Court File No. CV-15-10832-00CL

Ontario
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF **TARGET CANADA CO., TARGET CANADA HEALTH CO., TARGET CANADA MOBILE GP CO., TARGET CANADA PHARMACY (BC) CORP., TARGET CANADA PHARMACY (ONTARIO) CORP., TARGET CANADA PHARMACY CORP., TARGET CANADA PHARMACY (SK) CORP.,** and **TARGET CANADA PROPERTY LLC**

APPLICANTS

BOOK OF AUTHORITIES OF THE APPLICANTS

(Motion to Accept Filing of a Plan and Authorize Creditors' Meeting to Vote on the Plan)

December 3, 2015

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31. Consolidated Plan of Compromise and Arrangement of Extreme Retail (Canada) Inc. and Extreme Properties Inc., available at http://www.kpmg.com/ca/en/services/advisory/transactionrestructuring/creditorlinksites

TAB 1

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IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE AND ARRANGEMENT INVOLVING METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS II CORP., METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS III CORP., METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS V CORP., METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS XI CORP., METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS XII CORP., 4446372 CANADA INC. AND 6932819 CANADA INC., TRUSTEES OF THE CONDUITS LISTED IN SCHEDULE "A" HERETO

THE INVESTORS REPRESENTED ON THE PAN-CANADIAN INVESTORS COMMITTEE FOR THIRD-PARTY STRUCTURED ASSET-BACKED COMMERCIAL PAPER LISTED IN SCHEDULE "B" HERETO (Applicants / Respondents in Appeal) and METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS II CORP., METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS III CORP., METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS V CORP., METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS XI CORP., METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS XII CORP., 4446372 CANADA INC. AND 6932819 CANADA INC., TRUSTEES OF THE CONDUITS LISTED IN SCHEDULE "A" HERETO (Respondents / Respondents in Appeal) and AIR TRANSAT A.T. INC., TRANSAT TOURS CANADA INC., THE JEAN COUTU GROUP (PJC) INC., AÉROPORTS DE MONTRÉAL INC., AÉROPORTS DE MONTRÉAL CAPITAL INC., POMERLEAU ONTARIO INC., POMERLEAU INC., LABOPHARM INC., DOMTAR INC., DOMTAR PULP AND PAPER PRODUCTS INC., GIRO INC., VÊTEMENTS DE SPORTS R.G.R. INC., 131519 CANADA INC., AIR JAZZ LP, PETRIFOND FOUNDATION COMPANY LIMITED, PETRIFOND FOUNDATION MIDWEST LIMITED, SERVICES HYPOTHÉCAIRES LA PATRIMONIALE INC., TECSYS INC. SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE DE FINANCEMENT DU QUÉBEC, VIBROSYSTM INC., INTERQUISA CANADA L.P., REDCORP VENTURES LTD., JURA ENERGY CORPORATION, IVANHOE MINES LTD., WEBTECH WIRELESS INC., WYNN CAPITAL CORPORATION INC., HY BLOOM INC., CARDACIAN MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC., WEST ENERGY LTD., SABRE ENERTY LTD., PETROLIFERA PETROLEUM LTD., VAQUERO RESOURCES LTD. and STANDARD ENERGY INC. (Respondents / Appellants)

J.I. Laskin, E.A. Cronk, R.A. Blair JJ.A.

Heard: June 25-26, 2008
Judgment: August 18, 2008 *
Docket: CA C48969

Proceedings: affirming *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.* (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 3523, 43 C.B.R. (5th) 269 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])

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Usman Sheikh for Coventree Capital Inc.
Allan Sternberg, Sam R. Sasso for Brookfield Asset Management and Partners Ltd., Hy Bloom Inc., Cardacian Mortgage Services Inc.
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James A. Woods, Sebastien Richemont, Marie-Anne Paquette for Air Transat A.T. Inc., Transat Tours Canada Inc., Jean Coutu Group (PJC) Inc., Aéroports de Montréal, Aéroports de Montréal Capital Inc., Pomerleau Ontario Inc., Pomerleau Inc., Labopharm Inc., Agence Métropolitaine de Transport (AMT), Giro Inc., Vêtements de sports RGR Inc., 131519 Canada Inc., Tecsys Inc., New Gold Inc., Jazz Air LP
Scott A. Turner for Webtech Wireless Inc., Wynn Capital Corporation Inc., West Energy Ltd., Sabre Energy Ltd., Petrolifera Petroleum Ltd., Vaquero Resources Ltd., and Standard Energy Ltd.
R. Graham Phoenix for Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments III Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments V Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XI Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XII Corp., Quanto Financial Corporation and Metcalfe & Mansfield Capital Corp.

Subject: Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure

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s. 91 ¶ 21 — referred to

s. 92 — referred to

s. 92 ¶ 13 — referred to

Words and phrases considered:

arrangement

"Arrangement" is broader than "compromise" and would appear to include any scheme for reorganizing the affairs of the debtor.

APPEAL by opponents of creditor-initiated plan from judgment reported at *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.* (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 3523, 43 C.B.R. (5th) 269, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 74 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), granting application for approval of plan.

***R.A. Blair J.A.*:**

A. Introduction

1 In August 2007 a liquidity crisis suddenly threatened the Canadian market in Asset Backed Commercial Paper ("ABCP"). The crisis was triggered by a loss of confidence amongst investors stemming from the news of widespread defaults on U.S. sub-prime mortgages. The loss of confidence placed the Canadian financial market at risk generally and was reflective of an economic volatility worldwide.

2 By agreement amongst the major Canadian participants, the $32 billion Canadian market in third-party ABCP was frozen on August 13, 2007 pending an attempt to resolve the crisis through a restructuring of that market. The Pan-Canadian Investors Committee, chaired by Purdy Crawford, C.C., Q.C., was formed and ultimately put forward the creditor-initiated Plan of Compromise and Arrangement that forms the subject-matter of these proceedings. The Plan was sanctioned by Colin L. Campbell J. on June 5, 2008.

3 Certain creditors who opposed the Plan seek leave to appeal and, if leave is granted, appeal from that decision. They raise an important point regarding the permissible scope of a restructuring under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 as amended ("CCAA"): can the court sanction a Plan that calls for creditors to provide releases to third parties who are themselves solvent and not creditors of the debtor company? They also argue that, if the answer to this question is yes, the application judge erred in holding that this Plan, with its particular releases (which bar some claims even in fraud), was fair and reasonable and therefore in sanctioning it under the CCAA.

Leave to Appeal

4 Because of the particular circumstances and urgency of these proceedings, the court agreed to collapse an oral hearing for leave to appeal with the hearing of the appeal itself. At the outset of argument we encouraged counsel to combine their submissions on both matters.

5 The proposed appeal raises issues of considerable importance to restructuring proceedings under the CCAA Canada-wide. There are serious and arguable grounds of appeal and — given the expedited time-table — the appeal will not unduly delay the progress of the proceedings. I am satisfied that the criteria for granting leave to appeal in CCAA proceedings, set out in such cases as *Cineplex Odeon Corp., Re* (2001), 24 C.B.R. (4th) 201 (Ont. C.A.), and *Country Style Food Services Inc., Re* (2002), 158 O.A.C. 30 (Ont. C.A. [In Chambers]), are met. I would grant leave to appeal.

Appeal

6 For the reasons that follow, however, I would dismiss the appeal.

B. Facts

The Parties

7 The appellants are holders of ABCP Notes who oppose the Plan. They do so principally on the basis that it requires them to grant releases to third party financial institutions against whom they say they have claims for relief arising out of their purchase of ABCP Notes. Amongst them are an airline, a tour operator, a mining company, a wireless provider, a pharmaceuticals retailer, and several holding companies and energy companies.

8 Each of the appellants has large sums invested in ABCP — in some cases, hundreds of millions of dollars. Nonetheless, the collective holdings of the appellants — slightly over $1 billion — represent only a small fraction of the more than $32 billion of ABCP involved in the restructuring.

9 The lead respondent is the Pan-Canadian Investors Committee which was responsible for the creation and negotiation of the Plan on behalf of the creditors. Other respondents include various major international financial institutions, the five largest Canadian banks, several trust companies, and some smaller holders of ABCP product. They participated in the market in a number of different ways.

The ABCP Market

10 Asset Backed Commercial Paper is a sophisticated and hitherto well-accepted financial instrument. It is primarily a form of short-term investment — usually 30 to 90 days — typically with a low interest yield only slightly better than that available through other short-term paper from a government or bank. It is said to be "asset backed" because the cash that is used to purchase an ABCP Note is converted into a portfolio of financial assets or other asset interests that in turn provide security for the repayment of the notes.

11 ABCP was often presented by those selling it as a safe investment, somewhat like a guaranteed investment certificate.

12 The Canadian market for ABCP is significant and administratively complex. As of August 2007, investors had placed over $116 billion in Canadian ABCP. Investors range from individual pensioners to large institutional bodies. On the selling and distribution end, numerous players are involved, including chartered banks, investment houses and other financial institutions. Some of these players participated in multiple ways. The Plan in this proceeding relates to approximately $32 billion of non-bank sponsored ABCP the restructuring of which is considered essential to the preservation of the Canadian ABCP market.

13 As I understand it, prior to August 2007 when it was frozen, the ABCP market worked as follows.

14 Various corporations (the "Sponsors") would arrange for entities they control ("Conduits") to make ABCP Notes available to be sold to investors through "Dealers" (banks and other investment dealers). Typically, ABCP was issued by series and sometimes by classes within a series.

15 The cash from the purchase of the ABCP Notes was used to purchase assets which were held by trustees of the Conduits ("Issuer Trustees") and which stood as security for repayment of the notes. Financial institutions that sold or provided the Conduits with the assets that secured the ABCP are known as "Asset Providers". To help ensure that investors would be able to redeem their notes, "Liquidity Providers" agreed to provide funds that could be drawn upon to meet the demands of maturing ABCP Notes in certain circumstances. Most Asset Providers were also Liquidity Providers. Many of these banks and financial institutions were also holders of ABCP Notes ("Noteholders"). The Asset and Liquidity Providers held first charges on the assets.

16 When the market was working well, cash from the purchase of new ABCP Notes was also used to pay off maturing ABCP Notes; alternatively, Noteholders simply rolled their maturing notes over into new ones. As I will explain, however, there was a potential underlying predicament with this scheme.

The Liquidity Crisis

17 The types of assets and asset interests acquired to "back" the ABCP Notes are varied and complex. They were generally long-term assets such as residential mortgages, credit card receivables, auto loans, cash collateralized debt obligations and derivative investments such as credit default swaps. Their particular characteristics do not matter for the purpose of this appeal, but they shared a common feature that proved to be the Achilles heel of the ABCP market: because of their long-term nature there was an inherent timing mismatch between the cash they generated and the cash needed to repay maturing ABCP Notes.

18 When uncertainty began to spread through the ABCP marketplace in the summer of 2007, investors stopped buying the ABCP product and existing Noteholders ceased to roll over their maturing notes. There was no cash to redeem those notes. Although calls were made on the Liquidity Providers for payment, most of the Liquidity Providers declined to fund the redemption of the notes, arguing that the conditions for liquidity funding had not been met in the circumstances. Hence the "liquidity crisis" in the ABCP market.

19 The crisis was fuelled largely by a lack of transparency in the ABCP scheme. Investors could not tell what assets were backing their notes — partly because the ABCP Notes were often sold before or at the same time as the assets backing them were acquired; partly because of the sheer complexity of certain of the underlying assets; and partly because of assertions of confidentiality by those involved with the assets. As fears arising from the spreading U.S. sub-prime mortgage crisis mushroomed, investors became increasingly concerned that their ABCP Notes may be supported by those crumbling assets. For the reasons outlined above, however, they were unable to redeem their maturing ABCP Notes.

The Montreal Protocol

20 The liquidity crisis could have triggered a wholesale liquidation of the assets, at depressed prices. But it did not. During the week of August 13, 2007, the ABCP market in Canada froze — the result of a standstill arrangement orchestrated on the heels of the crisis by numerous market participants, including Asset Providers, Liquidity Providers, Noteholders and other financial industry representatives. Under the standstill agreement — known as the Montréal Protocol — the parties committed to restructuring the ABCP market with a view, as much as possible, to preserving the value of the assets and of the notes.

21 The work of implementing the restructuring fell to the Pan-Canadian Investors Committee, an applicant in the proceeding and respondent in the appeal. The Committee is composed of 17 financial and investment institutions, including chartered banks, credit unions, a pension board, a Crown corporation, and a university board of governors. All 17 members are themselves Noteholders; three of them also participated in the ABCP market in other capacities as well. Between them, they hold about two thirds of the $32 billion of ABCP sought to be restructured in these proceedings.

22 Mr. Crawford was named the Committee's chair. He thus had a unique vantage point on the work of the Committee and the restructuring process as a whole. His lengthy affidavit strongly informed the application judge's understanding of the factual context, and our own. He was not cross-examined and his evidence is unchallenged.

23 Beginning in September 2007, the Committee worked to craft a plan that would preserve the value of the notes and assets, satisfy the various stakeholders to the extent possible, and restore confidence in an important segment of the Canadian financial marketplace. In March 2008, it and the other applicants sought CCAA protection for the ABCP debtors and the approval of a Plan that had been pre-negotiated with some, but not all, of those affected by the misfortunes in the Canadian ABCP market.

The Plan

a) Plan Overview

24 Although the ABCP market involves many different players and kinds of assets, each with their own challenges, the committee opted for a single plan. In Mr. Crawford's words, "all of the ABCP suffers from common problems that are best addressed by a common solution." The Plan the Committee developed is highly complex and involves many parties. In its essence, the Plan would convert the Noteholders' paper — which has been frozen and therefore effectively worthless for many months — into new, long-term notes that would trade freely, but with a discounted face value. The hope is that a strong secondary market for the notes will emerge in the long run.

25 The Plan aims to improve transparency by providing investors with detailed information about the assets supporting their ABCP Notes. It also addresses the timing mismatch between the notes and the assets by adjusting the maturity provisions and interest rates on the new notes. Further, the Plan adjusts some of the underlying credit default swap contracts by increasing the thresholds for default triggering events; in this way, the likelihood of a forced liquidation flowing from the credit default swap holder's prior security is reduced and, in turn, the risk for ABCP investors is decreased.

26 Under the Plan, the vast majority of the assets underlying ABCP would be pooled into two master asset vehicles (MAV1 and MAV2). The pooling is designed to increase the collateral available and thus make the notes more secure.

27 The Plan does not apply to investors holding less than $1 million of notes. However, certain Dealers have agreed to buy the ABCP of those of their customers holding less than the $1-million threshold, and to extend financial assistance to these customers. Principal among these Dealers are National Bank and Canaccord, two of the respondent financial institutions the appellants most object to releasing. The application judge found that these developments appeared to be designed to secure votes in favour of the Plan by various Noteholders, and were apparently successful in doing so. If the Plan is approved, they also provide considerable relief to the many small investors who find themselves unwittingly caught in the ABDP collapse.

b) The Releases

28 This appeal focuses on one specific aspect of the Plan: the comprehensive series of releases of third parties provided for in Article 10.

29 The Plan calls for the release of Canadian banks, Dealers, Noteholders, Asset Providers, Issuer Trustees, Liquidity Providers, and other market participants — in Mr. Crawford's words, "virtually all participants in the Canadian ABCP market" — from any liability associated with ABCP, with the exception of certain narrow claims relating to fraud. For instance, under the Plan as approved, creditors will have to give up their claims against the Dealers who sold them their ABCP Notes, including challenges to the way the Dealers characterized the ABCP and provided (or did not provide) information about the ABCP. The claims against the proposed defendants are mainly in tort: negligence, misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, failure to act prudently as a dealer/advisor, acting in conflict of interest, and in a few cases fraud or potential fraud. There are also allegations of breach of fiduciary duty and claims for other equitable relief.

30 The application judge found that, in general, the claims for damages include the face value of the Notes, plus interest and additional penalties and damages.

31 The releases, in effect, are part of a *quid pro quo*. Generally speaking, they are designed to compensate various participants in the market for the contributions they would make to the restructuring. Those contributions under the Plan include the requirements that:

> a) Asset Providers assume an increased risk in their credit default swap contracts, disclose certain proprietary information in relation to the assets, and provide below-cost financing for margin funding facilities that are designed to make the notes more secure;
>
> b) Sponsors — who in addition have cooperated with the Investors' Committee throughout the process, including by sharing certain proprietary information — give up their existing contracts;
>
> c) The Canadian banks provide below-cost financing for the margin funding facility and,
>
> d) Other parties make other contributions under the Plan.

32 According to Mr. Crawford's affidavit, the releases are part of the Plan "because certain key participants, whose participation is vital to the restructuring, have made comprehensive releases a condition for their participation."

The CCAA Proceedings to Date

33 On March 17, 2008 the applicants sought and obtained an Initial Order under the CCAA staying any proceedings relating to the ABCP crisis and providing for a meeting of the Noteholders to vote on the proposed Plan. The meeting was held on April 25th. The vote was overwhelmingly in support of the Plan — 96% of the Noteholders voted in favour. At the instance of certain Noteholders, and as requested by the application judge (who has supervised the proceedings from the outset), the Monitor broke down the voting results according to those Noteholders who had worked on or with the Investors' Committee to develop the Plan and those Noteholders who had not. Re-calculated on this basis the results remained firmly in favour of the proposed Plan — 99% of those connected with the development of the Plan voted positively, as did 80% of those Noteholders who had not been involved in its formulation.

34 The vote thus provided the Plan with the "double majority" approval — a majority of creditors representing two-thirds in value of the claims — required under s. 6 of the CCAA.

35 Following the successful vote, the applicants sought court approval of the Plan under s. 6. Hearings were held on May 12 and 13. On May 16, the application judge issued a brief endorsement in which he concluded that he did not have sufficient facts to decide whether all the releases proposed in the Plan were authorized by the CCAA. While the application judge was prepared to approve the releases of negligence claims, he was not prepared at that point to sanction the release of fraud claims. Noting the urgency of the situation and the serious consequences that would result from the Plan's failure, the application judge nevertheless directed the parties back to the bargaining table to try to work out a claims process for addressing legitimate claims of fraud.

36 The result of this renegotiation was a "fraud carve-out" — an amendment to the Plan excluding certain fraud claims from the Plan's releases. The carve-out did not encompass all possible claims of fraud, however. It was limited in three key respects. First, it applied only to claims against ABCP Dealers. Secondly, it applied only to cases involving an express fraudulent misrepresentation made with the intention to induce purchase and in circumstances where the person making the representation knew it to be false. Thirdly, the carve-out limited available damages to the value of the notes, minus any funds distributed as part of the Plan. The appellants argue vigorously that such a limited release respecting fraud claims is unacceptable and should not have been sanctioned by the application judge.

37 A second sanction hearing — this time involving the amended Plan (with the fraud carve-out) — was held on June 3, 2008. Two days later, Campbell J. released his reasons for decision, approving and sanctioning the Plan on the basis both that he had jurisdiction to sanction a Plan calling for third-party releases and that the Plan including the third-party releases in question here was fair and reasonable.

38 The appellants attack both of these determinations.

C. Law and Analysis

39 There are two principal questions for determination on this appeal:

> 1) As a matter of law, may a CCAA plan contain a release of claims against anyone other than the debtor company or its directors?
>
> 2) If the answer to that question is yes, did the application judge err in the exercise of his discretion to sanction the Plan as fair and reasonable given the nature of the releases called for under it?

(1) Legal Authority for the Releases

40 The standard of review on this first issue — whether, as a matter of law, a CCAA plan may contain third-party releases — is correctness.

41 The appellants submit that a court has no jurisdiction or legal authority under the CCAA to sanction a plan that imposes an obligation on creditors to give releases to third parties other than the directors of the debtor company. [1] The requirement that objecting creditors release claims against third parties is illegal, they contend, because:

> a) on a proper interpretation, the CCAA does not permit such releases;
>
> b) the court is not entitled to "fill in the gaps" in the CCAA or rely upon its inherent jurisdiction to create such authority because to do so would be contrary to the principle that Parliament did not intend to interfere with private property rights or rights of action in the absence of clear statutory language to that effect;
>
> c) the releases constitute an unconstitutional confiscation of private property that is within the exclusive domain of the provinces under s. 92 of the *Constitution Act*, 1867;
>
> d) the releases are invalid under Quebec rules of public order; and because
>
> e) the prevailing jurisprudence supports these conclusions.

42 I would not give effect to any of these submissions.

Interpretation, "Gap Filling" and Inherent Jurisdiction

43 On a proper interpretation, in my view, the CCAA permits the inclusion of third party releases in a plan of compromise or arrangement to be sanctioned by the court where those releases are reasonably connected to the proposed restructuring. I am led to this conclusion by a combination of (a) the open-ended, flexible character of the CCAA itself, (b) the broad nature of the term "compromise or arrangement" as used in the Act, and (c) the express statutory effect of the "double-majority" vote and court sanction which render the plan binding on *all* creditors, including those unwilling to accept certain portions of it. The first of these signals a flexible approach to the application of the Act in new and evolving situations, an active judicial role in its application and interpretation, and a liberal approach to that interpretation. The second provides the entrée to negotiations between the parties affected in the restructuring and furnishes them with the ability to apply the broad scope of their ingenuity in fashioning the proposal. The latter afford necessary protection to unwilling creditors who may be deprived of certain of their civil and property rights as a result of the process.

44 The CCAA is skeletal in nature. It does not contain a comprehensive code that lays out all that is permitted or barred. Judges must therefore play a role in fleshing out the details of the statutory scheme. The scope of the Act and the powers of the court under it are not limitless. It is beyond controversy, however, that the CCAA is remedial legislation to be liberally construed in accordance with the modern purposive approach to statutory interpretation. It is designed to be a flexible instrument and it

is that very flexibility which gives the Act its efficacy: *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re* (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]). As Farley J. noted in *Dylex Ltd., Re* (1995), 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), at 111, "[t]he history of CCAA law has been an evolution of judicial interpretation."

45 Much has been said, however, about the "evolution of judicial interpretation" and there is some controversy over both the source and scope of that authority. Is the source of the court's authority statutory, discerned solely through application of the principles of statutory interpretation, for example? Or does it rest in the court's ability to "fill in the gaps" in legislation? Or in the court's inherent jurisdiction?

46 These issues have recently been canvassed by the Honourable Georgina R. Jackson and Dr. Janis Sarra in their publication "Selecting the Judicial Tool to get the Job Done: An Examination of Statutory Interpretation, Discretionary Power and Inherent Jurisdiction in Insolvency Matters,"[2] and there was considerable argument on these issues before the application judge and before us. While I generally agree with the authors' suggestion that the courts should adopt a hierarchical approach in their resort to these interpretive tools — statutory interpretation, gap-filling, discretion and inherent jurisdiction — it is not necessary in my view to go beyond the general principles of statutory interpretation to resolve the issues on this appeal. Because I am satisfied that it is implicit in the language of the CCAA itself that the court has authority to sanction plans incorporating third-party releases that are reasonably related to the proposed restructuring, there is no "gap-filling" to be done and no need to fall back on inherent jurisdiction. In this respect, I take a somewhat different approach than the application judge did.

47 The Supreme Court of Canada has affirmed generally — and in the insolvency context particularly — that remedial statutes are to be interpreted liberally and in accordance with Professor Driedger's modern principle of statutory interpretation. Driedger advocated that "the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament": *Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., Re*, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27 (S.C.C.) at para. 21, quoting E.A. Driedger, *Construction of Statutes*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983); *Bell ExpressVu Ltd. Partnership v. Rex*, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 (S.C.C.) at para. 26.

48 More broadly, I believe that the proper approach to the judicial interpretation and application of statutes — particularly those like the CCAA that are skeletal in nature — is succinctly and accurately summarized by Jackson and Sarra in their recent article, *supra*, at p. 56:

> The exercise of a statutory authority requires the statute to be construed. The plain meaning or textualist approach has given way to a search for the object and goals of the statute and the intentionalist approach. This latter approach makes use of the purposive approach and the mischief rule, including its codification under interpretation statutes that every enactment is deemed remedial, and is to be given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects. This latter approach advocates reading the statute as a whole and being mindful of Driedger's "one principle", that the words of the Act are to be read in their entire context, in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament. It is important that courts first interpret the statute before them and exercise their authority pursuant to the statute, before reaching for other tools in the judicial toolbox. Statutory interpretation using the principles articulated above leaves room for gap-filling in the common law provinces and a consideration of purpose in *Québec* as a manifestation of the judge's overall task of statutory interpretation. Finally, the jurisprudence in relation to statutory interpretation demonstrates the fluidity inherent in the judge's task in seeking the objects of the statute and the intention of the legislature.

49 I adopt these principles.

50 The remedial purpose of the CCAA — as its title affirms — is to facilitate compromises or arrangements between an insolvent debtor company and its creditors. In *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311 (B.C. C.A.) at 318, Gibbs J.A. summarized very concisely the purpose, object and scheme of the Act:

> Almost inevitably, liquidation destroyed the shareholders' investment, yielded little by way of recovery to the creditors, and exacerbated the social evil of devastating levels of unemployment. The government of the day sought, through the

> C.C.A.A., to create a regime whereby the principals of the company and the creditors could be brought together under the supervision of the court to attempt a reorganization or compromise or arrangement under which the company could continue in business.

51 The CCAA was enacted in 1933 and was necessary — as the then Secretary of State noted in introducing the Bill on First Reading — "because of the prevailing commercial and industrial depression" and the need to alleviate the effects of business bankruptcies in that context: see the statement of the Hon. C.H. Cahan, Secretary of State, *House of Commons Debates (Hansard)* (April 20, 1933) at 4091. One of the greatest effects of that Depression was what Gibbs J.A. described as "the social evil of devastating levels of unemployment". Since then, courts have recognized that the Act has a broader dimension than simply the direct relations between the debtor company and its creditors and that this broader public dimension must be weighed in the balance together with the interests of those most directly affected: see, for example, *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.), *per* Doherty J.A. in dissent; *Skydome Corp., Re* (1998), 16 C.B.R. (4th) 125 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); *Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re* (1998), 7 C.B.R. (4th) 51 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).

52 In this respect, I agree with the following statement of Doherty J.A. in *Elan*, *supra*, at pp. 306-307:

> . . . [T]he Act was designed to serve a "broad constituency of investors, creditors and employees". [3] Because of that "broad constituency" the court must, when considering applications brought under the Act, *have regard not only to the individuals and organizations directly affected by the application, but also to the wider public interest.* [Emphasis added.]

Application of the Principles of Interpretation

53 An interpretation of the CCAA that recognizes its broader socio-economic purposes and objects is apt in this case. As the application judge pointed out, the restructuring underpins the financial viability of the Canadian ABCP market itself.

54 The appellants argue that the application judge erred in taking this approach and in treating the Plan and the proceedings as an attempt to restructure a financial market (the ABCP market) rather than simply the affairs between the debtor corporations who caused the ABCP Notes to be issued and their creditors. The Act is designed, they say, only to effect reorganizations between a corporate debtor and its creditors and not to attempt to restructure entire marketplaces.

55 This perspective is flawed in at least two respects, however, in my opinion. First, it reflects a view of the purpose and objects of the CCAA that is too narrow. Secondly, it overlooks the reality of the ABCP marketplace and the context of the restructuring in question here. It may be true that, in their capacity as ABCP *Dealers*, the releasee financial institutions are "third-parties" to the restructuring in the sense that they are not creditors of the debtor corporations. However, in their capacities as *Asset Providers* and *Liquidity Providers*, they are not only creditors but they are prior secured creditors to the Noteholders. Furthermore — as the application judge found — in these latter capacities they are making significant contributions to the restructuring by "foregoing immediate rights to assets and ... providing real and tangible input for the preservation and enhancement of the Notes" (para. 76). In this context, therefore, the application judge's remark at para. 50 that the restructuring "involves the commitment and participation of all parties" in the ABCP market makes sense, as do his earlier comments at paras. 48-49:

> Given the nature of the ABCP market and all of its participants, it is more appropriate to consider all Noteholders as claimants and the object of the Plan to restore liquidity to the assets being the Notes themselves. The restoration of the liquidity of the market necessitates the participation (including more tangible contribution by many) of all Noteholders.
>
> In these circumstances, *it is unduly technical to classify the Issuer Trustees as debtors and the claims of the Noteholders as between themselves and others as being those of third party creditors*, although I recognize that the restructuring structure of the CCAA requires the corporations as the vehicles for restructuring. [Emphasis added.]

56 The application judge did observe that "[t]he insolvency is of the ABCP market itself, the restructuring is that of the market for such paper ..." (para. 50). He did so, however, to point out the uniqueness of the Plan before him and its industry-wide significance and not to suggest that he need have no regard to the provisions of the CCAA permitting a restructuring

as between debtor and creditors. His focus was on *the effect* of the restructuring, a perfectly permissible perspective, given the broad purpose and objects of the Act. This is apparent from his later references. For example, in balancing the arguments against approving releases that might include aspects of fraud, he responded that "what is at issue is a liquidity crisis that affects the ABCP market in Canada" (para. 125). In addition, in his reasoning on the fair-and-reasonable issue, he stated at para. 142: "Apart from the Plan itself, there is a need to restore confidence in the financial system in Canada and this Plan is a legitimate use of the CCAA to accomplish that goal."

57 I agree. I see no error on the part of the application judge in approaching the fairness assessment or the interpretation issue with these considerations in mind. They provide the context in which the purpose, objects and scheme of the CCAA are to be considered.

The Statutory Wording

58 Keeping in mind the interpretive principles outlined above, I turn now to a consideration of the provisions of the CCAA. Where in the words of the statute is the court clothed with authority to approve a plan incorporating a requirement for third-party releases? As summarized earlier, the answer to that question, in my view, is to be found in:

> a) the skeletal nature of the CCAA;
>
> b) Parliament's reliance upon the broad notions of "compromise" and "arrangement" to establish the framework within which the parties may work to put forward a restructuring plan; and in
>
> c) the creation of the statutory mechanism binding all creditors in classes to the compromise or arrangement once it has surpassed the high "double majority" voting threshold and obtained court sanction as "fair and reasonable".

Therein lies the expression of Parliament's intention to permit the parties to negotiate and vote on, and the court to sanction, third-party releases relating to a restructuring.

59 Sections 4 and 6 of the CCAA state:

> 4. Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its unsecured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company, of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors, and, if the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.
>
> 6. Where a majority in number representing two-thirds in value of the creditors, or class of creditors, as the case may be, present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting or meetings thereof respectively held pursuant to sections 4 and 5, or either of those sections, agree to any compromise or arrangement either as proposed or as altered or modified at the meeting or meetings, the compromise or arrangement may be sanctioned by the court, and if so sanctioned is binding
>
> (a) on all the creditors or the class of creditors, as the case may be, and on any trustee for any such class of creditors, whether secured or unsecured, as the case may be, and on the company; and
>
> (b) in the case of a company that has made an authorized assignment or against which a bankruptcy order has been made under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or is in the course of being wound up under the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, on the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator and contributories of the company.

Compromise or Arrangement

60 While there may be little practical distinction between "compromise" and "arrangement" in many respects, the two are not necessarily the same. "Arrangement" is broader than "compromise" and would appear to include any scheme for reorganizing the affairs of the debtor: Houlden & Morawetz, *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law of Canada*, loose-leaf, 3rd ed., vol. 4 (Toronto: Thomson Carswell) at 10A-12.2, N§10. It has been said to be "a very wide and indefinite [word]": *Reference re Refund of Dues*

Paid under s.47 (f) of Timber Regulations in the Western Provinces, [1935] A.C. 184 (Canada P.C.) at 197, affirming S.C.C. [1933] S.C.R. 616 (S.C.C.). See also, *Guardian Assurance Co., Re*, [1917] 1 Ch. 431 (Eng. C.A.) at 448, 450; *T&N Ltd., Re* (2006), [2007] 1 All E.R. 851 (Eng. Ch. Div.).

61 The CCAA is a sketch, an outline, a supporting framework for the resolution of corporate insolvencies in the public interest. Parliament wisely avoided attempting to anticipate the myriad of business deals that could evolve from the fertile and creative minds of negotiators restructuring their financial affairs. It left the shape and details of those deals to be worked out within the framework of the comprehensive and flexible concepts of a "compromise" and "arrangement." I see no reason why a release in favour of a third party, negotiated as part of a package between a debtor and creditor and reasonably relating to the proposed restructuring cannot fall within that framework.

62 A proposal under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S., 1985, c. B-3 (the "BIA") is a contract: *Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Ideal Petroleum (1959) Ltd.*, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 230 (S.C.C.) at 239; *Society of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada v. Armitage* (2000), 50 O.R. (3d) 688 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 11. In my view, a compromise or arrangement under the CCAA is directly analogous to a proposal for these purposes, and therefore is to be treated as a contract between the debtor and its creditors. Consequently, parties are entitled to put anything into such a plan that could lawfully be incorporated into any contract. See *Air Canada, Re* (2004), 2 C.B.R. (5th) 4 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 6; *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co.* (1993), 12 O.R. (3d) 500 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at 518.

63 There is nothing to prevent a debtor and a creditor from including in a contract between them a term providing that the creditor release a third party. The term is binding as between the debtor and creditor. In the CCAA context, therefore, a plan of compromise or arrangement may propose that creditors agree to compromise claims against the debtor and to release third parties, just as any debtor and creditor might agree to such a term in a contract between them. Once the statutory mechanism regarding voter approval and court sanctioning has been complied with, the plan — including the provision for releases — becomes binding on all creditors (including the dissenting minority).

64 *T&N Ltd., Re*, *supra*, is instructive in this regard. It is a rare example of a court focussing on and examining the meaning and breadth of the term "arrangement". T&N and its associated companies were engaged in the manufacture, distribution and sale of asbestos-containing products. They became the subject of many claims by former employees, who had been exposed to asbestos dust in the course of their employment, and their dependents. The T&N companies applied for protection under s. 425 of the U.K. *Companies Act 1985*, a provision virtually identical to the scheme of the CCAA — including the concepts of compromise or arrangement. [4]

65 T&N carried employers' liability insurance. However, the employers' liability insurers (the "EL insurers") denied coverage. This issue was litigated and ultimately resolved through the establishment of a multi-million pound fund against which the employees and their dependants (the "EL claimants") would assert their claims. In return, T&N's former employees and dependants (the "EL claimants") agreed to forego any further claims against the EL insurers. This settlement was incorporated into the plan of compromise and arrangement between the T&N companies and the EL claimants that was voted on and put forward for court sanction.

66 Certain creditors argued that the court could not sanction the plan because it did not constitute a "compromise or arrangement" between T&N and the EL claimants since it did not purport to affect rights as between them but only the EL claimants' rights against the EL insurers. The Court rejected this argument. Richards J. adopted previous jurisprudence — cited earlier in these reasons — to the effect that the word "arrangement" has a very broad meaning and that, while both a compromise and an arrangement involve some "give and take", an arrangement need not involve a compromise or be confined to a case of dispute or difficulty (paras. 46-51). He referred to what would be the equivalent of a solvent arrangement under Canadian corporate legislation as an example. [5] Finally, he pointed out that the compromised rights of the EL claimants against the EL insurers were not unconnected with the EL claimants' rights against the T&N companies; the scheme of arrangement involving the EL insurers was "an integral part of a single proposal affecting all the parties" (para. 52). He concluded his reasoning with these observations (para. 53):

> In my judgment it is not a necessary element of an arrangement for the purposes of s 425 of the 1985 Act that it should alter the rights existing between the company and the creditors or members with whom it is made. No doubt in most cases it will alter those rights. But, provided that the context and content of the scheme are such as properly to constitute an arrangement between the company and the members or creditors concerned, it will fall within s 425. It is ... neither necessary nor desirable to attempt a definition of arrangement. The legislature has not done so. To insist on an alteration of rights, or a termination of rights as in the case of schemes to effect takeovers or mergers, is to impose a restriction which is neither warranted by the statutory language nor justified by the courts' approach over many years to give the term its widest meaning. *Nor is an arrangement necessarily outside the section, because its effect is to alter the rights of creditors against another party or because such alteration could be achieved by a scheme of arrangement with that party*. [Emphasis added.]

67 I find Richard J.'s analysis helpful and persuasive. In effect, the claimants in *T&N* were being asked to release their claims against the EL insurers in exchange for a call on the fund. Here, the appellants are being required to release their claims against certain financial third parties in exchange for what is anticipated to be an improved position for all ABCP Noteholders, stemming from the contributions the financial third parties are making to the ABCP restructuring. The situations are quite comparable.

The Binding Mechanism

68 Parliament's reliance on the expansive terms "compromise" or "arrangement" does not stand alone, however. Effective insolvency restructurings would not be possible without a statutory mechanism to bind an unwilling minority of creditors. Unanimity is frequently impossible in such situations. But the minority must be protected too. Parliament's solution to this quandary was to permit a wide range of proposals to be negotiated and put forward (the compromise or arrangement) and to bind *all* creditors by class to the terms of the plan, but to do so only where the proposal can gain the support of the requisite "double majority" of votes [6] *and* obtain the sanction of the court on the basis that it is fair and reasonable. In this way, the scheme of the CCAA supports the intention of Parliament to encourage a wide variety of solutions to corporate insolvencies without unjustifiably overriding the rights of dissenting creditors.

The Required Nexus

69 In keeping with this scheme and purpose, I do not suggest that any and all releases between creditors of the debtor company seeking to restructure and third parties may be made the subject of a compromise or arrangement between the debtor and its creditors. Nor do I think the fact that the releases may be "necessary" in the sense that the third parties or the debtor may refuse to proceed without them, of itself, advances the argument in favour of finding jurisdiction (although it may well be relevant in terms of the fairness and reasonableness analysis).

70 The release of the claim in question must be justified as part of the compromise or arrangement between the debtor and its creditors. In short, there must be a reasonable connection between the third party claim being compromised in the plan and the restructuring achieved by the plan to warrant inclusion of the third party release in the plan. This nexus exists here, in my view.

71 In the course of his reasons, the application judge made the following findings, all of which are amply supported on the record:

a) The parties to be released are necessary and essential to the restructuring of the debtor;

b) *The claims to be released are rationally related to the purpose of the Plan and necessary for it*;

c) The Plan cannot succeed without the releases;

d) *The parties who are to have claims against them released are contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the Plan*; and

e) The Plan will benefit not only the debtor companies but creditor Noteholders generally.

72 Here, then — as was the case in *T&N* — there is a close connection between the claims being released and the restructuring proposal. The tort claims arise out of the sale and distribution of the ABCP Notes and their collapse in value, just as do the contractual claims of the creditors against the debtor companies. The purpose of the restructuring is to stabilize and shore up the value of those notes in the long run. The third parties being released are making separate contributions to enable those results to materialize. Those contributions are identified earlier, at para. 31 of these reasons. The application judge found that the claims being released are not independent of or unrelated to the claims that the Noteholders have against the debtor companies; they are closely connected to the value of the ABCP Notes and are required for the Plan to succeed. At paras. 76-77 he said:

> [76] I do not consider that the Plan in this case involves a change in relationship among creditors "that does not directly involve the Company." Those who support the Plan and are to be released are "directly involved in the Company" in the sense that many are foregoing immediate rights to assets and are providing real and tangible input for the preservation and enhancement of the Notes. It would be unduly restrictive to suggest that the moving parties' claims against released parties do not involve the Company, since the claims are directly related to the value of the Notes. The value of the Notes is in this case the value of the Company.
>
> [77] This Plan, as it deals with releases, doesn't change the relationship of the creditors apart from involving the Company and its Notes.

73 I am satisfied that the wording of the CCAA — construed in light of the purpose, objects and scheme of the Act and in accordance with the modern principles of statutory interpretation — supports the court's jurisdiction and authority to sanction the Plan proposed here, including the contested third-party releases contained in it.

The Jurisprudence

74 Third party releases have become a frequent feature in Canadian restructurings since the decision of the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench in *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* (2000), 265 A.R. 201 (Alta. Q.B.), leave to appeal refused by (2000), 266 A.R. 131 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]), and (2001), 293 A.R. 351 (note) (S.C.C.). In *Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re* (2006), 25 C.B.R. (5th) 231 (Ont. S.C.J.) Justice Ground remarked (para. 8):

> [It] is not uncommon in CCAA proceedings, in the context of a plan of compromise and arrangement, to compromise claims against the Applicants and other parties against whom such claims or related claims are made.

75 We were referred to at least a dozen court-approved CCAA plans from across the country that included broad third-party releases. With the exception of *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*, however, the releases in those restructurings — including *Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re* — were not opposed. The appellants argue that those cases are wrongly decided, because the court simply does not have the authority to approve such releases.

76 In *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* the releases in question were opposed, however. Paperny J. (as she then was) concluded the court had jurisdiction to approve them and her decision is said to be the well-spring of the trend towards third-party releases referred to above. Based on the foregoing analysis, I agree with her conclusion although for reasons that differ from those cited by her.

77 Justice Paperny began her analysis of the release issue with the observation at para. 87 that "[p]rior to 1997, the CCAA did not provide for compromises of claims against anyone other than the petitioning company." It will be apparent from the analysis in these reasons that I do not accept that premise, notwithstanding the decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal in *Steinberg Inc. c. Michaud*,[7] of which her comment may have been reflective. Paperny J.'s reference to 1997 was a reference to the amendments of that year adding s. 5.1 to the CCAA, which provides for limited releases in favour of directors. Given the limited scope of s. 5.1, Justice Paperny was thus faced with the argument — dealt with later in these reasons — that Parliament must not have intended to extend the authority to approve third-party releases beyond the scope of this section. She chose to address this contention by concluding that, although the amendments "[did] not authorize a release of claims against third parties other than directors, [they did] not prohibit such releases either" (para. 92).

78 Respectfully, I would not adopt the interpretive principle that the CCAA permits releases because it does not expressly prohibit them. Rather, as I explain in these reasons, I believe the open-ended CCAA permits third-party releases that are reasonably related to the restructuring at issue because they are encompassed in the comprehensive terms "compromise" and "arrangement" and because of the double-voting majority and court sanctioning statutory mechanism that makes them binding on unwilling creditors.

79 The appellants rely on a number of authorities, which they submit support the proposition that the CCAA may not be used to compromise claims as between anyone other than the debtor company and its creditors. Principal amongst these are *Steinberg Inc. c. Michaud*, *supra*; *NBD Bank, Canada v. Dofasco Inc.* (1999), 46 O.R. (3d) 514 (Ont. C.A.); *Pacific Coastal Airlines Ltd. v. Air Canada* (2001), 19 B.L.R. (3d) 286 (B.C. S.C.); and *Stelco Inc., Re* (2005), 78 O.R. (3d) 241 (Ont. C.A.) ("*Stelco I*"). I do not think these cases assist the appellants, however. With the exception of *Steinberg Inc.*, they do not involve third party claims that were reasonably connected to the restructuring. As I shall explain, it is my opinion that *Steinberg Inc.* does not express a correct view of the law, and I decline to follow it.

80 In *Pacific Coastal Airlines Ltd.*, Tysoe J. made the following comment at para. 24:

> [The purpose of the CCAA proceeding] is not to deal with disputes between a creditor of a company and a third party, even if the company was also involved in the subject matter of the dispute. While issues between the debtor company and non-creditors are sometimes dealt with in CCAA proceedings, it is not a proper use of a CCAA proceeding to determine disputes between parties other than the debtor company.

81 This statement must be understood in its context, however. Pacific Coastal Airlines had been a regional carrier for Canadian Airlines prior to the CCAA reorganization of the latter in 2000. In the action in question it was seeking to assert separate tort claims against Air Canada for contractual interference and inducing breach of contract in relation to certain rights it had to the use of Canadian's flight designator code prior to the CCAA proceeding. Air Canada sought to have the action dismissed on grounds of *res judicata* or issue estoppel because of the CCAA proceeding. Tysoe J. rejected the argument.

82 The facts in *Pacific Coastal Airlines Ltd.* are not analogous to the circumstances of this case, however. There is no suggestion that a resolution of Pacific Coastal's separate tort claim against Air Canada was in any way connected to the Canadian Airlines restructuring, even though Canadian — at a contractual level — may have had some involvement with the particular dispute. Here, however, the disputes that are the subject-matter of the impugned releases are not simply "disputes between parties other than the debtor company". They are closely connected to the disputes being resolved between the debtor companies and their creditors and to the restructuring itself.

83 Nor is the decision of this Court in the *NBD Bank, Canada* case dispositive. It arose out of the financial collapse of Algoma Steel, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dofasco. The Bank had advanced funds to Algoma allegedly on the strength of misrepresentations by Algoma's Vice-President, James Melville. The plan of compromise and arrangement that was sanctioned by Farley J. in the Algoma CCAA restructuring contained a clause releasing Algoma from all claims creditors "may have had against Algoma or its directors, officers, employees and advisors." Mr. Melville was found liable for negligent misrepresentation in a subsequent action by the Bank. On appeal, he argued that since the Bank was barred from suing Algoma for misrepresentation by its officers, permitting it to pursue the same cause of action against him personally would subvert the CCAA process — in short, he was personally protected by the CCAA release.

84 Rosenberg J.A., writing for this Court, rejected this argument. The appellants here rely particularly upon his following observations at paras. 53-54:

> 53 In my view, the appellant has not demonstrated that allowing the respondent to pursue its claim against him would undermine or subvert the purposes of the Act. As this court noted in *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey* (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289 at 297, the *CCAA* is remedial legislation "intended to provide a structured environment for the negotiation of compromises between a debtor company and its creditors for the benefit of both". It is a means of avoiding a liquidation that may yield little for the creditors, especially unsecured creditors like the respondent, and the debtor company shareholders. However,

> the appellant has not shown that allowing a creditor to continue an action against an officer for negligent misrepresentation would erode the effectiveness of the Act.
>
> 54 In fact, to refuse on policy grounds to impose liability on an officer of the corporation for negligent misrepresentation would contradict the policy of Parliament as demonstrated in recent amendments to the *CCAA* and the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3. Those Acts now contemplate that an arrangement or proposal may include a term for compromise of certain types of claims against directors of the company except claims that "are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors". L.W. Houlden and C.H. Morawetz, the editors of *The 2000 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Toronto: Carswell, 1999) at p. 192 are of the view that the policy behind the provision is to encourage directors of an insolvent corporation to remain in office so that the affairs of the corporation can be reorganized. I can see no similar policy interest in barring an action against an officer of the company who, prior to the insolvency, has misrepresented the financial affairs of the corporation to its creditors. It may be necessary to permit the compromise of claims against the debtor corporation, otherwise it may not be possible to successfully reorganize the corporation. The same considerations do not apply to individual officers. Rather, it would seem to me that it would be contrary to good policy to immunize officers from the consequences of their negligent statements which might otherwise be made in anticipation of being forgiven under a subsequent corporate proposal or arrangement. [Footnote omitted.]

85 Once again, this statement must be assessed in context. Whether Justice Farley had the authority in the earlier Algoma CCAA proceedings to sanction a plan that included third party releases was not under consideration at all. What the Court was determining in *NBD Bank, Canada* was whether the release extended by its terms to protect a third party. In fact, on its face, it does not appear to do so. Justice Rosenberg concluded only that not allowing Mr. Melville to rely upon the release did not subvert the purpose of the CCAA. As the application judge here observed, "there is little factual similarity in *NBD Bank, Canada* to the facts now before the Court" (para. 71). Contrary to the facts of this case, in *NBD Bank, Canada* the creditors had not agreed to grant a release to officers; they had not voted on such a release and the court had not assessed the fairness and reasonableness of such a release as a term of a complex arrangement involving significant contributions by the beneficiaries of the release — as is the situation here. Thus, *NBD Bank, Canada* is of little assistance in determining whether the court has authority to sanction a plan that calls for third party releases.

86 The appellants also rely upon the decision of this Court in *Stelco I*. There, the Court was dealing with the scope of the CCAA in connection with a dispute over what were called the "Turnover Payments". Under an inter-creditor agreement one group of creditors had subordinated their rights to another group and agreed to hold in trust and "turn over" any proceeds received from Stelco until the senior group was paid in full. On a disputed classification motion, the Subordinated Debt Holders argued that they should be in a separate class from the Senior Debt Holders. Farley J. refused to make such an order in the court below, stating:

> [Sections] 4, 5 and 6 [of the CCAA] talk of compromises or arrangements between a company and its creditors. There is no mention of this extending by statute to encompass a change of relationship among the creditors vis-à-vis the creditors themselves *and not directly involving the company*. [Citations omitted; emphasis added.]

See *Re Stelco Inc.* (2005), 15 C.B.R. (5th) 297 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 7.

87 This Court upheld that decision. The legal relationship between each group of creditors and Stelco was the same, albeit there were inter-creditor differences, and creditors were to be classified in accordance with their legal rights. In addition, the need for timely classification and voting decisions in the CCAA process militated against enmeshing the classification process in the vagaries of inter-corporate disputes. In short, the issues before the Court were quite different from those raised on this appeal.

88 Indeed, the Stelco plan, as sanctioned, included third party releases (albeit uncontested ones). This Court subsequently dealt with the same inter-creditor agreement on an appeal where the Subordinated Debt Holders argued that the inter-creditor subordination provisions were beyond the reach of the CCAA and therefore that they were entitled to a separate civil action to determine their rights under the agreement: *Stelco Inc., Re* (2006), 21 C.B.R. (5th) 157 (Ont. C.A.) (*"Stelco II")*. The Court

rejected that argument and held that where the creditors' rights amongst themselves were sufficiently related to the debtor and its plan, they were properly brought within the scope of the CCAA plan. The Court said (para. 11):

> In [*Stelco I*] — the classification case — the court observed that it is not a proper use of a CCAA proceeding to determine disputes between parties other than the debtor company ... [*H]owever, the present case is not simply an inter-creditor dispute that does not involve the debtor company; it is a dispute that is inextricably connected to the restructuring process*. [Emphasis added.]

89 The approach I would take to the disposition of this appeal is consistent with that view. As I have noted, the third party releases here are very closely connected to the ABCP restructuring process.

90 Some of the appellants — particularly those represented by Mr. Woods — rely heavily upon the decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal in *Steinberg Inc. c. Michaud*, *supra*. They say that it is determinative of the release issue. In *Steinberg*, the Court held that the CCAA, as worded at the time, did not permit the release of directors of the debtor corporation and that third-party releases were not within the purview of the Act. Deschamps J.A. (as she then was) said (paras. 42, 54 and 58 — English translation):

> [42] Even if one can understand the extreme pressure weighing on the creditors and the respondent at the time of the sanctioning, a plan of arrangement is not the appropriate forum to settle disputes other than the claims that are the subject of the arrangement. In other words, one cannot, under the pretext of an absence of formal directives in the Act, transform an arrangement into a potpourri.
>
> . . . . .
>
> [54] The Act offers the respondent a way to arrive at a compromise with is creditors. It does not go so far as to offer an umbrella to all the persons within its orbit by permitting them to shelter themselves from any recourse.
>
> . . . . .
>
> [58] The [CCAA] and the case law clearly do not permit extending the application of an arrangement to persons other than the respondent and its creditors and, consequently, the plan should not have been sanctioned as is [that is, including the releases of the directors].

91 Justices Vallerand and Delisle, in separate judgments, agreed. Justice Vallerand summarized his view of the consequences of extending the scope of the CCAA to third party releases in this fashion (para. 7):

> In short, the Act will have become the Companies' *and Their Officers and Employees* Creditors Arrangement Act — an awful mess — and likely not attain its purpose, which is to enable the company to survive in the face of *its* creditors and through their will, and not in the face of the creditors of its officers. This is why I feel, just like my colleague, that such a clause is contrary to the Act's mode of operation, contrary to its purposes and, for this reason, is to be banned.

92 Justice Delisle, on the other hand, appears to have rejected the releases because of their broad nature — they released directors from all claims, including those that were altogether unrelated to their corporate duties with the debtor company — rather than because of a lack of authority to sanction under the Act. Indeed, he seems to have recognized the wide range of circumstances that could be included within the term "compromise or arrangement". He is the only one who addressed that term. At para. 90 he said:

> The CCAA is drafted in general terms. It does not specify, among other things, what must be understood by "compromise or arrangement". However, it may be inferred from the purpose of this [A]ct that these terms *encompass all that should enable the person who has recourse to it to fully dispose of his debts*, both those that exist on the date when he has recourse to the statute and *those contingent on the insolvency in which he finds himself* ... [Emphasis added.]

93 The decision of the Court did not reflect a view that the terms of a compromise or arrangement should "encompass all that should enable the person who has recourse to [the Act] to dispose of his debts ... and those contingent on the insolvency

in which he finds himself," however. On occasion such an outlook might embrace third parties other than the debtor and its creditors in order to make the arrangement work. Nor would it be surprising that, in such circumstances, the third parties might seek the protection of releases, or that the debtor might do so on their behalf. Thus, the perspective adopted by the majority in *Steinberg Inc.*, in my view, is too narrow, having regard to the language, purpose and objects of the CCAA and the intention of Parliament. They made no attempt to consider and explain why a compromise or arrangement could not include third-party releases. In addition, the decision appears to have been based, at least partly, on a rejection of the use of contract-law concepts in analysing the Act — an approach inconsistent with the jurisprudence referred to above.

94 Finally, the majority in *Steinberg Inc.* seems to have proceeded on the basis that the CCAA cannot interfere with civil or property rights under Quebec law. Mr. Woods advanced this argument before this Court in his factum, but did not press it in oral argument. Indeed, he conceded that if the Act encompasses the authority to sanction a plan containing third-party releases — as I have concluded it does — the provisions of the CCAA, as valid federal insolvency legislation, are paramount over provincial legislation. I shall return to the constitutional issues raised by the appellants later in these reasons.

95 Accordingly, to the extent *Steinberg Inc.* stands for the proposition that the court does not have authority under the CCAA to sanction a plan that incorporates third-party releases, I do not believe it to be a correct statement of the law and I respectfully decline to follow it. The modern approach to interpretation of the Act in accordance with its nature and purpose militates against a narrow interpretation and towards one that facilitates and encourages compromises and arrangements. Had the majority in *Steinberg Inc.* considered the broad nature of the terms "compromise" and "arrangement" and the jurisprudence I have referred to above, they might well have come to a different conclusion.

The 1997 Amendments

96 *Steinberg Inc.* led to amendments to the CCAA, however. In 1997, s. 5.1 was added, dealing specifically with releases pertaining to directors of the debtor company. It states:

> 5.1(1) A compromise or arrangement made in respect of a debtor company may include in its terms provision for the compromise of claims against directors of the company that arose before the commencement of proceedings under this Act and that relate to the obligations of the company where the directors are by law liable in their capacity as directors for the payment of such obligations.
>
> **Exception**
>
> (2) A provision for the compromise of claims against directors may not include claims that
>
> (a) relate to contractual rights of one or more creditors; or
>
> (b) are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors to creditors or of wrongful or oppressive conduct by directors.
>
> **Powers of court**
>
> (3) The court may declare that a claim against directors shall not be compromised if it is satisfied that the compromise would not be fair and reasonable in the circumstances.
>
> **Resignation or removal of directors**
>
> (4) Where all of the directors have resigned or have been removed by the shareholders without replacement, any person who manages or supervises the management of the business and affairs of the debtor company shall be deemed to be a director for the purposes of this section.
>
> 1997, c. 12, s. 122.

97 Perhaps the appellants' strongest argument is that these amendments confirm a prior lack of authority in the court to sanction a plan including third party releases. If the power existed, why would Parliament feel it necessary to add an amendment specifically permitting such releases (subject to the exceptions indicated) in favour of directors? *Expressio unius est exclusio alterius*, is the Latin maxim sometimes relied on to articulate the principle of interpretation implied in that question: to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other.

98 The maxim is not helpful in these circumstances, however. The reality is that there *may* be another explanation why Parliament acted as it did. As one commentator has noted: [8]

> Far from being a rule, [the maxim *expressio unius*] is not even lexicographically accurate, because it is simply not true, generally, that the mere express conferral of a right or privilege in one kind of situation implies the denial of the equivalent right or privilege in other kinds. Sometimes it does and sometimes its does not, and whether it does or does not depends on the particular circumstances of context. Without contextual support, therefore there is not even a mild presumption here. Accordingly, the maxim is at best a description, after the fact, of what the court has discovered from context.

99 As I have said, the 1997 amendments to the CCAA providing for releases in favour of directors of debtor companies in limited circumstances were a response to the decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal in *Steinberg Inc.*. A similar amendment was made with respect to proposals in the BIA at the same time. The rationale behind these amendments was to encourage directors of an insolvent company to remain in office during a restructuring, rather than resign. The assumption was that by remaining in office the directors would provide some stability while the affairs of the company were being reorganized: see Houlden & Morawetz, vol.1, *supra*, at 2-144, E§11A; *Royal Penfield Inc., Re*, [2003] R.J.Q. 2157 (C.S. Que.) at paras. 44-46.

100 Parliament thus had a particular focus and a particular purpose in enacting the 1997 amendments to the CCAA and the BIA. While there is some merit in the appellants' argument on this point, at the end of the day I do not accept that Parliament intended to signal by its enactment of s. 5.1 that it was depriving the court of authority to sanction plans of compromise or arrangement in all circumstances where they incorporate third party releases in favour of anyone other than the debtor's directors. For the reasons articulated above, I am satisfied that the court does have the authority to do so. Whether it sanctions the plan is a matter for the fairness hearing.

The Deprivation of Proprietary Rights

101 Mr. Shapray very effectively led the appellants' argument that legislation must not be construed so as to interfere with or prejudice established contractual or proprietary rights — including the right to bring an action — in the absence of a clear indication of legislative intention to that effect: *Halsbury's Laws of England*, 4th ed. reissue, vol. 44 (1) (London: Butterworths, 1995) at paras. 1438, 1464 and 1467; Driedger, 2nd ed., *supra*, at 183; Ruth Sullivan, *Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes*, 4th ed., (Markham: Butterworths, 2002) at 399. I accept the importance of this principle. For the reasons I have explained, however, I am satisfied that Parliament's intention to clothe the court with authority to consider and sanction a plan that contains third party releases is expressed with sufficient clarity in the "compromise or arrangement" language of the CCAA coupled with the statutory voting and sanctioning mechanism making the provisions of the plan binding on all creditors. This is not a situation of impermissible "gap-filling" in the case of legislation severely affecting property rights; it is a question of finding meaning in the language of the Act itself. I would therefore not give effect to the appellants' submissions in this regard.

The Division of Powers and Paramountcy

102 Mr. Woods and Mr. Sternberg submit that extending the reach of the CCAA process to the compromise of claims as between solvent creditors of the debtor company and solvent third parties to the proceeding is constitutionally impermissible. They say that under the guise of the federal insolvency power pursuant to s. 91(21) of the *Constitution Act, 1867*, this approach would improperly affect the rights of civil claimants to assert their causes of action, a provincial matter falling within s. 92(13), and contravene the rules of public order pursuant to the *Civil Code of Quebec*.

103 I do not accept these submissions. It has long been established that the CCAA is valid federal legislation under the federal insolvency power: *Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada)*, [1934] S.C.R. 659 (S.C.C.). As the Supreme Court confirmed in that case (p. 661), citing Viscount Cave L.C. in *Quebec (Attorney General) v. Bélanger (Trustee of)*, [1928] A.C. 187 (Canada P.C.), "the exclusive legislative authority to deal with all matters within the domain of bankruptcy and insolvency is vested in Parliament." Chief Justice Duff elaborated:

> Matters normally constituting part of a bankruptcy scheme but not in their essence matters of bankruptcy and insolvency may, of course, from another point of view and in another aspect be dealt with by a provincial legislature; but, when treated as matters pertaining to bankruptcy and insolvency, they clearly fall within the legislative authority of the Dominion.

104 That is exactly the case here. The power to sanction a plan of compromise or arrangement that contains third-party releases of the type opposed by the appellants is embedded in the wording of the CCAA. The fact that this may interfere with a claimant's right to pursue a civil action — normally a matter of provincial concern — or trump Quebec rules of public order is constitutionally immaterial. The CCAA is a valid exercise of federal power. Provided the matter in question falls within the legislation directly or as necessarily incidental to the exercise of that power, the CCAA governs. To the extent that its provisions are inconsistent with provincial legislation, the federal legislation is paramount. Mr. Woods properly conceded this during argument.

Conclusion With Respect to Legal Authority

105 For all of the foregoing reasons, then, I conclude that the application judge had the jurisdiction and legal authority to sanction the Plan as put forward.

(2) The Plan is "Fair and Reasonable"

106 The second major attack on the application judge's decision is that he erred in finding that the Plan is "fair and reasonable" and in sanctioning it on that basis. This attack is centred on the nature of the third-party releases contemplated and, in particular, on the fact that they will permit the release of some claims based in fraud.

107 Whether a plan of compromise or arrangement is fair and reasonable is a matter of mixed fact and law, and one on which the application judge exercises a large measure of discretion. The standard of review on this issue is therefore one of deference. In the absence of a demonstrable error an appellate court will not interfere: see *Ravelston Corp., Re* (2007), 31 C.B.R. (5th) 233 (Ont. C.A. [In Chambers]).

108 I would not interfere with the application judge's decision in this regard. While the notion of releases in favour of third parties — including leading Canadian financial institutions — that extend to claims of fraud is distasteful, there is no legal impediment to the inclusion of a release for claims based in fraud in a plan of compromise or arrangement. The application judge had been living with and supervising the ABCP restructuring from its outset. He was intimately attuned to its dynamics. In the end he concluded that the benefits of the Plan to the creditors as a whole, and to the debtor companies, outweighed the negative aspects of compelling the unwilling appellants to execute the releases as finally put forward.

109 The application judge was concerned about the inclusion of fraud in the contemplated releases and at the May hearing adjourned the final disposition of the sanctioning hearing in an effort to encourage the parties to negotiate a resolution. The result was the "fraud carve-out" referred to earlier in these reasons.

110 The appellants argue that the fraud carve-out is inadequate because of its narrow scope. It (i) applies only to ABCP Dealers, (ii) limits the type of damages that may be claimed (no punitive damages, for example), (iii) defines "fraud" narrowly, excluding many rights that would be protected by common law, equity and the Quebec concept of public order, and (iv) limits claims to representations made directly to Noteholders. The appellants submit it is contrary to public policy to sanction a plan containing such a limited restriction on the type of fraud claims that may be pursued against the third parties.

111 The law does not condone fraud. It is the most serious kind of civil claim. There is therefore some force to the appellants' submission. On the other hand, as noted, there is no legal impediment to granting the release of an antecedent claim in fraud, provided the claim is in the contemplation of the parties to the release at the time it is given: *Fotinis Restaurant Corp. v. White Spot Ltd* (1998), 38 B.L.R. (2d) 251 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) at paras. 9 and 18. There may be disputes about the scope or extent of what is released, but parties are entitled to settle allegations of fraud in civil proceedings — the claims here all being untested allegations of fraud — and to include releases of such claims as part of that settlement.

112 The application judge was alive to the merits of the appellants' submissions. He was satisfied in the end, however, that the need "to avoid the potential cascade of litigation that ... would result if a broader 'carve out' were to be allowed" (para. 113) outweighed the negative aspects of approving releases with the narrower carve-out provision. Implementation of the Plan, in his view, would work to the overall greater benefit of the Noteholders as a whole. I can find no error in principle in the exercise of his discretion in arriving at this decision. It was his call to make.

113 At para. 71 above I recited a number of factual findings the application judge made in concluding that approval of the Plan was within his jurisdiction under the CCAA and that it was fair and reasonable. For convenience, I reiterate them here — with two additional findings — because they provide an important foundation for his analysis concerning the fairness and reasonableness of the Plan. The application judge found that:

> a) The parties to be released are necessary and essential to the restructuring of the debtor;
>
> b) The claims to be released are rationally related to the purpose of the Plan and necessary for it;
>
> c) The Plan cannot succeed without the releases;
>
> d) The parties who are to have claims against them released are contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the Plan;
>
> e) The Plan will benefit not only the debtor companies but creditor Noteholders generally;
>
> f) The voting creditors who have approved the Plan did so with knowledge of the nature and effect of the releases; and that,
>
> g) The releases are fair and reasonable and not overly broad or offensive to public policy.

114 These findings are all supported on the record. Contrary to the submission of some of the appellants, they do not constitute a new and hitherto untried "test" for the sanctioning of a plan under the CCAA. They simply represent findings of fact and inferences on the part of the application judge that underpin his conclusions on jurisdiction and fairness.

115 The appellants all contend that the obligation to release the third parties from claims in fraud, tort, breach of fiduciary duty, etc. is confiscatory and amounts to a requirement that they — as individual creditors — make the equivalent of a greater financial contribution to the Plan. In his usual lively fashion, Mr. Sternberg asked us the same rhetorical question he posed to the application judge. As he put it, how could the court countenance the compromise of what in the future might turn out to be fraud perpetrated at the highest levels of Canadian and foreign banks? Several appellants complain that the proposed Plan is unfair to them because they will make very little additional recovery if the Plan goes forward, but will be required to forfeit a cause of action against third-party financial institutions that may yield them significant recovery. Others protest that they are being treated unequally because they are ineligible for relief programs that Liquidity Providers such as Canaccord have made available to other smaller investors.

116 All of these arguments are persuasive to varying degrees when considered in isolation. The application judge did not have that luxury, however. He was required to consider the circumstances of the restructuring as a whole, including the reality that many of the financial institutions were not only acting as Dealers or brokers of the ABCP Notes (with the impugned releases relating to the financial institutions in these capacities, for the most part) but also as Asset and Liquidity Providers (with the financial institutions making significant contributions to the restructuring in these capacities).

117 In insolvency restructuring proceedings almost everyone loses something. To the extent that creditors are required to compromise their claims, it can always be proclaimed that their rights are being unfairly confiscated and that they are being called upon to make the equivalent of a further financial contribution to the compromise or arrangement. Judges have observed on a number of occasions that CCAA proceedings involve "a balancing of prejudices," inasmuch as everyone is adversely affected in some fashion.

118 Here, the debtor corporations being restructured represent the issuers of the more than $32 billion in non-bank sponsored ABCP Notes. The proposed compromise and arrangement affects that entire segment of the ABCP market and the financial markets as a whole. In that respect, the application judge was correct in adverting to the importance of the restructuring to the resolution of the ABCP liquidity crisis and to the need to restore confidence in the financial system in Canada. He was required to consider and balance the interests of *all* Noteholders, not just the interests of the appellants, whose notes represent only about 3% of that total. That is what he did.

119 The application judge noted at para. 126 that the Plan represented "a reasonable balance between benefit to all Noteholders and enhanced recovery for those who can make out specific claims in fraud" within the fraud carve-out provisions of the releases. He also recognized at para. 134 that:

> No Plan of this size and complexity could be expected to satisfy all affected by it. The size of the majority who have approved it is testament to its overall fairness. No plan to address a crisis of this magnitude can work perfect equity among all stakeholders.

120 In my view we ought not to interfere with his decision that the Plan is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances.

D. Disposition

121 For the foregoing reasons, I would grant leave to appeal from the decision of Justice Campbell, but dismiss the appeal.

***J.I. Laskin J.A.*:**

I agree.

***E.A. Cronk J.A.*:**

I agree.

Schedule A — Conduits

Apollo Trust

Apsley Trust

Aria Trust

Aurora Trust

Comet Trust

Encore Trust

Gemini Trust

Ironstone Trust

MMAI-I Trust

Newshore Canadian Trust

Opus Trust

Planet Trust

Rocket Trust

Selkirk Funding Trust

Silverstone Trust

Slate Trust

Structured Asset Trust

Structured Investment Trust III

Symphony Trust

Whitehall Trust

Schedule B — Applicants

ATB Financial

Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec

Canaccord Capital Corporation

Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation

Canada Post Corporation

Credit Union Central Alberta Limited

Credit Union Central of BC

Credit Union Central of Canada

Credit Union Central of Ontario

Credit Union Central of Saskatchewan

Desjardins Group

Magna International Inc.

National Bank of Canada/National Bank Financial Inc.

NAV Canada

Northwater Capital Management Inc.

Public Sector Pension Investment Board

The Governors of the University of Alberta

Schedule A — Counsel

1) Benjamin Zarnett and Frederick L. Myers for the Pan-Canadian Investors Committee

2) Aubrey E. Kauffman and Stuart Brotman for 4446372 Canada Inc. and 6932819 Canada Inc.

3) Peter F.C. Howard and Samaneh Hosseini for Bank of America N.A.; Citibank N.A.; Citibank Canada, in its capacity as Credit Derivative Swap Counterparty and not in any other capacity; Deutsche Bank AG; HSBC Bank Canada; HSBC Bank USA, National Association; Merrill Lynch International; Merill Lynch Capital Services, Inc.; Swiss Re Financial Products Corporation; and UBS AG

4) Kenneth T. Rosenberg, Lily Harmer and Max Starnino for Jura Energy Corporation and Redcorp Ventures Ltd.

5) Craig J. Hill and Sam P. Rappos for the Monitors (ABCP Appeals)

6) Jeffrey C. Carhart and Joseph Marin for Ad Hoc Committee and Pricewaterhouse Coopers Inc., in its capacity as Financial Advisor

7) Mario J. Forte for Caisse de Dépôt et Placement du Québec

8) John B. Laskin for National Bank Financial Inc. and National Bank of Canada

9) Thomas McRae and Arthur O. Jacques for Ad Hoc Retail Creditors Committee (Brian Hunter, et al)

10) Howard Shapray, Q.C. and Stephen Fitterman for Ivanhoe Mines Ltd.

11) Kevin P. McElcheran and Heather L. Meredith for Canadian Banks, BMO, CIBC RBC, Bank of Nova Scotia and T.D. Bank

12) Jeffrey S. Leon for CIBC Mellon Trust Company, Computershare Trust Company of Canada and BNY Trust Company of Canada, as Indenture Trustees

13) Usman Sheikh for Coventree Capital Inc.

14) Allan Sternberg and Sam R. Sasso for Brookfield Asset Management and Partners Ltd. and Hy Bloom Inc. and Cardacian Mortgage Services Inc.

15) Neil C. Saxe for Dominion Bond Rating Service

16) James A. Woods, Sebastien Richemont and Marie-Anne Paquette for Air Transat A.T. Inc., Transat Tours Canada Inc., The Jean Coutu Group (PJC) Inc., Aéroports de Montréal, Aéroports de Montréal Capital Inc., Pomerleau Ontario Inc., Pomerleau Inc., Labopharm Inc., Agence Métropolitaine de Transport (AMT), Giro Inc., Vêtements de sports RGR Inc., 131519 Canada Inc., Tecsys Inc., New Gold Inc. and Jazz Air LP

17) Scott A. Turner for Webtech Wireless Inc., Wynn Capital Corporation Inc., West Energy Ltd., Sabre Energy Ltd., Petrolifera Petroleum Ltd., Vaquero Resources Ltd., and Standard Energy Ltd.

18) R. Graham Phoenix for Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments III Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments V Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XI Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XII Corp., Quanto Financial Corporation and Metcalfe & Mansfield Capital Corp.

Application granted; appeal dismissed.

Footnotes

* Leave to appeal refused at *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.* (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 5432, 2008 CarswellOnt 5433 (S.C.C.).

1 Section 5.1 of the CCAA specifically authorizes the granting of releases to directors in certain circumstances.

2 Justice Georgina R. Jackson and Dr. Janis P. Sarra, "Selecting the Judicial Tool to get the Job Done: An Examination of Statutory Interpretation, Discretionary Power and Inherent Jurisdiction in Insolvency Matters" in Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law, 2007* (Vancouver: Thomson Carswell, 2007).

3 Citing Gibbs J.A. in *Chef Ready Foods*, *supra*, at pp.319-320.

4 The Legislative Debates at the time the CCAA was introduced in Parliament in April 1933 make it clear that the CCAA is patterned after the predecessor provisions of s. 425 of the *Companies Act 1985* (U.K.): see *House of Commons Debates (Hansard)*, *supra*.

5 See *Canada Business Corporations Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, s. 192; *Ontario Business Corporations Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16, s. 182.

6 A majority in number representing two-thirds in value of the creditors (s. 6)

7 *Steinberg Inc.* was originally reported in French: *Steinberg Inc. c. Michaud*, [1993] R.J.Q. 1684 (C.A. Que.). All paragraph references to *Steinberg Inc.* in this judgment are from the unofficial English translation available at 1993 CarswellQue 2055 (C.A. Que.)

8 Reed Dickerson, *The Interpretation and Application of Statutes* (1975) at pp.234-235, cited in Bryan A. Garner, ed., Black's Law Dictionary, 8th ed. (West Group, St. Paul, Minn., 2004) at 621.

End of Document

TAB 2

2013 ONSC 1078
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Labourers' Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada v. Sino-Forest Corp.

2013 CarswellOnt 3361, 2013 ONSC 1078, 100 C.B.R. (5th) 30, 227 A.C.W.S. (3d) 930, 37 C.P.C. (7th) 135

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Sino-Forest Corporation, Applicant

The Trustees of the Labourers' Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada, The Trustees of the International Union of Operating Engineers Local 793 Pension Plan for Operating Engineers in Ontario, Sjunde Ap-Fonden, David Grant and Robert Wong, Plaintiffs and Sino-Forest Corporation, Ernst & Young LLP, BDO Limited (Formerly Known as BDO McCabe Lo Limited), Allen T.Y. Chan, W. Judson Martin, Kai Kit Poon, David J. Horsley, William E. Ardell, James P. Bowland, James M.E. Hyde, Edmund Mak, Simon Murray, Peter Wang, Garry J. West, Pöyry (Beijing) Consulting Company Limited, Credit Suisse Securities (Canada) In., TD Securities Inc., Dundee Securities Corporation, RBC Dominion Securities Inc., Scotia Capital Inc., CIBC World Markets Inc., Merrill Lunch Canada Inc., Canaccord Financial Ltd., Maison Placements Canada Inc., Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated (Successor by Merger to Banc of America Securities LLC), Defendants

Morawetz J.

Heard: February 4, 2013
Judgment: March 20, 2013
Docket: CV-12-9667-00CL, CV-11-431153-00CP

Counsel: Kenneth Rosenberg, Max Starnino, A. Dimitri Lascaris, Daniel Bach, Charles M. Wright, Jonathan Ptak, for Ad Hoc Committee of Purchasers including the Class Action Plaintiffs
Peter Griffin, Peter Osborne, Shara Roy, for Ernst & Young LLP, John Pirie and David Gadsden, for Pöyry (Beijing) Consulting Company Ltd.
Robert W. Staley for Sino-Forest Corporation
Won J. Kim, Michael C. Spencer, Megan B. McPhee for Objectors, Invesco Canada Ltd., Northwest & Ethical Investments LP and Comité Syndical National de Retraite Bâtirente Inc.
John Fabello Rebecca Wise, for Underwriters
Ken Dekker, Peter Greene for BDO Limited
Emily Cole, Joseph Marin for Allen Chan
James Doris for U.S. Class Action
Brandon Barnes for Kai Kit Poon
Robert Chadwick, Brendan O'Neill for Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders
Derrick Tay, Cliff Prophet for Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc.
Simon Bieber for David Horsley
James Grout for Ontario Securities Commission
Miles D. O'Reilly, Q.C. for Junior Objectors, Daniel Lam and Senthilvel Kanagaratnam

Subject: Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure; Corporate and Commercial; Securities

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Morawetz J.*:

Allen-Vanguard Corp., Re (2011), 2011 ONSC 5017, 2011 CarswellOnt 8984, 81 C.B.R. (5th) 270 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 ONCA 587, 2008 CarswellOnt 4811, *(*sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re)* 240 O.A.C. 245, *(*sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re)* 296 D.L.R. (4th) 135, *(*sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re)* 92 O.R. (3d) 513, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 123 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 3346, 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299, 72 O.T.C. 99 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Durling v. Sunrise Propane Energy Group Inc. (2011), 2011 ONSC 266, 2011 CarswellOnt 77, 10 C.P.C. (7th) 188 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG (2012), 2012 CarswellOnt 16498, 2012 ONSC 7299 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Fischer v. IG Investment Management Ltd. (2012), 2012 ONCA 47, 2012 CarswellOnt 635, 287 O.A.C. 148, 109 O.R. (3d) 498, 346 D.L.R. (4th) 598, 15 C.P.C. (7th) 81 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Grace Canada Inc., Re (2008), 50 C.B.R. (5th) 25, 2008 CarswellOnt 6284 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Mangan v. Inco Ltd. (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 801, 16 C.P.C. (4th) 165, 38 O.R. (3d) 703, 27 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 141 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re (2007), 30 C.B.R. (5th) 59, 2007 CarswellOnt 1029 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Nortel Networks Corp., Re (2010), 63 C.B.R. (5th) 44, 81 C.C.P.B. 56, 2010 CarswellOnt 1754, 2010 ONSC 1708 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Osmun v. Cadbury Adams Canada Inc. (2009), 85 C.P.C. (6th) 148, 2009 CarswellOnt 8132 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

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Sino-Forest Corp., Re (2012), 2012 ONSC 4377, 2012 CarswellOnt 9430, 92 C.B.R. (5th) 99 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Sino-Forest Corp., Re (2012), 2012 ONCA 816, 2012 CarswellOnt 14701 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re (2010), *(*sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. Canada (A.G.))* [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, *(*sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada)* 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), *(*sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada)* 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), *(*sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re)* 503 W.A.C. 1, *(*sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re)* 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 2010 SCC 60, 2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 CarswellBC 3420, 409 N.R. 201, *(*sub nom. *Ted LeRoy Trucking Ltd., Re)* 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383 (S.C.C.) — considered

Statutes considered:

Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6
Generally — referred to

s. 9 — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

s. 2(1) "equity claim" — considered

MOTION by representative plaintiffs for approval of settlement in class proceeding.

***Morawetz J.*:**

Introduction

1 The Ad Hoc Committee of Purchasers of the Applicant's Securities (the "Ad Hoc Securities Purchasers' Committee" or the "Applicant"), including the representative plaintiffs in the Ontario class action (collectively, the "Ontario Plaintiffs"), bring this motion for approval of a settlement and release of claims against Ernst & Young LLP [the "Ernst & Young Settlement", the "Ernst & Young Release", the "Ernst & Young Claims" and "Ernst & Young", as further defined in the Plan of Compromise and Reorganization of Sino-Forest Corporation ("SFC") dated December 3, 2012 (the "Plan")].

2 Approval of the Ernst & Young Settlement is opposed by Invesco Canada Limited ("Invesco"), Northwest and Ethical Investments L.P. ("Northwest"), Comité Syndical National de Retraite Bâtirente Inc. ("Bâtirente"), Matrix Asset Management Inc. ("Matrix"), Gestion Férique and Montrusco Bolton Investments Inc. ("Montrusco") (collectively, the "Objectors"). The Objectors particularly oppose the no-opt-out and full third-party release features of the Ernst & Young Settlement. The Objectors also oppose the motion for a representation order sought by the Ontario Plaintiffs, and move instead for appointment of the Objectors to represent the interests of all objectors to the Ernst & Young Settlement.

3 For the following reasons, I have determined that the Ernst & Young Settlement, together with the Ernst & Young Release, should be approved.

Facts

Class Action Proceedings

4 SFC is an integrated forest plantation operator and forest productions company, with most of its assets and the majority of its business operations located in the southern and eastern regions of the People's Republic of China. SFC's registered office is in Toronto, and its principal business office is in Hong Kong.

5 SFC's shares were publicly traded over the Toronto Stock Exchange. During the period from March 19, 2007 through June 2, 2011, SFC made three prospectus offerings of common shares. SFC also issued and had various notes (debt instruments) outstanding, which were offered to investors, by way of offering memoranda, between March 19, 2007 and June 2, 2011.

6 All of SFC's debt or equity public offerings have been underwritten. A total of 11 firms (the "Underwriters") acted as SFC's underwriters, and are named as defendants in the Ontario class action.

7 Since 2000, SFC has had two auditors: Ernst & Young, who acted as auditor from 2000 to 2004 and 2007 to 2012, and BDO Limited ("BDO"), who acted as auditor from 2005 to 2006. Ernst & Young and BDO are named as defendants in the Ontario class action.

8 Following a June 2, 2011 report issued by short-seller Muddy Waters LLC ("Muddy Waters"), SFC, and others, became embroiled in investigations and regulatory proceedings (with the Ontario Securities Commission (the "OSC"), the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police) for allegedly engaging in a "complex fraudulent scheme". SFC concurrently became embroiled in multiple class action proceedings across Canada, including Ontario, Quebec and Saskatchewan (collectively, the "Canadian Actions"), and in New York (collectively with the Canadian Actions, the "Class Action Proceedings"), facing allegations that SFC, and others, misstated its financial results, misrepresented its timber rights, overstated the value of its assets and concealed material information about its business operations from investors, causing the collapse of an artificially inflated share price.

9 The Canadian Actions are comprised of two components: first, there is a shareholder claim, brought on behalf of SFC's current and former shareholders, seeking damages in the amount of $6.5 billion for general damages, $174.8 million in connection with a prospectus issued in June 2007, $330 million in relation to a prospectus issued in June 2009, and $319.2 million in relation to a prospectus issued in December 2009; and second, there is a noteholder claim, brought on behalf of former holders of SFC's notes (the "Noteholders"), in the amount of approximately $1.8 billion. The noteholder claim asserts, among other things, damages for loss of value in the notes.

10 Two other class proceedings relating to SFC were subsequently commenced in Ontario: *Smith et al. v. Sino-Forest Corporation et al.*, which commenced on June 8, 2011; and *Northwest and Ethical Investments L.P. et al. v. Sino-Forest Corporation et al.*, which commenced on September 26, 2011.

11 In December 2011, there was a motion to determine which of the three actions in Ontario should be permitted to proceed and which should be stayed (the "Carriage Motion"). On January 6, 2012, Perell J. granted carriage to the Ontario Plaintiffs, appointed Siskinds LLP and Koskie Minsky LLP to prosecute the Ontario class action, and stayed the other class proceedings.

CCAA Proceedings

12 SFC obtained an initial order under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("CCAA") on March 30, 2012 (the "Initial Order"), pursuant to which a stay of proceedings was granted in respect of SFC and certain of its subsidiaries. Pursuant to an order on May 8, 2012, the stay was extended to all defendants in the class actions, including Ernst & Young. Due to the stay, the certification and leave motions have yet to be heard.

13 Throughout the CCAA proceedings, SFC asserted that there could be no effective restructuring of SFC's business, and separation from the Canadian parent, if the claims asserted against SFC's subsidiaries arising out of, or connected to, claims against SFC remained outstanding.

14 In addition, SFC and FTI Consulting Canada Inc. (the "Monitor") continually advised that timing and delay were critical elements that would impact on maximization of the value of SFC's assets and stakeholder recovery.

15 On May 14, 2012, an order (the "Claims Procedure Order") was issued that approved a claims process developed by SFC, in consultation with the Monitor. In order to identify the nature and extent of the claims asserted against SFC's subsidiaries,

the Claims Procedure Order required any claimant that had or intended to assert a right or claim against one or more of the subsidiaries, relating to a purported claim made against SFC, to so indicate on their proof of claim.

16 The Ad Hoc Securities Purchasers' Committee filed a proof of claim (encapsulating the approximately $7.3 billion shareholder claim and $1.8 billion noteholder claim) in the CCAA proceedings on behalf of all putative class members in the Ontario class action. The plaintiffs in the New York class action filed a proof of claim, but did not specify quantum of damages. Ernst & Young filed a proof of claim for damages and indemnification. The plaintiffs in the Saskatchewan class action did not file a proof of claim. A few shareholders filed proofs of claim separately. No proof of claim was filed by Kim Orr Barristers P.C. ("Kim Orr"), who represent the Objectors.

17 Prior to the commencement of the CCAA proceedings, the plaintiffs in the Canadian Actions settled with Pöyry (Beijing) Consulting Company Limited ("Pöyry") (the "Pöyry Settlement"), a forestry valuator that provided services to SFC. The class was defined as all persons and entities who acquired SFC's securities in Canada between March 19, 2007 to June 2, 2011, and all Canadian residents who acquired SFC securities outside of Canada during that same period (the "Pöyry Settlement Class").

18 The notice of hearing to approve the Pöyry Settlement advised the Pöyry Settlement Class that they may object to the proposed settlement. No objections were filed.

19 Perell J. and Émond J. approved the settlement and certified the Pöyry Settlement Class for settlement purposes. January 15, 2013 was fixed as the date by which members of the Pöyry Settlement Class, who wished to opt-out of either of the Canadian Actions, would have to file an opt-out form for the claims administrator, and they approved the form by which the right to optout was required to be exercised.

20 Notice of the certification and settlement was given in accordance with the certification orders of Perell J. and Émond J. The notice of certification states, in part, that:

> IF YOU CHOOSE TO OPT OUT OF THE CLASS, YOU WILL BE OPTING OUT OF THE **ENTIRE** PROCEEDING. THIS MEANS THAT YOU WILL BE UNABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY FUTURE SETTLEMENT OR JUDGMENT REACHED WITH OR AGAINST THE REMAINING DEFENDANTS.

21 The opt-out made no provision for an opt-out on a conditional basis.

22 On June 26, 2012, SFC brought a motion for an order directing that claims against SFC that arose in connection with the ownership, purchase or sale of an equity interest in SFC, and related indemnity claims, were "equity claims" as defined in section 2 of the CCAA, including the claims by or on behalf of shareholders asserted in the Class Action Proceedings. The equity claims motion did not purport to deal with the component of the Class Action Proceedings relating to SFC's notes.

23 In reasons released July 27, 2012 [*Sino-Forest Corp., Re*, 2012 ONSC 4377 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])], I granted the relief sought by SFC (the "Equity Claims Decision"), finding that "the claims advanced in the shareholder claims are clearly equity claims". The Ad Hoc Securities Purchasers' Committee did not oppose the motion, and no issue was taken by any party with the court's determination that the shareholder claims against SFC were "equity claims". The Equity Claims Decision was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeal for Ontario on November 23, 2012 [*Sino-Forest Corp., Re*, 2012 ONCA 816 (Ont. C.A.)].

Ernst & Young Settlement

24 The Ernst & Young Settlement, and third party releases, was not mentioned in the early versions of the Plan. The initial creditors' meeting and vote on the Plan was scheduled to occur on November 29, 2012; when the Plan was amended on November 28, 2012, the creditors' meeting was adjourned to November 30, 2012.

25 On November 29, 2012, Ernst & Young's counsel and class counsel concluded the proposed Ernst & Young Settlement. The creditors' meeting was again adjourned, to December 3, 2012; on that date, a new Plan revision was released and the Ernst & Young Settlement was publicly announced. The Plan revision featured a new Article 11, reflecting the "framework" for the

proposed Ernst & Young Settlement and for third-party releases for named third-party defendants as identified at that time as the Underwriters or in the future.

26 On December 3, 2012, a large majority of creditors approved the Plan. The Objectors note, however, that proxy materials were distributed weeks earlier and proxies were required to be submitted three days prior to the meeting and it is evident that creditors submitting proxies only had a pre-Article 11 version of the Plan. Further, no equity claimants, such as the Objectors, were entitled to vote on the Plan. On December 6, 2012, the Plan was further amended, adding Ernst & Young and BDO to Schedule A, thereby defining them as named third-party defendants.

27 Ultimately, the Ernst & Young Settlement provided for the payment by Ernst & Young of $117 million as a settlement fund, being the full monetary contribution by Ernst & Young to settle the Ernst & Young Claims; however, it remains subject to court approval in Ontario, and recognition in Quebec and the United States, and conditional, pursuant to Article 11.1 of the Plan, upon the following steps:

> (a) the granting of the sanction order sanctioning the Plan including the terms of the Ernst & Young Settlement and the Ernst & Young Release (which preclude any right to contribution or indemnity against Ernst & Young);
>
> (b) the issuance of the Settlement Trust Order;
>
> (c) the issuance of any other orders necessary to give effect to the Ernst & Young Settlement and the Ernst & Young Release, including the Chapter 15 Recognition Order;
>
> (d) the fulfillment of all conditions precedent in the Ernst & Young Settlement; and
>
> (e) all orders being final orders not subject to further appeal or challenge.

28 On December 6, 2012, Kim Orr filed a notice of appearance in the CCAA proceedings on behalf of three Objectors: Invesco, Northwest and Bâtirente. These Objectors opposed the sanctioning of the Plan, insofar as it included Article 11, during the Plan sanction hearing on December 7, 2012.

29 At the Plan sanction hearing, SFC's counsel made it clear that the Plan itself did not embody the Ernst & Young Settlement, and that the parties' request that the Plan be sanctioned did not also cover approval of the Ernst & Young Settlement. Moreover, according to the Plan and minutes of settlement, the Ernst & Young Settlement would not be consummated (*i.e.* money paid and releases effective) unless and until several conditions had been satisfied in the future.

30 The Plan was sanctioned on December 10, 2012 with Article 11. The Objectors take the position that the Funds' opposition was dismissed as premature and on the basis that nothing in the sanction order affected their rights.

31 On December 13, 2012, the court directed that its hearing on the Ernst & Young Settlement would take place on January 4, 2013, under both the CCAA and the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992*, S.O. 1992, c. 6 ("CPA"). Subsequently, the hearing was adjourned to February 4, 2013.

32 On January 15, 2013, the last day of the opt-out period established by orders of Perell J. and Émond J., six institutional investors represented by Kim Orr filed opt-out forms. These institutional investors are Northwest and Bâtirente, who were two of the three institutions represented by Kim Orr in the Carriage Motion, as well as Invesco, Matrix, Montrusco and Gestion Ferique (all of which are members of the Pöyry Settlement Class).

33 According to the opt-out forms, the Objectors held approximately 1.6% of SFC shares outstanding on June 30, 2011 (the day the Muddy Waters report was released). By way of contrast, Davis Selected Advisors and Paulson and Co., two of many institutional investors who support the Ernst & Young Settlement, controlled more than 25% of SFC's shares at this time. In addition, the total number of outstanding objectors constitutes approximately 0.24% of the 34,177 SFC beneficial shareholders as of April 29, 2011.

Law and Analysis

Court's Jurisdiction to Grant Requested Approval

34 The Claims Procedure Order of May 14, 2012, at paragraph 17, provides that any person that does not file a proof of claim in accordance with the order is barred from making or enforcing such claim as against any other person who could claim contribution or indemnity from the Applicant. This includes claims by the Objectors against Ernst & Young for which Ernst & Young could claim indemnity from SFC.

35 The Claims Procedure Order also provides that the Ontario Plaintiffs are authorized to file one proof of claim in respect of the substance of the matters set out in the Ontario class action, and that the Quebec Plaintiffs are similarly authorized to file one proof of claim in respect of the substance of the matters set out in the Quebec class action. The Objectors did not object to, or oppose, the Claims Procedure Order, either when it was sought or at any time thereafter. The Objectors did not file an independent proof of claim and, accordingly, the Canadian Claimants were authorized to and did file a proof of claim in the representative capacity in respect of the Objectors' claims.

36 The Ernst & Young Settlement is part of a CCAA plan process. Claims, including contingent claims, are regularly compromised and settled within CCAA proceedings. This includes outstanding litigation claims against the debtor and third parties. Such compromises fully and finally dispose of such claims, and it follows that there are no continuing procedural or other rights in such proceedings. Simply put, there are no "opt-outs" in the CCAA.

37 It is well established that class proceedings can be settled in a CCAA proceeding. See *Robertson v. ProQuest Information & Learning Co.*, 2011 ONSC 1647 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) [*Robertson*].

38 As noted by Pepall J. (as she then was) in *Robertson*, para. 8:

> When dealing with the consensual resolution of a CCAA claim filed in a claims process that arises out of ongoing litigation, typically no court approval is required. In contrast, class proceedings settlements must be approved by the court. The notice and process for dissemination of the settlement agreement must also be approved by the court.

39 In this case, the notice and process for dissemination have been approved.

40 The Objectors take the position that approval of the Ernst & Young Settlement would render their opt-out rights illusory; the inherent flaw with this argument is that it is not possible to ignore the CCAA proceedings.

41 In this case, claims arising out of the class proceedings are claims in the CCAA process. CCAA claims can be, by definition, subject to compromise. The Claims Procedure Order establishes that claims as against Ernst & Young fall within the CCAA proceedings. Thus, these claims can also be the subject of settlement and, if settled, the claims of all creditors in the class can also be settled.

42 In my view, these proceedings are the appropriate time and place to consider approval of the Ernst & Young Settlement. This court has the jurisdiction in respect of both the CCAA and the CPA.

Should the Court Exercise Its Discretion to Approve the Settlement

43 Having established the jurisdictional basis to consider the motion, the central inquiry is whether the court should exercise its discretion to approve the Ernst & Young Settlement.

CCAA Interpretation

44 The CCAA is a "flexible statute", and the court has "jurisdiction to approve major transactions, including settlement agreements, during the stay period defined in the Initial Order". The CCAA affords courts broad jurisdiction to make orders and "fill in the gaps in legislation so as to give effect to the objects of the CCAA." [*Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, 2010 ONSC

1708 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), paras. 66-70 ("*Re Nortel*")); *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re* (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299, 72 O.T.C. 99 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), para. 43]

45 Further, as the Supreme Court of Canada explained in *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re*, 2010 SCC 60 (S.C.C.), para. 58:

> CCAA decisions are often based on discretionary grants of jurisdiction. The incremental exercise of judicial discretion in commercial courts under conditions one practitioner aptly described as "the hothouse of real time litigation" has been the primary method by which the CCAA has been adapted and has evolved to meet contemporary business and social needs (internal citations omitted). ...When large companies encounter difficulty, reorganizations become increasingly complex. CCAA courts have been called upon to innovate accordingly in exercising their jurisdiction beyond merely staying proceedings against the Debtor to allow breathing room for reorganization. They have been asked to sanction measures for which there is no explicit authority in the CCAA.

