyers and strategic partners was reasonable.

[67] Further, it is not clear to what extent the First Nations bands had knowledge of the sale process and could have participated. The September 17, 2014 newspaper article says that Cliffs is exploring alternatives including the possibility of selling its

Ring of Fire interests.³¹ That article refers to a letter which was sent to the First Nations bands in the area which again would have referred to a possible sale.

[68] At the very latest, they knew about the potential sale when a press release was published on March 23, 2015.

[69] Moreover, in its materials, CDM alleged that its final offer on April 15 “had the support of two of the most impacted First Nations communities”,³² which suggests that the First Nations bands had at least some involvement in the sale process.

[70] Nevertheless, the interest of the First Nations bands remains at a very preliminary level. Although the First Nations bands say that they have hired a financial adviser and that they want a delay to analyze the possibility of making an offer for the Ring of Fire interests, whether on their own or with a partner, there is no evidence to suggest that the bands on their own would make a serious offer, or that they would partner with a party that was not already identified by Moelis and included in the process. It is pure speculation as to whether they will ever present an offer in excess of the Noront offer. The Courts have rejected firm offers for greater amounts received after the sale process has concluded.³³ The Courts should also refuse to stop the sale process because a party arriving late might be interested in presenting an offer which might be better than the offer on the table.

[71] The First Nations bands also plead that they have a special interest in this transaction because they live and exercise their Aboriginal and treaty rights guaranteed by the Constitution on the land and territories surrounding the Ring of Fire.

[72] For the purposes of this motion, the Court will assume that to be true. It is nevertheless unclear to what extent a change of control of the corporations which own the interests in the Ring of Fire project impacts on those rights. The identity of the shareholders of the corporations does not change the rights of the First Nations bands or the obligations of the corporations in relation to the development of the project.

[73] The First Nations bands pointed to two specific issues.

[74] First, they argued that there was a duty to consult which was not respected. It is clear that as a matter of constitutional law, there is a duty to consult. It is equally clear that this duty lies on the Crown, not on private parties.³⁴ As a result, the Crown has a duty to consult when it acts, including when it sells shares in a corporation with interests that impact on the rights of the First Nations.³⁵ However, a sale of shares from one private party to another does not trigger the duty to consult. The First Nations bands also produced the Regional Framework Agreement between nine First Nation bands in the Ring of Fire area, including the six objectors, and the Ontario Crown.³⁶ Cliffs was not a party to this agreement, and the sale of the sellers’ interests

³¹ Exhibit R-7.

³² Declaration of Intervention and Contestation (#87), par. 30.

³³ See, for example, *Boutiques San Francisco inc. (Arrangement relatif aux)*, [2004] R.J.Q. 965 (C.S.), par. 11-25; *AbitibiBowater*, *supra* note 18, par. 72-73.

³⁴ *Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests)*, 2004 SCC 73, par. 35, 56; *Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council*, 2010 SCC 43, par. 79..

³⁵ *In the Matter of CCAA and Skeena Cellulose Inc.*, 2002 BCSC 597, par. 14.

³⁶ Exhibit O-1.

in the Ring of Fire project does not affect any party's rights and obligations under the agreement. It is indeed unfortunate that the First Nations bands were not included in the sale process, because they will have an important role to play in the development of the Ring of Fire. But the failure to include them was not a breach of the duty to consult or of the Regional Framework Agreement.

[75] Second, the First Nations bands gave as an example of how the proposed transaction might prejudice their rights a royalty arrangement which Noront appears to have entered into with Franco-Nevada as part of the financing for the proposed transaction. The press release announcing the initial transaction on March 23, 2015 provided:

Franco-Nevada will receive a 3% royalty over the Black Thor chromite deposit and a 2% royalty over all of Noront's property in the region with the exception of Eagle's Nest, which is excluded.³⁷

[76] Assuming that the financing arrangements for the final transaction include a similar provision, which seems likely, the Court is unconvinced that it should refuse the approval of the transaction for this reason.

[77] It is difficult to see how granting a 2 or 3% royalty impacts the rights of the First Nations bands, unless it is their position that they are entitled to a royalty of more than 97%. They did not advance such an argument during the hearing.

[78] Further, the Court is not being asked to approve the financing arrangements between Noront and Franco-Nevada. If there is something in those financing arrangements that infringes on the rights of the First Nations bands, their rights and their remedies are not affected by the order that the Court is being asked to issue today.

[79] For all of these reasons, the Court dismisses the objection made by the First Nations bands.

3. Interest or Standing

[80] For the reasons set out above, the Court will dismiss CDM's contestation and the objection made by the First Nations bands. In principle, it is not necessary to deal with the issue of interest or standing. Also, given that the Court was given only a short delay to draft this judgment, it might not be wise to get too far into the issue.

[81] However, all parties pleaded the question at length and the Court will therefore deal with it.

[82] The Ontario authorities supporting the position that the "bitter bidder" has no interest or standing to challenge the approval motion are clear³⁸ and they have been followed in Québec.³⁹

³⁷ *Supra*, note 9.

³⁸ *Crown Trust v. Rosenberg*, 1986 CanLII 2760 (ON SC), p. 43; *Skyepharm plc v. Hyal Pharmaceutical Corp.*, [2000] O.J. No 467 (ON CA), par. 24-26, 30; *Consumers Packaging Inc. (Re)*, 2001 CanLII 6708 (ON CA), par. 7; *BDC Venture Capital Inc. v. Natural Convergence Inc.*, 2009 ONCA 665, par. 7-8.

[83] However, the issues which the Court must consider before approving a sale include the reasonableness of the sale process, which involves questions of the fairness and the integrity of the process.

[84] A losing bidder is not seeking to promote the best interests of the creditors, but is looking to promote its own interest. It will seek to raise these issues, not because it has any particular interest in fairness or integrity, but because it lost and it wants a second kick at the proverbial can. The narrow technical ground on which the losing bidder is found to have no interest is that it has no legal or proprietary right in the property being sold.⁴⁰ The underlying policy reason is that the losing bidder is a distraction, with the potential for delay and additional expense.

[85] However, if the losing bidder is excluded from the process, who will raise the issues of fairness and integrity? The creditors will not do so, because their interest is limited to getting the best price. Where there is a subsequent higher bid, their interest will be in direct conflict with the integrity of the sale process.

[86] Perhaps the way to reconcile all of this is to exclude the losing bidder from the Court approval process and instead require the losing bidder to make its complaints and objections to the monitor. The monitor would then be required to report to the Court on any such complaints and objections. In this case, the Monitor's Fourth Report deals with the objection of the First Nations bands in fair and objective manner. However, because CDM filed its intervention after the Monitor filed his report, the Monitor's Fourth Report does not deal with the issues raised by CDM. In that sense, the CDM intervention was useful to the Court in exercising its jurisdiction under Section 36 of the CCAA.

[87] The objection of the First Nations bands went beyond their status as losing bidders or excluded bidders, and included issues related to their Aboriginal and treaty rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

[88] The case law on the interest or standing of the "bitter bidder" and the policy considerations underlying that case law have no application to these issues. The interest of the First Nations bands is closer to the interest of "social stakeholders" that have been recognized in a number of cases.⁴¹

[89] Although the Court will dismiss the objections raised by the First Nations bands and CDM, it will not do so on grounds of a lack of interest or standing.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT HEREBY:

[90] **GRANTS** the Petitioners' Amended Motion for the Issuance of an Approval and Vesting Order (#82).

³⁹ *AbitibiBowater*, *supra* note 18, par. 81-88; *White Birch*, *supra* note 16, par. 55-56.

⁴⁰ Purchasers generally do not have a proprietary interest in the property they are buying.

⁴¹ *Re Canadian Airlines Corporation*, 2000 ABQB 442, par. 95; *Canadian Red Cross Society*, *Re*, 1998 CanLII 14907 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), par. 50; *Anvil Range Mining Corp.*, *Re*, 1998 CarswellOnt 5319 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), par. 9; *Skydome Corp.*, *Re*, 1998 CarswellOnt 5922 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), par. 6-7.

[91] **ORDERS** that all capitalized terms in this Order shall have the meaning given to them in the Share Purchase Agreement dated as of March 22, 2015, as amended and restated as of April 17, 2015 (the “**Share Purchase Agreement**”) by and among Petitioner Cliffs Québec Iron Mining ULC (“**CQIM**”), Cliffs Greene B.V., Cliffs Netherlands B.V. and the Additional Sellers, as vendors, Noront Resources Ltd., as parent, and 9201955 Canada Inc., as purchaser (the “**Purchaser**”), a redacted copy of which was filed as Exhibit R-11 to the Motion, unless otherwise indicated herein.

SERVICE

[92] **ORDERS** that any prior delay for the presentation of this Motion is hereby abridged and validated so that this Motion is properly returnable today and hereby dispenses with further service thereof.

[93] **PERMITS** service of this Order at any time and place and by any means whatsoever.

SALE APPROVAL

[94] **ORDERS and DECLARES** that the transaction (the “**Transaction**”) contemplated by the Share Purchase Agreement is hereby approved, and the execution of the Share Purchase Agreement by CQIM is hereby authorized and approved, *nunc pro tunc*, with such non-material alterations, changes, amendments, deletions or additions thereto as may be agreed to but only with the consent of the Monitor.

[95] **AUTHORIZES and DIRECTS** the Monitor to hold the Deposit, *nunc pro tunc*, and to apply, disburse and/or deliver the Deposit or the applicable portions thereof in accordance with the provisions of the Share Purchase Agreement.

EXECUTION OF DOCUMENTATION

[96] **AUTHORIZES and DIRECTS** CQIM and the Monitor to perform all acts, sign all documents and take any necessary action to execute any agreement, contract, deed, provision, transaction or undertaking stipulated in or contemplated by the Share Purchase Agreement (Exhibit R-12) and any other ancillary document which could be required or useful to give full and complete effect thereto.

AUTHORIZATION

[97] **ORDERS and DECLARES** that this Order shall constitute the only authorization required by CQIM to proceed with the Transaction and that no shareholder approval, if applicable, shall be required in connection therewith.

VESTING OF THE AMALCO SHARES

[98] **ORDERS and DECLARES** that upon the issuance of a Monitor’s certificate substantially in the form appended as **Schedule “A”** hereto (the “**Certificate**”), all of CQIM’s right, title and interest in and to the Amalco Shares shall vest absolutely and exclusively in and with the Purchaser, free and clear of and from any and all right, title,

benefits, priorities, claims (including claims provable in bankruptcy in the event that CQIM should be adjudged bankrupt), liabilities (direct, indirect, absolute or contingent), obligations, interests, prior claims, security interests (whether contractual, statutory or otherwise), liens, charges, hypothecs, mortgages, pledges, trusts, deemed trusts (whether contractual, statutory, or otherwise), assignments, judgments, executions, writs of seizure or execution, notices of sale, options, agreements, rights of distress, legal, equitable or contractual setoff, adverse claims, levies, taxes, disputes, debts, charges, rights of first refusal or other pre-emptive rights in favour of third parties, restrictions on transfer of title, or other claims or encumbrances, whether or not they have attached or been perfected, registered, published or filed and whether secured, unsecured or otherwise (collectively, the “**Encumbrances**”) by or of any and all persons or entities of any kind whatsoever, including without limiting the generality of the foregoing (i) any Encumbrances created by the Initial Order of this Court dated January 27, 2015 (as amended on February 20, 2015 and as may be further amended from time to time), and (ii) all charges, security interests or charges evidenced by registration, publication or filing pursuant to the Civil Code of Québec, the Ontario Personal Property Security Act, the British Columbia Personal Property Security Act or any other applicable legislation providing for a security interest in personal or movable property, and, for greater certainty, **ORDERS** that all of the Encumbrances affecting or relating to the Amalco Shares be expunged and discharged as against the Amalco Shares, in each case effective as of the applicable time and date of the Certificate.

[99] **ORDERS and DIRECTS** the Monitor to file with the Court a copy of the Certificate, forthwith after issuance thereof.

[100] **DECLARES** that the Monitor shall be at liberty to rely exclusively on the Conditions Certificates in issuing the Certificate, without any obligation to independently confirm or verify the waiver or satisfaction of the applicable conditions.

[101] **AUTHORIZES and DIRECTS** the Monitor to receive and hold the Purchase Price and to remit the Purchase Price in accordance with the provisions of this Order.

[102] **AUTHORIZES and DIRECTS** the Monitor to remit, following closing of the Transaction, that portion of the Purchase Price payable to the Non-Filing Sellers, to the Non-Filing Sellers in accordance with the Purchase Price Allocation described under Exhibit D of the Share Purchase Agreement (Exhibit R-12), as it may be amended by the Non-Filing Sellers, or as the Non-Filing Sellers may otherwise direct.

CANCELLATION OF SECURITY REGISTRATIONS

[103] **ORDERS** the Québec Personal and Movable Real Rights Registrar, upon presentation of the required form with a true copy of this Order and the Certificate, to reduce the scope of or strike the registrations in connection with the Amalco Shares, listed in **Schedule “B”** hereto, in order to allow the transfer to the Purchaser of the Amalco Shares free and clear of such registrations.

[104] **ORDERS** that upon the issuance of the Certificate, CQIM shall be authorized and directed to take all such steps as may be necessary to effect the discharge of all Encumbrances registered against the Amalco Shares, including filing such financing

change statements in the Ontario Personal Property Registry (“**OPPR**”) as may be necessary, from any registration filed against CQIM in the OPPR, provided that CQIM shall not be authorized or directed to effect any discharge that would have the effect of releasing any collateral other than the Amalco Shares, and CQIM shall be authorized to take any further steps by way of further application to this Court.

[105] **ORDERS** that upon the issuance of the Certificate, CQIM shall be authorized and directed to take all such steps as may be necessary to effect the discharge of all Encumbrances registered against the Amalco Shares, including filing such financing change statements in the British Columbia Personal Property Security Registry (the “**BCPPR**”) as may be necessary, from any registration filed against CQIM in the BCPPR, provided that CQIM shall not be authorized or directed to effect any discharge that would have the effect of releasing any collateral other than the Amalco Shares, and CQIM shall be authorized to take any further steps by way of further application to this Court.

CQIM NET PROCEEDS

[106] **ORDERS** that the proportion of the Purchase Price payable to CQIM in accordance with the Share Purchase Agreement (the “**CQIM Net Proceeds**”) shall be remitted to the Monitor and shall be held by the Monitor pending further order of the Court.

[107] **ORDERS** that for the purposes of determining the nature and priority of the Encumbrances, the CQIM Net Proceeds shall stand in the place and stead of the Amalco Shares, and that upon payment of the Purchase Price by the Purchaser, all Encumbrances shall attach to the CQIM Net Proceeds with the same priority as they had with respect to the Amalco Shares immediately prior to the sale, as if the Amalco Shares had not been sold and remained in the possession or control of the person having that possession or control immediately prior to the sale.

VALIDITY OF THE TRANSACTION

[108] **ORDERS** that notwithstanding:

- a) the pendency of these proceedings;
- b) any petition for a receiving order now or hereafter issued pursuant to the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (“**BIA**”) and any order issued pursuant to any such petition; or
- c) the provisions of any federal or provincial legislation;

the vesting of the Amalco Shares contemplated in this Order, as well as the execution of the Share Purchase Agreement pursuant to this Order, are to be binding on any trustee in bankruptcy that may be appointed, and shall not be void or voidable nor deemed to be a preference, assignment, fraudulent conveyance, transfer at undervalue or other reviewable transaction under the BIA or any other applicable federal or provincial legislation, as against CQIM,

the Purchaser or the Monitor, and shall not constitute oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct pursuant to any applicable federal or provincial legislation.

LIMITATION OF LIABILITY

[109] **DECLARES** that, subject to other orders of this Court, nothing herein contained shall require the Monitor to take control, or to otherwise manage all or any part of the Purchased Shares. The Monitor shall not, as a result of this Order, be deemed to be in possession of any of the Purchased Shares within the meaning of environmental legislation, the whole pursuant to the terms of the CCAA.

[110] **DECLARES** that no action lies against the Monitor by reason of this Order or the performance of any act authorized by this Order, except by leave of the Court. The entities related to the Monitor or belonging to the same group as the Monitor shall benefit from the protection arising under the present paragraph.

CONFIDENTIALITY

[111] **ORDERS** that the unredacted Initial Purchase Agreement filed with the Court as Exhibit R-3, the summary of the two LOIs filed with the Court as Exhibit R-8, the unredacted Share Purchase Agreement filed with the Court as Exhibit R-12 and the unredacted blackline of the Share Purchase Agreement showing changes from the Initial Purchase Agreement filed with the Court as Exhibit R-16 shall be sealed, kept confidential and not form part of the public record, but rather shall be placed, separate and apart from all other contents of the Court file, in a sealed envelope attached to a notice that sets out the title of these proceedings and a statement that the contents are subject to a sealing order and shall only be opened upon further Order of the Court.

GENERAL

[112] **DECLARES** that this Order shall have full force and effect in all provinces and territories in Canada.

[113] **DECLARES** that the Monitor shall be authorized to apply as it may consider necessary or desirable, with or without notice, to any other court or administrative body, whether in Canada, the United States of America or elsewhere, for orders which aid and complement this Order and, without limitation to the foregoing, an order under Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, for which the Monitor shall be the foreign representative of the Petitioners and Mises-en-cause. All courts and administrative bodies of all such jurisdictions are hereby respectfully requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to the Monitor as may be deemed necessary or appropriate for that purpose.

[114] **REQUESTS** the aid and recognition of any court or administrative body in any Province of Canada and any Canadian federal court or administrative body and any federal or state court or administrative body in the United States of America and any court or administrative body elsewhere, to act in aid of and to be complementary to this Court in carrying out the terms of this Order.

[115] **ORDERS** the provisional execution of the present Order notwithstanding any appeal and without the requirement to provide any security or provision for costs whatsoever.

[116] **THE WHOLE WITHOUT COSTS.**

STEPHEN W. HAMILTON J.S.C.

Me Bernard Boucher
Me Sébastien Guy
Me Steven J. Weisz
BLAKE, CASSELS & GRAYDON, S.E.N.C.R.L.
for:

Bloom Lake General Partner Limited
Quinto Mining Corporation
8568391 Canada Limited
Cliffs Quebec Iron Mining ULC
The Bloom Lake Iron Ore Mine Limited Partnership
Bloom Lake Railway Company Limited

Me Sylvain Rigaud
Me Chrystal Ashby
NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT CANADA S.E.N.C.R.L.
for:
FTI Consulting Canada Inc.

Me Jean-Yves Simard
LAVERY DE BILLY, S.E.N.C.R.L.
Me Sean Zweig
BENNETT JONES
for:
9201955 CANADA INC.

Me Stéphane Hébert
Me Maurice Fleming
MILLER THOMSON, S.E.N.C.R.L./LLP
for:

Eabametoong First Nation
Ginoogaming First Nation
Constance Lake First Nation and
Long Lake # 58 First Nation
Aroland First Nation
Marten Falls First Nation

Me Sandra Abitan
Me Éric Préfontaine
Me Julien Morissette
OSLER, HOSKIN & HARCOURT, S.E.N.C.R.L./S.R.L.
for:
8901341 Canada inc.
Canadian Development and Marketing Corporation

Date of hearing: April 24, 2015

SCHEDULE “A”
FORM OF CERTIFICATE OF THE MONITOR
SUPERIOR COURT
 (Commercial Division)

C A N A D A
PROVINCE OF QUÉBEC
DISTRICT OF MONTRÉAL
File: No: 500-11-048114-157

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES’ CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED:

BLOOM LAKE GENERAL PARTNER LIMITED

QUINTO MINING CORPORATION

8568391 CANADA LIMITED

CLIFFS QUEBEC IRON MINING ULC

Petitioners

-and-

THE BLOOM LAKE IRON ORE MINE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

BLOOM LAKE RAILWAY COMPANY LIMITED

Mises-en-cause

-and-

9201955 CANADA INC.

Mise-en-cause

-and-

THE REGISTRAR OF THE REGISTER OF PERSONAL AND MOVABLE REAL RIGHTS

Mise-en-cause

-and-

FTI CONSULTING CANADA INC.