46 It is also established that third-party releases are not an uncommon feature of complex restructurings under the CCAA [*ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.*, 2008 ONCA 587 (Ont. C.A.) ("*ATB Financial*"); *Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, *supra*; *Robertson, supra*; *Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re* (2007), 30 C.B.R. (5th) 59, 156 A.C.W.S. (3d) 22 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) ("*Muscle Tech*"); *Grace Canada Inc., Re* (2008), 50 C.B.R. (5th) 25 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); *Allen-Vanguard Corp., Re*, 2011 ONSC 5017 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])].

47 The Court of Appeal for Ontario has specifically confirmed that a third-party release is justified where the release forms part of a comprehensive compromise. As Blair J. A. stated in *ATB Financial*, *supra*:

> 69. In keeping with this scheme and purpose, I do not suggest that any and all releases between creditors of the debtor company seeking to restructure and third parties may be made the subject of a compromise or arrangement between the debtor and its creditors. Nor do I think the fact that the releases may be "necessary" in the sense that the third parties or the debtor may refuse to proceed without them, of itself, advances the argument in favour of finding jurisdiction (although it may well be relevant in terms of the fairness and reasonableness analysis).
>
> 70. The release of the claim in question must be justified as part of the compromise or arrangement between the debtor and its creditors. In short, there must be a reasonable connection between the third party claim being compromised in the plan and the restructuring achieved by the plan to warrant inclusion of the third party release in the plan ...
>
> 71. In the course of his reasons, the application judge made the following findings, all of which are amply supported on the record:
>
> a) The parties to be released are necessary and essential to the restructuring of the debtor;
>
> b) The claims to be released are rationally related to the purpose of the Plan and necessary for it;
>
> c) The Plan cannot succeed without the releases;
>
> d) The parties who are to have claims against them released are contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the Plan; and
>
> e) The Plan will benefit not only the debtor companies but creditor Noteholders generally.
>
> 72. Here, then — as was the case in T&N — there is a close connection between the claims being released and the restructuring proposal. The tort claims arise out of the sale and distribution of the ABCP Notes and their collapse in value, just as do the contractual claims of the creditors against the debtor companies. The purpose of the restructuring is to stabilize and shore up the value of those notes in the long run. The third parties being released are making separate contributions to enable those results to materialize. Those contributions are identified earlier, at para. 31 of these reasons. The application judge found that the claims being released are not independent of or unrelated to the claims that the Noteholders have

against the debtor companies; they are closely connected to the value of the ABCP Notes and are required for the Plan to succeed ...

73. I am satisfied that the wording of the CCAA — construed in light of the purpose, objects and scheme of the Act and in accordance with the modern principles of statutory interpretation — supports the court's jurisdiction and authority to sanction the Plan proposed here, including the contested third-party releases contained in it.

. . .

78. ... I believe the open-ended CCAA permits third-party releases that are reasonably related to the restructuring at issue because they are encompassed in the comprehensive terms "compromise" and "arrangement" and because of the double-voting majority and court sanctioning statutory mechanism that makes them binding on unwilling creditors.

. . .

113. At para. 71 above I recited a number of factual findings the application judge made in concluding that approval of the Plan was within his jurisdiction under the CCAA and that it was fair and reasonable. For convenience, I reiterate them here — with two additional findings — because they provide an important foundation for his analysis concerning the fairness and reasonableness of the Plan. The application judge found that:

a) The parties to be released are necessary and essential to the restructuring of the debtor;

b) The claims to be released are rationally related to the purpose of the Plan and necessary for it;

c) The Plan cannot succeed without the releases;

d) The parties who are to have claims against them released are contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the Plan;

e) The Plan will benefit not only the debtor companies but creditor Noteholders generally;

f) The voting creditors who have approved the Plan did so with knowledge of the nature and effect of the releases; and that,

g) The releases are fair and reasonable and not overly broad or offensive to public policy.

48 Furthermore, in *ATB Financial*, *supra*, para. 111, the Court of Appeal confirmed that parties are entitled to settle allegations of fraud and to include releases of such claims as part of the settlement. It was noted that "there is no legal impediment to granting the release of an antecedent claim in fraud, provided the claim is in the contemplation of the parties to the release at the time it is given".

Relevant CCAA Factors

49 In assessing a settlement within the CCAA context, the court looks at the following three factors, as articulated in *Robertson*, *supra*:

(a) whether the settlement is fair and reasonable;

(b) whether it provides substantial benefits to other stakeholders; and

(c) whether it is consistent with the purpose and spirit of the CCAA.

50 Where a settlement also provides for a release, such as here, courts assess whether there is "a reasonable connection between the third party claim being compromised in the plan and the restructuring achieved by the plan to warrant inclusion of

the third party release in the plan". Applying this "nexus test" requires consideration of the following factors: [*ATB Financial*, *supra*, para. 70]

> (a) Are the claims to be released rationally related to the purpose of the plan?
>
> (b) Are the claims to be released necessary for the plan of arrangement?
>
> (c) Are the parties who have claims released against them contributing in a tangible and realistic way? and
>
> (d) Will the plan benefit the debtor and the creditors generally?

Counsel Submissions

51 The Objectors argue that the proposed Ernst & Young Release is not integral or necessary to the success of Sino-Forest's restructuring plan, and, therefore, the standards for granting thirdparty releases in the CCAA are not satisfied. No one has asserted that the parties require the Ernst & Young Settlement or Ernst & Young Release to allow the Plan to go forward; in fact, the Plan has been implemented prior to consideration of this issue. Further, the Objectors contend that the $117 million settlement payment is not essential, or even related, to the restructuring, and that it is concerning, and telling, that varying the end of the Ernst & Young Settlement and Ernst & Young Release to accommodate opt-outs would extinguish the settlement.

52 The Objectors also argue that the Ernst & Young Settlement should not be approved because it would vitiate opt-out rights of class members, as conferred as follows in section 9 of the CPA: "Any member of a class involved in a class proceeding may opt-out of the proceeding in the manner and within the time specified in the certification order." This right is a fundamental element of procedural fairness in the Ontario class action regime [*Fischer v. IG Investment Management Ltd.*, 2012 ONCA 47 (Ont. C.A.), para. 69], and is not a mere technicality or illusory. It has been described as absolute [*Durling v. Sunrise Propane Energy Group Inc.*, 2011 ONSC 266 (Ont. S.C.J.)]. The opt-out period allows persons to pursue their self-interest and to preserve their rights to pursue individual actions [*Mangan v. Inco Ltd.* (1998), 16 C.P.C. (4th) 165, 38 O.R. (3d) 703 (Ont. Gen. Div.)].

53 Based on the foregoing, the Objectors submit that a proposed class action settlement with Ernst & Young should be approved solely under the CPA, as the Pöyry Settlement was, and not through misuse of a third-party release procedure under the CCAA. Further, since the minutes of settlement make it clear that Ernst & Young retains discretion not to accept or recognize normal opt-outs if the CPA procedures are invoked, the Ernst & Young Settlement should not be approved in this respect either.

54 Multiple parties made submissions favouring the Ernst & Young Settlement (with the accompanying Ernst & Young Release), arguing that it is fair and reasonable in the circumstances, benefits the CCAA stakeholders (as evidenced by the broad-based support for the Plan and this motion) and rationally connected to the Plan.

55 Ontario Plaintiffs' counsel submits that the form of the bar order is fair and properly balances the competing interests of class members, Ernst & Young and the non-settling defendants as:

> (a) class members are not releasing their claims to a greater extent than necessary;
>
> (b) Ernst & Young is ensured that its obligations in connection to the Settlement will conclude its liability in the class proceedings;
>
> (c) the non-settling defendants will not have to pay more following a judgment than they would be required to pay if Ernst & Young remained as a defendant in the action; and
>
> (d) the non-settling defendants are granted broad rights of discovery and an appropriate credit in the ongoing litigation, if it is ultimately determined by the court that there is a right of contribution and indemnity between the co-defendants.

56 SFC argues that Ernst & Young's support has simplified and accelerated the Plan process, including reducing the expense and management time otherwise to be incurred in litigating claims, and was a catalyst to encouraging many parties, including

the Underwriters and BDO, to withdraw their objections to the Plan. Further, the result is precisely the type of compromise that the CCAA is designed to promote; namely, Ernst & Young has provided a tangible and significant contribution to the Plan (notwithstanding any pitfalls in the litigation claims against Ernst & Young) that has enabled SFC to emerge as Newco/NewcoII in a timely way and with potential viability.

57 Ernst & Young's counsel submits that the Ernst & Young Settlement, as a whole, including the Ernst & Young Release, must be approved or rejected; the court cannot modify the terms of a proposed settlement. Further, in deciding whether to reject a settlement, the court should consider whether doing so would put the settlement in "jeopardy of being unravelled". In this case, counsel submits there is no obligation on the parties to resume discussions and it could be that the parties have reached their limits in negotiations and will backtrack from their positions or abandon the effort.

Analysis and Conclusions

58 The Ernst & Young Release forms part of the Ernst & Young Settlement. In considering whether the Ernst & Young Settlement is fair and reasonable and ought to be approved, it is necessary to consider whether the Ernst & Young Release can be justified as part of the Ernst & Young Settlement. See *ATB Financial*, *supra*, para. 70, as quoted above.

59 In considering the appropriateness of including the Ernst & Young Release, I have taken into account the following.

60 Firstly, although the Plan has been sanctioned and implemented, a significant aspect of the Plan is a distribution to SFC's creditors. The significant and, in fact, only monetary contribution that can be directly identified, at this time, is the $117 million from the Ernst & Young Settlement. Simply put, until such time as the Ernst & Young Settlement has been concluded and the settlement proceeds paid, there can be no distribution of the settlement proceeds to parties entitled to receive them. It seems to me that in order to effect any distribution, the Ernst & Young Release has to be approved as part of the Ernst & Young Settlement.

61 Secondly, it is apparent that the claims to be released against Ernst & Young are rationally related to the purpose of the Plan and necessary for it. SFC put forward the Plan. As I outlined in the Equity Claims Decision, the claims of Ernst & Young as against SFC are intertwined to the extent that they cannot be separated. Similarly, the claims of the Objectors as against Ernst & Young are, in my view, intertwined and related to the claims against SFC and to the purpose of the Plan.

62 Thirdly, although the Plan can, on its face, succeed, as evidenced by its implementation, the reality is that without the approval of the Ernst & Young Settlement, the objectives of the Plan remain unfulfilled due to the practical inability to distribute the settlement proceeds. Further, in the event that the Ernst & Young Release is not approved and the litigation continues, it becomes circular in nature as the position of Ernst & Young, as detailed in the Equity Claims Decision, involves Ernst & Young bringing an equity claim for contribution and indemnity as against SFC.

63 Fourthly, it is clear that Ernst & Young is contributing in a tangible way to the Plan, by its significant contribution of $117 million.

64 Fifthly, the Plan benefits the claimants in the form of a tangible distribution. Blair J.A., at paragraph 113 of *ATB Financial*, *supra*, referenced two further facts as found by the application judge in that case; namely, the voting creditors who approved the Plan did so with the knowledge of the nature and effect of the releases. That situation is also present in this case.

65 Finally, the application judge in *ATB Financial*, *supra*, held that the releases were fair and reasonable and not overly broad or offensive to public policy. In this case, having considered the alternatives of lengthy and uncertain litigation, and the full knowledge of the Canadian plaintiffs, I conclude that the Ernst & Young Release is fair and reasonable and not overly broad or offensive to public policy.

66 In my view, the Ernst & Young Settlement is fair and reasonable, provides substantial benefits to relevant stakeholders, and is consistent with the purpose and spirit of the CCAA. In addition, in my view, the factors associated with the *ATB Financial* nexus test favour approving the Ernst & Young Release.

67 In *Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, *supra*, para. 81, I noted that the releases benefited creditors generally because they "reduced the risk of litigation, protected Nortel against potential contribution claims and indemnity claims and reduced the risk of delay caused by potentially complex litigation and associated depletion of assets to fund potentially significant litigation costs". In this case, there is a connection between the release of claims against Ernst & Young and a distribution to creditors. The plaintiffs in the litigation are shareholders and Noteholders of SFC. These plaintiffs have claims to assert against SFC that are being directly satisfied, in part, with the payment of $117 million by Ernst & Young.

68 In my view, it is clear that the claims Ernst & Young asserted against SFC, and SFC's subsidiaries, had to be addressed as part of the restructuring. The interrelationship between the various entities is further demonstrated by Ernst & Young's submission that the release of claims by Ernst & Young has allowed SFC and the SFC subsidiaries to contribute their assets to the restructuring, unencumbered by claims totalling billions of dollars. As SFC is a holding company with no material assets of its own, the unencumbered participation of the SFC subsidiaries is crucial to the restructuring.

69 At the outset and during the CCAA proceedings, the Applicant and Monitor specifically and consistently identified timing and delay as critical elements that would impact on maximization of the value and preservation of SFC's assets.

70 Counsel submits that the claims against Ernst & Young and the indemnity claims asserted by Ernst & Young would, absent the Ernst & Young Settlement, have to be finally determined before the CCAA claims could be quantified. As such, these steps had the potential to significantly delay the CCAA proceedings. Where the claims being released may take years to resolve, are risky, expensive or otherwise uncertain of success, the benefit that accrues to creditors in having them settled must be considered. See *Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, *supra*, paras. 73 and 81; and *Muscletech*, *supra*, paras. 19-21.

71 Implicit in my findings is rejection of the Objectors' arguments questioning the validity of the Ernst & Young Settlement and Ernst & Young Release. The relevant consideration is whether a proposed settlement and third-party release sufficiently benefits all stakeholders to justify court approval. I reject the position that the $117 million settlement payment is not essential, or even related, to the restructuring; it represents, at this point in time, the only real monetary consideration available to stakeholders. The potential to vary the Ernst & Young Settlement and Ernst & Young Release to accommodate opt-outs is futile, as the court is being asked to approve the Ernst & Young Settlement and Ernst & Young Release as proposed.

72 I do not accept that the class action settlement should be approved solely under the CPA. The reality facing the parties is that SFC is insolvent; it is under CCAA protection, and stakeholder claims are to be considered in the context of the CCAA regime. The Objectors' claim against Ernst & Young cannot be considered in isolation from the CCAA proceedings. The claims against Ernst & Young are interrelated with claims as against SFC, as is made clear in the Equity Claims Decision and Claims Procedure Order.

73 Even if one assumes that the opt-out argument of the Objectors can be sustained, and optout rights fully provided, to what does that lead? The Objectors are left with a claim against Ernst & Young, which it then has to put forward in the CCAA proceedings. Without taking into account any argument that the claim against Ernst & Young may be affected by the claims bar date, the claim is still capable of being addressed under the Claims Procedure Order. In this way, it is again subject to the CCAA fairness and reasonable test as set out in *ATB Financial*, *supra*.

74 Moreover, CCAA proceedings take into account a class of creditors or stakeholders who possess the same legal interests. In this respect, the Objectors have the same legal interests as the Ontario Plaintiffs. Ultimately, this requires consideration of the totality of the class. In this case, it is clear that the parties supporting the Ernst & Young Settlement are vastly superior to the Objectors, both in number and dollar value.

75 Although the right to opt-out of a class action is a fundamental element of procedural fairness in the Ontario class action regime, this argument cannot be taken in isolation. It must be considered in the context of the CCAA.

76 The Objectors are, in fact, part of the group that will benefit from the Ernst & Young Settlement as they specifically seek to reserve their rights to "opt-in" and share in the spoils.

77 It is also clear that the jurisprudence does not permit a dissenting stakeholder to opt-out of a restructuring. [*Sammi Atlas Inc., Re* (1998), 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List])).] If that were possible, no creditor would take part in any CCAA compromise where they were to receive less than the debt owed to them. There is no right to opt-out of any CCAA process, and the statute contemplates that a minority of creditors are bound by the plan which a majority have approved and the court has determined to be fair and reasonable.

78 SFC is insolvent and all stakeholders, including the Objectors, will receive less than what they are owed. By virtue of deciding, on their own volition, not to participate in the CCAA process, the Objectors relinquished their right to file a claim and take steps, in a timely way, to assert their rights to vote in the CCAA proceeding.

79 Further, even if the Objectors had filed a claim and voted, their minimal 1.6% stake in SFC's outstanding shares when the Muddy Waters report was released makes it highly unlikely that they could have altered the outcome.

80 Finally, although the Objectors demand a right to conditionally opt-out of a settlement, that right does not exist under the CPA or CCAA. By virtue of the certification order, class members had the ability to opt-out of the class action. The Objectors did not opt-out in the true sense; they purported to create a conditional opt-out. Under the CPA, the right to opt-out is "in the manner and within the time specified in the certification order". There is no provision for a conditional opt-out in the CPA, and Ontario's single opt-out regime causes "no prejudice...to putative class members". [CPA, section 9; *Osmun v. Cadbury Adams Canada Inc.* (2009), 85 C.P.C. (6th) 148 (Ont. S.C.J.), paras. 43-46; and *Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG*, 2012 ONSC 7299 (Ont. S.C.J.).]

Miscellaneous

81 For greater certainty, it is my understanding that the issues raised by Mr. O'Reilly have been clarified such that the effect of this endorsement is that the Junior Objectors will be included with the same status as the Ontario Plaintiffs.

Disposition

82 In the result, for the foregoing reasons, the motion is granted. A declaration shall issue to the effect that the Ernst & Young Settlement is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances. The Ernst & Young Settlement, together with the Ernst & Young Release, is approved and an order shall issue substantially in the form requested. The motion of the Objectors is dismissed.

Motion granted.

End of Document

TAB 3

1990 CarswellOnt 139
Ontario Court of Appeal

Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)

1990 CarswellOnt 139, 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, 1 O.R. (3d) 289, 23 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1192, 41 O.A.C. 282

ELAN CORPORATION et al. v. COMISKEY (TRUSTEE OF) et al.

Finlayson, Krever and Doherty JJ.A.

Heard: October 30 and 31, 1990
Judgment: November 2, 1990
Docket: Doc. Nos. CA 684/90 and CA 685/90

Counsel: *F.J.C. Newbould*, Q.C., and *G.B. Morawetz*, for appellant The Bank of Nova Scotia.
John Little, for respondents Elan Corporation and Nova Metal Products Inc.
Michael B. Rotsztain, for RoyNat Inc.
Kim Twohig and *Mel Olanow*, for Ontario Development Corp.
K.P. McElcheran, for monitor Ernst & Young.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Table of Authorities

Cases considered:

Per Finlayson J.A. (Krever J.A. concurring)

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Northland Properties Ltd., Re (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 166, 31 B.C.L.R. (2d) 35 (S.C.), aff'd (16 September 1988), Doc. No. Vancouver CA009772, Taggart, Lambert and Locke JJ.A. (B.C. C.A.) — *considered*

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NsC Diesel Power Inc., Re (1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 97 N.S.R. (2d) 295, 258 A.P.R. 295 (T.D.) — *considered*

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Wellington Building Corp., Re, [1934] O.R. 653, 16 C.B.R. 48, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 626, [1934] O.W.N. 562 (S.C.) — *applied*

Per Doherty J.A. (dissenting in part)

Alberta Treasury Branches v. Hat Development Ltd. (1988), 71 C.B.R. (N.S.) 264, 64 Alta. L.R. (2d) 17 (Q.B.), aff'd (1989), 65 Alta. L.R. (2d) 374 (C.A.) — *considered*

Avery Construction Co., Re, 24 C.B.R. 17, [1942] 4 D.L.R. 558 (Ont. S.C.) — *referred to*

Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd., [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84 (C.A.) — *considered*

Icor Oil & Gas Co. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (1989), 102 A.R. 161 (Q.B.) — *referred to*

Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank; Meridian Developments Inc. v. Nu-West Ltd., 52 C.B.R. (N.S.) 109, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 215, 32 Alta. L.R. (2d) 150, 11 D.L.R. (4th) 576, 53 A.R. 39 (Q.B.) — *referred to*

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Northland Properties Ltd., Re (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 (S.C.), aff'd 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195, [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363, 34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 122 (C.A.) — *referred to*

Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp. (1990), 47 B.C.L.R. (2d) 193 (S.C.) — *referred to*

Reference re Residential Tenancies Act (Ontario), [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714, 123 D.L.R. (3d) 554, 37 N.R. 158 — *referred to*

Stephanie's Fashions Ltd., Re (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 248 (B.C.S.C.) — *considered*

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Statutes considered:

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s. 5

s. 6

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s. 11

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s. 144(1)

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s. 12

Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 302 —

s. 369

APPEAL from order of Hoolihan J. dated September 11, 1990, allowing application under *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.

***FINLAYSON J.A. (KREVER J.A.* concurring) (orally):**

1 This is an appeal by the Bank of Nova Scotia (the "bank") from orders made by Mr. Justice Hoolihan [(11 September 1990), Doc. Nos. Toronto RE 1993/90 and RE 1994/90 (Ont. Gen. Div.)] as hereinafter described. The Bank of Nova Scotia was the lender to two related companies, namely, Elan Corporation ("Elan") and Nova Metal Products Inc. ("Nova"), which commenced proceedings under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (the "CCAA"), for the purposes of having a plan of arrangement put to a meeting of secured creditors of those companies.

2 The orders appealed from are:

(i) An order of September 11, 1990, which directed a meeting of the secured creditors of Elan and Nova to consider the plan of arrangement filed, or other suitable plan. The order further provided that for 3 days until September 14, 1990, the bank be prevented from acting on any of its security or paying down any of its loans from accounts receivable collected by Elan and Nova, and that Elan and Nova could spend the accounts receivable assigned to the bank that would be received.

(ii) An order dated September 14, 1990, extending the terms of the order of September 11, 1990, to remain in effect until the plan of arrangement was presented to the Court no later than October 24, 1990. This order continued the stay against the bank and the power of Elan and Nova to spend the accounts receivable assigned to the bank. Further orders dated September 27, 1990, and October 18, 1990, have extended the stay, and the power of Elan and Nova to spend the accounts receivable that have been assigned to the bank. The date of the meetings of creditors has been extended to November 9, 1990. The application to sanction the plan of arrangement must be heard by November 14, 1990.

(iii) An order dated October 18, 1990, directing that there be two classes of secured creditors for the purposes of voting at the meeting of secured creditors. The first class is to be comprised of the bank, RoyNat Inc. ("RoyNat"), the Ontario Development Corporation ("O.D.C."), the city of Chatham and the village of Glencoe. The second class is to be comprised of persons related to Elan and Nova that acquired debentures to enable the companies to apply under the CCAA.

3 There is very little dispute about the facts in this matter, but the chronology of events is important and I am setting it out in some detail.

4 The bank has been the banker to Elan and Nova. At the time of the application in August 1990, it was owed approximately $1,900,000. With interest and costs, including receivers' fees, it is now owed in excess of $2,300,000. It has a first registered charge on the accounts receivable and inventory of Elan and Nova, and a second registered charge on the land, buildings and equipment. It also has security under s. 178 of the *Bank Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-1, as am. R.S.C. 1985 (3rd Supp.), c. 25, s.

26. The terms of credit between the bank and Elan as set out in a commitment agreement provide that Elan and Nova may not encumber their assets without the consent of the bank.

5 RoyNat is also a secured creditor of Elan and Nova, and it is owed approximately $12 million. It holds a second registered charge on the accounts receivable and inventory of Elan and Nova, and a first registered charge on the land, buildings and equipment. The bank and RoyNat entered into a priority agreement to define with certainty the priority which each holds over the assets of Elan and Nova.

6 The O.D.C. guaranteed payment of $500,000 to RoyNat for that amount lent by RoyNat to Elan. The O.D.C. holds debenture security from Elan and secure the guarantee which it gave to RoyNat. That security ranks third to the bank and RoyNat. The O.D.C. has not been called upon by RoyNat to pay under its guarantee. O.D.C. has not lent any money directly to Elan or Nova.

7 Elan owes approximately $77,000 to the City of Chatham for unpaid municipal taxes. Nova owes approximately $18,000 to the Village of Glencoe for unpaid municipal taxes. Both municipalities have a lien on the real property of the respective companies in priority to every claim except the Crown under s. 369 of the *Municipal Act*, R.S.O. 1980, c. 302.

8 On May 8, 1990, the bank demanded payment of all outstanding loans owing by Elan and Nova to be made by June 1, 1990. Extensions of time were granted and negotiations directed to the settlement of the debt took place thereafter. On August 27, 1990, the bank appointed Coopers & Lybrand Limited as receiver and manager of the assets of Elan and Nova, and as agent under the bank's security to realize upon the security. Elan and Nova refused to allow the receiver and manager to have access to their premises, on the basis that insufficient notice had been provided by the bank before demanding payment.

9 Later on August 27, 1990, the bank brought a motion in an action against Elan and Nova (Court File No. 54033/90) for an order granting possession of the premises of Elan and Nova to Coopers & Lybrand. On the evening of August 27, 1990, at approximately 9 p.m., Mr. Justice Saunders made an order adjourning the motion on certain conditions. The order authorized Coopers & Lybrand access to the premises to monitor Elan's business, and permitted Elan to remain in possession and carry on its business in the ordinary course. The bank was restrained in the order, until the motion could be heard, from selling inventory, land, equipment or buildings or from notifying account debtors to collect receivables, but was not restrained from applying accounts receivable that were collected against outstanding bank loans.

10 On Wednesday, August 29, 1990, Elan and Nova each issued a debenture for $10,000 to a friend of the principals of the companies, Joseph Comiskey, through his brother Michael Comiskey as trustee, pursuant to a trust deed executed the same day. The terms were not commercial and it does not appear that repayment was expected. It is conceded by counsel for Elan that the sole purpose of issuing the debentures was to qualify as a "debtor company" within the meaning of s. 3 of the CCAA. Section 3 reads as follows:

> 3. This Act does not apply in respect of a debtor company unless
>
> (a) the debtor company has outstanding an issue of secured or unsecured bonds of the debtor company or of a predecessor in title of the debtor company issued under a trust deed or other instrument running in favour of a trustee; and
>
> (b) the compromise or arrangement that is proposed under section 4 or 5 in respect of the debtor company includes a compromise or an arrangement between the debtor company and the holders of an issue referred to in paragraph (a).

11 The debentures conveyed the personal property of Elan and Nova as security to Michael Comiskey as trustee. No consent was obtained from the bank as required by the loan agreements, nor was any consent obtained from the receiver. Cheques for $10,000 each, representing the loans secured in the debentures, were given to Elan and Nova on Wednesday, August 29, 1990, but not deposited until 6 days later on September 4, 1990, after an interim order had been made by Mr. Justice Farley in favour of Elan and Nova staying the bank from taking proceedings.

12 On August 30, 1990 Elan and Nova applied under s. 5 of the CCAA for an order directing a meeting of secured creditors to vote on a plan of arrangement. Section 5 provides:

> 5. Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its secured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company or of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors, and, if the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.

13 The application was heard by Farley J. on Friday, August 31, 1990, at 8 a.m. Farley J. dismissed the application on the grounds that the CCAA required that there be more than one debenture issued by each company. Later on the same say, August 31, 1990, Elan and Nova each issued two debentures for $500 to the wife of the principal of Elan through her sister as trustee. The debentures provided for payment of interest to commence on August 31, 1992. Cheques for $500 were delivered that day to the companies but not deposited in the bank account until September 4, 1990. These debentures conveyed the personal property in the assets of Elan and Nova to the trustee as security. Once again it is conceded that the debentures were issued for the sole purpose of meeting the requirements of s. 3 of the CCAA. No consent was obtained from the bank as required by the loan terms, nor was any consent obtained from the receiver.

14 On August 31, 1990, following the creation of the trust deeds and the issuance of the debentures, Elan and Nova commenced new applications under the CCAA which were heard late in the day by Farley J. He adjourned the applications to September 10, 1990, on certain terms, including a stay preventing the bank from acting on its security and allowing Elan to spend up to $321,000 from accounts receivable collected by it.

15 The plan of arrangement filed with the application provided that Elan and Nova would carry on business for 3 months, that secured creditors would not be paid and could take no action on their security for 3 months, and that the accounts receivable of Elan and Nova assigned to the bank could be utilized by Elan and Nova for purposes of its day-to-day operations. No compromise of any sort was proposed.

16 On September 11, 1990, Hoolihan J. ordered that a meeting of the secured creditors of Elan and Nova be held no later than October 22, 1990, to consider the plan of arrangement that had been filed, or other suitable plan. He ordered that the plan of arrangement be presented to the secured creditors no later than September 27, 1990. He made further orders effective for 3 days until September 14, 1990, including orders:

> (i) that the companies could spend the accounts receivable assigned to the bank that would be collected in accordance with a cash flow forecast filed with the Court providing for $1,387,000 to be spent by September 30, 1990; and
>
> (ii) a stay of proceedings against the bank acting on any of its security or paying down any of its loans from accounts receivable collected by Elan and Nova.

17 On September 14, 1990, Hoolihan J. extended the terms of his order of September 11, 1990, to remain in effect until the plan of arrangement was presented to the Court no later than October 24, 1990 for final approval. This order continued the power of Elan and Nova to spend up to $1,387,000 of the accounts receivable assigned to the bank in accordance with the projected cash flow to September 30, 1990, and to spend a further amount to October 24, 1990, in accordance with a cash flow to be approved by Hoolihan J. prior to October 1, 1990. Further orders dated September 27 and October 18 have extended the power to spend the accounts receivable to November 14, 1990.

18 On September 14, 1990, the bank requested Hoolihan J. to restrict his order so that Elan and Nova could use the accounts receivable assigned to the bank only so long as they continued to operate within the borrowing guidelines contained in the terms of the loan agreements with the bank. These guidelines require a certain ratio to exist between bank loans and the book value of the accounts receivable and inventory assigned to the bank, and are designed in normal circumstances to ensure that there is sufficient value in the security assigned to the bank. Hoolihan J. refused to make the order.

19 On October 18, 1990, Hoolihan J. ordered that the composition of the classes of secured creditors for the purposes of voting at the meeting of secured creditors shall be as follows:

(a) The bank, RoyNat, O.D.C., the City of Chatham and the Village of Glencoe shall comprise one class.

(b) The parties related to the principal of Elan that acquired their debentures to enable the companies to apply under the CCAA shall comprise a second class.

20 On October 18, 1990, at the request of counsel for Elan and Nova, Hoolihan J. further ordered that the date for the meeting of creditors of Elan and Nova be extended to November 9, 1990, in order to allow a new plan of arrangement to be sent to all creditors, including unsecured creditors of those companies. Elan and Nova now plan to offer a plan of compromise or arrangement to the unsecured creditors of Elan and Nova as well as to the secured creditors.

21 There are five issues in this appeal.

(1) Are the debentures issued by Elan and Nova for the purpose of permitting the companies to qualify as applicants under the CCAA debentures within the meaning of s. 3 of the CCAA?

(2) Did the issue of the debentures contravene the provisions of the loan agreements between Elan and Nova and the bank? If so, what are the consequences for CCAA purposes?

(3) Did Elan and Nova have the power to issue the debentures and make application under the CCAA after the bank had appointed a receiver and after the order of Saunders J.?

(4) Did Hoolihan J. have the power under s. 11 of the CCAA to make the interim orders that he made with respect to the accounts receivable?

(5) Was Hoolihan J. correct in ordering that the bank vote on the proposed plan of arrangement in a class with RoyNat and the other secured creditors?

22 It is well established that the CCAA is intended to provide a structured environment for the negotiation of compromises between a debtor company and its creditors for the benefit of both. Such a resolution can have significant benefits for the company, its shareholders and employees. For this reason the debtor companies, Elan and Nova, are entitled to a broad and liberal interpretation of the jurisdiction of the Court under the CCAA. Having said that, it does not follow that in exercising its discretion to order a meeting of creditors under s. 5 of the CCAA that the Court should not consider the equities in this case as they relate to these companies and to one of its principal secured creditors, the bank.

23 The issues before Hoolihan J. and this Court were argued on a technical basis. Hoolihan J. did not give effect to the argument that the debentures described above were a "sham" and could not be used for the purposes of asserting jurisdiction. Unfortunately, he did not address any of the other arguments presented to him on the threshold issue of the availability of the CCAA. He appears to have acted on the premise that if the CCAA can be made available, it should be utilized.

24 If Hoolihan J. did exercise any discretion overall, it is not reflected in his reasons. I believe, therefore, that we are in a position to look at the uncontested chronology of these proceedings and exercise our own discretion. To me, the significant date is August 27, 1990 when the bank appointed Coopers & Lybrand Limited as receiver and manager of the undertaking, property and assets mortgaged and charged under the demand debenture and of the collateral under the general security agreement, both dated June 20, 1979. On the same date, it appointed the same company as receiver and manager for Nova under a general security agreement dated December 5, 1988. The effect of this appointment is to divest the companies and their boards of directors of their power to deal with the property comprised in the appointment: Raymond Walton, *Kerr on the Law and Practice as to Receivers*, 16th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1983), p. 292. Neither Elan nor Nova had the power to create further indebtedness, and thus to interfere with the ability of the receiver to manage the two companies: *Alberta Treasury Branches v. Hat Development Ltd.* (1988), 71 C.B.R. (N.S.) 264, 64 Alta. L.R. (2d) 17 (Q.B.), aff'd (1989), 65 Alta. L.R. (2d) 374 (C.A.).

25 Counsel for the debtor companies submitted that the management powers of the receiver were stripped from the receiver by Saunders J. in his interim order, when he allowed the receiver access to the companies' properties but would not permit it

to realize on the security of the bank until further order. He pointed out that the order also provided that the companies were entitled to remain in possession and "to carry on business in the ordinary course" until further order.

26 I do not agree with counsel's submission covering the effect of the order. It certainly restricted what the receiver could do on an interim basis, but it imposed restrictions on the companies as well. The issue of these disputed debentures in support of an application for relief as insolvent companies under the CCAA does not comply with the order of Saunders J. This is not carrying on business in the ordinary course. The residual power to take all of these initiatives for relief under the CCAA remained with the receiver, and if trust deeds were to be issued, an order of the Court in Action 54033/90 was required permitting their issuance and registration.

27 There is another feature which, in my opinion, affects the exercise of discretion, and that is the probability of the meeting achieving some measure of success. Hoolihan J. considered the calling of the meeting at one hearing, as he was asked to do, and determined the respective classes of creditors at another. This latter classification is necessary because of the provisions of s. 6(a) of the CCAA, which reads as follows:

> 6. Where a majority in number representing three-fourths in value of the creditors, or class of creditors, as the case may be, present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting or meetings thereof respectively held pursuant to sections 4 and 5, or either of those sections, agree to any compromise or arrangement either as proposed or as altered or modified at the meeting or meetings, the compromise or arrangement may be sanctioned by the court, and if so sanctioned is binding
>
> (a) on all the creditors or the class of creditors, as the case may be, and on any trustee for any such class of creditors, whether secured or unsecured, as the case may be, and on the company.

28 If both matters had been considered at the same time, as in my view they should have been, and if what I regard as a proper classification of the creditors had taken place, I think it is obvious that the meeting would not be a productive one. It was improper, in my opinion, to create one class of creditors made up of all the secured creditors save the so-called "sham" creditors. There is no true community of interest among them, and the motivation of Elan and Nova in striving to create a single class is clearly designed to avoid the classification of the bank as a separate class.

29 It is apparent that the only secured creditors with a significant interest in the proceeding under the CCAA are the bank and RoyNat. The two municipalities have total claims for arrears of taxes of less than $100,000. They have first priority in the lands of the companies. They are in no jeopardy whatsoever. The O.D.C. has a potential liability in that it can be called upon by RoyNat under its guarantee to a maximum of $500,000, and this will trigger default under its debentures with the companies, but its interests lie with RoyNat.

30 As to RoyNat, it is the largest creditor with a debt of some $12 million. It will dominate any class it is in because, under s. 6 of the CCAA, the majority in a class must represent three-quarters in value of that class. It will always have a veto by reason of the size of its claim, but requires at least one creditor to vote for it to give it a majority in number (I am ignoring the municipalities). It needs the O.D.C.

31 I do not base my opinion solely on commercial self-interest, but also on the differences in legal interest. The bank has first priority on the receivables referred to as the "quick assets", and RoyNat ranks second in priority. RoyNat has first priority on the buildings and realty, the "fixed assets", and the bank has second priority.

32 It is in the commercial interests of the bank, with its smaller claim and more readily realizable assets, to collect and retain the accounts receivable. It is in the commercial interests of RoyNat to preserve the cash flow of the business and sell the enterprise as a going concern. It can only do that by overriding the prior claim of the bank to these receivables. If it can vote with the O.D.C. in the same class as the bank, it can achieve that goal and extinguish the prior claim of the bank to realize on the receivables. This it can do, despite having acknowledged its legal relationship to the bank in the priority agreement signed by the two. I can think of no reason why the legal interest of the bank as the holder of the first security on the receivables should be overridden by RoyNat as holder of the second security.

33 The classic statement on classes of creditors is that of Lord Esher M.R. in *Sovereign Life Assurance Co. v. Dodd*, [1892] 2 Q.B. 573, [1891-4] All E.R. 246 (C.A.), at pp. 579-580 [Q.B.]:

> The Act [*Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act, 1870*] says that the persons to be summoned to the meeting (all of whom, be it said in passing, are creditors) are persons who can be divided into different classes — classes which the Act of Parliament recognises, though it does not define them. This, therefore, must be done: they must be divided into different classes. What is the reason for such a course? It is because the creditors composing the different classes have different interests; and, therefore, if we find a different state of facts existing among different creditors which may differently affect their minds and their judgment, they must be divided into different classes.

34 The *Sovereign Life* case was quoted with approval by Kingstone J. in *Re Wellington Building Corp.*, [1934] O.R. 653, 16 C.B.R. 48, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 626, [1934] O.W.N. 562 (S.C.), at p. 659 [O.R.]. He also quoted another English authority at p. 658:

> In *In re Alabama, New Orleans, Texas and Pacific Junction Ry. Co.*, [1891] 1 Ch. 213, a scheme and arrangement under the Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act (1870), was submitted to the Court for approval. Lord Justice Bowen, at p. 243, says:
>
> > Now, I have no doubt at all that it would be improper for the Court to allow an arrangement to be forced on any class of creditors, if the arrangement cannot reasonably be supposed by sensible business people to be for the benefit of that class as such, otherwise the sanction of the Court would be a sanction to what would be a scheme of confiscation. The object of this section is not confiscation ... Its object is to enable compromises to be made which are for the common benefit of the creditors as creditors, or for the common benefit of some class of creditors as such.

35 Kingstone J. set aside a meeting where three classes of creditors were permitted to vote together. He said at p. 660:

> It is clear that Parliament intended to give the three-fourths majority of any class power to bind that class, but I do not think the Statute should be construed so as to permit holders of subsequent mortgages power to vote and thereby destroy the priority rights and security of a first mortgagee.

36 We have been referred to more modern cases, including two decisions of Trainor J. of the British Columbia Supreme Court, both entitled *Re Northland Properties Ltd.* One case is reported in (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 166, 31 B.C.L.R. (2d) 35, and the other in the same volume at p. 175 [C.B.R.]. Trainor J. was upheld on appeal on both judgments. The first judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal is unreported (16 September, 1988) [Doc. No. Vancouver CA009772, Taggart, Lambert and Locke JJ.A.]. The judgment in the second appeal is reported at 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195, [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363, 34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 122.

37 In the first *Northland* case, Trainor J. held that the difference in the terms of parties to and priority of different bonds meant that they should be placed in separate classes. He relied upon *Re Wellington Building Corp.*, supra. In the second *Northland* case, he dealt with 15 mortgagees who were equal in priority but held different parcels of land as security. Trainor J. held that their relative security positions were the same, notwithstanding that the mortgages were for the most part secured by charges against separate properties. The nature of the debt was the same, the nature of the security was the same, the remedies for default were the same, and in all cases they were corporate loans by sophisticated lenders. In specifically accepting the reasoning of Trainor J., the Court of Appeal held that the concern of the various mortgagees as to the quality of their individual securities was "a variable cause arising not by any difference in legal interests, but rather as a consequence of bad lending, or market values, or both" (p. 203).

38 In *Re NsC Diesel Power Inc.* (1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 97 N.S.R. (2d) 295, 258 A.P.R. 295 (T.D.), the Court stressed that a class should be made up of persons "'whose rights are not so dissimilar as to make it impossible for them to consult together with a view to their common interest'" (p. 8 [of C.B.R.]).

39 My assessment of these secured creditors is that the bank should be in its own class. This being so, it is obvious that no plan of arrangement can succeed without its approval. There is no useful purpose to be served in putting a plan of arrangement

to a meeting of creditors if it is known in advance that it cannot succeed. This is another cogent reason for the Court declining to exercise its discretion in favour of the debtor companies.

40 For all the reasons given above, the application under the CCAA should have been dismissed. I do not think that I have to give definitive answers to the individual issues numbered (1) and (2). They can be addressed in a later case, where the answers could be dispositive of an application under the CCAA. The answer to (3) is that the combined effect of the receivership and the order of Saunders J. disentitled the companies to issue the debentures and bring the application under the CCAA. It is not necessary to answer issue (4), and the answer to (5) is no.

41 Accordingly, I would allow the appeal, set aside the three orders of Hoolihan J., and, in their place, issue an order dismissing the application under the CCAA. The bank should receive its costs of this appeal, the applications for leave to appeal, and the proceedings before Farley and Hoolihan JJ., to be paid by Elan, Nova and RoyNat.

42 Ernst & Young were appointed monitor in the order of Hoolihan J. dated September 14, 1990, to monitor the operations of Elan and Nova and give effect to and supervise the terms and conditions of the stay of proceedings in accordance with Appendix "C" appended to the order. The monitor should be entitled to be paid for all services performed to date, including whatever is necessary to complete its reports for past work, as called for in Appendix "C".

DOHERTY J.A. **(dissenting in part):**

I Background

43 On November 2, 1990, this Court allowed the appeal brought by the Bank of Nova Scotia (the "bank") and vacated several orders made by Hoolihan J. Finlayson J.A. delivered oral reasons on behalf of the majority. At the same time, I delivered brief oral reasons dissenting in part from the conclusion reached by the majority and undertook to provide further written reasons. These are those reasons.

44 The events relevant to the disposition of this appeal are set out in some detail in the oral reasons of Finlayson J.A. I will not repeat that chronology, but will refer to certain additional background facts before turning to the legal issues.

45 Elan Corporation ("Elan") owns the shares of Nova Metal Products Inc. ("Nova Inc."). Both companies have been actively involved in the manufacture of automobile parts for a number of years. As of March 1990, the companies had total annual sales of about $30 million, and employed some 220 people in plants located in Chatham and Glencoe, Ontario. The operation of these companies no doubt plays a significant role in the economy of these two small communities.

46 In the 4 years prior to 1989, the companies had operated at a profit ranging from $287,000 (1987) to $1,500,000 (1986). In 1989, several factors, including large capital expenditures and a downturn in the market, combined to produce an operational loss of about $1,333,000. It is anticipated that the loss for the year ending June 30, 1990, will be about $2.3 million. As of August 1, 1990, the companies continued in full operation, and those in control anticipated that the financial picture would improve significantly later in 1990, when the companies would be busy filling several contracts which had been obtained earlier in 1990.

47 The bank has provided credit to the companies for several years. In January 1989, the bank extended an operating line of credit to the companies. The line of credit was by way of a demand loan that was secured in the manner described by Finlayson J.A. Beginning in May 1989, and from time to time after that, the companies were in default under the terms of the loan advanced by the bank. On each occasion, the bank and the companies managed to work out some agreement so that the bank continued as lender and the companies continued to operate their plants.

48 Late in 1989, the companies arranged for a $500,000 operating loan from RoyNat Inc. It was hoped that this loan, combined with the operating line of $2.5 million from the bank, would permit the company to weather its fiscal storm. In March 1990, the bank took the position that the companies were in breach of certain requirements under their loan agreements, and warned that if the difficulties were not rectified the bank would not continue as the company's lender. Mr. Patrick Johnson, the president of both companies, attempted to respond to these concerns in a detailed letter to the bank dated March 15, 1990.

The response did not placate the bank. In May 1990, the bank called its loan and made a demand for immediate payment. Mr. Spencer, for the bank, wrote: "We consider your financial condition continues to be critical and we are not prepared to delay further making formal demand." He went on to indicate that, subject to further deterioration in the companies' fiscal position, the bank was prepared to delay acting on its security until June 1, 1990.

49 As of May 1990, Mr. Johnson, to the bank's knowledge, was actively seeking alternative funding to replace the bank. At the same time, he was trying to convince the union which represented the workers employed at both plants to assist in a co-operative effort to keep the plants operational during the hard times. The union had agreed to discuss amendment of the collective bargaining agreement to facilitate the continued operation of the companies.

50 The June 1, 1990 deadline set by the bank passed without incident. Mr. Johnson continued to search for new financing. A potential lender was introduced to Mr. Spencer of the bank on August 13, 1990, and it appeared that the bank, through Mr. Spencer, was favourably impressed with this potential lender. However, on August 27, 1990, the bank decided to take action to protect its position. Coopers & Lybrand was appointed by the bank as receiver-manager under the terms of the security agreements with the companies. The companies denied the receiver access to their plants. The bank then moved before the Honourable Mr. Justice E. Saunders for an order giving the receiver possession of the premises occupied by the companies. On August 27, 1990, after hearing argument from counsel for the bank and the companies, Mr. Justice Saunders refused to install the receivers and made the following interim order:

> 1. THIS COURT ORDERS that the receiver be allowed access to the property to monitor the operations of the defendants but shall not take steps to realize on the security of The Bank of Nova Scotia until further Order of the Court.
>
> 2. THIS COURT ORDERS that the defendants shall be entitled to remain in possession and to carry on business in the ordinary course until further Order of this Court.
>
> 3. THIS COURT ORDERS that until further order the Bank of Nova Scotia shall not take steps to notify account debtors of the defendants for the purpose of collecting outstanding accounts receivable. This Order does not restrict The Bank of Nova Scotia from dealing with accounts receivable of the defendants received by it.
>
> 4. THIS COURT ORDERS that the motion is otherwise adjourned to a date to be fixed.

51 The notice of motion placed before Saunders J. by the bank referred to "an intended action" by the bank. It does not appear that the bank took any further steps in connection with this "intended action."

52 Having resisted the bank's efforts to assume control of the affairs of the companies on August 27, 1990, and realizing that their operations could cease within a matter of days, the companies turned to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (the "Act"), in an effort to hold the bank at bay while attempting to reorganize their finances. Finlayson J.A. has described the companies' efforts to qualify under that Act, the two appearances before the Honourable Mr. Justice Farley on August 31, 1990, and the appearances before the Honourable Mr. Justice Hoolihan in September and October 1990, which resulted in the orders challenged on this appeal.

II The Issues

53 The dispute between the bank and the companies when this application came before Hoolihan J. was a straightforward one. The bank had determined that its best interests would be served by the immediate execution of the rights it had under its various agreements with the companies. The bank's best interest was not met by the continued operation of the companies as going concerns. The companies and their other two substantial secured creditors considered that their interests required that the companies continue to operate, at least for a period which would enable the companies to place a plan of reorganization before its creditors.

54 All parties were pursuing what they perceived to be their commercial interests. To the bank, these interests entailed the "death" of the companies as operating entities. To the companies, these interests required "life support" for the companies through the provisions of the Act to permit a "last ditch" effort to save the companies and keep them in operation.

55 The issues raised on this appeal can be summarized as follows:

(i) Did Hoolihan J. err in holding that the companies were entitled to invoke the Act?

(ii) Did Hoolihan J. err in exercising his discretion in directing that a meeting of creditors should be held under the Act?

(iii) Did Hoolihan J. err in directing that the bank and RoyNat Inc. should be placed in the same class of creditors for the purposes of the Act?

(iv) Did Hoolihan J. err in the terms of the interim orders he made pending the meeting of creditors and the submission to the court of a plan of reorganization?

III The Purpose and Scheme of the Act

56 Before turning to these issues, it is necessary to understand the purpose of the Act, and the scheme established by the Act for achieving that purpose. The Act first appeared in the midst of the Great Depression (S.C. 1932-33, c. 36). The Act was intended to provide a means whereby insolvent companies could avoid bankruptcy and continue as ongoing concerns through a reorganization of their financial obligations. The reorganization contemplated required the cooperation of the debtor companies' creditors and shareholders: *Re Avery Construction Co.*, 24 C.B.R. 17, [1942] 4 D.L.R. 558 (Ont. S.C.); Stanley E. Edwards, "Reorganizations under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act" (1947) 25 Can. Bar Rev. 587, at pp. 592-593; David H. Goldman, "Reorganizations Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada)" (1985) 55 C.B.R. (N.S.) 36, at pp. 37-39.

57 The legislation is remedial in the purest sense in that it provides a means whereby the devastating social and economic effects of bankruptcy- or creditor-initiated termination of ongoing business operations can be avoided while a court-supervised attempt to reorganize the financial affairs of the debtor company is made.

58 The purpose of the Act was artfully put by Gibbs J.A., speaking for the British Columbia Court of Appeal, in *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.*, an unreported judgment released October 29, 1990 [Doc. No. Vancouver CA12944, Carrothers, Cumming and Gibbs JJ.A., now reported [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84], at pp. 11 and 6 [unreported, pp. 91 and 88 B.C.L.R.]. In referring to the purpose for which the Act was initially proclaimed, he said:

> Almost inevitably liquidation destroyed the shareholders' investment, yielded little by way of recovery to the creditors, and exacerbated the social evil of devastating levels of unemployment. The government of the day sought, through the C.C.A.A. ['the Act'], to create a regime whereby the principals of the company and the creditors could be brought together under the supervision of the court to attempt a reorganization or compromise or arrangement under which the company could continue in business.

59 In an earlier passage, His Lordship had said:

> The purpose of the C.C.A.A. is to facilitate the making of a compromise or arrangement between an insolvent debtor company and its creditors to the end that the company is able to continue in business.

60 Gibbs J.A. also observed (at p. 13) that the Act was designed to serve a "broad constituency of investors, creditors and employees." Because of that "broad constituency", the Court must, when considering applications brought under the Act, have regard not only to the individuals and organizations directly affected by the application, but also to the wider public interest. That interest is generally, but not always, served by permitting an attempt at reorganization: see S.E. Edwards, "Reorganizations Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act," at p. 593.

61 The Act must be given a wide and liberal construction so as to enable it to effectively serve this remedial purpose: *Interpretation Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, s. 12; *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.*, supra, at p. 14 [unreported, p. 92 B.C.L.R.].

62 The Act is available to all insolvent companies, provided the requirements of s. 3 of the Act are met. That section provides:

> 3. This Act does not apply in respect of a debtor company unless
>
> (a) the debtor company has outstanding an issue of secured or unsecured bonds of the debtor company or of a predecessor in title of the debtor company issued under a trust deed or other instrument running in favour of a trustee; and
>
> (b) the compromise or arrangement that is proposed under section 4 or 5 in respect of the debtor company includes a compromise or an arrangement between the debtor company and the holders of an issue referred to in paragraph (a).

63 A debtor company, or a creditor of that company, invokes the Act by way of summary application to the Court under s. 4 or s. 5 of the Act. For present purposes, s. 5 is the relevant section:

> 5. Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its secured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company or of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors, and, if the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.

64 Section 5 does not require that the Court direct a meeting of creditors to consider a proposed plan. The Court's power to do so is discretionary. There will no doubt be cases where no order will be made, even though the debtor company qualifies under s. 3 of the Act.

65 If the Court determines that a meeting should be called, the creditors must be placed into classes for the purpose of that meeting. The significance of this classification process is made apparent by s. 6 of the Act:

> 6. Where a majority in number representing three-fourths in value of the creditors, or class of creditors, as the case may be, present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting or meetings thereof respectively held pursuant to sections 4 and 5, or either of those sections, agree to any compromise or arrangement either as proposed or as altered or modified at the meeting or meetings, the compromise or arrangement may be sanctioned by the court, and if so sanctioned is binding
>
> (a) on all the creditors or the class of creditors, as the case may be, and on any trustee for any such class of creditors, whether secured or unsecured, as the case may be, and on the company; and
>
> (b) in the case of a company that has made an authorized assignment or against which a receiving order has been made under the *Bankruptcy Act* or is in the course of being wound up under the *Winding-up Act*, on the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator and contributories of the company.

66 If the plan of reorganization is approved by the creditors as required by s. 6, it must then be presented to the Court. Once again, the Court must exercise a discretion, and determine whether it will ap prove the plan of reorganization. In exercising that discretion, the Court is concerned not only with whether the appropriate majority has approved the plan at a meeting held in accordance with the Act and the order of the Court, but also with whether the plan is a fair and reasonable one: *Re Northland Properties Ltd.* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 at 182-185 (S.C.), aff'd 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195, [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363, 34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 122 (C.A.).

67 If the Court chooses to exercise its discretion in favour of calling a meeting of creditors for the purpose of considering a plan of reorganization, the Act provides that the rights and remedies available to creditors, the debtor company, and others during the period between the making of the initial order and the consideration of the proposed plan may be suspended or otherwise controlled by the Court.

68 Section 11 gives a court wide powers to make any interim orders:

> 11. Notwithstanding anything in the *Bankruptcy Act* or the *Winding-up Act*, whenever an application has been made under this Act in respect of any company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit,
>
> (a) make an order staying, until such time as the court may prescribe or until any further order, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under the *Bankruptcy Act* and the *Winding-up Act* or either of them;
>
> (b) restrain further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company on such terms as the court sees fit; and
>
> (c) make an order that no suit, action or other proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except with the leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court imposes.

69 Viewed in its totality, the Act gives the Court control over the initial decision to put the reorganization plan before the creditors, the classification of creditors for the purpose of considering the plan, conduct affecting the debtor company pending consideration of that plan, and the ultimate acceptability of any plan agreed upon by the creditors. The Act envisions that the rights and remedies of individual creditors, the debtor company and others may be sacrificed, at least temporarily, in an effort to serve the greater good by arriving at some acceptable reorganization which allows the debtor company to continue in operation: *Icor Oil & Gas Co. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce* (1989), 102 A.R. 161 at p. 165 (Q.B.).

IV Did Hoolihan J. Err in Holding that the Debtor Companies were Entitled to Invoke the Act?

70 The appellant advances three arguments in support of its contention that Elan and Nova Inc. were not entitled to seek relief under the Act. It argues first that the debentures issued by the companies after August 27, 1990, were "shams" and did not fulfil the requirements of s. 3 of the Act. The appellant next contends that the issuing of the debentures by the companies contravened their agreements with the bank, in which they undertook not to further encumber the assets of the companies without the consent of the bank. Lastly, the appellant maintains that once the bank had appointed a receiver-manager over the affairs of the companies on August 27, 1990, the companies had no power to create further indebtedness by way of debentures or to bring an application on behalf of the companies under the Act.

(i) Section 3 and "Instant" Trust Deeds

71 The debentures issued in August 1990, after the bank had moved to install a receiver-manager, were issued solely and expressly for the purpose of meeting the requirements of s. 3 of the Act. Indeed, it took the companies two attempts to meet those requirements. The debentures had no commercial purpose. The transactions did, however, involve true loans in the sense that moneys were advanced and debt was created. Appropriate and valid trust deeds were also issued.

72 In my view, it is inappropriate to refer to these transactions as "shams." They are neither false nor counterfeit, but rather are exactly what they appear to be, transactions made to meet jurisdictional requirements of the Act so as to permit an application for reorganization under the Act. Such transactions are apparently well known to the commercial Bar: B. O'Leary, "A Review of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act" (1987) 4 Nat. Insolvency Rev. 38, at p. 39; C. Ham, " 'Instant' Trust Deeds Under the C.C.A.A." (1988) 2 Commercial Insolvency Reporter 25; G.B. Morawetz, "Emerging Trends in the Use of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act" (1990) Proceedings, First Annual General Meeting and Conference of the Insolvency Institute of Canada.

73 Mr. Ham writes, at pp. 25 and 30:

> Consequently, some companies have recently sought to bring themselves within the ambit of the C.C.A.A. by creating 'in stant' trust deeds, i.e., trust deeds which are created solely for the purpose of enabling them to take advantage of the C.C.A.A.

74 Applications under the Act involving the use of "instant" trust deeds have been before the Courts on a number of occasions. In no case has any court held that a company cannot gain access to the Act by creating a debt which meets the requirements of s. 3 for the express purpose of qualifying under the Act. In most cases, the use of these "instant" trust deeds has been acknowledged without comment.

75 The decision of Chief Justice Richard in *Re United Maritime Fishermen Co-op.* (1988), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 44, 84 N.B.R. (2d) 415, 214 A.P.R. 415 (Q.B.), varied on reconsideration (1988), 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 170, 87 N.B.R. (2d) 333, 221 A.P.R. 333 (Q.B.), at 55-56 [67 C.B.R.], speaks directly to the use of "instant" trust deeds. The Chief Justice refused to read any words into s. 3 of the Act which would limit the availability of the Act depending on the point at which, or the purpose for which, the debenture or bond and accompanying trust deed were created. He accepted [at p. 56 C.B.R.] the debtor company's argument that the Act:

> does not impose any time restraints on the creation of the conditions as set out in s. 3 of the Act, nor does it contain any prohibition against the creation of the conditions set out in s. 3 for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction.

76 It should, however, be noted that in *Re United Maritime Fishermen Co-op.*, supra, the debt itself was not created for the purpose of qualifying under the Act. The bond and the trust deed, however, were created for that purpose. The case is therefore factually distinguishable from the case at Bar.

77 The Court of Appeal reversed the ruling of the Chief Justice ((1988), 69 C.B.R. (N.S.) 161, 51 D.L.R. (4th) 618, 88 N.B.R. (2d) 253, 224 A.P.R. 253) on the basis that the bonds required by s. 3 of the Act had not been issued when the application was made, so that on a precise reading of the words of s. 3 the company did not qualify. The Court did not go on to consider whether, had the bonds been properly issued, the company would have been entitled to invoke the Act. Hoyt J.A., for the majority, did, however, observe without comment that the trust deeds had been created specifically for the purpose of bringing an application under the Act.

78 The judgment of MacKinnon J. in *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.*, unreported, Doc. No. Vancouver A893427, released January 24, 1990 (B.C. S.C.) [now reported 1 C.B.R. (3d) 248], is factually on all fours with the present case. In that case, as in this one, it was acknowledged that the sole purpose for creating the debt was to effect compliance with s. 3 of the Act. After considering the judgment of Chief Justice Richard in *Re United Maritime Fishermen Co-op.*, supra, MacKinnon J. held, at p. 251:

> The reason for creating the trust deed is not for the usual purposes of securing a debt but, when one reads it, on its face, it does that. I find that it is a genuine trust deed and not a fraud, and that the petitioners have complied with s. 3 of the statute.

79 *Re Metals & Alloys Co.* (16 February 1990) is a recent example of a case in this jurisdiction in which "instant" trust deeds were successfully used to bring a company within the Act. The company issued debentures for the purpose of permitting the company to qualify under the Act, so as to provide it with an opportunity to prepare and submit a reorganization plan. The company then applied for an order, seeking, inter alia, a declaration that the debtor company was a corporation within the meaning of the Act. Houlden J.A., hearing the matter at first instance, granted the declaration request in an order dated February 16, 1990. No reasons were given. It does not appear that the company's qualifications were challenged before Houlden J.A.; however, the nature of the debentures issued and the purpose for their issue was fully disclosed in the material before him. The requirements of s. 3 of the Act are jurisdictional in nature, and the consent of the parties cannot vest a court with jurisdiction it does not have. One must conclude that Houlden J.A. was satisfied that "instant" trust deeds suffice for the purposes of s. 3 of the Act.

80 A similar conclusion is implicit in the reasons of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.*. In that case, a debt of $50, with an accompanying debenture and trust deed, was created specifically to enable the company to make application under the Act. The Court noted that the debt was created solely for that purpose in an effort to forestall an attempt by the bank to liquidate the assets of the debtor company. The Court went on to deal with the merits, and to dismiss an appeal from an order granting a stay pending a reorganization meeting. The Court could not have reached the merits without first concluding that the $50 debt created by the company met the requirements of s. 3 of the Act.

81 The weight of authority is against the appellant. Counsel for the appellant attempts to counter that authority by reference to the remarks of the Minister of Justice when s. 3 was introduced as an amendment to the Act in the 1952-53 sittings of Parliament (House of Commons Debates, 1-2 Eliz. II (1952-53), vol. II, pp. 1268-1269). The interpretation of words found in a statute, by reference to speeches made in Parliament at the time legislation is introduced, has never found favour in our Courts: *Reference Re Residential Tenancies Act (Ontario)*, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714, 123 D.L.R. (3d) 554, 37 N.R. 138, at 721 [S.C.R.], 561 [D.L.R.]. Nor, with respect to Mr. Newbould's able argument, do I find the words of the Minister of Justice at the time the present s. 3 was introduced to be particularly illuminating. He indicated that the amendment to the Act left companies with complex financial structures free to resort to the Act, but that it excluded companies which had only unsecured mercantile creditors. The Minister does not comment on the intended effect of the amendment on the myriad situations between those two extremes. This case is one such situation. These debtor companies had complex secured debt structures, but those debts were not, prior to the issuing of the debentures in August 1990, in the form contemplated by s. 3 of the Act. Like Richard C.J.Q.B. in *Re United Maritime Fishermen Co-op.*, supra, at pp. 52-53, I am not persuaded that the comments of the Minister of Justice assist in interpreting s. 3 of the Act in this situation.

82 The words of s. 3 are straightforward. They require that the debtor company have, at the time an application is made, an outstanding debenture or bond issued under a trust deed. No more is needed. Attempts to qualify those words are not only contrary to the wide reading the Act deserves, but can raise intractable problems as to what qualifications or modifications should be read into the Act. Where there is a legitimate debt which fits the criteria set out in s. 3, I see no purpose in denying a debtor company resort to the Act because the debt and the accompanying documentation was created for the specific purpose of bringing the application. It must be remembered that qualification under s. 3 entitles the debtor company to nothing more than consideration under the Act. Qualification under s. 3 does not mean that relief under the Act will be granted. The circumstances surrounding the creation of the debt needed to meet the s. 3 requirement may well have a bearing on how a court exercises its discretion at various stages of the application, but they do not alone interdict resort to the Act.

83 In holding that "instant" trust deeds can satisfy the requirements of s. 3 of the Act, I should not be taken as concluding that debentures or bonds which are truly shams, in that they do not reflect a transaction which actually occurred and do not create a real debt owed by the company, will suffice. Clearly, they will not. I do not, however, equate the two. One is a tactical device used to gain the potential advantages of the Act. The other is a fraud.

84 Nor does my conclusion that "instant" trust deeds can bring a debtor company within the Act exclude considerations of the good faith of the debtor company in seeking the protection of the Act. A debtor company should not be allowed to use the Act for any purpose other than to attempt a legitimate reorganization. If the purpose of the application is to advantage one creditor over another, to defeat the legitimate interests of creditors, to delay the inevitable failure of the debtor company, or for some other improper purpose, the Court has the means available to it, apart entirely from s. 3 of the Act, to prevent misuse of the Act. In cases where the debtor company acts in bad faith, the Court may refuse to order a meeting of creditors, it may deny interim protection, it may vary interim protection initially given when the bad faith is shown, or it may refuse to sanction any plan which emanates from the meeting of the creditors: see Lawrence J. Crozier, "Good Faith and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act" (1989) 15 Can. Bus. L.J. 89.

(ii) Section 3 and the Prior Agreement with the Bank Limiting Creation of New Debt

85 The appellant also argues that the debentures did not meet the requirements of s. 3 of the Act because they were issued in contravention of a security agreement made between the companies and the bank. Assuming that the debentures were issued in contravention of that agreement, I do not understand how that contravention affects the status of the debentures for the purposes of s. 3 of the Act. The bank may well have an action against the debtor company for issuing the debentures, and it may have remedies against the holders of the debentures if they attempted to collect on their debt or enforce their security. Neither possibility, however, negates the existence of the debentures and the related trust deeds. Section 3 does not contemplate an inquiry into the effectiveness or enforceability of the s. 3 debentures, as against other creditors, as a condition precedent to qualification under the Act. Such inquiries may play a role in a judge's determination as to what orders, if any, should be made under the Act.

(iii) Section 3 and the Appointment of a Receiver-Manager

86 The third argument made by the bank relies on its installation of a receiver-manager in both companies prior to the issue of the debentures. I agree with Finlayson J.A. that the placement of a receiver, either by operation of the terms of an agreement or by court order, effectively removes those formerly in control of the company from that position, and vests that control in the receiver-manager: *Alberta Treasury Branches v. Hat Development Ltd.* (1988), 71 C.B.R. (N.S.) 264, 64 Alta. L.R. (2d) 17 (Q.B.), aff'd without deciding this point (1989), 65 Alta. L.R. (2d) 374 (C.A.). I cannot, however, agree with his interpretation of the order of Saunders J. I read that order as effectively turning the receiver into a monitor with rights of access, but with no authority beyond that. The operation of the business is specifically returned to the companies. The situation created by the order of Saunders J. can usefully be compared to that which existed when the application was made in *Hat Development Ltd.* Forsyth J., at p. 268 C.B.R., states:

> The receiver-manager in this case and indeed in almost all cases is charged by the court with the responsibility of managing the affairs of a corporation. It is true that it is appointed pursuant, in this case, to the existence of secured indebtedness and at the behest of a secured creditor to realize on its security and retire the indebtedness. Nonetheless, this receiver-manager was court-appointed and not by virtue of an instrument. As a court-appointed receiver it owed the obligation and the duty to the court to account from time to time and to come before the court for the purposes of having some of its decisions ratified or for receiving advice and direction. *It is empowered by the court to manage the affairs of the company and it is completely inconsistent with that function to suggest that some residual power lies in the hands of the directors of the company to create further indebtedness of the company and thus interfere, however slightly, with the receiver-manager's ability to manage*.

[Emphasis added.]

87 After the order of Saunders J., the receiver-manager in this case was not obligated to manage the companies. Indeed, it was forbidden from doing so. The creation of the "instant" trust deeds and the application under the Act did not interfere in any way with any power or authority the receiver-manager had after the order of Saunders J. was made.

88 I also find it somewhat artificial to suggest that the presence of a receiver-manager served to vitiate the orders of Hoolihan J. Unlike many applications under s. 5 of the Act, the proceedings before Hoolihan J. were not ex parte and he was fully aware of the existence of the receiver-manager, the order of Saunders J., and the arguments based on the presence of the receiver-manager. Clearly, Hoolihan J. considered it appropriate to proceed with a plan of reorganization despite the presence of the receiver-manager and the order of Saunders J. Indeed, in his initial order he provided that the order of Saunders J. "remains extant." Hoolihan J. did not, as I do not, see that order as an impediment to the application or the granting of relief under the Act. Had he considered that the receiver-manager was in control of the affairs of the company, he could have varied the order of Saunders J. to permit the applications under the Act to be made by the companies: *Hat Development Ltd.*, at pp. 268-269 C.B.R. It is clear to me that he would have done so had he felt it necessary. If the installation of the receiver-manager is to be viewed as a bar to an application under this Act, and if the orders of Hoolihan J. were otherwise appropriate, I would order that the order of Saunders J. should be varied to permit the creation of the debentures and the trust deeds and the bringing of this application by the companies. I take this power to exist by the combined effect of s. 14(2) of the Act and s. 144(1) of the *Courts of Justice Act*, 1984, S.O. 1984, c. 11.

89 In my opinion, the debentures and "instant" trust deeds created in August 1990 sufficed to bring the company within the requirements of s. 3 of the Act, even if in issuing those debentures the companies breached a prior agreement with the bank. I am also satisfied that, given the terms of the order of Saunders J., the existence of a receiver-manager installed by the bank did not preclude the application under s. 3 of the Act.

V Did Hoolihan J. Err in Exercising his Discretion in Favour of Directing that a Creditors' Meeting be Held to Consider the Proposed Plan of Reorganization?

90 As indicated earlier, the Act provides a number of points at which the Court must exercise its discretion. I am concerned with the initial exercise of discretion contemplated by s. 5 of the Act, by which the Court may order a meeting of creditors for purposes of considering a plan of reorganization. Hoolihan J. exercised that discretion in favour of the debtor companies. The factors relevant to the exercise of that discretion are as variable as the fact situations which may give rise to the application. Finlayson J.A. has concentrated on one such factor, the chance that the plan, if put before a properly constituted meeting of the creditors, could gain the required approval. I agree that the feasibility of the plan is a relevant and significant factor to be considered in determining whether to order a meeting of creditors: S.E. Edwards, "Reorganizations Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act," at pp. 594-595. I would not, however, impose a heavy burden on the debtor company to establish the likelihood of ultimate success from the outset. As the Act will often be the last refuge for failing companies, it is to be expected that many of the proposed plans of reorganization will involve variables and contingencies which will make the plan's ultimate acceptability to the creditors and the Court very uncertain at the time the initial application is made.

91 On the facts before Hoolihan J., there were several factors which supported the exercise of his discretion in favour of directing a meeting of the creditors. These included the apparent support of two of the three substantial secured creditors, the companies' continued operation, and the prospect (disputed by the bank) that the companies' fortunes would take a turn for the better in the near future, the companies' ongoing efforts — that eventually met with some success — to find alternate financing, and the number of people depending on the operation of the company for their livelihood. There were also a number of factors pointing in the other direction, the most significant of which was the likelihood that a plan of reorganization acceptable to the bank could not be developed.

92 I see the situation which presented itself to Hoolihan J. as capable of a relatively straightforward risk-benefit analysis. If the s. 5 order had been refused by Hoolihan J., it was virtually certain that the operation of the companies would have ceased immediately. There would have been immediate economic and social damage to those who worked at the plants, and those who depended on those who worked at the plants for their well-being. This kind of damage cannot be ignored, especially when it occurs in small communities like those in which these plants are located. A refusal to grant the application would also have put the investments of the various creditors, with the exception of the bank, at substantial risk. Finally, there would have been obvious financial damage to the owner of the companies. Balanced against these costs inherent in refusing the order would be the benefit to the bank, which would then have been in a position to realize on its security in accordance with its agreements with the companies.

93 The granting of the s. 5 order was not without its costs. It has denied the bank the rights it had bargained for as part of its agreement to lend substantial amounts of money to the companies. Further, according to the bank, the order has put the bank at risk of having its loans become undersecured because of the diminishing value of the accounts receivable and inventory which it holds as security and because of the ever-increasing size of the companies' debt to the bank. These costs must be measured against the potential benefit to all concerned if a successful plan of reorganization could be developed and implemented.

94 As I see it, the key to this analysis rests in the measurement of the risk to the bank inherent in the granting of the s. 5 order. If there was a real risk that the loan made by the bank would become undersecured during the operative period of the s. 5 order, I would be inclined to hold that the bank should not have that risk forced on it by the Court. However, I am unable to see that the bank is in any real jeopardy. The value of the security held by the bank appears to be well in excess of the size of its loan on the initial application. In his affidavit, Mr. Gibbons of Coopers & Lybrand asserted that the companies had overstated their cash flow projections, that the value of the inventory could diminish if customers of the companies looked to alternate sources for their product, and that the value of the accounts receivable could decrease if customers began to claim set-offs against those receivables. On the record before me, these appear to be no more than speculative possibilities. The bank has had access to all of the companies' financial data on an ongoing basis since the order of Hoolihan J. was made almost 2 months ago. Nothing was placed before this Court to suggest that any of the possibilities described above had come to pass.

95 Even allowing for some overestimation by the companies of the value of the security held by the bank, it would appear that the bank holds security valued at approximately $4 million for a loan that was, as of the hearing of this appeal, about $2.3 million. The order of Hoolihan J. was to terminate no later than November 14, 1990. I am not satisfied that the bank ran any

real risk of having the amount of the loan exceed the value of the security by that date. It is also worth noting that the order under appeal provided that any party could apply to terminate the order at any point prior to November 14. This provision provided further protection for the bank in the event that it wished to make the case that its loan was at risk because of the deteriorating value of its security.

96 Even though the chances of a successful reorganization were not good, I am satisfied that the benefits flowing from the making of the s. 5 order exceeded the risk inherent in that order. In my view, Hoolihan J. properly exercised his discretion in directing that a meeting of creditors should be held pursuant to s. 5 of the Act.

VI Did Hoolihan J. Err in Directing that the Bank and RoyNat Inc. Should be Placed in the Same Class for the Purposes of the Act?

97 I agree with Finlayson J.A. that the bank and RoyNat Inc., the two principal creditors, should not have been placed in the same class of secured creditors for the purposes of ss. 5 and 6 of the Act. Their interests are not only different, they are opposed. The classification scheme created by Hoolihan J. effectively denied the bank any control over any plan of reorganization.

98 To accord with the principles found in the cases cited by Finlayson J.A., the secured creditors should have been grouped as follows:

— Class 1 — The City of Chatham and the Village of Glencoe

— Class 2 — The Bank of Nova Scotia

— Class 3 — RoyNat Inc., Ontario Development Corporation, and those holding debentures issued by the company on August 29 and 31, 1990.

VII Did Hoolihan J. Err in Making the Interim Orders He Made?

99 Hoolihan J. made a number of orders designed to control the conduct of all of the parties, pending the creditors' meeting and the placing of a plan of reorganization before the Court. The first order was made on September 11, 1990, and was to expire on or before October 24, 1990. Subsequent orders varied the terms of the initial order somewhat, and extended its effective date until November 14, 1990.

100 These orders imposed the following conditions pending the meeting:

(a) all proceedings with respect to the debtor companies should be stayed, including any action by the bank to realize on its security;

(b) the bank could not reduce its loan by applying incoming receipts to those debts;

(c) the bank was to be the sole banker for the companies;

(d) the companies could carry on business in the normal course, subject to certain very specific restrictions;

(e) a licensed trustee was to be appointed to monitor the business operations of the companies and to report to the creditors on a regular basis; and

(f) any party could apply to terminate the interim orders, and the orders would be terminated automatically if the companies defaulted on any of the obligations imposed on them by the interim orders.

101 The orders placed significant restrictions on the bank for a 2-month period, but balanced those restrictions with provisions limiting the debtor companies' activities, and giving the bank ongoing access to up-to-date financial information concerning the companies. The bank was also at liberty to return to the Court to request any variation in the interim orders which changes in financial circumstances might merit.

102 These orders were made under the wide authority granted to the court by s. 11 of the Act. L.W. Houlden and C.H. Morawetz, in *Bankruptcy Law of Canada*, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1989), at pp. 2-102 to 2-103, describe the purpose of the section:

> The legislation is intended to have wide scope and allows a judge to make orders which will effectively maintain the status quo for a period while the insolvent company attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for a proposed arrangement which will enable the company to remain in operation for what is, hopefully, the future benefit of both the company and it creditors. This aim is facilitated by s. 11 of the Act, which enables the court to restrain further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company upon such terms as the court sees fit.

103 A similar sentiment appears in *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.*. Gibbs J.A., in discussing the scope of s. 11, said at p. 7 [unreported, pp. 88-89 B.C.L.R.]:

> When a company has recourse to the C.C.A.A. the court is called upon to play a kind of supervisory role to preserve the status quo and to move the process along to the point where a compromise or arrangement is approved or it is evident that the attempt is doomed to failure. Obviously time is critical. Equally obviously, if the attempt at compromise or arrangement is to have any prospect of success, there must be a means of holding the creditors at bay, hence the powers vested in the court under s. 11.

104 Similar views of the scope of the power to make interim orders covering the period when reorganization is being attempted are found in *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank; Meridian Developments Inc. v. Nu-West Ltd.*, 52 C.B.R. (N.S.) 109, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 215, 32 Alta. L.R. (2d) 150, 11 D.L.R. (4th) 576, 53 A.R. 39 (Q.B.) at 114-118 [C.B.R.]; *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.* (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361, 92 A.R. 81 (Q.B.) at 12-15 [C.B.R.]; *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.*, an unreported judgment of Thackray J., released June 18, 1990 [since reported (1990), 47 B.C.L.R. (2d) 193 (S.C.)], at pp. 5-9 [pp. 196-198 B.C.L.R.]; and B. O'Leary, "A Review of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act," at p. 41.

105 The interim orders made by Hoolihan J. are all within the wide authority created by s. 11 of the Act. The orders were crafted to give the company the opportunity to continue in operation, pending its attempt to reorganize, while at the same time providing safeguards to the creditors, including the bank, during that same period. I find no error in the interim relief granted by Hoolihan J.

VIII Conclusion

106 In the result, I would allow the appeal in part, vacate the order of Hoolihan J. of October 18, 1990, insofar as it purports to settle the class of creditors for the purpose of the Act, and I would substitute an order establishing the three classes referred to in Part VI of these reasons. I would not disturb any of the other orders made by Hoolihan J.

Appeal allowed.

TAB 4

2004 ABCA 31
Alberta Court of Appeal

Alternative Fuel Systems Inc., Re

2004 CarswellAlta 64, 2004 ABCA 31, [2004] 5 W.W.R. 475, [2004] A.W.L.D. 182, [2004] A.J. No. 60, 128 A.C.W.S. (3d) 804, 236 D.L.R. (4th) 155, 24 Alta. L.R. (4th) 1, 320 W.A.C. 28, 346 A.R. 28, 47 C.B.R. (4th) 1

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 as amended

And in the Matter of Alternative Fuels Inc.

Remington Development Corporation (Respondent / Applicant)
and Alternative Fuel Systems Inc. (Appellant / Respondent)

McFadyen, Paperny JJ.A., Clark J. (ad hoc)

Heard: December 2, 2003
Judgment: January 29, 2004
Docket: Calgary Appeal 0301-0270-AC

Proceedings: affirming (2003), (2003) 2003 CarswellAlta 1262, 46 C.B.R. (4th) 8, 20 Alta. L.R. (4th) 265, 2003 ABQB 745 (Alta. Q.B.)

Counsel: B.P. O'Leary, Q.C., C. Murray for Appellant
L.B. Robinson for Respondent
R.J. Gilborn, Q.C. for Monitor

Subject: Insolvency

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Principal Plaza Leaseholds Ltd. v. Principal Group Ltd. (Trustee of) (1996), *(*sub nom. *Principal Plaza Leaseholds Ltd. v. Principal Group Ltd. (Bankrupt))* 188 A.R. 187, 41 Alta. L.R. (3d) 248, [1996] 9 W.W.R. 539, 1996 CarswellAlta 676 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Québec (Sous-ministre du Revenu) c. Wynden Canada Inc. (1982), [1983] C.S. 194, 47 C.B.R. (N.S.) 76, 1982 CarswellQue 50, 1982 CarswellQue 276 (C.S. Que.) — referred to

Quebec Steel Products (Industries) Ltd. v. James United Steel Ltd. (1969), [1969] 2 O.R. 349, 5 D.L.R. (3d) 374, 1969 CarswellOnt 173 (Ont. H.C.) — referred to

Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312, 86 D.L.R. (4th) 621, 1991 CarswellOnt 220 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — considered

Smoky River Coal Ltd., Re (1999), 1999 CarswellAlta 491, 175 D.L.R. (4th) 703, 237 A.R. 326, 197 W.A.C. 326, 71 Alta. L.R. (3d) 1, [1999] 11 W.W.R. 734, 12 C.B.R. (4th) 94, 1999 ABCA 179 (Alta. C.A.) — considered

Sumner Co. (1984), Re (1987), 64 C.B.R. (N.S.) 218, 79 N.B.R. (2d) 191, 201 A.P.R. 191, 1987 CarswellNB 26 (N.B. Q.B.) — referred to

Woodward's Ltd., Re (1993), 20 C.B.R. (3d) 74, 84 B.C.L.R. (2d) 206, 1993 CarswellBC 555 (B.C. S.C.) — considered

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3
Generally — considered

Pt. II — referred to

Pt. III — referred to

Pt. V — referred to

s. 65.2 [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 30] — considered

s. 65.2(4) [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 30] — referred to

s. 73(4) — referred to

s. 121(1) — considered

s. 121(2) — considered

s. 135(1.1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 89(1)] — referred to

s. 136 — considered

s. 136(1)(f) — considered

s. 146 — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — considered

s. 12 — considered

s. 12(1) "claim" — considered

s. 12(2) — considered

s. 12(2)(a)(iii) — considered

Landlord's Rights on Bankruptcy Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-5
Generally — considered

s. 1 — considered

s. 2 — considered

s. 3 — considered

s. 4 — considered

APPEAL by debtor from judgment reported at *Alternative Fuel Systems Inc., Re* (2003), 46 C.B.R. (4th) 8, 20 Alta. L.R. (4th) 265, 2003 ABQB 745, 2003 CarswellAlta 1262, [2004] 5 W.W.R. 467 (Alta. Q.B.), determining question of law.

***Paperny J.A.*:**

Introduction

1 This appeal raises a pure question of law: Does the *Landlord's Rights on Bankruptcy Act*, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-5 (LRBA) apply to the determination of a landlord's claim when the debtor tenant has received protection under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (CCAA).

Facts

2 The respondent, Remington Development Corporation (Remington) is agent for the landlord of the appellant, Alternative Fuel Systems Inc. (AFS). Remington had two agreements with AFS to lease commercial space in Calgary from August 1, 2000 to January 31, 2016. Finding itself in financial difficulty, AFS petitioned and on April 9, 2003 received the order that it was a company to which the CCAA applies and could file a plan of compromise or arrangement under the CCAA. As part of its restructuring, AFS surrendered the leased premises to Remington in May 2003.

3 Both Remington and AFS sought a valuation of the landlord's claim and a determination whether, as an unsecured creditor, the claim should form part of the unsecured creditor class in the CCAA. Before the chambers judge, AFS calculated Remington's claim under the LRBA was approximately $96,000 without considering offsets for prepaid rent and other items. On a full accounting, the sum could be further reduced to $15,000. A non-discounted mitigated claim for the unexpired term of the leases would be about $4.2 million, although, as a result of mitigation the largest portion of Remington's claim has now been reduced to $1.1 million while the smaller portion currently remains at $400,000.

4 The chambers judge held that the LRBA does not automatically apply to limit or quantify the landlord's claim in CCAA proceedings.

Appellant's position

5 The thrust of the appellant's submission, broadly stated, is that under the CCAA the amount of a landlord's claim in Alberta is the same amount as would be calculated in a bankruptcy. More specifically, the appellant submits that an unbreakable thread connects the CCAA to the LRBA. The thread begins with the plain meaning of s. 12(1) of the CCAA which refers to the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 (BIA) to define claims under the CCAA. The thread continues to s. 12(2) of the CCAA which provides for a determination of the amount represented by a claim in three different ways. In this appeal, the applicable sub-clause, s. 12(2)(a)(iii) provides that amount is that which might be proven under the BIA. A third link is s. 136 of the BIA which sets a priority for payment to a bankrupt's creditors and specifically, s. 136(f), which includes a landlord for priority payment, but limits the amount which may be claimed by a landlord. The next connection, says the appellant, is s. 146 of the BIA which further provides that in addition to ss. 136 and 73(4) of the BIA, rights of landlords are determined according to the law of the province in which leased premises are situated. In Alberta, that law includes the LRBA which further limits a landlord's rights in bankruptcy. Through this series of statutory provisions, it submits Parliament has provided that the landlord's rights under the CCAA are identical to those under the BIA and thus, under the LRBA.

Relevant legislation

6 The relevant provision in the CCAA is s. 12 which provides:

> 12. (1) For the purposes of this Act, "claim" means any indebtedness, liability or obligation of any kind that, if unsecured, would be a debt provable in bankruptcy within the meaning of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*.
>
> **Determination of amount of claim**
>
> (2) For the purposes of this Act, the amount represented by a claim of any secured or unsecured creditor shall be determined as follows:

(a) the amount of an unsecured claim shall be the amount

(i) in the case of a company in the course of being wound up under the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, proof of which has been made in accordance with that Act,

(ii) in the case of a company that has made an authorized assignment or against which a receiving order has been made under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, proof of which has been made in accordance with that Act, or

(iii) in the case of any other company, proof of which might be made under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, but if the amount so provable is not admitted by the company, the amount shall be determined by the court on summary application by the company or by the creditor; and

(b) the amount of a secured claim shall be the amount, proof of which might be made in respect thereof under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* if the claim were unsecured, but the amount if not admitted by the company shall, in the case of a company subject to pending proceedings under the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act* or the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, be established by proof in the same manner as an unsecured claim under the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act* or the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, as the case may be, and in the case of any other company the amount shall be determined by the court on summary application by the company or the creditor.

Admission of claims

(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2), the company may admit the amount of a claim for voting purposes under reserve of the right to contest liability on the claim for other purposes, and nothing in this Act, the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act* or the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* prevents a secured creditor from voting at a meeting of secured creditors or any class of them in respect of the total amount of a claim as admitted.

7 The following provisions in the BIA are also relevant:

Scheme of Distribution

Priority of claims

136. (1) Subject to the rights of secured creditors, the proceeds realized from the property of a bankrupt shall be applied in priority of payment as follows:

. . .

(f) the landlord for arrears of rent for a period of three months immediately preceding the bankruptcy and accelerated rent for a period not exceeding three months following the bankruptcy if entitled thereto under the lease, but the total amount so payable shall not exceed the realization from the property on the premises under lease, and any payment made on account of accelerated rent shall be credited against the amount payable by the trustee for occupation rent;

. . .

Application of provincial law to landlords' rights

146. Subject to priority of ranking as provided by section 136 and subject to subsection 73(4), the rights of landlords shall be determined according to the laws of the province in which the leased premises are situated.

8 The provisions in the LRBA which the appellant submits are relevant are:

Assignment of property

1 A lessee against or by whom a receiving order or assignment is made under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Canada) is deemed to have made an assignment of all the lessee's property for the general benefit of the lessee's creditors before the date of the receiving order or assignment.

Payment of rent after assignment

2 As soon as the receiving order or assignment is made

(a) the landlord of the lessee is not afterwards entitled to distrain or realize the rent by distress, and

(b) the trustee in whom the property of the lessee vests under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Canada) shall pay to the landlord in priority to all other debts

(i) an amount not exceeding in value the distrainable assets of the lessee and not exceeding 3 months' rent accrued due before the date of the receiving order or assignment, and

(ii) the costs of distress, if any.

Surplus rent

3 The lessee is a debtor to the landlord

(a) for all surplus rent in excess of the 3 months' rent accrued due at the date of the receiving order or assignment, and

(b) for any accelerated rent to which the landlord may be entitled under the lease but not exceeding an amount equal to 3 months' rent.

When landlord unable to claim from lessee

4 Subject to section 3, the landlord has no right to claim as a debt any money due to the landlord from the lessee for any portion of the unexpired term of the lessee's lease.

Analysis

9 As a pure question of law, the standard of review is correctness. I agree with the Chambers Judge that the LRBA does not apply to limit or quantify the landlord's claim in CCAA proceedings.

10 I arrive at this conclusion on the basis, first, that the condition precedent set out in the LRBA for its application (and mirrored in its correlative, Part II of the BIA, which deals with Receiving Orders and Assignments) is not satisfied when the debtor is not the subject of a receiving order or an assignment, nor does the LRBA fit within the scheme and intent of the CCAA. Second, the interpretation of s. 12 of the CCAA does not direct the importation of all the provisions of the BIA into the CCAA when determining the amount of the claim. Third and most significantly, the objects of the BIA and CCAA are distinct and each must be interpreted with their respective purposes in mind.

The condition precedent for application of the LRBA

11 That provincial legislation can deal with a landlord's rights upon the bankruptcy of a tenant if it does not conflict with the BIA (*Principal Plaza Leaseholds Ltd. v. Principal Group Ltd. (Trustee of)* (1996), 188 A.R. 187 (Alta. Q.B.)) is not in dispute. There is no question that the LRBA properly operates within a bankruptcy context, when the debtor is the subject of either a receiving order or an assignment.

12 In such a case, s. 136(1)(f) of the BIA confers on the landlord a preferred claim for arrears of rent for a specified period and provincial legislation is called into operation pursuant to s. 146. Consequently the LRBA's provisions are invoked.

13 The appellant seeks to invoke these provisions when a debtor is not the subject of a receiving order or an assignment, but rather, proposes a plan of arrangement under the CCAA. In my view, the LRBA's provisions are not invoked in such circumstances.

14 The LRBA sets out the conditions under which the provisions of the Act operate. The triggering condition is that a receiving order or assignment under the BIA be made against or by the lessee. Section 1 describes the effect of a receiving order or assignment into bankruptcy. Section 2 operates "as soon as the receiving order or assignment is made", making it clear that the pre-condition is the receiving order or assignment.

15 The entire LRBA should be read as relying upon the operation and effect of a receiving order or assignment under the BIA. Sections 3 and 4 of the LRBA, which limit the landlord's debt, must be interpreted as requiring the condition precedent of a receiving order or assignment. Nothing in the wording of the LRBA suggests it applies in the absence of a receiving order or assignment into bankruptcy, and no receiving order or assignment is made while a company attempts to restructure under the CCAA.

Section 12 of the CCAA

16 The specific sub-clause at issue in this appeal is s. 12(2)(a)(iii), which appears under the heading "Determination of amount of claim". Omitting the irrelevant sub-clauses, it states:

> For the purposes of this Act, the amount represented by a claim of any secured or unsecured creditor shall be determined as follows: (a) the amount of an unsecured claim shall be the amount . . . (iii) in the case of any other company, proof of which might be made under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, but if the amount so provable is not admitted by the company, the amount shall be determined by the court on summary application by the company or by the creditor.

17 It is the appellant's position that this sub-clause must be interpreted as mandating the importation of the BIA and LRBA to expressly calculate the amount provable. I reject that interpretation for the three reasons set out below.

Use of the Word "Might" Conveying Discretion

18 The first basis for my disagreement stems from Parliament's use of the words "might be made" (in sub-clause iii) which *per se* confers flexibility. This is underscored and reinforced when contrasted with the imperative "has been made" specified in the other two sub-clauses, (i) and (ii). In my view, "might" should be understood as meaning "could", i.e., the claim may be capable of being proven under the BIA.

19 This interpretation is consistent with a long line of unassailable authorities. In *Algoma Steel Corp. v. Royal Bank* (1992), 11 C.B.R. (3d) 11 (Ont. C.A.), Farley J. held that the word "shall" in s. 12(2) which then stated that "the amount represented by a claim . . . shall be defined as follows . . . " should be interpreted as "may" when one appreciates that the debtor companies and all affected stakeholders are entitled to a broad and liberal interpretation of the jurisdiction of the court under the CCAA.

20 Ten years later, the following statement by Houlden and Morawetz in *2003 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Toronto: Carswell, 2002) at 1100 is analogous to the issue before us. Citing *Parisian Cleaners & Laundry Ltd. v. Blondin* (1938), 20 C.B.R. 452 (C.A. Que.), they stated: "The purpose of s. 12(2) [of the CCAA] is to provide a *means* of determining the amount of a claim, not to incorporate the provisions of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act as to what constitutes a preferred or unsecured claim.". (Emphasis added) The same proposition is also supported by *Québec (Sous-ministre du Revenu) c. Wynden Canada Inc.* (1982), 47 C.B.R. (N.S.) 76 (C.S. Que.), and *Quebec Steel Products (Industries) Ltd. v. James United Steel Ltd.* (1969), 5 D.L.R. (3d) 374 (Ont. H.C.).

21 In my view, the words "might be made under the BIA" should be understood to mean "could be made". In other words, the claim may be, but must not necessarily be, capable of being proven under the BIA.

Use of the Word "Determined" Conveying "Methodology"

22 My second disagreement stems from my broader interpretation of the word "determined" as used in the opening sentence of s. 12(2). The interpretation urged upon us by the appellant is that "determined" should be interpreted as meaning "calculated". However, reference to the BIA indicates that use of the term has two meanings: it can mean either a "methodology" or a "calculation", i.e., a formula for calculating a specific amount.

23 That "determination" is used to mean "methodology" is illustrated by the following example. Section s. 121(1) broadly defines "claims provable" and the subsequent sub-sections add more specificity. Section 121(2) states that the "determination" of whether contingent and unliquidated claims are provable claims and their valuation is in made accordance with s. 135. The term "determination" in s. 121(2) clearly refers to a methodology, since s. 135 does not provide a formula for calculation of the amount, but rather a methodology at s. 135(1.1):

> **Claims provable**
>
> 121. (1) All debts and liabilities, present or future, to which the bankrupt is subject on the day on which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt or to which the bankrupt may become subject before the bankrupt's discharge by reason of any obligation incurred before the day on which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt shall be deemed to be claims provable in proceedings under this Act.
>
> **Contingent and unliquidated claims**
>
> (2) The determination whether a contingent or unliquidated claim is a provable claim and the valuation of such a claim shall be made in accordance with section 135.
>
> **Determination of provable claims**
>
> 135(1.1) The trustee shall determine whether any contingent claim or unliquidated claim is a provable claim, and, if a provable claim, the trustee shall value it, and the claim is thereafter, subject to this section, deemed a proved claim to the amount of its valuation.