Monitor

CERTIFICATE OF THE MONITOR

RECITALS

- A.** Pursuant to an initial order rendered by the Honourable Mr. Justice Martin Catonguay, J.S.C., of the Superior Court of Québec, [Commercial Division] (the “**Court**”) on January 27, 2015 (as amended on February 20, 2015 and as may be further amended from time to time, the “**Initial Order**”), FTI Consulting Canada Inc. (the “**Monitor**”) was appointed to monitor the business and financial affairs of the Petitioners and the Mises-en-cause (together with the Petitioners, the “**CCAA Parties**”).

- B.** Pursuant to an order (the “**Approval and Vesting Order**”) rendered by the Court on <*>, 2015, the transaction contemplated by the Share Purchase Agreement dated as of March 22, 2015, as amended and restated as of April 17, 2015 (the “**Share Purchase Agreement**”) by and among Petitioner Cliffs Québec Iron Mining ULC (“**CQIM**”), Cliffs Greene B.V., Cliffs Netherlands B.V. and the Additional Sellers (as defined therein), as vendors, Noront Resources Ltd., as parent, and 9201955 Canada Inc., as purchaser (the “**Purchaser**”) was authorized and approved, with a view, *inter alia*, to vest in and to the Purchaser, all of CQIM’s right, title and interest in and to the Amalco Shares.
- C.** Each capitalized term used and not defined herein has the meaning given to such term in the Share Purchase Agreement.
- D.** The Approval and Vesting Order provides for the vesting of all of CQIM’s right, title and interest in and to the Amalco Shares in the Purchaser, in accordance with the terms of the Approval and Vesting Order and upon the delivery of a certificate (the “**Certificate**”) issued by the Monitor confirming that the Sellers and the Purchaser have each delivered Conditions Certificates to the Monitor.
- E.** In accordance with the Approval and Vesting Order, the Monitor has the power to authorize, execute and deliver this Certificate.
- F.** The Approval and Vesting Order also directed the Monitor to file with the Court, a copy of this Certificate forthwith after issuance thereof.

THEREFORE, THE MONITOR CERTIFIES THE FOLLOWING:

- A.** The Sellers and the Purchaser have each delivered to the Monitor the Conditions Certificates evidencing that all applicable conditions under the Share Purchase Agreement have been satisfied and/or waived, as applicable.
- B.** The Closing Time is deemed to have occurred on at <TIME> on <*>, 2015.

THIS CERTIFICATE was issued by the Monitor at <TIME> on <*>, 2015.

FTI Consulting Canada Inc., in its capacity as
Monitor of the CCAA Parties, and not in its
personal capacity.

By: _____

Name Nigel Meakin

:

**SCHEDULE “B”
REGISTRATIONS TO BE REDUCED OR STRICKEN**

Nil.

[NTD: Updated searches will be run before motion is heard to confirm no registrations in Quebec.]

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Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta

Citation: Sanjel Corporation (Re), 2016 ABQB 257

Date: 05162016
Docket: 1601 03143
Registry: Calgary

In the matter of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36,
as amended

And in the matter of the Compromise or Arrangement of Sanjel Corporation, Sanjel Canada Ltd., Terracor Group Ltd., Suretech Group Ltd., Suretech Completions Canada Ltd., Sanjel Energy Services (USA) Inc., Sanjel (USA) Inc., Suretech Completions (USA) Inc., Sanjel Capital (USA) Inc., Terracor (USA) Inc., Terracor Resources (USA) Inc., Terracor Logistics (USA) Inc., Sanjel Middle East Ltd., Sanjel Latin America Limited and Sanjel Energy Services DMCC

Reasons for Decision
of the
Honourable Madam Justice B.E. Romaine

I. Introduction

[1] The Sanjel debtors seek orders approving certain sales of assets generated through a SISP that was conducted prior to the debtors filing under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*. The proceeds of the sales will be insufficient to fully payout the secured creditor, and will generate no return to unsecured creditors, including the holders of unsecured Bonds.

[2] The Trustee of the Bonds challenged the process under which the SISP was conducted, and the use of what he characterized as a liquidating CCAA in this situation. He alleged that the use of the CCAA to effect a pre-packaged sale of the debtors' assets for the benefit of the secured creditor was an abuse of the letter and spirit of the CCAA. He also alleged that bad faith and collusion tainted the integrity of the SISP.

[3] After reviewing extensive evidence and hearing submissions from interested parties, I decided to allow the application to approve the sales, and dismiss the application of the Trustee. These are my reasons.

II. Facts

[4] On April 4, 2016, the Sanjel Corporation and its affiliates were granted an Initial Order under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-36, as amended. PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc., ("PWC") was appointed as Monitor of the applicants.

[5] Sanjel and its affiliates (the "Sanjel Group" or "Sanjel") provide fracturing, cementing, coiled tubing and reservoir services to the oil and gas industry in Canada, the United States and Saudi Arabia. Sanjel Corporation, the parent company, is a private corporation, the shares of which are owned by the MacDonald Group Ltd. It was incorporated under the *Alberta Business Corporations Act* in 1980, and its principal executive and registered office is located in Calgary. Four of the other members of the group were incorporated in Alberta, seven in various American states and three in offshore jurisdictions.

[6] The sole director of all Canadian and US Sanjel companies resides in Calgary, as do all of the officers of these companies. The affidavit in support of the Initial Order sets out a number of factors relevant to the Sanjel Group's ability to file under the CCAA and that would be relevant to a determination of a Centre of Main Interest ("COMI") of the Sanjel Group. In subsequent Chapter 15 proceedings in the United States, the US Court declared COMI to be located in Canada and the CCAA proceedings to be a "foreign main proceeding." It is clear that the Sanjel Group is a fully integrated business centralized in Calgary.

[7] Sanjel Corporation and Sanjel (USA) Inc. are borrowers under a credit agreement (the "Bank Credit Facility") dated April 21, 2015 with a banking syndicate (the "Syndicate") led by Alberta Treasury Branches as agent. The total amount outstanding under the Bank Credit Facility at the time of the CCAA filing was approximately \$415.5 million. The Syndicate has perfected security interests over substantially all of the assets of the Sanjel Group, and is the principal secured creditor of the Sanjel Group in these CCAA proceedings.

[8] On June 18, 2014, Sanjel Corporation issued US \$300 million 7.5% Callable Bonds due June 19, 2019. Interest is payable on the Bonds semi-annually on June 19 and December 19. The Bonds are unsecured. Nordic Trust ASA (the "Trustee") is the trustee under the Bond Agreement.

[9] The Sanjel Group has been severely impacted by the catastrophic drop in global oil and gas prices since mid-2014. Over the last 18 months, the Sanjel Group has taken aggressive steps to cut costs, including by reducing staffing levels by more than half. However, by late October, 2015, Sanjel Corporation was in breach of certain covenants under the Bank Credit Facility. By late December, 2016, the Syndicate was in a position to exercise enforcement rights. In addition, an interest payment of USD \$11,250,000 was due on the Bonds on December 19, 2015. Since late 2015, the Sanjel Group has been in negotiations with both the Syndicate and two bondholders, Ascribe Capital LLC and Clearlake Capital Group L.P., (the "Ad Hoc Bondholders"). The Ad Hoc Bondholders hold over 45% of the Bonds.

[10] In the fall of 2015, Sanjel Corporation engaged Bank of America Merrill Lynch ("BAML") to identify strategic partners and attempt to raise additional capital for the Sanjel Group. BAML contacted 28 private equity firms; 19 non-disclosure agreements were executed and 9 management presentations were made. However, the BAML process did not result in a successful transaction.

[11] In December, 2015, the Ad Hoc Bondholders retained a New York law firm, Fried Frank, as their legal advisor and Moelis & Company as their financial advisor.

[12] On December 10, 2015, Fried Frank conveyed a proposal from the Ad Hoc Bondholders to Sanjel. Under this proposal, Sanjel would be required to pay the USD \$11,250,000 interest payment. Provided that the interest payment was made, the bondholders would agree to a standstill agreement for the same period as may be agreed with the Syndicate. In return, the Ad Hoc Bondholders would lend back their pro rata share of that interest payment to Sanjel in return for secured notes ranking *pari passu* with the Bank Credit Facility, bearing interest at the same rate as the Bank Credit Facility plus 2%. The new notes would not be repaid until the Bank Credit Facility was repaid.

[13] The Ad Hoc Bondholders indicated that they would consider acting as standby lenders to Sanjel for the remainder of the interest payment and would offer the other bondholders the option of lending back their pro-rata share to Sanjel on the same basis. If they agreed to be standby lenders, the Ad Hoc Bondholders would receive a commitment fee equal to 10% of their standby commitment, payable in new notes.

[14] The proposal letter indicated that the Ad Hoc Bondholders were aware that Sanjel had been engaged in a process to address liquidity and leverage issues over the past few months, including attempting to raise equity to sell assets. In their view, Sanjel had exhausted those efforts, and the only remaining option was a deal negotiated with the bondholders. However, the Ad Hoc Bondholders would only embark on such a process if the December 19, 2015 interest payment was made.

[15] Sanjel rejected the proposal on December 14, 2015. It is noteworthy that the Bank Credit Facility includes a negative covenant prohibiting Sanjel from granting a security interest over its assets. The Syndicate advised Sanjel that the Ad Hoc Bondholders' proposal to have their existing unsecured position elevated to rank *pari passu* with the Bank Credit Facility was unacceptable, and that it would not provide its consent.

[16] On December 15, 2015, the Ad Hoc Bondholders advised counsel to the Syndicate that they wished to work towards a restructuring, which they envisaged would involve paying down a portion of the Syndicate's debt "in an amount to be mutually agreed on". They also suggested that Sanjel would implement a rights offering to holders of Bonds and then to existing equity, with a conversion of the Bonds into new debt and equity.

[17] On or about December 15, 2015, the Ad Hoc Bondholders sent Sanjel a draft waiver and standstill agreement, which required the payment of part of the December 19 interest payment by December 23, 2015 and the payment of the fees and disbursements of Fried Frank and Moelis in return for arranging for a bondholder meeting to be called to consider a period of forbearance to March 31, 2016.

[18] Fried Frank and Moelis executed Non-Disclosure Agreements ("NDAs") on December 24, 2015, but the Ad Hoc Bondholders did not, thus not restricting their right to trade the Bonds. Fried Frank and Moelis were granted access to a Sanjel virtual database ("VDR") on January 9, 2016.

[19] By January, 2016, given the prolonged downturn in oil and gas prices, Sanjel's liquidity was limited. Events of default under the Bank Credit Facility that had occurred as of October 31, 2015 were exacerbated by a cross-default based on the non-payment of interest under the Bond

Agreement. As of January 31, 2016, the Sanjel Group had total consolidated liabilities of approximately \$1.064 billion.

[20] Sanjel was facing very significant negative cash flow projections over the next few months. As of early January, 2016, Sanjel's projected cash flows showed that its cash position would deteriorate by more than half as of the first week of April, 2016, and would be further reduced by anticipated forbearance payments.

[21] In the circumstances, Sanjel agreed with the Syndicate to implement a Sales and Investment Solicitation Process ("SISP"). Sanjel states that it hoped that if a SISP was implemented, it might find a transaction that preserved the business as a going concern, which would maximize stakeholder value and preserve goodwill and jobs.

[22] In mid-January, 2016, Sanjel engaged PWC as a proposed Monitor in the event it would become necessary to file under the CCAA.

[23] The SISP was commenced on behalf of Sanjel by its financial advisors, PJT Partners Inc. ("PJT") and Credit Suisse Securities (CANADA), Inc. ("CS") on January 17, 2016. The advisors contacted prospective bidders, many of whom had already been identified through the BAML process of late 2015.

[24] The process of soliciting non-bidding indications of interest ran from January 17, 2016 to February 22, 2016. On January 26, 2016, the advisers updated and opened a VDR available to anyone who had signed a NDA. A teaser letter was distributed and meetings and conference calls were held with bidders. A process letter was distributed on January 28, 2016. Nine indications of interest were submitted on or about February 22, 2016.

[25] Before and during the SISP process, Sanjel was negotiating with both the Syndicate and the Ad Hoc Bondholders with respect to separate forbearance agreements, and with the Ad Hoc Bondholders with respect to NDAs to be signed by the Ad Hoc Bondholders. The Ad Hoc Bondholders complain that there was a delay of almost a month before Sanjel's counsel responded to a mark-up of a NDA provided by Fried Frank, but negotiations were stymied by the Ad Hoc Bondholders' insistence that the December interest payment be paid. Until this issue was settled, there was no reason to finalize the NDAs. In addition, it was not until January 29, 2016 that representatives of the Ad Hoc Bondholders advised Sanjel that they were prepared to be restricted from trading and therefore able to receive confidential information. During this period of time, the Ad Hoc Bondholders refused to meet with Sanjel management when they travelled to New York on January 20, 2016.

[26] On February 1, 2016, counsel to Sanjel sent counsel to the Ad Hoc Bondholders a copy of the draft forbearance agreement between the Syndicate and Sanjel, which set out the key dates of the SISP, including the completion of definitive purchase and sales agreements by March 24, 2016. It would have been clear to the Ad Hoc Bondholders from this draft that Sanjel was proceeding on a dual track basis, considering both a potential stand-alone restructuring of the company and a sales process.

[27] The Ad Hoc Bondholders made a second proposal to Sanjel on February 2, 2016, very shortly after the NDAs were signed. This proposal involved the Syndicate recovering a portion of its loan from Sanjel's existing cash reserves and a rights offering backstopped by the Ad Hoc Bondholders. A portion of the Bonds would be converted into equity. The December interest payment would have to be paid. Sanjel's management team met with the Ad Hoc Bondholders

and their advisors in New York on February 3, 2016 and Sanjel's team, the Syndicate and its advisors and the Ad Hoc Bondholders met on February 8, 2016.

[28] Sanjel delivered an indicative restructuring term sheet to the Ad Hoc Bondholders on February 12, 2016, as required by the forbearance agreement that the parties were negotiating. The restructuring term sheet emphasized that a bondholder-led restructuring would require significant new money, a significant capital commitment and ongoing capital, with a significant pay-down of the Syndicate's debt.

[29] Commencing on February 15, 2016, Sanjel allowed representatives of Alvarez and Marsal ("A&M"), advisors to the Ad Hoc Bondholders, to attend in Calgary and conduct due diligence.

[30] On February 18, 2016, Sanjel uploaded to its VDR the final, unsigned versions of the Syndicate Amending and Forbearance Agreement and the Bondholders Forbearance Agreement.

[31] Under the SISP, preliminary, non-binding indications of interest were delivered to the advisors and the company by February 22, 2016. Six such indications of interest were received, all of which were materially superior to the Ad Hoc Bondholders proposal of February 2, 2016. The Ad Hoc Bondholders have admitted that they were aware of the milestones under the SISP and the Bank Forbearance Agreement by mid-February, 2016, although it is clear that their advisors would have been aware of these milestones from February 1, 2016.

[32] As part of finalizing the form of Bond Forbearance Agreement, counsel for Sanjel and for the Ad Hoc Bondholders had negotiated a form of summons that would be used to call a bondholder meeting to consider the agreement. The only item for consideration to be considered at the meeting was to be the Bond Forbearance Agreement. The plan was to have 2/3 of the bondholders approve and execute the Bond Forbearance Agreement, and then to hold a bondholders meeting.

[33] Instead, on February 25, 2016, the Ad Hoc Bondholders caused the Trustee to issue a summons for a meeting on March 10, 2016 to consider and vote on a) whether to declare the Bonds in default, accelerate them and exercise remedies, including commencing involuntary bankruptcy proceedings against Sanjel under Chapter 11 of the *United States Bankruptcy Code*, including claims against the MacDonald family and MacBain Properties Ltd., which owns the business premises that are leased by the Sanjel Group or b) approve the Bond Forbearance Agreement.

[34] On March 2, 2016, the Ad Hoc Bondholders submitted a restructuring proposal to Sanjel. This proposal provided no cash recovery to the Syndicate. Instead, a portion of the debt owed to the Syndicate would be converted to a new loan and the remainder extinguished, with the Syndicate receiving warrants in a reorganized company. There would be a Chapter 11 filing and the bondholders would provide a debtor-in-possession ("DIP") facility to rank *pari passu* with the Syndicate debt. Bondholders who contributed to the DIP would receive new 2nd lien notes for part of their previous notes, the remainder being extinguished. The DIP facility would be converted into 100% of the equity of the reorganized company. Sanjel would be required to appoint a Chief Restructuring Officer ("CRO") designated by the Ad Hoc Bondholders.

[35] On March 4, 2016, in a follow-up letter to a telephone meeting on March 3, 2016, US counsel to the Syndicate wrote to Fried Frank requesting that the March 10 bondholders meeting

be adjourned to March 31, 2016. Canadian counsel to Sanjel made the same request of the Trustee.

[36] Also on March 4, 2016, a template Asset Purchase Agreement (“APA”) for SISP bidders was posted on the VDRs, which disclosed a CCAA/Chapter 15 filing with PWC as designated Monitor. This template agreement was available to the Ad Hoc Bondholders and their advisors.

[37] Counsel for the Ad Hoc Bondholders replied on March 5, 2016 that they would advise the Trustee to postpone the March 10 meeting subject to:

- a) a response to their March 2 proposal by March 10, 2016;
- b) full disclosure of company records for A&M’s representative, “so that [that representative] is ready and best positioned to commence his duties as Chief Restructuring Officer for the Company”.
- c) payment by March 7, 2016 of roughly USD \$2.2 million in fees and disbursements for the Ad Hoc Bondholders’ legal and financial advisors.

[38] After some negotiation, Sanjel agreed to these terms for an adjournment, other than with respect to a small deduction in fees and disbursements. Sanjel made it clear that it reserved all rights with respect to the appointment of a CRO and a filing under Chapter 11, which it would not agree to at that time. On March 8, 2016 the Trustee confirmed that the meeting would be postponed to March 31.

[39] On March 9, 2016, second round bids under the SISP were received. Five bids were received, all of which were materially superior to the Ad Hoc Bondholders’ March 2, 2016 proposal in terms of cash recovery for the Syndicate.

[40] An information update conference for bondholders was scheduled to be held on March 11, 2016, at which Sanjel, the Trustee and the Ad Hoc Bondholders would provide an update to any bondholder that wished to call in. This was rescheduled by the Trustee to March 31, 2016.

[41] On March 11, 2016, the Syndicate sent the counter-offer required by the postponement of meeting agreement to the Ad Hoc Bondholders. This counter-proposal made it clear that there would be a CCAA/Chapter 15 process, rather than a Chapter 11 process. While this counter-proposal is confidential, it is fair to say that the parties were far apart in their negotiations, particularly with respect to treatment of the Syndicate indebtedness.

[42] Also on March 11, 2016, a representative of Sanjel met with A&M’s representative and discussed Sanjel’s intention to disclaim certain leases in the anticipated CCAA proceedings.

[43] Following receipt of the second round bids, Sanjel and its advisors identified the top three bidders and began negotiations with them with the goal of finalizing due diligence and being in a position to execute final APAs on March 24, 2016, as indicated in the Bank Forbearance Agreement.