24 When Parliament directed that the claims of unsecured creditors are those that might be proven under the BIA, it did not refer to the quantification or calculation of the amount provable in bankruptcy. In my view, it was intended to define who is included in the scheme of the CCAA, so as to override conflicting common law definitions.

The Dilemma of Which Section of the BIA To Invoke to Calculate Quantum

25 This interpretation is supported by my third area of disagreement with the appellant. Were one to adopt the appellant's interpretation of sub-clause (iii), i.e., that the *amount* of the claim must be *calculated* in accordance with the methodology for calculating such claims under the BIA/LRBA, the issue then raised is: should one apply the method set out in s. 65.2 or that in s. 136, both of which apply to landlords? Each method yields substantially different results.

26 As a preface, and at the risk of stating the obvious, the BIA governs two types of debtors. Part III, titled "Proposals", is similar to the scheme and object of the CCAA, and is intended to govern those debtors who, with the support their creditors, have a reasonable hope of returning to financial viability. In contrast, Part II, titled "Receiving Orders and Assignments" and its companion section, Part V ("Administration of Estates") govern situations where the debtor has no hope of returning to financial viability, but rather, its assets are vested in a trustee for distribution among the debtors' creditors. These two discrete objects of the BIA are essential to the analysis that follows.

27 For landlords, the direction in s. 12(1)(a)(iii) of the CCAA cannot be read as requiring the valuation of the amount of the claim as set out in the BIA because the BIA itself provides two different methods and amounts that may be applicable to landlords' claims.

28 The first is s. 65.2 (in Part III, Proposals), which makes provisions for disclaiming commercial leases. If the disclaimer of the lease is in accordance with the requirements of the section, s. 65.2(4) sets out the amount the landlord may claim as follows:

> **Effects of disclaimer**
>
> (4) Where a lease is disclaimed under subsection (1),
>
> (a) the landlord has no claim for accelerated rent;
>
> (b) the proposal must indicate whether the landlord may file a proof of claim for the actual losses resulting from the disclaimer, or for an amount equal to the lesser of
>
> (i) the aggregate of
>
> (A) the rent provided for in the lease for the first year of the lease following the date on which the disclaimer becomes effective, and
>
> (B) fifteen percent of the rent for the remainder of the term of the lease after that year, and
>
> (ii) three year's rent; and
>
> (c) the landlord may file a proof of claim as indicated in the proposal.

29 Section 65.2 limits a landlord's claim under a proposal and provides for a larger amount than when the debtor is the subject of a receiving order or assignment. This accords with authorities which suggest that proposals must offer creditors some better advantage than a bankruptcy: *Pateman, Re* (1991), 5 C.B.R. (3d) 115 (Man. Q.B.), *Sumner Co. (1984), Re* (1987), 64 C.B.R. (N.S.) 218 (N.B. Q.B.), *Allen Theatre Ltd., Re* (1922), 3 C.B.R. 147 (Ont. Bktcy.).

30 Section 136 (in Part V) provides a scheme for the distribution of the assets of a bankrupt who is the subject of a receiving order or an assignment under Part II. Landlords are specifically provided for at s. 136(1)(f) as follows:

> **Priority of claims**
>
> 136. (1) Subject to the rights of secured creditors, the proceeds realized from the property of a bankrupt shall be applied in priority of payment as follows:
>
> . . .
>
> (f) the landlord for arrears of rent for a period of three months immediately preceding the bankruptcy and accelerated rent for a period not exceeding three months following the bankruptcy if entitled thereto under the lease, but the total amount so payable shall not exceed the realization from the property on the premises under lease, and any payment made on account of accelerated rent shall be credited against the amount payable by the trustee for occupation rent;

31 This is the section that the appellant urges upon us as being part of the unbreakable thread. In my view, nothing in the wording of s. 136 assists it's position. On the contrary, the limitation on the amount a landlord may claim in s. 136(f) appears under the heading "priority of claim". As appellant's counsel explained, there is a trade off, the amount which the landlord receives is reduced from the full amount which could be claimed under a lease and in return, the landlord receives a priority position when the proceeds of the bankrupt's property is paid out. Section 136 requires payment of the enumerated claims in full in the order specified before any other unsecured creditor receives payment.

32 However, there is no scheme for priority payment of claims set out in the CCAA. Thus, the effect on the landlord, were this interpretation accepted, is to compromise the claim not once, but twice, without the benefit of any priority, as noted by the Chambers Judge.

33 If s. 65.2 were to be applied, it assumes that the proposal provisions, Part III of the BIA, applies to CCAA and not Parts II and V, the bankruptcy provisions. Section 146 of the BIA which allows for the application of provincial law is also included in Part V and its provisions are in reference to s. 136 which sets out distribution in bankruptcy proceedings, not proposals.

34 If s. 12(2)(a)(iii) of the CCAA requires calculation of an amount in accordance with the BIA, as submitted by the appellant, it would have to stipulate which of ss. 65.2 or 136 is applicable. It does not, providing further support that the BIA does not direct the calculation of the amount of a landlord's claim in a CCAA proceeding or that the CCAA requires s. 136 of the BIA be applied.

35 During oral argument, the appellant sought to distinguish cases involving Ontario's provincial legislation which is not as restrictive as the Alberta LRBA. But the provincial legislation setting out the rights of landlords in bankruptcy proceedings is irrelevant if ss. 136 and 146 of the BIA do not apply to the CCAA.

36 There are numerous cases dealing with landlords' claims that have treated the CCAA as an autonomous statute and did not look to s. 12 as directing the use of BIA provisions to determine the amount of the claim. *Woodward's Ltd., Re* (1993), 20 C.B.R. (3d) 74 (B.C. S.C.), is an example of the purposive approach taken by courts under the CCAA in dealing with creditors.

37 Decisions in *Re Agnew Group Inc.* unreported February 4, 1994, *Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1991), 86 D.L.R. (4th) 621 (Ont. Gen. Div.), *Grafton-Fraser Inc. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce* (1992), 90 D.L.R. (4th) 285 (Ont. Gen. Div.), and *Armbro Enterprises Inc., Re* (1993), 22 C.B.R. (3d) 80 (Ont. Bktcy.), all treated landlord's claims very differently than the BIA and took a broad approach to the classification and quantification of landlords' claims to facilitate the object and purpose of the CCAA.

38 The appellant was unable to cite any authority to compel us to a different conclusion. The appellant submits that the Court's decision in *Smoky River Coal Ltd., Re* (1999), 175 D.L.R. (4th) 703 (Alta. C.A.), determined that s. 12(2) provides that an amount of a claim must be that amount as provided for under the BIA. I disagree. The issue in *Smoky River Coal Ltd., Re* (*supra*) was whether a CCAA judge had the discretion to establish a procedure for resolving a dispute between parties who had agreed by contract to arbitrate their disputes. This required that the dispute fall within the jurisdiction of the CCAA. In other words, the plaintiffs in the dispute had to be considered "creditors" for the purpose of the CCAA. The court's focus was on s. 12(1) of the CCAA, not s. 12(2). This Court looked to the similar wording between the BIA and CCAA referring to "debt provable in bankruptcy" and "claim provable in bankruptcy" to conclude that the plaintiffs, who had a contingent and unliquidated claim, were creditors. Valuation of the amount was not an issue since the claim was contingent and unliquidated. The issue was solely one of the court's discretion to establish a process to resolve the amount of the claim.

39 The wording in s. 12(2)(a)(iii) is intended to be and must be general. That sub-clause captures all the unsecured claims of a company not subject to a receiving order or assignment or winding up. These unsecured claims include landlords as creditors, but also capture a host of unliquidated and contingent claims, the latter of which would not be defined as creditors at common law. Thus, the phrase "proof of which might be made under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act" directs that the various methods within the BIA to determine claims are to be employed to cover the wide range of potential claims. This clause is intended to define who is included in the scheme of the CCAA and override conflicting common law definitions.

40 Moreover, amendments to both the BIA and CCAA in 1997 and 1998 were intended to harmonize the two pieces of legislation. Changes were made to the BIA to enhance the rights given to landlords, but no change in either legislation amended or introduced provisions to apply the BIA to landlords in CCAA proceedings.

41 More recently, in November 2003, the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce released "Debtors and Creditors Sharing the Burden: A Review of the BIA and the CCAA", a report calling for substantial reform of the

federal insolvency statutes (the "Report"). Twenty-two of the Committee's recommendations apply specifically to commercial insolvencies.

42 A very broad range of stakeholders provided input on virtually all elements of the two *Acts*. The Committee concluded that [p. 173]: "We believe that the need for flexibility is paramount with the CCAA . . . .". As a consequence, they recommend that the BIA and the CCAA continue to operate as separate statutes.

43 The Report also considered the existence of contracts, including leases, and how these should be dealt with under the legislation. The Joint Task Force on Business Insolvency Law Reform was of the view that the ability set out in the BIA to disclaim executory contracts including real property leases should apply to all bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings. The Committee's final recommendation was that:

> The BIA and the CCAA be amended to permit disclaimer of executory contracts in existence in the date of commencement of proceedings under the Acts. This disclaimer should apply to all contracts, provided that a number of conditions are met. In particular: the debtor should be obliged to establish inability or serious hardship in restructuring the enterprise without the disclaimer; the co-contracting party should be permitted to file a claim in damages in the restructuring [and other conditions specific to collective agreements].
>
> [Emphasis added]

44 The Report recognized that the CCAA treats landlords differently than the BIA and harmonization in respect of this difference was recommended. Significantly, no such recommendations were made with respect to implementing a consistent approach for the valuation of a landlord's claim.

Purposes of the BIA and CCAA

45 Assuming the words are capable of bearing the interpretation urged upon us by the appellant, statutory interpretation requires that s. 12 be read in the context of the scheme, the object, and the intention of Parliament in passing the CCAA and where the CCAA refers to the BIA, regard must also be given to the scheme, object and intention of that Act.

46 The proper approach to statutory interpretation requires that words be read contextually to give effect to the purpose and intent of the legislation. As the Supreme Court of Canada recently stated in *Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of Patents)*, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45 (S.C.C.) at para. 154, "This Court has on many occasions expressed the view that statutory interpretation cannot be based on the wording of the legislation alone (*Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re)*, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27)". When interpreting specific provisions, a court must pay sufficient attention to the scheme of an act, its objects or the intention of the legislature.

47 The BIA is a comprehensive legislative scheme largely designed to facilitate the orderly liquidation of the estate of a bankrupt. The purposes of the Act include conducting the liquidation in a manner that maximizes recovery for the general benefit of the creditors, treating similarly situated creditors fairly and in accordance with the Act. The Act sets out priorities and a detailed process, making the BIA a logical choice when the only possible outcome is dissolution. It provides a high degree of certainty for all creditors.

48 The CCAA is a very brief piece of legislation with a purpose described in *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.) as follows:

> The legislation is remedial in the purest sense in that it provides a means whereby devastating, social and economic effects of bankruptcy or creditor-initiated detriments of ongoing business operations can be avoided while court-supervised attempt to reorganize the financial affairs of the debtor is made.

49 The very brevity of the Act and the fact that it is silent on details permits a wide and liberal construction to enable the Act to serve its remedial purpose: *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* (1990), [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136 (B.C. C.A.).

50 The role of the CCAA is unique. It affords the debtor company an opportunity to restructure its affairs in a manner that will permit it to continue as a going concern without intervention by creditors which might hamper or prevent the restructuring process. Its ultimate goal is to avoid bankruptcy, thereby maximizing creditor compensation, reducing the inevitable loss of employment precipitated by bankruptcy and, if successful, offering the prospect of shareholder equity. The debtor remains in possession and control of the company under the supervision of a court appointed monitor. See for example, *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*, [2000] 10 W.W.R. 269, 2000 ABQB 442 (Alta. Q.B.), leave denied, [2000] 10 W.W.R. 314, 2000 ABCA 238 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]), leave denied (S.C.C.); *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); *Northland Properties Ltd., Re*, [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363 (B.C. C.A.).

51 The decision to seek protection under the CCAA is that of the debtor. There are numerous considerations in choosing the CCAA as opposed to utilizing the proposal provisions of the BIA, however, one significant factor is the high degree of flexibility the CCAA offers in terms of plan fundamentals and process. The BIA is highly rule driven with clearly defined standards and processes for developing a proposal. Thus, the debtor company under CCAA has far broader latitude within which to propose a plan capable of winning creditor support.

52 A company which invokes the CCAA process retains a great deal of control over it. Under the CCAA claims process, the company, not the monitor, initially accepts or rejects claims. Section 12(2)(a)(iii) states, "if the amount so provable is not admitted by the company, the amount shall be determined by the court on summary application by the company or by the creditor".

53 Section 12(2)(a)(iii) permits different treatment of different claims. The company can admit a claim, or refer it to a court to determine by summary application or trial. In recent cases, recognizing the need for expedited valuation of claims to facilitate the process, the courts have begun appointing a claims officer to make this determination.

54 Rehabilitation of a company under the CCAA is furthered by a climate that allows for commercial realities and variables to be considered and negotiated among and by the affected parties. The debtor company, through the operation of the stay, is given the breathing room to explore alternatives and to structure a proposed plan that will find favour with creditors, sufficient to support the restructuring.

55 To maximize flexibility, it is unwise and unnecessary to incorporate, by oblique reference, portions of the BIA or the LRBA that may not assist the process. What the CCAA requires is that the end result, the plan of arrangement, be fair and reasonable. Only when those conditions are met, will a plan of arrangement be approved by a court. What constitutes fairness is largely determined by the circumstances of each case. An important measure of fairness is the degree to which creditors approve it. Creditor support can create an inference that assenting creditors see the plan as viable and commercially reasonable given other available alternatives. The courts generally accept the view that the creditors are in a better position to determine whether the plan is in their own best interests.

The implications of incorporating all BIA provisions into the CCAA

56 If the appellant's interpretation of s. 12 of the CCAA is accepted, such an interpretation would not be limited to claims by landlords but would include all other unsecured creditors who fall within the provisions of the BIA. At minimum, tax claimants, employees claims, and workers compensation indebtedness as provided in s. 136 of the BIA would apply to the CCAA, thereby increasing the rigidity and reducing the options for compromise.

57 Under the BIA, the claims receiving priority after secured creditors are enumerated in s. 136 and have ten categories, each ranking behind the other. All must be paid in full before unsecured creditors recover anything. If the appellant is correct, arguably, those claims must be quantified under the BIA but without priority and subject to possible further compromise.

58 Two other examples illustrate the uncertainty and difficulty that would arise if the appellant's submission was adopted. First, federal excise tax legislation gives Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA) a deemed trust for amounts due to it for GST and prohibits any legislation other than the BIA from overriding the deemed trust. There is no deemed trust in a

bankruptcy, but cases including this proceeding have held a deemed trust exists in a CCAA restructuring. If the appellant is correct, then excise tax claims must be treated the same in CCAA and a deemed trust would be overridden.

59 A second example that would import complex and unsettled issues in bankruptcy law is a severance claim. These claims raise thorny issues such as whether the bankruptcy itself triggers termination of employment without cause and thereby gives rise to a provable claim, whether legislation which continues a collective agreement gives rise to a severance claim, and whether a bankruptcy triggered by a creditor and not the bankrupt is to be distinguished. Under the CCAA, employees' claims for severance avoid those issues by treating employees as claimants and capable of being compromised under the CCAA. In *Woodward's Ltd., Re*, a British Columbia case, the court recognized the claims of employees who were terminated and included them in the class of general creditors maintaining that once the amount of the claim had been agreed upon or determined by a court, the employees had the same rights as any other unsecured creditor.

The inconsistency of the BIA and LRBA with the objectives of the CCAA

60 Automatically applying the LRBA when protection is sought under the CCAA results in the immediate compromise of a landlord's claim prior to the formulation of a plan. Its effect could be to isolate the landlord's claim, treating it differently and potentially unfairly by automatically compromising it without consideration of the plan as a whole. There is no compelling reason for such an *a priori* blanket regime for landlords in a CCAA proceeding that is intended to preserve the status quo pending the approval of a plan.

61 There is no reported decision of a court applying s. 136 of the BIA, the LRBA or other provincial legislation equivalent to the LRBA. Instead, case law shows those provisions are not applied and courts have agreed with Farley J., who stated in *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* at para. 11, "Amounts owing to landlords in respect of arrears of rent or unpaid rent for the unexpired portion of lease terms are properly dealt with in a plan of compromise or arrangement: see *Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312 (Ont. Gen. Div.) especially at p. 318."

62 Landlords' claims have been a source of difficulty under the CCAA and have spawned considerable academic comment on the problems and potential ways to resolve them. The chambers judge and the respondent have noted many including the following: Moffat, "Treatment of Landlords in Commercial Re-organizations" (1997) 10 Comm. Insol. R. 14; Rotsztain and Kraft, "Landlords and Leases in Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act Reorganizations" [1994] ICR 2005; Marantz, "Retail Revival: The Eaton's Restructuring" (1998), 10 Comm. Insol. R. 37; Birkness, "*Re Woodward's Limited* - The Contextual Commonality of Interest Approach to Classification of Creditors" (1993) 20 C.B.R. (3d) 91; Kulidjian, Sheldon and Peck, "Potential Creditors Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act" (1996) 13 National I. R. 4; Marantz, "Dealing with Proposals: Acting for the Creditor in CCAA and the New Bankruptcy Act Proposals" (Ontario: Canadian Bar Association C.L.E., 1993); Hayes, "Landlords' Rights on Bankruptcy and in Restructuring Proceedings" in *The Failing Smaller Business: Essential Debtor - Creditor Practice* (Law Society of Upper Canada, 1994); and Johnston and Campbell, "Using the CCAA to 'Cram Down" Landlords: *Sklar-Pepplar Furniture Corporation v. Bank of Nova Scotia* and its Aftermath" (1992) 1 Nat. Real Property L. Rev. (2d) 181.

63 Much of the comment accords with those of Moffat, "Treatment of Landlords in Commercial Re-organizations", where the author states at 16:

> Unlike the proposal provisions of Part II of the BIA, the CCAA does not make any special provision for the valuation or classification of landlord claims under a plan. This does not give the debtor the power to compromise a landlord's claim in any way it chooses; the courts have placed limits on the method by which landlord claims may be valued and classified under a plan. A landlord which objects to its treatment under a plan may pursue a number of remedies, including seeking amendment of the plan prior to the meeting of creditors held to vote upon the plan, voting against the plan at the creditors' meeting, and opposing court approval of the plan at the sanction hearing.

64 Courts have approved a variety of solutions to quantifying landlord's claims without reliance on the BIA or provincial legislation. In *Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia*, the court classified the landlords among the general class

of unsecured creditors for both outstanding rent and any contingent claim for damages arising from repudiation of the lease. The court permitted the termination of certain leases upon the plan's approval and limited damages to three months arrears of rent, three months' rent after a protection order and share pro rata with other ordinary creditors for the balance of their claims. Borins J. stated at 318:

> [R]ecognition must be given to the legislative intent to facilitate corporate re-organization and that in the modern world of large and complex business enterprises the excessive fragmentation of classes could be counter-productive to the fulfilment of this intent . . . .In my view, in placing a broad and purposive interpretation upon the provisions of the CCAA the court should take care to resist approaches which would potentially fragment creditors and thereby jeopardize potentially viable plans of arrangement, such as the plan advance in this application.

65 In *Grafton-Fraser* and in *Re Agnew Group Inc.*, the landlords were granted claims based on the present value of the unexpired terms of the abandoned leases. In *Agnew*, with the exception of one landlord with a particularly long term lease, landlords received a maximum of six months' rent.

66 Rotsztain and Kraft in "Landlords and Leases in BIA and CCAA Reorganizations" commenting on *Agnew* and *Grafton-Fraser* note at 5-31 that, "A claim based on the present value of the unexpired term of the lease is something which landlords generally look upon more favourably than a straight payment of a few months' rent." The authors explain that this is because this approach recognizes the significant long term impact termination can have on landlords and allows the factoring in of tenant inducements which are generally built into rental payments over the entire lease.

67 On this appeal, the appellant suggests incorporating the LRBA serves a useful purpose because without the LRBA limitations, the landlord's claim is so potentially large that it makes a restructuring impossible, and requires too much time to mitigate and thus to quantify the landlord's claim.

68 Speaking generally, I disagree that the magnitude or quantification issues arising from a landlord's claim make restructuring impossible. Treatment of a landlord's claim under a plan may produce the same result as that under the LRBA and such plan might be approved by both the landlord and the court. Similarly, treatment under the plan could be less than or more than the amount provided for under the LRBA. But these are issues for negotiation and ultimately, court approval.

69 In the absence of legislation, the unique and distinct purpose of the CCAA has been and must remain the focus for judicial interpretation and discretion. Where there is neither statutory direction nor demonstrated need, it is undesirable to import statutory provisions that may have a negative affect on the flexibility afforded by the CCAA and thus become an impediment to its creative use. Adopting the LRBA as determinative of a landlord's claim under the CCAA is an example of narrowing the benefit of a broad statute in favour of a certainty. As a general proposition and without considering the merits of that position in a particular plan, such an approach is to be discouraged.

Relief

70 For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed.

***McFadyen J.A.*:**

I concur.

***Clark J.* (ad hoc):**

I concur.

Appeal dismissed.

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TAB 5

1993 CarswellOnt 241
Ontario Court of Justice (General Division), In Bankruptcy

Armbro Enterprises Inc., Re

1993 CarswellOnt 241, [1993] O.J. No. 4482, 22 C.B.R. (3d) 80

Re ARMBRO ENTERPRISES INC.

R.A. Blair J.

Judgment: November 1, 1993

Counsel: *Geoffrey B. Morawetz* and *Craig J. Hill*, for applicants.
Irving Marks, for opposing creditor.
Michael S.F. Watson and *Lilly A. Wong*, for Royal Bank of Canada.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Table of Authorities

Cases considered:

Ayer's Ltd., Re (December 9, 1991), (Nfld. T.D.) [unreported] — *referred to*

Dairy Corp. of Canada Ltd., Re, [1934] O.R. 436, [1934] 3 D.L.R. 347 (S.C.) — *referred to*

Grafton-Fraser Inc. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (1992), 11 C.B.R. (3d) 161, 90 D.L.R. (4th) 285 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — *considered*

Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd. (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84, [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136 (C.A.) — *referred to*

Inducon Development Corp., Re (1992), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — *referred to*

Keddy Motor Inns Ltd., Re (1992), 13 C.B.R. (3d) 245, 90 D.L.R. (4th) 175, 6 B.L.R. (2d) 116, 110 N.S.R. (2d) 246, 299 A.P.R. 246 (C.A.) — *referred to*

*Northland Properties Ltd., Re, (*sub nom. *Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada)* 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195, [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363, 34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 122 (C.A.) — *referred to*

Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, *(*sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey)* 41 O.A.C. 282, 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (C.A.) — *referred to*

Quintette Coal Ltd., Re (1992), 13 C.B.R. (3d) 146, 68 B.C.L.R. (2d) 219 (S.C.) — *referred to*

Silcorp Ltd. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (June 26, 1992), Doc. B152/92 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — *referred to*

Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312, 86 D.L.R. (4th) 621 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — *referred to*

Woodward's Ltd., Re (1993), 20 C.B.R. (3d) 74, 84 B.C.L.R. (2d) 206 (S.C.) — *referred to*

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 —

s. 6

Motion for order sanctioning and approving plan of compromise and arrangement.

R.A. Blair J. **(Endorsement):**

1 This is a motion by the Applicants for an Order pursuant to s. 6 of the CCAA for sanction and approval of the plan of compromise and arrangement filed by the Applicants on September 24, 1993, as amended. On that date, I made an Order granting the Applicants the protection of a stay of proceedings under the Act, in order to permit them to restructure their operations and develop a plan of compromise or arrangement for presentation to their Creditors.

2 The Plan has now been negotiated and put to meetings of the classes of creditors established under the Sept. 24th Order. With certain amendments it has been voted on and approved by creditors of sufficient numbers and in sufficient value amounts in each class to meet the requirements of s. 6 of the Act. One creditor, a landlord — 803774 Ontario Limited — opposes the sanctioning and approval of the Plan.

3 In considering whether to sanction a Plan of this sort, the Court must have regard to the following criteria, namely:

1) whether there has been complete compliance with all statutory requirements;

2) whether any material filings or procedures have been done or are purported to have been done otherwise than as authorized by the CCAA; and,

3) whether the proposed Plan is fair and reasonable.

See: *Re Dairy Corp. of Canada*, [1934] O.R. 436 (S.C.); *Re Quintette Coal Ltd.* (1992), 13 C.B.R. (3d) 146 (B.C. S.C.).

4 I am satisfied that this Plan meets the foregoing criteria. The position put forward on behalf of the opposing creditor needs to be addressed, however.

5 As I apprehend the Landlord's position, it is essentially twofold, namely

a) that the landlord ought to have been placed in a separate class of creditors, and ought not to have been grouped with the unsecured creditors, generally; and,

b) that the Plan purports to terminate the tenancy, and there is no power in the Court under the CCAA to sanction a Plan which purports to do so.

6 Counsel for the opposing creditor advanced an additional argument under the "fairness" criterion to the effect that the "new common shares" to be issued under the Plan were not evenly allocated amongst the unsecured creditors, and that Royal Bank of Canada ("RBC") — the major creditor, and also a secured creditor for part of its claim — was being favoured. I am not persuaded that there is a sufficient tilt in the allocation of these new common shares in favour of RBC to justify the Court in interfering with the business decision made by the creditor classes in approving the proposed Plan, as they have done. RBC's

co-operation is a *sine qua non* for the Plan, or any Plan, to work, and it is the only creditor continuing to advance funds to the Applicants to finance the proposed re-organization. It does not seem unfair or unreasonable to me that it should receive some additional incentive to support the Plan.

Classification

7 In the circumstances of this case, it is not, in my view, inappropriate to have classified the landlord in the same class of creditors as the unsecured creditors. The landlord's claim has two bases: it is a judgment creditor for approximately $1 million as a result of a default judgment obtained against Armbro Inc. for arrears of rent; and it has a contingent claim for unliquidated damages arising out of the termination of the lease. A landlord has a right of distraint under a lease, but I am told that this right is academic for present purposes. Thus, it seems to me that 803774 Ontario Limited is not in a materially different position than other unsecured creditors who have either a claim for liquidated damages or an unliquidated claim for damages which is contingent or which has crystallized.

8 There is, in my view, a sufficient community of interest and rights between the Landlord here objecting and the other unsecured creditors to warrant their inclusion in the same class of creditors and to avoid an unnecessary fragmentation of creditors into an unwieldy patchwork or into a patchwork which may — as it would here — give one creditor an undue advantage and influence over the negotiations. The Landlord's claim is sizeable — between $3.5 million and $4.5 million, depending on whose version prevails — but it is nonetheless relatively insignificant in an overall blanket of approximately $130 million in indebtedness. See: *Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312 (Ont. Gen. Div.); *Re Northland Properties Ltd.* (sub nom. *Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada*) (1989), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195 (B.C. C.A.); *Re Woodward's Ltd.* (1993), 20 C.B.R. (3d) 74 (B.C. S.C.).

9 There is another factor to be considered at this juncture, as well. The Applicants have been assiduous in their efforts to negotiate in good faith and in advance of their Application with all of their creditors — and the opposing creditor falls within this category. The Landlord had notice of the Application which was returnable on Sept. 24 and of the Order which was sought, including the classification of creditors into three groups: Secured, Unsecured, and RBC. It did not attend and oppose or make submissions at that time regarding its classification with the unsecured creditors. It did not avail itself of the "come back" clause within the Sept. 24th Order, to raise the issue be fore the creditor's meetings. It did not appeal. In my opinion, one of those avenues should have been followed. To await the sanctioning hearing is too late, unless it can be said — which it cannot, in this case — that the classification has given rise to a "substantial injustice": *Re Keddy Motor Inns Ltd.* (1992), 13 C.B.R. (3d) 245 (N.S. C.A.).

Termination of Leases within CCAA Proceedings

10 This brings me to the second major issue raised on behalf of the objecting creditor, namely that the Court does not have the power under the CCAA to sanction or approve a Plan which terminates leases as part of its arrangement.

11 I do not accept this submission.

12 The CCAA is broad, remedial legislation, designed to facilitate a re-organization of a debtor company's affairs in a way that is in the interests of the company, its creditors and the public. It is to be liberally construed. See: *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (C.A.); *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* (1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84 (C.A.).

13 It is true that there is no specific provision in the CCAA which states openly that the Court has the power to sanction the termination of leases. This, I think, is what Houlden J.A. must have been contemplating when he noted, in *Grafton-Fraser Inc. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce* (1992), 90 D.L.R. (4th) 285 (Ont. Gen. Div.) [at p. 287], that "[i]t is difficult to make a plan of compromise for such a company (a chain of retail clothing stores in rented premises) under the C.C.A.A., because there is no way ... to terminate leases and to limit the amount of the claims of landlords." Section 6 of the Act is discretionary, however, and provides that "the compromise or arrangement *may be sanctioned* by the court" — assuming the statutory requirements respecting voting have been met, as they have here. There are a number of examples where the Courts

have granted their approval to arrangements which involve the repudiation, surrender and ultimate termination of leases — including, incidentally, *Re Grafton-Fraser* itself in its ultimate disposition. See also: *Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia, supra; Re Ayer's Ltd.* (unreported, December 9, 1991, Nfld. T.D.); *Re Inducon Development Corp.* (1992), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. Gen. Div.); *Silcorp Ltd. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce* (June 26, 1992), Doc. B152/92 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (unreported). I see nothing in principle which precludes a Court from interfering with the rights of a landlord under a lease, in the CCAA context, any more than from interfering with the rights of a secured creditor under a security document. Both may be sanctioned when the exigencies of the particular re-organization justify such balancing of the prejudices.

14 In this case the sanction and approval of the Court is warranted, for the reasons I have articulated, and an Order will issue to that effect in terms of the draft Order filed on which I have placed my fiat.

15 In addition, an Order will go directing the Registrar of Deeds to discharge and vacate the registration of certain Instruments described in a companion draft Order on which I have placed my fiat, and directing the Sheriff to withdraw certain Writs of Seizure and Sale also described therein. This Order is to issue immediately upon the filing of an Affidavit on behalf of the Applicants deposing that the conditions to implementation referred to in Article 5.3 of the Plan have been satisfied and that the Applicants are proceeding to implement the Plan. The Court office shall issue, enter and return this Order to the Applicants on the day on which the Order is presented for signing and entry.

Motion allowed.

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TAB 6

2000 CarswellAlta 623
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re

2000 CarswellAlta 623, [2000] A.W.L.D. 642, [2000] A.J. No. 1693, 19 C.B.R. (4th) 12

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

In the Matter of the Business Corporations Act (Alberta) S.A. 1981, c. B-15, As Amended, Section 185

In the Matter of Canadian Airlines Corporation and Canadian Airlines International Ltd.

Paperny J.

Judgment: May 12, 2000 *
Docket: Calgary 0001-05071

Proceedings: refused leave to appeal *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*, 2000 ABCA 149, 80 Alta. L.R. (3d) 213 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers])

Counsel: *A.L. Friend, Q.C.*, *H.M. Kay, Q.C.*, and *R.B. Low, Q.C.*, for Canadian Airlines.
V.P. Lalonde and *Ms M. Lalonde*, for AMR Corporation.
S. Dunphy, for Air Canada.
P.T. McCarthy, Q.C., for PricewaterhouseCoopers.
D. Nishimura, for Resurgence Asset Management LLC.
E. Halt, for Claims Officer.
A.J. McConnell, for Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Company of New York and Montreal Trust Co. of Canada.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Paperny J.*:

Fairview Industries Ltd., Re (1991), 11 C.B.R. (3d) 71, *(*sub nom. *Fairview Industries Ltd., Re (No. 3))* 109 N.S.R. (2d) 32, *(*sub nom. *Fairview Industries Ltd., Re (No. 3))* 297 A.P.R. 32 (N.S. T.D.) — considered

Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd. (1988), 64 Alta. L.R. (2d) 139, [1989] 2 W.W.R. 566, 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 20, 72 C.R. (N.S.) 20 (Alta. Q.B.) — considered

Northland Properties Ltd., Re (1988), 31 B.C.L.R. (2d) 35, 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 166 (B.C. S.C.) — considered

Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada, 34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 122, 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195, [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363 (B.C. C.A.) — considered

NsC Diesel Power Inc., Re (1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 97 N.S.R. (2d) 295, 258 A.P.R. 295 (N.S. T.D.) — considered

Savage v. Amoco Acquisition Co. (1988), 59 Alta. L.R. (2d) 260, 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 154, 40 B.L.R. 188, *(*sub nom. *Amoco Acquisition Co. v. Savage)* 87 A.R. 321 (Alta. C.A.) — considered

Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312, 86 D.L.R. (4th) 621 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — considered

Sovereign Life Assurance Co. v. Dodd (1891), [1891-4] All E.R. Rep. 246, [1892] 2 Q.B. 573 (Eng. C.A.) — applied

Wellington Building Corp., Re, 16 C.B.R. 48, [1934] O.R. 653, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 626 (Ont. S.C.) — distinguished

Woodward's Ltd., Re (1993), 20 C.B.R. (3d) 74, 84 B.C.L.R. (2d) 206 (B.C. S.C.) — considered

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3
Generally — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — considered

s. 5.1 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 122] — referred to

s. 5.1(3) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 122] — considered

APPLICATION by unsecured creditors of corporation for order that unsecured claims held by Air Canada should be placed in separate class from other unsecured creditors, and for order striking portion of reorganization plan.

***Paperny J.* (orally):**

1 Resurgence Asset Management LLC "Resurgence" appeared on behalf of holders of approximately 60 percent of the unsecured notes issued by Canadian Airlines Corporation in the total amount of $100 million U.S. These unsecured note holders are proposed to be classified as unsecured creditors in the plan that is the subject of these proceedings.

2 Resurgence applied for the following relief:

1. An order lifting the stay of proceedings against Canadian Airlines Corporation and Canadian Airlines International Ltd. (respectively "CAC" and "CAIL" and collectively called "Canadian") to permit Resurgence to commence and proceed with an oppression action against Canadian, Air Canada and others.

2. Further, and in the alternative, Resurgence sought the same relief described in item one above in the context of the C.C.A.A. proceedings.

3. An order that any and all unsecured claims held or controlled, directly or indirectly by Air Canada shall be placed in a separate class and either not allowed to be voted at all, or, alternatively, allowed to be voted in separate class from all other affected unsecured claims.

4. An order that there be a separation in class between creditors of CAC and CAIL

5. An order striking Section 6.2(2)(ii) of the plan on the basis that it is contrary to the C.C.A.A.

3 Resurgence abandoned the application described in item 1 above, and the application in item 2 was addressed in my ruling given May 8, 2000, in these proceedings.

Standing

4 Prior to dealing with the remaining issues of classification, voting and Section 6.2(2)(ii) of the plan, the issue of standing needs to be addressed. This was a matter of some debate, largely in the context of the first two applications. Canadian argued that Resurgence was only a fund manager and did not hold the unsecured notes, beneficially or otherwise, and, accordingly, did not have standing to make any of the applications. The evidence establishes that Resurgence is not the legal owner and the evidence of beneficial ownership is equivocal.

5 Canadian has not raised this issue on any of the previous occasions on which Resurgence has been before the court in these proceedings. There has been a consent order involving Resurgence and Canadian.

6 In my view, it is not appropriate now for Canadian to suggest that Resurgence does not represent the interests of the holders of 60 percent of the unsecured notes and essentially seek a declaration that Resurgence is a stranger to these proceedings.

7 I am not prepared to dismiss the applications of Resurgence on classification, voting and amending the plan out of hand on the basis of standing.

8 Resurgence was also supported in these applications by the senior secured note holders. For the purposes of these applications, I accept that Resurgence is representing the interests of 60 percent of the unsecured note holders.

Classification of Air Canada's Unsecured Claim

9 By my April 14, 2000 order in these proceedings, I approved transactions involving CAIL, a large number of aircraft lessors and Air Canada, which achieved approximately $200 million worth of concessions for CAIL. In exchange for granting the concession, each creditor received a guarantee from Air Canada and the assurance that the creditor would immediately cease to be affected by the C.C.A.A. proceedings.

10 These concessions or deficiency claims were quantified and reflected in promissory notes which were assigned to Air Canada in exchange for its guarantee of the aircraft leases. The monitor approved the method of quantifying these claims and recognized the value of the concessions to Canadian. In that order I reserved the issue of classification and voting to be determined at some later date. The plan provides for two classes of creditors, secured and unsecured.

11 The unsecured class is composed of a number of types of unsecured claims, including aircraft financings, executory contracts, unsecured notes, litigation claims, real estate leases and the deficiencies, if any, of the senior secured note holders.

12 In one portion of the application, Resurgence seeks to have Air Canada vote the promissory notes in separate class and relied on several factors to distinguish the claims of other Affected, Unsecured Creditors from Air Canada's unsecured claim, including the following:

> 1. The Air Canada appointed board caused Canadian to enter into these C.C.A.A. proceedings under which Air Canada stands to gain substantial benefits in its own operations and in the merged operations and ownership contemplated after the compromise of debts under the plan.
>
> 2. Air Canada is providing the fund of money to be distributed to the Affected Unsecured Creditors and will, therefore, end up paying itself a portion of that money if it is included in the Affected Unsecured Creditors' class and permitted to vote.
>
> 3. Air Canada gave no real consideration in acquiring the deficiency claims and manufactured them only to secure a 'yes' vote.

13 Air Canada and Canadian argue that the legal right associated with Air Canada's unsecured promissory notes and with the other Affected, Unsecured Claims, are the same and that the matters raised by Resurgence, as relating to classification, are really matters of fairness, more appropriately dealt with at the fairness hearing. Air Canada and Canadian emphasized that classification must be determined according to the rights of the creditors, not their personalities.

14 The starting point in determining classification is the statute under which the parties are operating and from which the court obtains its jurisdiction. The primary purpose of the C.C.A.A. is to facilitate the re-organization of insolvent companies, and this goal must be given proper consideration at every stage of the C.C.A.A. process, including classification of claims; see, for example, *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.* (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 20 (Alta. Q.B.)

15 Beyond identifying secured and unsecured classes, the C.C.A.A. does not offer any guidance to the classification of claims. The process, instead, has developed in the case law.

16 A frequently cited description of the method of classification of creditors for the purposes of voting on a plan, under the C.C.A.A., is *Sovereign Life Assurance Co. v Dodd* (1891), [1892] 2 Q.B. 573 (Eng. C.A.).

17 At page 583 (Q.B.), Bowen, L.J. stated:

> The word 'class' is vague and to find out what is meant by it, we must look at the scope of the section which is a section enabling the court to order a meeting of a class of creditors to be called. It seems plain that we must give such a meaning to the term 'class' as will prevent the section being so worked as to result in confiscation and injustice, and that it must be confined to those persons whose rights are not so dissimilar as to make it impossible for them to consult together with the view to their common interest.

This test has been described as the "commonality of interest" test. All counsel agree that this is the test to apply in classification of claims under the C.C.A.A. However, there is a dispute on the types of interests that are to be considered in determining commonality.

18 Generally, the cases hold that classification is a fact-driven determination unique to the circumstances of every case, upon which the court should be loathe to impose rules for universal application, particularly in light of the flexible and remedial jurisdiction involved; see, for example, *Re Fairview Industries Ltd.* (1991), 11 C.B.R. (3d) 71 (N.S. T.D.)

19 The majority of the cases presented to me, held that commonality of the interest is to be determined by the rights the creditor has vis-a-vis the debtor. Courts have also found it helpful to consider the context of the proposed plan and treatment of creditors under a liquidation scenario. In the absence of bad faith, motivation for supporting or rejecting a plan is not a classification issue in the authorities.

20 In considering what interests are included in the commonality of interest test, Forsyth J., in *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd.* (Supra) had to determine whether all the secured creditors of the company ought to be included in one class. The creditors all had first-charge security and the same method of valuation was applied to each secured claim in order to determine security value under the plan. The distinguishing features were submitted to be based on the difference in the security held, including ease of marketability and realization potential. In holding that a separate class was not necessary, Forsyth J., said at page 29:

> Different security positioning and changing security values are a fact of life in the world of secured financing. To accept this argument would again result in a different class of creditor for each secured lender.

In doing so, Forsyth J. rejected the "identity of the interest" approach in which creditors in a class must have identical interests.

21 It was also submitted in *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd.* that since the purchaser under the plan had made financing arrangements with the Royal Bank, the bank had an interest not shared by the other secured creditors. Forsyth J., held that in the absence of any allegation that the Royal Bank was not acting bona fide in considering the benefit of the plan, the secured creditors could not be heard to criticize the presence of the Royal Bank in their class.

22 Forsyth J., also emphasized in *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd.* that the commonality test cannot be considered without also considering the underlying purpose of the C.C.A.A., which is to facilitate reorganizations of insolvent companies. To that end, the court should not approve a classification scheme which would make a reorganization difficult, if not impossible, to

achieve. At the same time, while the C.C.A.A. grants the court the authority to alter the legal rights of parties other than the debtor company without their consent, the court will not permit a confiscation of rights or an injustice to occur.

23 The *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd.* approach was specifically adopted in British Columbia in *Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada* (1989), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195 (B.C. C.A.), where it was held that various mortgagees with different mortgages against different properties were included in the same class.

24 In *Savage v. Amoco Acquisition Co.* (1988), 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 154 (Alta. C.A.) the Alberta Court of Appeal rejected the argument that shareholders who have private arrangements with the applicant or who are brokers or officers or otherwise in a special position vis-a-vis the debtor company, should be put in a special category.

25 At page 158 the court stated in regard to the test applied to classification:

> We do not think that this rule justifies the division of shareholders into separate classes on the basis of their presumed prior commitment to a point of view. The state of facts, common to all, is that they are all offered this proposal, face as an alternative the break-up of this apparently insolvent company and hold shares that appear to be worthless on break-up. In any event, any attempt to divide them on the basis suggested, would be futile. One would have as many groups as there are shareholders.

The commonality of interest test was addressed by the British Columbia Supreme Court in *Re Woodward's Ltd.* (1993), 84 B.C.L.R. (2d) 206 (B.C. S.C.). Tysoe J. rejected the identity of interest approach and held that it was permissible to include creditors with different legal rights in the same class, so long as their legal rights were not so dissimilar that it was still possible for them to vote with a common interest.

26 Tysoe J. went on to find that legal interests should be considered in the context of the proposed plan and that it was also necessary to examine the legal rights of creditors in the context of the possible failure of the plan.

27 In other words, "interest" for the purpose of classification does not include the personality or identity of the creditor, and the interests it may have in the broader commercial sphere that might influence its decision or predispose it to vote in a particular way; rather, "interest" involves the entitlement of the debt holder viewed within the context of the provisions of the proposed plan. In that regard, see *Woodward's Ltd.* at page 212.

28 In *Fairview Industries Ltd.* , the court held that in classification there need not be a commonality of interest of debts involved, so long as the legal interests were the same. Justice Glube (as she then was) stated that it did not automatically follow that those with different commercial interests, for example, those with security on "quick" assets, are necessarily in conflict with those with security on "fixed" assets. She stated that just saying there is a conflict is insufficient to warrant separation.

29 In *Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1991), 86 D.L.R. (4th) 621 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at 626 like *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd.*, the "identity of interests" approach was rejected. The court preserved a class of creditors which included debenture holders, terminated employees, realty lessors and equipment lessors.

30 Borins J. held that not every difference in the nature of the debt warrants a separate class and that in placing a broad and purposive interpretation on the C.C.A.A., the court should "take care to resist approaches which would potentially jeopardize a potentially viable plan." He observed that "excessive fragmentation is counterproductive to the legislative intent to facilitate corporate reorganization" and that it would be "improper to create a special class simply for the benefit of an opposing creditor which would give that creditor the potential to exercise an unwarranted degree of power." (p. 627).

31 In summary, the cases establish the following principles applicable to assessing commonality of interest:

> 1. Commonality of interest should be viewed on the basis of the non-fragmentation test, not on an identity of interest test;
>
> 2. The interests to be considered are the legal interests the creditor holds qua creditor in relationship to the debtor company, prior to and under the plan as well as on liquidation;

3. The commonality of these interests are to be viewed purposively, bearing in mind the object of the C.C.A.A., namely to facilitate reorganizations if at all possible;

4. In placing a broad and purposive interpretation on the C.C.A.A., the court should be careful to resist classification approaches which would potentially jeopardize potentially viable plans.

5. Absent bad faith, the motivations of the creditors to approve or disapprove are irrelevant.

6. The requirement of creditors being able to consult together means being able to assess their legal entitlement *as creditors* before or after the plan in a similar manner.

32 With this background, I will make several observations relating to the reasons asserted by Resurgence that distinguish Air Canada from the rest of the Affected Unsecured Creditors.

33 The first two reasons given relate to interests of Air Canada extraneous to its legal rights as a unsecured creditor. The third reason relates largely to the further assertion that Air Canada should not be allowed to vote at all. The matter of voting is addressed more specifically later in these reasons.

34 The factors described by Resurgence distinguish between Air Canada and other unsecured creditors relate largely to the fact that Air Canada is the assignee of the unsecured debt. In my view, that approach is to be discouraged at the classification stage. To require the court to consider who holds the claim, as distinct from what they hold, at that point would be untenable. I note that Mr. Edwards recognizes in 1947 in his article, "*Reorganizations under the Companies Creditors Arrangement Act*", (1947), 25 Cdn. Bar Rev. 587, and observe this concern is heightened in the current commercial reality of debt trading.

35 Resurgence also asserted that a court should avoid placing creditors with a potential conflict of interest in the same class and relies on *Re NsC Diesel Power Inc.* (1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1 (N.S. T.D.), a case in which the court considered a potential conflict of interest between subcontractors and direct contractors. To the extent this case can be seen as decided on the basis of the distinct legal rights of the creditors, I agree with the result. To the extent that the case determined that a class could be separated based on a conflict of interest not based on legal right, I disagree. In my view, this would be the sort of issue the court should consider at the fairness hearing.

36 Resurgence also relied on the decisions of the British Columbia Supreme Court in *Re Northland Properties Ltd.* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 166 (B.C. S.C.), a case decided prior to *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd.*. In that case the court held that a subsidiary wholly owned by Northland Bank was incorporated to purchase certain bonds from Northland in exchange for preferred shares and was not entitled to vote. The court found that would be tantamount to Northland Bank voting in its own reorganization and relied on *Re Wellington Building Corp.*, [1934] O.R. 653, 16 C.B.R. 48 (Ont. S.C.) In this regard. I would note that the passage relied upon at page 5 in that case, in *Wellington Building Corp* (Supra) dealt with whether the scheme, as proposed, was unfair.

37 All creditors proposed to be included in the class of Affected, Unsecured Creditors, are all unsecured and are treated the same under the plan. All would be treat similarly under the BIA. The plan provides that they will receive 12 cents on the dollar. The Monitor opined that in liquidation unsecured creditors would realize a maximum of 3 cents on the dollar. Their legal interests are essentially the same. Issue is taken with the presence of Air Canada, supporter and funder of the plan, also having taken an assignment of a substantial, unsecured claim. However, absent bad faith, who creditors are is not relevant. Air Canada's mere presence in the class does not in and of itself constitute bad faith.

38 Further, all of these methods of distinguishing Air Canada's unsecured claim at their core are fundamentally issues of fairness which will be addressed by the Court at the fairness hearing on June 5, 2000. I am prepared to give serious consideration to these matters at that time and direct that there be a separate tabulation of the votes cast by Air Canada arising from any assignments of promissory notes they have taken, so that there is an evidentiary record to assist me in assessing the fairness of the vote when and if I am called upon to sanction the plan. This approach was taken by Justice Forsyth in *Norcen Energy*

Resources Ltd., and in my view is consistent with the underlying purpose of the C.C.A.A. I wish to emphasize that the concerns raised by Resurgence will form part of the assessment of the overall fairness of the plan.

39 Permitting the classification to remain intact for voting purposes will not result in a confiscation of rights of or injustice to the unsecured note holders. Their treatment does not at this point depart from any other Affected Unsecured Creditors and recognizes the similarity of legal rights. Although based on different legal instruments, the legal rights of the unsecured note holders and Air Canada are essentially the same. Neither has security, nor specific entitlement to assets. Further, the ability of all of the Affected Unsecured Creditors to realize their claims against the debtor companies, depend in significant part, on the company's ability to continue as a going concern.

40 The separate tabulation of votes will allow the "voice" of unsecured creditors to be heard, while at the same time, permit rather than rule out the possibility that a plan might proceed.

41 It is important to preserve this possibility in the interests of facilitating the aim of the C.C.A.A. and protecting interests of all constituents. To fracture the class prior to the vote, may have the effect of denying the court jurisdiction to consider sanctioning a plan which may pass the fairness test but which has been rejected by one creditor. This would be contrary to the purpose of the C.C.A.A.

Separating the Claims Against CAC and CAIL

42 Resurgence briefly argued that since Air Canada's debt is owed by CAIL only, it could only look to CAIL's assets in a bankruptcy and would not be able to look to any CAC assets. In contrast, Resurgence suggested that the unsecured note holders are creditors of both CAIL under a guarantee, and CAC under the notes. Resurgence submitted that the resulting difference in legal rights destroys the commonality of interests.

43 There is insufficient evidence to suggest that the unsecured note holders are also creditors of CAIL. Counsel referred only to a statement made by Mr. Carty on cross-examination that there was an "unsecured guarantee". However, no documents have been brought to my attention that would support this statement and, in of itself, the statement is not determinative. In any case, I do not have sufficient evidence before me to conclude that there would be a meaningful difference in recoveries for unsecured creditors of CAC and CAIL in the event of bankruptcy. I, therefore, cannot conclude on this basis that rights are being confiscated, unlike Tysoe J.'s ability to do so in *Re Woodward's Ltd.* Simply looking to different assets or pools of assets will not alone fracture a class; some unique additional legal right of value in liquidation going unrecognized in a plan and not balanced by others losing rights as well is needed on the analysis of Tysoe J.

44 I recognize the struggle between the unsecured note holders, represented by Resurgence on one side, and Air Canada and Canadian on the other. Resurgence fears the inclusion of Air Canada and the Affected Unsecured Creditors' class will swamp the vote. Air Canada and Canadian fear that exclusion of Air Canada will result in the voting down of a plan which, in their view, otherwise stands a realistic chance of approval. As unsecured creditors, they do share similar legal rights. As supporters or opponents of the plan, they may well have distinctly different financial or strategic interests. I believe that in the circumstances of this case, these other interests and their impact on the plan, are best addressed as matters of fairness at the June 5, 2000 hearing, and in this way, the concerns will be heard by the court without necessarily putting an end to the entire process.

Voting

45 Although my decision on classification makes it clear that I will permit Air Canada to vote on the plan, I wish to comment further on this issue. Air Canada submitted that it should be entitled to vote the face value of the promissory notes which represent deficiency claims assigned to it from aircraft lessors in the same fashion as any other creditor who has acquired the claims by assignment. All parties accept that deficiency claims such as these would normally be included and voted upon in an unsecured claims class. The request by Resurgence to deny them a vote would have the effect of varying rights associated with those notes.

46 The concessions achieved in the re-negotiation of the aircraft leases, represent value to CAIL. The methodology of calculation of the claims and their valuation was reviewed by the Monitor and this is not being challenged. Rather, it is because it is Air Canada that now holds them, that it is objectionable to Resurgence. Resurgence asserts that Air Canada manufactured the assignment so it could preserve a 'yes' vote. This, in my view, is a matter going to fairness. Is it fair for Air Canada to vote to share in the pool of cash funded by it for the benefit of unsecured creditors? That matter is best resolved at the fairness hearing.

47 Resurgence relied on *Northland Properties Ltd.* in which a wholly owned subsidiary of the debtor company was not allowed to vote because to do so would amount to the debtor company voting in its own reorganization. The corporate relationship between Air Canada and CAIL can be distinguished from the parent and wholly owned subsidiary in *Northland Properties Ltd.*. Air Canada is not CAIL's parent and owns 10 percent of a numbered company which owns 82 percent of CAIL. Further, as noted above, the court in *Northland Properties Ltd.* apparently relied on the passage from *Wellington Building Corp* which indicated in that case the court was being asked to approve a plan as fair. Again, the basis on which Resurgence seeks to deprive Air Canada of its vote is really an issue of fairness.

Section 6(2)(2) of the Plan

48 Resurgence wishes me to strike out Section 6(2)(2) of the plan, which essentially purports to provide a release by affected creditors of all claims based in whole or in part on any act, omission transaction, event or occurrence that took place prior to the effective date in any way relating to the debtor companies and subsidiaries, the C.C.A.A. proceeding or the plan against:

1. The debtor companies and its subsidiaries;

2. The directors, officers and employees;

3. The former directors, officers and employees of the debtor companies and its subsidiaries; or

4. The respective current and former professionals of the entities, including the Monitor, its counsel and its current officers and directors, et cetera. Resurgence submits that this provision constitutes a wholesale release of directors and others which is beyond that permitted by Section 5.1 of the C.C.A.A. CAIL and CAC submit that the proposed release was not intended to preclude rights expressly preserved by the statute and are prepared to amend the plan to state this.

49 Section 5.1(3) of the C.C.A.A. provides that the court may declare that a claim against directors shall not be compromised if it is satisfied that the compromise would not be fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

50 In this application of Resurgence, the court must deal with two issues: One, what releases are permitted under the statute; and, two, what releases ought to be permitted, if any, under the plan.

51 In my view, I will be in a better position to assess the fairness of the proposed compromise of claims which is drafted in extremely broad terms, when I consider the other issues of fairness raised by Resurgence. Accordingly, I leave that matter to the fairness hearing as well.

52 In summary, the application contained in paragraph (d) of the Resurgence Notice of Motion is dismissed. The application in paragraph (e) is adjourned to June 5, 2000.

Application dismissed.

Footnotes

* Leave to appeal refused 2000 ABCA 149, 80 Alta L.R. (3d) 213, 19 C.B.R. (4th) 33 (Alta C.A. [In Chambers]).

End of Document

TAB 7

2010 ONSC 4209
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re

2010 CarswellOnt 5510, 2010 ONSC 4209, 191 A.C.W.S. (3d) 378, 70 C.B.R. (5th) 1

IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 11 OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT
OF CANWEST GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS AND THE OTHER APPLICANTS

Pepall J.

Judgment: July 28, 2010
Docket: CV-09-8396-00CL

Counsel: Lyndon Barnes, Jeremy Dacks, Shawn Irving for CMI Entities
David Byers, Marie Konyukhova for Monitor
Robin B. Schwill, Vince Mercier for Shaw Communications Inc.
Derek Bell for Canwest Shareholders Group (the "Existing Shareholders")
Mario Forte for Special Committee of the Board of Directors
Robert Chadwick, Logan Willis for Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders
Amanda Darrach for Canwest Retirees
Peter Osborne for Management Directors
Steven Weisz for CIBC Asset-Based Lending Inc.

Subject: Insolvency; Corporate and Commercial

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Pepall J.*:

Air Canada, Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 469, 47 C.B.R. (4th) 169 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

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ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 ONCA 587, 2008 CarswellOnt 4811, *(*sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re)* 240 O.A.C. 245, *(*sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re)* 296 D.L.R. (4th) 135, *(*sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re)* 92 O.R. (3d) 513, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 123 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

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Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re (2007), 2007 CarswellAlta 1050, 2007 ABQB 504, 35 C.B.R. (5th) 1, 415 A.R. 196, 33 B.L.R. (4th) 68 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

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Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2000), 2000 CarswellAlta 919, [2000] 10 W.W.R. 314, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 46, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 52, 9 B.L.R. (3d) 86, 2000 ABCA 238, 266 A.R. 131, 228 W.A.C. 131 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]) — referred to

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2000), 88 Alta. L.R. (3d) 8, 2001 ABCA 9, 2000 CarswellAlta 1556, [2001] 4 W.W.R. 1, 277 A.R. 179, 242 W.A.C. 179 (Alta. C.A.) — referred to

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Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co. (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 1, *(*sub nom. *Olympia & York Developments Ltd., Re)* 12 O.R. (3d) 500, 1993 CarswellOnt 182 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

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Statutes considered:

Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44
s. 173 — considered

s. 173(1)(e) — considered

s. 173(1)(h) — considered

s. 191 — considered

s. 191(1) "reorganization" (c) — considered

s. 191(2) — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

s. 2(1) "debtor company" — referred to

s. 6 — considered

s. 6(1) — considered

s. 6(2) — considered

s. 6(3) — considered

s. 6(5) — considered

s. 6(6) — considered

s. 6(8) — referred to

s. 36 — considered

APPLICATION by debtors for order sanctioning plan of compromise, arrangement, and reorganization and for related relief.

***Pepall J.*:**

1 This is the culmination of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* [1] restructuring of the CMI Entities. The proceeding started in court on October 6, 2009, experienced numerous peaks and valleys, and now has resulted in a request for an order sanctioning a plan of compromise, arrangement and reorganization (the "Plan"). It has been a short road in relative terms but not without its challenges and idiosyncrasies. To complicate matters, this restructuring was hot on the heels of the amendments to the CCAA that were introduced on September 18, 2009. Nonetheless, the CMI Entities have now successfully concluded a Plan for which they seek a sanction order. They also request an order approving the Plan Emergence Agreement, and other related relief. Lastly, they seek a post-filing claims procedure order.

2 The details of this restructuring have been outlined in numerous previous decisions rendered by me and I do not propose to repeat all of them.

The Plan and its Implementation

3 The basis for the Plan is the amended Shaw transaction. It will see a wholly owned subsidiary of Shaw Communications Inc. ("Shaw") acquire all of the interests in the free-to-air television stations and subscription-based specialty television channels currently owned by Canwest Television Limited Partnership ("CTLP") and its subsidiaries and all of the interests in the specialty television stations currently owned by CW Investments and its subsidiaries, as well as certain other assets of the CMI Entities. Shaw will pay to CMI US $440 million in cash to be used by CMI to satisfy the claims of the 8% Senior Subordinated Noteholders (the "Noteholders") against the CMI Entities. In the event that the implementation of the Plan occurs after September 30, 2010, an additional cash amount of US $2.9 million per month will be paid to CMI by Shaw and allocated by CMI to the Noteholders. An additional $38 million will be paid by Shaw to the Monitor at the direction of CMI to be used to satisfy the claims of the Affected Creditors (as that term is defined in the Plan) other than the Noteholders, subject to a pro rata increase in that cash amount for certain restructuring period claims in certain circumstances.

4 In accordance with the Meeting Order, the Plan separates Affected Creditors into two classes for voting purposes:

(a) the Noteholders; and

(b) the Ordinary Creditors. Convenience Class Creditors are deemed to be in, and to vote as, members of the Ordinary Creditors' Class.

5 The Plan divides the Ordinary Creditors' pool into two sub-pools, namely the Ordinary CTLP Creditors' Sub-pool and the Ordinary CMI Creditors' Sub-pool. The former comprises two-thirds of the value and is for claims against the CTLP Plan Entities and the latter reflects one-third of the value and is used to satisfy claims against Plan Entities other than the CTLP Plan Entities. In its 16th Report, the Monitor performed an analysis of the relative value of the assets of the CMI Plan Entities and the CTLP Plan Entities and the possible recoveries on a going concern liquidation and based on that analysis, concluded that it was fair and reasonable that Affected Creditors of the CTLP Plan Entities share pro rata in two-thirds of the Ordinary Creditors' pool and Affected Creditors of the Plan Entities other than the CTLP Plan Entities share pro rata in one-third of the Ordinary Creditors' pool.

6 It is contemplated that the Plan will be implemented by no later than September 30, 2010.

7 The Existing Shareholders will not be entitled to any distributions under the Plan or other compensation from the CMI Entities on account of their equity interests in Canwest Global. All equity compensation plans of Canwest Global will be extinguished and any outstanding options, restricted share units and other equity-based awards outstanding thereunder will be terminated and cancelled and the participants therein shall not be entitled to any distributions under the Plan.

8 On a distribution date to be determined by the Monitor following the Plan implementation date, all Affected Creditors with proven distribution claims against the Plan Entities will receive distributions from cash received by CMI (or the Monitor at CMI's direction) from Shaw, the Plan Sponsor, in accordance with the Plan. The directors and officers of the remaining CMI Entities and other subsidiaries of Canwest Global will resign on or about the Plan implementation date.

9 Following the implementation of the Plan, CTLP and CW Investments will be indirect, wholly-owned subsidiaries of Shaw, and the multiple voting shares, subordinate voting shares and non-voting shares of Canwest Global will be delisted from the TSX Venture Exchange. It is anticipated that the remaining CMI Entities and certain other subsidiaries of Canwest Global will be liquidated, wound-up, dissolved, placed into bankruptcy or otherwise abandoned.

10 In furtherance of the Minutes of Settlement that were entered into with the Existing Shareholders, the articles of Canwest Global will be amended under section 191 of the CBCA to facilitate the settlement. In particular, Canwest Global will reorganize the authorized capital of Canwest Global into (a) an unlimited number of new multiple voting shares, new subordinated voting shares and new non-voting shares; and (b) an unlimited number of new non-voting preferred shares. The terms of the new non-voting preferred shares will provide for the mandatory transfer of the new preferred shares held by the Existing Shareholders to a designated entity affiliated with Shaw for an aggregate amount of $11 million to be paid upon delivery by Canwest Global of the transfer notice to the transfer agent. Following delivery of the transfer notice, the Shaw designated entity will donate and surrender the new preferred shares acquired by it to Canwest Global for cancellation.

11 Canwest Global, CMI, CTLP, New Canwest, Shaw, 7316712 and the Monitor entered into the Plan Emergence Agreement dated June 25, 2010 detailing certain steps that will be taken before, upon and after the implementation of the plan. These steps primarily relate to the funding of various costs that are payable by the CMI Entities on emergence from the CCAA proceeding. This includes payments that will be made or may be made by the Monitor to satisfy post-filing amounts owing by the CMI Entities. The schedule of costs has not yet been finalized.

Creditor Meetings

12 Creditor meetings were held on July 19, 2010 in Toronto, Ontario. Support for the Plan was overwhelming. 100% in number representing 100% in value of the beneficial owners of the 8% senior subordinated notes who provided instructions for voting at the Noteholder meeting approved the resolution. Beneficial Noteholders holding approximately 95% of the principal amount of the outstanding notes validly voted at the Noteholder meeting.

13 The Ordinary Creditors with proven voting claims who submitted voting instructions in person or by proxy represented approximately 83% of their number and 92% of the value of such claims. In excess of 99% in number representing in excess of 99% in value of the Ordinary Creditors holding proven voting claims that were present in person or by proxy at the meeting voted or were deemed to vote in favour of the resolution.

Sanction Test

14 Section 6(1) of the CCAA provides that the court has discretion to sanction a plan of compromise or arrangement if it has achieved the requisite double majority vote. The criteria that a debtor company must satisfy in seeking the court's approval are:

(a) there must be strict compliance with all statutory requirements;

(b) all material filed and procedures carried out must be examined to determine if anything has been done or purported to be done which is not authorized by the CCAA; and

(c) the Plan must be fair and reasonable.

See *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* [2]

(a) Statutory Requirements

15 I am satisfied that all statutory requirements have been met. I already determined that the Applicants qualified as debtor companies under section 2 of the CCAA and that they had total claims against them exceeding $5 million. The notice of meeting was sent in accordance with the Meeting Order. Similarly, the classification of Affected Creditors for voting purposes was addressed in the Meeting Order which was unopposed and not appealed. The meetings were both properly constituted and voting in each was properly carried out. Clearly the Plan was approved by the requisite majorities.

16 Section 6(3), 6(5) and 6(6) of the CCAA provide that the court may not sanction a plan unless the plan contains certain specified provisions concerning crown claims, employee claims and pension claims. Section 4.6 of Plan provides that the claims listed in paragraph (l) of the definition of "Unaffected Claims" shall be paid in full from a fund known as the Plan Implementation Fund within six months of the sanction order. The Fund consists of cash, certain other assets and further contributions from Shaw. Paragraph (l) of the definition of "Unaffected Claims" includes any Claims in respect of any payments referred to in section 6(3), 6(5) and 6(6) of the CCAA. I am satisfied that these provisions of section 6 of the CCAA have been satisfied.

(b) Unauthorized Steps

17 In considering whether any unauthorized steps have been taken by a debtor company, it has been held that in making such a determination, the court should rely on the parties and their stakeholders and the reports of the Monitor: *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* [3].

18 The CMI Entities have regularly filed affidavits addressing key developments in this restructuring. In addition, the Monitor has provided regular reports (17 at last count) and has opined that the CMI Entities have acted and continue to act in good faith and with due diligence and have not breached any requirements under the CCAA or any order of this court. If it was not obvious from the hearing on June 23, 2010, it should be stressed that there is no payment of any equity claim pursuant to section 6(8) of the CCAA. As noted by the Monitor in its 16th Report, settlement with the Existing Shareholders did not and does not in any way impact the anticipated recovery to the Affected Creditors of the CMI Entities. Indeed I referenced the inapplicability of section 6(8) of the CCAA in my Reasons of June 23, 2010. The second criterion relating to unauthorized steps has been met.

(c) Fair and Reasonable

19 The third criterion to consider is the requirement to demonstrate that a plan is fair and reasonable. As Paperny J. (as she then was) stated in *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*:

> The court's role on a sanction hearing is to consider whether the plan fairly balances the interests of all stakeholders. Faced with an insolvent organization, its role is to look forward and ask: does this plan represent a fair and reasonable compromise that will permit a viable commercial entity to emerge? It is also an exercise in assessing current reality by comparing available commercial alternatives to what is offered in the proposed plan. [4]

20 My discretion should be informed by the objectives of the CCAA, namely to facilitate the reorganization of a debtor company for the benefit of the company, its creditors, shareholders, employees and in many instances, a much broader constituency of affected persons.

21 In assessing whether a proposed plan is fair and reasonable, considerations include the following:

(a) whether the claims were properly classified and whether the requisite majority of creditors approved the plan;

(b) what creditors would have received on bankruptcy or liquidation as compared to the plan;

(c) alternatives available to the plan and bankruptcy;

(d) oppression of the rights of creditors;

(e) unfairness to shareholders; and

(f) the public interest.

22 I have already addressed the issue of classification and the vote. Obviously there is an unequal distribution amongst the creditors of the CMI Entities. Distribution to the Noteholders is expected to result in recovery of principal, pre-filing interest and a portion of post-filing accrued and default interest. The range of recoveries for Ordinary Creditors is much less. The recovery of the Noteholders is substantially more attractive than that of Ordinary Creditors. This is not unheard of. In *Armbro Enterprises Inc., Re* [5] Blair J. (as he then was) approved a plan which included an uneven allocation in favour of a single major creditor, the Royal Bank, over the objection of other creditors. Blair J. wrote:

> "I am not persuaded that there is a sufficient tilt in the allocation of these new common shares in favour of RBC to justify the court in interfering with the business decision made by the creditor class in approving the proposed Plan, as they have done. RBC's cooperation is a sine qua non for the Plan, or any Plan, to work and it is the only creditor continuing to advance funds to the applicants to finance the proposed re-organization." [6]

23 Similarly, in *Uniforêt inc., Re* [7] a plan provided for payment in full to an unsecured creditor. This treatment was much more generous than that received by other creditors. There, the Québec Superior Court sanctioned the plan and noted that a plan can be more generous to some creditors and still fair to all creditors. The creditor in question had stepped into the breach on several occasions to keep the company afloat in the four years preceding the filing of the plan and the court was of the view that the conduct merited special treatment. See also Romaine J.'s orders dated October 26, 2009 in *SemCanada Crude Company et al.*

24 I am prepared to accept that the recovery for the Noteholders is fair and reasonable in the circumstances. The size of the Noteholder debt was substantial. CMI's obligations under the notes were guaranteed by several of the CMI Entities. No issue has been taken with the guarantees. As stated before and as observed by the Monitor, the Noteholders held a blocking position in any restructuring. Furthermore, the liquidity and continued support provided by the Ad Hoc Committee both prior to and during these proceedings gave the CMI Entities the opportunity to pursue a going concern restructuring of their businesses. A description of the role of the Noteholders is found in Mr. Strike's affidavit sworn July 20, 2010, filed on this motion.

25 Turning to alternatives, the CMI Entities have been exploring strategic alternatives since February, 2009. Between November, 2009 and February, 2010, RBC Capital Markets conducted the equity investment solicitation process of which I have already commented. While there is always a theoretical possibility that a more advantageous plan could be developed than the Plan proposed, the Monitor has concluded that there is no reason to believe that restarting the equity investment solicitation process or marketing 100% of the CMI Entities assets would result in a better or equally desirable outcome. Furthermore, restarting the process could lead to operational difficulties including issues relating to the CMI Entities' large studio suppliers and advertisers. The Monitor has also confirmed that it is unlikely that the recovery for a going concern liquidation sale of the assets of the CMI Entities would result in greater recovery to the creditors of the CMI Entities. I am not satisfied that there is any other alternative transaction that would provide greater recovery than the recoveries contemplated in the Plan. Additionally, I am not persuaded that there is any oppression of creditor rights or unfairness to shareholders.

26 The last consideration I wish to address is the public interest. If the Plan is implemented, the CMI Entities will have achieved a going concern outcome for the business of the CTLP Plan Entities that fully and finally deals with the Goldman Sachs Parties, the Shareholders Agreement and the defaulted 8% senior subordinated notes. It will ensure the continuation of

employment for substantially all of the employees of the Plan Entities and will provide stability for the CMI Entities, pensioners, suppliers, customers and other stakeholders. In addition, the Plan will maintain for the general public broad access to and choice of news, public and other information and entertainment programming. Broadcasting of news, public and entertainment programming is an important public service, and the bankruptcy and liquidation of the CMI Entities would have a negative impact on the Canadian public.

27 I should also mention section 36 of the CCAA which was added by the recent amendments to the Act which came into force on September 18, 2009. This section provides that a debtor company may not sell or otherwise dispose of assets outside the ordinary course of business unless authorized to do so by a court. The section goes on to address factors a court is to consider. In my view, section 36 does not apply to transfers contemplated by a Plan. These transfers are merely steps that are required to implement the Plan and to facilitate the restructuring of the Plan Entities' businesses. Furthermore, as the CMI Entities are seeking approval of the Plan itself, there is no risk of any abuse. There is a further safeguard in that the Plan including the asset transfers contemplated therein has been voted on and approved by Affected Creditors.

28 The Plan does include broad releases including some third party releases. In *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.* [8], the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the CCAA court has jurisdiction to approve a plan of compromise or arrangement that includes third party releases. The *Metcalfe* case was extraordinary and exceptional in nature. It responded to dire circumstances and had a plan that included releases that were fundamental to the restructuring. The Court held that the releases in question had to be justified as part of the compromise or arrangement between the debtor and its creditors. There must be a reasonable connection between the third party claim being compromised in the plan and the restructuring achieved by the plan to warrant inclusion of the third party release in the plan.

29 In the *Metcalfe* decision, Blair J.A. discussed in detail the issue of releases of third parties. I do not propose to revisit this issue, save and except to stress that in my view, third party releases should be the exception and should not be requested or granted as a matter of course.

30 In this case, the releases are broad and extend to include the Noteholders, the Ad Hoc Committee and others. Fraud, wilful misconduct and gross negligence are excluded. I have already addressed, on numerous occasions, the role of the Noteholders and the Ad Hoc Committee. I am satisfied that the CMI Entities would not have been able to restructure without materially addressing the notes and developing a plan satisfactory to the Ad Hoc Committee and the Noteholders. The release of claims is rationally connected to the overall purpose of the Plan and full disclosure of the releases was made in the Plan, the information circular, the motion material served in connection with the Meeting Order and on this motion. No one has appeared to oppose the sanction of the Plan that contains these releases and they are considered by the Monitor to be fair and reasonable. Under the circumstances, I am prepared to sanction the Plan containing these releases.

31 Lastly, the Monitor is of the view that the Plan is advantageous to Affected Creditors, is fair and reasonable and recommends its sanction. The board, the senior management of the CMI Entities, the Ad Hoc Committee, and the CMI CRA all support sanction of the Plan as do all those appearing today.

32 In my view, the Plan is fair and reasonable and I am granting the sanction order requested. [9]

33 The Applicants also seek approval of the Plan Emergence Agreement. The Plan Emergence Agreement outlines steps that will be taken prior to, upon, or following implementation of the Plan and is a necessary corollary of the Plan. It does not confiscate the rights of any creditors and is necessarily incidental to the Plan. I have the jurisdiction to approve such an agreement: *Air Canada, Re* [10] and *Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re* [11] I am satisfied that the agreement is fair and reasonable and should be approved.

34 It is proposed that on the Plan implementation date the articles of Canwest Global will be amended to facilitate the settlement reached with the Existing Shareholders. Section 191 of the CBCA permits the court to order necessary amendments to the articles of a corporation without shareholder approval or a dissent right. In particular, section 191(1)(c) provides that reorganization means a court order made under any other Act of Parliament that affects the rights among the corporation, its

shareholders and creditors. The CCAA is such an Act: *Beatrice Foods Inc., Re* [12] and *Laidlaw, Re* [13]. Pursuant to section 191(2), if a corporation is subject to a subsection (1) order, its articles may be amended to effect any change that might lawfully be made by an amendment under section 173. Section 173(1)(e) and (h) of the CBCA provides that:

> (1) Subject to sections 176 and 177, the articles of a corporation may by special resolution be amended to
>
> (e) create new classes of shares;
>
> (h) change the shares of any class or series, whether issued or unissued, into a different number of shares of the same class or series or into the same or a different number of shares of other classes or series.

35 Section 6(2) of the CCAA provides that if a court sanctions a compromise or arrangement, it may order that the debtor's constating instrument be amended in accordance with the compromise or arrangement to reflect any change that may lawfully be made under federal or provincial law.

36 In exercising its discretion to approve a reorganization under section 191 of the CBCA, the court must be satisfied that: (a) there has been compliance with all statutory requirements; (b) the debtor company is acting in good faith; and (c) the capital restructuring is fair and reasonable: *A&M Cookie Co. Canada, Re* [14] and *MEI Computer Technology Group Inc., Re* [15]

37 I am satisfied that the statutory requirements have been met as the contemplated reorganization falls within the conditions provided for in sections 191 and 173 of the CBCA. I am also satisfied that Canwest Global and the other CMI Entities were acting in good faith in attempting to resolve the Existing Shareholder dispute. Furthermore, the reorganization is a necessary step in the implementation of the Plan in that it facilitates agreement reached on June 23, 2010 with the Existing Shareholders. In my view, the reorganization is fair and reasonable and was a vital step in addressing a significant impediment to a satisfactory resolution of outstanding issues.

38 A post-filing claims procedure order is also sought. The procedure is designed to solicit, identify and quantify post-filing claims. The Monitor who participated in the negotiation of the proposed order is satisfied that its terms are fair and reasonable as am I.

39 In closing, I would like to say that generally speaking, the quality of oral argument and the materials filed in this CCAA proceeding has been very high throughout. I would like to express my appreciation to all counsel and the Monitor in that regard. The sanction order and the post-filing claims procedure order are granted.

Application granted.

Footnotes

1 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 as amended.

2 2000 ABQB 442 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 60, leave to appeal denied 2000 ABCA 238 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]), aff'd 2001 ABCA 9 (Alta. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused July 12, 2001 [2001 CarswellAlta 888 (S.C.C.)].

3 Ibid,at para. 64 citing *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co.*, [1993] O.J. No. 545 (Ont. Gen. Div.) and *Cadillac Fairview Inc., Re*, [1995] O.J. No. 274 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).

4 Ibid, at para. 3.

5 (1993), 22 C.B.R. (3d) 80 (Ont. Bktcy.).

6 *Ibid*, at para. 6.

7 (2003), 43 C.B.R. (4th) 254 (C.S. Que.).

8 (2008), 92 O.R. (3d) 513 (Ont. C.A.).

9 The Sanction Order is extraordinarily long and in large measure repeats the Plan provisions. In future, counsel should attempt to simplify and shorten these sorts of orders.

10 (2004), 47 C.B.R. (4th) 169 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

11 (2007), 35 C.B.R. (5th) 1 (Alta. Q.B.).

12 (1996), 43 C.B.R. (4th) 10 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).

13 (2003), 39 C.B.R. (4th) 239 (Ont. S.C.J.).

14 [2009] O.J. No. 2427 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 8/

15 [2005] Q.J. No. 22993 (C.S. Que.) at para. 9.

End of Document

TAB 8

2008 QCCS 5388
Cour supérieure du Québec

Charles-Auguste Fortier inc., Re

2008 CarswellQue 11376, 2008 QCCS 5388, J.E. 2009-9, EYB 2008-150616

Dans l'affaire de la loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies, l.r.c. (1985), ch. c-36 en sa version modifiée, Charles-Auguste Fortier inc., 424, boulevard Raymond, Québec (Québec), G1C 7S4, Débitrice, c. Raymond Chabot inc., 140, Grande-Allée Est, bureau 200, Québec (Québec), G1R 5P7, Contrôleur, et Caisse Desjardins de Limoilou, 3174, 1e Avenue, Québec (Québec), G1L 3P7, Axa Assurances. inc., 2640, boulevard Laurier, bureau 900, Québec (Québec), G1V 5C2 et GE Canada Equipment Financing G.P. / Financement d'équipement GE Canada S.E.N.C., 3075, chemin des Quatre-Bourgeois, bureau 410, Québec (Québec), G1W 4Y9, Mises en cause

Parent J.C.S.

Audience: 6 novembre 2008
Jugement: 14 novembre 2008
Dossier: C.S. Qué. Québec 200-11-017167-084

Avocat: *Me Luc Paradis*, pour la requérante
Me William Noonan, pour le contrôleur
Me Yves Chassé, pour Caisse Desjardins de Limoilou
Me Christian Roy, pour Axa Assurances inc.
Me Isabelle Germain, pour GE Canada Equipment Financing G.P. / Financement d'équipement GE Canada s.e.n.c.
Me Richard Roy, pour les opposantes

Sujet: Insolvency; Corporate and Commercial

***Parent J.C.S.*:**

Introduction

1 Un plan d'arrangement formulé en vertu de la *Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies* (*LACC*) peut-il prévoir la libération d'une caution du débiteur proposant?

2 Voilà la principale question soulevée dans le cadre de la demande d'homologation du plan d'arrangement (le Plan) proposé par la Débitrice (CAF) à ses créanciers le 4 novembre 2008.

3 Aucun créancier n'a comparu afin de contester la demande en homologation du Plan. Toutefois, deux créanciers, Styro Rail inc. et Transport Michel Deschamps & fils (les Opposantes) ont transmis par télécopieur, quelques minutes avant l'audition, un avis de contestation sous forme de lettre.

4 Malgré l'irrégularité de cette forme d'opposition, le Tribunal disposera de la demande d'homologation en tenant compte des moyens formulés par les Opposantes, dans la mesure où ceux-ci reposent sur des faits prouvés ou sur des arguments de droit.

4 *Contexte*

5 CAF oeuvre depuis plus de 40 ans dans le domaine de la construction d'ouvrages d'aqueduc, d'égout et de voirie. Elle opère également des équipements de concassage, en plus d'effectuer des travaux de déneigement.

6 Au fil des ans, CAF prospère. En 2007, elle compte environ 150 employés.

7 Elle s'engage alors dans un projet d'envergure, le prolongement de l'autoroute 50 à Thurso.

8 L'aventure s'avère désastreuse. CAF essuie une perte d'environ 5 millions de dollars, sur un contrat total de 25 millions de dollars. À cette époque, la valeur de ce contrat représente la moitié du chiffre d'affaires de CAF.

9 Un autre chantier routier important, la Route 175 dans le Parc des Laurentides, entraîne également des pertes importantes, mais dans une moindre mesure.

10 Les difficultés de CAF sont exacerbées par l'augmentation fulgurante du coût des produits pétroliers et des produits dérivés, lesquels constituent une partie importante de l'approvisionnement de CAF en matières premières.

11 À court de liquidités, CAF obtient, le 11 juin 2008, une ordonnance initiale en vertu de la *LACC*.

12 L'ordonnance autorise la mise en place d'un financement temporaire, consenti par la mise en cause GE Canada Equipment Financing G.P. /Financement d'équipement GE Canada s.e.n.c. (GE) jusqu'à concurrence de 2 millions de dollars. Ce financement temporaire est assorti d'une garantie de premier rang sur l'ensemble des actifs de CAF.

13 Le financement temporaire permet à CAF de faire face à ses obligations à court terme depuis juin 2008.

14 Parallèlement à l'intervention de GE, CAF doit aussi obtenir la collaboration de la mise en cause AXA Assurances inc. (AXA).

15 En effet, AXA fournit les cautionnements d'exécution et pour gages, matériaux et services. Ces cautionnements sont exigés des donneurs d'ouvrage publics (gouvernements, organismes publics, municipalités, etc) avec qui CAF fait affaires.

16 La participation d'AXA permet à CAF de poursuivre ses opérations. Au moment de l'ordonnance initiale, AXA fait également face à des réclamations potentielles de sous-traitants de CAF totalisant environ 10 millions de dollars.

17 Depuis l'ordonnance initiale, les représentants de CAF et du Contrôleur négocient un refinancement des opérations de CAF, autant au niveau du court terme que du long terme, afin d'assurer la survie de l'entreprise.

18 Ces négociations ont abouti par la présentation du Plan, le 4 novembre 2008.

19 Afin d'être en mesure de soumettre ce Plan, CAF devait convaincre à la fois des prêteurs et une compagnie de cautionnement de l'appuyer dans son projet.

20 Malgré le contexte économique difficile, les mises en cause GE et Caisse Desjardins de Limoilou (la Caisse) acceptent de participer à la relance de CAF.

21 Cependant, la participation d'AXA, à titre de caution, s'avère nécessaire à la mise en place d'un plan d'arrangement viable.

22 D'une part, CAF doit être en mesure de fournir les cautionnements requis par les donneurs d'ouvrage, dont les contrats sont essentiels à sa rentabilité, selon le témoignage du Contrôleur.

23 D'autre part, GE et la Caisse exigent qu'AXA cautionne, en tout ou en partie, leurs avances consenties à CAF dans le cadre du Plan.

24 AXA accepte de s'impliquer dans le Plan. En contrepartie, elle exige que les créanciers bénéficiant de son cautionnement réduisent leurs réclamations à 85% de leurs créances.

25 Dans ce contexte, le Plan prévoit trois catégories de créanciers:

1. Créanciers garantis:

Il s'agit de créanciers qui possèdent des hypothèques ou autres sûretés réelles sur les biens de CAF. Le Plan requiert un moratoire de six mois pour le remboursement du capital.

2. Créanciers cautionnés

et créanciers dénoncés:

Cette catégorie regroupe les créanciers qui bénéficient du cautionnement pour gages, matériaux et services émis par AXA. Il comprend également les créanciers qui peuvent faire valoir une hypothèque légale de la construction, au sens du Code civil du Québec. Selon les informations obtenues à l'audience, 95 % des créanciers de cette catégorie sont des créanciers cautionnés. Le Plan offre à ses créanciers de recevoir 85 % de leur réclamation prouvée, en trois versements:

a) un premier versement de 25 % payable le ou vers le 15 décembre 2008;

b) un deuxième versement de 25 % payable le 30 avril 2009; et

c) un dernier versement de 35 % payable le 30 octobre 2009.

3. Créanciers ordinaires:

Ces créanciers, qui ne bénéficient d'aucune garantie ni de cautionnement, se partageront 650 000 $, à raison d'une première tranche de 500 $ pour chaque créancier, en plus d'un dividende d'environ 10% pour l'excédant de leur créance.

26 Les Opposantes soumettent qu'il est illégal que le Plan prévoit une quittance en faveur d'AXA. Ils appuient leurs arguments sur trois arrêts de la Cour d'appel du Québec [1] .

27 Or, ces arrêts ne visent pas des situations qui s'apparentent au présent dossier.

28 Dans deux des arrêts, la Cour d'appel souligne que la suspension des recours contre le débiteur, en vertu de l'article 11 de la Loi, n'emporte pas la suspension des recours contre les tiers.

29 Dans la troisième affaire, l'arrêt *Steinberg*, la Cour d'appel limite la quittance que le Plan peut accorder aux administrateurs d'un débiteur.

30 Cet arrêt fut suivi par une modification à la *LACC* en 1997, soit l'ajout de l'article 5.1 à la *LACC*, qui précise la possibilité de libérer les administrateurs de leurs responsabilités, sous certaines réserves [2] .

31 Le Contrôleur soumet au Tribunal un arrêt du 18 août 2008 de la Cour d'appel d'Ontario [3] . Cet arrêt, prononcé dans le cadre d'une demande d'homologation d'un plan d'arrangement, analyse les questions suivantes :

> There are two principal questions for determination on this appeal:
>
> 1) As a matter of law, may a CCAA plan contain a release of claims against anyone other than the debtor company or its directors?
>
> 2) If the answer to that question is yes, did the application judge err in the exercise of his discretion to sanction the Plan as fair and reasonable given the nature of the releases called for under it? [4]
>
> (Soulignement du Tribunal)

32 Monsieur le juge Blair procède à une analyse approfondie afin de répondre aux questions soulevées. Il s'exprime notamment ainsi concernant la première question :

> [43] On a proper interpretation, in my view, the CCAA permits the inclusion of third party releases in a plan of compromise or arrangement to be sanctioned by the court where those releases are reasonably connected to the proposed restructuring. I am led to this conclusion by a combination of (a) the open-ended, flexible character of the CCAA itself, (b) the broad nature of the term "compromise or arrangement" as used in the Act, and (c) the express statutory effect of the "double-majority" vote and court sanction which render the plan binding on all creditors, including those unwilling to accept certain portions of it. The first of these signals a flexible approach to the application of the Act in new and evolving situations, an active judicial role in its application and interpretation, and a liberal approach to that interpretation. The second provides the entrée to negotiations between the parties affected in the restructuring and furnishes them with the ability to apply the broad scope of their ingenuity in fashioning the proposal. The latter afford necessary protection to unwilling creditors who may be deprived of certain of their civil and property rights as a result of the process.
>
> [44] The CCAA is skeletal in nature. It does not contain a comprehensive code that lays out all that is permitted or barred. Judges must therefore play a role in fleshing out the details of the statutory scheme. The scope of the Act and the powers of the court under it are not limitless. It is beyond controversy, however, that the CCAA is remedial legislation to be liberally construed in accordance with the modern purposive approach to statutory interpretation. It is designed to be a flexible instrument and it is that very flexibility which gives the Act its efficacy: *Canadian Red Cross Society (Re)* 1998 CanLII 14907 (ON S.C.), (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. Gen. Div.). As Farley J. noted in *Re Dylex Ltd.* 1995 CanLII 7370 (ON S.C.), (1995), 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106 at 111 (Ont. Gen. Div.), "[t]he history of CCAA law has been an evolution of judicial interpretation.
>
> (Soulignements du Tribunal)

33 Poursuivant l'analyse du caractère exceptionnel de l'atteinte aux droits que les créanciers possèdent contre les tiers en vertu du droit civil, dont ils sont privés par l'effet de l'homologation d'un plan d'arrangement, le juge Blair poursuit :

> [104] The power to sanction a plan of compromise or arrangement that contains third-party releases of the type opposed by the appellants is embedded in the wording of the CCAA. The fact that this may interfere with a claimant's right to pursue a civil action - normally a matter of provincial concern - or trump Quebec rules of public order is constitutionally immaterial. The CCAA is a valid exercise of federal power. Provided the matter in question falls within the legislation directly or as necessarily incidental to the exercise of that power, the CCAA governs. To the extent that its provisions are inconsistent with provincial legislation, the federal legislation is paramount.

34 Il est aussi intéressant de souligner que l'arrêt *Steinberg* précité, prononcé quinze ans plus tôt par la Cour d'appel, fait l'objet d'une minutieuse analyse, au terme de laquelle est énoncée la conclusion suivante :

> [95] Accordingly, to the extent *Steinberg* stands for the proposition that the court does not have authority under the CCAA to sanction a plan that incorporates third-party releases, I do not believe it to be a correct statement of the law and I respectfully decline to follow it. The modern approach to interpretation of the Act in accordance with its nature and purpose militates against a narrow interpretation and towards one that facilitates and encourages compromises and arrangements. Had the majority in *Steinberg* considered the broad nature of the terms "compromise" and "arrangement" and the jurisprudence I have referred to above, they might well have come to a different conclusion.
>
> (Soulignement du Tribunal)

35 Le 2 septembre 2008, la Cour suprême du Canada refuse la demande d'autorisation d'en appeler de cette décision [5].

36 Avec égards, le Tribunal estime que les principes énoncés dans cette affaire trouvent application au Québec. La grande variété de moyens et d'outils auxquels une compagnie peut faire appel afin de présenter un plan d'arrangement exige une approche souple des dispositions de la *LACC*.

37 Cela ne signifie pas que la libération d'un tiers, dans le cadre d'un plan d'arrangement, doive être systématiquement acceptée. Au contraire, les circonstances particulières justifiant l'exclusion du recours contre un tiers doivent être analysées.

38 Dans *Metcalfe*, la Cour d'appel d'Ontario suggère certains paramètres d'analyse :

> [113] At para. 71 above I recited a number of factual findings the application judge made in concluding that approval of the Plan was within his jurisdiction under the CCAA and that it was fair and reasonable. For convenience, I reiterate them here - with two additional findings - because they provide an important foundation for his analysis concerning the fairness and reasonableness of the Plan. The application judge found that:
>
> a) The parties to be released are necessary and essential to the restructuring of the debtor;
>
> b) The claims to be released are rationally related to the purpose of the Plan and necessary for it;
>
> c) The Plan cannot succeed without the releases;
>
> d) The parties who are to have claims against them released are contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the Plan;
>
> e) The Plan will benefit not only the debtor companies but creditor Noteholders generally;
>
> f) The voting creditors who have approved the Plan did so with knowledge of the nature and effect of the releases; and that,
>
> g) The releases are fair and reasonable and not overly broad or offensive to public policy.

38 *Raisonnabilité du Plan en regard de l'exclusion des recours contre AXA*

39 L'importance qu'occupe AXA dans la restructuration de CAF et la continuation de ses opérations justifie amplement la quittance exigée des créanciers cautionnés.

40 L'article 4.2 du Plan prévoit :

> Pour permettre à la Compagnie de poursuivre ses opérations, il est essentiel que de nouveaux cautionnements (soumission, exécution et paiement des gages, matériaux et services) soient émis par AXA Assurances inc.
>
> Pour accepter d'émettre de nouveaux cautionnements, AXA Assurances inc. a notamment exigé :
>
> 1) l'acceptation et l'homologation d'un plan de transaction et d'arrangements entre la Compagnie et ses Créanciers ;
>
> 2) le règlement des Réclamations Prouvées des Créanciers Cautionnés en contrepartie d'une quittance complète, générale et finale en faveur de la Compagnie et de AXA Assurances inc.
>
> Par ailleurs, pour permettre à la Compagnie de soumettre le Plan à ses Créanciers, AXA Assurances inc. s'est montrée disposée à prendre certains engagements au bénéfice de la Compagnie, de façon à faciliter son refinancement. [6]

41 De l'avis du Tribunal, il s'agit d'un cas où les critères suivants sont réunis:

> a) La partie qui obtient la quittance joue un rôle central dans le plan d'arrangement proposé par le débiteur;
>
> b) Le plan d'arrangement échouera à défaut que la quittance soit accordée;

c) La partie qui bénéficie de la quittance, partielle en l'espèce, contribue de façon importante au plan d'arrangement;

d) Le plan d'arrangement est bénéfique non seulement pour la débitrice mais pour l'ensemble des créanciers;

e) Les créanciers qui se sont prononcés au moment de l'acceptation du Plan étaient parfaitement informés de la quittance accordée à AXA; à ce sujet, le Tribunal souligne qu'il apparaît au procès-verbal que les Opposantes ont posé des questions au Contrôleur et à la débitrice au sujet de la quittance, avant que le vote ne soit tenu;

f) La quittance partielle accordée est juste et raisonnable et ne va pas à l'encontre de l'ordre public.

42 En conséquence, le Tribunal conclut que la *LACC* permet de prévoir la quittance d'un tiers dans le cadre d'un plan d'arrangement. En l'espèce, la quittance apparaît raisonnable et justifiée. Elle rencontre les objectifs de la *LACC*, dans le meilleur intérêt de l'ensemble des créanciers et de la Débitrice.

43 Les Opposantes soulèvent qu'AXA ne s'est pas engagée à assurer le paiement de 85% des réclamations prouvées des créanciers cautionnés. Lors de l'audition de la requête, le Contrôleur dépose une lettre émanant des procureurs d'AXA confirmant sans équivoque cet engagement [7] . Cet argument des Opposantes est donc rejeté.

44 Finalement, les Opposantes soutiennent que le Plan va à l'encontre de l'ordonnance initiale.

45 En effet, le paragraphe 15 de l'ordonnance initiale prévoit que toute personne ayant fourni un cautionnement doit continuer à l'honorer.

46 Cette ordonnance est conforme aux dispositions de l'article 11.2 *LACC*. Elle précise simplement qu'il n'y a pas suspension des recours contre les tiers malgré l'effet de suspension des recours contre le débiteur en vertu de l'article 11 *LACC*.