[44] In the meantime, Sanjel continued meetings with the A&M representative, who asked for, and was provided with:

- a) access to the newly created VDR for second stage bidders/investors in the SISP on March 12, 2016.

- b) draft materials relating to the CCAA filing, including current drafts of cash flow projections and drafts of stakeholder communication regarding the CCAA, on March 21, 2016.

[45] On March 20, 2016, the Ad Hoc Bondholders provided Sanjel and the Syndicate with a third restructuring proposal. This one provided for some paydown of the Syndicate's debt, but involved less than half of that recovery in new money, about the same amount in debt secured by accounts receivable and a substantial amount of bank debt rolled over into a new loan. It also provided for a DIP facility to rank *pari passu* with a new bank credit facility in the event of a liquidation and the conversion of some bondholder debt into secured notes.

[46] On March 23, 2016, counsel for Sanjel requested that the Trustee postpone the bondholder meeting scheduled for March 31, 2016 to April 14, 2016. He also proposed to set up the requested informational update on March 31, 2016. On March 25, 2016, counsel for the Trustee consented to this request.

[47] In the SISP, final bids were received from the three top bidders on March 24, 2016, with negotiations to continue on final APAs. On the same day, Sanjel and its advisors hosted a call with A&M and Moelis, during which they walked through a 13 week cash forecast.

[48] On March 31, 2016 the Syndicate and the Ad Hoc Bondholders had discussions with respect to the Ad Hoc Bondholders' March 20 proposal. In previous correspondence, the Syndicate's counsel had questioned the adequacy of the proposed DIP financing in the proposal and noted Sanjel's significant cash needs following exit from an insolvency proceeding, as opposed to the proposal's assumption that there would be better cash flow. At the conclusion of the call, the Ad Hoc Bondholders indicated that they would provide further modelling with respect to their proposal.

[49] On April 3, 2016, Sanjel entered into final APAs with the proposed purchasers, STEP and Liberty. On April 4, 2016, the Sanjel Group filed for CCAA protection. Counsel for Sanjel Group disclosed that the application was made without notice to the Ad Hoc Bondholders. He submitted that notice would imperil the CCAA proceedings as the bondholders may, with notice, have pre-empted the CCAA filing by an involuntary filing under Chapter 11. There is no requirement to give notice to unsecured creditors of a CCAA filing. There are circumstances, and this was one of them, where it is appropriate to seek an initial order on an ex parte basis:

This may be an appropriate – even necessary – step in order to prevent “creditors from moving to realize on their claims, essentially a ‘stampede to the assets’ once creditors learn of the debtor’s financial distress”: J.P. Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act* (2007), at p. 55 (“Rescue!”); see also *Algoma Steel Inc., Re* (2001), 25 C.B.R. (4th) 194 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 7

[50] On April 11, 2016, the Ad Hoc Bondholders presented their fourth proposal for restructuring, not to Sanjel but to the Syndicate. This proposal increases the amount the bondholders would contribute to Sanjel for new equity, which would be used to repay a portion of the Syndicate's loan.

[51] According to Fried Frank, the Syndicate's counsel responded on April 13, 2016 advising that while they appreciated the work done by the Ad Hoc Bondholders, the Syndicate preferred the sale route. The Syndicate proposed alternatives that it might consider involving a higher pay-

out of the Syndicate's debt than offered by the April 11, 2016 proposal. The Ad Hoc Bondholders have not responded.

[52] The Sanjel Group apply for an order approving the sales transactions generated through the SISP, being a sales agreement between Sanjel and STEP Energy Services Ltd., including an assignment of the sale of the debtor's cementing assets in favour of 1961531 Alberta Ltd., and a sales agreement between Sanjel and Liberty.

[53] The Trustee applied for an order dismissing the application for approval of these transactions, allowing the Ad Hoc Bondholders to propose a plan of arrangement, lifting the stay to allow the Trustee to commence a Chapter 11 filing and directing a new Court-monitored SISP, among other applications

III. Applicable Law

[54] Section 36(3) of the CCAA sets out six non-exhaustive factors that must be considered in approving a sale by a CCAA debtor of assets outside the ordinary course of business. They are:

- (a) whether the process leading to the proposed sale was reasonable in the circumstances;
- (b) whether the Monitor approved the process leading to the proposed sale;
- (c) whether the Monitor filed with the court a report stating that in its opinion the sale would be more beneficial to creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy;
- (d) the extent to which the creditors were consulted;
- (e) the effects of the proposed sale on creditors and other interested parties; and
- (f) whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value.

[55] In this case, the Monitor was not in place at the time of the process leading to the proposed sales, nor at the time the SISP was commenced. However, the Monitor has given an opinion on the process, which I will consider as part of my review.

[56] Prior to the enactment of section 36, CCAA courts considered what are known as the Soundair principles in considering approval application, and they are still useful guidelines:

- a) Was there a sufficient effort made to get the price at issue? Did the debtor company act improvidently?
- b) Were the interests of all parties considered?
- c) Are there any questions about the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers were obtained?
- d) Was there unfairness in the working out of the process?

Royal Bank v Soundair, 1991 Carswell Ont (Ont CA) at para 20.

[57] Gascon, J. (as he then was) suggested in *Re AbitibiBowater, Inc*, 2010 QCCS 1742 (C.S. Que.) at paras 70-72 that a court should give due consideration to two further factors:

- a) the business judgment rule, in that a court will not lightly interfere with the exercise of the commercial and business judgment of the debtor company and the

- monitor in the context of an asset sale where the marketing and sale process was fair, reasonable, transparent and efficient; and
- b) the weight to be given to the recommendation of the monitor.

[58] As noted by Gascon, J., it is not desirable for a bidder to wait to the last minute, even up to a court approval stage, to submit its best offer. However, a court can consider such an offer, if it is evidence that the debtor company did not properly carry out its duty to obtain the best price for creditors.

IV. Analysis

[59] The Trustee has raised a number of objections to the proposed sales, many of which relate to the factors and principles set out in section 36 of the CCAA, the Soundair principles and the AbitibiBowater factors:

- A. The Trustee submits that the CCAA can only be used to liquidate the assets of a debtor company and distribute the proceeds where such use is uncontested or where there is clear evidence that the CCAA provides scope for greater recoveries than would be available on a bankruptcy.

[60] Most of the cases relied upon by the Trustee with respect to this submission predate the 2009 enactment of section 36 of the CCAA. While prior to this change to the CCAA, there was some authority that questioned whether the CCAA should be used to carry out a liquidation of a debtors' assets, there was also authority that accepted this as a proper use of the statute .

[61] An analysis of the pre-section 36 state of the law on this issue, and support for the latter view, is well summarized in *Re Nortel Networks Corp.*, [2009] O.J. No. 3169. As noted by Morawetz, J. at para 28 of that decision, the CCAA is a flexible statute, particularly useful in complex insolvency cases in which the court is required to balance numerous constituents and myriad interests. This is such a case.

[62] Section 36 now provides that a CCAA court may authorize the sale or disposition of assets outside the ordinary course of business if authorized to do so by court order. There is thus no jurisdictional impediment to the sale of assets where such sales meet the requisite tests, even in the absence of a plan of arrangement.

[63] Morawetz, J in *Re Target Canada Co.*, 2015 ONSC 303 at paras 32 and 33, describes the change brought about by section 36:

Prior to the 2009 amendments to the CCAA, Canadian courts accepted that, in appropriate circumstances, debtor companies were entitled to seek the protection of the CCAA where the outcome was not going to be a going concern restructuring, but instead, a "liquidation" or wind-down of the debtor companies' assets or business.

The 2009 amendments did not expressly address whether the CCAA could be used generally to wind-down the business of a debtor company. However, I am satisfied that the enactment of section 36 of the CCAA, which establishes a process for a debtor company to sell assets outside the ordinary course of business while under CCAA protection, is consistent with the principle that the CCAA can be a vehicle to downsize or wind-down a debtor company's business.

See also *Re Brainhunter Inc.*, 2009 CarswellOnt 8207 at para 15.

[64] Whether before or after the enactment of section 36, Canadian courts have approved en bloc sales of a debtor company, recognizing that such sales are consistent with the broad remedial purpose and flexibility of the CCAA.

[65] What the provisions of the CCAA can provide in situations such as those facing the Sanjel Group is a court-supervised process of the execution of the sales, with provision for liquidity and the continuation of the business through the process provided by interim financing, a Key Employee Retention Plan that attempts to ensure that key employees are given an incentive to ensure a seamless transition, critical supplier relief that keeps operations functioning pending the closing of the sales and a process whereby a company with operations in Canada, the United States and internationally is able to invoke the aid of both Canadian and US courts during the process. It is true that the actual SISP process preceded the CCAA filing, and I will address that factor later in this decision.

[66] As counsel to the Sanjel Group notes, this type of insolvency proceeding is well-suited to the current catastrophic downturn of the economy in Alberta, with companies at the limit of their liquidity. It allows a business to be kept together and sold as a going concern to the extent possible. There have been a number of recent similar filings in this jurisdiction: the filing in Southern Pacific and Quicksilver are examples.

[67] The Monitor supports the sales, and is of the view, supported by investigation into the likely range of forced sale liquidation recoveries with financial advisors and others with industry knowledge, that a liquidation of assets would not generate a better result than the consideration contemplated by the proposed sales. The Monitor's investigations were hampered by the lack of recent sales of similar businesses, but I am satisfied by its thorough report that the Monitor's investigation of likely recoveries is the best estimate available. A CS estimate provided a different analysis, but I am satisfied by the evidence that it has little probative value.

[68] In summary, this is not an inappropriate use of the CCAA arising from the nature of the proposed sales.

B. The Trustee submits that the proposed sales are the product of a defective SISP conducted outside of the CCAA.

[69] It is true that the SISP, and the restructuring negotiations with the Ad Hoc Bondholders, took place prior to the filing under the CCAA, that this was a "pre-pack" filing.

[70] A pre-filing SISP is not of itself abusive of the CCAA. Nothing in the statute precludes it. Of course, a pre-filing SISP must meet the principles and requirements of section 36 of the CCAA and must be considered against the Soundair principles. The Trustee submits that such a SISP should be subject to heightened scrutiny. It may well be correct that a pre-filing SISP will be subject to greater challenges from stakeholders, and that it may be more difficult for the debtor company to establish that it was conducted in a fair and effective manner, given the lack of supervision by the Court and the Monitor, who as a court officer has statutory duties.

[71] Without prior court approval of the process, conducting a SISP outside of the CCAA means that both the procedure and the execution of the SISP are open to attack by aggrieved stakeholders and bitter bidders, as has been the case here. Any evidence or reasonable allegations of impropriety would have to be investigated carefully, whereas in a court-approved process, comfort can be obtained through the Monitor's review and the Court's approval of the process in

advance. However, in the end, it is the specific details of the SISP as conducted that will be scrutinized.

[72] Similar issues were considered in *Re Nelson Education Ltd.*, 2015 ONSC 5557 at paras 31-32, and in *Re Bloom Lake*, [p.1], 2015 QCCS 1920 at para 21.

[73] The Trustee submits that the SISP was defective in that its timelines were truncated and that it was destined not to generate offers that maximized value for all stakeholders. The Trustee filed an affidavit of a representative of Moelis indicating that it would be typical in a SISP to establish a deadline for non-binding offers one or two months following commencement of the process, while in this SISP, participants had only 12 to 25 days to evaluate the business and provide non-binding indications of interest. This opinion did not address the previous BAML process that identified likely purchasers and thus lengthened the review process for these parties who participated in the first process. The Trustee's advisor was also critical that the SISP provided only 16 days for final offers, suggesting that it is more typical to provide two months.

[74] While likely correct for normal-course SISP's, this analysis does not take into account the high cash burn situation of these debtors, nor the deteriorating market. The Moelis opinion suggests that potential purchaser would have a heightened diligence requirement in the current unfavourable market conditions, requiring extra time for due diligence. However, despite the speed of the SISP, it appears to have generated a range of bids significantly above liquidation value. The process was not limited to the SISP, but included the previous BAML process and the negotiations with the Ad Hoc Bondholders.

[75] The evidence discloses a thorough and comprehensive canvassing of the relevant markets for the debtors and their assets despite the aggressive timelines. The BAML process identified some interested parties and Sanjel's financial advisors built on that process by re-engaging with 28 private equity firms that had already expressed interest in these unique assets as well as identifying new potential purchasers, reaching out to 85 potential buyers.

[76] Of those 85 parties, 37 executed NDAs, 25 conducted due diligence and 17 met with the management team. Eight submitted non-binding indications of interest, five were invited to submit second-round bids and finally the top three were chosen for the continuation of negotiations to final agreements.

[77] While some interested parties may have found the time limits challenging, a reasonable number were able to meet them and submit bids. I am satisfied from the evidence that, despite a challenging economic environment, the process was competitive and robust.

[78] I also note the comments of the Monitor in its First Report dated April 12, 2016. While it was not directly involved in the SISP, the Monitor reports that the financial advisors advised the Monitor, that given the size and complexity of the Sanjel Group's operations and the time frames involved, all strategic and financial sponsors known to the advisors were contacted during the SISP and that it is unlikely that extending the SISP time frames in the current market would have resulted in materially better offers.

[79] Based on this advice and the Monitor's observations since its involvement in the SISP from mid-February 2016, the Monitor is of the opinion that it is highly improbable that another post-filing sales process would yield offers materially in excess of those received.

[80] Finally, I note that the Ad Hoc Bondholders' own March 20 proposal envisaged a pre-packaged CCAA proceedings. A sales process is only required to be reasonable, not perfect. I am

satisfied that this SISP was run appropriately and reasonably, and that it adequately canvassed the relevant market for the Sanjel Group and its assets.

C. The Ad Hoc Bondholders submit that negotiations among them, the Sanjel Group and the Syndicate were a sham conducted by Sanjel to delay the Ad Hoc Bondholders from taking action under Chapter 11 while it finalized the APAs. The Trustee alleges that the SISP has been conducted and the CCAA filing occurred in an atmosphere tainted by manoeuvring for advantage, bad faith, deception, secrecy, artificial haste and excessive deference by the Sanjel Group to the Syndicate.

[81] These are serious allegations, but they are not supported by the evidence.

[82] As the somewhat lengthy history of negotiations establishes, the Ad Hoc Bondholders had almost three months to present and negotiate restructuring proposals, with access to confidential information afforded to their advisors from January 9, 2016, weeks before the SISP participants. They presented four proposals, the last one after final bids had been received in the SISP. Although the final proposal breached the timelines of the SISP process, and could potentially raise an issue with respect to the integrity of the SISP process, Sanjel, the Syndicate and the prospective purchasers are not pressing that argument, as they take the position that the final offer is inferior at any rate.

[83] These proposals received responses from Sanjel and the Syndicate, and counter proposals were received. The evidence discloses that, in all proposals and counter proposals, the parties were far apart on a major issue: the extent to which the Syndicate's debt was to be paid down and how far it was willing to allow a portion to remain at risk.

[84] The Ad Hoc Bondholders were aware of the SISP from its commencement, and aware of the timing of the process. Throughout the SISP, the financial advisors had regular contact with Moelis and Fried Frank and directly with the Ad Hoc Bondholders. Michael Genereux, the lead partner at PJT with respect to the SISP, has sworn that he believes the Ad Hoc Bondholders were aware of the SISP and that it was progressing at a rapid pace. He says that he urged the Ad Hoc Bondholders to accelerate the pace at which they were advancing their restructuring negotiations.

[85] The Ad Hoc Bondholders were aware, or should have been aware, that the Sanjel Group intended a CCAA/Chapter 15 process from at the latest mid-March, 2016. Their representative from A&M was aware of the possibility of a CCAA filing from March 4, 2016. Reference to PWC as Monitor under the CCAA was available through the template APAs from March 4, 2016

[86] The Trustee and the Ad Hoc Bondholders submit that the Ad Hoc Bondholders' April 11, 2016 proposal provides superior recovery to the proposed sales generated by the SISP, that it "implies" a purchase price significantly in excess of the values generated by the APAs. The proposal, which was made directly to the Syndicate, was rejected by the Syndicate. It provides less immediate recovery to the Syndicate, and leaves a substantial portion of the Syndicate debt outstanding in a difficult and highly uncertain economic environment. It fails to address previously-expressed concerns about the need for capital going forward. The implied value of the proposal appears to rest on assumptions about improved economic recovery that the Syndicate does not accept or share.

[87] In addition, the proposal would require at least six months to execute and leaves a number of questions outstanding, not the least being whether a plan that raises some and not all

unsecured debt to secured status would pass muster. The proposal was rejected by the Syndicate for reasonable and defensible justifications.

[88] The Ad Hoc Bondholders describe their proposal as a “germ” of a viable plan. While a germ of a viable plan may be sufficient to justify the commencement of a CCAA proceeding, it is not comparable to the proposed sales generated by a reasonably-run and thorough SISP.

[89] The Trustee also submits that the Court should not be deterred by the Syndicate’s rejection of the proposal, insisting on its value and citing cases where a creditor’s stated intention not to accept a plan did not prevent a CCAA filing from proceeding. This is a different situation: the Ad Hoc Bondholder’s proposals are specific proposals with clear risks of timing and certainty. It is not up to this Court to second guess the Syndicate’s rejection of such a plan, even if inclined to do so.

[90] The Trustee submits that Sanjel did not act in good faith towards the Ad Hoc Bondholders in the period leading up to the filing. The Trustee notes that, contrary to the terms of the Bond Agreement, Sanjel failed to disclose to the bondholders that the Syndicate had issued a demand for payment acceleration and a notice of intention to enforce security pursuant to the terms of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (the “Demand Acceleration and NOI”) on March 18, 2016. While this was a contractual breach, the Ad Hoc Bondholders were well aware that Sanjel was in breach of the Bank Credit Facility, and that the Syndicate was taking steps to enforce its rights in negotiations with Sanjel and the Ad Hoc Bondholders. The Syndicate, and the Ad Hoc Bondholders, were both careful to preserve their rights of enforcement in proposals and counter-proposals. In fact, the Syndicate did not exercise its right to set-off, and has allowed Sanjel to continue to have access to liquidity going into the CCAA process.

[91] This failure by Sanjel to advise the Trustee, (and other unsecured creditors that had similar provisions in their contracts), of this further step by the Syndicate does not constitute a reason to refuse to approve that APAs.

[92] The Trustee submits that Sanjel failed to make full and plain disclosure during the initial hearing because it failed to disclose that in 2015, 62 % of the Sanjel Group’s revenue was generated in the United States. Sanjel made extensive disclosure of its corporate structure and the integration of its business in its initial filing, including the fact that the Sanjel Group’s “nerve centre”, management team and treasury and financial functions are largely based in Calgary. The factors disclosed were more than sufficient to establish jurisdiction for a CCAA filing. The US Court in the Chapter 15 filing found the Sanjel Group’s COMI to be in Calgary. The single statistic of 2015 revenue would not have changed the outcome of the Initial Order.

[93] The Trustee’s most serious allegation, given its implications for the professional reputations of those involved, is that Sanjel and its counsel and the Syndicate and its counsel misled the Trustee and the Ad Hoc Bondholders in their requests for adjournment of the bondholders’ meeting, that the correspondence relating to the requests for adjournment created an obligation to negotiate in good faith, and that Sanjel and the Syndicate failed to do so. The Trustee and the Ad Hoc Bondholders allege that Sanjel and the Syndicate were negotiating with the Ad Hoc Bondholders only to gain time to finalize the APAs and file under the CCAA .