47 Avec égards, il n'existe aucune corrélation entre cette conclusion de l'ordonnance initiale et les dispositions que l'on retrouve au Plan.

48 Au-delà des arguments soulevés par les Opposantes, les constats suivants commandent l'homologation du Plan.

49 Les résultats du vote de l'assemblée tenue le 4 novembre 2008 sont les suivants:

49 *Garantis*

49 *Dénoncés et Cautionnés*

49 *Non garantis*

49 *Pour*

49 *Contre*

49 *Pour*

49 *Contre*

49 *Pour*

49 *Contre*

49 $

49 2 508 667

49 n/a

49 7 575 708

49 1 362 176

49 4 135 774

49 213 746

49 Nb

49 6

49 n/a

49 82

49 6

49 213

14

% ($)

100 %

n/a

84,76 %

15 ,24 %

95,09 %

4,91%

% (Nb)

100 %

n/a

93,18 %

6,82 %

93,83 %

6,17

50 Le Tribunal constate que les créanciers de toutes catégories accordent un appui massif au Plan.

51 Cet appui peut s'expliquer notamment parce que le Plan assure la continuation des opérations de CAF. Ainsi, cela signifie, pour plusieurs des créanciers, le maintien de leurs relations d'affaires avec cette entreprise.

52 En outre, les créanciers ont, de toute évidence, tenu compte des recommandations du Contrôleur. Son rapport précise que dans le cadre d'un processus de liquidation des actifs de CAF, les créanciers obtiendraient une somme inférieure à ce qu'offre le Plan. En fait, les créanciers ordinaires ne recevraient aucun dividende.

53 Le Tribunal n'est pas lié par le vote des créanciers. La procédure d'homologation serait inutile si cela était le cas.

54 Cependant, le large consensus des créanciers ainsi que les recommandations du Contrôleur constituent, à tout le moins, des éléments importants que le Tribunal ne peut ignorer.

55 En l'espèce, la proposition formulée aux diverses catégories de créanciers apparaît raisonnable, à la lumière de l'ensemble des circonstances.

56 Il est vrai que les créanciers cautionnés et dénoncés pourraient, dans le cadre de poursuites intentées contre AXA ou les propriétaires d'immeubles visés par les hypothèques légales, espérer récupérer la totalité de leurs créances.

57 Cependant, le Tribunal constate qu'une très forte majorité des créanciers cautionnés et dénoncés ont accepté de réduire leur créance à 85 % de leur réclamation prouvée. Les coûts et les délais associés aux recours contre ces tiers, sans compter les risques qui s'y rattachent, peuvent expliquer ce choix.

POUR CES MOTIFS, LE TRIBUNAL:

58 *ACCUEILLE* la requête en homologation du plan d'arrangement.

59 *DISPENSE* le Contrôleur de la signification de la requête et de tout avis de présentation autre que ceux déjà transmis.

60 *DÉCLARE* que la charge du prêteur temporaire demeura en place jusqu'au remboursement intégral de tout somme due au prêteur temporaire et la Débitrice est autorisée à maintenir la Facilité temporaire et ce, jusqu'au dépôt par le Contrôleur dans le dossier de la Cour d'un certificat confirmant le remboursement complet et intégral de toutes sommes dues au prêteur temporaire, devant avoir lieu avant le 15 décembre 2008.

61 *DÉCLARE* que le prêteur temporaire n'est pas un créancier visé par le plan d'arrangement.

62 *HOMOLOGUE* le plan de transaction et d'arrangement amendé daté du 4 novembre 2008 approuvé par les majorités requises par chacune des catégories des créanciers qui y sont prévues, à toutes fins que de droit.

63 *ORDONNE* l'exécution provisoire du présent jugement malgré appel, et sans caution.

64 *LE TOUT* sans frais.

APPENDIX

Domaine de droit :

Faillite et insolvabilité

Notes de bas de page

1 *Michaud c. Steingerg inc.*, [1993] R.J.Q. 1684 (C.A.), AZ-93011723 aux pages 16 et suivantes; *Hydro Québec c. Meubles Dinec inc.*, 2006 QCCA 747aux pages 3 et suivantes; *Toiture P.E. Carrier inc. c. 2603373 Canada inc.*, [1994] R.J.Q. 1540 (C.A.).

2 1997, Ch. 12, article 122.

3 *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., (Re)* , 2008 ONCA 587 (CanLII); il s'agit du pland'arrangement canadien proposé à la suite de la « crise du papier commercial ».

4 idem, au paragraphe 39.

5 Il importe de souligner à cet égard que monsieur le juge LeBel, qui avait rédigé l'opinion pour la majorité dans l'arrêt *Steinberg* en 1993, fait partie de la formation ayant refusé l'autorisation.

6 Cette exigence s'apparente à celle analysée dans Metcalfe, où il était mis en preuve que « *the releases are part of the Plan "because certain key participants, whose participation is vital to the restructuring, have made comprehensive releases a condition for their participation."* » (paragraphe 32).

7 Pièce R-3.

TAB 9

2007 NSSC 384
Nova Scotia Supreme Court

Federal Gypsum Co., Re

2007 CarswellNS 630, 2007 NSSC 384, [2007] N.S.J. No. 559, 163 A.C.W.S. (3d) 687, 261 N.S.R. (2d) 314, 40 C.B.R. (5th) 39, 835 A.P.R. 314

IN THE MATTER OF The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985 C. C-36 as amended

And IN THE MATTER OF A Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of the Applicant, Federal Gypsum Company

A.D. MacAdam J.

Heard: November 29, 2007; December 14, 2007
Judgment: December 14, 2007
Written reasons: January 29, 2008
Docket: S.H. 285667

Counsel: Maurice P. Chaisson, Graham Lindfield for Federal Gypsum Company
Carl Holm, Q.C for BDO Dunwoody Goodman Rosen Inc.
Thomas Boyne, Q.C. for Royal Bank of Canada
Robert Sampson, Robert Risk for Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation, Cape Breton Growth Fund Corporation
Michael Pugsley for Her Majesty in Right of the Province of Nova Scotia (Nova Scotia Economic Development), Nova Scotia Business Incorporated
Michael Ryan, Q.C., Michael Schweiger for Black & McDonald Limited

Subject: Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *A.D. MacAdam J.*:

Bargain Harold's Discount Ltd. v. Paribas Bank of Canada (1992), 10 C.B.R. (3d) 23, 4 B.L.R. (2d) 306, 7 O.R. (3d) 362, 1992 CarswellOnt 159 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — considered

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2000), 19 C.B.R. (4th) 12, 2000 CarswellAlta 623 (Alta. Q.B.) — considered

Cansugar Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellNB 9, 2004 NBQB 7 (N.B. Q.B.) — considered

Dylex Ltd., Re (1995), 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106, 1995 CarswellOnt 54 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Fairview Industries Ltd., Re (1991), 1991 CarswellNS 35, 11 C.B.R. (3d) 43, (sub nom. *Fairview Industries Ltd., Re (No. 2))* 109 N.S.R. (2d) 12, (sub nom. *Fairview Industries Ltd., Re (No. 2))* 297 A.P.R. 12 (N.S. T.D.) — considered

Fairview Industries Ltd., Re (1991), (sub nom. *Fairview Industries Ltd., Re (No. 3))* 297 A.P.R. 32, 11 C.B.R. (3d) 71, (sub nom. *Fairview Industries Ltd., Re (No. 3))* 109 N.S.R. (2d) 32, 1991 CarswellNS 36 (N.S. T.D.) — considered

Fracmaster Ltd., Re (1999), 245 A.R. 102, 11 C.B.R. (4th) 204, 1999 CarswellAlta 461 (Alta. Q.B.) — considered

Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd. (1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84, 1990 CarswellBC 394, 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311, *(*sub nom. *Chef Ready Foods Ltd. v. Hongkong Bank of Canada)* [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136 (B.C. C.A.) — considered

Hunters Trailer & Marine Ltd., Re (2001), 2001 CarswellAlta 964, 94 Alta. L.R. (3d) 389, 27 C.B.R. (4th) 236, [2001] 9 W.W.R. 299, 2001 ABQB 546, 295 A.R. 113 (Alta. Q.B.) — considered

Keddy Motor Inns Ltd., Re (1992), *(*sub nom. *Keddy Motor Inns Ltd., Re (No. 4))* 299 A.P.R. 246, 90 D.L.R. (4th) 175, 13 C.B.R. (3d) 245, 6 B.L.R. (2d) 116, *(*sub nom. *Keddy Motor Inns Ltd., Re (No. 4))* 110 N.S.R. (2d) 246, 1992 CarswellNS 46 (N.S. C.A.) — considered

Manderley Corp., Re (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 1082, 10 C.B.R. (5th) 48 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered

Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (1990), 1990 CarswellOnt 139, 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, *(*sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey)* 1 O.R. (3d) 289, *(*sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey)* 41 O.A.C. 282 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

NsC Diesel Power Inc., Re (1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 97 N.S.R. (2d) 295, 258 A.P.R. 295, 1990 CarswellNS 33 (N.S. T.D.) — considered

Ontario v. Canadian Airlines Corp. (2001), 2001 CarswellAlta 1488, 98 Alta. L.R. (3d) 277, 306 A.R. 124, 2001 ABQB 983, 29 C.B.R. (4th) 236, [2002] 3 W.W.R. 373 (Alta. Q.B.) — considered

Pacific National Lease Holding Corp., Re (1992), 72 B.C.L.R. (2d) 368, 19 B.C.A.C. 134, 34 W.A.C. 134, 15 C.B.R. (3d) 265, 1992 CarswellBC 524 (B.C. C.A. [In Chambers]) — considered

Philip's Manufacturing Ltd., Re (1992), 9 C.B.R. (3d) 25, 67 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84, 4 B.L.R. (2d) 142, 1992 CarswellBC 542 (B.C. C.A.) — considered

San Francisco Gifts Ltd., Re (2005), 2005 ABQB 91, 2005 CarswellAlta 174, 10 C.B.R. (5th) 275, 42 Alta. L.R. (4th) 377, 378 A.R. 361 (Alta. Q.B.) — considered

Simpson's Island Salmon Ltd., Re (2005), 2005 CarswellNB 781, 2006 NBQB 6, 294 N.B.R. (2d) 95, 765 A.P.R. 95, 18 C.B.R. (5th) 182 (N.B. Q.B.) — considered

Stelco Inc., Re (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 6818, 204 O.A.C. 205, 78 O.R. (3d) 241, 261 D.L.R. (4th) 368, 11 B.L.R. (4th) 185, 15 C.B.R. (5th) 307 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Ursel Investments Ltd., Re (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 260, 1990 CarswellSask 34 (Sask. Q.B.) — considered

Ursel Investments Ltd., Re (1992), *(*sub nom. *Deloitte & Touche Inc. v. Ursel Investments Ltd. (Receiver of))* [1992] 3 W.W.R. 106, *(*sub nom. *Deloitte & Touche Inc. v. Ursel Investments Ltd. (Receiver of))* 89 D.L.R. (4th) 246, 10 C.B.R. (3d) 61, *(*sub nom. *Deloitte & Touche Inc. v. Ursel Investments Ltd. (Receiver of))* 97 Sask. R. 170, *(*sub nom. *Deloitte & Touche Inc. v. Ursel Investments Ltd. (Receiver of))* 12 W.A.C. 170, 1992 CarswellSask 19 (Sask. C.A.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 4 — considered

s. 5 — considered

s. 11 — pursuant to

s. 11(6) — referred to

APPLICATION by debtor for preliminary approval of plan of arrangement and related relief and for permission to increase debtor in possession financing.

***A.D. MacAdam J.*:**

1 By Order dated September 18, 2007, the Applicant, Federal Gypsum Company, (herein "the Company" or "the Applicant"), obtained an Order providing for a stay of proceedings pursuant to s.11 of the *Companies Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C 1985, c. C-36, (the "CCAA"). BDO Dunwoody Goodman Rosen Inc. was appointed monitor, (herein "the Monitor"). On September 24, 2007 the Applicant successfully applied for approval of debtor in possession, (herein "DIP") financing, in the amount of $350,000.00. The initial Order provided for a stay of proceedings against the Applicant up to and including October 18, 2007, or such later date as the court may by further order determine, and on October 18, 2007 the stay date was extended to November 29, 2007. On November 5, 2007 the Company made a further application for additional DIP borrowing powers, with approval, from the financing, to retire the creditor holding security on the operating line. DIP financing in the amount of $1,500,000.00 was granted, subject to a restriction on the amount to be advanced. The application to pay out the operating line creditor was denied. On November 22, 2007 a further application was made to establish the Claims Bar process which, with minor changes, was approved.

2 At issue is

1. Preliminary approval of the plan of arrangement (the "Plan") prepared by Federal Gypsum Company (the "Company") for the purposes of presenting the Plan to the Company's creditors;

2. Classification of the creditors for the purpose of voting on the Plan;

3. Calling of a meeting of the Company's creditors pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (the "CCAA");

4. Extension of the Stay Termination Date set out in the initial order made by this Court on September 18, 2007 (the "Initial Order") pursuant to the CCAA and extended by the subsequent Order of this Court to November 29, 2007 at 4:00 p.m.; and

5. Arrangements for additional debtor in possession ("DIP") financing to the Company pursuant to the CCAA.

1. Preliminary Court Approval

3 Counsel for the Company, noting there is nothing in the CCAA requiring the approval of the court for the Company's plan, acknowledges that "...the jurisprudence establishes that such approval is generally necessary prior to calling a meeting of such creditors...". Recognizing the burden is on the Applicant, Counsel suggests the standard to be met is whether the plan is "doomed to failure" as suggested by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311 (B.C. C.A.) at p.88; *Philip's Manufacturing Ltd., Re* (1992), 9 C.B.R. (3d) 25 (B.C. C.A.) at para 7; and *Pacific National Lease Holding Corp., Re*, [1992] B.C.J. No. 2309 (B.C. C.A. [In Chambers]) at para.25.

4 In his written submission Counsel references the decision of Austin J. in *Bargain Harold's Discount Ltd. v. Paribas Bank of Canada* (1992), 10 C.B.R. (3d) 23 (Ont. Gen. Div.). Citing Doherty J.A. in *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101 (Ont. C.A.), Austin J. at paras. 37, 38 and 39 stated:

> 37. As to the degree of persuasion required, Doherty J.A. in Elan said at p.316 [O.R.]:
>
> > I agree that the feasibility of the plan is a relevant and significant factor to be considered in determining whether to order a meeting of creditors: Edwards, 'Reorganizations under the Companies' 'Creditors Arrangement Act', supra, at pp. 594-595. I would not, however, impose a heavy burden on the debtor company to establish the likelihood of ultimate success from the outset. As the Act will often be the last refuge for failing companies, it is to be expected that many of the proposed plans of reorganization will involve variables and contingencies which will make the plan's ultimate acceptability to the creditors and the court very uncertain at the time the initial application is made.
>
> 38. In *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Zevenberger (Trustee of)* (1990), 3 C.B.R. (3d) 151, (sub nom. *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Gammon*) 1 O.R. (3d) 321 (Gen.Div.), Hoilett J., at p.330 f [O.R.], suggests that the test is whether the plan, or in the present case, any plan, 'has a probable chance of acceptance.'
>
> 39 These two standards are in conflict, Ultracare requiring the probability of success, and Elan requiring something less. Having regard to the nature of the legislation, I prefer the test enunciated by Doherty J.A. in Elan. In *First TreasuryFinancial Inc. v. Cango Petroleums Inc*. (1991), 3 C.B.R. (3d) 232 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p.238, I expressed the view that the statute required 'a reasonable chance' that a plan would be accepted. [emphasis added by counsel]

5 Also referenced by counsel is *Fairview Industries Ltd., Re* (1991), 11 C.B.R. (3d) 43 (N.S. T.D.), where, at para. 80, Glube, C.J.T.D., (as she then was), observed:

> 80 I have no hesitation in accepting the line of cases which are concerned with the concept of requiring a reasonable probability of success in the meetings to be held to deal with any proposal. (See *Diemaster Tool*, supra, and *First Treasury FinancialInc. v. Cango Petroleums Inc.* (1991), 3 C.B.R. (3d) 232, 78 D.L.R. (4th) 585 (Ont. Gen. Div.)). In my opinion, it would seem to be totally impractical and extremely costly to continue to prepare a plan when there is no hope that it will be approved. [emphasis added by counsel]

6 In his submission, counsel notes the reference to an article by Stanley E. Edwards by Osborn J. in *Ursel Investments Ltd., Re* (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 260 (Sask. Q.B.), at para.47, (reversed on other grounds at (1992), 10 C.B.R. (3d) 61 (Sask. C.A.)).

> 47 Stanley E. Edwards in his article 'Reorganizations Under the Companies' 'Creditors Arrangement Act' which appeared in (1947) 25 the Can. Bar Rev., 587 outlined the main problems which counsel and the courts will face in applying the Act. This article suggests that the Court before it orders a meeting of the creditors under ss. 4 and 5 of the Act must first be satisfied that:
>
> > (a) The companies should be kept going despite insolvency.
> >
> > (b) The public has an interest in the continuation of the enterprise, particularly if the companies supply commodities or services that are necessary or desirable to large numbers of consumers, or if they employ large numbers of workers who would be thrown out of employment by its liquidation.
> >
> > (c) The plan of reorganization is so framed that it is likely to accomplish its purpose.
> >
> > (d) The plan should embrace all parties, if possible, but particularly secured creditors.
> >
> > (e) The reorganization plan should be fair and equitable as between the parties.

7 Counsel says the Company has been in "significant discussions" with the term lenders, Cape Breton Growth Corporation, (herein "CBGC"), and Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation, (herein "ECBC"), (herein collectively referred to as the "Federal Crown Corporations"); Nova Scotia Business Inc., (herein "NSBI") and Nova Scotia — Office of Economic Development, (herein "NSOED"), (herein collectively referred to as the "Nova Scotia Crown Corporations"), each of whom hold or purport to hold, first secured charges on some of the fixed assets of the Company, as do the Federal Crown Corporations. Counsel anticipated, that in view of the plan proposing to retire the operating line provided by Royal Bank of Canada (herein "Royal Bank"), their acceptance of the plan.

8 In fact, the Royal Bank by its counsel in both written and oral submissions indicated its objection to the proposed extension of the stay termination date and the request for additional DIP financing. Counsel for the Royal Bank noted that in the affidavit of Rhyne Simpson, Jr., Director and President of the Applicant, that the Federal Crown Corporations and the Nova Scotia Crown Corporations did not appear to be on side with the proposed plan, and as the Royal Bank had repeatedly taken the position it did not support the process and would object to the plan of arrangement accordingly, "...it would seem clear that the proposed plan of compromise will not be approved." Counsel also suggests the court should consider whether, even if adopted by the creditors, the Plan has a reasonable probability of success. In this respect counsel suggests that to continue the process for another two months would involve "...significant expense and risk to the secured lenders, when it appears that the Company would not be able to successfully implement the plan even if accepted by the creditors." The Plan, in the submission of counsel, is deficient in that notwithstanding the proposal to repay the Royal Bank on the implementation date, the Company did not have the resources to do so. Counsel, referencing the report of the Monitor, and taking into account the extent of the DIP financing and the amount of the outstanding operating loan of the Royal Bank, says the Company would not have sufficient funds in place, on approval of the Plan, to retire the Royal Bank operating loan.

9 Through the course of the Application, counsel for the Federal Crown Corporations and the Nova Scotia Crown Corporations indicated they had no objection to either the extension of the stay termination date or the request for additional DIP financing. In doing so, counsel made it clear that they were not agreeing with the Plan as filed but rather were prepared to provide the Company with an opportunity to continue dialogue and discussions with the creditors concerning the nature and content of the final plan that would be submitted to a vote of the creditors.

10 In respect to the Royal Bank's concern the company would not have the necessary resources to retire its operating loan, even if the plan was approved by the creditors, counsel indicated the Company is in negotiations both with the DIP financing lender and other potential lenders to arrange financing to take effect upon approval of the plan, and presumably would, as a result, have the necessary resources to retire the Royal Bank operating loan.

11 A further concern raised by counsel for the Royal Bank related to the allocation of responsibility for administrative and operating expenses during the stay, as between the various secured creditors. In the earlier applications, it had been stipulated that the share of such expenses would be borne by the secured creditors in proportion to their respective indebtedness. Counsel for the Royal Bank suggested the possibility that some of the other secured creditors could enter into agreements whereby only one or two would recover on their assets and therefore a limitation of responsibility to share any expenses to the amount recovered could adversely affect the share of such expenses borne by the Royal Bank. Counsel for the Monitor advised that although there were agreements between various secured lenders involving a sharing of recovery, there was no agreement suggesting that any of the secured creditors had foregone their entitlement to repayment of their share of any realization on assets on which they held security. Therefore the concern, as acknowledged by counsel for the Royal Bank, was ameliorated.

12 In view of the relatively low threshold on the Company in seeking Court approval to have a plan of arrangement submitted to the creditors for a vote, I am satisfied the plan should proceed and the creditors should determine whether they do, or do not accept the plan as finally filed.

2. Classification of Creditors

13 The proposed Classification of Creditors, as set out in s. 3.3 of the Plan, is as follows:

(a) Operating Lender — This category will consist of Royal Bank of Canada for the amounts owing under its operating line of credit as of the Filing Date;

(b) Term Lenders — This category will consist of Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation, Cape Breton Growth Fund Corporation, Her Majesty in Right of the Province of Nova Scotia (Nova Scotia Economic Development) and Nova Scotia Business Incorporated (collectively, the 'Term Lenders');

(c) Lease Lenders — This category will consist of Royal Bank of Canada for its leases on rolling stock, Ford Credit Canada Limited, National Leasing Limited, First Union Rail Corporation and Nova Scotia Business Incorporated for its lease on the premises located in Port Hawkesbury, Nova Scotia in which the Business operates (collectively, the 'Lease Lenders');

(d) Unsecured Creditors;

(e) Shareholders of the Company — This category will consist of Federal Gypsum Inc. and Blue Thunder Construction Ltd. (collectively, the 'Shareholders')

14 Counsel for Black and MacDonald Limited, (herein "BML") who purport to hold a subordinate secured charge on assets of the Company, objected to the classification of BML as an unsecured creditor. Counsel for the Federal Crown Corporations and for the Nova Scotia Crown Corporations also indicated a potential concern with the proposed classification and, in particular, the classification of the Royal Bank as a separate secured class. Counsel were invited to submit further written submissions as to their concerns.

15 In his written submission, counsel for the Company references *Stelco Inc., Re* (2005), 15 C.B.R. (5th) 307 (Ont. C.A.), and the observations of Blair, J.A., at paras.23-25:

23 In *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* (2000), 19 C.B.R. (4th) 12 (Alta. Q.B.), Paperny J. nonetheless extracted a number of principles to be considered by the courts in dealing with the commonality of interest test. At para. 31 she said:

In summary, the cases establish the following principles applicable to assessing commonality of interest:

1. Commonality of interest should be viewed based on the non-fragmentation test, not on an identity of interest test;

2. The interests to be considered are the legal interests that a creditor holds qua creditor in relationship to the debtor company prior to and under the plan as well as on liquidation.

3. The commonality of interests are to be viewed purposively, bearing in mind the object of the C.C.C.A., namely to facilitate reorganizations if possible.

4. In placing a broad and purposive interpretation on the C.C.C.A., the court should be careful to resist classification approaches that would potentially jeopardize viable plans.

5. Absent bad faith, the motivations of creditors to approve or disapprove [of the Plan] are irrelevant.

6. The requirement of creditors being able to consult together means being able to assess their legal entitlement as creditors before or after the plan in a similar manner.

. . . . .

25 In the passage from his reasons cited above (paragraphs 13 and 14) the supervising judge in this case applied those principles. In our view he was correct in law in doing so.

16 In his written submission, counsel also references *NsC Diesel Power Inc., Re* (1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1 (N.S. T.D.) and the comments of Davison, J., at paras. 27-29.

> 27 In my view the court should avoid putting in the same class parties with a potential conflict of interest. I see that such a conflict could arise as between subcontractors and those with direct contracts with the owner. They have different contractual rights. A subcontractor may vote for a reduced amount of claim knowing he could still claim the deficiency from the general contractor, and this is cited as only an example of the possibility of conflict.
>
> 28 The test that was suggested by Bowen L.J. in *Sovereign Life Assur. Co. v. Dodd*, [1892] 2 Q.B. 573 (C.A.), dealing with the English legislation, is to place in one class persons 'whose rights are not so dissimilar as to make it impossible for them to consult together with a view to their common interest.'
>
> 29 With those principles in mind, I would direct the subcontractors with liens to comprise a separate class.

17 Counsel then references from the further comments of Justice Blair in *Stelco Inc., supra*, at paras. 30 and 35-36:

> 30 We agree with the line of authorities summarized in *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* and applied by the supervising judge in this case which stipulate that the classification of creditors is determined by their legal rights in relation to the debtor company, as opposed to their rights as creditors in relation to each other. To the extent that other authorities at the trial level in other jurisdictions may suggest to the contrary — see, for example *NsC Diesel Power Inc., Re*, *supra* — we prefer the Alberta [ie. *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* (*supra*)] approach.
>
> . . . . .
>
> 35 Finally, to hold the classification and voting process hostage to the vagaries of a potentially infinite variety of disputes as between already disgruntled creditors who have been caught in the maelstrom of a CCAA restructuring, runs the risk of hobbling that process unduly. It could lead to the very type of fragmentation and multiplicity of discrete classes or sub-classes of classes that judges and legal writers have warned might well defeat the purpose of the Act: ...
>
> 36 In the end, it is important to remember that classification of creditors, like most other things pertaining to the CCAA, must be crafted with the underlying purpose of the CCAA in mind, namely facilitation of the reorganization of an insolvent company through the negotiation and approval of a plan of compromise or arrangement between the debtor company and its creditors, so that the debtor company can continue to carry on its business to the benefit of all concerned. As Paperny J. noted in *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*, 'the Court should be careful to resist classification approaches that would potentially jeopardize viable Plans.'
>
> [emphasis added by counsel]

18 Counsel for the Company suggested the concerns raised by Davison, J. in *NsC Diesel*, *supra*, were not present here and that the proposed classification system was based on a "commonality of interest" and was appropriate. Any minor deficiencies, counsel suggests are "...clearly outweighed by the purposive benefits of the classes as presented in the Plan", referencing the comments of Justice Blair at para. 6 in *Stelco Inc.*, *supra*.

3. The Black and MacDonald Limited Classification

19 BML claims as secured creditor of the company, and objects to the classification placing it in the unsecured class. Counsel for BML asserts his client holds a security agreement "... charging all of the companies right, title, and interest in and to all equipment and proceeds thereof", excluding only the leased equipment. Counsel acknowledges BML executed a postponement and subordination agreement in favour of both the term lenders and the operating lender such that it holds a subordinate security on the assets charged in favour of both the term lender and the operating lender. After noting the six principles outlined by Paperny, J. in *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* [2000 CarswellAlta 623 (Alta. Q.B.)], *supra*, counsel references para 22:

> ... the commonality test cannot be considered without also considering the underlying purpose of the C.C.A.A. which is to facilitate reorganizations of insolvent companies. To that end, the court should not approve a classification scheme which would make a reorganization difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. At the same time, while the C,C.A.A. grants the court the authority to alter the legal rights of parties other than the debtor company without their consent, the court will not permit a confiscation of rights or an injustice to occur. (emphasis added)

20 Paul G. Goodman, President of the Monitor, in an Affidavit filed in this application, deposes:

> ... it is the Monitor's opinion that, subject to the currently intervening charge of the DIP lender and the Administrative Charge, as at the date of the Initial Order and as at December 7:
>
> (a) the assets on which RBC holds security are sufficient to provide for a 100% payout of its Operating Loan;
>
> (b) the assets on which NSBI, OED, CBGF & ECBC hold security, if realized on, would leave each of these creditors with a significant deficiency;
>
> (c) as B & M's security interest is subordinated to those of RBC, NSBI, OED, CBGF & ECBC there would be no assets remaining to be realized on by B & M under its security and in the result its security has no value.

21 The flexibility afforded the Court, in respect to CCAA applications, is to ensure that Plans of Arrangement and Compromise are fair and reasonable as well as designed to faciliate debtor reorganization. Justice Romaine, in *Ontario v. Canadian Airlines Corp.*, 2001 ABQB 983 (Alta. Q.B.), at paras. 36-38 stated:

> [36] The aim of minimizing prejudice to creditors embodied in the CCAA is a reflection of the cardinal principle of insolvency law: that relative entitlements created before insolvency are preserved: *R. v. Goode*, *Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law*, 2nd ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1997) at 54. While the CCAA may qualify this principle, it does so only when it is consistent with the purpose of facilitating debtor reorganization and ongoing survival, and in the spirit of what is fair and reasonable.
>
> [37] Paperny J. (as she then was) also discussed the purpose of the CCAA in *Re Canadian Airlines Corp.* (2000), 265 A.R. 201 (Q.B.), aff'd [2000] A. J. No. 1028 (C.A.), online: QL (AJ) (C.A.), leave refused [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 60. At para. 95, she stated that the purpose of the CCAA is to facilitate the reorganization of debtor companies for the benefit of a broad range of constituents.
>
> [38] Paperny J. also noted in para. 95 that, in dealing with applications under the CCAA, the court has a wide discretion to ensure the objectives of the CCAA are met. At para. 94, she identified guidance for the exercise of the discretion in *Olympia &York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co.* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. Gen.Div.) at p. 9 as follows:
>
> > Fairness' and 'reasonableness' are, in my opinion, the two keynote concepts underscoring the philosophy and workings of the Companies Creditors Arrangement Act. Fairness is the quintessential expression of the court's equitable jurisdiction — although the jurisdiction is statutory, the broad discretionary powers given to the judiciary by the legislation which make its exercise in equity — and 'reasonableness' is what lends objectivity to the process.

22 Counsel for BML suggests the Court should give weight to its status as a secured creditor. In fact, however, on the evidence presented to date, it would appear that BML's claim has no value, other than as an unsecured claim against the Company. In the opinion of the Monitor, there would be no assets available to BML, in the event of a liquidation of the Company's assets and therefore its security has "no value". I am satisfied that in classifying BML as an unsecured creditor, there is no "confiscation of rights or ... injustice". This security, having no apparent value, they are therefore unsecured and their classification as an unsecured creditor is both fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

4. The Royal Bank Classification

23 The term lenders, being the Nova Scotia Crown Corporations and the Federal Crown Corporations, object to the classification of the operating lender, being the Royal Bank, in a separate class. Counsel for the Federal Crown Corporations references *Stelco Inc., Re, supra*, and the observations of Blair, J. A., at paras 21-22:

> 21 Everyone agrees that the classification of creditors for CCAA voting purposes is to be determined generally on the basis of a 'commonality of interest' (or a 'common interest') between creditors of the same class. Most analyses of this approach start with a reference to *Sovereign Life Assurance Co. v. Dodd* (1892), [1891-94] All E.R. Rep. 246 (Eng. C.A.), which dealt with the classification of creditors for voting purposes in a winding-up proceeding. Two passages from the judgments in that decision are frequently cited:
>
> At pp. 249-350 Lord Esher said:
>
> > The Act provides that the persons to be summoned to the meeting, all of whom, is to be observed, are creditors, are persons who can be divided into different classes, classes which the Act [FN3] recognizes, though it does not define. The creditors, therefore, must be divided into different classes. What is the reason for prescribing such a course? It is because the creditors composing the different classes have different interests, and, therefore, it a different state of facts exists with respect to different creditors, which may affect their minds and judgments differently, they must be separated into different classes.
>
> At. p. 251, Bowen L.J. stated:
>
> > The word 'class' used in the statute is vague, and to find out what it means we must look at the general scope of the section, which enables the court to order a meeting of a class of creditors to be summoned. It seems to me that we must give such a meeting to the term 'class' as will prevent the section being so worked as to produce confiscation and injustice, and that we must confine its meaning to those persons whose rights are not so dissimilar as to make it impossible for them to consult together with a view to their common interest.
>
> 22 These views have been applied in the CCAA context. But what comprises those 'not so dissimilar' rights and what are the components of that 'common interest' have been the subject of debate and evolution over time. It is clear that classification is a fact-driven exercise, dependent upon the circumstances of each particular case. Moreover, given the nature of the CCAA process and the underlying flexibility of that process — a flexibility which is its genius — there can be no fixed rules that must apply in all cases.

24 Counsel for the Federal Crown Corporations, as well as for the Nova Scotia Crown Corporations, suggest that carving out a separate class for Royal Bank, from the remaining secured creditors, runs contrary to the principles outlined by Justice Paperny in *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re, supra.* Although not disputing the appropriateness of the creation of a class of creditors of "lease lenders", "unsecured creditors", and "shareholders", Counsel suggest the classification of two classes of secured creditors would create fragmentation that is unnecessary and contrary to the "commonality of interest" principle. Secured creditors are, in the submission of counsel, secured creditors and there is no reasonable, logical, rational and practical reason not to have all the secured debt within the same class.

25 Counsel for the Federal Crown Corporations refers to *Keddy Motor Inns Ltd., Re* (1992), 13 C.B.R. (3d) 245 (N.S. C.A.), and the decision of Justice Freeman, where at paras. 21-22, he notes an article by Ronald N. Robertson, Q.C., in a publication entitled "Legal Problems on Reorganization of Major Financial and Commercial Debtors", Canadian Bar Association — Ontario Continuing Legal Education, April 5, 1983. The author comments to the effect that the CCAA authorizes the Court to alter the legal rights of parties, other than the debtor company, without their consent, and secondly that the purpose of the Act is to facilitate reorganizations and this is a factor to be considered at every stage of the process, including in the classification of creditors. As such, to accept "identity of interest" in classification of creditors would result in a "multiplicity of discreet classes" making reorganizations difficult, if not impossible.

26 Counsel's submission also refers to *Fairview Industries Ltd., Re* (1991), 11 C.B.R. (3d) 71, 1991 CarswellNS 36 (N.S. T.D.), where Glube, C.J.T.D., (as she then was), at paras. 32-33, commented as follows:

> I have no difficulty in rationalizing the decisions in *Norcen* and *Elan*. In my opinion, whether the security is on 'quick' assets or 'fixed' assets, the companies listed under Fairview secured creditors and Shelburne secured creditors, except for Central Capital, all have a first charge. There does not have to be a commonality of interest of the debts involved, provided the legal interests are the same. In addition, it does not automatically follow that those who have different commercial interests, that is, those who hold security on 'quick' assets, are necessarily in conflict with those who hold security on hard or fixed assets. Just saying there is a conflict is insufficient to warrant putting them into separate classes.
>
> In the present case, all the secured creditors of Fairview and all the secured creditors of Shelburne, except Central Capital, have a first charge of some sort, even though the security of each differs. They have a common legal interest, excluding Central Capital. I find that there is a commonality or community of interest of the secured creditors of Fairview and the secured creditors of Shelburne. Based on this position, I find that the Fairview secured creditors shall continue as one group.

27 The submission by counsel for the Federal Crown Corporations continues:

> Like the situation in Fairview, both RBC and the Term Lenders each have a first charge of some sort, even though the type of asset differs. There is clearly a common legal interest in the debtor Company amongst each of the secured creditors. The distinction between security on 'quick' assets such as accounts receivable and inventory as opposed to security on hard or fixed assets as has been put forward by RBC (herein referred to as Royal), throughout is clearly not determinative.

28 Counsel also references the additional comments of Chief Justice Glube, at para. 19:

> I suggest that all counsel are reading too much into the two decisions *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. V. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.* (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 20, 64 AltaL.R. (2d) 139,[1989] 2 W.W.R. 566 (Q.B.) and *Nova Metal Products Inc. v.Comiskey (Trustee of)* (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) 41 O.A.C. 282, 1 O.R. (3d) 289 [hereinafter *Elan*]. In my opinion the two cases do not set up two 'lines' of cases reaching different conclusions. I suggest that each was decided on their particular facts. The court should be wary about setting up rigid guidelines which 'must' be followed. The *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (the 'C.C.A.A.') is intended to be a fairly summary procedure and should not be stretched out over months and years with protracted litigation. Quite definitely, each case must be decided on its own unique set of circumstances.

29 One of the circumstances considered in the Company's proposal to separately classify the term lenders and the operating lender is the opinion of the Monitor that upon liquidation the operating lender would recover the full amount of its operating loan, while there would be a substantial shortfall in respect to the term lenders. This opinion reflects the reported levels of receivables and inventory outlined in the various Monitor's reports, as compared with the indebtedness to the operating lender, and suggests that on a liquidation the operating lender would be successful in retiring its outstanding indebtedness. Also, the appraisal of the fixed assets, on the basis of an orderly liquidation, would appear to suggest a substantial shortfall in realization by the term lenders. Clearly, in respect to the relationship to the Company by the operating lender and the term lenders, the prospects for recovery on an orderly liquidation, being considerably different, would not be consistent with the "commonality" principle, at least, as it may relate to the prospects for recovery. There is also a very real difference in the nature of the assets on which they are secured, in that in the one instance the security is on fixed real assets and in the other on receivable and inventory. The latter are subject to ongoing fluctuations as the Company continues in operation.

5. Conclusion on Classification

30 There is nothing in the submission of Counsel, nor in the circumstances to warrant altering the classification proposed by the Company. BML's security has, apparently, little or no value. Each of the Federal Crown Corporations and the Nova Scotia Crown Corporations appear to have sufficient votes to derail the proposed Plan. There is no reason to deny the Royal Bank, who would then not have such a veto over the Plan, inclusion in the fixed asset lenders security classification. The Company has

not suggested they be in the same class, and no reason has been advanced to warrant departing from the Company's proposed classification.

3. The Creditors' Meeting

31 Sections 4 and 5 of the CCAA provide:

> 4. Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its unsecured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company, of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors, and, if the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.
>
> 5. Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its secured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company or of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors, and, if the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.

32 Counsel for the Company references the observation of Paperny J. in *Fracmaster Ltd., Re* (1999), 11 C.B.R. (4th) 204 (Alta. Q.B.), at para.24:

> 24 I also note the principle that even where a plan is proposed, the court need not order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors. That is because ss.4 and 5 of the CCAA, which provide for such meetings, are permissive, not mandatory. As Houlden and Morawetz state at 10A-11: 'If the court believes that the proposed plan or arrangement is not in the best interests of creditors, it may refuse to make the order...[I]f the plan lacks economic reality, the court will also refuse to make the order.'

33 In the circumstances and having regard to my earlier comments, I am satisfied there should be a meeting of creditors to consider and vote on the Plan.

4. Extension of Stay of Proceedings

34 In view of the preliminary approval of the Plan and the calling of a meeting of creditors to consider and vote on the Plan, it necessarily follows that there should be an extension of the stay to enable the Company to present the Plan to the creditors, to conduct the claims process as previously ordered and to determine whether the creditors have voted in favour or against the Plan. In *Cansugar Inc., Re*, 2004 NBQB 7 (N.B. Q.B.), Justice Glennie, in referencing s.11(6) of the CCAA, noted:

> In my opinion, the requirements of section 11(6) of the C.C.A.A. have been satisfied in this case. The continuation of the stay is supported by the overriding purpose of the C.C.A.A., which is to allow an insolvent company a reasonable period of time to reorganize and propose a plan of arrangement to its creditors and the Court, and to prevent maneuvers for positioning among creditors in the interim. [emphasis added by counsel]

35 To similar effect, Topolniski J. in *San Francisco Gifts Ltd., Re*, 2005 ABQB 91 (Alta. Q.B.), at para. 28 observed:

> The court's role during the stay period has been described as a supervisory one, meant to: '...preserve the status quo and to move the process along to the point where an arrangement or compromise is approved or it is evident that the attempt is doomed to failure.' That is not to say that the supervising judge is limited to a myopic view of balance sheets, scheduling of creditors' meetings and the like. On the contrary, this role requires attention to changing circumstances and vigilance in ensuring that a delicate balance of interests is maintained. [emphasis added by counsel]

36 Notwithstanding the objection by the Royal Bank, including the potential prejudice as outlined by counsel in the event there is a deterioration in the value of the assets securing its operating loan, continuation of the stay is to be supported in view of the overriding purpose of the CCAA "...to allow an insolvent company a reasonable period of time to reorganize and propose a plan of arrangement to its creditors and the court...".

5. Additional DIP Financing

37 According to counsel, providing the court approves presentation of the Plan to the creditors and the extension is granted, the Company will require additional DIP financing. In referencing the cash flow projections and the anticipated need for additional financing, counsel notes that the proposed increase is somewhat smaller than the earlier cash flow projections had anticipated. The reason, counsel suggests, is "...due in part to a slower than anticipated growth in sales which has reduced the Company's cash requirements." Counsel continues:

> It is clear from the cash flow reports prepared by the Company, however, that there is indeed a growth in sales which will require additional financing.

38 Although approval has already been made for initial DIP financing, with its "super-priority" security in favour of the DIP lender and later for additional DIP financing, each application must be considered on its own merits and in the circumstances then existing. In respect to this Application, counsel again references the observations of C. Campbell J. In *Manderley Corp., Re* (2005), 10 C.B.R. (5th) 48 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para.18:

> 18 The operative legal principles are set out in the following quotations from Houlden and Morawetz' Bankruptcy & Insolvency Analysis (Carswell, 2004), section N16 — Stay of Proceedings — CCAA — at page 18:
>
> > Although the C.C.A.A. makes no provision for DIP financing, it seems to be well established that, under its inherent powers, the court may give a priority for such financing and for professional fees incurred in connection with the working out of a C.C.A.A. plan.

Also referenced is *Hunters Trailer & Marine Ltd., Re* (2001), 295 A.R. 113 (Alta. Q.B.), and the comment by Wachowich J., at para. 32:

> 32 Having reviewed the jurisprudence on this issue, I am satisfied that the Court has the inherent or equitable jurisdiction to grant a super-priority for DIP financing and administrative charges, including the fees and disbursements of the professional advisors who guide a debtor company through the CCAA process.

Counsel notes the three issues outlined by Glennie J. in *Simpson's Island Salmon Ltd., Re* [2005 CarswellNB 781 (N.B. Q.B.)], *supra*, at paras.16-17 and 19:

> 16 In order for DIP financing with super-priority status to be authorized pursuant to the CCAA, there must be cogent evidence that the benefit of such financing clearly outweighs the potential prejudice to secured creditors whose security is being eroded. See *United Used Auto & Truck Parts Ltd., Re*, [1999] B.C.J. No. 2754 (B.C.S.C. [In Chambers]), affirmed [2000] B.C.J. No. 409 (B.C.C.A.)
>
> 17 DIP financing ought to be restricted to what is reasonably necessary to meet the debtor's urgent needs while a plan of arrangement or compromises is being developed.
>
> 19 A Court should not authorize DIP financing pursuant to the CCAA unless there is a reasonable prospect that the debtor will be able to make an arrangement with its creditors and rehabilitate itself.

39 Counsel recognizes the court is engaged in a "balancing act that is the hallmark of DIP financing" as declared by C. Campbell J. in *Manderley*, *supra*, at para.27. At para.18, in *Simpson's Island Salmon Ltd.*, *supra*, Justice Glennie observed:

> Failure to grant an increase in the Administrative Charge would result in the Applicants no longer being able to continue their attempts at restructuring.

40 Counsel suggests a similar result would occur if the proposed additional DIP was not approved and that so long as a reasonable chance of rehabilitation remains,

> ...a company under CCAA protection should be afforded what measures are available to aid that rehabilitation, despite the concomitant prejudice to its creditors. A successful restructuring continues to be in the best interest of both the Company and its creditors.

In counsel's submission, the "small additional prejudice to creditors" in allowing the additional DIP financing is "far outweighed by the potential benefits to all of the Company's stakeholders of allowing the Company the opportunity to present the Plan." Counsel's written submission concludes by referencing *Dylex Ltd., Re* (1995), 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) and the comment by Farley, J., to the effect that "...the mere fact that a significant secured creditor objects to such financing in no way precludes the Court's ability to allow DIP financing." The submission continues by noting the observation of Wachowich J. in *Hunters, supra*, at para. 32:

> ...If super-priority cannot be granted without the consent of secured creditors, the protection of the CCAA effectively would be denied a debtor company in many cases.

41 In his objection, counsel for the Royal Bank reiterates the bank's concern that DIP financing will erode its security. Counsel speculates that the increase in DIP financing means the margin of its debt to the current assets secured by its security would be reduced and indeed, applying a 50 per cent margin rate, would be eliminated. In his written submission, counsel observed:

> Although there is no evidence before the Court as to the estimated diminution in value of current assets in the event of liquidation, there is such evidence regarding the fixed assets. The appraisal provided by Universal Worldwide LLC estimates the value of the fixed assets on 'orderly liquidation' at $2,850,000US but only $950,000 on 'quick/forced sale', a drop of 2/3 in the later case. A drop in value of 50% in the case of the current assets would see the Bank get nothing in the event that the additional DIP financing sought were granted and that a liquidation ensued. This is without consideration of any impact from the Administration Charge.

42 It is clear the value of the security held by the Royal Bank is at risk by the continuation of the stay and the granting of additional DIP financing to enable the Company to present its Plan to its creditors for their consideration. However, the latest report of the Monitor does not reflect a substantial erosion in the value of the assets secured by the Royal Bank. Exhibit 3 to the Monitor's Report of November 26, 2007 shows accounts receivable of $778,383.00, while on November 23 the amount was $958,232.00. With respect to inventory, the raw materials at September 21 are reported at $944,393.00 and finished goods at $561,220.00, for a total of $1,505,613.00. The totals for November 23 were raw materials at $723,465.00 and finished goods at $438,165.00, for a total of $1,161,630.00. Although there has been a decline, it would not appear to be substantial and no evidence was submitted to suggest any greater concern about a potential deterioration during the period encompassed by the request to extend the stay. Although the additional DIP, together with the additional administrative charges, will impact on any recovery on realization of assets in general, there is, notwithstanding the speculation of counsel for the Royal Bank, no evidence the bank's security will be rendered valueless in the event of an eventual liquidation, particularly in view of the allocation of approximately 95 per cent of the burden of the DIP and administrative charges to the assets secured to the Federal Crown Corporations and the Nova Scotia Crown Corporations. In the initial report by the Monitor, the preliminary calculation of secured creditor percentages was 5.53 per cent for the Royal Bank, (taking into account both its operating loan and lease loan), with the remainder to the other secured creditors, including creditors holding leases. Although counsel for the Nova Scotia Crown Corporations suggested he would be submitting a revised figure for their loans, he further indicated it would not materially affect the percentages as outlined in the Monitor's Report. As such, the responsibility of the Royal Bank for the expenses of the restructuring are slightly over five per cent, and absent evidence of a material deterioration in the value of the assets secured under its security, as well as the value of the assets held by the other secured creditors, and in view of the need for the additional DIP financing to permit the Company to meet with and present to its creditors the Plan, I am satisfied to approve the additional financing and to grant the necessary priority contemplated by it.

Application granted.

End of Document

TAB 10

2012 ONSC 1299
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

First Leaside Wealth Management Inc., Re

2012 CarswellOnt 2559, 2012 ONSC 1299, 213 A.C.W.S. (3d) 266

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of First Leaside Wealth Management Inc., First Leaside Finance Inc., First Leaside Securities Inc., FL Securities Inc., First Leaside Management Inc., First Leaside Accounting and Tax Services Inc., First Leaside Holdings Inc., 2086056 Ontario Inc., First Leaside Realty Inc., First Leaside Capital Inc., First Leaside Realty II Inc., First Leaside Investments Inc., 965010 Ontario Inc., 1045517 Ontario Inc., 1024919 Ontario Inc., 1031628 Ontario Inc., 1056971 Ontario Inc., 1376095 Ontario Inc., 1437290 Ontario Ltd., 1244428 Ontario Ltd., PrestonOne Development (Canada) Inc., PrestonTwo Development (Canada) Inc., PrestonThree Development (Canada) Inc., PrestonFour Development (Canada) Inc., 2088543 Ontario Inc., 2088544 Ontario Inc., 2088545 Ontario Inc., 1331607 Ontario Inc., Queenston Manor General Partner Inc., 1408927 Ontario Ltd., 2107738 Ontario Inc., 1418361 Ontario Ltd., 2128054 Ontario Inc., 2069212 Ontario Inc., 1132413 Ontario Inc., 2067171 Ontario Inc., 2085306 Ontario Inc., 2059035 Ontario Inc., 2086218 Ontario Inc., 2085438 Ontario Inc., First Leaside Visions Management Inc., 1049015 Ontario Inc., 1049016 Ontario Inc., 2007804 Ontario Inc., 2019418 Ontario Inc., FL Research Management Inc., 970877 Ontario Inc., 1031628 Ontario Inc., 1045516 Ontario Inc., 2004516 Ontario Inc., 2192341 Ontario Inc., and First Leaside Fund Management Inc., Applicants

D.M. Brown J.

Heard: February 23, 2012
Judgment: February 26, 2012
Docket: CV-12-9617-00CL

Counsel: J. Birch, D. Ward, for Applicants
P. Huff, C. Burr, for Proposed Monitor, Grant Thornton Limited
D. Bish, for Independent Directors
B. Empey, for Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada
J. Grout, for Ontario Securities Commission
R. Oliver, for Kenaidan Contracting Limited
J. Dietrich — Proposed Representative Counsel, for the investors
E. Garbe, for Structform International Limited
N. Richter, for Gilbert Steel Limited
M. Sanford, for Janick Electrick Limited
M. Konyukhova, for Midland Loan Services Inc.
C. Prophet, for Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce

Subject: Insolvency; Corporate and Commercial

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Indalex Ltd., Re (2011), 2011 CarswellOnt 2458, 2011 ONCA 265, 2011 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8433, 104 O.R. (3d) 641, 75 C.B.R. (5th) 19, 17 P.P.S.A.C. (3d) 194, 331 D.L.R. (4th) 352, 276 O.A.C. 347, 89 C.C.P.B. 39 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

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Nortel Networks Corp., Re (2009), 256 O.A.C. 131, 2009 CarswellOnt 7383, 2009 ONCA 833, 59 C.B.R. (5th) 23, 77 C.C.P.B. 161, *(*sub nom. *Sproule v. Nortel Networks Corp.)* 2010 C.L.L.C. 210-005, *(*sub nom. *Sproule v. Nortel Networks Corp., Re)* 99 O.R. (3d) 708 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Priszm Income Fund, Re (2011), 2011 ONSC 2061, 2011 CarswellOnt 2258, 75 C.B.R. (5th) 213 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered

Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. v. Saskatchewan (2005), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 188, 2005 SCC 13, 2005 CarswellSask 162, 2005 CarswellSask 163, 250 D.L.R. (4th) 411, [2005] 9 W.W.R. 403 (S.C.C.) — considered

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299, 2004 CarswellOnt 1211 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re (2010), *(*sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. Canada (A.G.))* [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, *(*sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada)* 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), *(*sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada)* 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), *(*sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re)* 503 W.A.C. 1, *(*sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re)* 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 2010 SCC 60, 2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 CarswellBC 3420, 409 N.R. 201, *(*sub nom. *Ted LeRoy Trucking Ltd., Re)* 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383 (S.C.C.) — considered

Timminco Ltd., Re (2012), 2012 ONSC 506, 95 C.C.P.B. 48, 2012 CarswellOnt 1263, 85 C.B.R. (5th) 169 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3
Generally — referred to

s. 2 "insolvent person" — considered

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

s. 2 — considered

s. 2 "secured creditor" — considered

s. 3(1) — considered

s. 11.51 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.51(1) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.52 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.52(1) [en. 2007, c. 36, s. 66] — considered

Constitution Act, 1867, (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5
Generally — referred to

s. 91 ¶ 21 — considered

s. 92 ¶ 13 — considered

APPLICATION by members of insolvent group of companies for initial order under *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.

***D.M. Brown J.*:**

I. Overview: CCAA Initial Order

1 On Thursday, February 23, 2012, I granted an Initial Order under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, in respect of the Applicants. These are my Reasons for that decision.

II. The applicant corporations

2 The Applicants are members of the First Leaside group of companies. They are described in detail in the affidavit of Gregory MacLeod, the Chief Restructuring Officer of First Leaside Wealth Management ("FLWM"), so I intend only refer in these Reasons to the key entities in the group. The parent corporation, FLWM, owns several subsidiaries, including the applicant, First Leaside Securities Inc. ("FLSI"). According to Mr. MacLeod, the Group's operations centre on FLWM and FLSI.

3 FLSI is an Ontario investment dealer that manages clients' investment portfolios which, broadly speaking, consist of non-proprietary Marketable Securities as well as proprietary equity and debt securities issued by First Leaside (the so-called "FL Products"). All segregated Marketable Securities are held in segregated client accounts with Penson Financial Services Canada Inc.

4 First Leaside designed its FL Products to provide investors with consistent monthly distributions. First Leaside acts as a real estate syndicate, purchasing real estate through limited partnerships with a view to rehabilitating the properties for lease at

higher rates or eventual resale. First Leaside incorporated special-purpose corporations to act as general partners in the various LPs it set up. The general partners of First Leaside's Canadian LPs — i.e. those which own property in Canada — are applicants in this proceeding. First Leaside also seeks to extend the benefits of the Initial Order to the corresponding LPs.

5 First Leaside has two types of LPs: individual LPs that acquire and operate a single property or development, and aggregator LPs that hold units of multiple LPs. Investors have invested in both kinds of LPs. In paragraph 49 of his affidavit Mr. MacLeod detailed the LPs within First Leaside. While most First Leaside LPs hold interests in identifiable properties, for a few, called "Blind Pool LPs", clients invest funds without knowing where the funds likely were to be invested. Those LPs are described in paragraph 51 of Mr. MacLeod's affidavit.

6 The applicant, First Leaside Finance Inc. ("FL Finance"), acted as a "central bank" for the First Leaside group of entities.

III. The material events leading to this application

7 In the fall of 2009 the Ontario Securities Commission began investigating First Leaside. In March, 2011, First Leaside retained the proposed Monitor, Grant Thornton Limited, to review and make recommendations about First Leaside's businesses. Around the same time First Leaside arranged for appraisals to be performed of various properties.

8 Grant Thornton released its report on August 19, 2011. For purposes of this application Grant Thornton made several material findings:

> (i) There exist significant interrelationships between the entities in the FL Group which result in a complex corporate structure;
>
> (ii) Certain LPs have been a drain on the resources of the Group as a result of recurring operating losses and property rehabilitation costs; and,
>
> (iii) The future viability of the FL Group was contingent on its ability to raise new capital:
>
> > If the FL Group was restricted from raising new capital, it would likely be unable to continue its operations in the ordinary course, as it would have insufficient revenue to support its infrastructure, staffing costs, distributions, and to meet their funding requirements for existing projects.

9 As a result of the report First Leaside hired additional staff to improve accounting resources and financial planning. Last November the Board appointed an Independent Committee to assume all decision-making authority in respect of First Leaside; the Group's founder, David Phillips, was no longer in charge of its management.

10 FLSI is regulated by both the OSC and the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada ("IIROC"). In October, 2011, IIROC issued FLSI a discretionary early warning level 2 letter prohibiting the company from reducing capital and placing other restrictions on its activities. At the same time the OSC told First Leaside that unless satisfactory arrangements were made to deal with its situation, the OSC almost certainly would take regulatory action, including seeking a cease trade order.

11 First Leaside agreed to a voluntary cease trade, retained Grant Thornton to act as an independent monitor, informed investors about those developments, and made available the August Grant Thornton report.

12 Because the cease trade restricted First Leaside's ability to raise capital, the Independent Committee decided in late November to cease distributions to clients, including distributions to LP unit holders, interest payments on client notes/debts, and dividends on common or preferred shares.

13 In December the Independent Committee decided to retain Mr. MacLeod as CRO for First Leaside and asked him to develop a workout plan, which he finalized in late January, 2012. Mr. MacLeod deposed that the downturn in the economy has resulted in First Leaside realizing lower operating income while incurring higher operational costs. In his affidavit Mr. MacLeod set out his conclusion about a workout plan:

> After carefully analyzing the situation, my ultimate conclusion was that it was too risky and uncertain for First Leaside to pursue a resumption of previous operations, including the raising of capital. My recommendation to the Independent Committee was that First Leaside instead undertake an orderly wind-down of operations, involving:
>
> (a) Completing any ongoing property development activity which would create value for investors;
>
> (b) Realizing upon assets when it is feasible to do so (even where optimal realization might occur over the next 12 to 36 months);
>
> (c) Dealing with the significant inter-company debts; and,
>
> (d) Distributing proceeds to investors.

Mr. MacLeod further deposed:

> [T]he best way to promote this wind-down is through a filing under the *CCAA* so that all issues — especially the numerous investor and creditor claims and inter-company claims — can be dealt with in one forum under the supervision of the court.

The Independent Committee approved Mr. MacLeod's recommendations. This application resulted.

IV. Availability of CCAA

A. The financial condition of the applicants

14 According to Mr. MacLeod, First Leaside has over $370 million in assets under management. Some of those, however, are Marketable Securities. First Leaside is proposing that clients holding Marketable Securities (which are held in segregated accounts) be free to transfer them to another investment dealer during the *CCAA* process. As to the value of FL Products, Mr. MacLeod deposed that "it remains to be determined specifically how much value will be realized for investors on the LP units, debt instruments, and shares issued by the various First Leaside entities."

15 First Leaside's debt totals approximately $308 million: $176 million to secured creditors (mostly mortgagees) and $132 million to unsecured creditors, including investors holding notes or other debt instruments.

16 Mr. MacLeod summarized his assessment of the financial status of the First Leaside Group as follows:

> [S]ince GTL reported that the aggregate value of properties in the First Leaside exceeded the value of the properties, there will be net proceeds remaining to provide at least some return to subordinate creditors or equity holders (i.e., LP unit holders and corporation shareholders) in many of the First Leaside entities. The recovery will, of course, vary depending on the entity. At this stage, however, it is fair to conclude that there is a material equity deficit both in individual First Leaside entities and in the overall First Leaside group.

17 In his affidavit Mr. MacLeod also deposed, with respect to the financial situation of First Leaside, that:

> (i) The cease trade placed severe financial constraints on First Leaside as almost every business unit depended on the ability of FLWM and its subsidiaries to raise capital from investors;
>
> (ii) There are immediate cash flow crises at FLWM and most LPs;
>
> (iii) FLWM's cash reserves had fallen from $2.8 million in November, 2011 to $1.6 million at the end of this January;
>
> (iv) Absent new cash from asset disposals, current cash reserves would be exhausted in April;
>
> (v) At the end of December, 2011 Ventures defaulted by failing to make a principal mortgage payment of $4.25 million owing to KingSett;

(vi) Absent cash flow from FLWM a default is imminent for Investor's Harmony property;

(vii) First Leaside lacks the liquidity or refinancing options to rehabilitate a number of the properties and execute on its business plan; and,

(viii) First Leaside generally has been able to make mortgage payments to its creditors, but in the future it will be difficult to do so given the need to expend monies on property development and upgrading activities

18 In his description of the status of the employees of the Applicants, Mr. MacLeod did not identify any issue concerning a pension funding deficiency. [1] The internally-prepared 2010 FLWM financial statements did not record any such liability. Grant Thornton did not identify any such issue in its Pre-filing Report.

19 First Leaside is not proposing to place all of its operations under court-supervised insolvency proceedings. It does not plan to seek Chapter 11 protection for its Texas properties since it believes they may be able to continue operations over the anticipated wind-up period using cash flows they generate and pay their liabilities as they become due. Nor does First Leaside seek to include in this *CCAA* proceeding the First Leaside Venture LP ("Ventures") which owns and operates several properties in Ontario and British Columbia. On February 15, 2012 Ventures and Bridge Gap Konsult Inc. signed a non-binding term sheet to provide some bridge financing for Ventures. First Leaside decided not to include certain Ventures-related limited partnerships in the *CCAA* application at this stage, [2] while reserving the right to later bring a motion to extend the Initial Order and stay to these Excluded LPs. The Initial Order which I signed reflected that reservation.

20 As noted above, over the better part of the past year the proposed Monitor, Grant Thornton, has become familiar with the affairs of the First Leaside Group as a result of the review it conducted for its August, 2011 report. Last November First Leaside retained Grant Thornton as an independent monitor of its business.

21 In its Pre-filing Report Grant Thornton noted that the last available financial statements for FLWM were internally prepared ones for the year ended December 31, 2010. They showed a net loss of about $2.863 million. The Pre-filing Report contained a 10-week cash flow projection (ending April 27, 2012) prepared by the First Leaside Group. The Cash Flow Projection does not contemplate servicing interest and principal payments during the projection period. On that basis the Cash Flow Projection showed the Group's combined closing bank balance declining from $6.97 million to $4.144 million by the end of the projection period. Grant Thornton reviewed the Cash Flow Projection and stated that it reflected the probable and hypothetical assumptions on which it was prepared and that the assumptions were suitably supported and consistent with the plans of the First Leaside Group and provided a reasonable basis for the Cash Flow Projection.

22 Grant Thornton reported that certain creditors, specifically construction lien claimants, had commenced enforcement proceedings and it concluded:

Given creditors' actions to date and due to the complicated nature of the FL Group's business, the complex corporate structure and the number of competing stakeholders, it is unlikely that the FL Group will be able to conduct an orderly wind-up or continue to rehabilitate properties without the stability provided by a formal Court supervised restructuring process.

. . .

As the various stakeholder interests are in many cases intertwined, including intercompany claims, the granting of the relief requested would provide a single forum for the numerous stakeholders of the FL Group to be heard and to deal with such parties' claims in an orderly manner, under the supervision of the Court, a CRO and a Court-appointed Monitor. In particular, a simple or forced divestiture of the properties of the FL Group would not only erode potential investor value, but would not provide the structure necessary to reconcile investor interests on an equitable and ratable basis.

A stay of proceedings for both the Applicants and the LPs is necessary if it is deemed appropriate by this Honourable Court to allow the FL Group to maintain its business and to allow the FL Group the opportunity to develop, refine and implement their restructuring/wind-up plan(s) in a stabilized environment.

B. Findings

23 I am satisfied that the Applicants are "companies" within the meaning of the *CCAA* and that the total claims against the Applicants, as an affiliated group of companies, is greater than $5 million.

24 Are the Applicant companies "debtor companies" in the sense that they are insolvent? For the purposes of the *CCAA* a company may be insolvent if it falls within the definition of an insolvent person in section 2 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or if its financial circumstances fall within the meaning of insolvent as described in *Stelco Inc., Re* which include a financially troubled corporation that is "reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within reasonable proximity of time as compared with the time reasonably required to implement a restructuring". [3]

25 When looked at as a group the Applicants fall within the extended meaning of "insolvent": as a result of the cease trade their ability to raise capital has been severely restricted; cash reserves fell significantly from November until the time of filing, and the Cash Flow Projection indicates that cash reserves will continue to decline even with the cessation of payments on mortgages and other debt; Mr. MacLeod estimated that cash reserves would run out in April; distributions to unit holders were suspended last November; and, some formal mortgage defaults have occurred.

26 However, a secured creditor mortgagee, Midland Loan Services Inc., submitted that to qualify for *CCAA* protection each individual applicant must be a "debtor company" and that in the case of one applicant, Queenston Manor General Partner Inc., that company was not insolvent. In his affidavit Mr. MacLeod deposed that the Queenston Manor LP is owned by the First Leaside Expansion Limited Partnership ("FLEX"). Queenston owns and operates a 77-unit retirement complex in St. Catherines, has been profitable since 2008 and is expected to remain profitable through 2013. Queenston has been listed for sale, and management currently is considering an offer to purchase the property. Midland Loan submitted that in light of that financial situation, no finding could be made that the applicant, Queenston Manor General Partner Inc., was a "debtor company".

27 Following that submission I asked Applicants' counsel where in the record one could find evidence about the insolvency of each individual Applicant. That prompted a break in the hearing, at the end of which the Applicants filed a supplementary affidavit from Mr. MacLeod. Indicating that one of the biggest problems facing the Applicants was the lack of complete and up-to-date records, in consultation with the Applicants' CFO Mr. MacLeod submitted a chart providing, to the extent possible, further information about the financial status of each Applicant. That chart broke down the financial status of each of the 52 Applicants as follows:

Insolvent	28
Dormant	15
Little or no realizable assets	5
More information to be made available to the court	3
Other: management revenue stopped in 2010; $70,000 cash; $270,000 in related-company receivables	1

Queenston Manor General Partner Inc. was one of the applicants for which "more information would be made available to the court".

28 As I have found, when looked at as a group, the Applicants fall within the extended meaning of "insolvent". When one descends a few levels and looks at the financial situation of some of the aggregator LPs, such as FLEX, Mr. MacLeod deposed that FLEX is one of the largest net debtors — i.e. it is unable to repay inter-company balances from operating cash flows and lacks sufficient net asset value to settle the intercompany balances through the immediate liquidation of assets. The evidence

therefore supports a finding that the corporate general partner of FLEX is insolvent. Queenston Manor is one of several assets owned by FLEX, albeit an asset which uses the form of a limited partnership.

29 If an insolvent company owns a healthy asset in the form of a limited partnership does the health of that asset preclude it from being joined as an applicant in a *CCAA* proceeding? In the circumstances of this case it does not. The jurisprudence under the *CCAA* provides that the protection of the Act may be extended not only to a "debtor company", but also to entities who, in a very practical sense, are "necessary parties" to ensure that that stay order works. Morawetz J. put the matter the following way in *Priszm Income Fund, Re*:

> The *CCAA* definition of an eligible company does not expressly include partnerships. However, *CCAA* courts have exercised jurisdiction to stay proceedings with respect to partnerships and limited partnerships where it is just and convenient to do so. See *Lehndorff, supra*, and *Re Canwest Global Communications Corp*., 2009 CarswellOnt 6184 (S.C.J.).
>
> The courts have held that this relief is appropriate where the operations of the debtor companies are so intertwined with those of the partnerships or limited partnerships in question, that not extending the stay would significantly impair the effectiveness of a stay in respect of the debtor companies. [4]

30 Although section 3(1) of the *CCAA* requires a court on an initial application to inquire into the solvency of any applicant, the jurisprudence also requires a court to take into account the relationship between any particular company and the larger group of which it is a member, as well as the need to place that company within the protection of the Initial Order so that the order will work effectively. On the evidence filed I had no hesitation in concluding that given the insolvency of the overall First Leaside Group and the high degree of inter-connectedness amongst the members of that group, the protection of the *CCAA* needed to extend both to the Applicants and the limited partnerships listed in Schedule "A" to the Initial Order. The presence of all those entities within the ambit of the Initial Order is necessary to effect an orderly winding-up of the insolvent group as a whole. Consequently, whether Queenston Manor General Partner Inc. falls under the Initial Order by virtue of being a "debtor company", or by virtue of being a necessary party as part of an intertwined whole, is, in the circumstances of this case, a distinction without a practical difference.

31 In sum, I am satisfied that those Applicants identified as "insolvent" on the chart attached to Mr. MacLeod's supplementary affidavit are "debtor companies" within the meaning of the *CCAA* and that the other Applicants, as well as the limited partnerships listed on Schedule "A" of the Initial Order, are entities to which it is necessary and appropriate to extend *CCAA* protection.

C. "Liquidation" CCAA

32 While in most circumstances resort is made to the *CCAA* to "permit the debtor to continue to carry on business and, where possible, avoid the social and economic costs of liquidating its assets" and to create "conditions for preserving the *status quo* while attempts are made to find common ground amongst stakeholders for a reorganization that is fair to all", the reality is that "reorganizations of differing complexity require different legal mechanisms." [5] That reality has led courts to recognize that the *CCAA* may be used to sell substantially all of the assets of a debtor company to preserve it as a going concern under new ownership, [6] or to wind-up or liquidate it. In *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* [7] Farley J. observed:

> It appears to me that the purpose of the *CCAA* is also to protect the interests of creditors and to enable an orderly distribution of the debtor company's affairs. This may involve a winding-up or liquidation of a company or simply a substantial downsizing of its business operations, provided the same is proposed in the best interests of the creditors generally. See *Assoc. Investors, supra*, at p. 318; *Re Amirault Co*. (1951), 32 C.B.R. 1986, (1951) 5 D.L.R. 203 (N.S.S.C.) at pp. 187-8 (C.B.R.).

33 In the decision of *Associated Investors of Canada Ltd., Re* referred to by Farley J., the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench stated:

> The realities of the modern marketplace dictate that courts of law respond to commercial problems in innovative ways without sacrificing legal principle. In my opinion, the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act is not restricted in its application to companies which are to be kept in business. Moreover, the Court is not without the ability to address within its jurisdiction the concerns expressed in the Ontario cases. The Act may be invoked as a means of liquidating a company and winding-up its affairs but only if certain conditions precedent are met:
>
> > 1. It must be demonstrated that benefits would likely flow to Creditors that would not otherwise be available if liquidation were effected pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act or the Winding-Up Act.
> >
> > 2. The Court must concurrently provide directions pursuant to compatible legislation that ensures judicial control over the liquidation process and an effective means whereby the affairs of the company may be investigated and the results of that investigation made available to the Court.
> >
> > 3. A Plan of Arrangement should not receive judicial sanction until the Court has in its possession, all of the evidence necessary to allow the Court to properly exercise its discretion according to standards of fairness and reasonableness, absent any findings of illegality. [8]

The editors of *The 2012 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* take some issue with the extent of those conditions:

> With respect, these conditions may be too rigorous. If the court finds that the plan is fair and reasonable and in the best interests of creditors, and there are cogent reasons for using the statute rather than the *BIA* or *WURA*, there seems no reason why an orderly liquidation could not be carried out under the *CCAA*. [9]

34 Mr. MacLeod, the CRO, deposed that no viable plan exists to continue First Leaside as a going concern and that the most appropriate course of action is to effect an orderly wind-down of First Leaside's operations over a period of time and in a manner which will create the opportunity to realize improved net asset value. In his professional judgment the *CCAA* offered the most appropriate mechanism by which to conduct such an orderly liquidation:

> [T]he best way to promote this wind-down is through a filing under the *CCAA* so that all issues — especially the numerous investor and creditor claims and the inter-company claims — can be dealt with in one forum under the supervision of the court.

In its Pre-filing Report the Monitor also supported using the *CCAA* to implement the "restructuring/wind-up plan(s) in a stabilized environment".

35 Both the CRO and the proposed Monitor possess extensive knowledge about the workings of the Applicants. Both support a process conducted under the *CCAA* as the most practical and effective way in which to deal with the affairs of this insolvent group of companies. No party contested the availability of the *CCAA* to conduct an orderly winding-up of the affairs of the Applicants (although, as noted, some parties questioned whether certain entities should be included within the scope of the Initial Order). Given that state of affairs, I saw no reason not to accept the professional judgment of the CRO and the proposed Monitor that a liquidation under the *CCAA* was the most appropriate route to take.

36 Moreover, I saw no prejudice to claimant creditors by permitting the winding-up of the First Leaside Group to proceed under the *CCAA* instead of under the *BIA* in view of the convergence which exists between the *CCAA* and *BIA* on the issue of priorities. As the Supreme Court of Canada pointed out in *Century Services*:

> Because the *CCAA* is silent about what happens if reorganization fails, the *BIA* scheme of liquidation and distribution necessarily supplies the backdrop for what will happen if a *CCAA* reorganization is ultimately unsuccessful. [10]

As the British Columbia Court of Appeal observed in *Caterpillar Financial Services Ltd. v. 360networks Corp.* interested parties also use that priorities backdrop to negotiate successful *CCAA* reorganizations:

> While it might be suggested that *CCAA* proceedings may require those with a financial stake in the company, including shareholders and creditors, to compromise some of their rights in order to sustain the business, it cannot be said that the priorities between those with a financial stake are meaningless. The right of creditors to realize on any security may be suspended pending the final approval of the court, but this does not render their potential priority nugatory. Priorities are always in the background and influence the decisions of those who vote on the plan. [11]

37 I therefore concluded that the *CCAA* was available to the Applicants in the circumstances, and I so ordered.

V. Representative Counsel, CRO and Monitor

38 The Applicants sought the appointment of Fraser Milner Casgrain ("FMC") as Representative Counsel to represent the interests of the some 1,200 clients of FLSI in this proceeding, subject to the right of any client to opt-out of such representation. The proposed Monitor expressed the view that it would be in the best interests of the FL Group and its investors to appoint Representative Counsel. No party objected to such an appointment. I reviewed the qualifications and experience of proposed Representative Counsel and its proposed fees, and I was satisfied that it would be appropriate to appoint FMC as Representative Counsel on the terms set out in the Initial Order.

39 The Applicants sought the appointment of G.S. MacLeod & Associates Inc. as CRO of First Leaside. No party objected to that appointment. The Applicants included a copy of the CRO's December 21, 2011 Retention Agreement in their materials. The proposed Monitor stated that the appointment of a CRO was important to ensure an adequate level of senior corporate governance leadership. I agree, especially in light of the withdrawal of Mr. Phillips last November from the management of the Group. The proposed Monitor reported that the terms and conditions of the Retention Agreement were consistent with similar arrangements approved by other courts in *CCAA* proceedings and the remuneration payable was reasonable in the circumstances. As a result, I confirmed the appointment of G.S. MacLeod & Associates Inc. as CRO of First Leaside.

40 Finally, I appointed Grant Thornton as Monitor. No party objected, and Grant Thornton has extensive knowledge of the affairs of the First Leaside Group.

VI. Administration and D&O Charges and their priorities

A. Charges sought

41 The Applicants sought approval, pursuant to section 11.52 of the *CCAA*, of an Administration Charge in the amount of $1 million to secure amounts owed to the Estate Professionals — First Leaside's legal advisors, the CRO, the Monitor, and the Monitor's counsel.

42 They also sought an order indemnifying the Applicants' directors and officers against any post-filing liabilities, together with approval, pursuant to section 11.51 of the *CCAA*, of a Director and Officer's Charge in the amount of $250,000 as security for such an indemnity. Historically the First Leaside Group did not maintain D&O insurance, and the Independent Committee was not able to secure such insurance at reasonable rates and terms when it tried to do so in 2011.

43 The Monitor stated that the amount of the Administration Charge was established based on the Estate Professionals' previous history and experience with restructurings of similar magnitude and complexity. The Monitor regarded the amount of the D&O Charge as reasonable under the circumstances. The Monitor commented that the combined amount of both charges ($1.25 million) was reasonable in comparison with the amount owing to mortgagees ($176 million).

44 In its Pre-filing Report the Monitor did note that shortly before commencing this application the Applicants paid $250,000 to counsel for the Independent Committee of the Board. The Monitor stated that the payment might "be subject to review by the Monitor, if/when it is appointed, in accordance with s. 36.1(1) of the *CCAA*". No party requested an adjudication of this issue, so I refer to the matter simply to record the Monitor's expression of concern.

45 Based on the evidence filed, I concluded that it was necessary to grant the charges sought in order to secure the services of the Estate Professionals and to ensure the continuation of the directors in their offices and that the amounts of the charges were reasonable in the circumstances.

B. Priority of charges

46 The Applicants sought super-priority for the Administration and D&O Charges, with the Administration Charge enjoying first priority and the D&O Charge second, with some modification with respect to the property of FLSI which the Applicants had negotiated with IIROC.

47 In its Pre-filing Report the proposed Monitor stated that the mortgages appeared to be well collateralized, and the mortgagees would not be materially prejudiced by the granting of the proposed priority charges. The proposed Monitor reported that it planned to work with the Applicants to develop a methodology which would allocate the priority charges fairly amongst the Applicants and the included LPs, and the allocation methodology developed would be submitted to the Court for review and approval.

48 In *Indalex Ltd., Re* [12] the Court of Appeal reversed the super-priority initially given to a DIP Charge by the motions judge in an initial order and, instead, following the sale of the debtor company's assets, granted priority to deemed trusts for pension deficiencies. In reaching that decision Court of Appeal observed that affected persons — the pensioners — had not been provided at the beginning of the *CCAA* proceeding with an appropriate opportunity to participate in the issue of the priority of the DIP Charge. [13] Specifically, the Court of Appeal held:

> In this case, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the issue of paramountcy was invoked on April 8, 2009, when Morawetz J. amended the Initial Order to include the super-priority charge. The documents before the court at that time did not alert the court to the issue or suggest that the *PBA* deemed trust would have to be overridden in order for Indalex to proceed with its DIP financing efforts while under *CCAA* protection. To the contrary, the affidavit of Timothy Stubbs, the then CEO of Indalex, sworn April 3, 2009, was the primary source of information before the court. In para. 74 of his affidavit, Mr. Stubbs deposes that Indalex intended to comply with all applicable laws including "regulatory deemed trust requirements".
>
> While the super-priority charge provides that it ranks in priority over trusts, "statutory or otherwise", I do not read it as taking priority over the deemed trust in this case because the deemed trust was not identified by the court at the time the charge was granted and the affidavit evidence suggested such a priority was unnecessary. As no finding of paramountcy was made, valid provincial laws continue to operate: the super-priority charge does not override the *PBA* deemed trust. The two operate sequentially, with the deemed trust being satisfied first from the Reserve Fund. [14]

49 In his recent decision in *Timminco Ltd., Re* [15] ("Timminco I") Morawetz J. described the commercial reality underpinning requests for Administration and D&O Charges in *CCAA* proceedings:

> In my view, in the absence of the court granting the requested super priority and protection, the objectives of the CCAA would be frustrated. It is not reasonable to expect that professionals will take the risk of not being paid for their services, and that directors and officers will remain if placed in a compromised position should the Timminco Entities continue *CCAA* proceedings without the requested protection. The outcome of the failure to provide these respective groups with the requested protection would, in my view, result in the overwhelming likelihood that the *CCAA* proceedings would come to an abrupt halt, followed, in all likelihood, by bankruptcy proceedings. [16]

50 In its Pre-filing Report the proposed Monitor expressed the view that if the priority charges were not granted, the First Leaside Group likely would not be able to proceed under the *CCAA*.

51 In my view, absent an express order to the contrary by the initial order applications judge, the issue of the priorities enjoyed by administration, D&O and DIP lending charges should be finalized at the commencement of a *CCAA* proceeding. Professional services are provided, and DIP funding is advanced, in reliance on super-priorities contained in initial orders. To ensure the integrity, predictability and fairness of the *CCAA* process, certainty must accompany the granting of such super-priority charges. When those important objectives of the *CCAA* process are coupled with the Court of Appeal's holding that parties affected by such priority orders be given an opportunity to raise any paramountcy issue, it strikes me that a judge hearing an initial order application should directly raise with the parties the issue of the priority of the charges sought, including any possible issue of paramountcy in respect of competing claims on the debtor's property based on provincial legislation.

52 Accordingly I raised that issue at the commencement of the hearing last Thursday and requested submissions on the issues of priority and paramountcy from any interested party. Several parties made submissions on those points: (i) the Applicants, proposed Monitor and proposed Representative Counsel submitted that the Court should address any priority or paramountcy issues raised; (ii) IIROC advised that it did not see any paramountcy issue in respect of its interests; (iii) counsel for Midland Loan submitted that a paramountcy issue existed with respect to its client, a secured mortgagee, because it enjoyed certain property rights under provincial mortgage law; she also argued that the less than full day's notice of the hearing given by the Applicants was inadequate to permit the mortgagee to consider its position, and her client should be given seven days to do so; and, (iv) counsel for a construction lien claimant, Structform International, who spoke on behalf of a number of such lien claimants, made a similar submission, contending that the construction lien claimants required 10 days to determine whether they should make submissions on the relationship between their lien claims and any super-priority charge granted under the *CCAA*.

53 I did not grant the adjournment requested by the mortgagee and construction lien claimants for the following reasons. First, the facts in *Indalex* were quite different from those in the present case, involving as they did considerations of what fiduciary duty a debtor company owed to pensioners in respect of underfunded pension liabilities. I think caution must be exercised before extending the holding of *Indalex* concerning *CCAA*-authorized priority charges to other situations, such as the one before me, which do not involve claims involving pension deficiencies, but claims by more "ordinary" secured creditors, such as mortgagees and construction lien claimants.

54 Second, I have some difficulty seeing how constitutional issues of paramountcy arise in in a *CCAA* proceeding as between claims to the debtor's property by secured creditors, such as mortgagees and construction lien claimants, and persons granted a super-priority charge by court order under sections 11.51 and 11.52 of the *CCAA*. At the risk of gross over-simplification, Canadian constitutional law places the issue of priorities of secured creditors in different legislative balliwicks depending on the health of the debtor company. When a company is healthy, secured creditor priorities usually are determined under provincial laws, such as personal property security legislation and related statutes, which result from provincial legislatures exercising their powers with respect to "property and civil rights in the province". [17] However, when a company gets sick — becomes insolvent — our *Constitution* vests in Parliament the power to craft the legislative regimes which will govern in those circumstances. Exercising its power in respect of "bankruptcy and insolvency", [18] Parliament has established legal frameworks under the *BIA* and *CCAA* to administer sick companies. Priority determinations under the *CCAA* draw on those set out in the *BIA*, as well as the provisions of the *CCAA* dealing with specific claims such as Crown trusts and other claims.

55 As it has evolved over the years the constitutional doctrine of paramountcy polices the overlapping effects of valid federal and provincial legislation: "The doctrine applies not only to cases in which the provincial legislature has legislated pursuant to its ancillary power to trench on an area of federal jurisdiction, but also to situations in which the provincial legislature acts within its primary powers, and Parliament pursuant to its ancillary powers." [19] Since 1960 the Supreme Court of Canada has travelled a "path of judicial restraint in questions of paramountcy". [20] That Court has not been prepared to presume that, by legislating in respect of a matter, Parliament intended to rule out any possible provincial action in respect of that subject, [21] unless (and it is a big "unless"), Parliament used very clear statutory language to that effect. [22]

56 I have found that the Applicants have entered the world of the sick, or the insolvent, and are eligible for the protection of the federal *CCAA*. The federal legislation *expressly* brings mortgagees and construction lien claimants within its regime — the definition of "secured creditor" contained in section 2 of the *CCAA* specifically includes "a holder of a mortgage" and "a holder of a ...lien...on or against...all or any of the property of a debtor company as security for indebtedness of the debtor company". The federal legislation also *expressly* authorizes a court to grant priority to administration and D&O charges over the claims of such secured creditors of the debtor. [23] In light of those express provisions in sections 2, 11.51 and 11.52 of the *CCAA*, and my finding that the Applicants are eligible for the protection offered by the *CCAA*, I had great difficulty understanding what argument could be advanced by the mortgagees and construction lien claimants about the concurrent operation of provincial and federal law which would relieve them from the priority charge provisions of the *CCAA*. I therefore did not see any practical need for an adjournment.

57 Finally, sections 11.51(1) and 11.52(1) of the *CCAA* both require that notice be given to secured creditors who are likely to be affected by an administration or D&O charge before a court grants such charges. In the present case I was satisfied that such notice had been given. Was the notice adequate in the circumstances? I concluded that it was. To repeat, making due allowance for the unlimited creativity of lawyers, I have difficulty seeing what concurrent operation argument could be advanced by mortgagee and construction lien claims against court-ordered super-priority charges under sections 11.51 and 11.52 of the *CCAA*. Second, as reported by the proposed Monitor, the quantum of the priority charges ($1.25 million) is reasonable in comparison with the amount owing to mortgagees ($176 million) and the mortgages appeared to be well collateralized based on available information. Third, the Applicant and Monitor will develop an allocation methodology for the priority charges for later consideration by this Court. The proposed Monitor reported:

> It is the Proposed Monitor's view that the allocation of the proposed Priority Charges should be carried out on an equitable and proportionate basis which recognizes the separate interests of the stakeholders of each of the entities.

The secured creditors will be able to make submissions on any proposed allocation of the priority charges. Finally, while I understand why the secured creditors are focusing on their specific interests, it must be recalled that the work secured by the priority charges will be performed for the benefit of all creditors of the Applicants, including the mortgagees and construction lien claimants. All creditors will benefit from an orderly winding-up of the affairs of the Applicants.

58 In the event that I am incorrect that no paramountcy issue arises in this case in respect of the priority charges, I echo the statements made by Morawetz J. in *Timminco* which I reproduced in paragraph 49 above. In *Indalex* the Court of Appeal accepted that "the CCAA judge can make an order granting a super-priority charge that has the effect of overriding provincial legislation". [24] I find that it is both necessary and appropriate to grant super priority to both the Administration and D&O Charges in order to ensure that the objectives of the *CCAA* are not frustrated.

59 For those reasons I did not grant the adjournment requested by Midland Loan and the construction lien claimants, concluding that they had been given adequate notice in the circumstances, and I granted the requested Administration and D&O Charges.

VII. Other matters

60 At the hearing counsel for one of the construction lien claimants sought confirmation that by granting the Initial Order a construction lien claimant who had issued, but not served, a statement of claim prior to the granting of the order would not be prevented from serving the statement of claim on the Applicants. Counsel for the Applicants confirmed that such statements of claim could be served on it.

61 At the hearing the Applicants submitted a modified form of the model Initial Order. Certain amendments were proposed during the hearing; the parties had an opportunity to make submissions on the proposed amendments.

VIII. Summary

62 For the foregoing reasons I was satisfied that it was appropriate to grant the *CCAA* Initial Order in the form requested. I signed the Initial Order at 4:08 p.m. EST on Thursday, February 23, 2012.

Application granted.

Footnotes

1 MacLeod Affidavit, paras. 104 to 106.

2 The Excluded LPs were identified in paragraph 134 of Mr. MacLeod's affidavit.

3 (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

4 2011 ONSC 2061 (Ont. S.C.J.), paras. 26-27.

5 *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re*, 2010 SCC 60 (S.C.C.), paras. 15, 77 and 78.

6 *Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, 2009 ONCA 833 (Ont. C.A.), para. 46; see Kevin P. McElcheran, *Commercial Insolvency in Canada, Second Edition* (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2011), pp. 284 et seq.

7 [1993] O.J. No. 14 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]). In *Brake Pro Ltd., Re*, [2008] O.J. No. 2180 (Ont. S.C.J.), Wilton-Siegel J. stated, at paragraph 10: "While reservations are expressed from time to time regarding the appropriateness of a "liquidating" *CCAA* proceeding, such proceedings are permissible under the *CCAA*."

8 *Associated Investors of Canada Ltd., Re* (1987), 46 D.L.R. (4th) 669 (Alta. Q.B.), para. 36.

9 Houlden, Morawetz & Sarra, *The 2012 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, N§1, p. 1099.

10 *Century Services*, *supra.*, para. 23.

11 (2007), 279 D.L.R. (4th) 701 (B.C. C.A.), para. 42.

12 2011 ONCA 265 (Ont. C.A.).

13 *Ibid*., para. 155.

14 *Ibid*., paras. 178 and 179.

15 2012 ONSC 506 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

16 *Ibid*., para. 66.

17 *Constitution Act, 1867*, s. 92 ¶13.

18 *Ibid*., s. 91 ¶21.

19 *Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta*, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.), para. 69.

20 *Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. v. Saskatchewan*, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 188 (S.C.C.), para. 21

21 *Canadian Western Bank*, *supra.*, para. 74.

22 *Rothmans*, *supra.*, para. 21.

23 *CCAA* ss. 11.51(2) and 11.52(2).

24 *Indalex*, *supra.*, para. 176.

End of Document

TAB 11

2014 ONSC 494
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Jaguar Mining Inc., Re

2013 CarswellOnt 18630, 2014 ONSC 494, 12 C.B.R. (6th) 290, 236 A.C.W.S. (3d) 820

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Jaguar Mining Inc., Applicant

Morawetz R.S.J.

Heard: December 23, 2013
Judgment: December 23, 2013
Written reasons: January 16, 2014
Docket: CV-13-10383-00CL

Counsel: Tony Reyes, Evan Cobb for Applicant, Jaguar Mining Inc.
Robert J. Chadwick, Caroline Descours for Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders
Joseph Bellissimo for Secured Lender, Global Resource Fund
Jeremy Dacks for Proposed Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc.
Robin B. Schwill for Special Committee of the Board of Directors

Subject: Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Morawetz J.*:

Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 187, 2006 ABQB 153, 2006 CarswellAlta 446 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re (2010), 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115, 2010 CarswellOnt 212, 2010 ONSC 222 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

SkyLink Aviation Inc., Re (2013), 2013 CarswellOnt 2785, 2013 ONSC 1500, 3 C.B.R. (6th) 150 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16
Generally — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

s. 10(2) — considered

s. 11.51 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.52 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 22(2) — considered

APPLICATION by debtor for prection under *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.

Morawetz J. **(orally):**

1 On December 23, 2013, I heard the CCAA application of Jaguar Mining Inc. ("Jaguar") and made the following three endorsements:

> 1. CCAA protection granted. Initial Order signed. Reasons will follow. It is expected that parties will utilize the e-Service Protocol which can be confirmed on comeback motion. Sealing Order of confidential exhibits granted.
>
> 2. Meeting Order granted in form submitted.
>
> 3. Claims Procedure Order granted in form submitted.

2 These are my reasons.

3 Jaguar sought protection from its creditors under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA") and requested authorization to commence a process for the approval and implementation of a plan of compromise and arrangement affecting its unsecured creditors.

4 Jaguar also requested certain protections in favour of its wholly-owned subsidiaries that are not applicants (the "Subsidiaries" and, together with the Applicant, the "Jaguar Group").

5 Counsel to Jaguar submits that the principal objective of these proceedings is to effect a recapitalization and financing transaction (the "Recapitalization") on an expedited basis through a plan of compromise and arrangement (the "Plan") to provide a financial foundation for the Jaguar Group going forward and additional liquidity to allow the Jaguar Group to continue to work towards its operational and financial goals. The Recapitalization, if implemented, is expected to result in a reduction of over $268 million of debt and new liquidity upon exit of approximately $50 million.

6 Jaguar's senior unsecured convertible notes (the "Notes") are the primary liabilities affected by the Recapitalization. Any other affected liabilities of Jaguar, which is a holding company with no active business operations, are limited and identifiable.

7 The Recapitalization is supported by an Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders of the Notes (the "Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders") and other Consenting Noteholders, who collectively represent approximately 93% of the Notes.

8 The background facts are set out in the affidavit of David M. Petrov sworn December 23, 2013 (the "Petrov Affidavit"), the important points of which are summarized below.

9 Jaguar is a corporation existing under the *Business Corporations Act*, R.S.O. 1990 c. B.16, with a registered office in Toronto, Ontario. Jaguar has assets in Canada.

10 Jaguar is the public parent corporation of other corporations in the Jaguar Group that carry on active gold mining and exploration in Brazil, employing in excess of 1,000 people. Jaguar itself does not carry on active gold mining operations.

11 Jaguar has three wholly-owned Brazilian operating subsidiaries: MCT Mineração Ltda. ("MCT"), Mineração Serras do Oeste Ltda. ("MSOL") and Mineração Turmalina Ltda. ("MTL") (and, together with MCT and MSOL, the "Subsidiaries"), all incorporated in Brazil.

12 The Subsidiaries' assets include properties in the development stage and in the production stage.

13 Jaguar has been the main corporate vehicle through which financing has been raised for the operations of the Jaguar Group. The Subsidiaries have guaranteed repayment of certain funds borrowed by Jaguar.

14 Jaguar has raised debt financing by (a) issuing notes, and (b) borrowing from Renvest Mercantile Bank Corp. Inc., through its global resource fund ("Renvest").

15 In aggregate, Jaguar has issued a principal amount of $268.5 million of Notes through two transactions, known as the "2014 Notes" and the "2016 Notes".

16 Interest is paid semi-annually on the 2014 Notes and the 2016 Notes. Jaguar has not paid the last interest payment due on November 1, 2013. Under the 2014 Notes, the grace period has lapsed and an event of default has occurred.

17 Jaguar is also the borrower under a fully drawn $30 million secured facility (the "Renvest Facility") with Renvest. The obligations under the Renvest Facility are secured by a general security agreement from Jaguar as well as guarantees and collateral security granted by each of the Subsidiaries.

18 Jaguar has identified another potential liability. Mr. Daniel Titcomb, former chief executive officer of Jaguar, and certain other associated parties, have instituted a legal proceeding against Jaguar and certain of its current and former directors that is currently proceeding in the United States Federal Court. Counsel to Jaguar submits that this lawsuit alleges certain employment-related claims and other claims in respect of equity interests in Jaguar that are held by Mr. Titcomb and others. Counsel to Jaguar advises that Jaguar and its board of directors believe this lawsuit to be without merit.

19 Counsel also advises that, aside from the lawsuit and professional service fees incurred by Jaguar, the unsecured liabilities of Jaguar are not material.

20 The Jaguar Group's mines are not low-cost gold producers and the recent decline in the price of gold has negatively impacted the Jaguar Group.

21 Based on current world prices and Jaguar Group's current level of expenditures, the Jaguar Group is expected to cease to have sufficient cash resources to continue operations early in the first quarter of 2014.

22 Counsel also submits that, as a result of Jaguar's event of default under the 2014 Notes, certain remedies have become available, including the possible acceleration of the principal amount and accrued and unpaid interest on the 2014 Notes. As of November 13, 2013, that principal and accrued interest totalled approximately $169.3 million.

23 Jaguar's unaudited consolidated financial statements for the nine months ending September 30, 2013 show that Jaguar had an accumulated deficit of over $317 million and a net loss of over $82 million for the nine months ending September 30, 2013. Jaguar's current liabilities (at book value) exceed Jaguar's current assets (at book value) by approximately $40 million.

24 I accept that Jaguar faces a liquidity crisis and is insolvent.

25 Jaguar has been involved in a strategic review over the past two years. Counsel submits that the efforts of Jaguar and its advisors have shown that a comprehensive restructuring plan involving a debt-to-equity exchange and an investment of new money is the best available alternative to address Jaguar's financial issues.

26 Counsel to Jaguar advises that the board of directors of Jaguar has determined that the Recapitalization is the best available option to Jaguar and, further, that the plan cannot be implemented outside of a CCAA proceeding. Counsel emphasizes that

without the protection of the CCAA, Jaguar is exposed to the immediate risk that enforcement steps may be taken under a variety of debt instruments. Further, Jaguar is not in a position to satisfy obligations that may result from such enforcement steps.

27 Jaguar requests a stay of proceedings in favour of non-applicant Subsidiaries contending that, because of Jaguar's dependence upon its Subsidiaries for their value generating capacity, the commencement of any proceedings or the exercise of rights or remedies against these Subsidiaries would be detrimental to Jaguar's restructuring efforts and would undermine a process that would otherwise benefit Jaguar Group's stakeholders as a whole.

28 Jaguar also seeks a charge on its current and future assets (the "Property") in the maximum amount of $5 million (a $500,000 first-ranking charge (the "Primary Administration Charge") and a $4.5 million fourth-ranking charge (the "Subordinated Administration Charge") (together, the "Administration Charge")). The purpose of the charge is to secure the fees and disbursements incurred in connection with services rendered both before and after the commencement of the CCAA proceedings by various professionals, as well as Canaccord Genuity and Houlihan Lokey, as financial advisors to the Ad Hoc Committee (collectively, the "Financial Advisors").

29 Counsel advises that the Financial Advisors' monthly work fees (but not their success fees) will be secured by the Primary Administration Charge, while the Financial Advisors' success fees will be secured solely by the Subordinated Administration Charge.

30 Counsel further advises that the Proposed Initial Order contemplates the establishment of a charge on Jaguar's Property in the amount of $150,000 (the "Director's Charge") to protect the directors and officers. Counsel further advises that the benefit of the Director's Charge will only be available to the extent that a liability is not covered by existing directors and officers insurance. The directors and officers have indicated that, due to the potential for personal liability, they may not continue their service in this restructuring unless the Initial Order grants the Director's Charge.

31 Counsel to Jaguar further advises that the proposed monitor is of the view that the Director's Charge and the Administration Charge are reasonable in these circumstances.

32 Jaguar is unaware of any secured creditors, other than those who have received notice of the application, who are likely to be affected by the court-ordered charges.

33 In addition to the Initial Order, Jaguar also seeks a Claims Procedure Order and a Meeting Order, submitting that it must complete the Recapitalization on an expedited timeline.

34 Each of the Claims Procedure Order and Meeting Order include a comeback provision.

35 Having reviewed the record and upon hearing submissions, I am satisfied the Applicant is a company to which the CCAA applies. It is insolvent and faces a looming liquidity crisis. The Applicant is subject to claims in excess of $5 million and has assets in Canada. I am also satisfied that the application is properly before me as the Applicant's registered office and certain of its assets are situated in Toronto, Ontario.

36 I am also satisfied that the Applicant has complied with the obligations of s. 10(2) of the CCAA.

37 I am also satisfied that an extension of the stay of proceedings to the Subsidiaries of Jaguar is appropriate in the circumstances. Further, I am also satisfied that it is reasonable and appropriate to grant the Administration Charge and the Director's Charge over the Property of the Applicant. In these circumstances, I am also prepared to approve the Engagement Letters and to seal the terms of the Engagement Letters. In deciding on the sealing provision, I have taken into account that the Engagement Letters contain sensitive commercial information, the disclosure of which could be harmful to the parties at issue. However, as I indicated at the hearing, this issue should be revisited at the comeback hearing.

38 I am also satisfied that Jaguar should be authorized to comply with the pre-filing obligations to the extent provided in the Initial Order.

39 In arriving at the foregoing conclusions, I reviewed the argument submitted by counsel to Jaguar that the stay of proceedings against non-applicants is appropriate. The Jaguar Group operates in a fully integrated manner and depends upon its Subsidiaries for their value generating capacity. Absent a stay of proceedings not only in favour of Jaguar but also in favour of the Subsidiaries, various creditors would be in a position to take enforcement steps which could conceivably lead to a failed restructuring, which would not be in the best interests of Jaguar's stakeholders.

40 The court has jurisdiction to extend the stay in favour of Jaguar's Subsidiaries. See *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); *Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re*, 2006 ABQB 153, 19 C.B.R. (5th) 187 (Alta. Q.B.); *SkyLink Aviation Inc., Re*, 2013 ONSC 1500, 3 C.B.R. (6th) 150 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

41 The authority to grant the court-ordered Administration Charge and Director's Charge is contained in ss. 11.51 and 11.52 of the CCAA.

42 In granting the Administration Charge, I am satisfied that:

(i) notice has been given to the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge;

(ii) the amount is appropriate; and

(iii) the charges should extend to all of the proposed beneficiaries.

43 In considering both the amount of the Administration Charge and who should be entitled to its benefit, the following factors can also be considered:

(a) the size and complexity of the business being restructured; and

(b) whether there is an unwarranted duplication of roles.

See *Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re*, 2010 ONSC 222, 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

44 In this case, the proposed restructuring involves the proposed beneficiaries of the charge. I accept that many have played a significant role in the negotiation of the Recapitalization to date and will continue to play a role in the implementation of the Recapitalization. I am satisfied that there is no unwarranted duplication of roles among those who benefit from the proposed Administration Charge.

45 With respect to the Director's Charge, the court must be satisfied that:

(i) notice has been given to the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge;

(ii) the amount is appropriate;

(iii) the applicant could not obtain adequate indemnification insurance for the director or officer at a reasonable cost; and

(iv) the charge does not apply in respect of any obligation incurred by a director or officer as a result of the director's or officer's gross negligence or wilful misconduct.

46 A review of the evidence satisfies me that it is appropriate to grant the Director's Charge as requested.

47 Jaguar requested that the Initial Order authorize it to perform certain pre-filing obligations in respect of professional service providers and third parties who provide services in respect of Jaguar's public listing agreement. In the circumstances, I find it to be reasonable that Jaguar be authorized to perform these pre-filing obligations.

48 In view of Jaguar's desire to move quickly to implement the Recapitalization, I have also been persuaded that it is both necessary and appropriate to grant the Claims Procedure Order and the Meeting Order at this time. These are procedural steps in the CCAA process and do not require any assessment by the court as to the fairness and reasonableness of the Plan at this stage.

49 Counsel to Jaguar submits that Jaguar's approach to classification of the affected unsecured creditors is appropriate in these circumstances, citing a commonality of interest. Counsel also references s. 22(2) of the CCAA. For the purposes of today's motion, I am prepared to accept this argument. However, this is an issue that can, if raised, be reviewed at the comeback hearing.

50 In the result, an Initial Order is granted together with a Meeting Order and Claims Procedure Order. All orders have been signed in the form presented.

Application granted.

End of Document

TAB 12

1993 CarswellOnt 183
Ontario Court of Justice (General Division — Commercial List)

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re

1993 CarswellOnt 183, [1993] O.J. No. 14, 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 37 A.C.W.S. (3d) 847, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275

Re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36; Re Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-43; Re plan of compromise in respect of LEHNDORFF GENERAL PARTNER LTD. (in its own capacity and in its capacity as general partner of LEHNDORFF UNITED PROPERTIES (CANADA), LEHNDORFF PROPERTIES (CANADA) and LEHNDORFF PROPERTIES (CANADA) II) and in respect of certain of their nominees LEHNDORFF UNITED PROPERTIES (CANADA) LTD., LEHNDORFF CANADIAN HOLDINGS LTD., LEHNDORFF CANADIAN HOLDINGS II LTD., BAYTEMP PROPERTIES LIMITED and 102 BLOOR STREET WEST LIMITED and in respect of THG LEHNDORFF VERMÖGENSVERWALTUNG GmbH (in its capacity as limited partner of LEHNDORFF UNITED PROPERTIES (CANADA))

Farley J.

Heard: December 24, 1992
Judgment: January 6, 1993
Docket: Doc. B366/92

Counsel: *Alfred Apps, Robert Harrison* and *Melissa J. Kennedy* , for applicants.
L. Crozier , for Royal Bank of Canada.
R.C. Heintzman , for Bank of Montreal.
J. Hodgson, Susan Lundy and *James Hilton* , for Canada Trustco Mortgage Corporation.
Jay Schwartz , for Citibank Canada.
Stephen Golick , for Peat Marwick Thorne * Inc., proposed monitor.
John Teolis , for Fuji Bank Canada.
Robert Thorton , for certain of the advisory boards.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Table of Authorities

Cases considered:

Amirault Fish Co., Re, 32 C.B.R. 186, [1951] 4 D.L.R. 203 (N.S. T.D.) — *referred to*

Associated Investors of Canada Ltd., Re, 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 , Alta. L.R. (2d) 259, [1988] 2 W.W.R. 211, 38 B.L.R. 148, *(*sub nom. *Re First Investors Corp.)* 46 D.L.R. (4th) 669 (Q.B.) , reversed (1988), 71 C.B.R. 71, 60 Alta. L.R. (2d) 242, 89 A.R. 344 (C.A.) — *referred to*

Campeau v. Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (1992), 14 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — *referred to*

Canada Systems Group (EST) v. Allen-Dale Mutual Insurance Co. (1982), 29 C.P.C. 60, 137 D.L.R. (3d) 287 (Ont. H.C.) [affirmed (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 135, 33 C.P.C. 210, 145 D.L.R. (3d) 266 (C.A.)] — *referred to*

Empire-Universal Films Ltd. v. Rank, [1947] O.R. 775 [H.C.] — *referred to*

Feifer v. Frame Manufacturing Corp., Re, 28 C.B.R. 124, [1947] Que. K.B. 348 (C.A.) — *referred to*

Fine's Flowers Ltd. v. Fine's Flowers (Creditors of) (1992), 10 C.B.R. (3d) 87, 4 B.L.R. (2d) 293, 87 D.L.R. (4th) 391, 7 O.R. (3d) 193 (Gen. Div.) — *referred to*

Gaz Métropolitain v. Wynden Canada Inc. (1982), 44 C.B.R. (N.S.) 285 (C.S. Que.) [affirmed (1982), 45 C.B.R. (N.S.) 11 (Que. C.A.)] — *referred to*

Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd. (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84, [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136 (C.A.) — *referred to*

Inducon Development Corp. Re (1992), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — *referred to*

International Donut Corp. v. 050863 N.B. Ltd. (1992), 127 N.B.R. (2d) 290, 319 A.P.R. 290 (Q.B.) — *considered*

Keppoch Development Ltd., Re (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 95 (N.S. T.D.) — *referred to*

Langley's Ltd., Re, [1938] O.R. 123, [1938] 3 D.L.R. 230 (C.A.) — *referred to*

McCordic v. Bosanquet (1974), 5 O.R. (2d) 53 (H.C.) — *referred to*

Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank, 52 C.B.R. (N.S.) 109, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 215, 32 Alta. L.R. (2d) 150, 53 A.R. 39, 11 D.L.R. (4th) 576 (Q.B.) — *referred to*

Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd. (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361, 92 A.R. 1 (Q.B.) — *referred to*

Northland Properties Ltd., Re (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 141 (B.C. S.C.) — *referred to*

Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, *(*sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey)* 41 O.A.C. 282, 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (C.A.) — *referred to*

Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp. (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 303, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 105 (C.A.) , affirming (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 291, 47 B.C.L.R. (2d) 193 (S.C.) , leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 164 (note), 55 B.C.L.R. (2d) xxxiii (note), 135 N.R. 317 (note) — *referred to*

Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada), [1934] S.C.R. 659, 16 C.B.R. 1, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75 — *referred to*

Seven Mile Dam Contractors v. R. (1979), 13 B.C.L.R. 137, 104 D.L.R. (3d) 274 (S.C.) , affirmed (1980), 25 B.C.L.R. 183 (C.A.) — *referred to*

Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312, 86 D.L.R. (4th) 621 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — *referred to*

Slavik, Re (1992), 12 C.B.R. (3d) 157 (B.C. S.C.) — *considered*

Stephanie's Fashions Ltd., Re (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 248 (B.C. S.C.) — *referred to*

Ultracare Management Inc. v. Zevenberger (Trustee of) (1990), 3 C.B.R. (3d) 151, (sub nom. *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Gammon)* 1 O.R. (3d) 321 (Gen. Div.) — *referred to*

United Maritime Fishermen Co-operative, Re (1988), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 44, 84 N.B.R. (2d) 415, 214 A.P.R. 415 (Q.B.) , varied on reconsideration (1988), 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 170, 87 N.B.R. (2d) 333, 221 A.P.R. 333 (Q.B.) , reversed (1988), 69 C.B.R. (N.S.) 161, 88 N.B.R. (2d) 253, 224 A.P.R. 253, (sub nom. *Cdn. Co-op. Leasing Services v. United Maritime Fishermen Co-op.)* 51 D.L.R. (4th) 618 (C.A.) — *referred to*

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 —

s. 85

s. 142

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 — preamble

s. 2

s. 3

s. 4

s. 5

s. 6

s. 7

s. 8

s. 11

Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43.

Judicature Act, The, R.S.O. 1937, c. 100.

Limited Partnerships Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.16 —

s. 2(2)

s. 3(1)

s. 8

s. 9

s. 11

s. 12(1)

s. 13

s. 15(2)

s. 24

Partnership Act, R.S.A. 1980, c.P-2 — Pt. 2

s. 75

Rules considered:

Ontario, Rules of Civil Procedure —

r. 8.01

r. 8.02

Application under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act to file consolidated plan of compromise and for stay of proceedings.

***Farley J.*:**

1 These are my written reasons relating to the relief granted the applicants on December 24, 1992 pursuant to their application under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* , R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("CCAA") and the *Courts of Justice Act* , R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 ("CJA"). The relief sought was as follows:

(a) short service of the notice of application;

(b) a declaration that the applicants were companies to which the CCAA applies;

(c) authorization for the applicants to file a consolidated plan of compromise;

(d) authorization for the applicants to call meetings of their secured and unsecured creditors to approve the consolidated plan of compromise;

(e) a stay of all proceedings taken or that might be taken either in respect of the applicants in their own capacity or on account of their interest in Lehndorff United Properties (Canada) ("LUPC"), Lehndorff Properties (Canada) ("LPC") and Lehndorff Properties (Canada) II ("LPC II") and collectively (the "Limited Partnerships") whether as limited partner, as general partner or as registered titleholder to certain of their assets as bare trustee and nominee; and

(f) certain other ancillary relief.

2 The applicants are a number of companies within the larger Lehndorff group ("Group") which operates in Canada and elsewhere. The group appears to have suffered in the same way that a number of other property developers and managers which have also sought protection under the CCAA in recent years. The applicants are insolvent; they each have outstanding debentures issues under trust deeds; and they propose a plan of compromise among themselves and the holders of these debentures as well as those others of their secured and unsecured creditors as they deemed appropriate in the circumstances. Each applicant except THG Lehndorff Vermögensverwaltung GmbH ("GmbH") is an Ontario corporation. GmbH is a company incorporated under the laws of Germany. Each of the applicants has assets or does business in Canada. Therefore each is a "company" within the definition of s. 2 of the CCAA. The applicant Lehndorff General Partner Ltd. ("General Partner Company") is the sole general

partner of the Limited Partnerships. The General Partner Company has sole control over the property and businesses of the Limited Partnerships. All major decisions concerning the applicants (and the Limited Partnerships) are made by management operating out of the Lehndorff Toronto Office. The applicants aside from the General Partner Company have as their sole purpose the holding of title to properties as bare trustee or nominee on behalf of the Limited Partnerships. LUPC is a limited partnership registered under the *Limited Partnership Act* , R.S.O. 1990, c. L.16 ("Ontario LPA"). LPC and LPC II are limited partnerships registered under Part 2 of the *Partnership Act* , R.S.A. 1980, c. P-2 ("Alberta PA") and each is registered in Ontario as an extra provincial limited partnership. LUPC has over 2,000 beneficial limited partners, LPC over 500 and LPC II over 250, most of whom are residents of Germany. As at March 31, 1992 LUPC had outstanding indebtedness of approximately $370 million, LPC $45 million and LPC II $7 million. Not all of the members of the Group are making an application under the CCAA. Taken together the Group's indebtedness as to Canadian matters (including that of the applicants) was approximately $543 million. In the summer of 1992 various creditors (Canada Trustco Mortgage Company, Bank of Montreal, Royal Bank of Canada, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and the Bank of Tokyo Canada) made demands for repayment of their loans. On November 6, 1992 Funtanua Investments Limited, a minor secured lendor also made a demand. An interim standstill agreement was worked out following a meeting of July 7, 1992. In conjunction with Peat Marwick Thorne Inc. which has been acting as an informal monitor to date and Fasken Campbell Godfrey the applicants have held multiple meetings with their senior secured creditors over the past half year and worked on a restructuring plan. The business affairs of the applicants (and the Limited Partnerships) are significantly intertwined as there are multiple instances of intercorporate debt, cross-default provisions and guarantees and they operated a centralized cash management system.

3 This process has now evolved to a point where management has developed a consolidated restructuring plan which plan addresses the following issues:

(a) The compromise of existing conventional, term and operating indebtedness, both secured and unsecured.

(b) The restructuring of existing project financing commitments.

(c) New financing, by way of equity or subordinated debt.

(d) Elimination or reduction of certain overhead.

(e) Viability of existing businesses of entities in the Lehndorff Group.

(f) Restructuring of income flows from the limited partnerships.

(g) Disposition of further real property assets aside from those disposed of earlier in the process.

(h) Consolidation of entities in the Group; and

(i) Rationalization of the existing debt and security structure in the continuing entities in the Group.

Formal meetings of the beneficial limited partners of the Limited Partnerships are scheduled for January 20 and 21, 1993 in Germany and an information circular has been prepared and at the time of hearing was being translated into German. This application was brought on for hearing at this time for two general reasons: (a) it had now ripened to the stage of proceeding with what had been distilled out of the strategic and consultative meetings; and (b) there were creditors other than senior secured lenders who were in a position to enforce their rights against assets of some of the applicants (and Limited Partnerships) which if such enforcement did take place would result in an undermining of the overall plan. Notice of this hearing was given to various creditors: Barclays Bank of Canada, Barclays Bank PLC, Bank of Montreal, Citibank Canada, Canada Trustco Mortgage Corporation, Royal Trust Corporation of Canada, Royal Bank of Canada, the Bank of Tokyo Canada, Funtauna Investments Limited, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Fuji Bank Canada and First City Trust Company. In this respect the applicants have recognized that although the initial application under the CCAA may be made on an ex parte basis (s. 11 of the CCAA; *Re Langley's Ltd.*, [1938] O.R. 123, [1938] 3 D.L.R. 230 (C.A.) ; *Re Keppoch Development Ltd.* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 95 (N.S.

T.D.) . The court will be concerned when major creditors have not been alerted even in the most minimal fashion (*Re Inducon Development Corp.* (1992), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 310). The application was either supported or not opposed.

4 "Instant" debentures are now well recognized and respected by the courts: see *Re United Maritime Fishermen Co-operative* (1988), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 44 (N.B. Q.B.) , at pp. 55-56, varied on reconsideration (1988), 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 170 (N.B. Q.B.) , reversed on different grounds (1988), 69 C.B.R. (N.S.) 161 (N.B. C.A.) , at pp. 165-166; *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.* (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 248 (B.C. S.C.) at pp. 250-251; *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289, 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101 (C.A.) per Doherty J.A., dissenting on another point, at pp. 306-310 (O.R.); *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Zevenberger (Trustee of)* (sub nom. *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Gammon*) (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 321 (Gen. Div.) at p. 327. The applicants would appear to me to have met the technical hurdle of s. 3 and as defined s. 2) of the CCAA in that they are debtor companies since they are insolvent, they have outstanding an issue of debentures under a trust deed and the compromise or arrangement that is proposed includes that compromise between the applicants and the holders of those trust deed debentures. I am also satisfied that because of the significant intertwining of the applicants it would be appropriate to have a consolidated plan. I would also understand that this court (Ontario Court of Justice (General Division)) is the appropriate court to hear this application since all the applicants except GmbH have their head office or their chief place of business in Ontario and GmbH, although it does not have a place of business within Canada, does have assets located within Ontario.

5 The CCAA is intended to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors as an alternative to bankruptcy and, as such, is remedial legislation entitled to a liberal interpretation. It seems to me that the purpose of the statute is to enable insolvent companies to carry on business in the ordinary course or otherwise deal with their assets so as to enable plan of compromise or arrangement to be prepared, filed and considered by their creditors and the court. In the interim, a judge has great discretion under the CCAA to make order so as to effectively maintain the status quo in respect of an insolvent company while it attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for the proposed compromise or arrangement which will be to the benefit of both the company and its creditors. See the preamble to and sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 11 of the CCAA; *Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, [1934] S.C.R. 659 at p. 661, 16 C.B.R. 1, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75 ; *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank*, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 215 (Alta. Q.B.) at pp. 219-220; *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.* (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361 (Q.B.) , at pp. 12-13 (C.B.R.); *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (B.C. C.A.) , at pp. 310-311, affirming (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 291, 47 B.C.L.R. (2d) 193 (S.C.) , leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 164 (S.C.C.) .; *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* , supra, at p. 307 (O.R.); *Fine's Flowers v. Fine's Flowers (Creditors of)* (1992), 7 O.R. (3d) 193 (Gen. Div.) , at p. 199 and "Reorganizations Under The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act", Stanley E. Edwards (1947) 25 Can. Bar Rev. 587 at p. 592.

6 The CCAA is intended to provide a structured environment for the negotiation of compromises between a debtor company and its creditors for the benefit of both. Where a debtor company realistically plans to continue operating or to otherwise deal with its assets but it requires the protection of the court in order to do so and it is otherwise too early for the court to determine whether the debtor company will succeed, relief should be granted under the CCAA. see *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* , supra at pp. 297 and 316; *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.* , supra, at pp. 251-252 and *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Zevenberger (Trustee of)* , supra, at p. 328 and p. 330. It has been held that the intention of the CCAA is to prevent any manoeuvres for positioning among the creditors during the period required to develop a plan and obtain approval of creditors. Such manoeuvres could give an aggressive creditor an advantage to the prejudice of others who are less aggressive and would undermine the company's financial position making it even less likely that the plan will succeed: see *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank* , supra, at p. 220 (W.W.R.). The possibility that one or more creditors may be prejudiced should not affect the court's exercise of its authority to grant a stay of proceedings under the CCAA because this affect is offset by the benefit to all creditors and to the company of facilitating a reorganization. The court's primary concerns under the CCAA must be for the debtor and *all* of the creditors: see *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* , supra, at pp. 108-110; *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84 (C.A.) , at pp. 315-318 (C.B.R.) and *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.* , supra, at pp. 251-252.

7 One of the purposes of the CCAA is to facilitate ongoing operations of a business where its assets have a greater value as part of an integrated system than individually. The CCAA facilitates reorganization of a company where the alternative, sale of the property piecemeal, is likely to yield far less satisfaction to the creditors. Unlike the *Bankruptcy Act* , R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, before the amendments effective November 30, 1992 to transform it into the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* ("BIA"), it is possible under the CCAA to bind secured creditors it has been generally speculated that the CCAA will be resorted to by companies that are generally larger and have a more complicated capital structure and that those companies which make an application under the BIA will be generally smaller and have a less complicated structure. Reorganization may include partial liquidation where it is intended as part of the process of a return to long term viability and profitability. See *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* , supra, at p. 318 and *Re Associated Investors of Canada Ltd.* (1987), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Alta. Q.B.) at pp. 245, reversed on other grounds at (1988), 71 C.B.R. (N.S.) 71 (Alta. C.A.) . It appears to me that the purpose of the CCAA is also to protect the interests of creditors and to enable an orderly distribution of the debtor company's affairs. This may involve a winding-up or liquidation of a company or simply a substantial downsizing of its business operations, provided the same is proposed in the best interests of the creditors generally. See *Re Associated Investors of Canada Ltd.* , supra, at p. 318; *Re Amirault Fish Co.*, 32 C.B.R. 186, [1951] 4 D.L.R. 203 (N.S. T.D.) at pp. 187-188 (C.B.R.).

8 It strikes me that each of the applicants in this case has a realistic possibility of being able to continue operating, although each is currently unable to meet all of its expenses albeit on a reduced scale. This is precisely the sort of circumstance in which all of the creditors are likely to benefit from the application of the CCAA and in which it is appropriate to grant an order staying proceedings so as to allow the applicant to finalize preparation of and file a plan of compromise and arrangement.

9 Let me now review the aspect of the stay of proceedings. Section 11 of the CCAA provides as follows:

> 11. Notwithstanding anything in the *Bankruptcy Act* or the *Winding-up Act* , whenever an application has been made under this Act in respect of any company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit,
>
> (*a*) make an order staying, until such time as the court may prescribe or until any further order, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under the *Bankruptcy Act* and the *Winding-up Act* or either of them;
>
> (*b*) restrain further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company on such terms as the court sees fit; and
>
> (*c*) make an order that no suit, action or other proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except with the leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court imposes.

10 The power to grant a stay of proceeding should be construed broadly in order to permit the CCAA to accomplish its legislative purpose and in particular to enable continuance of the company seeking CCAA protection. The power to grant a stay therefore extends to a stay which affected the position not only of the company's secured and unsecured creditors, but also all non-creditors and other parties who could potentially jeopardize the success of the plan and thereby the continuance of the company. See *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.* , supra, at pp. 12-17 (C.B.R.) and *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* , supra, at pp. 296-298 (B.C. S.C.) and pp. 312-314 (B.C. C.A.) and *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank* , supra, at pp. 219 ff. Further the court has the power to order a stay that is effective in respect of the rights arising in favour of secured creditors under all forms of commercial security: see *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* , supra, at p. 320 where Gibbs J.A. for the court stated:

> The trend which emerges from this sampling will be given effect here by holding that where the word "security" occurs in the C.C.A.A., it includes s. 178 security and, where the word creditor occurs, it includes a bank holding s. 178 security. To the extent that there may be conflict between the two statutes, therefore, the broad scope of the C.C.A.A. prevails.

11 The power to grant a stay may also extend to preventing persons seeking to terminate or cancel executory contracts, including, without limitation agreements with the applying companies for the supply of goods or services, from doing so: see *Gaz Métropolitain v. Wynden Canada Inc.* (1982), 44 C.B.R. (N.S.) 285 (C.S. Que.) at pp. 290-291 and *Quintette Coal Ltd. v.*

Nippon Steel Corp. , supra, at pp. 311-312 (B.C. C.A.). The stay may also extend to prevent a mortgagee from proceeding with foreclosure proceedings (see *Re Northland Properties Ltd.* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 141 (B.C. S.C.) or to prevent landlords from terminating leases, or otherwise enforcing their rights thereunder (see *Feifer v. Frame Manufacturing Corp.* (1947), 28 C.B.R. 124 (C.A. Que.)). Amounts owing to landlords in respect of arrears of rent or unpaid rent for the unexpired portion of lease terms are properly dealt with in a plan of compromise or arrangement: see *Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312 (Ont. Gen. Div.) especially at p. 318. The jurisdiction of the court to make orders under the CCAA in the interest of protecting the debtor company so as to enable it to prepare and file a plan is effective notwithstanding the terms of any contract or instrument to which the debtor company is a party. Section 8 of the CCAA provides:

> 8. This Act extends and does not limit the provisions of any instrument now or hereafter existing that governs the rights of creditors or any class of them and has full force and effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in that instrument.

The power to grant a stay may also extend to prevent persons from exercising any right of set off in respect of the amounts owed by such a person to the debtor company, irrespective of whether the debtor company has commenced any action in respect of which the defense of set off might be formally asserted: see *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* , supra, at pp. 312-314 (B.C.C.A.).

12 It was submitted by the applicants that the power to grant a stay of proceedings may also extend to a stay of proceedings against non-applicants who are not companies and accordingly do not come within the express provisions of the CCAA. In support thereof they cited a CCAA order which was granted staying proceedings against individuals who guaranteed the obligations of a debtor-applicant which was a qualifying company under the terms of the CCAA: see *Re Slavik* , unreported, [1992] B.C.J. No. 341 [now reported at 12 C.B.R. (3d) 157 (B.C. S.C.)]. However in the *Slavik* situation the individual guarantors were officers and shareholders of two companies which had sought and obtained CCAA protection. Vickers J. in that case indicated that the facts of that case included the following unexplained and unamplified fact [at p. 159]:

> 5. The order provided further that all creditors of Norvik Timber Inc. be enjoined from making demand for payment upon that firm or upon any guarantor of an obligation of the firm until further order of the court.

The CCAA reorganization plan involved an assignment of the claims of the creditors to "Newco" in exchange for cash and shares. However the basis of the stay order originally granted was not set forth in this decision.

13 It appears to me that Dickson J. in *International Donut Corp. v. 050863 N.D. Ltd.* , unreported, [1992] N.B.J. No. 339 (N.B. Q.B.) [now reported at 127 N.B.R. (2d) 290, 319 A.P.R. 290] was focusing only on the stay arrangements of the CCAA when concerning a limited partnership situation he indicated [at p. 295 N.B.R.]:

> In August 1991 the limited partnership, through its general partner the plaintiff, applied to the Court under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* , R.S.C., c. C-36 for an order delaying the assertion of claims by creditors until an opportunity could be gained to work out with the numerous and sizable creditors a compromise of their claims. An order was obtained but it in due course expired without success having been achieved in arranging with creditors a compromise. *That effort may have been wasted, because it seems questionable that the federal Act could have any application to a limited partnership in circumstances such as these* . (Emphasis added.)

14 I am not persuaded that the words of s. 11 which are quite specific as relating as to a *company* can be enlarged to encompass something other than that. However it appears to me that Blair J. was clearly in the right channel in his analysis in *Campeau v. Olympia & York Developments Ltd.* unreported, [1992] O.J. No. 1946 [now reported at 14 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (Ont. Gen. Div.)] at pp. 4-7 [at pp. 308-310 C.B.R.].

> **The Power to Stay**
>
> The court has always had an inherent jurisdiction to grant a stay of proceedings whenever it is just and convenient to do so, in order to control its process or prevent an abuse of that process: see *Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v. Allendale*

Mutual Insurance Co. (1982), 29 C.P.C. 60, 137 D.L.R. (3d) 287 (Ont. H.C.) , and cases referred to therein. In the civil context, this general power is also embodied in the very broad terms of s. 106 of the *Courts of Justice Act* , R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, which provides as follows:

> 106. A court, on its own initiative or on motion by any person, whether or not a party, may stay any proceeding in the court on such terms as are considered just.

Recently, Mr. Justice O'Connell has observed that this discre tionary power is "highly dependent on the facts of each particular case": *Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim* (unreported) [(June 25, 1992), Doc. 24127/88 (Ont. Gen. Div.)], [1992] O.J. No. 1330.

Apart from this inherent and general jurisdiction to stay proceedings, there are many instances where the court is specifically granted the power to stay in a particular context, by virtue of statute or under the *Rules of Civil Procedure* . The authority to prevent multiplicity of proceedings in the same court, under r. 6.01(1), is an example of the latter. The power to stay judicial and extra-judicial proceedings under s. 11 of the C.C.A.A., is an example of the former. Section 11 of the C.C.A.A. provides as follows.

The Power to Stay in the Context of C.C.A.A. Proceedings

By its formal title the C.C.A.A. is known as "An Act to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors". To ensure the effective nature of such a "facilitative" process it is essential that the debtor company be afforded a respite from the litigious and other rights being exercised by creditors, while it attempts to carry on as a going concern and to negotiate an acceptable corporate restructuring arrangement with such creditors.

In this respect it has been observed that the C.C.A.A. is "to be used as a practical and effective way of restructuring corporate indebtedness.": see the case comment following the report of *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.* (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361, 92 A.R. 81 (Q.B.) , and the approval of that remark as "a perceptive observation about the attitude of the courts" by Gibbs J.A. in *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* (1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 105 (C.A.) at p. 113 [B.C.L.R.].

Gibbs J.A. continued with this comment:

> To the extent that a general principle can be extracted from the few cases directly on point, and the others in which there is persuasive obiter, it would appear to be that the courts have concluded that under s. 11 there is *a discretionary power to restrain judicial or extra-judicial conduct* against the debtor company *the effect of which is, or would be, seriously to impair the ability of the debtor company to continue in business during the compromise or arrangement negotiating period* .

(emphasis added)

I agree with those sentiments and would simply add that, in my view, the restraining power extends as well to conduct which could seriously impair the debtor's ability to focus and concentrate its efforts on the business purpose of negotiating the compromise or arrangement. [In this respect, see also *Sairex GmbH v. Prudential Steel Ltd.* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 62 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 77.]

I must have regard to these foregoing factors while I consider, as well, the general principles which have historically governed the court's exercise of its power to stay proceedings. These principles were reviewed by Mr. Justice Montgomery in *Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v. Allendale Mutual Insurance* , supra (a "Mississauga Derailment" case), at pp. 65-66 [C.P.C.]. The balance of convenience must weigh significantly in favour of granting the stay, as a party's right to have access to the courts must not be lightly interfered with. The court must be satisfied that a continuance of the proceeding would serve as an injustice to the party seeking the stay, in the sense that it would be oppressive or vexatious or an abuse of the process of the court in some other way. The stay must not cause an injustice to the plaintiff.

It is quite clear from *Empire-Universal Films Limited v. Rank*, [1947] O.R. 775 (H.C.) that McRuer C.J.H.C. considered that *The Judicature Act* [R.S.O. 1937, c. 100] then [and now the CJA] merely confirmed a statutory right that previously had been considered inherent in the jurisdiction of the court with respect to its authority to grant a stay of proceedings. See also *McCordic v. Bosanquet* (1974), 5 O.R. (2d) 53 (H.C.) and *Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v. Allen-Dale Mutual Insurance Co.* (1982), 29 C.P.C. 60 (H.C.) at pp. 65-66.

15 Montgomery J. in *Canada Systems* , supra, at pp. 65-66 indicated:

> Goodman J. (as he then was) in *McCordic v. Bosanquet* (1974), 5 O.R. (2d) 53 in granting a stay reviewed the authorities and concluded that the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to grant a stay of proceedings may be made whenever it is just and reasonable to do so. "This court has ample jurisdiction to grant a stay whenever it is just and reasonable to do so." (Per Lord Denning M.R. in *Edmeades v. Thames Board Mills Ltd.*, [1969] 2 Q.B. 67 at 71, [1969] 2 All E.R. 127 (C.A.)). Lord Denning's decision in *Edmeades* was approved by Lord Justice Davies in *Lane v. Willis; Lane v. Beach (Executor of Estate of George William Willis)*, [1972] 1 All E.R. 430, *(*sub nom. *Lane v. Willis; Lane v. Beach)* [1972] 1 W.L.R. 326 (C.A.) .
>
> . . . . .
>
> In *Weight Watchers Int. Inc. v. Weight Watchers of Ont. Ltd.* (1972), 25 D.L.R. (3d) 419, 5 C.P.R. (2d) 122 , appeal allowed by consent without costs *(*sub nom. *Weight Watchers of Ont. Ltd. v. Weight Watchers Inc. Inc.)* 42 D.L.R. (3d) 320n, 10 C.P.R. (2d) 96n (Fed. C.A.) , Mr. Justice Heald on an application for stay said at p. 426 [25 D.L.R.]:
>
> > The principles which must govern in these matters are clearly stated in the case of *Empire Universal Films Ltd. et al. v. Rank et al.*, [1947] O.R. 775 at p. 779, as follows [quoting *St. Pierre et al. v. South American Stores (Gath & Chaves), Ltd. et al.*, [1936] 1 K.B. 382 at p. 398]:
> >
> > > (1.) A mere balance of convenience is not a sufficient ground for depriving a plaintiff of the advantages of prosecuting his action in an English Court if it is otherwise properly brought. The right of access to the King's Court must not be lightly refused. (2.) In order to justify a stay two conditions must be satisfied, one positive and the other negative: (a) the defendant must satisfy the Court that the continuance of the action would work an injustice because it would be oppressive or vexatious to him or would be an abuse of the process of the Court in some other way; and (b) the stay must not cause an injustice to the plaintiff. On both the burden of proof is on the defendant.

16 Thus it appears to me that the inherent power of this court to grant stays can be used to supplement s. 11 of the CCAA when it is just and reasonable to do so. Is it appropriate to do so in the circumstances? Clearly there is jurisdiction under s. 11 of the CCAA to grant a stay in respect of any of the applicants which are all companies which fit the criteria of the CCAA. However the stay requested also involved the limited partnerships to some degree either (i) with respect to the applicants acting on behalf of the Limited Partnerships or (ii) the stays being effective vis-à-vis any proceedings taken by any party against the property assets and undertaking of the Limited Partnerships in respect of which they hold a direct interest (collectively the "Property") as set out in the terms of the stay provisions of the order paragraphs 4 through 18 inclusive attached as an appendix to these reasons. [Appendix omitted.] I believe that an analysis of the operations of a limited partnership in this context would be beneficial to an understanding of how there is a close inter-relationship to the applicants involved in this CCAA proceedings and how the Limited Partnerships and their Property are an integral part of the operations previously conducted and the proposed restructuring.

17 A limited partnership is a creation of statute, consisting of one or more general partners and one or more limited partners. The limited partnership is an investment vehicle for passive investment by limited partners. It in essence combines the flow through concept of tax depreciation or credits available to "ordinary" partners under general partnership law with limited liability available to shareholders under corporate law. See Ontario LPA sections 2(2) and 3(1) and Lyle R. Hepburn, *Limited Partnerships* , (Toronto: De Boo, 1991), at p. 1-2 and p. 1-12. I would note here that the limited partnership provisions of the Alberta PA are roughly equivalent to those found in the Ontario LPA with the interesting side aspect that the Alberta legislation

in s. 75 does allow for judgment against a limited partner to be charged against the limited partner's interest in the limited partnership. A general partner has all the rights and powers and is subject to all the restrictions and liabilities of a partner in a partnership. In particular a general partner is fully liable to each creditor of the business of the limited partnership. The general partner has sole control over the property and business of the limited partnership: see Ontario LPA ss. 8 and 13. Limited partners have no liability to the creditors of the limited partnership's business; the limited partners' financial exposure is limited to their contribution. The limited partners do not have any "independent" ownership rights in the property of the limited partnership. The entitlement of the limited partners is limited to their contribution plus any profits thereon, after satisfaction of claims of the creditors. See Ontario LPA sections 9, 11, 12(1), 13, 15(2) and 24. The process of debtor and creditor relationships associated with the limited partnership's business are between the general partner and the creditors of the business. In the event of the creditors collecting on debt and enforcing security, the creditors can only look to the assets of the limited partnership together with the assets of the general partner including the general partner's interest in the limited partnership. This relationship is recognized under the *Bankruptcy Act* (now the BIA) sections 85 and 142.

18 A general partner is responsible to defend proceedings against the limited partnership in the firm name, so in procedural law and in practical effect, a proceeding against a limited partnership is a proceeding against the general partner. See Ontario *Rules of Civil Procedure* , O. Reg. 560/84, Rules 8.01 and 8.02.

19 It appears that the preponderance of case law supports the contention that contention that a partnership including a limited partnership is not a separate legal entity. See *Lindley on Partnership* , 15th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1984), at pp. 33-35; *Seven Mile Dam Contractors v. R.* (1979), 13 B.C.L.R. 137 (S.C.) , affirmed (1980), 25 B.C.L.R. 183 (C.A.) and "Extra-Provincial Liability of the Limited Partner", Brad A. Milne, (1985) 23 Alta. L. Rev. 345, at pp. 350-351. Milne in that article made the following observations:

> The preponderance of case law therefore supports the contention that a limited partnership is not a separate legal entity. It appears, nevertheless, that the distinction made in *Re Thorne* between partnerships and trade unions could not be applied to limited partnerships which, like trade unions, must rely on statute for their validity. The mere fact that limited partnerships owe their existence to the statutory provision is probably not sufficient to endow the limited partnership with the attribute of legal personality as suggested in *Ruzicks* unless it appeared that the Legislature clearly intended that the limited partnership should have a separate legal existence. A review of the various provincial statutes does not reveal any procedural advantages, rights or powers that are fundamentally different from those advantages enjoyed by ordinary partnerships. The legislation does not contain any provision resembling section 15 of the *Canada Business Corporation Act* [S.C. 1974-75, c. 33, as am.] which expressly states that a corporation has the capacity, both in and outside of Canada, of a natural person. It is therefore difficult to imagine that the Legislature intended to create a new category of legal entity.

20 It appears to me that the operations of a limited partnership in the ordinary course are that the limited partners take a completely passive role (they must or they will otherwise lose their limited liability protection which would have been their sole reason for choosing a limited partnership vehicle as opposed to an "ordinary" partnership vehicle). For a lively discussion of the question of "control" in a limited partnership as contrasted with shareholders in a corporation, see R. Flannigan, "The Control Test of Investor Liability in Limited Partnerships" (1983) 21 Alta. L. Rev. 303; E. Apps, "Limited Partnerships and the 'Control' Prohibition: Assessing the Liability of Limited Partners" (1991) 70 Can. Bar Rev. 611; R. Flannigan, "Limited Partner Liability: A Response" (1992) 71 Can. Bar Rev. 552. The limited partners leave the running of the business to the general partner and in that respect the care, custody and the maintenance of the property, assets and undertaking of the limited partnership in which the limited partners and the general partner hold an interest. The ownership of this limited partnership property, assets and undertaking is an undivided interest which cannot be segregated for the purpose of legal process. It seems to me that there must be afforded a protection of the whole since the applicants' individual interest therein cannot be segregated without in effect dissolving the partnership arrangement. The limited partners have two courses of action to take if they are dissatisfied with the general partner or the operation of the limited partnership as carried on by the general partner — the limited partners can vote to (a) remove the general partner and replace it with another or (b) dissolve the limited partnership. However Flannigan strongly argues that an unfettered right to remove the general partner would attach general liability for the limited partners (and especially as to the question of continued enjoyment of favourable tax deductions) so that it is prudent to provide

this as a conditional right: *Control Test* , (1992), supra, at pp. 524-525. Since the applicants are being afforded the protection of a stay of proceedings in respect to allowing them time to advance a reorganization plan and complete it if the plan finds favour, there should be a stay of proceedings (vis-à-vis any action which the limited partners may wish to take as to replacement or dissolution) through the period of allowing the limited partners to vote on the reorganization plan itself.

21 It seems to me that using the inherent jurisdiction of this court to supplement the statutory stay provisions of s. 11 of the CCAA would be appropriate in the circumstances; it would be just and reasonable to do so. The business operations of the applicants are so intertwined with the limited partnerships that it would be impossible for relief as to a stay to be granted to the applicants which would affect their business without at the same time extending that stay to the undivided interests of the limited partners in such. It also appears that the applicants are well on their way to presenting a reorganization plan for consideration and a vote; this is scheduled to happen within the month so there would not appear to be any significant time inconvenience to any person interested in pursuing proceedings. While it is true that the provisions of the CCAA allow for a cramdown of a creditor's claim (as well as an interest of any other person), those who wish to be able to initiate or continue proceedings against the applicants may utilize the comeback clause in the order to persuade the court that it would not be just and reasonable to maintain that particular stay. It seems to me that in such a comeback motion the onus would be upon the applicants to show that in the circumstances it was appropriate to continue the stay.

22 The order is therefore granted as to the relief requested including the proposed stay provisions.

Application allowed.

Footnotes

* As amended by the court.

End of Document

TAB 13

2011 ONSC 2750
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Nelson Financial Group Ltd., Re

2011 CarswellOnt 3100, 2011 ONSC 2750, 202 A.C.W.S. (3d) 444, 79 C.B.R. (5th) 307

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, Cc. C-36, as Amended

And In the Matter of a Proposed Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Nelson Financial Group Ltd. (Applicant)

Morawetz J.

Heard: April 20, 2011
Judgment: April 21, 2011
Written reasons: May 6, 2011
Docket: 10-8630-00CL

Counsel: Richard B. Jones, Douglas Turner, Q.C. for Interim Operating Officer and Noteholders
James H. Grout, Seema Aggarwal for Monitor, A. John Page & Associates Inc.
Jane Waechter, Swapna Chandra for Ontario Securities Commission

Subject: Insolvency

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Morawetz J.*:

Sammi Atlas Inc., Re (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 1145, 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — followed

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

MOTION by debtor company to sanction plan of arrangement .

***Morawetz J.*:**

1 The motion to sanction the Plan of Arrangement of Nelson Financial Group Ltd. ("Nelson") was heard on April 20, 2011.

2 On April 21, 2011, following consideration of the supplementary affidavit of Richard B. Jones, sworn April 20, 2011, the record was endorsed as follows:

> Motion granted. The Plan is sanctioned. An order has been signed in the form presented, as amended, which includes sealing provision relating to Exhibit B to the Thirteenth Report of the Monitor. Reasons will follow.

3 These are the reasons.

4 At the outset, I note that this *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA") application proceeded in a somewhat unconventional manner. These reasons reflect the very specific facts of the application.

5 Nelson filed its application under the CCAA on March 22, 2010. Nelson had sold to members of the public some $80 million of term promissory notes and preferred shares. As of the date of filing, over $37 million of the promissory notes were outstanding. The sole director, voting shareholder and president of Nelson was Mr. Marc Boutet.

6 Under the Initial Order of March 23, 2010, A. John Page & Associates Inc. was appointed as Monitor of the Applicant (the "Monitor").

7 By order of Pepall J., made on consent of the Applicant and the Monitor on June 15, 2010, Douglas Turner, Q.C. was appointed as Representative Counsel for the holders of the notes issued by Nelson and Richard B. Jones was appointed as his Special Counsel.

8 The restructuring was commenced as an application made by Nelson under the direction and control of incumbent management and ownership.

9 Commencing in September 2010, Representative Counsel sought the replacement of management, as issues had been raised questioning the competency and *bona fides* of management.

10 In October 2010, the Representative Counsel's Noteholder Advisory Committee canvassed noteholders and obtained confirmation from more than two-thirds in claim amount that they would not support any plan of arrangement that continued the incumbency of Mr. Boutet.

11 On November 11, 2010, Mr. Boutet resigned all of his positions with Nelson, surrendered his shares for cancellation and released all claims against Nelson held by him or any of his associated corporations. In exchange, he was provided with a limited release. The arrangements in respect of his departure were approved by order of Pepall J. made November 22, 2010. In that same decision, Pepall J. appointed a substantial shareholder, Ms. Sherri Townsend, as the Interim Operating Officer ("IOO"). Under the terms of her appointment, the IOO was granted full powers as the Chief Executive Officer and was given particular authority to review the circumstances of the debtor company and its assets and, if practicable, to develop a plan for its restructuring.

12 Under the direction of the IOO, a business plan was developed and a Plan of Compromise and Arrangement was devised.

13 Counsel for the IOO takes the position that since the business of Nelson came under the authority and direction of the IOO, Nelson has conducted itself in full compliance with the requirements of the CCAA and of the court orders made in these proceedings. Specifically, counsel submits that the IOO has performed all of the duties and responsibilities placed upon her by the order of November 22, 2010 and by subsequent orders of the court.

14 Under the Plan, creditors have the following options:

(a) creditors with claims for $1,000 or less will receive a cash payment for the full amount of their claims (the "Convenience Class");

(b) creditors may elect to receive a cash payment of 25% of their claims in full satisfaction of their claims and all of their rights against the Applicant or any other person in respect of their claims (the "Cash Exit Option"); and

(c) creditors who are not in the Convenience Class and who do not elect the Cash Exit Option will receive:

(i) capital recovery debentures for 25% of their claim;

(ii) new special shares with a redemption price of 25% of their claim; and

(iii) one common share of the Applicant for each $100 of their claims (the "General Plan Option").

15 The Plan was substantially finalized on February 11, 2011.

16 The Plan Filing and Meeting Order was granted on March 4, 2011.

17 From and after the appointment of the IOO, the relationship as between the Monitor, the IOO and their respective counsel became strained, if not dysfunctional. Further details in respect of this relationship are set out in the materials served by the parties in the period leading up to the granting of the Plan Filing and Meeting Order on March 4, 2011.

18 Subsequent to the granting of the Plan Filing and Meeting Order, issues were raised by Ms. Brenda Bissell, in her capacity as power of attorney for Gloria Bissell, who holds promissory notes of Nelson in her own name and also in her capacity as the owner of Globis Administrators Inc. The concerns of Ms. Bissell are set out in her affidavit of April 12, 2011.

19 Ms. Bissell, through counsel, attended before Mesbur J. on April 13, 2011 in respect of a request for scheduling of a motion seeking to adjourn the meeting of creditors scheduled by the Plan Filing and Meeting Order for April 16, 2011.

20 The endorsement of Mesbur J. reads as follows:

> Brenda Bissell P.A. [Power of Attorney] for a noteholder wishes to move urgently to postpone the vote on the proposed Plan of Arrangement, etc. scheduled for Saturday, April 16, 2011. Essentially, she wishes the opportunity to communicate her position and information to the other Noteholders. A solution has emerged at this 9:30 that will avoid both an urgent motion and any necessity to delay the vote.
>
> On consent:
>
> 1. Special Counsel, Mr. Jones, will forthwith (i.e. today, as soon as possible) email all the Noteholders directing them to Ms. Bissell's motion materials posted on the Monitor's website, and suggesting they review the material before the meeting.
>
> 2. Mr. Page will provide Mr. Yellin today with a copy of the unredacted claims procedure memorandum: (done)
>
> 3. Mr. Yellin will provide Mr. Jones with an electronic copy of the communication his client wishes to send to the Noteholders and Mr. Jones will immediately email it to all the Noteholders, subject to the communication not containing defamatory, libellous or illegal statements.
>
> 4. If the plan is approved, Ms. Bissell's motion materials may be filed for the purposes of the sanction hearing and considered as a dissenting creditor's responding materials on the sanction hearing.
>
> "Mesbur J."

21 Counsel to the IOO stated that all required steps, directed by the court in the Plan Filing and Meeting Order, have been taken by the IOO and the Monitor.

22 About 93% of the creditor claims were voted and the Plan of Compromise and Arrangement including its technical amendments to April 12, 2011, was approved by over 96% of the creditors voting representing 94.9% of the claim value voted.

23 For a plan to be sanctioned, the application must meet the following three tests:

> (i) there has been strict compliance with all statutory requirements and adherence to previous orders of the court;
>
> (ii) nothing has been done or purported to be done that is not authorized by the CCAA; and
>
> (iii) the plan is fair and reasonable.

Sammi Atlas Inc., Re (1998), 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).

24 Counsel to the IOO submits that the circumstances of this case are atypical. Until late 2010, the Applicant was under the direction of Mr. Boutet who, counsel submits, appears to have committed a number of wrongful and fraudulent acts. The IOO, in her First Report dated February 18, 2011, set out some of those acts that had come to her attention. Counsel advised that there can be no assurance provided by the IOO or the Monitor that there was strict compliance with the court orders or the CCAA by the Applicant prior to the appointment of the IOO. Counsel submitted that in a case where the control of the debtor company is changed in the course of the CCAA proceedings, the tests of compliance must be applied with reference to the conduct of the persons who are directing the debtor company and the persons who will benefit from the exercise of the court's discretion at the time of the application for sanctioning.

25 In the circumstances of this case, I accept this submission and consider it appropriate to apply the test as set out in *Sammi Atlas*, in respect of compliance with statutory requirements and orders of the court, for the period subsequent to the appointment of the IOO.

26 Based on what was disclosed in the Motion Record filed April 19, 2011, the test as set out in *Sammi Atlas* would appear to have been satisfied.

27 However, it is also necessary to consider the Motion Record submitted by counsel on behalf of Ms. Bissell. In the hearing, I inquired as to whether counsel had any comment in respect of the materials filed by Ms. Bissell, as it was apparent that neither Ms. Bissell nor her counsel were in attendance.

28 In response to my inquiries, counsel advised that there had been the aforementioned attendance before Mesbur J. on April 13, 2011.

29 I find it surprising that the directions ordered by Mesbur J. were not placed in the materials put before the court. In submissions, Mr. Jones advised that there had been full compliance with respect to the directions issued by Mesbur J. He subsequently filed, in response to my request, his affidavit setting forth complete details of the steps taken to comply with the directions of Mesbur J.

30 Having had the opportunity to review the affidavit of Mr. Jones, I am satisfied that, in the period following the application of the IOO, there has been compliance with all statutory requirements and adherence to all previous orders of the court. Further, I am satisfied that it appears that there has been nothing done or purported to be done that has not been authorized by the CCAA.

31 With respect to the third part of the test, namely, whether the plan is fair and reasonable, the Plan does extinguish the equity interests of shareholders. Counsel to the IOO submits that this is just and equitable as the liquidation analysis of the Monitor, as set out in the Thirteenth Report as of April 6, 2011, confirms that there is no reasonable basis on which there is any economic value or interest in any shareholding of the Applicant at this time.

32 Further, the Monitor, in its Thirteenth Report, finds that the Plan is "fair and reasonable".

33 In addition, counsel to the IOO points out that the IOO and Representative Counsel provided an information circular to the creditors including specific information as to the business plan, financial projections and management of Nelson if the plan should be approved. Further, the circular was reviewed by the Ontario Securities Commission and was found to be unobjectionable.

34 Counsel also submits that the Plan proposed and approved by the creditors is fair and reasonable on its face and the only persons who receive any benefit under the Plan are the creditors and those benefits are strictly proportionate to the proven claim interests of each creditor.

35 In its Report, the Monitor makes a recommendation to the creditors and the court. The Monitor clearly states that the creditors of Nelson are faced with a choice. They could choose to approve the Plan which has both upsides and downsides. The upside is that if the new board of directors and new management can successfully carry on the business, then, in time, the creditors may recover the full amount of their claim and perhaps make a profit. However, the downside is that, if not successful,

then the corporation may end up being wound up and creditors may recover less than the approximately 42% recovery over five years that is estimated by the Monitor in a bankruptcy or other form of liquidation at this time.

36 In this case, creditors had the benefit of the information circular and the supplementary materials posted on the website and voted overwhelmingly in favour of the Plan.

37 In determining whether a plan is fair and reasonable, the following are relevant considerations:

1. The claims must have been properly classified; there must be no secret arrangements to give an advantage to a creditor or creditors; the approval of the plan by the requisite majority of creditors is most important.

2. It is helpful if the monitor or some other disinterested person has prepared an analysis of anticipated receipts and liquidation or bankruptcy.

3. If other options or alternatives have been explored and rejected as workable, this will be significant.

4. Consideration of the oppression of rights of certain creditors.

5. Unfairness to shareholders.

6. The court will consider the public interest.

(See N§45, The 2011 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (Houlden, Morawetz and Sarra)

38 I am satisfied that the foregoing considerations have been taken into account and, I am satisfied that, in these circumstances, the Plan can be considered fair and reasonable.

39 Accordingly, the motion is granted. An order has been signed approving and sanctioning the Plan and the Articles of Reorganization and providing for its implementation.

Motion granted.

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TAB 14

1988 CarswellAlta 319
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench

Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.

1988 CarswellAlta 319, [1989] 2 W.W.R. 566, [1989] A.W.L.D. 231, [1989] C.L.D. 336, 64 Alta. L.R. (2d) 139, 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 20

NORCEN ENERGY RESOURCES LIMITED and PRAIRIE OIL ROYALTIES COMPANY LTD. v. OAKWOOD PETROLEUMS LTD.

Forsyth J.

Judgment: December 22, 1988
Docket: No. 8801-14453

Counsel: *J.J. Marshall, Q.C.*, and *J.A. Legge*, for Norcen Energy Resources Limited and Prairie Oil Royalties Company, Ltd.
E.D. Tavender, Q.C., D. Lloyd, R. Wigham and *R.C. Dixon*, for Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.
B. Tait and *B.D. Newton*, for Bank of Montreal.
B. O'Leary, M.R. Russo, A. Pettie and *A.Z. Breitman*, for Sceptre Resources Limited.
L. Robinson, for Royal Bank of Canada.
P.T. McCarthy and *T. Warner*, for HongKong Bank of Canada.
R. Gregory and *P. Jull*, for Bank America, Canada.
R.C. Pittman and *B.J. Roth*, for Esso Resources.
W. Corbett, for Canadian Co-operative Society and Saskatchewan Co-operative Society.
T.L. Czechowskyj, for National Bank.
J.G. Hanley and *H.J.R. Clarke*, for A.B.C. noteholders.
V.P. Lalonde and *L.R. Duncan*, for Innovex Equities Corporation.
I. Kerr, for Alberta Securities.
G.K. Randall, Q.C., for Director C.B.C.A.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency; Criminal

Table of Authorities

Cases considered:

Alabama, New Orleans, Texas & Pac. Junction Ry. Co., Re, [1891] 1 Ch. 213 (C.A.) — *distinguished*

Amoco Can. Petroleum Co. v. Dome Petroleum Ltd., Calgary No. 8701-20108 (not yet reported) — *distinguished*

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, Re; A.G. Can. v. A.G. Que., [1934] S.C.R. 659, 16 C.B.R. 1, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75 — *referred to*

Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd. (1988), 71 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361 (Q.B.) — *considered*

Palisades-on-the-Desplaines, Re; Seidel v. Palisades-on-the-Desplaines, 89 F. 2d 214 (1937, Ill.) — *referred to*

Savage v. Amoco Acqusition Co. (1988), 59 Alta. L.R. (2d) 260, 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 154, 87 A.R. 321 (C.A.) [leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 60 Alta. L.R. (2d) lv, 89 A.R. 80] — *applied*

Sovereign Life Assur. Co. v. Dodd, [1892] 2 Q.B. 573 (C.A.) — *referred to*

Statutes considered:

Business Corporations Act, S.A. 1981, c. B-15

s. 186 [am. 1988, c. 7, s. 3]

Canada Business Corporations Act, S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 33 [now R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44]

s. 185 [now s. 191]

s. 185.1 [en. 1978-79, c. 9, s. 61; now s. 192]

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-25 [now R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36]

s. 4

s. 5

s. 6

Authorities considered:

Edwards, "Reorganization under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act" (1947), 25 Can. Bar Rev. 587, p. 603.

Robertson, "Legal Problems on Reorganization of Major Financial and Commercial Debtors", Canadian Bar Association — Ontario Continuing Legal Education, 5th April 1983, pp. 15, 16, 19-21.

Application to approve classification of creditors for purpose of voting on plan of arrangement.

***Forsyth J.*:**

1 On 12th December 1988 Oakwood Petroleums Limited ("Oakwood") filed with the court a plan of arrangement ("the plan") made pursuant to the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada), R.S.C. 1970, c. C-25 [now R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36] ("C.C.A.A."), as amended, ss. 185 and 185.1 [now ss. 191 and 192] of the Canada Business Corporations Act, S.C. 1974-75-76 [now R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44] as amended, and s. 186 of the Business Corporations Act (Alberta), S.A. 1981, c. B-15, as amended.

2 On 16th December 1988 Oakwood brought an application before me for an order which would, inter alia, approve the classification of creditors and shareholders proposed in the plan. I would note that the classifications requested are made pursuant to ss. 4, 5 and 6 of the C.C.A.A. for the purpose of holding a vote within each class to approve the plan.

3 Since my concern primarily is with the secured creditors of Oakwood, I shall set out, in part, the sections of the C.C.A.A. relevant to the court's authority with respect to compromises with secured creditors:

> 4 5. Where a compromise or arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its secured creditors or any class of them, the court may ... order a meeting of such creditors or class of creditors ...

> 5 6. Where a majority in numbers representing three-fourths in value of the creditors, or class of creditors, as the case may be, present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting or meetings ... held pursuant to sections 4 and 5 ... agree to any compromise or arrangement ... [it] may be sanctioned by the court, and if so sanctioned is binding on all the creditors ...

6 The plan filed with the court envisions five separate classes of creditors and shareholders. They are as follows:

7 (i) The secured creditors;

8 (ii) The unsecured creditors;

9 (iii) The preferred shareholders of Oakwood;

10 (iv) The common shareholders and holders of class A non-voting shares of Oakwood;

11 (v) The shareholders of New York Oils Ltd.

12 With the exception of the proposed class comprising the secured creditors of Oakwood, there has been for the moment no objection to the proposed groupings. I add here that shareholders of course have not yet had notice of the proposal with respect to voting percentages and classes with respect to their particular interests. With that caveat, and leaving aside the proposed single class of secured creditors, I am satisfied that the other classes suggested are appropriate and they are approved.

13 I turn now to the proposed one class of secured creditors. The membership of and proposed scheme of voting within the secured creditors class is dependent upon the value of each creditor's security as determined by Sceptre Resources Ltd. ("Sceptre"), the purchaser under the plan.

14 As a result of those valuations, the membership of that class was determined to include: the Bank of Montreal, the A.B.C. noteholders, the Royal Bank of Canada, the National Bank of Canada and the HongKong Bank of Canada and the Bank of America Canada. Within the class, each secured creditor will receive one vote for each dollar of "security value". The valuations made by Sceptre represent what it considers to be a fair value for the securities.

15 Any dispute over the amount of money each creditor is to receive for its security will be determined at a subsequent fairness hearing where approval of the plan will be sought. Further, it should be noted that all counsel have agreed that, on the facts of this case, any errors made in the valuations would not result in any significant shift of voting power within the proposed class so as to alter the outcome of any vote. Therefore, the valuations made by Sceptre do not appear to be a major issue before me at this time insofar as voting is concerned.

16 The issue with which I am concerned arises from the objection raised by two of Oakwood's secured creditors, namely, HongKong Bank and Bank of America Canada, that they are grouped together with the other secured creditors. They have brought applications before me seeking leave to realize upon their security or, in the alternative, to be constituted a separate and exclusive class of creditors and to be entitled to vote as such at any meeting convened pursuant to the plan.

17 The very narrow issue which I must address concerns the propriety of classifying all the secured creditors of the company into one group. Counsel for Oakwood and Sceptre have attempted to justify their classifications by reference to the "commonality of interests test" described in *Sovereign Life Assur. Co. v. Dodd*, [1892] 2 Q.B. 573 (C.A.). That test received the approval of the Alberta Court of Appeal in *Savage v. Amoco Acquisition Co.* (1988), 59 Alta. L.R. (2d) 260, 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 154, 87 A.R. 321, where Kerans J.A., on behalf of the court, stated [pp. 264-65]:

> 18 We agree that the basic rule for the creation of groups for the consideration of fundamental corporate changes was expressed by Lord Esher in *Sovereign Life Assur. Co. v. Dodd,* [supra] when he said, speaking about creditors:

19 ... if we find a different state of facts existing among different creditors which may differently affect their minds and their judgments, they must be divided into different classes.

20 In the case of *Sovereign Life Assur. Co.*, Bowen L.J. went on to state at p. 583 that the class:

21 ... must be confined to those persons whose rights are not so dissimilar as to make it impossible for them to consult together with a view to their common interest.

22 Counsel also made reference to two other "tests" which they argued must be complied with — the "minority veto test" and the "bona fide lack of oppression test". The former, it is argued, holds that the classes must not be so numerous as to give a veto power to an otherwise insignificant minority. In support of this test, they cite my judgment in *Amoco Can. Petroleum Co. v. Dome Petroleum Ltd.*, Calgary No. 8701-20108, 28th January 1988 (not yet reported).

23 I would restrict my comments on the applicability of this test to the fact that, in the *Amoco* case, I was dealing with "a very small minority group of [shareholders] near the bottom of the chain of priorities". Such is not the case here.

24 In support of the "bona fide lack of oppression test", counsel cite *Re Alabama, New Orleans, Texas & Pac. Junction Ry. Co.*, [1891] 1 Ch. 213 (C.A.), where Lindley L.J. stated at p. 239:

25 The Court must look at the scheme, and see whether the Act has been complied with, whether the majority are acting *bona fide*, and whether they are coercing the minority in order to promote interests adverse to those of the class whom they purport to represent ...

26 Whether this test is properly considered at this stage, that is, whether the issue is the constitution of a membership of a class, is not necessary for me to decide as there have been no allegations by the HongKong Bank or Bank of America as to a lack of bona fides.

27 What I am left with, then, is the application to the facts of this case of the "commonality of interests test" while keeping in mind that the proposed plan of arrangement arises under the C.C.A.A.

28 Sceptre and Oakwood have argued that the secured creditors' interests are sufficiently common that they can be grouped together as one class. That class is comprised of six institutional lenders (I would note that the A.B.C. noteholders are actually a group of ten lenders) who have each taken first charges as security on assets upon which they have the right to realize in order to recover their claims. The same method of valuation was applied to each secured claim in order to determine the security value under the plan.

29 On the other hand, HongKong Bank and Bank of America have argued that their interests are distinguishable from the secured creditors class as a whole and from other secured creditors on an individual basis. While they have identified a number of individually distinguishing features of their interests vis-à-vis those of other secured parties (which I will address later), they have put forth the proposition that since each creditor has taken separate security on different assets, the necessary commonality of interests is not present. The rationale offered is that the different assets may give rise to a different state of facts which could alter the creditors' view as to the propriety of participating in the plan. For example, it was suggested that the relative ease of marketability of a distinct asset as opposed to the other assets granted as security could lead that secured creditor to choose to disapprove of the proposed plan. Similarly, the realization potential of assets may also lead to distinctions in the interests of the secured creditors and consequently bear upon their desire to participate in the plan.

30 In support of this proposition, the HongKong Bank and Bank of America draw from comments made by Ronald N. Robertson, Q.C., in a publication entitled "Legal Problems on Reorganization of Major Financial and Commercial Debtors", Canadian Bar Association — Ontario Continuing Legal Education, 5th April 1983, at p. 15, and by Stanley E. Edwards in an earlier article, "Reorganizations under the Companies'; Creditors Arrangement Act" (1947), 25 Can. Bar Rev. 587, at p. 603. Both authors gave credence to this "identity of interest" proposition that secured creditors should not be members of the same class "unless their security is on the same or substantially the same property and in equal priority". They also made reference to

a case decided under c. 11 of the Bankruptcy Code of the United States of America which, while not applying that proposition in that given set of facts, accepted it as a "general rule". That authority is *Re Palisades-on-the-Desplaines; Seidel v. Palisades-on-the-Desplaines*, 89 F. 2d. 214 at 217-18 (1937, Ill.).

31 Basically, in putting forth that proposition, the HongKong Bank and Bank of America are asserting that they have made advances to Oakwood on the strength of certain security which they identified as sufficient and desirable security and which they alone have the right to realize upon. Of course, the logical extension of that argument is that in the facts of this case each secured creditor must itself comprise a class of creditors. While counsel for the HongKong Bank and Bank of America suggested it was not necessary to do so in this case, as they are the only secured creditors opposed to the classification put forth, in principle such would have to be the case if I were to accept their proposition.

32 To put the issue in another light, what I must decide is whether the holding of distinct security by each creditor necessitates a separate class of creditor for each, or whether notwithstanding this factor that they each share, nevertheless this factor does not override the grouping into one class of creditors. In my opinion, this decision cannot be made without considering the underlying purpose of the C.C.A.A.

33 In *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.*, Calgary No. 8801-14453, 17th November 1988 [now reported ante, p. 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361], after canvassing the few authorities on point, I concluded that the purpose of the C.C.A.A. is to allow debtor companies to continue to carry on their business and that necessarily incidental to that purpose is the power to interfere with contractual relations. In referring to the case authority *Re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act; A.G. Can. v. A.G. Que.*, [1934] S.C.R. 659, 16 C.B.R. 1, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75, I stated at pp. 24 and 25 [p. 15]:

> 34 It was held in that case that the Act was valid as relating to bankruptcy and insolvency rather than property and civil rights. At p. 664, Cannon J. held:
>
> > 35 Therefore, if the proceedings under this new Act of 1933 are not, strictly speaking, 'bankruptcy' proceedings, because they had not for object the sale and division of the assets of the debtor, they may, however, be considered as 'insolvency proceedings' *with the object of preventing a declaration of bankruptcy and the sale of these assets*. If the creditors directly interested for the time being reach the conclusion that an opportune arrangement to avoid such sale would better protect their interest, as a whole or in part, provisions for the settlement of the liabilities of the insolvent are an essential element of any insolvency legislation ...

36 I went on to note:

> 37 *The C.C.A.A. is an Act designed to continue, rather than liquidate companies* ... The critical part of the decision is that federal legislation pertaining to assisting in the continuing operation of companies is constitutionally valid. In effect the Supreme Court of Canada has given the term "insolvency" a broad meaning in the constitutional sense by bringing within that term *an Act designed to promote the continuation of an insolvent company*. [emphasis added]

38 In this regard, I would make extensive reference to the article by Mr. Robertson, Q.C., where, in discussing the classification of creditors under the C.C.A.A. and after stating the proposition referred to by counsel for the HongKong Bank and Bank of America, he states at p. 16 in his article:

> 39 An initial, almost instinctive, response that differences in claims and property subject to security automatically means segregation into different classes does not necessarily make economic or legal sense in the context of an act such as the C.C.A.A.

40 And later at pp. 19 and 20, in commenting on the article by Mr. Edwards, he states:

> 41 However, if the trend of Edwards' suggestions that secured creditors can only be classed together when they held security of the same priority, that perhaps classes should be sub-divided into further groups according to whether or not a member of the class also holds some other security or form of interest in the debtor company, *the multiplicity of discrete*

> *classes or subclasses classes might be so compounded as to defeat the object of the act*. As Edwards himself says, the subdivision of voting groups and the counting of angels on the heads of pins must top somewhere and some forms of differences must surely be disregarded.

42 In summarizing his discussion, he states on pp. 20-21:

> 43 From the foregoing one can perceive at least two potentially conflicting approaches to the issue of classification. On the one hand there is the concept that members of a class ought to have the same "interest" in the company, ought to be only creditors entitled to look to the same "source" or "fund" for payment, and ought to encompass all of the creditors who do have such an identity of legal rights. *On the other hand, there is recognition that the legislative intent is to facilitate reorganization, that excessive fragmentation of classes may be counter-productive and that some degree of difference between claims should not preclude creditors being put in the same class*.
>
> 44 *It is fundamental to any imposed plan or reorganization that strict legal rights are going to be altered and that such alteration may be imposed against the will of at least some creditors*. When one considers the complexity and magnitude of contemporary large business organizations, and the potential consequences of their failure it may be that the courts will be compelled to focus less on whether there is any identity of legal rights and rather focus on whether or not those constituting the class are persons, to use Lord Esher's phrase, "whose rights are not so dissimilar as to make it impossible for them to consult together with a view to their common interest" ...
>
> 45 If the plan of reorganization is such that the creditors' particular priorities and securities are preserved, especially in the event of ultimate failure, *it may be that the courts will, for example in an apt case decide that creditors who have basically made the same kinds of loans against the same kind of security, even though on different terms and against different particular secured assets, do have a sufficient similarity of interest to warrant being put into one class and being made subject to the will of the required majority of that class*. [emphasis added]

46 These comments may be reduced to two cogent points. First, it is clear that the C.C.A.A. grants a court the authority to alter the legal rights of parties other than the debtor company without their consent. Second, the primary purpose of the Act is to facilitate reorganizations and this factor must be given due consideration at every stage of the process, including the classification of creditors made under a proposed plan. To accept the "identity of interest" proposition as a starting point in the classification of creditors necessarily results in a "multiplicity of discrete classes" which would make any reorganization difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.

47 In the result, given that this planned reorganization arises under the C.C.A.A., I must reject the arguments put forth by the HongKong Bank and the Bank of America, that since they hold separate security over different assets, they must therefore be classified as a separate class of creditors.

48 I turn now to the other factors which the HongKong Bank and Bank of America submit distinguishes them on individual bases from other creditors of Oakwood. The HongKong Bank and Bank of America argue that the values used by Sceptre are significantly understated. With respect to the Bank of Montreal, it is alleged that that bank actually holds security valued close to, if not in excess of, the outstanding amount of its loans when compared to the HongKong Bank and Bank of America whose security, those banks allege, is approximately equal to the amount of its loans. It is submitted that a plan which understates the value of assets results in the oversecured party being more inclined to support a plan under which they will receive, without the difficulties of realization, close to full payments of their loans.

49 The problem with this argument is that it is a throwback to the "identity of interest" proposition. Differing security positions and changing security values are a fact of life in the world of secured financing. To accept this argument would again result in a different class of creditor for each secured lender, with the possible exception of the A.B.C. noteholders who could be lumped with the HongKong Bank or Bank of America, as their percentage realization under the proposed plan is approximately equal to that of the HongKong Bank and Bank of America.

50 Further, the HongKong Bank and Bank of America also submit that since the Royal Bank and National Bank of Canada are so much more undersecured on their loans, they too have a distinct interest in participating in the plan which is not shared by themselves. The sum total of their submissions would seem to be that, since oversecured and undersecured lenders have a greater incentive to participate, it is only those lenders, such as themselves with just the right amount of security, that do not share that common interest. Frankly, it appears to me that these arguments are drawn from the fact that they are the only secured creditors of Oakwood who would prefer to retain their right to realize upon their security, as opposed to participating in the plan. I do not wish to suggest that they should be chided for taking such a position, but surely expressed approval or disapproval of the plan is not a valid reason to create different classes of creditors. Further, as I have already clearly stated, the C.C.A.A. can validly be used to alter or remove the rights of creditors.

51 Finally, I wish to address the argument that, since Sceptre has made arrangements with the Royal Bank of Canada relating to the purchase of Oakwood, it has an interest not shared by the other secured creditors. The Royal Bank's position as a principal lender in the reorganization is separate from its status as a secured creditor of Oakwood and arises from a separate business decision. In the absence of any allegation that the Royal Bank will not act bona fide in considering the benefit of the plan of the secured creditors as a class, the HongKong Bank and Bank of America cannot be heard to criticize the Royal Bank's presence in the same class.

52 In light of my conclusions, the result is that I approve the proposed classification of secured creditors into one class.

53 There is one further comment I wish to make with respect to the valuations made by Sceptre for the purposes of the vote calculations. I assume that Sceptre will be relying on those valuations at any fairness hearing, assuming this matter proceeds. I would simply observe that the onus is of course on Sceptre to establish that the valuations relied on and set forth in their plan in fact represent fair value under all the circumstances.

54 It has been obvious during the course of the hearing of this phase of the application that at least two of the secured creditors, to whom reference has been made, are not satisfied that that is the case, and in the event evidence is led by them in an effort to establish that the values proposed do not represent the fair value, the onus will be on Sceptre and Oakwood to establish the contrary. Underlying my comments above are of course the court's concern of ensuring that approval of any plan proposed does not result in unfair confiscation of the property of any secured creditors. In that regard, the underlying value of the assets of each individual secured creditor on the facts of this case would appear to be of prime importance.

Application granted.

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TAB 15

2014 ONSC 5274
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Nortel Networks Corp., Re

2014 CarswellOnt 11369, 2014 ONSC 5274, 244 A.C.W.S. (3d) 10

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. c-36, as Amended

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Nortel Networks Corporation, Nortel Networks Limited, Nortel Networks Global Corporation, Nortel Networks International Corporation and Nortel Networks Technology Corporation

Newbould J.

Heard: July 25, 2014
Judgment: September 11, 2014
Docket: 09-CL-7950

Counsel: Benjamin Zarnett, Graham Smith, for Monitor and Canadian Debtors
Ken Rosenberg, for Canadian Creditors' Committee
Michael Barrack, D.J. Miller, Michael Shakra, for UK Pension Claimants
Tracy Wynne, for EMEA Debtors
Kenneth Kraft, for Wilmington Trust, National Association
Richard Swan, Gavin Finlayson, Kevin Zych, for Ad Hoc Group of Bondholders
Shayne Kukulowicz, for US Unsecured Creditors' Committee
John D. Marshall, for Law Debenture Trust Company of New York
Brett Harrison, for Bank of New York Mellon
Andrew Gray, Scott Bomhof, for US Debtors

Subject: Insolvency

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s. 11(1) — considered

Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15
Generally — referred to

Winding-up Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. W-10
Generally — referred to

CLAIM by bondholders for post-filing interest against an insolvent estate under *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.

***Newbould J.*:**

1 Nortel Networks Corporation ("NNC") and other Canadian debtors filed for and were granted protection under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. c-36, ("CCAA") on January 14, 2009. On the same date, Nortel Network Inc. ("NNI") and other US debtors filed petitions in Delaware under the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C., Chapter 11.

2 Beginning in 1996, unsecured *pari passu* notes were issued under three separate bond indentures, first by a US Nortel corporation guaranteed by Nortel Networks Limited ("NNL"), a Canadian corporation, and then by NNL in several tranches jointly and severally guaranteed by NNC and NNI (the "crossover bonds"). Thus all of the notes are payable by Nortel entities in both Canada and the US, either as the maker or guarantor. Under claims procedures in both the Canadian and US proceedings, claims by bondholders for principal and pre-filing interest in the amount of US$4.092 billion have been made against each of the Canadian and US estates. The bondholders also claim to be entitled to post-filing interest and related claims under the terms of the bonds which, as of December 31, 2013, amounted to approximately US$1.6 billion.

3 The total assets realized on the sale of Nortel assets worldwide which are the subject of the allocation proceedings amongst the Canadian, US, and European, Middle East and African estates ("EMEA") are approximately US$7.3 billion, and thus the post-filing bond interest claims of now more than US$1.6 billion represent a substantial portion of the total assets available to all three estates. While the post-filing bond interest grows at various compounded rates under the terms of the bonds, the US$7.3 billion is apparently not growing at any appreciable rate because of the very conservative nature of the investments made with it pending the outcome of the insolvency proceedings. Apart from the bondholders, the main claimants against the Canadian debtors are Nortel disabled employees, former employees and retirees.

4 The bond claims in the Canadian proceedings have been filed pursuant to a claims procedure order in the CCAA proceedings dated July 30, 2009. The order contemplated that the claims filed under it would be finally determined in accordance with further procedures to be authorized, including by a further claims resolution order. By order dated September 16, 2010, a further order was made in the CCAA proceedings that authorized procedures to determine claims for all purposes.

5 By direction of June 24, 2014, it was ordered that the following issues be argued:

(a) whether the holders of the crossover bond claims are legally entitled in each jurisdiction to claim or receive any amounts under the relevant indentures above and beyond the outstanding principal debt and pre-petition interest (namely, above and beyond US$4.092 billion); and

(b) if it is determined that the crossover bondholders are so entitled, what additional amounts are such holders entitled to so claim and receive.

6 The hearing in the US Bankruptcy Court was scheduled to proceed at the same time as the hearing in this Court but was adjourned due to an apparent settlement between the US Debtors and certain bondholders.

7 The Monitor and Canadian debtors, supported by the Canadian Creditors' Committee, the UK Pension Claimants, the EMEA debtors, and the Wilmington Trust take the position that in a liquidating CCAA proceeding such as this, post-filing interest is not legally payable on the crossover bonds as a result of the "interest stops" rule. The Ad Hoc Group of Bondholders, supported by the US Unsecured Creditors' Committee, Law Debenture Trust Company of New York and Bank of New York Mellon take the position that there is no "interest stops" rule in CCAA proceedings and that the right to interest on the crossover bonds is not lost on the filing of CCAA proceedings and can be the subject of negotiations regarding a CCAA plan of reorganization. They take the position that no distribution of Nortel's sale proceeds that fails to recognize the full amount of the crossover bondholders' claims, including post-filing interest, can be ordered under the CCAA except under a negotiated CCAA plan duly approved by the requisite majorities of creditors and sanctioned by the court.

8 For the reasons that follow, I accept the position and hold that post-filing interest is not legally payable on the crossover bonds in this case.

The interest stops rule

9 In this case, the bondholders have a contractual right to interest. The other major claimants, being pensioners, do not. The Canadian debtors contend that the reason for the interest stops rule is one of fundamental fairness and that the rule should apply in this case.

10 The Canadian debtors contend that the interest-stops rule is a common law rule corollary to the *pari passu* rule governing rateable payments of an insolvent's debts and that while the CCAA is silent as to the right to post-filing interest, it does not rule out the interest-stops rule.

11 The bondholders contend that to deny them the right to post-filing interest would amount to a confiscation of a property right to interest and that absent express statutory authority the court has no ability to interfere with their contractual entitlement to interest. I do not see their claim to interest as being a property right, as the bonds are unsecured. See *Thibodeau v. Thibodeau* (2011), 104 O.R. (3d) 161 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 43. However, the question remains as to whether their contractual rights should prevail.

12 It is a fundamental tenet of insolvency law that all debts shall be paid *pari passu* and all unsecured creditors receive equal treatment. See *Shoppers Trust Co. (Liquidator of) v. Shoppers Trust Co.* (2005), 74 O.R. (3d) 652 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 25, per Blair J.A. and *Indalex Ltd., Re* (2009), 55 C.B.R. (5th) 64 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), at para. 16 per Morawetz J. This common law principle has led to the development of the interest stops rule. In *Canada (Attorney General) v. Confederation Life Insurance Co.*, [2001] O.J. No. 2610 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), Blair J. (as he then was) stated the following:

> **20** One of the governing principles of insolvency law - including proceedings in a winding-up - is that the assets of the insolvent debtor are to be distributed amongst classes of creditors rateably and equally, as those assets are found at the date of the insolvency. This principle has led to the development of the "interest stops rule", i.e., that no interest is payable on a debt from the date of the winding-up or bankruptcy. As Lord Justice James put it, colourfully, in *Re Savin* (1872), L.R. 7 Ch. 760 (C.A.), at p. 764:
>
> > I believe, however, that if the question now arose for the first time I should agree with the rule [i.e. the "interest stops rule"], seeing that the theory in bankruptcy is to stop all things at the date of the bankruptcy, and to divide the wreck of the man's property as it stood at that time.

13 This rule is "judge-made" law. See *Humber Ironworks & Shipbuilding Co., Re* (1869), 4 Ch. App. 643 (Eng. Ch. Div.), at 647, per Sir G. M. Giffard, L.J.

14 In *Shoppers Trust*, Blair J.A. referred to *pari passu* principles in the context of the interest stops rule and the common law understanding of those rules in liquidation proceedings. He stated:

> 25. The rationale underlying this approach rests on a fundamental principle of insolvency law, namely, that "in the case of an insolvent estate, all the money being realized as speedily as possible, should be applied equally and rateably in payment of the debts as they existed at the date of the winding-up": *Humber Ironworks*, *supra*, at p. 646 Ch. App. Unless this is the case, the principle of *pari passu* distribution cannot be honoured. See also *Re McDougall*, [1883] O.J. No. 63, 8 O.A.R. 309, at paras. 13-15; *Principal Savings & Trust Co. v. Principal Group Ltd. (Trustee of)* (1993), 109 D.L.R. (4th) 390, 14 Alta. L.R. (3d) 442 (C.A.), at paras. 12-16; and *Canada (Attorney General) v. Confederation Trust Co.* (2003), 65 O.R. (3d) 519, [2003] O.J. No. 2754 (S.C.J.), at p. 525 [O.R.] While these cases were decided in the context of what is known as the "interest stops" rule, they are all premised on the common law understanding that claims for principal and interest are provable in liquidation proceedings to the date of the winding-up.

15 The interest stops rule has been applied in winding-up cases in spite of the fact that the legislation did not provide for it. In *Shoppers Trust*, Blair J.A. stated:

> 26. Thus, it was of little moment that the provisions of the *Winding-up Act* in force at the time of the March 10, 1993 order did not contain any such term. The 1996 amendment to s. 71(1) of the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, establishing that claims against the insolvent estate are to be calculated as at the date of the winding-up, merely clarified and codified the position as it already existed in insolvency law.

16 In *Abacus Cities Ltd. (Trustee of) v. AMIC Mortgage Investment Corp.* (1992), 11 C.B.R. (3d) 193 (Alta. C.A.), Kerans J.A. applied the interest stops rule in a bankruptcy proceeding under the BIA even although, in his view, the BIA assumed that interest was not payable after bankruptcy but did not expressly forbid it. He did so on the basis of the common law rule enunciated in *Savin, Re* [(1872), 7 Ch. App. 760 (Eng. Ch. Div.)], quoted by Blair J. in *Confederation Life*. Kerans J.A. stated:

> 19. ... I accept that *Savin* expresses the law in Canada today: claims provable in bankruptcy cannot include interest after bankruptcy.

17 In *Confederation Life*, Blair J. was of the view that the Winding-Up Act and the BIA could be interpreted to permit post-filing interest. Yet he held that the common law insolvency interest stops rule applied. He stated:

> **22** This common law principle has been applied consistently in Canadian bankruptcy and winding-up proceedings. This is so notwithstanding the language of subsection 71(1) of the Winding-Up Act and section 121 of the BIA, which might be read to the contrary, in my view....
>
> **23** Yet the "interest stops" principle has always applied to the payment of post-insolvency interest, and the provisions of subsection 71(1) have never been interpreted to trump the common law insolvency "interest stops rule".

18 Thus I see no reason to not apply the interest stops rule to a CCAA proceeding because the CCAA does not expressly provide for its application. The issue is whether the rule should apply to this CCAA proceeding.

Nature of the CCAA proceeding

19 When the Nortel entities filed for CCAA protection on January 14, 2009, and filed on the same date in the US and the UK, the stated purpose was to stabilize the Nortel business to maximize the chances of preserving all or a portion of the enterprise. However that hope quickly evaporated and on June 19, 2009 Nortel issued a news release announcing it had sold its CMDA business and LTE Access assets and that it was pursuing the sale of its other business interests. Liquidation followed, first by a sale of Nortel's eight business lines in 2009-2011 for US$2.8 billion and second by the sale of its residual patent portfolio under a stalking-horse bid process in June 2011 for US$4.5 billion. The sale of the CMDA and LTE assets was approved on June 29, 2009.

20 The Canadian debtors contend that this CCAA proceeding is a liquidating proceeding, and thus in substance the same as a bankruptcy under the BIA. The bondholders contend that there is no definition of a "liquidating" CCAA proceeding and no distinct legal category of a liquidating CCAA, essentially arguing that like beauty, it is in the eyes of the beholder.

21 In this case, I think there is little doubt that this is a liquidating CCAA process and has been since June, 2009, notwithstanding that there was some consideration given to monetizing the residual intellectual property in a new company to be formed (referred to as IPCO) before it was decided to sell the residual intellectual property that resulted in the sale to the Rockstar consortium for US$4.5 billion. In *Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, 2012 ONSC 1213, 88 C.B.R. (5th) 111 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), Morawetz J. referred to his recognizing in his June 29, 2009 Nortel decision approving the sale of the CMDA and LTE assets that the CCAA can be applied in "a liquidating insolvency". See also Dr. Janis P. Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2013) at p. 167, in which she states "increasingly, there are 'liquidating CCAA' proceedings, whereby the debtor corporation is for all intents and purposes liquidated".

22 In *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), Farley J. recognized in para. 7 that a CCAA proceeding might involve liquidation. He stated:

> It appears to me that the purpose of the CCAA is also to protect the interests of creditors and to enable an orderly distribution of the debtor company's affairs. This may involve a winding-up or liquidation of a company ... provided the same is proposed in the best interests of the creditors generally.

23 It is quite common now for there to be liquidating CCAA proceedings in which there is no successful restructuring of the business but rather a sale of the assets and a distribution of the proceeds to the creditors of the business. Nortel is unfortunately one of such CCAA proceedings.

Can the interest stops rule apply in a CCAA proceeding?

24 There is no controlling authority in Canada in a case such as this in which there is a contested claim being made by bondholders for post-filing interest against an insolvent estate under the CCAA, let alone under a liquidating CCAA process, or in which the other creditors are mainly pensioners with no contractual right to post-filing interest. Accordingly, it is necessary to deal with first principles and with various cases raised by the parties.

25 The Canadian debtors contend that the rationale for the interest stops rule is equally applicable to a liquidating CCAA proceeding as it is in a BIA or Winding-Up proceeding. They assert that the reason for the interest stops rule is one of fundamental fairness. An insolvency filing under the CCAA stays creditor enforcement. Accordingly, it is unfair to permit the bondholders with a contractual right to receive a payment on account of interest, and thus compensation for the delay in receipt of payment, while other creditors such as the pension claimants, who have been equally delayed in payment by virtue of the insolvency, receive no compensation. They cite Sir G. M. Giffard, L.J. in *Humber Ironworks*:

> I do not see with what justice interest can be computed in favour of creditors whose debts carry interest, while creditors whose debts do not carry interest are stayed from recovering judgment, and so obtaining a right to interest.

26 In *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re*, 2010 SCC 60, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Century Services], Deschamps J. reaffirmed that the purpose of a CCAA stay of proceedings is to preserve the *status quo*. She stated at para. 77:

> The *CCAA* creates conditions for preserving the *status quo* while attempts are made to find common ground amongst stakeholders for a reorganization that is fair to all.

27 If post-filing interest is available to one set of creditors while the other creditors are prevented from asserting their rights and obtaining post-judgment interest, the Canadian Creditors' Committee contend that the *status quo* has not been preserved.

28 It has long been recognized that the federal insolvency regime includes the CCAA and the BIA and that the two statutes create a complimentary and interrelated scheme for dealing dealing with the property of insolvent companies. See *Ivaco Inc., Re* (2006), 83 O.R. (3d) 108 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 62 and 64, per Laskin J.A.

29 Recently the Supreme Court of Canada analysed the CCAA and indicated that the BIA and CCAA are to be considered parts of an integrated insolvency scheme, the court will favour interpretations that give creditors analogous entitlements under the CCAA and BIA, and the court will avoid interpretations that give creditors incentives to prefer BIA processes.

30 In *Century Services*, Deschamps J. enunciated guiding principles for interpreting the CCAA. Deschamps J. also stated that the case was the first time that the Supreme Court was called upon to directly interpret the provisions of the CCAA. The case involved competing interpretations of the federal *Excise Tax Act* ("ETA") and the CCAA in considering a deemed trust for GST collections. The ETA expressly excluded the provisions in the BIA rendering deemed trusts ineffective, but did not exclude similar provisions in the CCAA. In holding in favour of a stay under the CCAA, Deschamps J. was guided in her interpretation of the relevant CCAA provision by the desire to have similar results under the BIA and CCAA.

31 In her analysis, Deschamps J. made a number of statements, including

> Because the CCAA is silent about what happens if reorganization fails, the *BIA* scheme of liquidation and distribution necessarily supplies the backdrop for what will happen if a CCAA reorganization is ultimately unsuccessful. (para. 23)
>
> With parallel CCAA and BIA restructuring schemes now an accepted feature of the insolvency law landscape, the contemporary thrust of legislative reform has been towards harmonizing aspects of insolvency law common to the two statutory schemes to the extent possible and encouraging reorganization over liquidation. (para. 24)
>
> Moreover, a strange asymmetry would arise if the interpretation giving the ETA priority over the CCAA urged by the Crown is adopted here: the Crown would retain priority over GST claims during CCAA proceedings but not in bankruptcy. As courts have reflected, this can only encourage statute shopping by secured creditors in cases such as this one where the debtor's assets cannot satisfy both the secured creditors' and the Crown's claims (*Gauntlet*, at para. 21). If creditors' claims were better protected by liquidation under the BIA, creditors' incentives would lie overwhelmingly with avoiding proceedings under the CCAA and not risking a failed reorganization. Giving a key player in any insolvency such skewed incentives against reorganizing under the CCAA can only undermine that statute's remedial objectives and risk inviting the very social ills that it was enacted to avert. (para. 47)
>
> Notably, acting consistently with its goal of treating both the BIA and the CCAA as sharing the same approach to insolvency, Parliament made parallel amendments to both statutes... (para. 54)
>
> The CCAA and BIA are related and no gap exists between the two statutes which would allow the enforcement of property interests at the conclusion of CCAA proceedings that would be lost in bankruptcy. (para. 78)

32 In *Indalex Ltd., Re*, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 271 (S.C.C.), a case involving a competition between a deemed trust under provincial pension legislation and the right of a lender to security granted under the DIP lending provisions of the CCAA, Deschamps J. had occasion to refer to the *Century Services* case and her statement in *Century Services* in para 23 referred to above. She then stated:

> In order to avoid a race to liquidation under the BIA, courts will favour an interpretation of the CCAA that affords creditors analogous entitlements.

33 Thus it is a fair comment taken the direction of the Supreme Court in *Century Services* and *Indalex* regarding the aims of insolvency law in Canada to say that if the common law principle of the interest stops rule was applicable to proceedings under the BIA and *Winding-Up Act* before legislative amendments to those statutes were made, (or if the comments of Blair J. in *Confederation Life* are accepted that the BIA still might be read to prevent its application but does not trump the application of the rule), there is no reason not to apply the interest stops rule in liquidating CCAA proceedings. I accept this and note that there is no provision in the CCAA that would not permit the application of the rule.

34 There are also policy reasons for this result, and they flow from *Century Services* and *Indalex*. I accept the argument of the Canadian Creditors' Committee that to permit some creditors' claims to grow disproportionately to others during the stay

period would not maintain the *status quo* and would encourage creditors whose interests are being disadvantaged to immediately initiate bankruptcy proceedings, threatening the objectives of the CCAA.