[94] Again, this serious allegation is not supported by the evidence. The correspondence relating to the adjournment requests discloses no promises to hold off proceedings. The letter of request for the first adjournment for counsel to the Syndicate, while it refers to engaging with the

Ad Hoc Bondholders with respect to the March 2, 2016 proposal, stipulates that in requesting the postponement of the meeting, counsel is not promising any course of action and reserves all rights.

[95] The request from counsel to Sanjel refers to the dual track of negotiating a financial restructuring and/or sale of assets. It speaks of focusing on negotiations for the balance of the month, instead of “prospective enforcement action as proposed for consideration at the scheduled bondholders meeting,” as was threatened by the notice of meeting. The Ad Hoc Bondholders were well-compensated financially for this adjournment.

[96] The second request to adjourn the meeting to April 14, 2016 was similarly without any promise to forbear and the acceptance of the request by the Trustee did not impose any conditions nor give any reasons for the acceptance. The representatives of the Ad Hoc Bondholders are knowledgeable and sophisticated with respect to financing and insolvency matters. They cannot be said to have been misled by the language used in the adjournment requests.

[97] The Trustee submits that the CCAA process to date has been engineered to effect a foreclosure in favour of the Syndicate “to the serious and material prejudice of the Bondholders” and other unsecured creditors.

[98] The SISP did not disclose any possibility that, in the current economic climate, the disposition of the assets would generate even enough to cover the debt owed to the secured creditors. The proposals made by the Ad Hoc Bondholders did not offer nearly enough to pay out that debt.

[99] The views of the Syndicate and its priority rights must be given due consideration: *Windsor Machine & Stamping Limited (Re)*, 2009 CarswellOnt 4471 (SCJ) at para 43.

[100] Section 6 of the CCAA requires that any compromise of creditors’ rights must be supported by a double majority of the affected creditors. The Syndicate (as the principal secured creditor group) and the Ad Hoc Bondholders (as unsecured creditors with other unsecured creditors) would form separate voting classes for the purposes of a vote on any plan of arrangement. Each class must have a double majority of creditors, representing both two-thirds in value and a majority of number, voting in support of the plan as a condition precedent to court approval. Thus, the Syndicate holds an effective “veto” over the approval of any plan proposed by the Ad Hoc Bondholders: *SemCanada Crude Co, Re*, 2009 ABQB 490 at para 22.

[101] As noted by the Syndicate, the Ad Hoc Bondholders proposals, including the April 11, 2016 proposal, pose substantial risk to the Syndicate, and it is under no obligation to support them. There is no evidence that the Syndicate is acting unreasonably or unfairly in asserting that it would exercise the statutory protection afforded to a secured creditor under the CCAA; in fact, the evidence is that the Syndicate was willing to consider a less than 100% payout in negotiations with the Ad Hoc Bondholders. There was however no agreement as to the extent of the payout and the extent to which the Syndicate would agree to remain at risk.

[102] The prejudice to the bondholders is that they were unable to persuade the secured creditors to compromise or put its financial interests at risk in order to provide the bondholders with some chance that an improved economic climate may save this enterprise. As noted, the Syndicate had doubts that the Ad Hoc Bondholder’s proposals would even provide sufficient

operating capital to keep the Sanjel Group operating for the months it would take to implement their proposals.

[103] The prejudice, if any, to the Ad Hoc Bondholders is that they were not able to pre-empt the CCAA filing with a filing under Chapter 11 of the *United States Bankruptcy Code*, with an automatic stay that, according to US bankruptcy law, has worldwide effect. A subsequent CCAA filing could be considered a breach of the stay, and provoke a jurisdictional issue that would delay proceedings and prove expensive to the Syndicate, improving the Ad Hoc Bondholders' bargaining position.

[104] While there is only hearsay opinion before me with respect to the advantages of a Chapter 11 filing, the Trustee suggests that under such a filing:

- (a) the Liberty and Step APAs would have been subject to market test and to higher and better offers;
- (b) Sanjel could confirm a plan without the consent of the Syndicate; and
- (c) parties in interest and estate fiduciaries could pursue claims and causes of action against Sanjel, the Syndicate, Sanjel's equity holders and MacBain.

[105] Sanjel cites academic commentary that the cram-down provisions of Chapter 11 require strict compliance so as not to override the protections and elections available to secured creditors in opposition to a plan that they do not support. Specifically, if a class of creditors is impaired, the plan must be fair and equitable with respect to that class.

[106] This is an issue for the US Courts. However, even if the Chapter 15 filing was replaced by a Chapter 11 filing, the current CCAA proceedings would not be terminated and any restructuring in the United States would necessarily have to be coordinated with these CCAA proceedings. Accordingly, the voting requirements for any plan of arrangement or the requirements for approval of a sale under the CCAA could not be avoided.

- D. The Ad Hoc Bondholders were prejudiced in that they were not provided with information regarding the process and the bids received.

[107] The Ad Hoc Bondholders had access to the same information afforded to bidders under the SISP and more. They were able to make proposals both before and after that process. Their financial advisors were afforded an opportunity for due diligence, and exercised it.

[108] What they did not receive was disclosure of the details of the bids. There was a dispute about whether or not the Ad Hoc Bondholders could be considered "bidders". While they were not part of the SISP, they certainly had interests in conflict with the SISP bidders. Had the bids been disclosed to them, there would indeed have been concern over the integrity of the process, as such disclosure would allow them to tailor their proposals in such a way as to undermine the bids.

[109] The Ad Hoc Bondholders were aware that they would not be given copies of the bids by mid-February, 2016 when the Bondholders Forbearance Agreement was settled, as it included a provision clarifying that they were not entitled to any pricing or bidder information from the SISP.

[110] The Bond Forbearance Agreement also recognized that, while Sanjel would negotiate in good faith with the Ad Hoc Bondholders, nothing restricted its ability to enter into or conduct

negotiations with respect to potential sales or other transactions. It was only on March 14, 2016 that the Ad Hoc Bondholders requested third party bid information.

[111] The Ad Hoc Bondholders were not improperly denied access to information, and would not have been entitled to know details of the third party bids.

V. Conclusion

[112] I am satisfied by the evidence before me that the factors set out in section 36(3) of the CCAA and Soundair favour the approval of the proposed sales. Specifically:

- (a) the process, while not conducted under the CCAA, was nevertheless reasonable in the circumstances, as established by the evidence. It was brief, but not unreasonably brief, given the previous BAML process, current economic climate and the deteriorating financial position of the Sanjel Group;
- (b) while the Monitor was not directly involved and did not actively participate in the SISP process prior to February 24, 2016, the Monitor has reviewed the process and is of the opinion that the SISP was a robust process run fairly and reasonably, and that sufficient efforts were made to obtain the best price possible for the Sanjel Group's assets in that process. I agree with the Monitor's assessment from my review of the evidence.

It is the Monitor's view, based on (i) the advice of CS and PJT, (ii) the nature of the Sanjel Group's operations and assets, (iii) the market conditions over the past year, (iv) the proposals received in the context of the SISP and from the Ad Hoc Bondholders, (v) the current ongoing depressed condition of the market and (vi) the underlying value of the Sanjel Group's assets, it is highly improbable that another post-filing sales process would yield offers for the Canadian and U.S. operations materially in excess of the values contained in the STEP and Liberty APAs.

I accept the Monitor's opinion in that regard, and nothing in my review of the evidence and the submissions of interested parties causes me to doubt that opinion.

- (c) The Monitor has provided an opinion that the proposed sales are more beneficial to creditors than a sale or disposition under bankruptcy.
- (d) Creditors, other than trade creditors, were consulted and involved in the process.
- (e) While the sales provide no return to any creditor other than the Syndicate, I am satisfied that all other viable or reasonable options were considered. While there is no guarantee of further employment arising from the sale, there is the prospect that since the business will continue to operate until the sale, there will be an opportunity for employment for Sanjel employees with the new enterprises, and an opportunity for suppliers to continue to supply them.
- (f) I am satisfied from the evidence that the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair.

I therefore approve the sale approval and vesting orders sought by the Sanjel Group.

VI. Postscript

[113] On May 9, 2016, before these reasons were released, I received a copy of a letter dated May 5, 2016 from Fried Frank on behalf of the Ad Hoc Bondholders addressed to Canadian and US counsel for the Sanjel Group, the Monitor, the Syndicate and the prospective purchasers. In extravagant language, the Ad Hoc Bondholders state that they have become aware of information that the addressees are “duty bound” to bring to the attention of the Courts as officers of the Courts. That information is that Shane Hooker has been designated to lead the Canadian cementing operations when the STEP sale closes, according to a STEP press release. Evidently, Mr. Hooker is married to the daughter of Dan MacDonald, the chairman of Sanjel’s board, and is the sister of Darin MacDonald, who was Chief Executive Officer of Sanjel and head of the restructuring committee.

[114] The letter asserts the following:

- a) There are “substantial and material” connections between STEP and the MacDonald family. It appears that the basis for this statement is that Mr. Hooker is married to Mr. MacDonald’s daughter and an employee and “executive in residence” of ARC Financial Corp., STEP’s financial sponsor in the sale;
- b) Mr. Hooker is “an intimate beneficiary of all that is and all that belongs to the MacDonald family.” In subsequent correspondence with the Monitor, it appears that the Ad Hoc Bondholders have no evidence to support this allegation;
- c) Mr. Hooker is “the loyal son-in-law and brother-in-law” of the MacDonald family. Again, the Ad Hoc Bondholders admit that they have no information to support this allegation;
- d) By reason of Mr. Hooker’s relationship with the “MacDonald family”, the proposed STEP transaction and the entirety of the SISP process “is tainted and worse”. “(O)ur clients have every reason to believe the substance, of self-dealing and deception of the highest order”;
- e) “Mr. Hooker’s personal and professional ties to the MacDonald family raise the spectre that all at hand is and has been a thinly-veiled scheme between the Company and the Syndicate and their advisors to deliver, on the one hand, an adequate recovery to the Syndicate and, on the other hand, Sanjel’s Canadian assets back into the hands of the MacDonald family thereby working a substantial forfeiture of value to the Bondholders and all other unsecured creditors of the Company”.