35 In my view, there is no need for there to be a "liquidating" CCCAA proceeding in order for the interest stops rule to apply to a CCAA proceeding. The reasoning for the application of the common law insolvency rule, being the desire to prevent a stay of proceedings from militating against one group of unsecured creditors over another in violation of the *pari passu* rule, is equally applicable to a CCAA proceeding that is not a liquidating proceeding. In such a proceeding, the parties would of course be free to include post-filing interest payments in a plan of arrangement, as is sometimes done.

36 The bondholders contend, however, that *Stelco Inc., Re*, 2007 ONCA 483, 32 B.L.R. (4th) 77 (Ont. C.A.) is binding authority that the interest stops rule does not apply in any CCAA proceeding. I do not agree. The facts of the case were quite different and did not involve a claim for post-filing interest against the debtor. Stelco was successfully restructured under the CCAA by a plan of compromise and arrangement approved by the creditors. The sanctioned plan did not provide for payment of post-petition interest. As among senior unsecured debenture holders, subordinated (junior) debenture holders and ordinary unsecured creditors, the plan treated all in the same class and *pro rata* distributions were calculated on the basis that no post-filing interest was allowed. That result was not challenged.

37 The relevant pre-filing indenture in *Stelco* provided that in the event of any insolvency, the holders of all senior debt would first be entitled to receive payment in full of the principal and interest due thereon, before the junior debenture holders would be entitled to receive any payment or distribution of any kind which might otherwise be payable in respect of their debentures. While the plan cancelled all Stelco debentures, subject to section 6.01(2) of the plan, that section provided that the rights between the debenture holders were preserved. The plan was agreed to by the junior debenture holders. After the plan had been sanctioned, the junior debenture holders challenged the senior debt holders' right to receive the subordinated payments towards their outstanding interest.

38 Wilton-Siegel J. rejected the argument, holding that the subordination agreement continued to operate independently of the sanctioned plan and was not affected by it. While it is not clear why, the junior Noteholders contended that interest stopped accruing in respect of the claims of the senior debenture holders against Stelco after the CCAA filing. There was no issue about a claim against Stelco for post-filing interest, as no such claim had ever been made. The issue was a contest between the two levels of debenture holders. However, Wilton-Siegel J. stated that in situations in which there was value to the equity, a CCAA plan could include post-filing interest. I take this statement to be *obiter*, but in any event, it is not the situation in Nortel as there is no equity at all. At the Court of Appeal, O'Connor A.C.J.O, Goudge and Blair JJ.A. agreed that the interest stops rule did not preclude the continuation of interest to the senior note holders from the subordinated payments to be made by the junior note holders under the binding inter-creditor arrangements.

39 In the course of its reasons, the Court of Appeal stated that there was no persuasive authority that supports an interest stops rule in a CCAA proceeding, and referred to statements of Binnie J. in *NAV Canada c. Wilmington Trust Co.*, 2006 SCC 24, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 865 (S.C.C.), [*NAV Canada*]. A number of comments can be made.

40 First, *Stelco* did not involve proceeding or claims against the debtor for post-filing interest. Second, the decision in *Stelco* was derived from the terms of negotiated inter-creditor agreements in the note indenture that were protected by plan. There was nothing about the common law interest stops rule that precluded one creditor from being held to its agreement to subordinate its realization to that of another creditor including foregoing its right to payment until the creditor with priority received principal and interest. That is what the Court of Appeal concluded by stating "We do not accept that there is a 'Interest Stops Rule' that precludes such a result". Third, the general statements made in *Stelco* and *NAV Canada* must now be considered in light of the later direction in *Century Services* and *Indalex*. I now turn to *NAV Canada*.

41 In *NAV Canada*, Canada 3000 Airlines filed for protection under the CCAA. Three days later the Monitor filed an assignment in bankruptcy on its behalf. Federal legislation gave the airport authorities a right to apply to the court authorizing the seizure of aircraft for outstanding payments owed by an airline for using an airport. The contest in the case was between the airport authorities and the owners/lessors of the aircraft as to the extent that the owners/lessors were liable for those payments

and whether a seizure order could be made against the aircraft leased to the airline. It was ultimately held that the owners/lessors were not liable for the outstanding payments owed by the airline but that the aircraft could be seized.

42 Interest on the arrears was raised in the first instance before Ground J. He held that the airport authorities were entitled as against the bankrupt airline to detain the aircraft until all amounts with interest were paid in full or security for such payment was posted under the provisions of the legislation, i.e. interest continued to accrue and be payable after bankruptcy. The Court of Appeal did not deal with interest as in their view it was relevant only if the airport authorities had a claim against the owners/lessors of the aircraft, which the court held they did not.

43 In the Supreme Court, which also dealt with an appeal from Quebec which dealt with the same issues, nearly the entire reasons of Binnie J. dealt with the issues as to whether the owners/lessors of the aircraft were liable for the outstanding charges and whether the aircraft could be seized by the airport authorities. It was held that the owners/lessors were not directly liable for the charges owed by the airline but that the aircraft could be seized until the charges were paid.

44 At the end of his reasons, Binnie J. dealt with interest and held that it continued to run until the earlier of payment, the posting of security, or bankruptcy. The bondholders rely on the last two sentences of the following paragraph from the reasons of Binnie J. which refer to the running of interest under the CCAA:

> **96** Given the authority to charge interest, my view is that interest continues to run to the first of the date of payment, the posting of security or bankruptcy. If interest were to stop accruing before payment has been made, then the airport authorities and NAV Canada would not recover the full amount owed to them in real terms. Once the owner, operator or titleholder has provided security, the interest stops accruing. The legal titleholder is then incurring the cost of the security and losing the time value of money. It should not have to pay twice. While a *CCAA* filing does not stop the accrual of interest, the unpaid charges remain an unsecured claim provable against the bankrupt airline. The claim does not accrue interest after the bankruptcy: ss. 121 and 122 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*.

45 The Quebec airline in question had first filed to make a proposal under the BIA and when that proposal was rejected by its creditors, it was deemed to have made an assignment in bankruptcy as of the date its proposal was filed. Thus the comments of Binnie J. regarding the CCAA could not have related to the Quebec airline, but only to Canada 3000, which had been under the CCAA for only three days before it was assigned into bankruptcy. It is by no means clear how much effort, if any, was spent in argument on the three days' interest issue. Binnie J. did not refer to any argument on the point.

46 There was no discussion of the common law interest stops rule and whether it could apply during the three day period in question or whether it should apply to a liquidating CCAA proceeding. Nor was there any discussion of the definition of claim in the CCAA, being a claim provable within the meaning of the BIA, and how that might impact a claim for post-filing interest under the CCAA. The statement regarding interest under the CCAA was simply conclusory. It may be fair to say that the statement of Binnie J. was *per incuriam*.

47 In my view, the statement of Binnie J. should not be taken as a blanket statement that interest always accrues in a CCAA proceeding, regardless of whether or not it is a liquidating proceeding. The circumstances in *NAV Canada* were far different from Nortel involving several years of compound interest in excess of US$1.6 billion out of a total world-wide asset base of US$7.3 billion. The statement of Binnie J. should now be construed in light of *Century Services* and *Indalex*.

Need for a CCAA plan

48 The bondholders contend that there is no authority under the CCAA to effect a distribution of a debtor's assets absent a plan of arrangement or compromise that must be negotiated by the debtor with its creditors, and that as a plan can include payment of post-filing interest, it is not possible for a court to conclude that the bondholders have no right to post-filing interest. They assert that there is no jurisdiction for a court to compromise a creditor's claim in a CCAA proceeding except in the context of approving a plan approved by the creditors. They also assert that plan negotiations cannot meaningfully take place "in earnest" until the allocation decision as to how much of the US$7.3 billion is to be allocated to each of the Canadian, US, or EMEA estates.

49 One may ask what is left over in this case to negotiate. The assets have long been sold and what is left is to determine the claims against the Canadian estate and, once the amount of the assets in the Canadian estate are known, distribute the assets on a *pari passu* basis. This is not a case in which equity is exchanged for debt in a reorganization of a business such as *Stelco*.

50 However, even if there were things to negotiate, they would involve creditors compromising some right, and bargaining against those rights. What those rights are need to be determined, and often are in CCAA proceedings.

51 In this case, compensation claims procedure orders were made by Morawetz J. The order covering claims by bondholders is dated July 30, 2009. It was made without any objection by the bondholders. That order provides for a claim to be proven for the purposes of voting and distribution under a plan. The claims resolution order of Morawetz J. dated September 16, 2010 provides for a proven claim to be for all purposes, including for the purposes of voting and distribution under any plan. The determination now regarding the bondholders claim for post-filing interest is consistent with the process of determining whether these claims by the bondholders are finally proven. Contrary to the contention of the bondholders, it is not a process in which the court is being asked to compromise the bondholders' claim for post-filing interest. It is rather a determination of whether they have a right to such interest.

52 It is perhaps not necessary to determine at this stage how the assets will be distributed and whether a plan, or what type of plan, will be necessary. However, in light of the argument advanced on behalf of the bondholders, I will deal with this issue.

53 I first note that the CCAA makes no provision as to how money is to be distributed to creditors. This is not surprising taken that plans of reorganization do not necessarily provide for payments to creditors and taken that the CCAA does not expressly provide for a liquidating CCAA process. There is no provision that requires distributions to be made under a plan of arrangement.

54 A court has wide powers in a CCAA proceeding to do what is just in the circumstances. Section 11(1) provides that a court may make any order it considers appropriate in the circumstances. Although this section was provided by an amendment that came into force after Nortel filed under the CCAA, and therefore by the amendment the new section does not apply to Nortel, it has been held that the provision merely reflects past jurisdiction. In *Century Services*, Deschamps J. stated:

> **65** I agree with Justice Georgina R. Jackson and Professor Janis Sarra that the most appropriate approach is a hierarchical one in which courts rely first on an interpretation of the provisions of the *CCAA* text before turning to inherent or equitable jurisdiction to anchor measures taken in a *CCAA* proceeding (see G. R. Jackson and J. Sarra, "Selecting the Judicial Tool to get the Job Done: An Examination of Statutory Interpretation, Discretionary Power and Inherent Jurisdiction in Insolvency Matters", in J. P. Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2007* (2008), 41, at p. 42). The authors conclude that when given an appropriately purposive and liberal interpretation, the *CCAA* will be sufficient in most instances to ground measures necessary to achieve its objectives (p. 94).
>
> **67** The initial grant of authority under the *CCAA* empowered a court "where an application is made under this Act in respect of a company ... on the application of any person interested in the matter ..., subject to this Act, [to] make an order under this section" (*CCAA*, s. 11(1)). The plain language of the statute was very broad.
>
> **68** In this regard, though not strictly applicable to the case at bar, I note that Parliament has in recent amendments changed the wording contained in s. 11(1), making explicit the discretionary authority of the court under the *CCAA*. Thus in s. 11 of the *CCAA* as currently enacted, a court may, "subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, ... make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances" (S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 128). Parliament appears to have endorsed the broad reading of *CCAA* authority developed by the jurisprudence. (underlining added)

55 I note also that payments to creditors without plans of arrangement or compromises are often ordered. In *Timminco Ltd., Re*, 2014 ONSC 3393 (Ont. S.C.J.), Morawetz J. noted at para. 38 that the assets of Timminco had been sold and distributions made to secured creditors without any plan and with no intention to advance a plan. In that case, there was a shortfall to the secured creditors and no assets available to the unsecured creditors. The fact that the distributions went to the secured creditors rather than to an unsecured creditor makes no difference to the jurisdiction under the CCAA to do so.

56 In *AbitibiBowater Inc., Re*, 2009 QCCS 6461 (C.S. Que.), Gascon J.C.S. (as he then was) granted a large interim distribution from the proceeds of a sale transaction to senior secured noteholders ("SSNs"). The bondholders opposed the distribution on the same grounds as advanced by the bondholders in this case:

> 56 The Bondholders claim that the proposed distribution violates the CCAA. From their perspective, nothing in the statute authorizes a distribution of cash to a creditor group prior to approval of a plan of arrangement by the requisite majorities of creditors and the Court. They maintain that the SSNs are subject to the stay of proceedings like all other creditors.
>
> 57 By proposing a distribution to one class of creditors, the Bondholders contend that the other classes of creditors are denied the ability to negotiate a compromise with the SSNs. Instead of bringing forward their proposed plan and creating options for the creditors for negotiation and voting purposes, the Abitibi Petitioners are thus eliminating bargaining options and confiscating the other creditors' leverage and voting rights.
>
> 58 Accordingly, the Bondholders conclude that the proposed distribution should not be considered until after the creditors have had an opportunity to negotiate a plan of arrangement or a compromise with the SSNs.

57 Justice Gascon did not accept this argument. He stated:

> 71 Despite what the Bondholders argue, it is neither unusual nor unheard of to proceed with an interim distribution of net proceeds in the context of a sale of assets in a CCAA reorganization. Nothing in the CCAA prevents similar interim distribution of monies. There are several examples of such distributions having been authorized by Courts in Canada. (underlining added)

58 Justice Gascon was persuaded that the distribution should be made as it was part and parcel of a DIP loan arrangement that he approved. Whatever the particular circumstances were that led to the exercise of his discretion, he did not question that he had jurisdiction to make an order distributing proceeds without a plan of arrangement. I see no difference between an interim distribution, as in the case of *AbitibiBowater*, or a final distribution, as in the case of *Timminco*, or a distribution to an unsecured or secured creditor, so far as a jurisdiction to make the order is concerned without any plan of arrangement.

59 There is a comment by Laskin J.A. in *Ivaco Inc., Re* (2006), 83 O.R. (3d) 108 (Ont. C.A.) that questions the right of a judge to order payment out of funds realized on the sale of assets under a CCAA process, in that case to pension plan administrators for funding deficiencies. He stated:

> [I]n my view, absent an agreement, I doubt that the CCAA even authorized the motions judge to order this payment. Once restructuring was not possible and the CCAA proceedings were spent, as the motions judge found and all parties acknowledged, I question whether the court had any authority to order a distribution of the sale proceeds.

60 This was an *obiter* statement. But in any event Justice Laskin was discussing a situation in which all parties agreed that the CCAA proceedings "were spent". That is, there was effectively no CCAA proceeding any more. This is not the situation with Nortel and I do not see the *obiter* statement as being applicable. As stated by Justice Gascon, distribution orders without a plan are common in Canada.

61 While it need not be decided, I am not persuaded that it would not be possible for a court to make an order distributing the proceeds of the Nortel sale without a plan of arrangement or compromise.

Conclusion

62 I hold and declare that holders of the crossover bond claims are not legally entitled to claim or receive any amounts under the relevant indentures above and beyond the outstanding principal debt and pre-petition interest (namely, above and beyond US$4.092 billion).

63 Those seeking costs may make cost submissions in writing within 10 days and responding submissions may be made in writing within a further 10 days. Submissions are to be brief and include a proper cost outline for costs sought.

Claim dismissed.

End of Document

TAB 16

2005 CarswellOnt 1482
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

SAAN Stores Ltd./Magasins SAAN Ltée, Re

2005 CarswellOnt 1482, [2005] O.J. No. 1471, 12 C.B.R. (5th) 35, 138 A.C.W.S. (3d) 793

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended

And In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise and Arrangement of SAAN Stores Ltd. - Les Magasins SAAN Ltée

Farley J.

Heard: April 7, 2005
Judgment: April 7, 2005
Docket: 05-CL-5695

Counsel: Frank J.C. Newbould, Q.C., Roger Jaipargas, Larry Ellis for SAAN Stores Ltd.
Robert J. Chadwick, Melaney Wagner for Quebecor
Mario Forte, Jennifer Stam for RSM Richter Inc.
Michael Miller, Sam De Caprio for 6301533 Canada Inc.
E.A. Sellers for Gendis Inc.

Subject: Insolvency

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Farley J.*:

Grafton-Fraser Inc. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (1992), 11 C.B.R. (3d) 161, 90 D.L.R. (4th) 285, 1992 CarswellOnt 164 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — considered

San Francisco Gifts Ltd., Re (2004), 5 C.B.R. (5th) 92, 359 A.R. 71, 2004 ABQB 705, 2004 CarswellAlta 1241 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312, 86 D.L.R. (4th) 621, 1991 CarswellOnt 220 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3
Generally — referred to

s. 65.2(5) [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 30] — considered

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

MOTION by creditor for directions regarding classification of creditors of company under *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, and disqualification of certain creditors from voting.

***Farley J.*:**

1 Motion by Quebecor ("Q") as to classification of creditors and as to disqualification from voting.

2 All counsel were extremely good at cooperating to ensure that this motion was heard on a timely basis because of the importance of it as to the vote required on SAAN's ("S's") restructuring and compromise plan — and as a result whether or not S will survive — especially with the financial condition it is now in and the need for interim funding. Mr. Chadwick should be singled out for being an exemplar in this regard (and he graciously and modestly acknowledged the great contribution of his colleague Ms. Wagner).

3 With respect to the question of a separate class for the landlords, I respectfully disagree with the proposition that there is "a lack [of] commonality of interest with other unsecured creditors based on the fact that their claims are calculated differently than the claims of all other creditors" (para. 33 factum). Section 65.2(5) of the BIA provides that landlords may have a separate class *or* be in a general unsecured class. It would not appear to me that there is any particular basis in this case for the proposition as in *Grafton-Fraser Inc. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce* [1992 CarswellOnt 164 (Ont. Gen. Div.)] re the difficulty of calculating the landlords' claims as there is the formula under the BIA. Rather it would seem desirable to avoid fragmentation, unless fragmentation of classes is necessary. See *San Francisco Gifts Ltd., Re* [2004 CarswellAlta 1241 (Alta. Q.B.)]; *Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia* [1991 CarswellOnt 220 (Ont. Gen. Div.)]. Landlords are to remain in the general class of unsecureds.

4 I did raise with Mr. Newbould the need for appropriate disclosure and information to the creditors as in certain areas there seemed to be deficiencies. He indicated that that would be remedied right away.

5 I also indicated that if there were other matters which surfaced in between now and the sanction hearing, if in fact the proposal was accepted by the statutory majority, with or without amendment, and these matters affected in a relevant way the vote, then these considerations would have to be taken into account at the sanction hearing as to whether the proposal was fair, reasonable and equitable in the circumstances. In that regard as a precaution, it would be desirable to keep a separate tally of the votes of 6301533 Canada Inc. ("630") and Gendis ("G") aside from their inclusion in the general tally if I conclude that they are permitted to vote.

6 Part of the difficulty in this case is that from the very start of the proceedings all things have been a scramble and the intensity of the scramble has intensified in the last month, it would seem caused by the frailty of S's financial situation and the need for interim funding (which has now been cobbled together with multiple conditions and linkage). The scramble has caused many lawyers to lose sleep as they worked virtually round the clock. No doubt other participants have also been sleep deprived. Thus in fairness some of the documentation has been a little sketchy and/or ambiguous. As well suspicions, for good or bad reasons, have abounded — unfortunately it also appears that the scramble has been to the detriment of good lines of communication to address those suspicions.

7 Thus some of Q's concerns — namely for example that S and 630 had the same (registered) office — namely the law firm of Goodman & Carr — was satisfactorily answered in that Elliott ("E") in essence took over the failed Chahine negotiations with G and used the same base documentation as that law firm.

8 It does not seem to me that in the circumstances anyone can doubt the need for interim financing. GMAC which is undoubtedly operating at arm's length would not provide the full amount needed and it further required S to get a further subordinate $6 million which S did almost in extremis with a cobbling together of $2 million from each of G, Jana and 630 in what might be equated to a "Rube Goldberg invention" (for those old enough to remember that comic strip). Apparently that GMAC deal was the origin of the requirement that 630 vote in favour of the proposal. On that basis I find that that agreement to so vote has an innocent explanation.

9 There would not appear on this record to be any evidence of shareholdings giving control which would lead to the result that by definition there were related parties which were automatically "disqualified".

10 G's claim of approximately $2 million is apparently made up primarily of its landlord claim for the distribution centre in Winnipeg of some $1.975 million. In addition there is a convoluted arrangement whereby 630 agreed to pay G $125,000 as part of the acquisition which payment amount S guaranteed and granted G a general security interest. In my view there has been no proper explanation as to this $125,000 arrangement and it would be undesirable in these circumstances for G to vote that part of its claim (I note that there may well be a good explanation and I do not fault G which was alerted to this motion at the very last minute). The Rube Goldberg invention handle may also be applied to the acquisition deal itself whereby E got control of S. However, the landlord claim of G appears to be regular and it would not appear appropriate to disqualify G from voting in favour of the proposal. However the question of releases should be fully dealt with including an analysis of potential claims and strength thereof — vis-à-vis G, its officers and directors. The lawsuit by GKP would not appear to be materially relevant to the proposal. The warrant would appear to be a kicker in the acquisition transaction and may be equated with potential deferred consideration as opposed to scarce present cash. I do not see it as a taint in these circumstances.

11 With respect to 630, the fact that it has agreed to elect to take a 2009 dividend would appear to be the result of negotiations to make the proposal more palatable to the other creditors.

12 However the relationship of 630 in the overall acquisition situation remains a question mark. Conceivably it paid $250,000 cash in the overall deal and a promissory note for $125,000 which was guaranteed by S as above noted. In return it got G's intercompany indebtedness of some $15.8 million. S however paid the E interests $650,000 in expenses for which apparently it received no benefit. It is therefore unclear on the simplest of analysis (which may not appreciate all intricacies) why 630 was needed if S was having to foot the expenses of its own takeover as opposed to using some of this money to have the intercompany debt cancelled. I note that E's affidavit was provided this afternoon (and therefore incapable of being cross-examined on — again no fault is attributed given the compressed timing necessary). However E's affidavit does not address why 630 was involved in the acquisition transaction and why E, it appears, required S to provide the support for 630's $125,000 obligation to G and the necessity to have 630 acquire the intercompany debt. On the record before me I must conclude that there is a strong relationship which is unexplained.

13 However in the circumstances it would not appear that 630's unsecured claim is tainted by that relationship pursuant to the *Oulahen* or *Northland* principles. Therefore I would not disqualify 630 from voting — but this relationship and the necessity/desirability of involving 630 in the acquisition transaction whereby it acquired the intercompany debt must be fully described in comprehensible language to the creditors.

14 In that respect I note that the Proposal of S indicates that it is giving background but it does not go back further than the CCAA filing on January 6, 2005. The Trustee's description did generally refer to the attempts by G to get rid of S but does not deal with the aborted negotiations with the Chahine interests (it was indicated in passing that there may have been a contact over the years between Chahine and the principal of 630) which led to the introduction of E. However 630's involvement is not discussed. I appreciate the terribly difficult balancing act between giving too little and too much information (particularly when there is a necessity to avoid confusion by deluging creditors with an avalanche of information); I do not fault in any way the Trustee in this regard but I find it necessary for 630's involvement in the deal and any relationship of any nature relevant to that involvement to be adequately explained.

Order accordingly.

End of Document

TAB 17

2004 ABQB 705
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench

San Francisco Gifts Ltd., Re

2004 CarswellAlta 1241, 2004 ABQB 705, [2004] A.W.L.D. 579, [2004] A.J. No. 1062, 134 A.C.W.S. (3d) 239, 359 A.R. 71, 42 Alta. L.R. (4th) 352, 5 C.B.R. (5th) 92

IN THE MATTER OF THE OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, 1985, C. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OFSAN FRANCISCO GIFTS LTD. ("SAN FRANCISCO"), SAN FRANCISCO RETAIL GIFTS INCORPORATED (PREVIOUSLY CALLED SAN FRANCISCO GIFTS INCORPORATED), SAN FRANCISCO GIFT STORES LIMITED, SAN FRANCISCO GIFTS (ATLANTIC) LIMITED, SAN FRANCISCO STORES LTD., SAN FRANCISCO GIFTS & NOVELTIES INC., SAN FRANCISCO GIFTS & NOVELTY MERCHANDISING CORPORATION (PREVIOUSLY CALLED SAN FRANCISCO GIFTS AND NOVELTY CORPORATION), SAN FRANCISCO (THE ROCK) LTD. (PREVIOUSLY CALLED SAN FRANCISCO NEWFOUNDLAND LTD.) and SAN FRANCISCO RETAIL GIFTS & NOVELTIES LIMITED (PREVIOUSLY CALLED SAN FRANCISCO GIFTS & NOVELTIES LIMITED) (COLLECTIVELY "THE COMPANIES")

Topolniski J.

Heard: September 1, 2004
Judgment: September 28, 2004 *
Docket: Edmonton 0403-00170

Counsel: Richard T.G. Reeson, Q.C., Howard J. Sniderman for Companies
Jeremy H. Hockin for Oxford Properties Group Inc., Ivanhoe Cambridge 1 Inc., 20 Vic Management Ltd., Morguard Investments Ltd. Morguard Investments Ltd, Morguard Real Estate Investments Trust, RioCan Property Services, 1113443 Ontario Inc. (the "Objecting Landlords")
Michael J. McCabe, Q.C. for Monitor

Subject: Insolvency; Property

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Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2000), 2000 ABCA 149, 2000 CarswellAlta 503, 80 Alta. L.R. (3d) 213, 19 C.B.R. (4th) 33, 261 A.R. 120, 225 W.A.C. 120 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]) — referred to

Dairy Corp. of Canada, Re (1934), [1934] O.R. 436, [1934] 3 D.L.R. 347, 1934 CarswellOnt 33 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

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APPLICATION by landlords for order reclassifying creditors for purposes of voting on plan of arrangement under *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.

***Topolniski J.*:**

Introduction

1 The San Francisco group of companies (San Francisco) obtained *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* [1] (*CCAA*) protection on January 7, 2004 under a consolidated Initial Order. The Initial Order has been extended and the companies continue in business. They now propose a compromise of their debt that is spelled out in a plan of arrangement ("Plan") that has been circulated to their creditors. Like all *CCAA* plans of arrangement, this Plan proposes classes of creditors for voting purposes. Two-thirds in value and a majority in number of the creditors in each class must cast a positive vote for the Plan in order for it to pass muster. If approved, the Plan will then be presented to the Court for sanctioning at what is commonly referred to as a "fairness hearing". [2] These steps have been delayed by the present application.

2 The six applicants are landlords (the "objecting landlords") of retail premises in Ontario, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland that were leased to San Francisco. The leases were either abandoned by San Francisco before the *CCAA* proceedings began or were later terminated with court approval. The objecting landlords seek to reclassify the creditors of San Francisco for purposes of voting on the Plan. They rely on three grounds for their application. First, they argue that they should be placed in a separate class because they have distinct legal rights, their claims are difficult to value and they are preferred over other creditors in the class. Second, they believe that their reclassification is warranted as a result of inequitable treatment of certain creditors under the Plan. Third, they seek to ban closely related creditors, or "related persons", as that phrase is defined in s. 4 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* [3] (*BIA*), from voting on the Plan at all. They submit that, at the very least, related persons should be placed in a separate class to prevent them from controlling the creditor vote.

Background

3 San Francisco operates a national chain of novelty goods stores. It currently has 450 employees working from 84 locations. The head office is in Edmonton, Alberta.

4 The group of companies is comprised of the operating company San Francisco Gifts Ltd., and a number of nominee companies. The operating company, which is 100 percent owned by Laurier Investments Corp. ("Laurier"), holds all of the group's assets. In turn, Laurier is 100 percent owned by Barry Slawsky ("Slawsky"), the driving force behind the companies. He is the president and sole director of virtually all of the companies, and is one of the companies' two secured creditors, the other being Laurier. The nominee companies are hollow shells incorporated for the sole purpose of leasing premises.

5 The Monitor reports that the reviews by its counsel of Slawsky and Laurier's security documents "do not indicate any deficiencies in the security position" and that the combined book value of their loans to the companies is $9,767,000.00. San Francisco's debt at the date of the Initial Order was $5,300,000.00, not including any unsecured deficiency claims by the secured creditors. There are 1183 creditors in total.

6 Like many consolidated *CCAA* plans of arrangement, this Plan contemplates the compromise of all of the participant companies' debts from one pool of assets. The Plan places all non-governmental unsecured creditors into one class and proposes

a compromise payment of roughly $.10 on the dollar by dividing $500,000 between all unsecured creditors in this class on a *pro rata* basis, after payment of the first $200.00 of each proven claim. The Plan also provides that Slawsky and Laurier's claims will survive the reorganization. They are defined in the Plan as "unaffected creditors" who will not share in the payment to creditors. They may, however, value their security and vote as unsecured creditors for their deficiency claims.

7 There is little common ground between the parties on this application, except for their ready recognition that a separate landlords' class will secure its members the power to veto the creditor vote.

Analysis

Classification of Creditors Generally

8 The *CCAA* does not direct how creditors should be classified for voting purposes. It does nothing more than define what a secured versus an unsecured creditor is [4] and specify that a plan of arrangement must be approved by the various classes of creditors affected by it. [5] However, a "commonality of interest" test and well-defined guidelines for classification have been set out in the case law.

9 In *Sovereign Life Assurance Co. v. Dodd*, [6] Lord Esher M.R. articulated the rationale for the commonality of interest test:

> ...It seems plain that we must give such a meaning to the term "class" that will prevent the section being so worked as to prevent a confiscation and injustice, and that it must be confined to those persons whose rights are not so dissimilar as to make it impossible for them to consult together with a view to their common interest.

10 The objecting landlords focus their argument on the two themes in this passage: the need for meaningful consultation between class members, something the objecting landlords say will not occur because their rights are different from other creditors in the proposed class; and avoidance of injustice by "confiscation of rights", something the objecting landlords say is preordained if there is no reclassification.

11 The commonality of interest test has evolved over time and now involves application of the following guidelines that were neatly summarized by Paperny J. (as she then was) in *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* ("*Canadian Airlines*") [7] :

> 1. Commonality of interest should be viewed based on the non-fragmentation test, [8] not on an identity of interest test.
>
> 2. The interests to be considered are the legal interests that a creditor holds *qua* creditor in relationship to the debtor prior to and under the Plan as well as on liquidation.
>
> 3. The commonality of interests should be viewed purposively, bearing in mind that the object of the *CCAA*, namely to facilitate reorganizations if possible.
>
> 4. In placing a broad and purposive interpretation on the *CCAA*, the Court should be careful to resist classification approaches that would potentially jeopardize viable Plans.
>
> 5. Absent bad faith, the motivations of creditors to approve or disapprove [of the Plan] are irrelevant.
>
> 6. The requirement of creditors being able to consult together means being able to assess their legal entitlement as creditors before or after the Plan in a similar manner.

12 To this pithy list, I would add the following considerations:

> (i) Since the *CCAA* is to be given a liberal and flexible interpretation, classification hearings should be dealt with on a fact specific basis and the court should avoid rigid rules of general application. [9]

(ii) In determining commonality of interests, the court should also consider factors like the plan's treatment of creditors, the business situation of the creditors, and the practical effect on them of a failure of the plan. [10]

Landlord Classifications Generally

13 The objecting landlords rely on the affidavit of Walter R. Stevenson, a Toronto lawyer who acts for them. I find it odd that counsel for a party would swear an affidavit in support of his client's motion. It is a risky proposition that is strongly discouraged in this Court. In any event, Mr. Stevenson deposes that he has thirteen years of experience representing clients in insolvency matters. He says that he has been involved in nine cases where national tenants abandoned leased premises and their landlords were placed in a separate class. Presumably, all of this information was intended to persuade me that a separate landlord class is now or should be the norm. It does not.

14 Mr. Stevenson's list is not, nor does it purport to be, an exhaustive review of classifications in multi-location *CCAA* restructurings across Canada. Further, he provides no insight as to whether it was the debtor company or the court which decided that a separate class was appropriate in each of the cases to which he referred. Nor does not provide any information as to why a particular classification decision was made in the first place. There may be valid reasons for a debtor to segregate landlords. For example, in *Grafton-Fraser Inc. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce*, [11] the court refused to disturb a separate class proposed by the debtor company for 130 landlords. A landlord in that case was funding the Plan.

15 *Grafton-Fraser Inc.* is cited as authority for the general proposition that landlords should be entitled to a separate class. In his brief reasons, Houlden J. indicated that he was allowing the separate class to remain on the basis that, as compared to other creditors, landlords would have difficulty valuing their claims and would be enjoined from exercising the contractual and statutory claims that they would ordinarily enjoy on a tenant's insolvency. *Grafton-Fraser Inc.*, like all *CCAA* cases, was doubtless decided on its facts. It was considered, but not applied, in *Woodward's Ltd., Re*, a case that brought widespread attention to the non-fragmentation and contextual approach in classification. [12]

16 Landlords are not entitled to a separate class simply because of who they are. There must be sufficient evidence that their claims are materially different from the claims of other creditors in the class to warrant that. To find otherwise would require that I ignore the contextual and non-fragmentation approach (which I observe does not appear to have firmly take hold until after *Grafton-Fraser Inc.* was decided), and give excessive power to one creditor group in relation to a plan of arrangement designed for the benefit of all of the creditors. This concern was expressed by Borins J. in *Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia* [13] in dismissing a landlord's plea for a separate class so that it's intended negative vote would not be fruitless. A similar caution was voiced by Blair J. in *Armbro Enterprises Inc., Re* [14]. He too found that a separate class for landlords was unwarranted in that case.

Distinct Legal Rights and Valuation Issues

17 Depending on their particular circumstances, the objecting landlords assert that they have one or more of three distinct legal rights that will be eroded or confiscated if they are unsuccessful in their application: (1) the right to follow and seize assets removed from abandoned premises; (2) the right to claim damages against any person who aided the tenant in clandestinely removing goods from their reach; and (3) the right to terminate a lease for default under what is commonly called an "insolvency clause" in their leases. At the risk of stating the obvious, objecting landlords who had leases terminated with court approval after the Initial Order cannot advance these arguments.

1. Rights Arising from Clandestine Removal of Goods

18 Before applying for *CCAA* protection, San Francisco removed assets and abandoned 14 of the 16 premises leased from the objecting landlords.

19 Ontario and New Brunswick's legislation allows a landlord the right to follow and seize goods that were fraudulently and clandestinely removed to prevent the landlord from distraining for rental arrears. There is a thirty day time limit on this right to seize. The landlord is also granted a right of action against any person who knowingly aided in the removal or concealment of the goods. [15] These remedies are akin to those provided in the 1737 *Distress for Rent Act* of England, [16] commonly called *The Statute of George*, 11 Geo. II, c. 19. Nova Scotia's legislation differs from that in Ontario and New Brunswick in that it does not provide for the third party right of action and the time period for following the goods and seizing is twenty-one rather than thirty days. [17] Newfoundland lacks any specific legislation granting these remedies, and it is questionable if *The Statute of George*, although incorporated into the laws of Newfoundland before December 31, 1831, remains in effect there. [18]

20 To succeed in an action under these statutory schemes (and perhaps under the common law in Newfoundland), there must be sufficient evidence to establish that: (1) rent payments are in arrears; (2) goods owned by the tenant were removed from the premises; (3) this conduct was clandestine or fraudulent; and (4) the goods were removed for the purpose of preventing the landlord from seizing them for arrears of rent.

21 The issue arises whether the objecting landlords must prove their claims for classification purposes or simply show that they have an arguable case. Clearly, the court is not interested in ruling on hypothetical matters, but it would be unreasonable at this stage to require an applicant in a reclassification hearing to actually prove their claim. Proof will be required at a later date to establish entitlement to membership in a new class, if one is ordered. What must be presented at this point is sufficient evidence to show that there is an arguable case that would justify a separate class.

22 The objecting landlords rely on two leases, which they say are typical of the leases entered into between them and San Francisco (or its nominee corporations), to demonstrate that there were arrears owing at the date of abandonment. The alleged arrears are comprised of accelerated rent which, under the terms of the leases, became due on termination and are contractually deemed arrears. Without deciding on the correctness of the objecting landlords' assertion, I find that there is sufficient evidence to establish at least an arguable case that there are arrears of rent.

23 Insofar as evidence of clandestine removal is concerned, two landlords depose that, without their knowledge and without notice to them, San Francisco vacated and removed all of its assets from their premises. Although it would have been preferable to have more detail of the circumstances of the alleged removal of assets, this evidence again is sufficient to establish an arguable case. The merits of the objecting landlords' position will be fully aired and determined in quantifying their claims.

24 I have concluded that the objecting landlords have an arguable case. Their rights to pursue distraint and sue a person for aiding in clandestine removal of goods are unique ones. However, the uniqueness of a right is, in and of itself, insufficient to warrant a separate class. The right must be adjudged worthy of a separate class after considering the various factors outlined above. In essence, it must preclude consultation between the creditors.

25 The Initial Order specifically preserved all creditors' rights to take or continue an action against San Francisco if their claims were subject to statutory time limitations. [19] The objecting landlords elected not to pursue their statutorily time limited remedy of following and seizing goods within the time permitted. As a result, it is unreasonable to allow them to now assert that entitlement as the justification for a separate class. Moreover, in the context of a bankruptcy, the remedy is generally academic since there are no goods available for distraint. For these reasons, the inability to follow and seize goods cannot support the ordering of a separate class.

26 The Plan requires that all creditors give up claims against the company, its officers, employees, agents, affiliates, associates and directors. This requirement is subject to the qualification that an action based on allegations of misrepresentations made by a director to creditors or of *wrongful or oppressive conduct by a director* is preserved (emphasis added). [20] While candidly acknowledging that their best chance of financial recovery on a successful action would be against Slawsky, the objecting landlords contend that preserving their right of action only against him would be insufficient protection given that they do not know at the moment whether he alone was the person who orchestrated or aided in the removal of San Francisco's goods. In

view of Slawsky's apparent level of control over the companies, it might be reasonable to conclude that he was involved in the decision to abandon the premises. However, that is speculative at this point and others may well have been involved.

27 Although the Initial Order did not stay actions against San Francisco's employees or agents, the landlords' failure as yet to pursue the employees or agents does not end the matter. This aspect of a removal action is quite different from the statutorily time limited ability of a landlord to follow and seize their tenant's goods, which the objecting landlords chose not to exercise. Only general limitations legislation and the practical effects of the Releases contained in the Plan affect this aspect of the claim.

28 I find that the Plan does not adequately address the objecting landlords' unique legal entitlement to claim damages against persons who aided their tenant in clandestinely removing goods from the premises. In making this finding, I considered the following to be significant factors:

> 1. Unlike the ability to follow and seize goods, which has been rendered academic, this right of action is potentially meaningful.
>
> 2. The Plan does not offer compensation for deprivation of this right of action, resulting in a "confiscation" of the objecting landlords' right as described in *Sovereign Life*.
>
> 3. Unlike claims that would be extinguished on a bankruptcy of the companies, this right of action would survive since it is against third parties.

29 The *CCAA* is designed to be fluid and flexible, and the Court is given wide discretion to facilitate that flexibility. Alternatives to establishing a separate voting class should be explored. I can envision at least three other options: (1) direct an amendment to the Plan to compensate the objecting landlords for the loss of their potential rights of action against persons other than Slawsky; (2) direct an amendment to the Plan to expand the survival of actions provision (clause 6.1 (b)) to include potential defendants other than Slawsky; or (3) deal with the matter at the fairness hearing.

30 Ordering a separate class would clearly recognize and protect the objecting landlords' potential causes of action against third parties other than Slawsky. Further, it would overcome potential hurdles in consultation among the unsecured creditors. However, a separate class would give the objecting landlords a veto power over the Plan. This flags the principle that courts should be careful to resist classification approaches that might jeopardize viable plans of arrangement.

31 Directing that the Plan be amended to compensate the objecting landlords for the loss of their potential rights of action is not a viable option. It would require that the Court blindly enter into San Francisco's strategic arena. Such a direction would interfere with the right of the companies to make their own Plan and would purport to cloak the Court with knowledge of the companies' resources, strategies and plans, knowledge which it simply does not posses. Interference of this sort should be avoided.

32 Directing an amendment to the Plan to expand the survival of actions provision to include potential defendants other than Slawsky certainly would be less intrusive than compensating the objecting landlords for the loss of their potential right of action. It would preserve their right to pursue the removal action against persons other than Slawsky and would enhance consultation with other creditors in the class. On the other hand, it would impose an obligation on the companies that they may not have contemplated or may have been unwilling to voluntarily assume.

33 As to dealing with the matter at a fairness hearing, I note that the *CCAA* does not require that debtors present a 'guaranteed winner' of a plan to their creditors. Debtors can make any proposal to their creditors and take whatever chances they might consider appropriate. However, to succeed, they must act in good faith and present a plan of arrangement at the end of the day which is fair and reasonable. If they fail to do so, the process is a waste of time and valuable resources. It accomplishes nothing but an erosion of assets that otherwise would be available to creditors on liquidation. This is precisely what Tysoe J. sought to avoid when he ordered a separate class for guarantee holders in *Woodward's Ltd., Re*, on being convinced that the plan in that case was unfair to them. [21]

34 The opposite result occurred in *Canadian Airlines*, where Madam Justice Paperny deferred the classification issue to the fairness hearing. *Canadian Airlines* presented quite a different scenario to that in *Woodward's Ltd., Re* or the one before me. The concern in *Canadian Airlines* was with Air Canada voting in the same class as other unsecured creditors when it had appointed the board which directed the *CCAA* proceedings, was funding the Plan, and fears existed about its acquisition of deficiency claims to secure a positive vote. The court was not concerned about a confiscation of legal rights but was attempting to safeguard against "ballot stuffing". [22]

35 In the particular circumstances of the present case, I find it preferable to protect the objecting landlords' remedy by directing that there be an amendment to the Plan to preserve any cause of action they might have against any party who aided San Francisco in clandestinely removing its assets from their premises. This measure balances the need to avoid giving unwarranted power to one creditor group and the need to protect a unique legal entitlement. It avoids the potential of valuable resources being expended on creditors' meetings when the potential exists that at the end of the day I would find the Plan to be unfair on the basis of this aspect of the objecting landlords' argument. Finally, it avoids significant interference with the debtor's financial strategy in formulating its Plan.

2. Loss of Default/Insolvency Clause Remedy

36 Some, if not all, of the leases allow the landlord to terminate the lease in the event of the tenant's insolvency. The objecting landlords argue that this is another unique right which is not compensated for in the Plan.

37 The Initial Order enjoined all of San Francisco's landlords from enforcing contractual insolvency clauses. This is a common prohibition designed, at least in part, to avoid a creditor frustrating the restructuring by relying on a contractual breach occasioned by the very insolvency that gave rise to the proceedings in the first place. [23] The objecting landlords complain that their rights are permanently lost because of the Release contained in the Plan. They do not acknowledge that the stay is essential to the longer-term feasibility of the *CCAA* restructuring and something which courts have granted with increasing regularity to give effect to the remedial nature of the *CCAA*. [24] Even ignoring this pragmatic consideration, the objecting landlords' argument fails. The contractual right that is affected is neither unique, nor of any practical use. Thirteen other creditors, mainly equipment lessors and utility providers, have similar contractual default provisions. Further, all of the leases have already been terminated.

3. Difficulty in Valuing Claim

38 The objecting landlords rely on *Grafton-Fraser Inc.* for the proposition that landlords' claims are difficult to value and therefore a separate class is warranted. Unfortunately, the brief reasons given by Houlden J. do not provide any insight as to how the company in that case proposed to value the landlords' claims. No doubt, Houlden J. had the specific facts before him clearly in focus as he made his decision. I reject the contention that *Grafton-Fraser Inc.* is a decision of sweeping application, being mindful that rigid rules of general application are to be avoided in *CCAA* matters.

39 The Claims Procedure Order, issued on June 22, 2004 in this matter, establishes a mechanism for valuing landlords' abandoned premises claims that reflects the methodology established by the Supreme Court of Canada in *Highway Properties Ltd. v. Kelly, Douglas & Co.* [25] The valuation mechanism, set out in para. 12 of the Order, [26] is straightforward. A claimant simply follows the formula. There is a clear cut-off date for mitigation efforts and a readily calculable present value. The landlords' claims will not be difficult to value.

Inequitable Treatment of Creditors

1. Preferential Treatment of Some Landlords

40 The objecting landlords make the curious complaint that the Plan prefers them to other unsecured creditors in that it contemplates the duty to mitigate, for valuation purposes, ending at the claims bar date.

41 Presumably, the objecting landlords could re-let the premises the following day and still base their claim on the value of unpaid rent for the unexpired portion of the term of their lease. While they might receive a benefit, it is trite that there must always be a cut-off date for mitigation when future losses are the subject of a *CCAA* creditor claim. San Francisco chose the claims bar date for ease of analyzing claims for voting purposes. Its choice makes practical sense and is not facially offensive. As noted in *Alternative Fuel Systems Inc., Re,* [27] courts have approved a variety of solutions to quantifying landlords' claims. That approach is in keeping with the distinct purpose of the *CCAA*. Further, the treatment of landlords' claims under a plan of arrangement is an issue for negotiation and, ultimately, court approval.

42 The objecting landlords also say that they are preferred in that the Plan is a consolidated one that proposes a compromise regardless of whether a landlord's claim against a hollow nominee company would have been worthless outside of the *CCAA*. This issue will be of interest to other creditors as they consider their vote and position on the fairness hearing. However, it does not warrant creation of a separate class. If anything, it might warrant San Francisco revisiting the Plan, which some of the beneficiaries appear to think is too generous in the circumstances.

2. Preferential Treatment of Slawsky and Laurier

43 The objecting landlords take issue with Slawsky and Laurier being classified as "unaffected creditors" whose claims survive the reorganization despite their ability to value their security for voting purposes and to vote as unsecured creditors for their deficiency claims. Slawsky and Laurier's view is that the Plan does not prefer them because they do not share in the payment available to the general pool of unsecured creditors under the Plan and they are, by deferring payment of their secured claims, effectively funding the Plan.

44 The Plan's treatment of Slawsky and Laurier does not serve as a reason to segregate the landlords. Whether it is a reason to place Slawsky and Laurier into a separate class is discussed under the next heading.

Related Parties

45 The objecting landlords take umbrage with Slawsky, his son Aaron, Laurier, and other corporate entities in which Slawsky has an interest, voting on the Plan. They want to import into the *CCAA* proceedings the *BIA* prohibition against "related persons" voting in favour of a proposal, urging that the same policy considerations apply against allowing an insider to control the vote. [28]

46 The Alberta Court of Appeal in *Alternative Fuel Systems Inc., Re* declined to import *BIA* landlord claim calculations into a *CCAA* proceeding. The court found that the section of the *CCAA* at issue did not mandate importation of *BIA* provisions and, more significantly, the court found that to do so would not pay sufficient attention to the distinct objectives of the *CCAA* (remedial) and *BIA* (largely liquidation). In conducting its contextual analysis, the court acknowledged the need to maintain flexibility in *CCAA* matters, discouraging importation of any statutory provision that might impede creative use of the *CCAA* without a demonstrated need or statutory direction. There is no such direction or need in this case.

47 The objecting landlords find support for their position in *Northland Properties Ltd., Re* [29] Trainor J. in that case refused to allow a subsidiary to vote on its parent's *CCAA* plan. While care should be exercised to avoid a corporation "stuffing the ballot boxes in its own favour", [30] a blanket ban on insider voting is not always necessary or desirable. Safeguards against potential abuses can be built into a plan and the voting mechanism. For example, the Monitor could procure sworn declarations from insiders as to their direct and indirect shareholdings in order to help track voting. That information, together with proofs of claim, proxies, and ballots, which relate to the insiders' claims could then be presented at the fairness hearing. This type of safeguard was taken in *Canadian Airlines*. Paperny J. observed in that case that "absent bad faith, who creditors are is irrelevant". [31]

48 Safeguards such as this are applicable only if the court is satisfied that there is sufficient commonality of interest between the insiders and the other creditors to place them in the same class. That was the case in *Canadian Airlines*. There, all of the creditors in the class were unsecured creditors. They were treated in the same way under the plan, and would have been treated

the same way on a bankruptcy. The plan called for the insider, Air Canada, to compromise its claim, just like all of the other creditors.

49 Here, there is no compromise by Slawsky or Laurier. Further, they would, but for a security position shortfall, be unaffected by a bankruptcy of the companies, whereas all of the other creditors in the class would receive nothing. Slawsky has created a Plan which gives him voting rights that he doubtless wants to employ if he senses the need to sway the vote. In return, he gives up nothing. It stretches the imagination to think that other creditors in the class could have meaningful consultations about the Plan with Slawsky and, through him, with Laurier. For that reason, Slawsky and Laurier must be placed in a separate class.

Conclusions

50 The right of the objecting landlords to pursue distraint is unique as is their right to sue a person for aiding in clandestine removal of goods from the leased premises. For the reasons stated, loss of the objecting landlords' right to follow and seize goods cannot support the ordering of a separate class. However, I find that the Plan does not adequately address their right to claim damages against persons who aided a tenant in clandestinely removing goods from the premises. Rather than create a separate voting class for the objecting landlords, I direct that the Plan be amended to preserve any cause of action the objecting landlords and others in their position might have against any party who aided San Francisco in clandestinely removing its assets from their premises.

51 The right or ability of the objecting landlords to terminate the leases in question in the event of their tenants' insolvency is neither unique nor of any practical effect at this point. It is not a sufficient ground for creation of a separate voting class. Nor have I accepted the argument of the objecting landlords that a separate class should be established because their claims will be difficult to value. The Claims Procedure Order provides a mechanism for valuing their claims.

52 I have determined that, to the extent there is preferential treatment of the landlords or of Slawsky and Laurier under the Plan, such preferential treatment does not justify segregating the objecting landlords. However, as Slawsky and Laurier do not share a commonality of interest with other unsecured creditors, they must constitute a separate class for voting purposes.

53 Although success on this application has been somewhat divided, the objecting landlords have enjoyed greater success. There are no provisions in the *CCAA* dealing with costs, however, the Court has the discretion to award costs under the *Rules of Court* and its inherent jurisdiction. [32] The nature of the relief granted to the objecting landlords is akin to declaratory relief and accordingly, costs under Column 1 of Schedule C to the *Rules of Court* are appropriate. The costs are payable forthwith.

Order accordingly.

Footnotes

* Leave to appeal refused *San Francisco Gifts Ltd., Re* (2004), 5 C.B.R. (5th) 300, 42 Alta. L.R. (4th) 371, 361 A.R. 220, 339 W.A.C. 220, 2004 ABCA 386, 2004 CarswellAlta 1607 (Alta. C.A.).

1 R.S.A. 1985, c. C-36, as am.

2 The considerations at this hearing are typically whether there has been strict compliance with statutory requirements, whether any unauthorized acts have occurred, and whether the plan is fair and reasonable: see *Sammi Atlas Inc., Re* (1998), 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).

3 R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, as am.

4 *CCAA*, s. 2.

5 *CCAA*, s. 6.

6 *Sovereign Life Assurance Co. v. Dodd*, [1892] 2 Q.B. 573 (Eng. C.A.), at 583.

7 *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* (2000), 19 C.B.R. (4th) 12 (Alta. Q.B.), leave to appeal denied (2000), 19 C.B.R. (4th) 33 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]), cited in the Court of Appeal's subsequent decision in *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* (2000), 261 A.R. 120, 2000 ABCA 149 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]) at para. 27: see also *Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1991), 86 D.L.R. (4th) 621, 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312 (Ont. Gen. Div.)).

8 "Non-fragmentation" means that a multiplicity of classes should be avoided if possible. The notion was first expressed in the Canadian context in *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.* (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 20 (Alta. Q.B.), but does not appear to have gained wide acceptance until 1993 when *Woodward's Ltd., Re* (1993), 20 C.B.R. (3d) 74 (B.C. S.C.), at 81 was decided. There were five creditor groups in *Woodward's Ltd., Re*, including one group of landlords of abandoned premises and another of creditors holding cross-corporate guarantees or joint covenants, which sought separate classes. The court ruled that, given there was sufficient commonality of interest among the general body of creditors and the applicant landlords, a separate class was unwarranted. Tysoe J. rejected the landlords' proposition that their legal interests differed from that of the other creditors in that repudiation of an anchor tenant's lease would cause the landlord to be in breach of other tenant obligations. He did, however, order a separate class for the holders of cross-corporate guarantees, observing that their unique rights were "confiscated without compensation" under the plan. Interestingly, Tysoe J. rejected the suggestion that the issue be dealt with at the fairness hearing because he was convinced that the scheme was so unfair that he would refuse to sanction a successful outcome, rendering the creditors' vote pointless.

9 *Fairview Industries Ltd., Re* (1991), 109 N.S.R. (2d) 32, 11 C.B.R. (3d) 71 (N.S. T.D.).

10 *Woodward's Ltd., Re* at p. 81.

11 *Grafton-Fraser Inc. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce* (1992), 90 D.L.R. (4th) 285, 11 C.B.R. (3d) 161 (Ont. Gen. Div.).

12 Peter B. Birkness, "Re Woodward's Limited — The Contextual Commonality of Interest Approach to Classification of Creditors" (1993), 20 C.B.R. (3d) 91 at 92.

13 *Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1991), 86 D.L.R. (4th) 621, 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312 (Ont. Gen. Div.).

14 *Armbro Enterprises Inc., Re* (1993), 22 C.B.R. (3d) 80 (Ont. Bktcy.).

15 *Commercial Tenancies Act*, R.S.O.1990, c. L-7, ss. 48-50 and *Landlord and Tenant Act*, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. L-1, ss. 27, 29.

16 *Distress for Rent Act 1737*, 11 Geo. 2, c. 19, s. 1, which provides: "In case of any tenant or tenants, lessee or lessees ... upon the demise or withholding whereof, any rent is or shall be reserved due or payable, shall fraudulently or clandestinely, convey away, or carry off or from such premises, his or her or their goods or chattels, to prevent the landlord or lessor ... from distraining the same for arrears of rent, it shall or may be lawful for every landlord or lessee ... to take or seize such goods and chattels wherever the same shall be found as distress for the said arrears of rent. "

17 *An Act Respecting Tenancies and Distress for Rent*, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 464, ss. 13 and 14.

18 *Buyer's Furniture Ltd. v. Barney's Sales & Transport Ltd.* (1982), 137 D.L.R. (3d) 320 (Nfld. T.D.), affirmed (1983), 3 D.L.R. (4th) 704 (Nfld. C.A.).

19 The amendment on January 12, 2004 does not affect the issues at bar.

20 Article 6.1 of the Plan provides as follows: "On the Effective Date, and except as provided below, each of the Companies, the Monitor, and the past and present directors, officers, employees, agents, affiliates and associates of each of the foregoing parties (the "Released Parties") shall be released and discharged by all Creditors, including holders of Unsecured Creditor Claims, and Goods and Services Tax Claims from any and all demands, claims, including claims of any past and present officers, directors or employees for contribution and indemnity, actions, causes of action, counterclaims, suits, debts, sums of money, accounts, covenants, damages, judgments, expenses, executions, charges and other recoveries on account of any liability, obligation, demand or cause of action of whatever nature which any person may be entitled to assert, including, without limitation, any and all claims in respect of any environmental condition or damage affecting any of the property or assets of the Companies, whether known or unknown, matured or unmatured, foreseen or unforeseen, existing or hereafter arising, based in whole or in part on any act or omission, transaction, dealing or other occurrence existing or taking place on or prior to the Effective Date relating to, arising out of or in connection with

any Claims, the business and affairs of the Companies, whenever and however conducted, this Plan and the *CCAA* Proceedings, and any Claim that has been barred or extinguished by the Claims Procedure Order shall be irrevocably released and discharged, provided that this release shall not affect the rights of any Person to pursue any recoveries for a Claim against a director or the Companies that: (a) relates to contractual rights of one or more creditors against a director; or (b) are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by a director to creditors or of wrongful or oppressive conduct by a director."

21 At para. 11.

22 *Olympia & York Developments Ltd., Re*, [1994] O.J. No. 1335 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at para. 24.

23 See for example: *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd.*, where one of the debtor's joint venture partners was enjoined from relying on an insolvency clause to replace the operator under a petroleum operating agreement.

24 As noted by Spence J. in *Playdium Entertainment Corp., Re* (2001), 31 C.B.R. (4th) 309 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 32: "If no permanent order could be made under s. 11(4) it would not be possible to order, for example, that the insolvency defaults which occasioned the *CCAA* order could not be asserted by the Famous Players after the stay period. If such an order could not be made the *CCAA* regime would prospectively be of no value even though a compromise of creditor claims might be worked out in the stay period." See also *Smoky River Coal Ltd., Re* (1999), 237 A.R. 326 (Alta. C.A.).

25 *Highway Properties Ltd. v. Kelly, Douglas & Co.*, [1971] S.C.R. 562 (S.C.C.).

26 12(a) With respect to Proofs of Claim to be filed with the Monitor by a Landlord of retail premises currently or formerly occupied by the Companies ("Landlord"), a Landlord is to value and calculate its claim ("Landlord's Claim") as being the aggregate of:
(i) Arrears of rent, if any, owing under a lease as at January 7, 2004;

(ii) In instances where a lease has been repudiated by the Companies (whether or not the repudiation occurred before or after January 7, 2004), the value of rent payable under the lease from the date of repudiation to the date of the Proof of Claim (if any) less any revenue received from any reletting of the premises (in whole or in part) as at the date of the Proof of Claim;

(iii) In instances where a lease has been repudiated by the Companies (whether or not the repudiation occurred before or after January 7, 2004), the present value (using an interest factor of 3.65%) of rents payable under the lease as at the date of the Proof of Claim through to the end of the unexpired term of the lease (if any) less any revenue to be received during that time period from any reletting of the premises (in whole or in part) which has occurred prior to the date of the Proof of Claim.
(b) For the purposes of a Landlord's Claim, where a lease contains an option in favour of the Companies authorizing the Companies to treat that lease as terminated and at an end prior to the otherwise stated termination date of that lease, the Companies shall be deemed to have exercised that option and the Landlord's Claim with respect to that lease shall be calculated having regard to the early termination date.

27 *Alternative Fuel Systems Inc., Re* (2004), 236 D.L.R. (4th) 155 at paras. 64-69, 2004 ABCA 31 (Alta. C.A.).

28 The *BIA*, s. 4(3)(c) definition of "related person" includes a controlling shareholder of a corporation. Section 54(3) provides that a creditor related to the debtor may vote against but not for the acceptance of a proposal.

29 *Northland Properties Ltd., Re* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 166 (B.C. S.C.), at 170. See also: *Wellington Building Corp., Re*, [1934] O.R. 653 (Ont. S.C.) and *Dairy Corp. of Canada, Re*, [1934] O.R. 436 (Ont. C.A.), referred to in *Northland Properties Ltd., Re*.

30 *Olympia & York Developments Ltd., Re* at para.24, per Farley J.

31 At para. 37.

32 *Jackpine Forest Products Ltd., Re*, 2004 BCSC 20 (B.C. S.C.).

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TAB 18

2009 NSSC 163
Nova Scotia Supreme Court

ScoZinc Ltd., Re

2009 CarswellNS 283, 2009 NSSC 163, 177 A.C.W.S. (3d) 294, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 205

In the Matter of The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 as amended

And In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of ScoZinc Limited

D.R. Beveridge J.

Heard: May 1, 2009
Judgment: May 1, 2009
Written reasons: May 20, 2009
Docket: Hfx 305549

Counsel: John D. Stringer, Q.C., Ben Durnford for Applicant
Robbie MacKeigan, Q.C. for Daniel Rozon
John McFarlane, Q.C. for Kamatsu

Subject: Insolvency

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *D.R. Beveridge J.*:

Fairview Industries Ltd., Re (1991), 1991 CarswellNS 35, 11 C.B.R. (3d) 43, (sub nom. *Fairview Industries Ltd., Re (No. 2))* 109 N.S.R. (2d) 12, (sub nom. *Fairview Industries Ltd., Re (No. 2))* 297 A.P.R. 12 (N.S. T.D.) — considered

Federal Gypsum Co., Re (2007), 2007 NSSC 384, 2007 CarswellNS 630, 261 N.S.R. (2d) 314, 835 A.P.R. 314, 40 C.B.R. (5th) 39 (N.S. S.C.) — considered

ScoZinc Ltd., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellNS 177, 2009 NSSC 108, 52 C.B.R. (5th) 200 (N.S. S.C.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

s. 4 — referred to

s. 5 — referred to

s. 11 — referred to

s. 11(4) — referred to

s. 11(6) — referred to

MOTION by company for order for meeting of creditors pursuant to ss. 4 and 5 of *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, further extension of stay of proceedings granted to company under *Act*, and approval of notice of motion being given only to certain defined creditors.

***D.R. Beveridge J.*:**

1 ScoZinc brings a motion seeking an order to accomplish three things. The first is for a meeting of the creditors pursuant to ss. 4 and 5 of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*. The second is a further extension of the stay of proceedings initially ordered by this Court on December 22, 2008 and extended from time to time. The third is approval of notice of this motion being given only to certain defined creditors.

2 The company has filed an affidavit of William Felderhof referred to as his seventh affidavit, sworn April 28, 2009 and the Monitor has filed its sixth report dated April 30, 2009.

3 As part of its submissions the company notes that there is nothing in the *CCAA* which requires the Court to give prior preliminary approval of ScoZinc's proposed plan before it is presented to the creditors. It notes that the jurisprudence establishes that this approval is generally desirable prior to calling a meeting of the creditors. Some, but not all of this jurisprudence was reviewed by MacAdam J. in *Federal Gypsum Co., Re*, 2007 NSSC 384 (N.S. S.C.).

4 Justice MacAdam in *Federal Gypsum Co., Re* did refer to the two different standards that have been proposed or referred to in cases from Ontario and British Columbia. Some of these cases have expressed the view that the debtor company should establish that the plan has "a reasonable chance" that it would be accepted by the creditors. Other cases have referred to the appropriate test as simply a determination as to whether or not the proposed plan is one that would be "doomed to failure".

5 In a different context, Glube C.J.T.D. (as she then was) in *Fairview Industries Ltd., Re* (1991), 11 C.B.R. (3d) 43 (N.S. T.D.) cautioned that it would be impractical and extremely costly to continue to prepare a plan when "there is no hope that it would be approved".

6 I think it fair to say that MacAdam J., although not expressly but by necessary implication, preferred the lower standard facing a debtor company in submitting its plan to the Court for a preliminary approval. At para. 12 he wrote:

> [12] In view of the relatively low threshold on the Company in seeking Court approval to have a plan of arrangement submitted to the creditors for a vote, I am satisfied the plan should proceed and the creditors should determine whether they do, or do not accept the plan as finally filed.

7 In my opinion it should not be up to the Court to second guess the probability of success of a proposed plan of arrangement. Businessmen are free to make their own views known before and ultimately at the creditors' meeting. It seems to me that the Court should only decline to give preliminary approval and refuse to order a meeting if it was of the view that there was no hope that the plan would be approved by the creditors or, if it was approved by the creditors, it would not, for some other reason, be approved by the Court.

8 The Monitor in its sixth report says that the proposed plan is reasonable under the circumstances. This opinion appears to flow from its conclusion that if the plan is rejected and the company forced into receivership or bankruptcy, unsecured creditors will not recover the amount offered in the plan and it is highly unlikely that the secured creditors will recover the amount offered to them. I see no reason to disagree with the opinion offered by the Monitor.

9 Given that opinion and in light of the terms that are set out in the proposed plan I am certainly satisfied that the plan is far from one that is doomed to failure. It is one that should be put to the creditors for their consideration. It is therefore appropriate that I exercise the discretion that is set out in ss. 4 and 5 of the *CCAA* and order a meeting of the creditors on the terms set out in the proposed meeting order.

10 With respect to the extension of the stay of proceedings, as I noted at the outset there had been an initial order of this Court under s.11 of the *CCAA*. This order was granted on December 22, 2008. It was, as required by the statute, limited to a period of 30 days. It has been extended on two previous occasions. It is now due to expire May 22 nd , 2009. The meeting of the creditors is scheduled for May 21, 2009. There is a tentative return date scheduled for May 28, 2009 for the Court to consider sanctioning the plan, should it be approved by the creditors.

11 The test with respect to extending the stay of proceedings has been set out in a number of cases that have considered ss. 11(4) and (6) of the *CCAA*. These were reviewed by me in *ScoZinc Ltd., Re*, 2009 NSSC 108 (N.S. S.C.). In these circumstances there is no need to review the test and the evidence in support of that test.

12 In light of my conclusion that the company had met the threshold for ordering a meeting of the creditors under ss. 4 and 5 of the *CCAA* the appropriateness of a further extension permitting the company to return to the Court within a very short period of time following that meeting of the creditors is patently obvious. The extension is therefore granted.

13 The last issue is the approval of notice of this motion being given only to certain defined creditors. Given the number of creditors that appeared early on in the proceedings it was somewhat impractical to give notice to each of them with the volumes of materials that would be required to be produced and served. With respect to the prior motions it was required that notice be given to all creditors asserting claims against the debtor company in excess of $100,000.00 and all creditors asserting builders liens. In addition all creditors were apprised of these proceedings by way of the mail out to each and every creditor as required by the *CCAA* leading to filing of proofs of claim. The status of the proceedings, including this motion, have been posted on the Monitor's website. I see no reason to depart from the previous practice and this aspect of the motion is also granted.

Motion granted.

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TAB 19

2009 ABQB 490
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench

SemCanada Crude Co., Re

2009 CarswellAlta 1269, 2009 ABQB 490, [2009] A.W.L.D. 3785, 180 A.C.W.S. (3d) 374, 479 A.R. 318, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 205

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended

And In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of SemCanada Crude Company, SemCAMS ULC, SemCanada Energy Company, A.E. Sharp Ltd., CEG Energy Options, Inc., 319278 Nova Scotia Company and 1380331 Alberta ULC

B.E. Romaine J.

Heard: August 5, 2009
Judgment: August 24, 2009
Docket: Calgary 0801-08510

Counsel: A. Robert Anderson, Q.C., Rupert Chartrand, Michael De Lellis, Cynthia L. Spry, Douglas Schweitzer for Applicants
David R. Byers, for Bank of America
Patrick T. McCarthy, Josef A. Krüger for Monitor
Douglas S. Nishimura for ARC Resources Ltd., City of Medicine Hat, Black Rider Resources Inc. Wolf Coulee Resources Inc., Orleans Energy Ltd., Crew Energy Inc., Trilogy Energy LP
Brendan O'Neill, Jason Wadden for Fortis Capital Corp.
Sean Fitzgerald for Tri-Ocean Engineering Ltd.
Dean Hutchison for Crescent Point Energy Trust, Enbridge Pipelines Inc.
Caireen Hanert for Bellamount Exploration Ltd., Enersul Limited Partnership
Bryce McLean for DPH Focus Corporation
Aubrey Kauffman for BNP Paribas

Subject: Insolvency

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APPLICATION for orders authorizing establishment of single class of creditors for three plans to restructure and distribute assets for purpose of considering and voting on plans.

***B.E. Romaine J.*:**

Introduction

1 The SemCanada Group applied for various relief related to the holding of meetings of creditors to consider three plans to restructure and distribute assets of the CCAA applicants, including applications for orders authorizing the establishment of a single class of creditors for each plan for the purpose of considering and voting on the plans. I granted the applications, and these are my reasons.

Relevant Facts

2 On July 22, 2008, SemCanada Crude Company ("SemCanada Crude") and SemCAMS ULC ("SemCAMS") were granted initial Orders pursuant to s. 11(1) of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-36, as amended (the "CCAA").

3 On July 30, 2008, the CCAA proceedings of SemCAMS and SemCanada Crude and the bankruptcy proceedings of SemCanada Energy Company ("SemCanada Energy") A.E. Sharp Ltd. ("AES") and CEG Energy Options, Inc. ("CEG") which had been commenced on July 24, 2008 were procedurally consolidated for the purpose of administrative convenience.

4 In addition, CCAA protection was granted to two affiliated companies, 3191278 Nova Scotia Company (A319") and 1380331 Alberta ULC ("138"). SemCanada Energy, AES, CEG, 319 and 138 are collectively referred to as the "SemCanada Energy Companies". The CCAA applicants are collectively referred to as the "SemCanada Group".

5 On July 22, 2008, SemGroup L.P. and its direct and indirect subsidiaries in the United States (the "U.S. Debtors") filed voluntary petitions to restructure under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.

6 According to the second report of the Monitor, the financial problems of the SemGroup arose from a failed trading strategy and the volatility of petroleum products prices, leading to material margin calls related to large futures and options positions on the NYMEX and OTC markets, resulting in a severe liquidity crisis. SemGroup's credit facilities were insufficient to accommodate its capital needs, and the corporate group sought protection under Chapter 11 and the CCAA.

7 The SemCanada Group are indirect, wholly-owned subsidiaries of SemGroup LP. The SemCanada Group is comprised of three separate businesses:

> (a) SemCanada Crude, a crude oil marketing and blending operation;
>
> (b) the SemCanada Energy Companies, whose business was gas marketing, including the purchase and sale of gas to certain of its four subsidiaries as well as to SemCAMS; and
>
> (c) SemCAMS, whose business consists of ownership interests in large gas processing facilities located in Alberta, as well as agreements to operate these facilities.

8 SemCrude, L.P. as U.S. borrower and a predecessor company of SemCAMS as Canadian borrower, certain U.S. SemGroup corporations and Bank of America as administrative agent for a syndicate of lenders (the "Secured Lenders") entered into a credit agreement in 2005 (the "Credit Agreement"). The Credit Agreement provides four different credit facilities. There are no advances outstanding with respect to the Canadian term loan facility, but in excess of U.S. $2.9 billion is owing under the U.S. term loan facility, the working capital loan facility and the revolver loan.

9 Five of the SemCanada Group, including SemCanada Crude, SemCanada Energy and SemCAMS, have provided a guarantee of all obligations under the Credit Agreement to the Secured Lenders, who rank as senior secured lenders, and under a US $600 million bond indenture issued by SemGroup. The guarantee is secured by a security and pledge agreement (the "Security Agreement") signed by the five members of the SemCanada Group.

10 The SemCanada Energy Companies were liquidated or have ceased operations and no longer have significant ongoing operations. As a result of liquidation proceedings and the collection of outstanding accounts receivable, the SemCanada Energy

Companies hold approximately $113 million in cash. An application to distribute that cash to the Secured Lenders was adjourned *sine die* on January 19, 2009: *SemCanada Crude Co., Re*, 2009 ABQB 90 (Alta. Q.B.).

11 Originally, SemCAMS and SemCanada Crude proposed to restructure their businesses as stand-alone operations without further affiliation with the U.S. Debtors and accordingly sought bids in a solicitation process undertaken in early 2009. Unfortunately, no acceptable bids were received. It also became apparent that, as SemCanada Crude's business was closely integrated with certain North Dakota transportation rights and assets owned by the U.S. Debtors, restructuring SemCanada Crude's operations on a stand alone basis would be problematic. The SemCanada Group turned to the alternative of joining in the restructuring of the entire SemGroup through concurrent and integrated plans of arrangement in both Canada and the United States.

Summary of the U.S. and Canadian Plans

12 The U.S. and Canadian plans are complex and need not be described in their entirety in these reasons. For the purpose of these reasons, the relevant aspects of the plans are as follows:

> 1. The disclosure statement relating to a joint plan of affiliated U.S. Debtors was approved for distribution to creditors by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court on July 21, 2009. Under the Chapter 11 process, meetings of creditors are not necessary. Voting takes place through a notice and balloting mechanism that has been approved by the U.S. Court and September 3, 2009 has been set as the voting deadline for acceptance or rejection of the U.S. plan.
>
> 2. The total distributable value of the SemGroup for the purpose of the plans is expected to be US $2.3 billion, consisting of US $965 million in cash, US $300 million in second lien term loan interests and US $1.035 billion in new common stock and warrants of the U.S. Debtors.
>
> 3. The SemCanada Group will contribute approximately US $161 million in available cash to the U.S. plan and US $54 million is expected to be received from SemCanada Crude relating to crude oil settlements that will occur after the effective date of the plans, being cash received from prepayments that are outstanding on the implementation date which will be replaced with letters of credit or other post-plan financing.
>
> 4. Approximately US $50 million will be retained by the corporate group for working capital and general corporate purposes, including for the post plan cash needs of SemCAMS and SemCanada Crude.
>
> 5. Certain U.S. causes of action will be contributed to a "litigation trust" and will be distributed through the U.S. Plan, including to the Secured Lenders on their deficiency claims. No value has been placed on the litigation trust by the U.S. Debtors. The Monitor reports that it is unable to make an informed assessment of the value of the litigation trust assets as the trust is a complicated legal mechanism that will likely require the expenditure of significant time and professional fees before there will be any recovery.
>
> 6. The U.S. plan contains a condition precedent that, on the effective date of the plan, the restructured corporate group will enter into a US $500 million exit financing facility, which will apply to all post-restructuring affiliates, including SemCAMS and SemCanada Crude, and which will allow the corporate group to re-enter the crude marketing business in the United States and to continue operations in Canada.
>
> 7. It is expected that the Secured Lenders will receive cash, second lien term loan interests and equity in priority to unsecured creditors on their secured guarantee claims of US $2.9 billion, which will leave them with a deficiency of approximately US $1.07 billion on the secured loans. The Secured Lenders are entitled under the U.S. Plan to a share in the litigation trust on their deficiency claim. If certain other classes of creditors do not vote to approve the U.S. plan, the Secured Lenders may also receive equity of a value up to 4.53% of their deficiency, subject to other contingencies. The Monitor reports that the Secured Lenders are thus estimated to recover approximately 57.1% of their estimated claims of US $2.1 billion on secured working capital claims and 73.3% of their estimated claims of US $811 million on secured revolver/term claims. The Monitor estimates that the Secured Lenders will recover no

value on their deficiency claims, assuming no reallocation of equity from other categories of debtors and no value for the litigation trust.

8. The holders of the US $600 million bonds (the "Noteholders") are entitled to receive common shares and warrants in the restructured corporate group, plus an interest in the litigation trust and certain trustee fees, for an estimated recovery of 8.34% on their claims of US $610 million under the U.S. plan, assuming all classes of Noteholders approve the plan and no value is given to the litigation trust. Depending on certain contingencies, the range of recovery is 0.44$ to 11.02% of their claim. Noteholders are treated more advantageously under the plans than general unsecured creditors in recognition that the Senior Notes are jointly and severally guaranteed by 23 U.S. debtors and the Canadian debtors, while in most instances only one SemGroup debtor is liable with respect to each ordinary unsecured creditor. In addition, the Noteholders have waived their right to receive distributions under the Canadian plans.

9. Under the U.S. Plan, general unsecured creditors will receive common shares, warrants and an interest in the litigation trust. Depending on the level of approval, recovery levels will range from 0.08% to 8.03% on claims of US $811 million. The Monitor reports that it expects recovery to general unsecured creditors under the U.S. Plan to be 2.09% of their claim.

10. Pursuant to section 503(b)(9) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, entities that provided goods to the U.S. Debtors in the ordinary course of business that were received within 20 days of the filing of Chapter 11 proceedings are entitled to a priority claim that ranks above the claims of the Secured Lenders.

11. There are 3 Canadian plans. As the Secured Lenders will be entitled to some recovery in respect of their deficiency claim and the Noteholders will be entitled to some recovery on their unsecured claim under the U.S. Plan, the Secured Lenders and the Noteholders are deemed to have waived their rights to any additional recovery under the Canadian plans for the most part. However, the votes of the Secured Lenders and the Noteholders entitled to vote on the U.S. Plan are deemed to be votes for the purpose of the Canadian plans, both with respect to numbers of parties and value of claims, and are to be included in the single class of "Affected Creditors" entitled to vote on the Canadian plans. Originally, the Canadian plans provided that the value attributable to the Secured Lenders' votes would be based on the full amount of their guarantee claim, approximately US $2.9 billion, and not only on their deficiency claim of approximately US $1.07 billion. Thus, the aggregate value of the Secured Lenders' voting claims would be:

a) US $2.939 billion for the SemCAMS plan;

b) US $2.939 billion less C $145 million for the SemCanada Crude plan, recognizing that the Secured Lenders would be entitled to receive C $145 million in respect of a negotiated Lenders' Secured Claim under the SemCanada Crude plan; and

c) US $2.939 billion less C $108 million for the SemCanada Energy plan, recognizing that the Secured Lenders will receive that amount in respect of a negotiated Lenders' Secured Claim under the SemCanada Energy plan.

At the conclusion of the classification hearing, the CCAA applicants proposed a revision to the proposed orders which stipulates that, if the approval of a plan by the creditors would be determined by the portion of the votes cast by the Secured Lenders that represents an amount of indebtedness that is greater than their estimated aggregate deficiency after taking into consideration the payments they are to receive under the U.S. plan and the Canadian plans, the Court shall determine whether the voting claim of the Secured Lenders should be limited to their estimated deficiency claim.

12. Only "Ordinary Creditors" receive any distribution under the Canadian Plans. Ordinary Creditors are defined as creditors holding "Affected Claims" other than the Secured Lenders, Noteholders, CCAA applicants and U.S. Debtors. Each plan provides that the Affected Creditors of the CCAA applicant will vote at the Creditors' Meeting as a single class.

13. The SemCAMS plan will be funded by a cash advance from SemCanada Crude and establishes two pools of cash. One pool will fund the full amount of secured claims which have not been paid prior to the implementation date of the plan up to the realizable value of the property secured, and the other pool will fund distributions to ordinary unsecured creditors. Ordinary unsecured creditors will receive cash subject to a maximum total payment of 4% of their proven claims. The Monitor estimates that the distribution will equal 4% of claims unless claims in excess of the current highest estimate are established.

14. The SemCanada Crude plan also establishes two pools of cash, one for secured claims and one for ordinary unsecured creditors. Again, the distribution to ordinary unsecured creditors is estimated to be 4% of claims unless claims in excess of the current highest estimate against SemCanada Crude are established.

15. Any cash remaining in SemCanada Crude after deducting amounts necessary to fund the above-noted payments to secured and unsecured ordinary creditors of SemCAMS and SemCanada Crude, unaffected claims and administrative costs, less a reserve for disputed claims, will be paid to the Secured Lenders through the U.S. plan as part of the payment on secured debt.

16. The SemCanada Energy distribution plan is funded from the cash received from the liquidation of the assets of the companies. It also establishes two pools of cash, one of which will be used to pay secured ordinary creditors and a one of which will be used to pay cash distributions to ordinary unsecured creditors. The Monitor estimates that the distribution to ordinary unsecured creditors will be in the range of 2.16% to 2.27% of their claims, unless claims in excess of the current maximum estimate are established. Any amounts outstanding after payment of these claims, unaffected claims and administration costs will be paid to the Secured Lenders. The proposed lower amount of recovery is stated to be in recognition of the fact that the SemCanada Energy Companies have been liquidated and have no going concern value.

17. As this summary indicates, the U.S. Plan and the Canadian plans are closely integrated and economically interdependent. Each of the plans requires that the other plans be approved by the requisite number of creditors and implemented on the same date in order to become effective. The receipt of at least $160 million from the SemCanada Group is a condition precedent to the implementation of the U.S. Plan.

18. The Monitor reports that the SemCanada Group has indicated that there is no viable option to the proposed plans and that a formal liquidation under bankruptcy legislation would provide a lower recovery to creditors. The Monitor notes that the rationale for the treatment of the Secured Lenders and the ordinary unsecured creditors under the plans is that the Secured Lenders have valid and enforceable secured claims, and that, in the event of the liquidation of the Canadian companies, the Secured Lenders would be entitled to all proceeds, resulting in no recovery to ordinary creditors. Therefore, reports the Monitor, the CCAA plans are considered to be better than the alternative of a liquidation. The Secured Lenders derive some benefit from the plans through the preservation of the going concern value of SemCAMS and SemCanada Crude and by having a prompt distribution of funds held by the SemCanada Energy Companies.

19. The Monitor notes that the distribution to the SemGroup unsecured creditors under the U.S. plan is viewed as better than a liquidation, and that, therefore, given the effect of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code's "cram-down" provisions, it is likely that the U.S. plan will be confirmed. The Monitor comments that the proposed distribution to ordinary unsecured creditors under the CCAA plans is considered to be fair as it is comparable to and potentially slightly more favourable than the distributions being made to the U.S. ordinary unsecured creditors.

Positions of Various Parties

13 The SemCanada Group applied for orders

a) accepting the filing of, in the case of SemCAMS and SemCanada Crude, proposed plans of arrangement and compromise, and in the case of SemCanada Energy, a proposed plan of distribution;

b) authorizing the calling and holding of meetings of the Canadian creditors of these three CCAA applicants;

c) authorizing the establishment of a single class of creditors for each plan for the purpose of considering and voting on the plans;

d) approving procedures with respect to the calling and conduct of such meetings; and

e) other non-contentious enabling relief.

14 Certain unsecured creditors of the applicants objected to the proposed classification of creditors, submitting that the Secured Lenders should not be allowed a vote in the same class as the unsecured creditors either with respect to the secured portion of their overall claim or any deficiency in their claims that would remain unpaid, and that the Noteholders should not be allowed a vote in the same class as the rest of the unsecured creditors.

15 As noted previously, the CCAA applicants proposed a revision to the proposed orders at the conclusion of the classification hearing which would allow the Court to consider whether the voting claim of the Secured Lenders should be limited to their estimated deficiency claim. The objecting creditors continued to object to the proposed classification, even if eligible votes were limited to the deficiency claim of the Secured Lenders.

Analysis

16 Section 6 of the CCAA provides that, where a majority in number representing two-thirds in value of "the creditors or class of creditors, as the case may be" vote in favour of a plan of arrangement or compromise at a meeting or meetings, the plan of arrangement may be sanctioned by the Court. There is little by way of specific statutory guidance on the issue of classification of claims, leaving the development of this issue in the CCAA process to case law. Prior decisions have recognized that the starting point in determining classification is the statute itself and the primary purpose of the statute is to facilitate the reorganization of insolvent companies: Paperny, J. in *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* (2000), 20 C.B.R. (4th) 46 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]), leave to appeal refused (2000), 20 C.B.R. (4th) 46 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]), affirmed [2001] 4 W.W.R. 1 (Alta. C.A.), leave to appeal to SCC refused [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 60 (S.C.C.) at para. 14. As first noted by Forsyth, J. in *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.* (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 20, 64 Alta. L.R. (2d) 139, [1989] 2 W.W.R. 566 (Alta. Q.B.) at page 28, and often repeated in classification decisions since, "this factor must be given due consideration at every stage of the process, including the classification of creditors..."

17 Classification is a key issue in CCAA proceedings, as a proposed plan must achieve the requisite level of creditor support in order to proceed to the stage of a sanction hearing. The CCAA debtor seeks to frame a class or classes in order to ensure that the plan receives the maximum level of support. Creditors have an interest in classifications that would allow them enhanced bargaining power in the negotiation of the plan, and creditors aggrieved by the process may seek to ensure that classification will give them an effective veto (see *Rescue: The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, Janis P. Sarra, 2007 ed. Thomson Carswell at page 234). Case law has developed from the comments of the British Columbia Court in *Woodward's Ltd., Re* (1993), 84 B.C.L.R. (2d) 206 (B.C. S.C.) warning against the danger of fragmenting the voting process unnecessarily, through the identification of principles applicable to the concept of "commonality of interest" articulated in *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* and elaborated further in Alberta in *San Francisco Gifts Ltd., Re*, 2004 CarswellAlta 1241, [2004] A.J. No. 1062 (Alta. Q.B.), leave to appeal refused (2004), 5 C.B.R. (5th) 300 (Alta. C.A.).

18 The parties in this case agree that "commonality of interest" is the key consideration in determining whether the proposed classification is appropriate, but disagree on whether the plans as proposed with their single class of voters meet that requirement. It is clear that classification is a fact-driven inquiry, and that the principles set out in the case law, while useful in considering whether commonality of interest has been achieved by the proposed classification, should not be applied rigidly: *Canadian*

Airlines Corp., Re at para. 18; *San Francisco Gifts Ltd., Re* at para. 12; *Stelco Inc., Re* (2005), 15 C.B.R. (5th) 307 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 22.

19 Although there are no fixed rules, the principles set out by Paperny, J. in para. 31 of *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* provide a useful structure for discussion of whether to the proposed classification is appropriate:

1. Commonality of interest should be viewed based on the non-fragmentation test, not on the identity of interest test.

20 Under the now-rejected "identity of interest" test, all members of the class had to have identical interests. Under the non-fragmentation test, interests need not be identical. The interests of the creditors in the class need only be sufficiently similar to allow them to vote with a common interest: *Woodward's Ltd., Re* at para. 8.

21 The objecting creditors submit that the creation of two classes rather than one cannot be considered to be fragmentation. The issue, however, is not the number of classes, but the effect that fragmentation of classes may have on the ability to achieve a viable reorganization. As noted by Farley, J. in para. 13 of his reasons relating to the classification of creditors in *Stelco Inc., Re*, as endorsed by the Ontario Court of Appeal:

> ...absent valid reason to have separate classes it would be reasonable, logical, rational and practical to have all this unsecured debt in the same class. Certainly that would avoid fragmentation - and in this respect multiplicity of classes does not mean that fragmentation starts only when there are many classes. Unless more than one class is necessary, fragmentation would start at two classes. Fragmentation if necessary, but not necessarily fragmentation.

2. The interests to be considered are the legal interests that a creditor holds qua creditor in relationship to the debtor company prior to and under the plan as well as on liquidation.

22 The classification of creditors is viewed with respect to the legal rights they hold in relation to the debtor company in the context of the proposed plan, as opposed to their rights as creditors in relation to each other: *Woodward's Ltd., Re* at para. 27, 29; *Stelco Inc., Re* at para. 30. In the proposed single classification, the rights of the creditors in the class against the debtor companies are unsecured (other than the proposed votes attributable to the secured portion of the debt of the Secured Lenders, which will be discussed separately).

23 With respect to the Secured Lenders' deficiency claim, there is a clear precedent for permitting a secured creditor to vote a substantial deficiency claim as part of the unsecured class: *Campeau Corp., Re* (1991), 10 C.B.R. (3d) 100 (Ont. Gen. Div.); *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*, supra.

24 The classification issues in the *Campeau Corp., Re* restructuring were similar to the present issues. In *Campeau Corp., Re*, a secured creditor, Olympia & York, was included in the class of unsecured creditors for the deficiency in its secured claim, which represented approximately 88% of the value of the unsecured class. The Court rejected the submission that the legal interests of Olympia & York were different from other unsecured creditors in the class. Montgomery, J. noted at para. 16 that Olympic & York's involvement in the negotiation of the plan was necessary and appropriate given that the size of its claims would allow it a veto no matter how the classes were constituted and that its co-operation was necessary for the success of both the U.S. and Canadian plans.

25 In the same way, the size and scope of the Secured Lenders claim makes their participation in the negotiation and endorsement of the proposed plans essential. That participation does not disqualify them from a vote in the process, nor necessitate their isolation in a special class. While under the integrated plans, the Secured Lenders will receive a different kind of distribution on their unsecured deficiency claim (a share of the litigation trust), that is an issue of fairness for the sanction hearing and does not warrant the establishment of a separate class.

26 The interests of the Noteholders are unsecured. While it is true that under the integrated plans, the Noteholders would be entitled to a higher share of the distribution of assets than ordinary unsecured creditors, the rationale for such difference in treatment relates to the multiplicity of debtor companies that are indebted to the Noteholders, as compared to the position of

the ordinary unsecured creditors. That difference, while it may be subject to submissions at the sanction hearing, is an issue of fairness, and not a difference material enough to warrant a separate class for the Noteholders in this case. A separate class for the Noteholders would only be necessary if, after considering all the relevant factors, it appeared that this difference would preclude reasonable consultation among the creditors of the class: *San Francisco Gifts Ltd., Re* at para. 24.

27 The question arises whether the fact that the Secured Lenders and the Noteholders have waived their rights to recover under the Canadian plans should result in either the requirement of separate classes or the forfeiture of their right to vote on the Canadian plans at all.

28 This is a unique case: a cross-border restructuring with separate but integrated and interdependent plans that are designed to comply with the restructuring legislation of two jurisdictions. As the applicants point out, the co-ordinated structure of the plans is designed to ensure that the Secured Lenders and the Noteholders receive sufficient recoveries under the U.S. plan to justify the sacrifices in recovery that result from their waiver of distributions under the Canadian plans. In considering the context of the proposed classification, it would be unrealistic and artificial to consider the Canadian plans in isolation, without regard to the commercial outcome to the creditors resulting from the implementation of the plans in both jurisdictions. Thus, the fact that the distributions to Secured Lenders and Noteholders will take place through the operation of the U.S. plan, and that the effective working of the plans require them to waive their rights to receive distributions under the Canadian plans does not deprive them of the right to an effective voice in the consideration of the Canadian plans through a meaningful vote.

29 It is not sufficient to say that the Secured Lenders and the Noteholders have a vote in the U.S. plans. The "cram down" power which exists under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code includes a "best interests test" that requires that if a class of holders of impaired claims rejects the plan, they can be "crammed down" and their claims will be satisfied if they receive property of a value that is not less than the value that the class would receive or retain if the debtor were liquidated under Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Thus, the votes available to the Secured Lenders and the Noteholders with respect to their claims under the U.S. Plan do not give them the right available to creditors under Canadian restructuring law to vote on whether a proposed plan should proceed to the next step of a sanction hearing There is no reason to deprive the Secured Lenders and the Noteholders of that right as creditors of the Canadian debtors, even if the distributions they would be entitled to flow through the U.S. plan. The question becomes, then, whether that right should be exercised in a class with other unsecured creditors as proposed or in a separate class.

30 It is noteworthy that the proposed single classification does not have the effect of confiscating the legal rights of any of the unsecured creditors, or adversely affecting any existing security position. It is in fact arguable that seeking to exclude the Secured Lenders and the Noteholders from the class prejudices these similarly-placed creditors by denying them a meaningful voice in the approval or rejection of the plans in Canada.

31 A number of cases suggest that the Court should also consider the rights of the parties in liquidation in determining whether a proposed classification is appropriate: *Woodward's Ltd., Re* at para. 14; *San Francisco Gifts Ltd., Re* at para. 12.

32 Under a liquidation scenario, the Secured Lenders would be entitled to nearly all of the proceeds of the liquidated corporate group, other than the relatively few secured claims that have priority. This suggests that the Secured Lenders are entitled to a meaningful vote with respect to both the U.S. plan and the Canadian plans.

3. The commonality of interests is to be viewed purposively, bearing in mind the object of the CCAA, namely to facilitate organizations if possible.

4. In placing a broad and purposive interpretation on the CCAA, the Court should be careful to resist classification approaches that would potentially jeopardize viable plans.

33 The Ontario Court of Appeal in *Stelco Inc., Re* cautioned that, in addition to considering commonality of interest issues, the court in a classification application should be alert to concerns about the confiscation of legal rights and should avoid "a tyranny of the minority", citing the comments of Borins, J. in *Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1991),

86 D.L.R. (4th) 621 (Ont. Gen. Div.), where he warned against creating "a special class simply for the benefit of the opposing creditor, which would give that creditor the potential to exercise an unwarranted degree of power": *Stelco Inc., Re* at para 28.

34 Excluding of the Secured Lenders and the Noteholders from the proposed single class would allow the objecting creditors to influence the voting process to a degree not warranted by their status. It is true that if the Secured Lenders and the Noteholders are not excluded from the class, even if only the votes related to the Secured Lenders' deficiency claim are tabulated, the positive vote will likely be enough to allow the proposed plans to proceed to a sanction hearing. It is also true that the Secured Lenders and the Noteholders may have been part of the negotiations that led to the proposed plans. Neither of those factors standing alone is sufficient to warrant a separate class unless rights are being confiscated or the classification creates an injustice.

35 The structure of the classification as proposed creates in effect what was imposed by the Court in *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*, a method of allowing the "voice" of ordinary unsecured creditors to be heard without the necessity of a separate classification, thus permitting rather than ruling out the possibility that the plans might proceed to a sanction hearing. Given that the votes of the Secured Lenders and the Noteholders on the U.S. plan will be deemed to be votes of those creditors on the Canadian plans, there will be perforce a separate tabulation of those votes from the votes of the remaining unsecured creditors. In accordance with the revision to the plans made at the end of the classification hearing, there will be a separate tabulation of the votes of the Secured Lenders relating to the secured portion of their claims and the votes relating to the unsecured deficiency.

36 The situation in this classification dispute is essentially the same as that which faced Paperny, J. in *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*. Fragmenting the classification prior to the vote raises the possibility that the plans may not reach the stage of a sanction hearing where fairness issues can be fully canvassed. This would be contrary to the purpose of the CCAA. This is particularly an issue recognizing that the U.S. plan and the Canadian plans must all be approved in order for any one of them to be implemented. Conrad, J.A. in denying leave to appeal in *San Francisco Gifts Ltd., Re*, 2004 ABCA 386 (Alta. C.A.) at para. 9 noted that the right to vote in a separate class and thereby defeat a proposed plan of arrangement is the statutory protection provided to the different classes of creditors, and thus must be determined reasonably at the classification stage. However, she also noted that "it is important to carefully examine classes with a view of protecting against injustice": para. 10. In this case, the goals of preventing confiscation of rights and protecting against injustice favour the proposed single classification.

37 This is the "pragmatic" factor referred to in *Campeau Corp., Re* at para. 21.The CCAA judge must keep in mind the interests of all stakeholders in reviewing the proposed classification, as in any step in the process. If a classification prevents the danger of a veto of a plan that promises some better return to creditors than the alternative of a liquidating insolvency, it should not be interfered with absent good reason. The classification hearing is not the only avenue of relief for aggrieved creditors. If a plan received the minimum required level of approval by vote of creditors, it must still be approved at a hearing where issues of fairness must be addressed.

5. Absent bad faith, the motivations of the creditors to approve or disapprove [of the Plan] are irrelevant.

38 As noted in *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* at para. 35, fragmenting a class because of an alleged conflict of interest not based on legal rights is an error. The issue of the motivation of a party to vote for or against a plan is an issue for the fairness hearing. There is no doubt that the various affected creditors in the proposed single class may have differing financial or strategic interests. To recognize such differences at the classification stage, unless the proposed classification confiscates rights, results in an injustice or creates a situation where meaningful consultation is impossible, would lead to the type of fragmentation that may jeopardize the CCAA process and be counter-productive to the legislative intent to facilitate viable reorganizations.

6. The requirement of creditors being able to consult together means being able to assess their legal entitlement as creditors before or after the plan in a similar manner.

39 The issue of meaningful consultation was addressed by both the supervising justice and the Court of Appeal in *San Francisco Gifts Ltd., Re*. In that case, Topolniski, J. noted that two corporate insiders that the proposed plan had included in the classification of affected creditors held claims that were uncompromised by the plan, that they gave up nothing, and that it "stretches the imagination to think other creditors in the class could have meaningful consultation [with them] about the Plan":

para. 49. Her decision to place these parties in a separate class was confirmed by the Court of Appeal, which commented that Topolniski, J. was "absolutely correct" to find no ability to consult "between shareholders whose debts would not be cancelled and other unsecured creditors whose debts would be": para. 14.

40 That is not the situation here. The deficiency claims of the Secured Lenders and the unsecured claims of the Noteholders are being compromised in the U.S. plan, and there is nothing to block consultations among affected creditors on the basis of dissimilarity of legal interests. While there are differences in the proposed distributions on the unsecured claims, they are not so major that they would preclude consultation.

41 The objecting creditors point to statements made by counsel for the Secured Lenders during the classification application about the alternatives to approval of the plans, which they submit indicates the impossibility of consultation. These comments were made in the context of advocacy on behalf of the proposed classification, and I do not take them as a clear statement by the Secured Lenders that they would refuse to consult with the other creditors.

Secured Portion of Secured Lenders' Claim

42 The CCAA applicants and the Secured Lenders submit that it would be unfair and inappropriate to limit the votes of the Secured Lenders in the Canadian plans to the amount of the deficiency in their secured claim, rather than the entire amount owing under the guarantee. They argue that, by endorsing the plans, the Secured Lenders have in effect elected to treat their entire claim under the guarantee as unsecured with respect to the Canadian plans, except for relatively small negotiated secured claims under the SemCanada Crude plan and the SemCanada Energy plan. They also submit that the fact that under bankruptcy law, a creditor of a bankrupt debtor is entitled to prove for the full amount of its debt in the estates of both the debtor and a bankrupt guarantor of the debt justifies granting the Secured Lenders the right to vote the full amount of the guarantee claim, even if part of the claim is to be recovered through the U.S. plan, as long as they do not actually recover more than 100 cents on the dollar.

43 It became apparent during the course of the classification hearing that it may not matter whether the plans are approved by the requisite number of creditors and value of their claims if the Secured Lenders are only entitled to vote the deficiency portion of their claims or the full amount of their claims. It was this that led to the revision in the language of the voting provisions of the plans. I defer a decision on the question of whether or not the Secured Lenders are entitled to vote the entire amount of their guarantee claims until after the vote has been conducted and the votes separately tabulated as directed. As noted by the Court of Appeal in *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* (2000), 19 C.B.R. (4th) 33 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]) at para. 39, such a deferral of a voting issue is not an error of law and is in fact consistent with the purpose of the CCAA.

Recent Amendments

44 The following amendment to the CCAA that has been proclaimed in effect from September 18, 2009 sets out certain factors that may be considered in approving a classification for voting purposes:

> 22.2 (2)**Factors** - For the purpose of subsection (1), creditors may be included in the same class if their interests or rights are sufficiently similar to give them a commonality of interest, taking into account:
>
> (a) the nature of the debts, liabilities or obligations giving rise to their claims;
>
> (b) the nature and rank of any security in respect of their claims;
>
> (c) the remedies available to the creditors in the absence of the compromise or arrangement being sanctioned, and the extent to which the creditors would recover their claims by exercising those remedies; and
>
> (d) any further criteria, consistent with those set out in paragraphs (a) to (c), that are prescribed. (R.S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 131, amended R.S.C. 2007, Bill C -12, c.36, s.71)

45 These factors do not change in any material way the factors that have been identified in the case law and discussed in these reasons nor would they have a material effect on the consideration of the proposed classification in this case.

Creditors with Claims in Process

46 Two creditors advised that, because their claims of secured status had not yet been resolved with the applicants and the Monitor, they were not in a position to evaluate whether or not to object to the proposed classification. The plans were revised to ensure that the votes of creditors whose status as secured creditors remains unresolved until after the meetings of creditors be recorded with votes of creditors with disputed claims and reported to the Court by the Monitor if these votes affect the approval or non-approval of the plan in question.

Conclusion

47 In summary, I have concluded that there is no good reason to exclude the Secured Lenders and the Noteholders from the single classification of voters in the proposed plans, nor to create a separate class for their votes. There are no material distinctions between the claims of these two creditors and the claims of the remaining unsecured creditors that are not more properly the subject of the sanction hearing, apart from the deferred issue of whether the Secured Lenders are entitled to vote their entire guarantee claim. No rights of the remaining unsecured creditors are being confiscated by the proposed classification, and no injustice arises, particularly given the separate tabulation of votes which enables the voice of the remaining unsecured creditors to be heard and measured at the sanction hearing. There are no conflicts of interest so over-riding as to make consultation impossible. While there are differences of interests and treatment among the affected creditors in the class, these are issues that will be addressed at the sanction hearing. Approval of the proposed classification in the context of the integrated plans is in accordance with the spirit and purpose of the CCAA.

Applications granted.

TAB 20

2005 CarswellOnt 6483
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Stelco Inc., Re

2005 CarswellOnt 6483, [2005] O.J. No. 4814, 143 A.C.W.S. (3d) 623, 15 C.B.R. (5th) 297

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PROPOSED PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT WITH RESPECT TO STELCO INC. AND THE OTHER APPLICANTS LISTED IN SCHEDULE "A"

APPLICATION UNDER THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

Farley J.

Heard: November 9, 2005
Judgment: November 10, 2005 *
Docket: 04-CL-5306

Proceedings: affirmed *Stelco Inc., Re* (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 6510 (Ont. C.A.)

Counsel: Michael E. Barrack, James D. Gage, Geoff R. Hall for Applicants
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Robert Staley for Senior Debenture Holders
Ashley John Taylor (Agent) to Secured Creditors for CIT
Paul MacDonald, Andy Kent, Hilary Clarke for Converts Committee
Aubrey Kauffman for Tricap
Ken Rosenberg, Jeff Larry for USW
H. Whitely for CIBC
Steven Bosnick for USW Locals 8782, 8328
Murray Gold, Andrew Hatney for Salaried Retirees
Gale Rubenstein for Superintendent

Subject: Insolvency

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Pacific Coastal Airlines Ltd. v. Air Canada (2001), 2001 BCSC 1721, 2001 CarswellBC 2943, 19 B.L.R. (3d) 286 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

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San Francisco Gifts Ltd., Re (2004), 42 Alta. L.R. (4th) 352, 5 C.B.R. (5th) 92, 359 A.R. 71, 2004 ABQB 705, 2004 CarswellAlta 1241 (Alta. Q.B.) — followed

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Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312, 86 D.L.R. (4th) 621, 1991 CarswellOnt 220 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

843504 Alberta Ltd., Re (2003), 2003 ABQB 1015, 2003 CarswellAlta 1786, 4 C.B.R. (5th) 306, 30 Alta. L.R. (4th) 91, 351 A.R. 222 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

s. 4 — considered

s. 5 — considered

s. 6 — considered

s. 8 — referred to

MOTION by creditors relating to terms of proposal in bankruptcy.

***Farley J.*:**

1 Fortunately time cleared so that the motion of the Informal Independent Converts' Committee ("ConCom") which surfaced late last week — and the responding cross motion of the Informal Committee of Senior Debenture Holders ("BondCom") — could be accommodated today, less than week before the scheduled vote on Stelco Inc.'s Plan of Arrangement under the CCAA set for November 15, 2005.

2 The motion of ConCom was for an order:

> (i) directing the Applicants to amend page 39 of the Notice of Proceedings and Meetings and Information Circular (the "Information Circular") with respect to the Applicants' Proposed Plan of Arrangement or Compromise (the "Proposed Plan") in the manner set out in the Draft Order to confirm that the right (if any) of the Bondholders (as hereinafter defined) to assert claims or other remedies against other creditors of Stelco Inc. ("Stelco") will be subject to the effect of the Proposed Plan (the "Bondholders Claims Statement") and that the right (if any) of the Bondholders to assert claims (the "Anti-Convert Claims") pursuant to Article 6 (the "Inter-Trustee Provisions") of the First Supplemental Trust Indenture dated January 21, 2002 between Stelco and CIBC Mellon Trust Company (the "Supplemental Trust Indenture") will be extinguished effective upon the implementation of the Proposed Plan;
>
> (ii) declaring that, if the Proposed Plan is approved by the requisite majority of the creditors of Stelco and sanctioned by this Court, the Inter-Trustee Provisions shall, from and after the effective date of the Proposed Plan, be of no force or effect;
>
> (iii) in the alternative, directing the Applicants to amend the Proposed Plan to provide that the Noteholders (as hereinafter defined) shall constitute a separate class of Stelco creditors for the purposes of voting on the Proposed Plan or any amended version thereof; and
>
> (iv) such further and other relief as counsel may request and this Honourable Court may permit.

3 The cross motion of BondCom was for an Order:

> 2. for a declaration that, if any or all of the relief sought by the Convertible Noteholders as set out in its notice of motion dated November 4, 2005 is granted, that the Senior Debenture Holders shall constitute a separate class of Stelco Inc. ("Stelco") creditors for the purposes of voting on the Proposed Plan of Arrangement or Compromise (the "Proposed Plan") or any amended version thereof; and
>
> 3. such further and other relief as to this Honourable Court seems just.

4 No one present at this hearing disputed the proposition that it was appropriate to have the creditors vote on the Plan with the necessary benefit of clear statements of what was involved in such a vote and to eliminate therefore any ambiguities to the extent possible so that an objective creditor could make a reasoned decision. In that respect it would appear to me that the language of the Information Circular at p.39 thereof should be clarified to track that of the Meeting Order of October 4, 2005 at para. 34 thereof as to the operative element. Further it was acknowledged by everyone that the Plan itself provided that it may be amended before the vote. In that respect there would be no impediment for Stelco to adjust the language of the Plan in the sense of clarifying what its intent has been and continues to be in respect of matters affecting the debt in question and as held by those represented by the ConCom and by the BondCom. (Note: Subsequent to release of these reasons in handwritten form, I was advised on November 10, 2005 that Stelco has undertaken to make the aforesaid clarifications.)

5 I wish to emphasize that nothing in my reasons should be taken as being determinative of or affecting the relationship of the ConCom holders of debt vis-à-vis the BondCom holders of debt (that would as well encompass the holders of all Senior Debt as that term is defined in the Supplemental Trust Indenture). If those two sides are not able to work out an agreement between themselves, then they are at liberty to come to court to have that adjudicated.

6 ConCom points out that the Supplemental Trust Indenture was an agreement between Stelco and the holders of the ConCom debt, but it was not an agreement signed by the holders of the BondCom debt. While true, that would not preclude a claim of the BondCom holders based on the concept of third party beneficiary.

7 The CCAA is styled as "An act to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors" and its short title is: *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*. Ss. 4, 5 and 6 talk of compromises or arrangements between a company and its creditors. There is no mention of this extending by statute to encompass a change of relationship among the creditors

vis-à-vis the creditors themselves and not directly involving the company. See *Pacific Coastal Airlines Ltd. v. Air Canada*, [2001] B.C.J. No. 2580 (B.C. S.C.) at paras. 24-25; *Royal Bank v. Gentra Canada Investments Inc.*, [2000] O.J. No. 315 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 41, appeal dismissed (Ont. C.A.); *843504 Alberta Ltd., Re*, [2003] A.J. No. 1549 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 13; *Royal Oak Mines Inc., Re*, [1999] O.J. No. 709 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at para. 24; *Royal Oak Mines Inc., Re*, [1999] O.J. No. 864 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at para. 1.

8 ConCom points out the language of article 4.01 of the Plan:

> **4.01 Cancellation of Certificates**
>
> At the Effective Time, all debentures, certificates, agreements, invoices and other instruments evidencing Affected Claims against Stelco or Existing Common Shares will not entitle any holder thereof to any compensation or participation other than as expressly provided for in this Plan or in the Articles or Reorganization, respectively, and will be cancelled and null and void, and all debentures, certificates, agreements, invoices and other instruments evidencing Affected Claims against any Subsidiary Applicant will not entitle any holder thereof (other than Stelco or its successors and assignees) to any compensation or participation other than as expressly provided for in this Plan and, if in the possession or control of any Person must, at the request of Stelco, be delivered to Stelco. (emphasis added)

However this must be carefully analyzed in context. This deals with "Affected Claims against Stelco." See also in this respect articles 6.01, 6.02 and 6.05.

> **6.01 Effect of Plan Generally**
>
> At the Effective Time, the treatment of Affected Claims will be final and binding on the Applicants, the Affected Creditors and the trustees under the trust indentures for the Bonds (and their respective heirs, executors, administrators and other legal representatives, successors and assigns), and this Plan will constitute: (a) full, final and absolute settlement of all rights of the Affected Creditors; (b) an absolute release and discharge of all indebtedness, liabilities and obligations of or in respect of the Affected Claims against Stelco, including any interest and costs accruing thereon; (c) an absolute assignment to Stelco of all indebtedness, liabilities and obligations of or in respect of the Affected Claims against Subsidiary Applicants, including any interest and costs accruing thereon, and an absolute release and discharge of any rights of Affected Creditors in respect thereof (excluding, for greater certainty, any rights assigned to Stelco); and (d) a reorganization of the capital and change in the minimum and maximum number of directors of Stelco in accordance with the provisions of Article 3 and the Articles of Reorganization. (emphasis added)
>
> **6.02 Prosecution of Judgments**
>
> At the Effective Time, no step or proceeding may be taken in respect of any suit, judgement, execution, cause of action or similar proceeding in connection with any Affected Claim (other than by Stelco in respect of Affected Claims assigned to it pursuant to this Plan) and any such proceedings will be deemed to have no further effect against any Applicant or any of its assets and will be released, discharged, dismissed or vacated without cost to the Applicants. Any Applicant may apply to Court to obtain a discharge or dismissal, if necessary, of any such proceedings without notice to the Affected Creditor. (emphasis added)
>
> **6.05 Consents, Waivers and Agreements**
>
> At the Effective Time, each Affected Creditor will be deemed to have consented and agreed to all of the provisions of the Plan, as an entirety. Without limitation to the foregoing, each Affected Creditor (but for greater certainty, excluding Stelco in respect of Affected Claims assigned to it pursuant to this Plan) will be deemed:
>
> (a) to have executed and delivered to the Applicants all consents, assignments, releases and waivers, statutory or otherwise, required to implement and carry out this Plan as an entirety;

> (b) to have waived any default by or rescinded any demand for payment against any Applicant that has occurred on or prior to the Plan Implementation Date pursuant to, based on or as a result of any provision, express or implied, in any agreement or other arrangement, written or oral, existing between such Affected Creditor and such Applicant with respect to an Affected Claim; and
>
> (c) to have agreed that, if there is any conflict between the provisions, express or implied, of any agreement or other arrangement, written or oral, existing between such Affected Creditor and any Applicant with respect to an Affected Claim as at the Plan Implementation Date and the provisions of this Plan, then the provisions of this Plan take precedence and priority and the provisions of such agreement or other arrangement are amended accordingly.
>
> (emphasis added)

This is not language which purports to, nor in my opinion does, affect relationships between creditors vis-à-vis themselves. With respect, I do not see s. 8 of the CCAA as coming into play here, nor is it necessary to have it come into play in this inter-creditor dispute which does not directly involve Stelco. No doubt it would be helpful to have Stelco clarify that aspect which ConCom has sincerely felt was ambiguous in article 4.01 of the Plan to reflect that these instruments are cancelled and null and void only as to the future (ie. that is after the Effective Time) vis-à-vis Stelco, but not as to the inter-creditor dispute or relationship. (See note above re: undertaking of Stelco.)

9 I would only note in passing that the holders of the ConCom debt freely bought into a situation governed by s. 6.2 of the Supplemental Trust Indenture which contemplated their relationship with the BondCom debt (Senior Debt) in the event of insolvency proceedings or a reorganization. Give the caveats in s. 6.3 it would not appear to me that this clause advances the argument pressed by the ConCom.

10 Therefore as to the relief request by ConCom in (i) and (ii) above, I would dismiss that part of the motion. That dismissal in no way affects the clarification of language mentioned above which would be of assistance to all concerned.

11 Secondly, I would note that while apparently Stelco had not specifically advised as to its position, at the time of the hearing, its counsel was quite straight forward in his opening comments when he stated that Stelco had intended and always intended that its Plan (as distributed) was only to affect rights between Stelco and its Affected Creditors, and specifically Stelco had no intent to alter the relationship between its creditors in the sense of one group of creditors vis-à-vis another group (i.e. the ConCom debt vis-à-vis BondCom debt (Senior Debt)). In this latter regard he indicated that Stelco was not intending to affect whatever subordination rights there may be between these two groups. This would be in the sense that what was the situation between these two groups as a result of the Supplemental Trust Indenture, especially at s. 6, would continue to be the relationship after the Effective Time.

12 The next question is whether or not there should be separate classes for the ConCom debt and/or the BondCom debt/ Senior Debt. I am of the view that the law in regard to classification is correctly set out in *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* (2000), 19 C.B.R. (4th) 12 (Alta. Q.B.), leave to appeal denied (2000), 19 C.B.R. (4th) 33 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]), cited in the Alberta Court of Appeal subsequent decision *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* (2000), 261 A.R. 120 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]), at para. 27. See also *San Francisco Gifts Ltd., Re* (2004), 5 C.B.R. (5th) 92 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 11, leave to appeal denied 2004 ABCA 386 (Alta. C.A.). As noted by Toplinski J. at para. 11 of San Francisco:

> (11) The commonality of interest test has evolved over time and now involves application of the following guidelines that were neatly summarized by Paperny J. (as she then was) in *Resurgence Asset Management LLS v. Canadian Airlines Corp.* ("Canadian Airlines")
>
> 1. Community of interest should be viewed based on the non-fragmentation test, not on an identity of interest test.
>
> 2. The interests to be considered are the legal interests that a creditor holds qua creditor in relationship to the debtor prior to and under the Plan as well as on liquidation.

> 3. The commonality of interests should be viewed purposively, bearing in mind that the object of the CCAA, namely to facilitate reorganizations if possible.
>
> 4. In placing a broad and purposive interpretation on the CCAA, the Court should be careful to resist classification approaches that would potentially jeopardize viable Plans.
>
> 5. Absent bad faith, the motivations of creditors to approve or disapprove [of the Plan] are irrelevant.
>
> 6. The requirement of creditors being able to consult together means being able to assess their legal entitlement as creditors before or after the Plan in a similar manner. (emphasis added)

13 I would note as well that the primary and most significant attribute of the ConCom debt and that of the BondCom debt/ Senior Debt plus the trade debt vis-à-vis Stelco is that it is all unsecured debt. Thus absent valid reason to have separate classes it would be reasonable, logical, rational and practical to have all this unsecured debt in the same class. Certainly that would avoid any unnecessary fragmentation — and in this respect multiplicity of classes does not mean that that fragmentation starts only when there are many classes. Unless more than one class is necessary, fragmentation would start at two classes. Fragmentation if necessary, but not necessarily fragmentation.

14 Is it necessary to have more than one class? Firstly, it would not appear to me that as between Stelco and the unsecured creditors overall there is any material distinction. Secondly, there would not appear to me to be any confiscation of any rights (or the other side of the coin any new imposition of obligations) upon the holders of ComCom debt. The subrogation issue was something which these holders assumed on the issue of that debt. Thirdly, I do not see that there is a realistic conflict of interest. Each group of unsecured creditors including the ConCom debt holders and the BondCom debt holders has the same general interest vis-à-vis Stelco, namely to extract from Stelco through the Plan the maximum value in the sense of consideration possible (subject to the practical caution that whatever is achieved must be compatible with Stelco being able to continue in a competitive industry so that the burden of this consideration cannot be so great as to swamp the newly renovated boat which had previously been sinking). That situation is not impacted for our purposes here in this motion by the possibility that in a subsequent dispute between the ConCom holders and the BondCom holders there may be a difference of opinion as to the valuation of the consideration obtained.

15 Counsel for BondCom and Stelco raised generally the question of there possibly being a tyranny of the minority if the ConCom debt was a separate class; counsel for ConCom raised the issue of tyranny of the majority if there was not a separate class for the ConCom debt. To my mind that questions of tyranny of the majority is something which may be addressed in the sanction hearing, if one takes place, as to the fairness, reasonableness and equitableness of the Plan. See item 4 of the Paperny list in *Canadian Airlines Corp.*; see also *Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 318 and *Campeau Corp., Re* (1991), 10 C.B.R. (3d) 100 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 103.

16 Therefore I do not see that ConCom has made out a case for a separate class. That aspect of its motion is also dismissed.

17 Given the dismissal of the ConCom motion, the BondCom motion for a separate class for its debt becomes moot.

Motions dismissed.

Footnotes

* Affirmed *Stelco Inc., Re* (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 6510, 15 C.B.R. (5th) 305 (Ont. C.A.)

End of Document

2005 CarswellOnt 6818
Ontario Court of Appeal

Stelco Inc., Re

2005 CarswellOnt 6818, [2005] O.J. No. 4883, 11 B.L.R. (4th) 185, 144 A.C.W.S. (3d) 15, 15 C.B.R. (5th) 307, 204 O.A.C. 205, 261 D.L.R. (4th) 368, 78 O.R. (3d) 241

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C., c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PROPOSED PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT WITH RESPECT TO STELCO INC., AND OTHER APPLICANTS LISTED IN SCHEDULE "A"

APPLICATION UNDER THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 AS AMENDED

Goudge, Sharpe, Blair JJ.A.

Heard: November 14, 2005
Judgment: November 17, 2005
Docket: CA C44436, M33171

Proceedings: additional reasons at *Stelco Inc., Re* ((2005)), 2005 CarswellOnt 6510, 15 C.B.R. (5th) 305 ((Ont. C.A.)); affirmed *Stelco Inc., Re* ((2005)), 2005 CarswellOnt 6483, 15 C.B.R. (5th) 297 ((Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]))

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Kyla Mahar for Monitor
Murray Gold for Salaried Retirees
Heath Whitley for CIBC
Steven Bosnick for U.S.W.A. Loc. 5328, 8782

Subject: Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure

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Cases considered by *Blair J.A.*:

Campeau Corp., Re (1991), 10 C.B.R. (3d) 100, 86 D.L.R. (4th) 570, 1991 CarswellOnt 155 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2000), 2000 CarswellAlta 623, 19 C.B.R. (4th) 12 (Alta. Q.B.) — followed

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2000), 2000 ABCA 149, 2000 CarswellAlta 503, 80 Alta. L.R. (3d) 213, 19 C.B.R. (4th) 33, 261 A.R. 120, 225 W.A.C. 120 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]) — referred to

Country Style Food Services Inc., Re (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 1038, 158 O.A.C. 30 (Ont. C.A. [In Chambers]) — referred to

Fairview Industries Ltd., Re (1991), 11 C.B.R. (3d) 71, *(*sub nom. *Fairview Industries Ltd., Re (No. 3))* 109 N.S.R. (2d) 32, *(*sub nom. *Fairview Industries Ltd., Re (No. 3))* 297 A.P.R. 32, 1991 CarswellNS 36 (N.S. T.D.) — referred to

Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd. (1988), 64 Alta. L.R. (2d) 139, [1989] 2 W.W.R. 566, 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 20, 1988 CarswellAlta 319 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Northland Properties Ltd., Re (1988), 31 B.C.L.R. (2d) 35, 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 166, 1988 CarswellBC 556 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

Northland Properties Ltd., Re (1989), *(*sub nom. *Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada)* 34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 122, *(*sub nom. *Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada)* 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195, *(*sub nom. *Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada)* [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363, 1989 CarswellBC 334 (B.C. C.A.) — referred to

Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, *(*sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey)* 1 O.R. (3d) 289, *(*sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey)* 41 O.A.C. 282, 1990 CarswellOnt 139 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

NsC Diesel Power Inc., Re (1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 97 N.S.R. (2d) 295, 258 A.P.R. 295, 1990 CarswellNS 33 (N.S. T.D.) — referred to

Pacific Coastal Airlines Ltd. v. Air Canada (2001), 2001 BCSC 1721, 2001 CarswellBC 2943, 19 B.L.R. (3d) 286 (B.C. S.C.) — considered

Savage v. Amoco Acquisition Co. (1988), 59 Alta. L.R. (2d) 260, 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 154, 40 B.L.R. 188, *(*sub nom. *Amoco Acquisition Co. v. Savage)* 87 A.R. 321, 1988 CarswellAlta 291 (Alta. C.A.) — referred to

Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312, 86 D.L.R. (4th) 621, 1991 CarswellOnt 220 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Sovereign Life Assurance Co. v. Dodd (1892), [1891-94] All E.R. Rep. 246, [1892] 2 Q.B. 573 (Eng. C.A.) — considered

Stelco Inc., Re (2005), 253 D.L.R. (4th) 109, 75 O.R. (3d) 5, 2005 CarswellOnt 1188, 2 B.L.R. (4th) 238, 9 C.B.R. (5th) 135, 196 O.A.C. 142 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Wellington Building Corp., Re (1934), 16 C.B.R. 48, [1934] O.R. 653, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 626, 1934 CarswellOnt 103 (Ont. S.C.) — referred to

Woodward's Ltd., Re (1993), 20 C.B.R. (3d) 74, 84 B.C.L.R. (2d) 206, 1993 CarswellBC 555 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

Joint Stock Companies Arrangements Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict.), c. 104
Generally — referred to

ADDITIONAL REASONS to judgment reported at *Stelco Inc., Re* (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 6510, 15 C.B.R. (5th) 305 (Ont. C.A.).

***Blair J.A.*:**

Background

1 This appeal arises out of the reorganization of Stelco Inc., and related companies, pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA"). [1] Stelco has been in the midst of this fractious process for approximately twenty-one months. Justice Farley has been the supervising judge throughout.

2 Stelco has presented a Proposed Plan of Compromise or Arrangement to its creditors for their approval. The vote was scheduled for Tuesday, November 15, 2005. On Thursday, November 10, a group of creditors known as the Informal Independent Converts' Committee ("the Converts' Committee) sought an order from the supervising judge, amongst other things, classifying the Subordinated Debenture Holders whom they represent as a separate class for voting purposes. Justice Farley dismissed the motion. In the face of the pending vote, the Converts' Committee sought leave to appeal on Thursday afternoon (The courts were closed on Friday, November 11, for Remembrance Day). Rosenberg J.A. dealt with the matter and directed that the application for leave, and if leave be granted, the appeal, be heard by a panel of this court on Monday, November 14, 2005.

3 This panel heard the application for leave and the appeal on Monday. We concluded that leave should be granted, but that the appeal must be dismissed, and at the conclusion of argument — and in order to clarify matters so that the vote could proceed the following day — we issued a brief endorsement with our decision, but indicating that more detailed reasons would follow.

4 The endorsement read as follows:

> In our view, the appellants have not demonstrated a different legal interest from the other unsecured creditors vis à vis the debtor, nor any basis for setting aside the finding of Farley J. that there are no different practical interests such that the appellants deserve a separate class. We see no legal error or error in principle in his exercise of discretion.
>
> Leave to appeal is granted, but the appeal must therefore be dismissed. Because of the importance of the issue for Ontario practice in this area, we propose to expand somewhat on these reasons in due course.

5 These are those expanded reasons.

Facts

6 Stelco's Proposed Plan is made to unsecured creditors only. It is not intended to affect the claims of secured creditors.

7 The Converts' Committee represents unsecured creditors who hold $90 million of convertible unsecured subordinated debentures issued by Stelco pursuant to a Supplemental Trust Indenture dated January 21, 2002, and due in 2007. With interest, the claims of the Subordinated Debenture Holders now amount to approximately $110 million. Those claims are subordinated to approximately $328 million in favour of Senior Debt Holders. In addition, Stelco has unsecured trade debts totalling approximately, $228 million. In the Proposed Plan, these three groups of unsecured creditors — the Subordinated Debenture Holders (represented by the Converts' Committee), the Senior Debt Holders, and the Trade Creditors — have all been included in the same class for the purposes of voting on the Proposed Plan or any amended version of it.

8 The Converts' Committee takes issue with this, and seeks to have the Subordinated Debenture Holders classified as a separate class of creditors for voting purposes. They argue that their interests are different than those of the Bondholders and that creditors who do not have common interests should not be classified in the same group for voting purposes. They submit,

therefore, that the supervising judge erred in law in not granting them a separate classification. In that regard, they rely upon this court's decision in *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.). They also argue that the supervising judge was wrong, on the facts contained in the record, in finding that the Subordinated Debenture Holders and the Bondholders did not have conflicting interests.

9 In making their argument about a different interest, the appellants rely upon their status as subordinated debt holders as shaped particularly by Articles 6.2 and 6.3 of the Supplemental Trust Indenture. In essence those provisions reinforce the subordinated nature of their debt. They stipulate (a) that if the Subordinated Debenture Holders receive any payment from Stelco, or any distribution from the assets of Stelco, before the Senior Debt is fully paid, they are obliged to remit any such payment or distribution to the Senior Debt Holders until the latter have been paid in full (Art. 6.2(3)), but (b) that no such payment or distribution by Stelco shall be deemed to constitute a payment on the Subordinated Debenture Holders' debt (Art. 6.3). The parties refer to these provisions as the "Turnover Payment" provisions.

10 In short, although Stelco is obliged to pay both groups of creditors in full, as between the Subordinated Debenture Holders and the Senior Debt Holders, the latter are entitled to be paid in full before the former receive anything. The Supplemental Trust Indenture makes it clear that the provisions of Article 6 "are intended solely for the purpose of defining the relative rights of [the Subordinated Debenture Holders] and the holders of the Senior Debt" (Art. 6.3).

11 The appellants contend that the Turnover Payment provisions distinguish their interests from those of the Subordinated Debenture Holders when it comes to voting on Stelco's Proposed Plan. They say that the Subordinated Debenture Holders' interest in maximizing the amounts to be made available to unsecured creditors ends once they have received full recovery, in part as a result of the Turnover Payments that the Subordinated Debenture Holders will be required to make from their portion of the funds. On the other hand, the Subordinated Debenture Holders will have an interest in seeking more because their recovery, for practical purposes, will have only begun once that point is reached.

12 The respondents submit, for their part, that the appellants are seeking a separate classification for a collateral purpose, i.e., so that they will be able to veto the Proposed Plan, or at least threaten to veto it, unless they are granted a benefit to which they are not entitled — the elimination of their subordinated position by virtue of the Turnover Payment provisions.

13 Farley J. rejected the appellants' arguments. The thrust of his decision in this regard is found in paragraphs 13 and 14 of his reasons:

> [13] I would note as well that the primary and most significant attribute of the ConCom debt and that of the BondCom debt/Senior Debt[2] plus the trade debt vis-à-vis Stelco is that it is all unsecured debt. Thus absent valid reason to have separate classes it would be reasonable, logical, rational and practical to have all this unsecured debt in the same class. Certainly that would avoid any unnecessary fragmentation — and in this respect multiplicity of classes does not mean that that fragmentation starts only when there are many classes. Unless more than one class is necessary, fragmentation would start at two classes. Fragmentation if necessary, but not necessarily fragmentation.
>
> [14] Is it necessary to have more than one class? Firstly, it would not appear to me that as between Stelco and the unsecured creditors overall there is any material distinction. Secondly, there would not appear to me to be any confiscation of any rights (or the other side of the coin any new imposition of obligations) upon the holders of the ConCom debt. The subrogation issue was something which these holders assumed on the issue of that debt. Thirdly, I do not see that there is a realistic conflict of interest. Each group of unsecured creditors including the ConCom debt holders and the BondCom debt holders has the same general interest vis-à-vis Stelco, namely to extract from Stelco through the Plan the maximum value in the sense of consideration possible. . . . That situation is not impacted for our purposes here in this motion by the possibility that in a subsequent dispute between the ConCom holders and the BondCom holders there may be a difference of opinion as to the variation of the consideration obtained.

14 We agree with his conclusion and see no basis to interfere with his findings in that regard.

The Leave Application

15 The principles to be applied by this court in determining whether leave to appeal should be granted to someone dissatisfied with an order made in a CCAA proceeding are not in dispute. Leave is only sparingly granted in such matters because of their "real time" dynamic and because of the generally discretionary character underlying many of the orders made by supervising judges in such proceedings. There must be serious and arguable grounds that are of real and significant interest to the parties. The court has assessed this criterion on the basis of a four-part test, namely,

a) whether the point on appeal is of significance to the practice;

b) whether the point is of significance to the action;

c) whether the appeal is *prima facie* meritorious or frivolous; and

d) whether the appeal will unduly hinder the progress of the action.

See *Stelco Inc. (Re)* (2005), 75 O.R. (3d) 5 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 24; *Country Style Food Services Inc., Re*, [2002] O.J. No. 1377, 158 O.A.C. 30 (Ont. C.A. [In Chambers]) at para. 15; *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* (2000), 19 C.B.R. (4th) 33 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]) at para. 7.

16 Here, we granted leave to appeal because the proposed appeal raised an issue of significance to the practice, namely the nature of the "common interest" test to be applied by the courts for purposes of the classification of creditors in CCAA proceedings. Although the law seems to have progressed in the lower courts along the lines developed in Alberta, beginning with the decision of Paperny J. in *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* (2000), 19 C.B.R. (4th) 12 (Alta. Q.B.), this court has not dealt with the issue since its decision in *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of), supra*, and the Converts' Committee argues that the Alberta line of authorities is contrary to *Nova Metal Products Inc.*

17 A brief further comment respecting the leave process may be in order.

18 The court recognizes the importance of its ability to react in a responsible and timely fashion to the appellate needs arising in the "real time" dynamics of CCAA restructurings. Often, as in the case of this restructuring, they involve a significant public dimension. For good policy reasons, however, appellate courts in Canada — including this one — have developed relatively stringent parameters for the granting of leave to appeal in CCAA cases. As noted, leave is only sparingly granted. The parameters as set out in the authorities cited above remain good law.

19 Merely because a corporate restructuring is a big one and money is no object to the participants in the process, does not mean that the court will necessarily depart from the normal leave to appeal process that applies to other cases. In granting leave to appeal in these circumstances, we do not wish to be taken as supporting a notion that the fusion of leave applications with the hearing of the appeal in CCAA restructurings — particularly in major ones such as this one involving Stelco — has become the practice. Where there is an urgency that a leave application be expedited in the public interest, the court will do so in this area of the law as it does in other areas. However, where what is involved is essentially an attempt to review a discretionary order made on the facts of the case, in a tightly supervised process with which the judge is intimately familiar, the collapsed process that was made available in this particular situation will not generally be afforded.

20 As these reasons demonstrate, however, the issues raised on this particular appeal, and the timing factor involved, warranted the expedited procedure that was ordered by Justice Rosenberg.

The Appeal

No Error in Law or Principle

21 Everyone agrees that the classification of creditors for CCAA voting purposes is to be determined generally on the basis of a "commonality of interest" (or a "common interest") between creditors of the same class. Most analyses of this approach start with a reference to *Sovereign Life Assurance Co. v. Dodd* (1892), [1891-94] All E.R. Rep. 246 (Eng. C.A.), which dealt with the classification of creditors for voting purposes in a winding-up proceeding. Two passages from the judgments in that decision are frequently cited:

At pp. 249-250 Lord Esher said:

> The Act provides that the persons to be summoned to the meeting, all of whom, it is to be observed, are creditors, are persons who can be divided into different classes, classes which the Act[3] recognizes, though it does not define. The creditors, therefore, must be divided into different classes. What is the reason for prescribing such a course? It is because the creditors composing the different classes have different interests, and, therefore, if a different state of facts exists with respect to different creditors, which may affect their minds and judgments differently, they must be separated into different classes.

At p. 251, Bowen L.J. stated:

> The word "class" used in the statute is vague, and to find out what it means we must look at the general scope of the section, which enables the court to order a meeting of a "class of creditors" to be summoned. It seems to me that we must give such a meaning to the term 'class' as will prevent the section being so worked as to produce confiscation and injustice, and that we must confine its meaning to those persons whose rights are not so dissimilar as to make it impossible for them to consult together with a view to their common interest.

22 These views have been applied in the CCAA context. But what comprises those "not so dissimilar" rights and what are the components of that "common interest" have been the subject of debate and evolution over time. It is clear that classification is a fact-driven exercise, dependent upon the circumstances of each particular case. Moreover, given the nature of the CCAA process and the underlying flexibility of that process — a flexibility which is its genius — there can be no fixed rules that must apply in all cases.

23 In *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* (2000), 19 C.B.R. (4th) 12 (Alta. Q.B.), Paperny J. nonetheless extracted a number of principles to be considered by the courts in dealing with the commonality of interest test. At para. 31 she said:

> In summary, the cases establish the following principles applicable to assessing commonality of interest:
>
> 1. Commonality of interest should be viewed based on the non-fragmentation test, not on an identity of interest test;
>
> 2. The interests to be considered are the legal interests that a creditor holds qua creditor in relationship to the debtor company prior to and under the plan as well as on liquidation.
>
> 3. The commonality of interests are to be viewed purposively, bearing in mind the object of the C.C.C.A., namely to facilitate reorganizations if possible.
>
> 4. In placing a broad and purposive interpretation on the C.C.C.A., the court should be careful to resist classification approaches that would potentially jeopardize viable plans.
>
> 5. Absent bad faith, the motivations of creditors to approve or disapprove [of the Plan] are irrelevant.
>
> 6. The requirement of creditors being able to consult together means being able to assess their legal entitlement *as creditors* before or after the plan in a similar manner.

24 In developing this summary of principles, Paperny J. considered a number of authorities from across Canada, including the following: *Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1991), 86 D.L.R. (4th) 621 (Ont. Gen. Div.); *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.* (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 20 (Alta. Q.B.); *Fairview Industries Ltd., Re*

(1991), 11 C.B.R. (3d) 71 (N.S. T.D.); *Woodward's Ltd., Re* (1993), 84 B.C.L.R. (2d) 206 (B.C. S.C.); *Northland Properties Ltd., Re* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 166 (B.C. S.C.); *Northland Properties Ltd., Re* (1989), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195 (B.C. C.A.); *NsC Diesel Power Inc., Re* (1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1 (N.S. T.D.); *Savage v. Amoco Acquisition Co.* (1988), 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 154 (Alta. C.A.), (*sub nom. Amoco Acquisition Co. v. Savage*); *Wellington Building Corp., Re* (1934), 16 C.B.R. 48 (Ont. S.C.). Her summarized principles were cited by the Alberta Court of Appeal, apparently with approval, in a subsequent *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* decision: *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* (2000), 19 C.B.R. (4th) 33 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]) at para. 27.

25 In the passage from his reasons cited above (paragraphs 13 and 14) the supervising judge in this case applied those principles. In our view he was correct in law in doing so.

26 We do not read the foregoing principles as being inconsistent with the earlier decision of this court in *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)*. There the court applied a common interest test in determining that the two creditors in question ought not to be grouped in the same class of creditors for voting purposes. But the differing interests in question were not different legal interests as between the two creditors; they were different legal interests as between each of the creditors and the debtor company. One creditor (the Bank) held first security over the debtor company's receivables and the other creditor (RoyNat) held second security on those assets; RoyNat, however, held first security over the debtor's building and realty, whereas the Bank was second in priority in relation to those assets. The two creditors had differing commercial interests in how the assets should be dealt with (it was in the interests of the bank, with a smaller claim, to collect and retain the more realizable receivable assets, but in the interests of RoyNat to preserve the cash flow and have the business sold as a going concern). Those differing commercial interests were rooted in differing legal interests as between the individual creditors and the debtor company, arising from the different security held. Because of the size of its claim, RoyNat would dominate any group that it was in, and Finlayson J.A. was of the view that RoyNat, as the holder of second security, should not be able to override the Bank's legal interest as the first secured creditor with respect to the receivables by virtue of its voting rights. On the basis that there was "no true community of interest" between the secured creditors (p. 259), given their different legal interests, he ordered that the Bank be placed in a separate class for voting purposes.

27 *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* did not deal with the issue of whether creditors with divergent interests as amongst themselves — as opposed to divergent legal interests vis-à-vis the debtor company — could be forced to vote as members of a common class. Nor did it apply an "identity of interest" test — a test that has been rejected as too narrow and too likely to lead to excessive fragmentation: see *Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia*, *supra*,); *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.*, *supra*; *Fairview Industries Ltd., Re*, *supra*; *Woodward's Ltd., Re*, *supra*. In our view, there is nothing in the decision in *Nova Metal Products Inc.* that is inconsistent with the evolutionary set of principles developed in the Alberta jurisprudence and applied by the supervising judge here.

28 In addition to commonality of interest concerns, a court dealing with a classification of creditors issue needs to be alert to concerns about the confiscation of legal rights and about avoiding what the parties have referred to as "a tyranny of the minority". Examples of the former include *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* [4] and *Wellington Building Corp., Re*, *supra* [5]. Examples of the latter include *Sklar-Peppler*, *supra* [6] and *Campeau Corp., Re* (1991), 10 C.B.R. (3d) 100 (Ont. Gen. Div.) [7].

29 Here, as noted earlier in these reasons, the respondents argue that the appellants are seeking a separate classification in order to extract a benefit to which they are not entitled, namely a concession that the Turnover Payment requirements of their subordinated position be extinguished by the Proposed Plan, thus avoiding their obligation to transfer payments to the Senior Debt Holders until they have been paid in full, and freeing up all of the distribution the appellants will receive from Stelco for payment on account of their own claims. On the other hand, the appellants point to this conflict between the Subordinated Debenture Holders and the Senior Debt Holders as evidence that they do not have a commonality of interest or the ability to consult together with a view to whatever commonality of interest they may have vis-à-vis Stelco.

30 We agree with the line of authorities summarized in *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* and applied by the supervising judge in this case which stipulate that the classification of creditors is determined by their legal rights in relation to the debtor company,

as opposed to their rights as creditors in relation to each other. To the extent that other authorities at the trial level in other jurisdictions may suggest to the contrary — see, for example *NsC Diesel Power Inc., Re, supra* — we prefer the Alberta approach.

31 There are good reasons for such an approach.

32 First, as the supervising judge noted, the CCAA itself is more compendiously styled "An act to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors". There is no mention of dealing with issues that would change the nature of the relationships as between the creditors themselves. As Tysoe J. noted in *Pacific Coastal Airlines Ltd. v. Air Canada*, [2001] B.C.J. No. 2580 (B.C. S.C.) at para. 24 (after referring to the full style of the legislation):

> [The purpose of the CCAA proceeding] is not to deal with disputes between a creditor of a company and a third party, even if the company was also involved in the subject matter of the dispute. While issues between the debtor company and non-creditors are sometimes dealt with in CCAA proceedings, it is not a proper use of a CCAA proceeding to determine disputes between parties other than the debtor company.

33 In this particular case, the supervising judge was very careful to say that nothing in his reasons should be taken to determine or affect the relationship between the Subordinate Debenture Holders and the Senior Debt Holders.

34 Secondly, it has long been recognized that creditors should be classified in accordance with their contract rights, that is, according to their respective interests in the debtor company: see Stanley E. Edwards, "Reorganizations Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act" (1947) 25 Can. Bar. Rev. 587, at p. 602.

35 Finally, to hold the classification and voting process hostage to the vagaries of a potentially infinite variety of disputes as between already disgruntled creditors who have been caught in the maelstrom of a CCAA restructuring, runs the risk of hobbling that process unduly. It could lead to the very type of fragmentation and multiplicity of discrete classes or sub-classes of classes that judges and legal writers have warned might well defeat the purpose of the Act: see Stanley Edwards, "Reorganizations under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act", *supra*; Ronald N. Robertson Q.C., "Legal Problems on Reorganization of Major Financial and Commercial Debtors", Canadian Bar Association — Ontario Continuing Legal Education, 5th April 1983 at 19-21; *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd., supra*, at para. 27; *Northland Properties Ltd., Re, supra*; *Sklar-Peppler, supra*; *Woodward's Ltd., Re, supra*.

36 In the end, it is important to remember that classification of creditors, like most other things pertaining to the CCAA, must be crafted with the underlying purpose of the CCAA in mind, namely facilitation of the reorganization of an insolvent company through the negotiation and approval of a plan of compromise or arrangement between the debtor company and its creditors, so that the debtor company can continue to carry on its business to the benefit of all concerned. As Paperny J. noted in *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*, "the Court should be careful to resist classification approaches that would potentially jeopardize viable Plans."

Discretion and Fact Finding

37 Having concluded that the supervising judge made no error in law or principle in his approach to the classification issue, we can find no error in his factual findings or in his exercise of discretion in determining that the Subordinate Debenture Holders should remain in the same class as the Senior Debt Holders and Trade Creditors in the circumstances of this case.

38 We agree that there is no material distinction between the legal rights of the Subordinated Debenture Holders and those of the Senior Debt Holders vis-à-vis Stelco. Each is entitled to be paid the monies owing under their respective debt contracts. The only difference is that the former creditors are subordinated in interest to the latter and have agreed to pay over to the latter any portion of their recovery received until the Senior Debt has been paid in full. As between the two groups of creditors, this merely reflects the very deal the Subordinated Debenture Holders bought into when they purchased their subordinated debentures. For that reason, the supervising judge was also entitled to determine that this was not a case involving any confiscation of legal rights.

39 Finally, the supervising judge's finding that there is no "realistic conflict of interest" between the creditors is supported on the record. Each has the same general interest in relation to Stelco, namely to be paid under their contracts, and to maximize the amount recoverable from the debtor company through the Plan negotiation process. We do not accept the argument that the Senior Debt Holder's efforts will be moderated in some respect because they will be content to make their recovery on the backs of the Subordinated Debenture Holders through the Turnover Payment process. In order to carry the class, the Senior Debt Holders will require the support of the Trade Creditors, whose interest is not affected by the subordination agreement. Thus the Senior Debt Holders will be required to support the maximization approach.

40 We need not deal with whether a realistic and genuine conflict of interest, produced by different legal positions of creditors vis-à-vis each other, could ever warrant separate classes, as we are satisfied that even if it could, this is not such a case.

Disposition

41 Accordingly, we would not interfere with the supervising judge's decision that the appellants had not made out a case for a separate class. The appeal is therefore dismissed.

***Goudge J.A.*:**

I agree.

***Sharpe J.A.*:**

I agree.

Application granted; appeal dismissed.

Footnotes

1 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended.

2 Farley J. uses the term "ConCom debt" to refer to the debt represented by the Converts' Committee (i.e., that of the Subordinated Debenture Holders), and the term "BondCom debt" to refer to that of the Senior Debt Holders.

3 The *Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act*, 1870.

4 A second secured creditor with superior voting power was separated from a first secured creditor for voting purposes, in order prevent the former from utilising its superior voting strength to adversely affect the latter's prior security position.

5 The court refused to allow subsequent mortgagees to vote in the same class as a first mortgagee because in the circumstances the subsequent mortgagees would be able to use their voting power to destroy the priority rights and security of the first mortgagee.

6 Borins J., as he then was, warned against the dangers of "excessive fragmentation" and of creating "a special class simply for the benefit of the opposing creditor, which would give that creditor the potential to exercise an unwarranted degree of power".

7 Montgomery J. declined to grant a separate classification to a minority group of creditors who would use that classification to extract benefits to which it was not otherwise entitled.

TAB 21

1997 CarswellOnt 5959
Ontario Court of Justice (General Division)

T. Eaton Co., Re

1997 CarswellOnt 5959

In the Matter of the Companies Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, C. C-36; and In the Matter of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. C.43; and In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of the T. Eaton Company Limited and all other Companies set out in Schedule A

Re: The T. Eaton Company Limited and all those Companies set out in Schedule A, Applicants

Houlden J.

Heard: September 5, 1997
Judgment: September 15, 1997
Docket: RE7483/97

Counsel: None given.

Subject: Insolvency

***Houlden J.*:**

1 Mr. Arcan submitted that the formula being used in the plan for the claims of real property creditors should be that contained in the amendment to the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (the "B.I.A."). The amendments have been enacted by Parliament but have not yet been proclaimed. Eaton's is agreeable to making the change. Accordingly, the formula used to determine the amount of the claims of the landlords and their distribution under the plan will be based on the formula contained in the amendments to s. 65.2(4)(b) (i) and (ii) of the B.I.A., but the pool of funds available for distribution will remain the same. Mr. Aren's motion will be allowed to the extent necessary to make the foregoing amendment.

2 Mr. Sternberg contended that the adoption of a formula for ranking the claims of creditors was in error and that the claims of the landlords should be based on the damages actually suffered by them. With respect, I do not agree. If this procedure was followed, I do not believe that Eaton's could make a successful plan of restructuring. It would take years to determine the value of claims and the uncertainty would make the plan unworkable.

3 The formula, as amended, is a fair one and permits landlords to be dealt with in a consistent and orderly manner. Accordingly, Mr. Sternberg's motion is dismissed.

4 Mr. Griffin argued that the plan could not bind the Quebec landlords, that Article 4 of the plan was unenforceable against the Quebec landlords, and that a separate class should be created for the Quebec landlords. I do not agree with these submissions. Under my order of February 22, 1997, I authorized the debtor company to abandon leases. Acting under this power, certain Quebec leases have been abandoned. Under the plan, Quebec landlords whose leases have been abandoned are given the right to vote to accept the compromise and if the compromise is accepted by creditors and approved by the court, the Quebec landlords will receive the distribution to which they are entitled under the plan and will receive the same treatment as other creditors whose leases have been abandoned. I do not believe there is any inconsistency between the law of Quebec and the question of the plan under the C.C.A.A. Mr. Griffin's motion is therefore dismissed.

1997 CarswellOnt 5959

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TAB 22

2015 ONSC 303
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Target Canada Co., Re

2015 CarswellOnt 620, 2015 ONSC 303, 22 C.B.R. (6th) 323, 248 A.C.W.S. (3d) 753

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36, as Amended

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Target Canada Co., Target Canada Health Co., Target Canada Mobile GP Co., Target Canada Pharmacy (BC) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (Ontario) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (SK) Corp., and Target Canada Property LLC.

Morawetz R.S.J.

Heard: January 15, 2015
Judgment: January 16, 2015
Docket: CV-15-10832-00CL

Counsel: Tracy Sandler, Jeremy Dacks for Applicants, Target Canada Co., Target Canada Health Co., Target Canada Mobile GP Co., Target Canada Pharmacy (BC) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (Ontario) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (SK) Corp., and Target Canada Property LLC
Jay Swartz for Target Corporation
Alan Mark, Melaney Wagner, Jesse Mighton for Proposed Monitor, Alvarez and Marsal Canada ULC ("Alvarez")
Terry O'Sullivan for Honourable J. Ground, Trustee of the Proposed Employee Trust
Susan Philpott for Proposed Employee Representative Counsel, for Employees of the Applicants

Subject: Insolvency; Property

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Morawetz R.S.J.*:

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Statutes considered:

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s. 2 "insolvent person" — considered

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Generally — referred to

s. 11 — considered

s. 11.02 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

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s. 11.2 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.2(4) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.7(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.51 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 36 — considered

Rules considered:

Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194
Generally — referred to

Words and phrases considered:

insolvent

"Insolvent" is not expressly defined in the [*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (CCAA)]. However, for the purposes of the CCAA, a debtor is insolvent if it meets the definition of an "insolvent person" in section 2 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* . . . or if it is "insolvent" as described in Stelco Inc. (Re), [2004] O.J. No. 1257, [Stelco], leave to appeal refused, [2004] O.J. No. 1903, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 336, where Farley, J. found that "insolvency" includes a corporation "reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within [a] reasonable proximity of time as compared with the time reasonably required to implement a restructuring".

APPLICATION for relief under *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.

***Morawetz R.S.J.*:**

1 Target Canada Co. ("TCC") and the other applicants listed above (the "Applicants") seek relief under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36, as amended (the "CCAA"). While the limited partnerships listed in Schedule "A" to the draft Order (the "Partnerships") are not applicants in this proceeding, the Applicants seek to have a stay of proceedings and other benefits of an initial order under the CCAA extended to the Partnerships, which are related to or carry on operations that are integral to the business of the Applicants.

2 TCC is a large Canadian retailer. It is the Canadian operating subsidiary of Target Corporation, one of the largest retailers in the United States. The other Applicants are either corporations or partners of the Partnerships formed to carry on specific aspects of TCC's Canadian retail business (such as the Canadian pharmacy operations) or finance leasehold improvements in leased Canadian stores operated by TCC. The Applicants, therefore, do not represent the entire Target enterprise; the Applicants consist solely of entities that are integral to the Canadian retail operations. Together, they are referred as the "Target Canada Entities".

3 In early 2011, Target Corporation determined to expand its retail operations into Canada, undertaking a significant investment (in the form of both debt and equity) in TCC and certain of its affiliates in order to permit TCC to establish and operate Canadian retail stores. As of today, TCC operates 133 stores, with at least one store in every province of Canada. All but three of these stores are leased.

4 Due to a number of factors, the expansion into Canada has proven to be substantially less successful than expected. Canadian operations have shown significant losses in every quarter since stores opened. Projections demonstrate little or no prospect of improvement within a reasonable time.

5 After exploring multiple solutions over a number of months and engaging in extensive consultations with its professional advisors, Target Corporation concluded that, in the interest of all of its stakeholders, the responsible course of action is to cease funding the Canadian operations.

6 Without ongoing investment from Target Corporation, TCC and the other Target Canada Entities cannot continue to operate and are clearly insolvent. Due to the magnitude and complexity of the operations of the Target Canada Entities, the

Applicants are seeking a stay of proceedings under the CCAA in order to accomplish a fair, orderly and controlled wind-down of their operations. The Target Canada Entities have indicated that they intend to treat all of their stakeholders as fairly and equitably as the circumstances allow, particularly the approximately 17,600 employees of the Target Canada Entities.

7 The Applicants are of the view that an orderly wind-down under Court supervision, with the benefit of inherent jurisdiction of the CCAA, and the oversight of the proposed monitor, provides a framework in which the Target Canada Entities can, among other things:

> a) Pursue initiatives such as the sale of real estate portfolios and the sale of inventory;
>
> b) Develop and implement support mechanisms for employees as vulnerable stakeholders affected by the wind-down, particularly (i) an employee trust (the "Employee Trust") funded by Target Corporation; (ii) an employee representative counsel to safeguard employee interests; and (iii) a key employee retention plan (the "KERP") to provide essential employees who agree to continue their employment and to contribute their services and expertise to the Target Canada Entities during the orderly wind-down;
>
> c) Create a level playing field to ensure that all affected stakeholders are treated as fairly and equitably as the circumstances allow; and
>
> d) Avoid the significant maneuvering among creditors and other stakeholders that could be detrimental to all stakeholders, in the absence of a court-supervised proceeding.

8 The Applicants are of the view that these factors are entirely consistent with the well-established purpose of a CCAA stay: to give a debtor the "breathing room" required to restructure with a view to maximizing recoveries, whether the restructuring takes place as a going concern or as an orderly liquidation or wind-down.

9 TCC is an indirect, wholly-owned subsidiary of Target Corporation and is the operating company through which the Canadian retail operations are carried out. TCC is a Nova Scotia unlimited liability company. It is directly owned by Nicollet Enterprise 1 S. à r.l. ("NE1"), an entity organized under the laws of Luxembourg. Target Corporation (which is incorporated under the laws of the State of Minnesota) owns NE1 through several other entities.

10 TCC operates from a corporate headquarters in Mississauga, Ontario. As of January 12, 2015, TCC employed approximately 17,600 people, almost all of whom work in Canada. TCC's employees are not represented by a union, and there is no registered pension plan for employees.

11 The other Target Canada Entities are all either: (i) direct or indirect subsidiaries of TCC with responsibilities for specific aspects of the Canadian retail operation; or (ii) affiliates of TCC that have been involved in the financing of certain leasehold improvements.

12 A typical TCC store has a footprint in the range of 80,000 to 125,000 total retail square feet and is located in a shopping mall or large strip mall. TCC is usually the anchor tenant. Each TCC store typically contains an in-store Target brand pharmacy, Target Mobile kiosk and a Starbucks café. Each store typically employs approximately 100 - 150 people, described as "Team Members" and "Team Leaders", with a total of approximately 16,700 employed at the "store level" of TCC's retail operations.

13 TCC owns three distribution centres (two in Ontario and one in Alberta) to support its retail operations. These centres are operated by a third party service provider. TCC also leases a variety of warehouse and office spaces.

14 In every quarter since TCC opened its first store, TCC has faced lower than expected sales and greater than expected losses. As reported in Target Corporation's Consolidated Financial Statements, the Canadian segment of the Target business has suffered a significant loss in every quarter since TCC opened stores in Canada.

15 TCC is completely operationally funded by its ultimate parent, Target Corporation, and related entities. It is projected that TCC's cumulative pre-tax losses from the date of its entry into the Canadian market to the end of the 2014 fiscal year (ending

January 31, 2015) will be more than $2.5 billion. In his affidavit, Mr. Mark Wong, General Counsel and Secretary of TCC, states that this is more than triple the loss originally expected for this period. Further, if TCC's operations are not wound down, it is projected that they would remain unprofitable for at least 5 years and would require significant and continued funding from Target Corporation during that period.

16 TCC attributes its failure to achieve expected profitability to a number of principal factors, including: issues of scale; supply chain difficulties; pricing and product mix issues; and the absence of a Canadian online retail presence.

17 Following a detailed review of TCC's operations, the Board of Directors of Target Corporation decided that it is in the best interests of the business of Target Corporation and its subsidiaries to discontinue Canadian operations.

18 Based on the stand-alone financial statements prepared for TCC as of November 1, 2014 (which consolidated financial results of TCC and its subsidiaries), TCC had total assets of approximately $5.408 billion and total liabilities of approximately $5.118 billion. Mr. Wong states that this does not reflect a significant impairment charge that will likely be incurred at fiscal year end due to TCC's financial situation.

19 Mr. Wong states that TCC's operational funding is provided by Target Corporation. As of November 1, 2014, NE1 (TCC's direct parent) had provided equity capital to TCC in the amount of approximately $2.5 billon. As a result of continuing and significant losses in TCC's operations, NE1 has been required to make an additional equity investment of $62 million since November 1, 2014.

20 NE1 has also lent funds to TCC under a Loan Facility with a maximum amount of $4 billion. TCC owed NE1 approximately $3.1 billion under this Facility as of January 2, 2015. The Loan Facility is unsecured. On January 14, 2015, NE1 agreed to subordinate all amounts owing by TCC to NE1 under this Loan Facility to payment in full of proven claims against TCC.

21 As at November 1, 2014, Target Canada Property LLC ("TCC Propco") had assets of approximately $1.632 billion and total liabilities of approximately $1.643 billion. Mr. Wong states that this does not reflect a significant impairment charge that will likely be incurred at fiscal year end due to TCC Propco's financial situation. TCC Propco has also borrowed approximately $1.5 billion from Target Canada Property LP and TCC Propco also owes U.S. $89 million to Target Corporation under a Demand Promissory Note.

22 TCC has subleased almost all the retail store leases to TCC Propco, which then made real estate improvements and sub-sub leased the properties back to TCC. Under this arrangement, upon termination of any of these sub-leases, a "make whole" payment becomes owing from TCC to TCC Propco.

23 Mr. Wong states that without further funding and financial support from Target Corporation, the Target Canada Entities are unable to meet their liabilities as they become due, including TCC's next payroll (due January 16, 2015). The Target Canada Entities, therefore state that they are insolvent.

24 Mr. Wong also states that given the size and complexity of TCC's operations and the numerous stakeholders involved in the business, including employees, suppliers, landlords, franchisees and others, the Target Canada Entities have determined that a controlled wind-down of their operations and liquidation under the protection of the CCAA, under Court supervision and with the assistance of the proposed monitor, is the only practical method available to ensure a fair and orderly process for all stakeholders. Further, Mr. Wong states that TCC and Target Corporation seek to benefit from the framework and the flexibility provided by the CCAA in effecting a controlled and orderly wind-down of the Canadian operations, in a manner that treats stakeholders as fairly and as equitably as the circumstances allow.

25 On this initial hearing, the issues are as follows:

a) Does this court have jurisdiction to grant the CCAA relief requested?

a) Should the stay be extended to the Partnerships?

b) Should the stay be extended to "Co-tenants" and rights of third party tenants?

c) Should the stay extend to Target Corporation and its U.S. subsidiaries in relation to claims that are derivative of claims against the Target Canada Entities?

d) Should the Court approve protections for employees?

e) Is it appropriate to allow payment of certain pre-filing amounts?

f) Does this court have the jurisdiction to authorize pre-filing claims to "critical" suppliers;

g) Should the court should exercise its discretion to authorize the Applicants to seek proposals from liquidators and approve the financial advisor and real estate advisor engagement?

h) Should the court exercise its discretion to approve the Court-ordered charges?

26 "Insolvent" is not expressly defined in the CCAA. However, for the purposes of the CCAA, a debtor is insolvent if it meets the definition of an "insolvent person" in section 2 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C., 1985, c. B-3 ("BIA") or if it is "insolvent" as described in *Stelco Inc., Re*, [2004] O.J. No. 1257 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), [*Stelco*], leave to appeal refused, [2004] O.J. No. 1903 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 336 (S.C.C.), where Farley, J. found that "insolvency" includes a corporation "reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within [a] reasonable proximity of time as compared with the time reasonably required to implement a restructuring" (at para 26). The decision of Farley, J. in *Stelco* was followed in *Priszm Income Fund, Re*, [2011] O.J. No. 1491 (Ont. S.C.J.), 2011 and *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*, [2009] O.J. No. 4286 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) [*Canwest*].

27 Having reviewed the record and hearing submissions, I am satisfied that the Target Canada Entities are all insolvent and are debtor companies to which the CCAA applies, either by reference to the definition of "insolvent person" under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (the "BIA") or under the test developed by Farley J. in *Stelco*.

28 I also accept the submission of counsel to the Applicants that without the continued financial support of Target Corporation, the Target Canada Entities face too many legal and business impediments and too much uncertainty to wind-down their operations without the "breathing space" afforded by a stay of proceedings or other available relief under the CCAA.

29 I am also satisfied that this Court has jurisdiction over the proceeding. Section 9(1) of the CCAA provides that an application may be made to the court that has jurisdiction in (a) the province in which the head office or chief place of business of the company in Canada is situated; or (b) any province in which the company's assets are situated, if there is no place of business in Canada.

30 In this case, the head office and corporate headquarters of TCC is located in Mississauga, Ontario, where approximately 800 employees work. Moreover, the chief place of business of the Target Canada Entities is Ontario. A number of office locations are in Ontario; 2 of TCC's 3 primary distribution centres are located in Ontario; 55 of the TCC retail stores operate in Ontario; and almost half the employees that support TCC's operations work in Ontario.

31 The Target Canada Entities state that the purpose for seeking the proposed initial order in these proceedings is to effect a fair, controlled and orderly wind-down of their Canadian retail business with a view to developing a plan of compromise or arrangement to present to their creditors as part of these proceedings. I accept the submissions of counsel to the Applicants that although there is no prospect that a restructured "going concern" solution involving the Target Canada Entities will result, the use of the protections and flexibility afforded by the CCAA is entirely appropriate in these circumstances. In arriving at this conclusion, I have noted the comments of the Supreme Court of Canada in *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re*, 2010 SCC 60 (S.C.C.) ("*Century Services*") that "courts frequently observe that the CCAA is skeletal in nature", and does not "contain a comprehensive code that lays out all that is permitted or barred". The flexibility of the CCAA, particularly in the context of large and complex restructurings, allows for innovation and creativity, in contrast to the more "rules-based" approach of the BIA.

32 Prior to the 2009 amendments to the CCAA, Canadian courts accepted that, in appropriate circumstances, debtor companies were entitled to seek the protection of the CCAA where the outcome was not going to be a going concern restructuring, but instead, a "liquidation" or wind-down of the debtor companies' assets or business.

33 The 2009 amendments did not expressly address whether the CCAA could be used generally to wind-down the business of a debtor company. However, I am satisfied that the enactment of section 36 of the CCAA, which establishes a process for a debtor company to sell assets outside the ordinary course of business while under CCAA protection, is consistent with the principle that the CCAA can be a vehicle to downsize or wind-down a debtor company's business.

34 In this case, the sheer magnitude and complexity of the Target Canada Entities business, including the number of stakeholders whose interests are affected, are, in my view, suited to the flexible framework and scope for innovation offered by this "skeletal" legislation.

35 The required audited financial statements are contained in the record.

36 The required cash flow statements are contained in the record.

37 Pursuant to s. 11.02 of the CCAA, the court may make an order staying proceedings, restraining further proceedings, or prohibiting the commencement of proceedings, "on any terms that it may impose" and "effective for the period that the court considers necessary" provided the stay is no longer than 30 days. The Target Canada Entities, in this case, seek a stay of proceedings up to and including February 13, 2015.

38 Certain of the corporate Target Canada Entities (TCC, TCC Health and TCC Mobile) act as general or limited partners in the partnerships. The Applicants submit that it is appropriate to extend the stay of proceedings to the Partnerships on the basis that each performs key functions in relation to the Target Canada Entities' businesses.

39 The Applicants also seek to extend the stay to Target Canada Property LP which was formerly the sub-leasee/sub-sub lessor under the sub-sub lease back arrangement entered into by TCC to finance the leasehold improvements in its leased stores. The Applicants contend that the extension of the stay to Target Canada Property LP is necessary in order to safeguard it against any residual claims that may be asserted against it as a result of TCC Propco's insolvency and filing under the CCAA.

40 I am satisfied that it is appropriate that an initial order extending the protection of a CCAA stay of proceedings under section 11.02(1) of the CCAA should be granted.

41 Pursuant to section 11.7(1) of the CCAA, Alvarez & Marsal Inc. is appointed as Monitor.

42 It is well established that the court has the jurisdiction to extend the protection of the stay of proceedings to Partnerships in order to ensure that the purposes of the CCAA can be achieved (see: *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); *Priszm Income Fund, Re*, 2011 ONSC 2061 (Ont. S.C.J.); *Canwest Publishing Inc./ Publications Canwest Inc., Re*, 2010 ONSC 222 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) ("*Canwest Publishing*") and *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*, 2009 CarswellOnt 6184 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) ("*Canwest Global*").

43 In these circumstances, I am also satisfied that it is appropriate to extend the stay to the Partnerships as requested.

44 The Applicants also seek landlord protection in relation to third party tenants. Many retail leases of non-anchored tenants provide that tenants have certain rights against their landlords if the anchor tenant in a particular shopping mall or centre becomes insolvent or ceases operations. In order to alleviate the prejudice to TCC's landlords if any such non-anchored tenants attempt to exercise these rights, the Applicants request an extension of the stay of proceedings (the "Co-Tenancy Stay") to all rights of these third party tenants against the landlords that arise out of the insolvency of the Target Canada Entities or as a result of any steps taken by the Target Canada Entities pursuant to the Initial Order.

45 The Applicants contend that the authority to grant the Co-Tenancy Stay derives from the broad jurisdiction under sections 11 and 11.02(1) of the CCAA to make an initial order on any terms that the court may impose. Counsel references *T. Eaton Co., Re*, 1997 CarswellOnt 1914 (Ont. Gen. Div.) as a precedent where a stay of proceedings of the same nature as the Co-Tenancy Stay was granted by the court in Eaton's second CCAA proceeding. The Court noted that, if tenants were permitted to exercise these "co-tenancy" rights during the stay, the claims of the landlord against the debtor company would greatly increase, with a potentially detrimental impact on the restructuring efforts of the debtor company.

46 In these proceedings, the Target Canada Entities propose, as part of the orderly wind-down of their businesses, to engage a financial advisor and a real estate advisor with a view to implementing a sales process for some or all of its real estate portfolio. The Applicants submit that it is premature to determine whether this process will be successful, whether any leases will be conveyed to third party purchasers for value and whether the Target Canada Entities can successfully develop and implement a plan that their stakeholders, including their landlords, will accept. The Applicants further contend that while this process is being resolved and the orderly wind-down is underway, the Co-Tenancy Stay is required to postpone the contractual rights of these tenants for a finite period. The Applicants contend that any prejudice to the third party tenants' clients is significantly outweighed by the benefits of the Co-Tenancy Stay to all of the stakeholders of the Target Canada Entities during the wind-down period.

47 The Applicants therefore submit that it is both necessary and appropriate to grant the Co-Tenancy Stay in these circumstances.

48 I am satisfied the Court has the jurisdiction to grant such a stay. In my view, it is appropriate to preserve the status quo at this time. To the extent that the affected parties wish to challenge the broad nature of this stay, the same can be addressed at the "comeback hearing".

49 The Applicants also request that the benefit of the stay of proceedings be extended (subject to certain exceptions related to the cash management system) to Target Corporation and its U.S. subsidiaries in relation to claims against these entities that are derivative of the primary liability of the Target Canada Entities.

50 I am satisfied that the Court has the jurisdiction to grant such a stay. In my view, it is appropriate to preserve the status quo at this time and the stay is granted, again, subject to the proviso that affected parties can challenge the broad nature of the stay at a comeback hearing directed to this issue.

51 With respect to the protection of employees, it is noted that TCC employs approximately 17,600 individuals.

52 Mr. Wong contends that TCC and Target Corporation have always considered their employees to be integral to the Target brand and business. However, the orderly wind-down of the Target Canada Entities' business means that the vast majority of TCC employees will receive a notice immediately after the CCAA filing that their employment is to be terminated as part of the wind-down process.

53 In order to provide a measure of financial security during the orderly wind-down and to diminish financial hardship that TCC employees may suffer, Target Corporation has agreed to fund an Employee Trust to a maximum of $70 million.

54 The Applicants seek court approval of the Employee Trust which provides for payment to eligible employees of certain amounts, such as the balance of working notice following termination. Counsel contends that the Employee Trust was developed in consultation with the proposed monitor, who is the administrator of the trust, and is supported by the proposed Representative Counsel. The proposed trustee is The Honourable J. Ground. The Employee Trust is exclusively funded by Target Corporation and the costs associated with administering the Employee Trust will be borne by the Employee Trust, not the estate of Target Canada Entities. Target Corporation has agreed not to seek to recover from the Target Canada Entities estates any amounts paid out to employee beneficiaries under the Employee Trust.

55 In my view, it is questionable as to whether court authorization is required to implement the provisions of the Employee Trust. It is the third party, Target Corporation, that is funding the expenses for the Employee Trust and not one of the debtor Applicants. However, I do recognize that the implementation of the Employee Trust is intertwined with this proceeding and is beneficial to the employees of the Applicants. To the extent that Target Corporation requires a court order authorizing the implementation of the employee trust, the same is granted.

56 The Applicants seek the approval of a KERP and the granting of a court ordered charge up to the aggregate amount of $6.5 million as security for payments under the KERP. It is proposed that the KERP Charge will rank after the Administration Charge but before the Directors' Charge.

57 The approval of a KERP and related KERP Charge is in the discretion of the Court. KERPs have been approved in numerous CCAA proceedings, including *Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, 2009 CarswellOnt 1330 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) [*Nortel Networks (KERP)]*, and *Grant Forest Products Inc., Re*, 2009 CarswellOnt 4699 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]). In *U.S. Steel Canada Inc., Re*, 2014 ONSC 6145 (Ont. S.C.J.), I recently approved the KERP for employees whose continued services were critical to the stability of the business and for the implementation of the marketing process and whose services could not easily be replaced due, in part, to the significant integration between the debtor company and its U.S. parent.

58 In this case, the KERP was developed by the Target Canada Entities in consultation with the proposed monitor. The proposed KERP and KERP Charge benefits between 21 and 26 key management employees and approximately 520 store-level management employees.

59 Having reviewed the record, I am of the view that it is appropriate to approve the KERP and the KERP Charge. In arriving at this conclusion, I have taken into account the submissions of counsel to the Applicants as to the importance of having stability among the key employees in the liquidation process that lies ahead.

60 The Applicants also request the Court to appoint Koskie Minsky LLP as employee representative counsel (the "Employee Representative Counsel"), with Ms. Susan Philpott acting as senior counsel. The Applicants contend that the Employee Representative Counsel will ensure that employee interests are adequately protected throughout the proceeding, including by assisting with the Employee Trust. The Applicants contend that at this stage of the proceeding, the employees have a common interest in the CCAA proceedings and there appears to be no material conflict existing between individual or groups of employees. Moreover, employees will be entitled to opt out, if desired.

61 I am satisfied that section 11 of the CCAA and the *Rules of Civil Procedure* confer broad jurisdiction on the court to appoint Representative Counsel for vulnerable stakeholder groups such as employee or investors (see *Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, 2009 CarswellOnt 3028 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) (Nortel Networks Representative Counsel)). In my view, it is appropriate to approve the appointment of Employee Representative Counsel and to provide for the payment of fees for such counsel by the Applicants. In arriving at this conclusion, I have taken into account:

(i) the vulnerability and resources of the groups sought to be represented;

(ii) the social benefit to be derived from the representation of the groups;

(iii) the avoidance of multiplicity of legal retainers; and

(iv) the balance of convenience and whether it is fair and just to creditors of the estate.

62 The Applicants also seek authorization, if necessary, and with the consent of the Monitor, to make payments for pre-filing amounts owing and arrears to certain critical third parties that provide services integral to TCC's ability to operate during and implement its controlled and orderly wind-down process.

63 Although the objective of the CCAA is to maintain the status quo while an insolvent company attempts to negotiate a plan of arrangement with its creditors, the courts have expressly acknowledged that preservation of the status quo does not necessarily entail the preservation of the relative pre-stay debt status of each creditor.

64 The Target Canada Entities seek authorization to pay pre-filing amounts to certain specific categories of suppliers, if necessary and with the consent of the Monitor. These include:

> a) Logistics and supply chain providers;
>
> b) Providers of credit, debt and gift card processing related services; and
>
> c) Other suppliers up to a maximum aggregate amount of $10 million, if, in the opinion of the Target Canada Entities, the supplier is critical to the orderly wind-down of the business.

65 In my view, having reviewed the record, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant this requested relief in respect of critical suppliers.

66 In order to maximize recovery for all stakeholders, TCC indicates that it intends to liquidate its inventory and attempt to sell the real estate portfolio, either en bloc, in groups, or on an individual property basis. The Applicants therefore seek authorization to solicit proposals from liquidators with a view to entering into an agreement for the liquidation of the Target Canada Entities inventory in a liquidation process.

67 TCC's liquidity position continues to deteriorate. According to Mr. Wong, TCC and its subsidiaries have an immediate need for funding in order to satisfy obligations that are coming due, including payroll obligations that are due on January 16, 2015. Mr. Wong states that Target Corporation and its subsidiaries are no longer willing to provide continued funding to TCC and its subsidiaries outside of a CCAA proceeding. Target Corporation (the "DIP Lender") has agreed to provide TCC and its subsidiaries (collectively, the "Borrower") with an interim financing facility (the "DIP Facility") on terms advantageous to the Applicants in the form of a revolving credit facility in an amount up to U.S. $175 million. Counsel points out that no fees are payable under the DIP Facility and interest is to be charged at what they consider to be the favourable rate of 5%. Mr. Wong also states that it is anticipated that the amount of the DIP Facility will be sufficient to accommodate the anticipated liquidity requirements of the Borrower during the orderly wind-down process.

68 The DIP Facility is to be secured by a security interest on all of the real and personal property owned, leased or hereafter acquired by the Borrower. The Applicants request a court-ordered charge on the property of the Borrower to secure the amount actually borrowed under the DIP Facility (the "DIP Lenders Charge"). The DIP Lenders Charge will rank in priority to all unsecured claims, but subordinate to the Administration Charge, the KERP Charge and the Directors' Charge.

69 The authority to grant an interim financing charge is set out at section 11.2 of the CCAA. Section 11.2(4) sets out certain factors to be considered by the court in deciding whether to grant the DIP Financing Charge.

70 The Target Canada Entities did not seek alternative DIP Financing proposals based on their belief that the DIP Facility was being offered on more favourable terms than any other potentially available third party financing. The Target Canada Entities are of the view that the DIP Facility is in the best interests of the Target Canada Entities and their stakeholders. I accept this submission and grant the relief as requested.

71 Accordingly, the DIP Lenders' Charge is granted in the amount up to U.S. $175 million and the DIP Facility is approved.

72 Section 11 of the CCAA provides the court with the authority to allow the debtor company to enter into arrangements to facilitate a restructuring under the CCAA. The Target Canada Entities wish to retain Lazard and Northwest to assist them during the CCCA proceeding. Both the Target Canada Entities and the Monitor believe that the quantum and nature of the remuneration to be paid to Lazard and Northwest is fair and reasonable. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to approve the engagement of Lazard and Northwest.

73 With respect to the Administration Charge, the Applicants are requesting that the Monitor, along with its counsel, counsel to the Target Canada Entities, independent counsel to the Directors, the Employee Representative Counsel, Lazard and Northwest be protected by a court ordered charge and all the property of the Target Canada Entities up to a maximum amount of $6.75 million as security for their respective fees and disbursements (the "Administration Charge"). Certain fees that may be payable to Lazard are proposed to be protected by a Financial Advisor Subordinated Charge.

74 In *Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re*, 2010 ONSC 222 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), Pepall J. (as she then was) provided a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered in approving an administration charge, including:

a. The size and complexity of the business being restructured;

b. The proposed role of the beneficiaries of the charge;

c. Whether there is an unwarranted duplication of roles;

d. Whether the quantum of the proposed Charge appears to be fair and reasonable;

e. The position of the secured creditors likely to be affected by the Charge; and

f. The position of the Monitor.

75 Having reviewed the record, I am satisfied, that it is appropriate to approve the Administration Charge and the Financial Advisor Subordinated Charge.

76 The Applicants seek a Directors' and Officers' charge in the amount of up to $64 million. The Directors Charge is proposed to be secured by the property of the Target Canada Entities and to rank behind the Administration Charge and the KERP Charge, but ahead of the DIP Lenders' Charge.

77 Pursuant to section 11.51 of the CCAA, the court has specific authority to grant a "super priority" charge to the directors and officers of a company as security for the indemnity provided by the company in respect of certain obligations.

78 I accept the submissions of counsel to the Applicants that the requested Directors' Charge is reasonable given the nature of the Target Canada Entities retail business, the number of employees in Canada and the corresponding potential exposure of the directors and officers to personal liability. Accordingly, the Directors' Charge is granted.

79 In the result, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant the Initial Order in these proceedings.

80 The stay of proceedings is in effect until February 13, 2015.

81 A comeback hearing is to be scheduled on or prior to February 13, 2015. I recognize that there are many aspects of the Initial Order that go beyond the usual first day provisions. I have determined that it is appropriate to grant this broad relief at this time so as to ensure that the status quo is maintained.

82 The comeback hearing is to be a "true" comeback hearing. In moving to set aside or vary any provisions of this order, moving parties do not have to overcome any onus of demonstrating that the order should be set aside or varied.

83 Finally, a copy of Lazard's engagement letter (the "Lazard Engagement Letter") is attached as Confidential Appendix "A" to the Monitor's pre-filing report. The Applicants request that the Lazard Engagement Letter be sealed, as the fee structure contemplated in the Lazard Engagement Letter could potentially influence the structure of bids received in the sales process.

84 Having considered the principles set out in *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)* (2002), 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.), I am satisfied that it is appropriate in the circumstances to seal Confidential Appendix "A" to the Monitor's pre-filing report.

85 The Initial Order has been signed in the form presented.

Application granted.

End of Document

TAB 23

2010 SCC 60
Supreme Court of Canada

Ted Leroy Trucking [Century Services] Ltd., Re

2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 CarswellBC 3420, 2010 SCC 60, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 533, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 534, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 196 A.C.W.S. (3d) 27, 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 409 N.R. 201, 503 W.A.C. 1, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, J.E. 2011-5

Century Services Inc. (Appellant) and Attorney General of Canada on behalf of Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Canada (Respondent)

Deschamps J., McLachlin C.J.C., Binnie, LeBel, Fish, Abella, Charron, Rothstein, Cromwell JJ.

Heard: May 11, 2010
Judgment: December 16, 2010
Docket: 33239

Proceedings: reversing *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re* (2009), 2009 CarswellBC 1195, 2009 G.T.C. 2020 (Eng.), 2009 BCCA 205, 270 B.C.A.C. 167, 454 W.A.C. 167, [2009] 12 W.W.R. 684, 98 B.C.L.R. (4th) 242, [2009] G.S.T.C. 79 (B.C. C.A.); reversing *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re* (2008), 2008 CarswellBC 2895, 2008 BCSC 1805, [2008] G.S.T.C. 221, 2009 G.T.C. 2011 (Eng.) (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers])

Counsel: Mary I.A. Buttery, Owen J. James, Matthew J.G. Curtis for Appellant
Gordon Bourgard, David Jacyk, Michael J. Lema for Respondent

Subject: Estates and Trusts; Goods and Services Tax (GST); Tax — Miscellaneous; Insolvency

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s. 11(3) — referred to

s. 11(4) — referred to

s. 11(6) — referred to

s. 11.02 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — referred to

s. 11.09 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.4 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — referred to

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s. 222(1) [en. 1990, c. 45, s. 12(1)] — considered

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s. 11 — considered

s. 11(1) — considered

s. 11(3) — considered

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Generally — referred to

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APPEAL by creditor from judgment reported at 2009 CarswellBC 1195, 2009 BCCA 205, [2009] G.S.T.C. 79, 98 B.C.L.R. (4th) 242, [2009] 12 W.W.R. 684, 270 B.C.A.C. 167, 454 W.A.C. 167, 2009 G.T.C. 2020 (Eng.) (B.C. C.A.), allowing Crown's appeal from dismissal of application for immediate payment of tax debt.

***Deschamps J.*:**

1 For the first time this Court is called upon to directly interpret the provisions of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("*CCAA*"). In that respect, two questions are raised. The first requires reconciliation of provisions of the *CCAA* and the *Excise Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 ("*ETA*"), which lower courts have held to be in conflict with one another. The second concerns the scope of a court's discretion when supervising reorganization. The relevant statutory provisions are reproduced in the Appendix. On the first question, having considered the evolution of Crown priorities in the context of insolvency and the wording of the various statutes creating Crown priorities, I conclude that it is the *CCAA* and not the *ETA* that provides the rule. On the second question, I conclude that the broad discretionary jurisdiction conferred on the supervising judge must be interpreted having regard to the remedial nature of the *CCAA* and insolvency legislation generally. Consequently, the court had the discretion to partially lift a stay of proceedings to allow the debtor to make an assignment under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 ("*BIA*"). I would allow the appeal.

1. Facts and Decisions of the Courts Below

2 Ted LeRoy Trucking Ltd. ("LeRoy Trucking") commenced proceedings under the *CCAA* in the Supreme Court of British Columbia on December 13, 2007, obtaining a stay of proceedings with a view to reorganizing its financial affairs. LeRoy Trucking sold certain redundant assets as authorized by the order.

3 Amongst the debts owed by LeRoy Trucking was an amount for Goods and Services Tax ("GST") collected but unremitted to the Crown. The *ETA* creates a deemed trust in favour of the Crown for amounts collected in respect of GST. The deemed trust extends to any property or proceeds held by the person collecting GST and any property of that person held by a secured creditor, requiring that property to be paid to the Crown in priority to all security interests. The *ETA* provides that the deemed trust operates despite any other enactment of Canada except the *BIA*. However, the *CCAA* also provides that subject to certain exceptions, none of which mentions GST, deemed trusts in favour of the Crown do not operate under the *CCAA*. Accordingly, under the *CCAA* the Crown ranks as an unsecured creditor in respect of GST. Nonetheless, at the time LeRoy Trucking commenced *CCAA* proceedings the leading line of jurisprudence held that the *ETA* took precedence over the *CCAA* such that the Crown enjoyed priority for GST claims under the *CCAA*, even though it would have lost that same priority under the *BIA*. The *CCAA* underwent substantial amendments in 2005 in which some of the provisions at issue in this appeal were renumbered and reformulated (S.C. 2005, c. 47). However, these amendments only came into force on September 18, 2009. I will refer to the amended provisions only where relevant.

4 On April 29, 2008, Brenner C.J.S.C., in the context of the *CCAA* proceedings, approved a payment not exceeding $5 million, the proceeds of redundant asset sales, to Century Services, the debtor's major secured creditor. LeRoy Trucking proposed to hold back an amount equal to the GST monies collected but unremitted to the Crown and place it in the Monitor's trust account until the outcome of the reorganization was known. In order to maintain the *status quo* while the success of the reorganization was uncertain, Brenner C.J.S.C. agreed to the proposal and ordered that an amount of $305,202.30 be held by the Monitor in its trust account.

5 On September 3, 2008, having concluded that reorganization was not possible, LeRoy Trucking sought leave to make an assignment in bankruptcy under the *BIA*. The Crown sought an order that the GST monies held by the Monitor be paid to the Receiver General of Canada. Brenner C.J.S.C. dismissed the latter application. Reasoning that the purpose of segregating the funds with the Monitor was "to facilitate an ultimate payment of the GST monies which were owed pre-filing, but only if a viable plan emerged", the failure of such a reorganization, followed by an assignment in bankruptcy, meant the Crown would lose priority under the *BIA* (2008 BCSC 1805, [2008] G.S.T.C. 221 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers])).

6 The Crown's appeal was allowed by the British Columbia Court of Appeal (2009 BCCA 205, [2009] G.S.T.C. 79, 270 B.C.A.C. 167 (B.C. C.A.)). Tysoe J.A. for a unanimous court found two independent bases for allowing the Crown's appeal.

7 First, the court's authority under s. 11 of the *CCAA* was held not to extend to staying the Crown's application for immediate payment of the GST funds subject to the deemed trust after it was clear that reorganization efforts had failed and that bankruptcy was inevitable. As restructuring was no longer a possibility, staying the Crown's claim to the GST funds no longer served a purpose under the *CCAA* and the court was bound under the priority scheme provided by the *ETA* to allow payment to the Crown. In so holding, Tysoe J.A. adopted the reasoning in *Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp. (Re)*, [2005] G.S.T.C. 1, 73 O.R. (3d) 737 (Ont. C.A.), which found that the *ETA* deemed trust for GST established Crown priority over secured creditors under the *CCAA*.

8 Second, Tysoe J.A. concluded that by ordering the GST funds segregated in the Monitor's trust account on April 29, 2008, the judge had created an express trust in favour of the Crown from which the monies in question could not be diverted for any other purposes. The Court of Appeal therefore ordered that the money held by the Monitor in trust be paid to the Receiver General.

2. Issues

9 This appeal raises three broad issues which are addressed in turn:

(1) Did s. 222(3) of the *ETA* displace s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* and give priority to the Crown's *ETA* deemed trust during *CCAA* proceedings as held in *Ottawa Senators*?

(2) Did the court exceed its *CCAA* authority by lifting the stay to allow the debtor to make an assignment in bankruptcy?

(3) Did the court's order of April 29, 2008 requiring segregation of the Crown's GST claim in the Monitor's trust account create an express trust in favour of the Crown in respect of those funds?

3. Analysis

10 The first issue concerns Crown priorities in the context of insolvency. As will be seen, the *ETA* provides for a deemed trust in favour of the Crown in respect of GST owed by a debtor "[d]espite ... any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*)" (s. 222(3)), while the *CCAA* stated at the relevant time that "notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be [so] regarded" (s. 18.3(1)). It is difficult to imagine two statutory provisions more apparently in conflict. However, as is often the case, the apparent conflict can be resolved through interpretation.

11 In order to properly interpret the provisions, it is necessary to examine the history of the *CCAA*, its function amidst the body of insolvency legislation enacted by Parliament, and the principles that have been recognized in the jurisprudence. It will be seen that Crown priorities in the insolvency context have been significantly pared down. The resolution of the second issue is also rooted in the context of the *CCAA*, but its purpose and the manner in which it has been interpreted in the case law are also key. After examining the first two issues in this case, I will address Tysoe J.A.'s conclusion that an express trust in favour of the Crown was created by the court's order of April 29, 2008.

3.1 Purpose and Scope of Insolvency Law

12 Insolvency is the factual situation that arises when a debtor is unable to pay creditors (see generally, R. J. Wood, *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law* (2009), at p. 16). Certain legal proceedings become available upon insolvency, which typically allow a debtor to obtain a court order staying its creditors' enforcement actions and attempt to obtain a binding compromise with creditors to adjust the payment conditions to something more realistic. Alternatively, the debtor's assets may be liquidated and debts paid from the proceeds according to statutory priority rules. The former is usually referred to as reorganization or restructuring while the latter is termed liquidation.

13 Canadian commercial insolvency law is not codified in one exhaustive statute. Instead, Parliament has enacted multiple insolvency statutes, the main one being the *BIA.* The *BIA* offers a self-contained legal regime providing for both reorganization and liquidation. Although bankruptcy legislation has a long history, the *BIA* itself is a fairly recent statute — it was enacted in 1992. It is characterized by a rules-based approach to proceedings. The *BIA* is available to insolvent debtors owing $1000 or more, regardless of whether they are natural or legal persons. It contains mechanisms for debtors to make proposals to their creditors for the adjustment of debts. If a proposal fails, the *BIA* contains a bridge to bankruptcy whereby the debtor's assets are liquidated and the proceeds paid to creditors in accordance with the statutory scheme of distribution.

14 Access to the *CCAA* is more restrictive. A debtor must be a company with liabilities in excess of $5 million. Unlike the *BIA*, the *CCAA* contains no provisions for liquidation of a debtor's assets if reorganization fails. There are three ways of exiting *CCAA* proceedings. The best outcome is achieved when the stay of proceedings provides the debtor with some breathing space during which solvency is restored and the *CCAA* process terminates without reorganization being needed. The second most desirable outcome occurs when the debtor's compromise or arrangement is accepted by its creditors and the reorganized company emerges from the *CCAA* proceedings as a going concern. Lastly, if the compromise or arrangement fails, either the company or its creditors usually seek to have the debtor's assets liquidated under the applicable provisions of the *BIA* or to place the debtor into receivership. As discussed in greater detail below, the key difference between the reorganization regimes under the *BIA* and the *CCAA* is that the latter offers a more flexible mechanism with greater judicial discretion, making it more responsive to complex reorganizations.

15 As I will discuss at greater length below, the purpose of the *CCAA* — Canada's first reorganization statute — is to permit the debtor to continue to carry on business and, where possible, avoid the social and economic costs of liquidating its assets. Proposals to creditors under the *BIA* serve the same remedial purpose, though this is achieved through a rules-based mechanism that offers less flexibility. Where reorganization is impossible, the *BIA* may be employed to provide an orderly mechanism for the distribution of a debtor's assets to satisfy creditor claims according to predetermined priority rules.

16 Prior to the enactment of the *CCAA* in 1933 (S.C. 1932-33, c. 36), practice under existing commercial insolvency legislation tended heavily towards the liquidation of a debtor company (J. Sarra, *Creditor Rights and the Public Interest: Restructuring Insolvent Corporations* (2003), at p. 12). The battering visited upon Canadian businesses by the Great Depression and the absence of an effective mechanism for reaching a compromise between debtors and creditors to avoid liquidation required a legislative response. The *CCAA* was innovative as it allowed the insolvent debtor to attempt reorganization under judicial supervision outside the existing insolvency legislation which, once engaged, almost invariably resulted in liquidation (*Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada)*, [1934] S.C.R. 659 (S.C.C.), at pp. 660-61; Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, at pp. 12-13).

17 Parliament understood when adopting the *CCAA* that liquidation of an insolvent company was harmful for most of those it affected — notably creditors and employees — and that a workout which allowed the company to survive was optimal (Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, at pp. 13-15).

18 Early commentary and jurisprudence also endorsed the *CCAA's* remedial objectives. It recognized that companies retain more value as going concerns while underscoring that intangible losses, such as the evaporation of the companies' goodwill, result from liquidation (S. E. Edwards, "Reorganizations Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act" (1947), 25 *Can. Bar Rev.* 587, at p. 592). Reorganization serves the public interest by facilitating the survival of companies supplying goods or services crucial to the health of the economy or saving large numbers of jobs (*ibid.*, at p. 593). Insolvency could be so widely

felt as to impact stakeholders other than creditors and employees. Variants of these views resonate today, with reorganization justified in terms of rehabilitating companies that are key elements in a complex web of interdependent economic relationships in order to avoid the negative consequences of liquidation.