[115] The letter repeats previous allegations that the SISP was “driven by self-interest and self-dealing”, “riddled with conflicts of interest”, “inappropriate and flawed in every respect”, “chilled, inadequate” and “not conducted in good faith and efforts were undertaken to mislead and misdirect the company’s stakeholders”. It alleges:

- a) “That none of this has been brought to the attention of the Courts and all parties in interest is reprehensible at best and has all indicia of fraudulent intent and purpose.”
- b) “Be advised that with respect to each and all of you and each and all of your respective clients as well as with respect to STEP, Liberty and any and all funding sources and sponsors for each, our clients hereby reserve all of their rights and remedies with respect to any and all claims and causes of action of every kind and nature whatsoever whether such

claims and causes of action are grounded in contract, tort, equity, statute and otherwise including, but not limited to, any and all breach of fiduciary duties, civil conspiracy, tortious interference and lender liability.”

- c) “... the efforts to continue with malfeasance wrapped in the cloak of SISP and CCAA by each and all of you and your clients must stop now. As above, the Courts and others should and must be informed, the failure to do so is and will be a misrepresentation and fraud on the Courts.”

[116] The letter comments that “(w)hen Justice Romaine is in receipt of the information, she will have reason and basis and we believe that Her Ladyship will be constrained, to vacate the order.”

[117] The Monitor took immediate action to investigate these serious allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, conspiracy and collusion, requesting urgent responses from counsel for Sanjel, the Syndicate, Mr. MacDonald, PJT and CS. Relevant witnesses were contacted and follow-up questions directed. The Monitor was also in contact with Fried Frank to determine the source of the allegations, and what investigation had been undertaken by Fried Frank or the Ad Hoc Bondholders to verify or support their allegations.

[118] On Saturday, May 7, 2016, Fried Frank made the further allegation that potential bidders in the SISP were provided with forecasts that were far worse than actual results in order to facilitate the alleged fraud and conspiracy. The Monitor added this allegation to its investigation.

[119] The Monitor was satisfied by its rapid but thorough investigations that:

- a) Mr. Hooker and Mr. MacDonald have been estranged for the last two and a half-years, and have had no communication on any personal or business matters;
- b) Mr. Hooker left Sanjel in March, 2014 and began working for ARC Financial in the fall of 2015 to assist ARC in an unrelated transaction. ARC is a large private investor focussed on energy, which provides financing through a number of funds financed by from third party investors. ARC is the primary financial stakeholder in the STEP acquisition. No one from the MacDonald family has an ownership position in ARC, nor are any of them investors in any ARC funds. Mr. Hooker has no involvement in ARC’s fundraising efforts or fund deployment and he has no ownership interest in ARC;
- c) Mr. MacDonald had no involvement in the negotiation of the STEP APA, other than attendance as a Sanjel representative at three meetings between November 2015 and January 2016, before the SISP was commenced;
- d) Mr. Crilly as CFO of Sanjel (and later CRO) led the SISP process for Sanjel, while Mr. MacDonald concentrated on attempting to find a buyer for the whole company;
- e) The senior Mr. MacDonald has not had an active role in Sanjel’s management for years, was not involved in the SISP and does not own shares in STEP or ARC;
- f) Mr. Hooker’s involvement with the SISP and negotiations with STEP was limited to conducting on-site diligence on behalf of STEP;
- g) Sanjel has no direct or indirect ownership interest or other financial interest in ARC, STEP, the newly formed company that will be purchasing the cementing assets or any other entity owned or controlled by ARC;

- h) No consideration was provided to Mr. Hooker or either Mr. MacDonald in connection with the STEP APA;
- i) In the opinion of many of those who provided responses, the relationship between Mr. Hooker and Mr. MacDonald had an adverse effect, if anything, on the merits of the STEP bid. The advisors and the Syndicate repeat their previous position that the STEP offer, in combination with the Liberty offer, was materially superior to any en bloc bid or combination of bids, and was supported on the basis of its economic merits.

[120] This information was largely confirmed by a number of sources. The Monitor did not obtain sworn statements, nor conduct any kind of discovery process. It did not present the information in its Sixth Report to the Court as evidence, but as a report on its investigation to determine whether there was any probative value to the Ad Hoc Bondholders' allegations.

[121] When the Monitor was unable to find any real evidence to support the allegations, other than the bare fact that Mr. Hooker is an employee of ARC and is married to Mr. MacDonald's sister, it asked the Ad Hoc Bondholders if they had any supporting evidence. The substance of counsel to the Ad Hoc Bondholders' response is that there is an appearance of inappropriate dealing (arising from the relationship), and that it was up to the Monitor to investigate this.

[122] The Ad Hoc Bondholders instead provided the Monitor with a list of additional questions that they wish the Monitor to investigate through sworn statements subject to cross-examination. These questions appear designed to elicit some evidence that may support the Ad Hoc Bondholder's speculations.

[123] The Monitor cannot be faulted for failing to obtain sworn evidence from relevant parties. The allegations were made after approval of the APAs in the context of tight timelines to the closing of the transactions and the risk of losing the recommended sales transactions. If the Monitor had discovered anything that would give any legitimacy to the allegations, or raise any doubt about the integrity of the SISP, it may have been appropriate to direct further investigation, including sworn evidence. However, mere speculation resting on a family relationship is insufficient to require the Monitor to undertake further expensive investigation or to conduct a fishing expedition. This is particularly the case as there is no real evidence that Mr. Hooker's prospective employment will benefit either Mr. MacDonald or Sanjel in any way, or Mr. Hooker himself, other than the offer of employment.

[124] This is not a case where evidence that should be presented in affidavit form has been incorporated improperly into a Monitor's report. The Monitor decided, quite properly, that at this stage of the process, a quick investigation to determine whether there was any real basis for the Ad Hoc Bondholders' complaint was warranted. This investigation has satisfied the Monitor that, other than the fact that Mr. Hooker is indeed Mr. MacDonald's brother-in-law, there is no evidence of collusion between them, Mr. MacDonald was not involved in the STEP APA, Mr. Hooker was in no position to influence that STEP APA and no evidence that Mr. Hooker or the "MacDonald family" will profit in any way from the STEP APA, other than Mr. Hooker's offer of employment.

[125] Given the lack of any indicia that there is any basis for the Ad Hoc Bondholders' speculations of fraud or conspiracy, there is no reason for this Court to require the Monitor to take further steps to investigate the allegations, which appear to be thinly veiled and reckless attempts to delay and obfuscate the process.

[126] With respect to the allegations that potential bidders were provided with forecasts far worse than actual results in order to facilitate the alleged fraud and conspiracy, the Monitor has reviewed the forecasts and the variances from the forecasts provided during the SISP to actuals. The Monitor reports that these relate to collection of accounts receivable and payment of accounts payable. The actual collection of receivables was better than forecasted for the months of March and April. However, the Monitor understands that is a temporary timing variance based on earlier collection of receivables and does not represent a permanent improvement in Sanjel's actual cash position.

[127] Thus, the Monitor is of the view that the allegations by the Ad Hoc Bondholders with respect to forecasts being far worse than actual results lack merit.

[128] I accept the Monitor's advice on this issue.

[129] With respect to disclosure, the Monitor was not aware of the connection between STEP and the company alleged in the Fried Frank letter. The Monitor has reported that it did not become aware of anything that would support or substantiate the allegations since its involvement in the SISP process after February 24, 2016.

[130] The Ad Hoc Bondholders' allegations are in essence that the SISP was structured to achieve a preferential outcome for the MacDonald family through the familial connections between Mr. Hooker and the MacDonald family. If a sale of assets of a debtor company is to be made to a person related to the debtor, the Court may only approve the sale if it is satisfied that:

- (a) good faith efforts were made to sell or otherwise dispose of the assets to persons who are not related to the debtor company; and
- (b) the consideration to be received is superior to the consideration that would be received under any other offer made in accordance with the process leading to the proposed sale: CCAA section 36(4).

[131] A related party pursuant to section 36(5) is defined to include certain categories of persons, and neither Mr. Hooker, his wife or either Mr. MacDonald fall into these categories.

[132] There is no evidence or indication that any member of the "MacDonald family" will benefit from the STEP APA, other than Mr. Hooker's offer of employment. I am therefore satisfied that section 36(3) is not applicable to the STEP or the Liberty transactions and that no disclosure of any relationship was necessary before the APAs were approved.

[133] Even if disclosure had been made, given the evidence before me with respect to the SISP process and the offers received, I would have been satisfied the requirements of section 36(3) were met.

[134] In conclusion, the allegations of the Ad Hoc Bondholders do not change my decision with respect to approval of the APAs. I see no reason why the Monitor should continue its investigation.

[135] The issue of who should bear the cost of the investigation into these allegations is reserved.

Heard on the 28th day of April, 2016.

Dated at the City of Calgary, Alberta this 16th day of May, 2016.

B.E. Romaine
J.C.Q.B.A.

Appearances:

Chris Simard/Alexis Teasdale
for the Sanjel Group

Robert Anderson Q.C./Emily Paplawski
for the Trustee

Josef Kruger Q.C./Robyn Gurofsky/Jessie Cameron
for the Monitor

Kelly Bourassa/Kelly Peters
for the Syndicate

David Mann
for the Canadian Purchasers

Sean Collins/Walker Macleod
for the US Purchasers

Daniel Gilborn
for the TR Transport Inc.

Katherine Reiffenstein
for Aspen Air Corp. and Aspen Air US Corp.

Brian Davison/Ryan Algar/Karen Fellowes
for MacBain Properties Ltd. and MacBain Group

Melanie Gaston
for TAQA

Caireen Hanert
for Weir Group PLC

Heather Ferris
for GCC of America Inc.

Jennifer Davis
for CT Logics

Mary Buttery
for ARI Fuel Services