19 The *CCAA* fell into disuse during the next several decades, likely because amendments to the Act in 1953 restricted its use to companies issuing bonds (S.C. 1952-53, c. 3). During the economic downturn of the early 1980s, insolvency lawyers and courts adapting to the resulting wave of insolvencies resurrected the statute and deployed it in response to new economic challenges. Participants in insolvency proceedings grew to recognize and appreciate the statute's distinguishing feature: a grant of broad and flexible authority to the supervising court to make the orders necessary to facilitate the reorganization of the debtor and achieve the *CCAA's* objectives. The manner in which courts have used *CCAA* jurisdiction in increasingly creative and flexible ways is explored in greater detail below.

20 Efforts to evolve insolvency law were not restricted to the courts during this period. In 1970, a government-commissioned panel produced an extensive study recommending sweeping reform but Parliament failed to act (see *Bankruptcy and Insolvency: Report of the Study Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency Legislation* (1970)). Another panel of experts produced more limited recommendations in 1986 which eventually resulted in enactment of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* of 1992 (S.C. 1992, c. 27) (see *Proposed Bankruptcy Act Amendments: Report of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency* (1986)). Broader provisions for reorganizing insolvent debtors were then included in Canada's bankruptcy statute. Although the 1970 and 1986 reports made no specific recommendations with respect to the *CCAA*, the House of Commons committee studying the *BIA*'s predecessor bill, C-22, seemed to accept expert testimony that the *BIA*'s new reorganization scheme would shortly supplant the *CCAA*, which could then be repealed, with commercial insolvency and bankruptcy being governed by a single statute (*Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Consumer and Corporate Affairs and Government Operations*, Issue No. 15, October 3, 1991, at pp. 15:15-15:16).

21 In retrospect, this conclusion by the House of Commons committee was out of step with reality. It overlooked the renewed vitality the *CCAA* enjoyed in contemporary practice and the advantage that a flexible judicially supervised reorganization process presented in the face of increasingly complex reorganizations, when compared to the stricter rules-based scheme contained in the *BIA*. The "flexibility of the *CCAA* [was seen as] a great benefit, allowing for creative and effective decisions" (Industry Canada, Marketplace Framework Policy Branch, *Report on the Operation and Administration of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (2002), at p. 41). Over the past three decades, resurrection of the *CCAA* has thus been the mainspring of a process through which, one author concludes, "the legal setting for Canadian insolvency restructuring has evolved from a rather blunt instrument to one of the most sophisticated systems in the developed world" (R. B. Jones, "The Evolution of Canadian Restructuring: Challenges for the Rule of Law", in J. P. Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2005* (2006), 481, at p. 481).

22 While insolvency proceedings may be governed by different statutory schemes, they share some commonalities. The most prominent of these is the single proceeding model. The nature and purpose of the single proceeding model are described by Professor Wood in *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law*:

> They all provide a collective proceeding that supersedes the usual civil process available to creditors to enforce their claims. The creditors' remedies are collectivized in order to prevent the free-for-all that would otherwise prevail if creditors were permitted to exercise their remedies. In the absence of a collective process, each creditor is armed with the knowledge that if they do not strike hard and swift to seize the debtor's assets, they will be beat out by other creditors. [pp. 2-3]

The single proceeding model avoids the inefficiency and chaos that would attend insolvency if each creditor initiated proceedings to recover its debt. Grouping all possible actions against the debtor into a single proceeding controlled in a single forum facilitates negotiation with creditors because it places them all on an equal footing, rather than exposing them to the risk that a more aggressive creditor will realize its claims against the debtor's limited assets while the other creditors attempt a compromise. With a view to achieving that purpose, both the *CCAA* and the *BIA* allow a court to order all actions against a debtor to be stayed while a compromise is sought.

23 Another point of convergence of the *CCAA* and the *BIA* relates to priorities. Because the *CCAA* is silent about what happens if reorganization fails, the *BIA* scheme of liquidation and distribution necessarily supplies the backdrop for what will happen if a *CCAA* reorganization is ultimately unsuccessful. In addition, one of the important features of legislative reform of both statutes since the enactment of the *BIA* in 1992 has been a cutback in Crown priorities (S.C. 1992, c. 27, s. 39; S.C. 1997, c. 12, ss. 73 and 125; S.C. 2000, c. 30, s. 148; S.C. 2005, c. 47, ss. 69 and 131; S.C. 2009, c. 33, ss. 25 and 29; see also *Alternative granite & marbre inc., Re*, 2009 SCC 49, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 286, [2009] G.S.T.C. 154 (S.C.C.); *Quebec (Deputy Minister of Revenue) c. Rainville* (1979), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 35 (S.C.C.); *Proposed Bankruptcy Act Amendments: Report of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency* (1986)).

24 With parallel *CCAA* and *BIA* restructuring schemes now an accepted feature of the insolvency law landscape, the contemporary thrust of legislative reform has been towards harmonizing aspects of insolvency law common to the two statutory schemes to the extent possible and encouraging reorganization over liquidation (see *An Act to establish the Wage Earner Protection Program Act, to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts*, S.C. 2005, c. 47; *Gauntlet Energy Corp., Re*, 2003 ABQB 894, [2003] G.S.T.C. 193, 30 Alta. L.R. (4th) 192 (Alta. Q.B.), at para. 19).

25 Mindful of the historical background of the *CCAA* and *BIA*, I now turn to the first question at issue.

3.2 GST Deemed Trust Under the CCAA

26 The Court of Appeal proceeded on the basis that the *ETA* precluded the court from staying the Crown's enforcement of the GST deemed trust when partially lifting the stay to allow the debtor to enter bankruptcy. In so doing, it adopted the reasoning in a line of cases culminating in *Ottawa Senators*, which held that an *ETA* deemed trust remains enforceable during *CCAA* reorganization despite language in the *CCAA* that suggests otherwise.

27 The Crown relies heavily on the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in *Ottawa Senators* and argues that the later in time provision of the *ETA* creating the GST deemed trust trumps the provision of the *CCAA* purporting to nullify most statutory deemed trusts. The Court of Appeal in this case accepted this reasoning but not all provincial courts follow it (see, e.g., *Komunik Corp., Re*, 2009 QCCS 6332 (C.S. Que.), leave to appeal granted, 2010 QCCA 183 (C.A. Que.)). Century Services relied, in its written submissions to this Court, on the argument that the court had authority under the *CCAA* to continue the stay against the Crown's claim for unremitted GST. In oral argument, the question of whether *Ottawa Senators* was correctly decided nonetheless arose. After the hearing, the parties were asked to make further written submissions on this point. As appears evident from the reasons of my colleague Abella J., this issue has become prominent before this Court. In those circumstances, this Court needs to determine the correctness of the reasoning in *Ottawa Senators*.

28 The policy backdrop to this question involves the Crown's priority as a creditor in insolvency situations which, as I mentioned above, has evolved considerably. Prior to the 1990s, Crown claims largely enjoyed priority in insolvency. This was widely seen as unsatisfactory as shown by both the 1970 and 1986 insolvency reform proposals, which recommended that Crown claims receive no preferential treatment. A closely related matter was whether the *CCAA* was binding at all upon the Crown. Amendments to the *CCAA* in 1997 confirmed that it did indeed bind the Crown (see *CCAA*, s. 21, as am. by S.C. 1997, c. 12, s. 126).

29 Claims of priority by the state in insolvency situations receive different treatment across jurisdictions worldwide. For example, in Germany and Australia, the state is given no priority at all, while the state enjoys wide priority in the United States and France (see B. K. Morgan, "Should the Sovereign be Paid First? A Comparative International Analysis of the Priority for Tax Claims in Bankruptcy" (2000), 74 *Am. Bank. L.J.* 461, at p. 500). Canada adopted a middle course through legislative reform of Crown priority initiated in 1992. The Crown retained priority for source deductions of income tax, Employment Insurance ("EI") and Canada Pension Plan ("CPP") premiums, but ranks as an ordinary unsecured creditor for most other claims.

30 Parliament has frequently enacted statutory mechanisms to secure Crown claims and permit their enforcement. The two most common are statutory deemed trusts and powers to garnish funds third parties owe the debtor (see F. L. Lamer, *Priority of Crown Claims in Insolvency* (loose-leaf), at § 2).

31 With respect to GST collected, Parliament has enacted a deemed trust. The *ETA* states that every person who collects an amount on account of GST is deemed to hold that amount in trust for the Crown (s. 222(1)). The deemed trust extends to other property of the person collecting the tax equal in value to the amount deemed to be in trust if that amount has not been remitted in accordance with the *ETA*. The deemed trust also extends to property held by a secured creditor that, but for the security interest, would be property of the person collecting the tax (s. 222(3)).

32 Parliament has created similar deemed trusts using almost identical language in respect of source deductions of income tax, EI premiums and CPP premiums (see s. 227(4) of the *Income Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) ("*ITA*"), ss. 86(2) and (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act*, S.C. 1996, c. 23, and ss. 23(3) and (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8). I will refer to income tax, EI and CPP deductions as "source deductions".

33 In *Royal Bank v. Sparrow Electric Corp.*, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 411 (S.C.C.), this Court addressed a priority dispute between a deemed trust for source deductions under the *ITA* and security interests taken under both the *Bank Act*, S.C. 1991, c. 46, and the Alberta *Personal Property Security Act*, S.A. 1988, c. P-4.05 ("*PPSA*"). As then worded, an *ITA* deemed trust over the debtor's property equivalent to the amount owing in respect of income tax became effective at the time of liquidation, receivership, or assignment in bankruptcy. *Sparrow Electric* held that the *ITA* deemed trust could not prevail over the security interests because, being fixed charges, the latter attached as soon as the debtor acquired rights in the property such that the *ITA* deemed trust had no property on which to attach when it subsequently arose. Later, in *First Vancouver Finance v. Minister of National Revenue*, 2002 SCC 49, [2002] G.S.T.C. 23, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 720 (S.C.C.), this Court observed that Parliament had legislated to strengthen the statutory deemed trust in the *ITA* by deeming it to operate from the moment the deductions were not paid to the Crown as required by the *ITA*, and by granting the Crown priority over all security interests (paras. 27-29) (the "*Sparrow Electric* amendment").

34 The amended text of s. 227(4.1) of the *ITA* and concordant source deductions deemed trusts in the *Canada Pension Plan* and the *Employment Insurance Act* state that the deemed trust operates notwithstanding any other enactment of Canada, except ss. 81.1 and 81.2 of the *BIA*. The *ETA* deemed trust at issue in this case is similarly worded, but it excepts the *BIA* in its entirety. The provision reads as follows:

> **222.** (3) Despite any other provision of this Act (except subsection (4)), any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act)*, any enactment of a province or any other law, if at any time an amount deemed by subsection (1) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn in the manner and at the time provided under this Part, property of the person and property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust, is deemed ....

35 The Crown submits that the *Sparrow Electric* amendment, added by Parliament to the *ETA* in 2000, was intended to preserve the Crown's priority over collected GST under the *CCAA* while subordinating the Crown to the status of an unsecured creditor in respect of GST only under the *BIA*. This is because the *ETA* provides that the GST deemed trust is effective "despite" any other enactment except the *BIA*.

36 The language used in the *ETA* for the GST deemed trust creates an apparent conflict with the *CCAA*, which provides that subject to certain exceptions, property deemed by statute to be held in trust for the Crown shall not be so regarded.

37 Through a 1997 amendment to the *CCAA* (S.C. 1997, c. 12, s. 125), Parliament appears to have, subject to specific exceptions, nullified deemed trusts in favour of the Crown once reorganization proceedings are commenced under the Act. The relevant provision reads:

> **18.3** (1) Subject to subsection (2), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

This nullification of deemed trusts was continued in further amendments to the *CCAA* (S.C. 2005, c. 47), where s. 18.3(1) was renumbered and reformulated as s. 37(1):

> **37.** (1) Subject to subsection (2), despite any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as being held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

38 An analogous provision exists in the *BIA*, which, subject to the same specific exceptions, nullifies statutory deemed trusts and makes property of the bankrupt that would otherwise be subject to a deemed trust part of the debtor's estate and available to creditors (S.C. 1992, c. 27, s. 39; S.C. 1997, c. 12, s. 73; *BIA*, s. 67(2)). It is noteworthy that in both the *CCAA* and the *BIA*, the exceptions concern source deductions (*CCAA*, s. 18.3(2); *BIA*, s. 67(3)). The relevant provision of the *CCAA* reads:

> **18.3** (2) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act*....

Thus, the Crown's deemed trust and corresponding priority in source deductions remain effective both in reorganization and in bankruptcy.

39 Meanwhile, in both s. 18.4(1) of the *CCAA* and s. 86(1) of the *BIA*, other Crown claims are treated as unsecured. These provisions, establishing the Crown's status as an unsecured creditor, explicitly exempt statutory deemed trusts in source deductions *(CCAA*, s. 18.4(3); *BIA*, s. 86(3)). The *CCAA* provision reads as follows:

> **18.4** (3) Subsection (1) [Crown ranking as unsecured creditor] does not affect the operation of
>
> (a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*,
>
> (b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution ....

Therefore, not only does the *CCAA* provide that Crown claims do not enjoy priority over the claims of other creditors (s. 18.3(1)), but the exceptions to this rule (i.e., that Crown priority is maintained for source deductions) are repeatedly stated in the statute.

40 The apparent conflict in this case is whether the rule in the *CCAA* first enacted as s. 18.3 in 1997, which provides that subject to certain explicit exceptions, statutory deemed trusts are ineffective under the *CCAA*, is overridden by the one in the *ETA* enacted in 2000 stating that GST deemed trusts operate despite any enactment of Canada except the *BIA*. With respect for my colleague Fish J., I do not think the apparent conflict can be resolved by denying it and creating a rule requiring both a statutory provision enacting the deemed trust, and a second statutory provision confirming it. Such a rule is unknown to the law. Courts must recognize conflicts, apparent or real, and resolve them when possible.

41 A line of jurisprudence across Canada has resolved the apparent conflict in favour of the *ETA*, thereby maintaining GST deemed trusts under the *CCAA*. *Ottawa Senators*, the leading case, decided the matter by invoking the doctrine of implied repeal to hold that the later in time provision of the *ETA* should take precedence over the *CCAA* (see also *Solid Resources Ltd., Re* (2002), 40 C.B.R. (4th) 219, [2003] G.S.T.C. 21 (Alta. Q.B.); *Gauntlet*

42 The Ontario Court of Appeal in *Ottawa Senators* rested its conclusion on two considerations. First, it was persuaded that by explicitly mentioning the *BIA* in *ETA* s. 222(3), but not the *CCAA*, Parliament made a deliberate choice. In the words of MacPherson J.A.:

> The *BIA* and the *CCAA* are closely related federal statutes. I cannot conceive that Parliament would specifically identify the *BIA* as an exception, but accidentally fail to consider the *CCAA* as a possible second exception. In my view, the omission of the *CCAA* from s. 222(3) of the *ETA* was almost certainly a considered omission. [para. 43]

43 Second, the Ontario Court of Appeal compared the conflict between the *ETA* and the *CCAA* to that before this Court in *Doré c. Verdun (Municipalité)*, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862 (S.C.C.), and found them to be "identical" (para. 46). It therefore considered *Doré* binding (para. 49). In *Doré*, a limitations provision in the more general and recently enacted *Civil Code of Québec*, S.Q. 1991, c. 64 ("*C.C.Q.*"), was held to have repealed a more specific provision of the earlier Quebec *Cities and Towns Act*, R.S.Q., c. C-19, with which it conflicted. By analogy, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the later in time and more general provision, s. 222(3) of the *ETA*, impliedly repealed the more specific and earlier in time provision, s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* (paras. 47-49).

44 Viewing this issue in its entire context, several considerations lead me to conclude that neither the reasoning nor the result in *Ottawa Senators* can stand. While a conflict may exist at the level of the statutes' wording, a purposive and contextual analysis to determine Parliament's true intent yields the conclusion that Parliament could not have intended to restore the Crown's deemed trust priority in GST claims under the *CCAA* when it amended the *ETA* in 2000 with the *Sparrow Electric* amendment.

45 I begin by recalling that Parliament has shown its willingness to move away from asserting priority for Crown claims in insolvency law. Section 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* (subject to the s. 18.3(2) exceptions) provides that the Crown's deemed trusts have no effect under the *CCAA*. Where Parliament has sought to protect certain Crown claims through statutory deemed trusts and intended that these deemed trusts continue in insolvency, it has legislated so explicitly and elaborately. For example, s. 18.3(2) of the *CCAA* and s. 67(3) of the *BIA* expressly provide that deemed trusts for source deductions remain effective in insolvency. Parliament has, therefore, clearly carved out exceptions from the general rule that deemed trusts are ineffective in insolvency. The *CCAA* and *BIA* are in harmony, preserving deemed trusts and asserting Crown priority only in respect of source deductions. Meanwhile, there is no express statutory basis for concluding that GST claims enjoy a preferred treatment under the *CCAA* or the *BIA*. Unlike source deductions, which are clearly and expressly dealt with under both these insolvency statutes, no such clear and express language exists in those Acts carving out an exception for GST claims.

46 The internal logic of the *CCAA* also militates against upholding the *ETA* deemed trust for GST. The *CCAA* imposes limits on a suspension by the court of the Crown's rights in respect of source deductions but does not mention the *ETA* (s. 11.4). Since source deductions deemed trusts are granted explicit protection under the *CCAA*, it would be inconsistent to afford a better protection to the *ETA* deemed trust absent explicit language in the *CCAA*. Thus, the logic of the *CCAA* appears to subject the *ETA* deemed trust to the waiver by Parliament of its priority (s. 18.4).

47 Moreover, a strange asymmetry would arise if the interpretation giving the *ETA* priority over the *CCAA* urged by the Crown is adopted here: the Crown would retain priority over GST claims during *CCAA* proceedings but not in bankruptcy. As courts have reflected, this can only encourage statute shopping by secured creditors in cases such as this one where the debtor's assets cannot satisfy both the secured creditors' and the Crown's claims (*Gauntlet*, at para. 21). If creditors' claims were better protected by liquidation under the *BIA*, creditors' incentives would lie overwhelmingly with avoiding proceedings under the *CCAA* and not risking a failed reorganization. Giving a key player in any insolvency such skewed incentives against reorganizing under the *CCAA* can only undermine that statute's remedial objectives and risk inviting the very social ills that it was enacted to avert.

48 Arguably, the effect of *Ottawa Senators* is mitigated if restructuring is attempted under the *BIA* instead of the *CCAA*, but it is not cured. If *Ottawa Senators* were to be followed, Crown priority over GST would differ depending on whether restructuring took place under the *CCAA* or the *BIA*. The anomaly of this result is made manifest by the fact that it would deprive companies of the option to restructure under the more flexible and responsive *CCAA* regime, which has been the statute of choice for complex reorganizations.

49 Evidence that Parliament intended different treatments for GST claims in reorganization and bankruptcy is scant, if it exists at all. Section 222(3) of the *ETA* was enacted as part of a wide-ranging budget implementation bill in 2000. The

summary accompanying that bill does not indicate that Parliament intended to elevate Crown priority over GST claims under the *CCAA* to the same or a higher level than source deductions claims. Indeed, the summary for deemed trusts states only that amendments to existing provisions are aimed at "ensuring that employment insurance premiums and Canada Pension Plan contributions that are required to be remitted by an employer are fully recoverable by the Crown in the case of the bankruptcy of the employer" (Summary to S.C. 2000, c. 30, at p. 4a). The wording of GST deemed trusts resembles that of statutory deemed trusts for source deductions and incorporates the same overriding language and reference to the *BIA*. However, as noted above, Parliament's express intent is that only source deductions deemed trusts remain operative. An exception for the *BIA* in the statutory language establishing the source deductions deemed trusts accomplishes very little, because the explicit language of the *BIA* itself (and the *CCAA*) carves out these source deductions deemed trusts and maintains their effect. It is however noteworthy that no equivalent language maintaining GST deemed trusts exists under either the *BIA* or the *CCAA*.

50 It seems more likely that by adopting the same language for creating GST deemed trusts in the *ETA* as it did for deemed trusts for source deductions, and by overlooking the inclusion of an exception for the *CCAA* alongside the *BIA* in s. 222(3) of the *ETA*, Parliament may have inadvertently succumbed to a drafting anomaly. Because of a statutory lacuna in the *ETA*, the GST deemed trust could be seen as remaining effective in the *CCAA*, while ceasing to have any effect under the *BIA*, thus creating an apparent conflict with the wording of the *CCAA*. However, it should be seen for what it is: a facial conflict only, capable of resolution by looking at the broader approach taken to Crown priorities and by giving precedence to the statutory language of s. 18.3 of the *CCAA* in a manner that does not produce an anomalous outcome.

51 Section 222(3) of the *ETA* evinces no explicit intention of Parliament to repeal *CCAA* s. 18.3. It merely creates an apparent conflict that must be resolved by statutory interpretation. Parliament's intent when it enacted *ETA* s. 222(3) was therefore far from unambiguous. Had it sought to give the Crown a priority for GST claims, it could have done so explicitly as it did for source deductions. Instead, one is left to infer from the language of *ETA* s. 222(3) that the GST deemed trust was intended to be effective under the *CCAA*.

52 I am not persuaded that the reasoning in *Doré* requires the application of the doctrine of implied repeal in the circumstances of this case. The main issue in *Doré* concerned the impact of the adoption of the *C.C.Q.* on the administrative law rules with respect to municipalities. While Gonthier J. concluded in that case that the limitation provision in art. 2930 *C.C.Q.* had repealed by implication a limitation provision in the *Cities and Towns Act*, he did so on the basis of more than a textual analysis. The conclusion in *Doré* was reached after thorough contextual analysis of both pieces of legislation, including an extensive review of the relevant legislative history (paras. 31-41). Consequently, the circumstances before this Court in *Doré* are far from "identical" to those in the present case, in terms of text, context and legislative history. Accordingly, *Doré* cannot be said to require the automatic application of the rule of repeal by implication.

53 A noteworthy indicator of Parliament's overall intent is the fact that in subsequent amendments it has not displaced the rule set out in the *CCAA*. Indeed, as indicated above, the recent amendments to the *CCAA* in 2005 resulted in the rule previously found in s. 18.3 being renumbered and reformulated as s. 37. Thus, to the extent the interpretation allowing the GST deemed trust to remain effective under the *CCAA* depends on *ETA* s. 222(3) having impliedly repealed *CCAA* s. 18.3(1) because it is later in time, we have come full circle. Parliament has renumbered and reformulated the provision of the *CCAA* stating that, subject to exceptions for source deductions, deemed trusts do not survive the *CCAA* proceedings and thus the *CCAA* is now the later in time statute. This confirms that Parliament's intent with respect to GST deemed trusts is to be found in the *CCAA*.

54 I do not agree with my colleague Abella J. that s. 44(*f*) of the *Interpretation Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, can be used to interpret the 2005 amendments as having no effect. The new statute can hardly be said to be a mere re-enactment of the former statute. Indeed, the *CCAA* underwent a substantial review in 2005. Notably, acting consistently with its goal of treating both the *BIA* and the *CCAA* as sharing the same approach to insolvency, Parliament made parallel amendments to both statutes with respect to corporate proposals. In addition, new provisions were introduced regarding the treatment of contracts, collective agreements, interim financing and governance agreements. The appointment and role of the Monitor was also clarified. Noteworthy are the limits imposed by *CCAA* s. 11.09 on the court's discretion to make an order staying the Crown's source deductions deemed trusts, which were formerly found in s. 11.4. No mention whatsoever is made of GST deemed trusts (see Summary to S.C. 2005, c. 47). The review went as far as looking at the very expression used to describe the statutory override of deemed trusts.

The comments cited by my colleague only emphasize the clear intent of Parliament to maintain its policy that only source deductions deemed trusts survive in *CCAA* proceedings.

55 In the case at bar, the legislative context informs the determination of Parliament's legislative intent and supports the conclusion that *ETA* s. 222(3) was not intended to narrow the scope of the *CCAA's* override provision. Viewed in its entire context, the conflict between the *ETA* and the *CCAA* is more apparent than real. I would therefore not follow the reasoning in *Ottawa Senators* and affirm that *CCAA* s. 18.3 remained effective.

56 My conclusion is reinforced by the purpose of the *CCAA* as part of Canadian remedial insolvency legislation. As this aspect is particularly relevant to the second issue, I will now discuss how courts have interpreted the scope of their discretionary powers in supervising a *CCAA* reorganization and how Parliament has largely endorsed this interpretation. Indeed, the interpretation courts have given to the *CCAA* helps in understanding how the *CCAA* grew to occupy such a prominent role in Canadian insolvency law.

3.3 Discretionary Power of a Court Supervising a CCAA Reorganization

57 Courts frequently observe that "[t]he *CCAA* is skeletal in nature" and does not "contain a comprehensive code that lays out all that is permitted or barred" (*ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.*, 2008 ONCA 587, 92 O.R. (3d) 513 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 44, *per* Blair J.A.). Accordingly, "[t]he history of CCAA law has been an evolution of judicial interpretation" (*Dylex Ltd., Re* (1995), 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List])), at para. 10, *per* Farley J.).

58 *CCAA* decisions are often based on discretionary grants of jurisdiction. The incremental exercise of judicial discretion in commercial courts under conditions one practitioner aptly describes as "the hothouse of real-time litigation" has been the primary method by which the *CCAA* has been adapted and has evolved to meet contemporary business and social needs (see Jones, at p. 484).

59 Judicial discretion must of course be exercised in furtherance of the *CCAA's* purposes. The remedial purpose I referred to in the historical overview of the Act is recognized over and over again in the jurisprudence. To cite one early example:

> The legislation is remedial in the purest sense in that it provides a means whereby the devastating social and economic effects of bankruptcy or creditor initiated termination of ongoing business operations can be avoided while a court-supervised attempt to reorganize the financial affairs of the debtor company is made.
>
> (*Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (1990), 41 O.A.C. 282 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 57, *per* Doherty J.A., dissenting)

60 Judicial decision making under the *CCAA* takes many forms. A court must first of all provide the conditions under which the debtor can attempt to reorganize. This can be achieved by staying enforcement actions by creditors to allow the debtor's business to continue, preserving the *status quo* while the debtor plans the compromise or arrangement to be presented to creditors, and supervising the process and advancing it to the point where it can be determined whether it will succeed (see, e.g., *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* (1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84 (B.C. C.A.), at pp. 88-89; *Pacific National Lease Holding Corp., Re* (1992), 19 B.C.A.C. 134 (B.C. C.A. [In Chambers]), at para. 27). In doing so, the court must often be cognizant of the various interests at stake in the reorganization, which can extend beyond those of the debtor and creditors to include employees, directors, shareholders, and even other parties doing business with the insolvent company (see, e.g., *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*, 2000 ABQB 442, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 9 (Alta. Q.B.), at para. 144, *per* Paperny J. (as she then was); *Air Canada, Re* (2003), 42 C.B.R. (4th) 173 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), at para. 3; *Air Canada, Re* [2003 CarswellOnt 4967 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])], 2003 CanLII 49366, at para. 13, *per* Farley J.; Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, at pp. 181-92 and 217-26). In addition, courts must recognize that on occasion the broader public interest will be engaged by aspects of the reorganization and may be a factor against which the decision of whether to allow a particular action will be weighed (see, e.g., *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix Rouge, Re* (2000), 19 C.B.R. (4th) 158 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 2, *per* Blair J. (as he then was); Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, at pp. 195-214).

61 When large companies encounter difficulty, reorganizations become increasingly complex. *CCAA* courts have been called upon to innovate accordingly in exercising their jurisdiction beyond merely staying proceedings against the debtor to allow breathing room for reorganization. They have been asked to sanction measures for which there is no explicit authority in the *CCAA*. Without exhaustively cataloguing the various measures taken under the authority of the *CCAA*, it is useful to refer briefly to a few examples to illustrate the flexibility the statute affords supervising courts.

62 Perhaps the most creative use of *CCAA* authority has been the increasing willingness of courts to authorize post-filing security for debtor in possession financing or super-priority charges on the debtor's assets when necessary for the continuation of the debtor's business during the reorganization (see, e.g., *Skydome Corp., Re* (1998), 16 C.B.R. (4th) 118 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); *United Used Auto & Truck Parts Ltd., Re*, 2000 BCCA 146, 135 B.C.A.C. 96 (B.C. C.A.), aff'g (1999), 12 C.B.R. (4th) 144 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]); and generally, J. P. Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (2007), at pp. 93-115). The *CCAA* has also been used to release claims against third parties as part of approving a comprehensive plan of arrangement and compromise, even over the objections of some dissenting creditors (see Metcalfe & Mansfield). As well, the appointment of a Monitor to oversee the reorganization was originally a measure taken pursuant to the *CCAA's* supervisory authority; Parliament responded, making the mechanism mandatory by legislative amendment.

63 Judicial innovation during *CCAA* proceedings has not been without controversy. At least two questions it raises are directly relevant to the case at bar: (1) what are the sources of a court's authority during *CCAA* proceedings? (2) what are the limits of this authority?

64 The first question concerns the boundary between a court's statutory authority under the *CCAA* and a court's residual authority under its inherent and equitable jurisdiction when supervising a reorganization. In authorizing measures during *CCAA* proceedings, courts have on occasion purported to rely upon their equitable jurisdiction to advance the purposes of the Act or their inherent jurisdiction to fill gaps in the statute. Recent appellate decisions have counselled against purporting to rely on inherent jurisdiction, holding that the better view is that courts are in most cases simply construing the authority supplied by the *CCAA* itself (see, e.g., *Skeena Cellulose Inc., Re*, 2003 BCCA 344, 13 B.C.L.R. (4th) 236 (B.C. C.A.), at paras. 45-47, *per* Newbury J.A.; *Stelco Inc. (Re)* (2005), 75 O.R. (3d) 5 (Ont. C.A.), paras. 31-33, *per* Blair J.A.).

65 I agree with Justice Georgina R. Jackson and Professor Janis Sarra that the most appropriate approach is a hierarchical one in which courts rely first on an interpretation of the provisions of the *CCAA* text before turning to inherent or equitable jurisdiction to anchor measures taken in a *CCAA* proceeding (see G. R. Jackson and J. Sarra, "Selecting the Judicial Tool to get the Job Done: An Examination of Statutory Interpretation, Discretionary Power and Inherent Jurisdiction in Insolvency Matters", in J. P. Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2007* (2008), 41, at p. 42). The authors conclude that when given an appropriately purposive and liberal interpretation, the *CCAA* will be sufficient in most instances to ground measures necessary to achieve its objectives (p. 94).

66 Having examined the pertinent parts of the *CCAA* and the recent history of the legislation, I accept that in most instances the issuance of an order during *CCAA* proceedings should be considered an exercise in statutory interpretation. Particularly noteworthy in this regard is the expansive interpretation the language of the statute at issue is capable of supporting.

67 The initial grant of authority under the *CCAA* empowered a court "where an application is made under this Act in respect of a company ... on the application of any person interested in the matter ..., subject to this Act, [to] make an order under this section" (*CCAA*, s. 11(1)). The plain language of the statute was very broad.

68 In this regard, though not strictly applicable to the case at bar, I note that Parliament has in recent amendments changed the wording contained in s. 11(1), making explicit the discretionary authority of the court under the *CCAA*. Thus in s. 11 of the *CCAA* as currently enacted, a court may, "subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, ... make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances" (S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 128). Parliament appears to have endorsed the broad reading of *CCAA* authority developed by the jurisprudence.

69 The *CCAA* also explicitly provides for certain orders. Both an order made on an initial application and an order on subsequent applications may stay, restrain, or prohibit existing or new proceedings against the debtor. The burden is on the applicant to satisfy the court that the order is appropriate in the circumstances and that the applicant has been acting in good faith and with due diligence (*CCAA*, ss. 11(3), (4) and (6)).

70 The general language of the *CCAA* should not be read as being restricted by the availability of more specific orders. However, the requirements of appropriateness, good faith, and due diligence are baseline considerations that a court should always bear in mind when exercising *CCAA* authority. Appropriateness under the *CCAA* is assessed by inquiring whether the order sought advances the policy objectives underlying the *CCAA*. The question is whether the order will usefully further efforts to achieve the remedial purpose of the *CCAA* — avoiding the social and economic losses resulting from liquidation of an insolvent company. I would add that appropriateness extends not only to the purpose of the order, but also to the means it employs. Courts should be mindful that chances for successful reorganizations are enhanced where participants achieve common ground and all stakeholders are treated as advantageously and fairly as the circumstances permit.

71 It is well-established that efforts to reorganize under the *CCAA* can be terminated and the stay of proceedings against the debtor lifted if the reorganization is "doomed to failure" (see *Chef Ready*, at p. 88; *Philip's Manufacturing Ltd., Re* (1992), 9 C.B.R. (3d) 25 (B.C. C.A.), at paras. 6-7). However, when an order is sought that does realistically advance the *CCAA's* purposes, the ability to make it is within the discretion of a *CCAA* court.

72 The preceding discussion assists in determining whether the court had authority under the *CCAA* to continue the stay of proceedings against the Crown once it was apparent that reorganization would fail and bankruptcy was the inevitable next step.

73 In the Court of Appeal, Tysoe J.A. held that no authority existed under the *CCAA* to continue staying the Crown's enforcement of the GST deemed trust once efforts at reorganization had come to an end. The appellant submits that in so holding, Tysoe J.A. failed to consider the underlying purpose of the *CCAA* and give the statute an appropriately purposive and liberal interpretation under which the order was permissible. The Crown submits that Tysoe J.A. correctly held that the mandatory language of the *ETA* gave the court no option but to permit enforcement of the GST deemed trust when lifting the *CCAA* stay to permit the debtor to make an assignment under the *BIA*. Whether the *ETA* has a mandatory effect in the context of a *CCAA* proceeding has already been discussed. I will now address the question of whether the order was authorized by the *CCAA*.

74 It is beyond dispute that the *CCAA* imposes no explicit temporal limitations upon proceedings commenced under the Act that would prohibit ordering a continuation of the stay of the Crown's GST claims while lifting the general stay of proceedings temporarily to allow the debtor to make an assignment in bankruptcy.

75 The question remains whether the order advanced the underlying purpose of the *CCAA*. The Court of Appeal held that it did not because the reorganization efforts had come to an end and the *CCAA* was accordingly spent. I disagree.

76 There is no doubt that had reorganization been commenced under the *BIA* instead of the *CCAA*, the Crown's deemed trust priority for the GST funds would have been lost. Similarly, the Crown does not dispute that under the scheme of distribution in bankruptcy under the *BIA*, the deemed trust for GST ceases to have effect. Thus, after reorganization under the *CCAA* failed, creditors would have had a strong incentive to seek immediate bankruptcy and distribution of the debtor's assets under the *BIA*. In order to conclude that the discretion does not extend to partially lifting the stay in order to allow for an assignment in bankruptcy, one would have to assume a gap between the *CCAA* and the *BIA* proceedings. Brenner C.J.S.C.'s order staying Crown enforcement of the GST claim ensured that creditors would not be disadvantaged by the attempted reorganization under the *CCAA*. The effect of his order was to blunt any impulse of creditors to interfere in an orderly liquidation. His order was thus in furtherance of the *CCAA's* objectives to the extent that it allowed a bridge between the *CCAA* and *BIA* proceedings. This interpretation of the tribunal's discretionary power is buttressed by s. 20 of the *CCAA*. That section provides that the *CCAA* "may be applied together with the provisions of any Act of Parliament... that authorizes or makes provision for the sanction of compromises or arrangements between a company and its shareholders or any class of them", such as the *BIA*. Section 20 clearly indicates the intention of Parliament for the *CCAA* to operate *in tandem* with other insolvency legislation, such as the *BIA*.

77 The *CCAA* creates conditions for preserving the *status quo* while attempts are made to find common ground amongst stakeholders for a reorganization that is fair to all. Because the alternative to reorganization is often bankruptcy, participants will measure the impact of a reorganization against the position they would enjoy in liquidation. In the case at bar, the order fostered a harmonious transition between reorganization and liquidation while meeting the objective of a single collective proceeding that is common to both statutes.

78 Tysoe J.A. therefore erred in my view by treating the *CCAA* and the *BIA* as distinct regimes subject to a temporal gap between the two, rather than as forming part of an integrated body of insolvency law. Parliament's decision to maintain two statutory schemes for reorganization, the *BIA* and the *CCAA*, reflects the reality that reorganizations of differing complexity require different legal mechanisms. By contrast, only one statutory scheme has been found to be needed to liquidate a bankrupt debtor's estate. The transition from the *CCAA* to the *BIA* may require the partial lifting of a stay of proceedings under the *CCAA* to allow commencement of the *BIA* proceedings. However, as Laskin J.A. for the Ontario Court of Appeal noted in a similar competition between secured creditors and the Ontario Superintendent of Financial Services seeking to enforce a deemed trust, "[t]he two statutes are related" and no "gap" exists between the two statutes which would allow the enforcement of property interests at the conclusion of *CCAA* proceedings that would be lost in bankruptcy *Ivaco Inc. (Re)* (2006), 83 O.R. (3d) 108 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 62-63).

79 The Crown's priority in claims pursuant to source deductions deemed trusts does not undermine this conclusion. Source deductions deemed trusts survive under both the *CCAA* and the *BIA.* Accordingly, creditors' incentives to prefer one Act over another will not be affected. While a court has a broad discretion to stay source deductions deemed trusts in the *CCAA* context, this discretion is nevertheless subject to specific limitations applicable only to source deductions deemed trusts (*CCAA*, s. 11.4). Thus, if *CCAA* reorganization fails (e.g., either the creditors or the court refuse a proposed reorganization), the Crown can immediately assert its claim in unremitted source deductions. But this should not be understood to affect a seamless transition into bankruptcy or create any "gap" between the *CCAA* and the *BIA* for the simple reason that, regardless of what statute the reorganization had been commenced under, creditors' claims in both instances would have been subject to the priority of the Crown's source deductions deemed trust.

80 Source deductions deemed trusts aside, the comprehensive and exhaustive mechanism under the *BIA* must control the distribution of the debtor's assets once liquidation is inevitable. Indeed, an orderly transition to liquidation is mandatory under the *BIA* where a proposal is rejected by creditors. The *CCAA* is silent on the transition into liquidation but the breadth of the court's discretion under the Act is sufficient to construct a bridge to liquidation under the *BIA.* The court must do so in a manner that does not subvert the scheme of distribution under the *BIA.* Transition to liquidation requires partially lifting the *CCAA* stay to commence proceedings under the *BIA.* This necessary partial lifting of the stay should not trigger a race to the courthouse in an effort to obtain priority unavailable under the *BIA.*

81 I therefore conclude that Brenner C.J.S.C. had the authority under the *CCAA* to lift the stay to allow entry into liquidation.

3.4 Express Trust

82 The last issue in this case is whether Brenner C.J.S.C. created an express trust in favour of the Crown when he ordered on April 29, 2008, that proceeds from the sale of LeRoy Trucking's assets equal to the amount of unremitted GST be held back in the Monitor's trust account until the results of the reorganization were known. Tysoe J.A. in the Court of Appeal concluded as an alternative ground for allowing the Crown's appeal that it was the beneficiary of an express trust. I disagree.

83 Creation of an express trust requires the presence of three certainties: intention, subject matter, and object. Express or "true trusts" arise from the acts and intentions of the settlor and are distinguishable from other trusts arising by operation of law (see D. W. M. Waters, M. R. Gillen and L. D. Smith, eds., *Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada* (3rd ed. 2005), at pp. 28-29 especially fn. 42).

84 Here, there is no certainty to the object (i.e. the beneficiary) inferrable from the court's order of April 29, 2008, sufficient to support an express trust.

85 At the time of the order, there was a dispute between Century Services and the Crown over part of the proceeds from the sale of the debtor's assets. The court's solution was to accept LeRoy Trucking's proposal to segregate those monies until that dispute could be resolved. Thus there was no certainty that the Crown would actually be the beneficiary, or object, of the trust.

86 The fact that the location chosen to segregate those monies was the Monitor's trust account has no independent effect such that it would overcome the lack of a clear beneficiary. In any event, under the interpretation of *CCAA* s. 18.3(1) established above, no such priority dispute would even arise because the Crown's deemed trust priority over GST claims would be lost under the *CCAA* and the Crown would rank as an unsecured creditor for this amount. However, Brenner C.J.S.C. may well have been proceeding on the basis that, in accordance with *Ottawa Senators*, the Crown's GST claim would remain effective if reorganization was successful, which would not be the case if transition to the liquidation process of the *BIA* was allowed. An amount equivalent to that claim would accordingly be set aside pending the outcome of reorganization.

87 Thus, uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the *CCAA* restructuring eliminates the existence of any certainty to permanently vest in the Crown a beneficial interest in the funds. That much is clear from the oral reasons of Brenner C.J.S.C. on April 29, 2008, when he said: "Given the fact that [*CCAA* proceedings] are known to fail and filings in bankruptcy result, it seems to me that maintaining the status quo in the case at bar supports the proposal to have the monitor hold these funds in trust." Exactly who might take the money in the final result was therefore evidently in doubt. Brenner C.J.S.C.'s subsequent order of September 3, 2008, denying the Crown's application to enforce the trust once it was clear that bankruptcy was inevitable, confirms the absence of a clear beneficiary required to ground an express trust.

4. Conclusion

88 I conclude that Brenner C.J.S.C. had the discretion under the *CCAA* to continue the stay of the Crown's claim for enforcement of the GST deemed trust while otherwise lifting it to permit LeRoy Trucking to make an assignment in bankruptcy. My conclusion that s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* nullified the GST deemed trust while proceedings under that Act were pending confirms that the discretionary jurisdiction under s. 11 utilized by the court was not limited by the Crown's asserted GST priority, because there is no such priority under the *CCAA*.

89 For these reasons, I would allow the appeal and declare that the $305,202.30 collected by LeRoy Trucking in respect of GST but not yet remitted to the Receiver General of Canada is not subject to deemed trust or priority in favour of the Crown. Nor is this amount subject to an express trust. Costs are awarded for this appeal and the appeal in the court below.

***Fish J. (concurring)*:**

I

90 I am in general agreement with the reasons of Justice Deschamps and would dispose of the appeal as she suggests.

91 More particularly, I share my colleague's interpretation of the scope of the judge's discretion under s. 11 of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("*CCAA*"). And I share my colleague's conclusion that Brenner C.J.S.C. did not create an express trust in favour of the Crown when he segregated GST funds into the Monitor's trust account (2008 BCSC 1805, [2008] G.S.T.C. 221 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers])).

92 I nonetheless feel bound to add brief reasons of my own regarding the interaction between the *CCAA* and the *Excise Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 ("*ETA*").

93 In upholding deemed trusts created by the *ETA* notwithstanding insolvency proceedings, *Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp. (Re)* (2005), 73 O.R. (3d) 737, [2005] G.S.T.C. 1 (Ont. C.A.), and its progeny have been unduly protective of Crown interests which Parliament itself has chosen to subordinate to competing prioritized claims. In my respectful view, a clearly marked departure from that jurisprudential approach is warranted in this case.

94 Justice Deschamps develops important historical and policy reasons in support of this position and I have nothing to add in that regard. I do wish, however, to explain why a comparative analysis of related statutory provisions adds support to our shared conclusion.

95 Parliament has in recent years given detailed consideration to the Canadian insolvency scheme. It has declined to amend the provisions at issue in this case. Ours is not to wonder why, but rather to treat Parliament's preservation of the relevant provisions as a deliberate exercise of the legislative discretion that is Parliament's alone. With respect, I reject any suggestion that we should instead characterize the apparent conflict between s. 18.3(1) (now s. 37(1)) of the *CCAA* and s. 222 of the *ETA* as a drafting anomaly or statutory lacuna properly subject to judicial correction or repair.

II

96 In the context of the Canadian insolvency regime, a deemed trust will be found to exist only where two complementary elements co-exist: first, a statutory provision *creating* the trust; and second, a *CCAA* or *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 ("*BIA*") provision *confirming* — or explicitly preserving — its effective operation.

97 This interpretation is reflected in three federal statutes. Each contains a deemed trust provision framed in terms strikingly similar to the wording of s. 222 of the *ETA*.

98 The first is the *Income Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) ("*ITA*") where s. 227(4) *creates* a deemed trust:

> **227 (4) Trust for moneys deducted** — Every person who deducts or withholds an amount under this Act is deemed, notwithstanding any security interest (as defined in subsection 224(1.3)) in the amount so deducted or withheld, to hold the amount separate and apart from the property of the person and from property held by any secured creditor (as defined in subsection 224(1.3)) of that person that but for the security interest would be property of the person, in trust for Her Majesty and for payment to Her Majesty in the manner and at the time provided under this Act. [Here and below, the emphasis is of course my own.]

99 In the next subsection, Parliament has taken care to make clear that this trust is unaffected by federal or provincial legislation to the contrary:

> **(4.1) Extension of trust** — Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (except sections 81.1 and 81.2 of that Act), any other enactment of Canada, any enactment of a province or any other law, where at any time an amount deemed by subsection 227(4) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not paid to Her Majesty in the manner and at the time provided under this Act, property of the person ... equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust is deemed
>
> > (a) to be held, from the time the amount was deducted or withheld by the person, separate and apart from the property of the person, in trust for Her Majesty whether or not the property is subject to such a security interest, ...
> >
> > ...
>
> ... and the proceeds of such property shall be paid to the Receiver General in priority to all such security interests.

100 The continued operation of this deemed trust is expressly *confirmed* in s. 18.3 of the *CCAA*:

> **18.3** (1) Subject to subsection (2), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as being held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act*....

101 The operation of the *ITA* deemed trust is also confirmed in s. 67 of the *BIA*:

67 (2) Subject to subsection (3), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a bankrupt shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty for the purpose of paragraph (1)(*a*) unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

(3) Subsection (2) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act*....

102 Thus, Parliament has first *created* and then *confirmed the continued operation of* the Crown's *ITA* deemed trust under *both* the *CCAA* and the *BIA* regimes.

103 The second federal statute for which this scheme holds true is the *Canada Pension Plan*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8 ("*CPP*"). At s. 23, Parliament creates a deemed trust in favour of the Crown and specifies that it exists despite all contrary provisions in any other Canadian statute. Finally, and in almost identical terms, the *Employment Insurance Act*, S.C. 1996, c. 23 ("*EIA*"), creates a deemed trust in favour of the Crown: see ss. 86(2) and (2.1).

104 As we have seen, the survival of the deemed trusts created under these provisions of the *ITA*, the *CPP* and the *EIA* is confirmed in s. 18.3(2) the *CCAA* and in s. 67(3) the *BIA*. In all three cases, Parliament's intent to enforce the Crown's deemed trust through insolvency proceedings is expressed in clear and unmistakable terms.

105 The same is not true with regard to the deemed trust created under the *ETA*. Although Parliament creates a deemed trust in favour of the Crown to hold unremitted GST monies, and although it purports to maintain this trust notwithstanding any contrary federal or provincial legislation, it does not *confirm* the trust — or expressly provide for its continued operation — in either the *BIA* or the *CCAA*. The second of the two mandatory elements I have mentioned is thus absent reflecting Parliament's intention to allow the deemed trust to lapse with the commencement of insolvency proceedings.

106 The language of the relevant *ETA* provisions is identical in substance to that of the *ITA*, *CPP*, and *EIA* provisions:

222. (1) [Deemed] Trust for amounts collected — Subject to subsection (1.1), every person who collects an amount as or on account of tax under Division II is deemed, for all purposes and despite any security interest in the amount, to hold the amount in trust for Her Majesty in right of Canada, separate and apart from the property of the person and from property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, until the amount is remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn under subsection (2).

...

(3) Extension of trust — Despite any other provision of this Act (except subsection (4)), any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*), any enactment of a province or any other law, if at any time an amount deemed by subsection (1) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn in the manner and at the time provided under this Part, property of the person and property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust, is deemed

(a) to be held, from the time the amount was collected by the person, in trust for Her Majesty, separate and apart from the property of the person, whether or not the property is subject to a security interest, ...

...

... and the proceeds of the property shall be paid to the Receiver General in priority to all security interests.

107 Yet no provision of the *CCAA* provides for the continuation of this deemed trust after the *CCAA* is brought into play.

108 In short, Parliament has imposed *two* explicit conditions, or "building blocks", for survival under the *CCAA* of deemed trusts created by the *ITA*, *CPP*, and *EIA*. Had Parliament intended to likewise preserve under the *CCAA* deemed trusts created by the *ETA*, it would have included in the *CCAA* the sort of confirmatory provision that explicitly preserves other deemed trusts.

109 With respect, unlike Tysoe J.A., I do not find it "inconceivable that Parliament would specifically identify the *BIA* as an exception when enacting the current version of s. 222(3) of the *ETA* without considering the *CCAA* as a possible second exception" (2009 BCCA 205, 98 B.C.L.R. (4th) 242, [2009] G.S.T.C. 79 (B.C. C.A.), at para. 37). *All* of the deemed trust provisions excerpted above make explicit reference to the *BIA*. Section 222 of the *ETA* does not break the pattern. Given the near-identical wording of the four deemed trust provisions, it would have been surprising indeed had Parliament not addressed the *BIA* at all in the *ETA*.

110 Parliament's evident intent was to render GST deemed trusts inoperative upon the institution of insolvency proceedings. Accordingly, s. 222 mentions the *BIA* so as to *exclude* it from its ambit — rather than to *include* it, as do the *ITA*, the *CPP*, and the *EIA*.

111 Conversely, I note that *none* of these statutes mentions the *CCAA* expressly. Their specific reference to the *BIA* has no bearing on their interaction with the *CCAA*. Again, it is the confirmatory provisions *in the insolvency statutes* that determine whether a given deemed trust will subsist during insolvency proceedings.

112 Finally, I believe that chambers judges should not segregate GST monies into the Monitor's trust account during *CCAA* proceedings, as was done in this case. The result of Justice Deschamps's reasoning is that GST claims become unsecured under the *CCAA*. Parliament has deliberately chosen to nullify certain Crown super-priorities during insolvency; this is one such instance.

III

113 For these reasons, like Justice Deschamps, I would allow the appeal with costs in this Court and in the courts below and order that the $305,202.30 collected by LeRoy Trucking in respect of GST but not yet remitted to the Receiver General of Canada be subject to no deemed trust or priority in favour of the Crown.

***Abella J. (dissenting)*:**

114 The central issue in this appeal is whether s. 222 of the *Excise Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 ("*EIA*"), and specifically s. 222(3), gives priority during *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("*CCAA*"), proceedings to the Crown's deemed trust in unremitted GST. I agree with Tysoe J.A. that it does. It follows, in my respectful view, that a court's discretion under s. 11 of the *CCAA* is circumscribed accordingly.

115 Section 11 [1] of the *CCAA* stated:

> **11**. (1) Notwithstanding anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up Act*, where an application is made under this Act in respect of a company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make an order under this section.

To decide the scope of the court's discretion under s. 11, it is necessary to first determine the priority issue. Section 222(3), the provision of the *ETA* at issue in this case, states:

> **222 (3) Extension of trust** — Despite any other provision of this Act (except subsection (4)), any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*), any enactment of a province or any other law, if at any time an amount deemed by subsection (1) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn in the manner and at the time provided under this Part, property of the person and property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust, is deemed
>
> (a) to be held, from the time the amount was collected by the person, in trust for Her Majesty, separate and apart from the property of the person, whether or not the property is subject to a security interest, and
>
> (b) to form no part of the estate or property of the person from the time the amount was collected, whether or not the property has in fact been kept separate and apart from the estate or property of the person and whether or not the property is subject to a security interest
>
> and is property beneficially owned by Her Majesty in right of Canada despite any security interest in the property or in the proceeds thereof and the proceeds of the property shall be paid to the Receiver General in priority to all security interests.

116 Century Services argued that the *CCAA's* general override provision, s. 18.3(1), prevailed, and that the deeming provisions in s. 222 of the *ETA* were, accordingly, inapplicable during *CCAA* proceedings. Section 18.3(1) states:

> **18.3** (1) ... [N]otwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

117 As MacPherson J.A. correctly observed in *Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp. (Re)* (2005), 73 O.R. (3d) 737, [2005] G.S.T.C. 1 (Ont. C.A.), s. 222(3) of the *ETA* is in "clear conflict" with s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* (para. 31). Resolving the conflict between the two provisions is, essentially, what seems to me to be a relatively uncomplicated exercise in statutory interpretation: does the language reflect a clear legislative intention? In my view it does. The deemed trust provision, s. 222(3) of the *ETA*, has unambiguous language stating that it operates notwithstanding any law except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 ("*BIA*").

118 By expressly excluding only one statute from its legislative grasp, and by unequivocally stating that it applies despite any other law anywhere in Canada *except* the *BIA*, s. 222(3) has defined its boundaries in the clearest possible terms. I am in complete agreement with the following comments of MacPherson J.A. in *Ottawa Senators*:

> The legislative intent of s. 222(3) of the *ETA* is clear. If there is a conflict with "any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*)", s. 222(3) prevails. In these words Parliament did two things: it decided that s. 222(3) should trump all other federal laws and, importantly, it addressed the topic of exceptions to its trumping decision and identified a single exception, the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* .... The *BIA* and the *CCAA* are closely related federal statutes. I cannot conceive that Parliament would specifically identify the *BIA* as an exception, but accidentally fail to consider the *CCAA* as a possible second exception. In my view, the omission of the *CCAA* from s. 222(3) of the *ETA* was almost certainly a considered omission. [para. 43]

119 MacPherson J.A.'s view that the failure to exempt the *CCAA* from the operation of the *ETA* is a reflection of a clear legislative intention, is borne out by how the *CCAA* was subsequently changed after s. 18.3(1) was enacted in 1997. In 2000, when s. 222(3) of the *ETA* came into force, amendments were also introduced to the *CCAA*. Section 18.3(1) was not amended.

120 The failure to amend s. 18.3(1) is notable because its effect was to protect the legislative *status quo*, notwithstanding repeated requests from various constituencies that s. 18.3(1) be amended to make the priorities in the *CCAA* consistent with those in the *BIA*. In 2002, for example, when Industry Canada conducted a review of the *BIA* and the *CCAA*, the Insolvency Institute of Canada and the Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals recommended that the priority regime

under the *BIA* be extended to the *CCAA* (Joint Task Force on Business Insolvency Law Reform, *Report* (March 15, 2002), Sch. B, proposal 71, at pp. 37-38). The same recommendations were made by the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce in its 2003 report, *Debtors and Creditors Sharing the Burden: A Review of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*; by the Legislative Review Task Force (Commercial) of the Insolvency Institute of Canada and the Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals in its 2005 *Report on the Commercial Provisions of Bill C-55*; and in 2007 by the Insolvency Institute of Canada in a submission to the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce commenting on reforms then under consideration.

121 Yet the *BIA* remains the only exempted statute under s. 222(3) of the *ETA*. Even after the 2005 decision in *Ottawa Senators* which confirmed that the *ETA* took precedence over the *CCAA*, there was no responsive legislative revision. I see this lack of response as relevant in this case, as it was in *R. v. Tele-Mobile Co.*, 2008 SCC 12, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 305 (S.C.C.), where this Court stated:

> While it cannot be said that legislative silence is necessarily determinative of legislative intention, in this case the silence is Parliament's answer to the consistent urging of Telus and other affected businesses and organizations that there be express language in the legislation to ensure that businesses can be reimbursed for the reasonable costs of complying with evidence-gathering orders. I see the legislative history as reflecting Parliament's intention that compensation not be paid for compliance with production orders. [para. 42]

122 All this leads to a clear inference of a deliberate legislative choice to protect the deemed trust in s. 222(3) from the reach of s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA*.

123 Nor do I see any "policy" justification for interfering, through interpretation, with this clarity of legislative intention. I can do no better by way of explaining why I think the policy argument cannot succeed in this case, than to repeat the words of Tysoe J.A. who said:

> I do not dispute that there are valid policy reasons for encouraging insolvent companies to attempt to restructure their affairs so that their business can continue with as little disruption to employees and other stakeholders as possible. It is appropriate for the courts to take such policy considerations into account, but only if it is in connection with a matter that has not been considered by Parliament. Here, Parliament must be taken to have weighed policy considerations when it enacted the amendments to the *CCAA* and *ETA* described above. As Mr. Justice MacPherson observed at para. 43 of *Ottawa Senators*, it is inconceivable that Parliament would specifically identify the *BIA* as an exception when enacting the current version of s. 222(3) of the *ETA* without considering the *CCAA* as a possible second exception. I also make the observation that the 1992 set of amendments to the *BIA* enabled proposals to be binding on secured creditors and, while there is more flexibility under the *CCAA*, it is possible for an insolvent company to attempt to restructure under the auspices of the *BIA*. [para. 37]

124 Despite my view that the clarity of the language in s. 222(3) is dispositive, it is also my view that even the application of other principles of interpretation reinforces this conclusion. In their submissions, the parties raised the following as being particularly relevant: the Crown relied on the principle that the statute which is "later in time" prevails; and Century Services based its argument on the principle that the general provision gives way to the specific (*generalia specialibus non derogani*).

125 The "later in time" principle gives priority to a more recent statute, based on the theory that the legislature is presumed to be aware of the content of existing legislation. If a new enactment is inconsistent with a prior one, therefore, the legislature is presumed to have intended to derogate from the earlier provisions (Ruth Sullivan, *Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes* (5th ed. 2008), at pp. 346-47; Pierre-André Côté, *The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada* (3rd ed. 2000), at p. 358).

126 The exception to this presumptive displacement of pre-existing inconsistent legislation, is the *generalia specialibus non derogant* principle that "[a] more recent, general provision will not be construed as affecting an earlier, special provision" (Côté, at p. 359). Like a Russian Doll, there is also an exception within this exception, namely, that an earlier, specific provision may

in fact be "overruled" by a subsequent general statute if the legislature indicates, through its language, an intention that the general provision prevails (*Doré c. Verdun (Municipalité)*, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862 (S.C.C.)).

127 The primary purpose of these interpretive principles is to assist in the performance of the task of determining the intention of the legislature. This was confirmed by MacPherson J.A. in *Ottawa Senators*, at para. 42:

> [T]he overarching rule of statutory interpretation is that statutory provisions should be interpreted to give effect to the intention of the legislature in enacting the law. This primary rule takes precedence over all maxims or canons or aids relating to statutory interpretation, including the maxim that the specific prevails over the general (*generalia specialibus non derogant*). As expressed by Hudson J. in *Canada v. Williams*, [1944] S.C.R. 226, ... at p. 239 ...:
>
> > The maxim *generalia specialibus non derogant* is relied on as a rule which should dispose of the question, but the maxim is not a rule of law but a rule of construction and bows to the intention of the legislature, if such intention can reasonably be gathered from all of the relevant legislation.

(See also Côté, at p. 358, and Pierre-Andre Côté, with the collaboration of S. Beaulac and M. Devinat, *Interprétation des lois* (4th ed. 2009), at para. 1335.)

128 I accept the Crown's argument that the "later in time" principle is conclusive in this case. Since s. 222(3) of the *ETA* was enacted in 2000 and s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* was introduced in 1997, s. 222(3) is, on its face, the later provision. This chronological victory can be displaced, as Century Services argues, if it is shown that the more recent provision, s. 222(3) of the *ETA*, is a general one, in which case the earlier, specific provision, s. 18.3(1), prevails (*generalia specialibus non derogant).* But, as previously explained, the prior specific provision does not take precedence if the subsequent general provision appears to "overrule" it. This, it seems to me, is precisely what s. 222(3) achieves through the use of language stating that it prevails despite any law of Canada, of a province, or "any other law" *other than the BIA.* Section 18.3(1) of the *CCAA*, is thereby rendered inoperative for purposes of s. 222(3).

129 It is true that when the *CCAA* was amended in 2005, [2] s. 18.3(1) was re-enacted as s. 37(1) (S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 131). Deschamps J. suggests that this makes s. 37(1) the new, "later in time" provision. With respect, her observation is refuted by the operation of s. 44(f) of the *Interpretation Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, which expressly deals with the (non) effect of re-enacting, without significant substantive changes, a repealed provision (see *Canada (Attorney General) v. Canada (Public Service Staff Relations Board)*, [1977] 2 F.C. 663 (Fed. C.A.), dealing with the predecessor provision to s. 44(f)). It directs that new enactments not be construed as "new law" unless they differ in substance from the repealed provision:

> **44.** Where an enactment, in this section called the "former enactment", is repealed and another enactment, in this section called the "new enactment", is substituted therefor,
>
> ...
>
> (f) except to the extent that the provisions of the new enactment are not in substance the same as those of the former enactment, the new enactment shall not be held to operate as new law, but shall be construed and have effect as a consolidation and as declaratory of the law as contained in the former enactment;

Section 2 of the *Interpretation Act* defines an enactment as "an Act or regulation or *any portion of an Act or regulation*".

130 Section 37(1) of the current *CCAA* is almost identical to s. 18.3(1). These provisions are set out for ease of comparison, with the differences between them underlined:

> **37.**(1) Subject to subsection (2), despite any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as being held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

> **18.3** (1) Subject to subsection (2), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

131 The application of s. 44(*f*) of the *Interpretation Act* simply confirms the government's clearly expressed intent, found in Industry Canada's clause-by-clause review of Bill C-55, where s. 37(1) was identified as "a technical amendment to reorder the provisions of this Act". During second reading, the Hon. Bill Rompkey, then the Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate, confirmed that s. 37(1) represented only a technical change:

> On a technical note relating to the treatment of deemed trusts for taxes, the bill [*sic*] makes no changes to the underlying policy intent, despite the fact that in the case of a restructuring under the CCAA, sections of the act [*sic*] were repealed and substituted with renumbered versions due to the extensive reworking of the CCAA.
>
> (*Debates of the Senate*, vol. 142, 1st Sess., 38th Parl., November 23, 2005, at p. 2147)

132 Had the substance of s. 18.3(1) altered in any material way when it was replaced by s. 37(1), I would share Deschamps J.'s view that it should be considered a new provision. But since s. 18.3(1) and s. 37(1) are the same in substance, the transformation of s. 18.3(1) into s. 37(1) has no effect on the interpretive queue, and s. 222(3) of the *ETA* remains the "later in time" provision (Sullivan, at p. 347).

133 This means that the deemed trust provision in s. 222(3) of the *ETA* takes precedence over s. 18.3(1) during *CCAA* proceedings. The question then is how that priority affects the discretion of a court under s. 11 of the *CCAA*.

134 While s. 11 gives a court discretion to make orders notwithstanding the *BIA* and the *Winding-up Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. W-11, that discretion is not liberated from the operation of any other federal statute. Any exercise of discretion is therefore circumscribed by whatever limits are imposed by statutes *other* than the *BIA* and the *Winding-up Act*. That includes the *ETA*. The chambers judge in this case was, therefore, required to respect the priority regime set out in s. 222(3) of the *ETA*. Neither s. 18.3(1) nor s. 11 of the *CCAA* gave him the authority to ignore it. He could not, as a result, deny the Crown's request for payment of the GST funds during the *CCAA* proceedings.

135 Given this conclusion, it is unnecessary to consider whether there was an express trust.

136 I would dismiss the appeal.

Appeal allowed.

Pourvoi accueilli.

Appendix

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (as at December 13, 2007)

> **11. (1) Powers of court** — Notwithstanding anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up Act*, where an application is made under this Act in respect of a company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make an order under this section.
>
> ...
>
> **(3) Initial application court orders** — A court may, on an initial application in respect of a company, make an order on such terms as it may impose, effective for such period as the court deems necessary not exceeding thirty days,
>
> (a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in subsection (i);

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and

(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of or proceeding with any other action, suit or proceeding against the company.

(4) Other than initial application court orders — A court may, on an application in respect of a company other than an initial application, make an order on such terms as it may impose,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, for such period as the court deems necessary, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in subsection (1);

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and

(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of or proceeding with any other action, suit or proceeding against the company.

...

(6) Burden of proof on application — The court shall not make an order under subsection (3) or (4) unless

(a) the applicant satisfies the court that circumstances exist that make such an order appropriate; and

(b) in the case of an order under subsection (4), the applicant also satisfies the court that the applicant has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence.

11.4 (1) Her Majesty affected — An order made under section 11 may provide that

(a) Her Majesty in right of Canada may not exercise rights under subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* or any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, in respect of the company if the company is a tax debtor under that subsection or provision, for such period as the court considers appropriate but ending not later than

(i) the expiration of the order,

(ii) the refusal of a proposed compromise by the creditors or the court,

(iii) six months following the court sanction of a compromise or arrangement,

(iv) the default by the company on any term of a compromise or arrangement, or

(v) the performance of a compromise or arrangement in respect of the company; and\

(b) Her Majesty in right of a province may not exercise rights under any provision of provincial legislation in respect of the company where the company is a debtor under that legislation and the provision has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

for such period as the court considers appropriate but ending not later than the occurrence or time referred to in whichever of subparagraphs (*a*)(i) to (v) may apply.

(2) When order ceases to be in effect — An order referred to in subsection (1) ceases to be in effect if

(a) the company defaults on payment of any amount that becomes due to Her Majesty after the order is made and could be subject to a demand under

(i) subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(ii) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(iii) under any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

(A) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(B) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection; or

(b) any other creditor is or becomes entitled to realize a security on any property that could be claimed by Her Majesty in exercising rights under

(i) subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(ii) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(iii) any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

(A) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(B) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection.

(3) Operation of similar legislation — An order made under section 11, other than an order referred to in subsection (1) of this section, does not affect the operation of

(a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(c) any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

and for the purpose of paragraph (*c*), the provision of provincial legislation is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (*c*)(i), or as subsection 23(2) of the *Canada Pension Plan* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (*c*)(ii), and in respect of any related interest, penalties or other amounts.

18.3 (1) Deemed trusts — Subject to subsection (2), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

(2) Exceptions — Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act* (each of which is in this subsection referred to as a "federal provision") nor in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under any law of a province that creates a deemed trust the sole purpose of which is to ensure remittance to Her Majesty in right of the province of amounts deducted or withheld under a law of the province where

(a) that law of the province imposes a tax similar in nature to the tax imposed under the *Income Tax Act* and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as the amounts referred to in subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, or

(b) the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan*, that law of the province establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as amounts referred to in subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan*,

and for the purpose of this subsection, any provision of a law of a province that creates a deemed trust is, notwithstanding any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as the corresponding federal provision.

18.4 (1) Status of Crown claims — In relation to a proceeding under this Act, all claims, including secured claims, of Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province or any body under an enactment respecting workers' compensation, in this section and in section 18.5 called a "workers' compensation body", rank as unsecured claims.

...

(3) Operation of similar legislation — Subsection (1) does not affect the operation of

(a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(c) any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

and for the purpose of paragraph (*c*), the provision of provincial legislation is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (*c*)(i), or as subsection 23(2) of the *Canada Pension Plan* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (*c*)(ii), and in respect of any related interest, penalties or other amounts.

...

20. [Act to be applied conjointly with other Acts] — The provisions of this Act may be applied together with the provisions of any Act of Parliament or of the legislature of any province, that authorizes or makes provision for the sanction of compromises or arrangements between a company and its shareholders or any class of them.

***Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (as at September 18, 2009)**

11. General power of court — Despite anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, if an application is made under this Act in respect of a debtor company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

...

11.02 (1) Stays, etc. — initial application — A court may, on an initial application in respect of a debtor company, make an order on any terms that it may impose, effective for the period that the court considers necessary, which period may not be more than 30 days,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*;

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and

(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of any action, suit or proceeding against the company.

(2) Stays, etc. — other than initial application — A court may, on an application in respect of a debtor company other than an initial application, make an order, on any terms that it may impose,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, for any period that the court considers necessary, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in paragraph (1)(*a*);

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and

(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of any action, suit or proceeding against the company.

(3) Burden of proof on application — The court shall not make the order unless

(a) the applicant satisfies the court that circumstances exist that make the order appropriate; and

(b) in the case of an order under subsection (2), the applicant also satisfies the court that the applicant has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence.

...

11.09 (1) Stay — Her Majesty — An order made under section 11.02 may provide that

(a) Her Majesty in right of Canada may not exercise rights under subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* or any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, in respect of the company if the company is a tax debtor under that subsection or provision, for the period that the court considers appropriate but ending not later than

(i) the expiry of the order,

(ii) the refusal of a proposed compromise by the creditors or the court,

(iii) six months following the court sanction of a compromise or an arrangement,

(iv) the default by the company on any term of a compromise or an arrangement, or

(v) the performance of a compromise or an arrangement in respect of the company; and

(b) Her Majesty in right of a province may not exercise rights under any provision of provincial legislation in respect of the company if the company is a debtor under that legislation and the provision has a purpose similar to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, and the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

for the period that the court considers appropriate but ending not later than the occurrence or time referred to in whichever of subparagraphs (*a*)(i) to (v) that may apply.

(2) When order ceases to be in effect — The portions of an order made under section 11.02 that affect the exercise of rights of Her Majesty referred to in paragraph (1)(*a*) or (*b*) cease to be in effect if

(a) the company defaults on the payment of any amount that becomes due to Her Majesty after the order is made and could be subject to a demand under

(i) subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(ii) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(iii) any provision of provincial legislation that has a purpose similar to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, and the sum

(A) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(B) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection; or

(b) any other creditor is or becomes entitled to realize a security on any property that could be claimed by Her Majesty in exercising rights under

(i) subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(ii) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(iii) any provision of provincial legislation that has a purpose similar to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, and the sum

(A) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(B) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection.

(3) Operation of similar legislation — An order made under section 11.02, other than the portions of that order that affect the exercise of rights of Her Majesty referred to in paragraph (1)(*a*) or (*b*), does not affect the operation of

(a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(c) any provision of provincial legislation that has a purpose similar to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, and the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

and for the purpose of paragraph (*c*), the provision of provincial legislation is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (*c*)(i), or as subsection 23(2) of the *Canada Pension Plan* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (*c*)(ii), and in respect of any related interest, penalties or other amounts.

37. (1) Deemed trusts — Subject to subsection (2), despite any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as being held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

(2) Exceptions — Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act* (each of which is in this subsection referred to as a "federal provision"), nor does it apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under any law of a province that creates a deemed trust the sole purpose of which is to ensure remittance to Her Majesty in right of the province of amounts deducted or withheld under a law of the province if

(a) that law of the province imposes a tax similar in nature to the tax imposed under the *Income Tax Act* and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as the amounts referred to in subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, or

(b) the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan*, that law of the province establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as amounts referred to in subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan*,

and for the purpose of this subsection, any provision of a law of a province that creates a deemed trust is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as the corresponding federal provision.

***Excise Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 (as at December 13, 2007)**

222. (1) [Deemed] Trust for amounts collected — Subject to subsection (1.1), every person who collects an amount as or on account of tax under Division II is deemed, for all purposes and despite any security interest in the amount, to hold the amount in trust for Her Majesty in right of Canada, separate and apart from the property of the person and from property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, until the amount is remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn under subsection (2).

(1.1) Amounts collected before bankruptcy — Subsection (1) does not apply, at or after the time a person becomes a bankrupt (within the meaning of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act)*, to any amounts that, before that time, were collected or became collectible by the person as or on account of tax under Division II.

...

(3) Extension of trust — Despite any other provision of this Act (except subsection (4)), any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act)*, any enactment of a province or any other law, if at any time an amount deemed by subsection (1) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn in the manner and at the time provided under this Part, property of the person and property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust, is deemed

(a) to be held, from the time the amount was collected by the person, in trust for Her Majesty, separate and apart from the property of the person, whether or not the property is subject to a security interest, and

(b) to form no part of the estate or property of the person from the time the amount was collected, whether or not the property has in fact been kept separate and apart from the estate or property of the person and whether or not the property is subject to a security interest

and is property beneficially owned by Her Majesty in right of Canada despite any security interest in the property or in the proceeds thereof and the proceeds of the property shall be paid to the Receiver General in priority to all security interests.

***Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 (as at December 13, 2007)**

67. (1) Property of bankrupt — The property of a bankrupt divisible among his creditors shall not comprise

(a) property held by the bankrupt in trust for any other person,

(b) any property that as against the bankrupt is exempt from execution or seizure under any laws applicable in the province within which the property is situated and within which the bankrupt resides, or

(b.1) such goods and services tax credit payments and prescribed payments relating to the essential needs of an individual as are made in prescribed circumstances and are not property referred to in paragraph (*a*) or (*b*),

but it shall comprise

(c) all property wherever situated of the bankrupt at the date of his bankruptcy or that may be acquired by or devolve on him before his discharge, and

(d) such powers in or over or in respect of the property as might have been exercised by the bankrupt for his own benefit.

(2) Deemed trusts — Subject to subsection (3), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a bankrupt shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty for the purpose of paragraph (1)(*a*) unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

(3) Exceptions — Subsection (2) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act* (each of which is in this subsection referred to as a "federal provision") nor in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under any law of a province that creates a deemed trust the sole purpose of which is to ensure remittance to Her Majesty in right of the province of amounts deducted or withheld under a law of the province where

(a) that law of the province imposes a tax similar in nature to the tax imposed under the *Income Tax Act* and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as the amounts referred to in subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, or

(b) the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan*, that law of the province establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as amounts referred to in subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan*,

and for the purpose of this subsection, any provision of a law of a province that creates a deemed trust is, notwithstanding any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as the corresponding federal provision.

86. (1) Status of Crown claims — In relation to a bankruptcy or proposal, all provable claims, including secured claims, of Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province or of any body under an Act respecting workers' compensation, in this section and in section 87 called a "workers' compensation body", rank as unsecured claims.

...

(3) Exceptions — Subsection (1) does not affect the operation of

(a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*;

(b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts; or

(c) any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

and for the purpose of paragraph (*c*), the provision of provincial legislation is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (*c*)(i), or as subsection 23(2) of the *Canada Pension Plan* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (*c*)(ii), and in respect of any related interest, penalties or other amounts.

Footnotes

1 Section 11 was amended, effective September 18, 2009, and now states:

11. Despite anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, if an application is made under this Act in respect of a debtor company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

2 The amendments did not come into force until September 18, 2009.

End of Document

TAB 24

CITATION: U.S. Steel Canada Inc. (Re), 2015 ONSC 5103
COURT FILE NO.: CV-14-10695-00CL
DATE: 20150813

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PROPOSED PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT WITH RESPECT TO U.S. STEEL CANADA INC.

BEFORE: Mr. Justice H. Wilton-Siegel

COUNSEL: *M. Barrack, J. Willis* and *M. Shapiro*, for United States Steel Corporation

R. Paul Steep and *S. Kour*, for the Applicant

A. Mark, R. Chadwick and *T. Jackson,* for the Province of Ontario

G. Capern, L. Harmer and *D. Cooney,* for the United Steel Workers Union and USW Local 8782

S. White, for the United Steel Workers Union, Local 1005

C. Kopach, for Robert and Sharon Milbourne

A. Hatnay and *B. Walancik,* for the Non-unionized active employees and retirees

R. Staley and *K. Zych* for the Monitor

HEARD: May 5, 2015

ENDORSEMENT

[1] This was a motion to schedule the timing of the hearing of a motion brought by United States Steel Corporation ("USS") to determine the amount and status of its claims in these proceedings. In particular, the motion sought directions on the extent and nature of production and discovery in respect of certain objections brought by the Province of Ontario (the "Province"), the United Steel Workers, USW Local 8782 and USW Local 1005 (collectively, the "USW"), and Robert and Sharon Milbourne (collectively, the "Milbournes"). The objections raise fundamental issues regarding the determination of claims for which the objecting parties seek an order of "equitable subordination" in proceedings brought under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (the "CCAA").

[2] The Province, the USW and the Milbournes seek a reduction or a subordination of the USS Claims (as defined below) to the claims of the other creditors of USSC for all purposes of the CCAA proceedings. In particular, they seek such subordination for purposes of determination of

the amount that USS may bid in any credit bid and for purposes of voting to approve any restructuring plan that may be proposed.

[3] At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court advised that, for written reasons to follow, the claims of the Province would be determined pursuant to the Claims Process Order within these CCAA proceedings and established a schedule for the next steps in that determination process. The Court also concluded that the claims of the USW, and of the Milbournes, other than their debt re-characterization claims, were not to be determined pursuant to the Claims Process Order and, after discussion with counsel, scheduled submissions by the parties regarding the appropriate forum for the determination of these claims. This Endorsement sets out the reasons for the Court's decision that the claims of the USW and the Milbournes, other than their debt re-characterization claims, are to be determined outside of the Claims Process Order, as well as the Court's decision regarding the forum for determination of such claims.

Background

[4] On September 16, 2014, U.S. Steel Canada Inc. ("USSC" or the "Applicant") was granted protection under the CCAA pursuant to an initial order of Morawetz R.S.J. (as amended and restated from time to time, the "Initial Order").

[5] USSC's objective in the CCAA process is to restructure its business by implementing either (i) a consensual CCAA restructuring plan, or (ii) one or more sales of its assets and business as a going concern pursuant to a sale and restructuring/recapitalization process that it has commenced and which was approved by the Court pursuant to an order dated April 2, 2015 (the "SARP").

[6] On November 13, 2014, the Court granted a claims process order (the "Claims Process Order") setting out, among other things, the procedure for the filing of proofs of claim, the Monitor's role in the review of claims, and the procedure for the resolution of claims.

[7] The Claims Process Order set out a specific procedure (the "USS Claims Determination Process") for the review and determination of the claims of USS, U.S. Steel Holdings, Inc., U.S. Steel Canada Limited Partnership, and any affiliates of USS, other than USSC or a subsidiary of USSC (the "USS Claims").

[8] The USS Claims Determination Process contemplated that the Monitor would prepare a report detailing its review of the USS Claims and then promptly seek a hearing to schedule a motion to determine such USS Claims. The Claims Process Order provided that the USS Claims would not be determined to be Proven Claims (as defined in the Claims Process Order) without Court approval.

[9] In accordance with the USS Claims Determination Process, USS and its subsidiaries filed 14 proofs of claim with the Monitor, some of which have since been amended. In aggregate, the proofs of claim set out a non-contingent secured claim in the amount of U.S. $122,471,525, non-contingent unsecured claims in the aggregate amounts of U.S. $127,855,104 and $1,847,169,934, and a contingent secured claim in the amount of $78,761,395.

[10] In connection with the USS Claims Determination Process, the Monitor filed a Seventh Report dated March 9, 2015 (the "Seventh Report") and a Supplemental Seventh Report dated April 29, 2015 (the "Supplementary Report"), describing its review of the USS Claims. The Monitor recommended that USS bring a motion for Court approval of its claims, and that, subject to the Court's determination of any objections to the USS Claims, USS be found to have Proven Claims in the full amounts claimed for the non-contingent claims. The Monitor also recommended leaving the contingent claims to be determined at a later date, as and when appropriate in the proceedings.

[11] On March 13, 2015, in accordance with the Monitor's recommendation, USS served a Notice of Motion for Court approval of the USS Claims.

[12] On March 18, 2015, a hearing to schedule the motion was held. The Court issued an endorsement setting a deadline of April 14, 2015 for the delivery of objections, and requiring the parties to return on April 24, 2015 to address a scheduling and litigation protocol.

[13] On April 14, 2015, four objections to the USS motion (the "Objections") were delivered by the following parties (collectively, the "Objecting Parties"): (i) the Province, (ii) the USW, (iii) representative counsel on behalf of the non-USW active salaried employees and retirees of USSC ("Representative Counsel"), and (iv) the Milbournes, each in their individual capacities as beneficiaries of a retirement benefits contract originally entered into by Stelco Inc. ("Stelco").

[14] On April 24, 2015, counsel to USSC, the Monitor, three of the Objecting Parties (the Province, the USW, and Representative Counsel), and USS appeared in chambers but were unable to settle a process and timetable for the determination of the USS Claims. A further case conference was held on April 30, 2014 to address the process and timetable, at which time it was agreed that the Objection of the Representative Counsel would be deferred and that a hearing would be scheduled for May 5, 2015 to address the process and timetable for the hearing of the Objections of the Province, the USW and the Milbournes.

[15] At the hearing on May 5, 2015, the parties addressed the substantive issue of whether the claims of the Province, the USW and the Milbournes were to be determined pursuant of the Claims Process Order, together with more procedural and timing issues that would follow after such a determination. This Endorsement does not address any of the latter issues for the reason that no material determinations were made other than to set a schedule for a subsequent case management conference to review the status of documentary production and the scheduling of discoveries, and any unresolved issues in respect thereof, regarding the process for determination of the Province's Objection and the similar claims of the USW and the Milbournes.

[16] This Endorsement is divided into three parts. In the first part, the Court summarizes the claims asserted in the Objections of each of the Province, the USW and the Milbournes. In the second part, the Court sets out its reasons for its previously announced decision that the claims of the Province set out in its Objection, and the similar claims of the USW and the Milbournes, would be determined pursuant to the Claims Process Order in the CCAA proceedings but that the remaining claims of the USW and of the Milbournes, set out in their respective Objections, would not. In the third part, the Court sets out its conclusions regarding the proper forum for the determination of these remaining claims of the USW and the Milbournes.

The Objections of the Province, the USW and the Milbournes

[17] The following summarizes briefly the claims set out in the Objections of the Province, the USW and the Milbournes, and adds certain observations concerning these claims that are relevant for the issues addressed in this Endorsement.

The Objection of the Province

[18] The Province says its Objection relates to financial issues, which it describes as relating to the proper characterization of the debt and the validity of the security. While it has provided the list of factual issues for which it seeks production and/or discovery, the Province has not provided any greater clarification regarding the specific legal issues that it intends to raise in respect of the USS Claim.

[19] It is my understanding, however, that, essentially, the Province intends to make two allegations: (1) that given the terms of the USS loans to USSC, and the circumstances in which the loans were made, such loans should substantively be characterized, in whole or in part, as equity; and (2) that given the circumstances in which the loans were made, the security for the loans should be invalidated pursuant to federal and/or provincial legislation pertaining to fraudulent preferences or fraudulent assignments.

[20] Although USS disputes the allegations of the Province in its Objection, USS is prepared to have these issues determined by the Court under the process contemplated by the Claims Process Order. The claim that the USS loans are, in substance, debt and should be so treated for the purposes of these CCAA proceedings is referred to herein as a "debt re-characterization claim".

The Objection of the USW

[21] The Union broadly categorizes its objections as follows:

(a) an objection to the granting of security interests on the assets of USSC;

(b) an objection to the characterization of much of the USS Claim as debt when it is properly characterized as equity; and

(c) an objection grounded in USS's conduct in relation to its Canadian plants, unionized pensioners, pension plan members and beneficiaries, which gives rise to claims of oppression and breaches of fiduciary duty.

By way of overview, the USW submits that USS, as the shareholder of USSC, directed the operations of USSC in a manner that has caused it to significantly underperform, thereby incurring substantial losses rather than achieving profitability and requiring it to incur significant debt. In addition, the USW says that such actions undermined the ability of USSC to meet its on-going funding obligations to the USW pension plans of USSC. The USW argues that, as a result, USS has diluted the potential recoveries of the USW members and the USW pension plan beneficiaries in this CCAA proceeding. In Schedule "A" to this Endorsement, I have set out an

excerpt from the USW Objection which summarizes the claims asserted by the USW in somewhat greater detail.

[22] The USW acknowledges that the first two claims overlap significantly, if not completely, with the claims raised by the Province in its Objection. Accordingly, in this section, I will deal only with the claims of oppression and breaches of fiduciary duty. The following four aspects of these claims are relevant.

[23] First, the USW's claims for oppression and breach of fiduciary duty do not involve a determination that, in substance, the USS loans to USSC are properly chacterized as equity, that is, they are not debt re-characterization claims. Instead, for the purposes of these claims, the USW implicitly accepts that such loans are valid debt claims but argues, instead, that, as a result of USS' actions, the USW should be entitled to equitable relief that would have the substantive result of treating some or all of the loans as if they were equity.

[24] Second, as a related matter, the USW claims are not related to the actions of USS in extending the challenged loans to USSC, and in particular do not involve claims based on the terms of the loans or the circumstances in which they were made. Instead, the oppression claim is based on actions of USS that occurred subsequent to the extension of most of the USS loans to USSC and that pertain principally to the effective integration of the manufacturing operations of USSC within the USS group of companies. Similarly, the breach of fiduciary duty claim pertains to the administration of the USW pension plans after USS acquired USSC. This claim has no connection whatsoever to the USS loans to USSC.

[25] The USW claims proceed on the basis that actions of USS resulted in a loss to the USW Beneficiaries (as defined in the USW Objection) that is represented by the diminished recoveries that they will realize in these CCAA proceedings. In essence, the USW argues that USSC would not have needed to commence these CCAA proceedings but for the decisions taken by USS regarding the operations of USSC. As such, the USW claims are fundamentally claims against USS in its capacity as a shareholder of USSC and as an alleged administrator of the USW pension plans, rather than in its capacity as a creditor of USSC.

[26] Third, while the actions upon which the USW bases its action are clear, the nature of the USW claim and the remedy which it seeks can be approached in two different ways.

[27] In its broadest form, the USW relies upon the actions as a basis for application of the doctrine of equitable subordination for which the relief sought would be a subordination of some or all of the USS Claims to the claims of all other creditors of USSC for all purposes of these CCAA proceedings. In this form, the USW claim asserts that the actions of USS caused loss to all of the other creditors of USSC or resulted in an unfair benefit to USS at the expense of all such other creditors. To anticipate a conclusion reached below, this claim cannot proceed within the process contemplated by the Claims Process Order for the reason that the Court lacks the authority under the CCAA to apply the doctrine of equitable subordination.

[28] In its alternative form, the USW Objection asserts claims on behalf of the USW members and its retirees against USS of oppressive behavior for the purposes of section 241 of the *Canada Business Corporations Act*, R.S.O. 1985, c. C-44 and of breach of trust. The USW asserts that

the actions of USS giving rise to such claims caused loss that is specific to such USW members and retirees. Two aspects of the USW claims, as expressed in this manner, are significant for present purposes.

[29] First, these claims are asserted against USS and are grounded in actions of USS, as the controlling stakeholder of USSC, pertaining to the manner in which USSC was operated as a subsidiary of USS from and after 2007. They are not asserted against USSC and, to the extent USSC were to be joined as a party to any proceeding in which the claims were determined, such joinder would be only for procedural purposes.

[30] Second if the USW is successful in its oppression claim or its breach of fiduciary duty claim, any remedy ordered subordinating some or all of the USS Claims would be specific to the USW members and retirees. Because the USW claim is based on an allegation of oppressive behaviour that is specific to the USW members, the relief granted by a court would be directed to, and limited to, rectification of the oppressive conduct suffered by such members. It would not extend to other stakeholders of USSC. Any other stakeholder who also considered that the actions of USS constituted oppressive conduct in respect of such stakeholder would have to institute a separate action based on its specific circumstances. In this regard, the Province, which is the other major stakeholder of USSC, while it supports the USW Objection, has not commenced a similar action and, does not suggest that it would be entitled to benefit from any equitable relief granted to the USW in respect of the USW's oppression claim.

[31] Similarly, the USW claim that is based on allegations that USS breached fiduciary duties owed to USW members and pensioners in respect of the USW pension plans is necessarily limited to claims in respect of alleged breaches of duties alleged to be owing to such individuals personally. Any remedy granted would therefore be specific to these individuals, and the loss that they suffered, rather than in favour of all stakeholders.

The Objection of the Milbournes

[32] The Milbournes also submit that the USS Claims should be dismissed in their entirety or subordinated to the claims of the other unsecured creditors of USSC.

[33] Their Objection is also based on the actions of USS as the controlling shareholder of USSC, which are summarized as follows:

> All of the USS Claims arise either as a result of USS's accounting and legal treatment of its investment in the acquisition of Stelco or as a result of its accounting treatment of the normal costs of, and operating results from, USS' fully integrated operation and management of the acquired assets [being the assets of USSC] as part of its North American Flat Rolled Group and are either the result of transactions between itself and non-arm's length entities over which it had dominance and exercised total control at all material times, or are expenses incurred in the normal course of operating its flat rolled steel mills.

[34] Insofar as the Milbournes challenge the treatment of USS' investment in the acquisition of Stelco Inc., the Milbournes appear to raise claims similar to those asserted by the Province, that is a debt re-characterization claim. However, the principal assertion in the Milbournes'

Objection is that, in its management of the former assets of Stelco as part of its North American Flat Rolled Group of steel plants, USS took actions to idle the blast furnaces and steelmaking units of USSC which resulted in significant operating losses to USSC while USS continued to supply the former customer base of Stelco from its steel plants in the United States. This claim is based on factual assertions similar to, although not identical to, the facts asserted by the USW in respect of the oppression claim and claim for breach of trust asserted on behalf of its members. It is not related in any manner to the actions of USS in extending the challenged loans to USSC or the terms therof. As with the USW oppression claim, the relief sought is an order for subordination of some or all of the USS Claims. Given the relationship of the Milbournes to the situation as pension recipients, the Milbournes' Objection is essentially a claim for breach of a fiduciary duty owed by USS to them personally, although in the discussion below I have also considered the possible expression of the Milbournes' Objection as a claim for application of the doctrine of equitable subordination.

Analysis and Conclusions Regarding the Process for Determination of the Claims of the USW and the Milbournes other than their Debt Re-Characterization Claims

[35] To address the issue in this section of the Endorsement, I will first set out the applicable statutory provisions and the authority of the Court to adjudicate claims in CCAA proceedings. I will then address the issue of whether the claims of the USW and the Milbournes, other than their debt re-characterization claims, are properly determined within the summary process provided for in the Claims Process Order.

The Applicable Statutory Provisions

[36] The following provisions of the CCAA are relevant for the issues on this motion:

2. In this Act,

"Claim" means any indebtedness, liability or obligation of any kind that would be a claim provable within the meaning of section 2 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*;

"Equity Claim" means a claim that is in respect of an equity interest, including a claim for, among others,

(a) a dividend or similar payment,

(b) a return of capital,

(c) a redemption or retraction obligation,

(d) a monetary loss resulting from the ownership, purchase or sale of an equity interest or from the rescission, or, in Quebec, the annulment, of a purchase or sale of an equity interest, or

(e) contribution or indemnity in respect of a claim referred to in any of paragraphs (a) to (d);

"Equity Interest" means

> (a) in the case of a corporation other than an income trust, a share in the corporation -- or a warrant or option or another right to acquire a share in the corporation -- other than one that is derived from a convertible debt, and
>
> (b) in the case of an income trust, a unit in the income trust -- or a warrant or option or another right to acquire a unit in the income trust -- other than one that is derived from a convertible debt;

6. (8) No compromise or arrangement that provides for the payment of an equity claim is to be sanctioned by the court unless it provides that all claims that are not equity claims are to be paid in full before the equity claim is to be paid.

11. Despite anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, if an application is made under this Act in respect of a debtor company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

20. (1) For the purposes of this Act, the amount represented by a claim of any secured or unsecured creditor is to be determined as follows:

(*a*) the amount of an unsecured claim is the amount

> (i) in the case of a company in the course of being wound up under the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, proof of which has been made in accordance with that Act,
>
> (ii) in the case of a company that has made an authorized assignment or against which a bankruptcy order has been made under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, proof of which has been made in accordance with that Act, or
>
> (iii) in the case of any other company, proof of which might be made under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, but if the amount so provable is not admitted by the company, *the amount is to be determined by the court on summary application by the company or by the creditor*; and

(*b*) the amount of a secured claim is the amount, proof of which might be made under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* if the claim were unsecured, but the amount if not admitted by the company is, in the case of a company subject to pending proceedings under the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act* or the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, to be established by proof in the same manner

> as an unsecured claim under the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act* or the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, as the case may be, and, in the case of any other company, *the amount is to be determined by the court on summary application by the company or the creditor*. [emphasis added]
>
> 22.1 Despite subsection 22(1) creditors having equity claims are to be in the same class of creditors in relation to those claims unless the court orders otherwise and may not, as members of that class, vote at any meeting unless the court orders otherwise.
>
> 36.1 (1) Sections 38 and 95 to 101 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* apply, with any modifications that the circumstances require, in respect of a compromise or arrangement unless the compromise or arrangement provides otherwise.
>
> (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a reference in sections 38 and 95 to 101 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*
>
> > (*a*) to *"date of the bankruptcy"* is to be read as a reference to *"day on which proceedings commence under this Act"*;
> >
> > (*b*) to *"trustee"* is to be read as a reference to *"monitor"*; and
> >
> > (*c*) to *"bankrupt"*, *"insolvent person"* or *"debtor"* is to be read as a reference to *"debtor company"*.

[37] Section 2 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c.B-3 (the "BIA"), which is referenced in section 2 of the CCAA, provides that a "claim provable in bankruptcy" includes any claim or liability provable in proceedings under the BIA by a creditor. "Creditor" is defined in s. 2 of the BIA as a person having a claim provable as a claim under the Act. Section 121(1) of the BIA describes claims provable as follows:

> All debts and liabilities, present or future, to which the bankrupt is subject on the day on which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt or to which the bankrupt may become subject before the bankrupt's discharge by reason of any obligation incurred before the day on which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt shall be deemed to be claims provable in proceedings under this Act.

The Authority of the Court to Adjudicate Claims for Debt Re-Characterization and for Equitable Subordination

[38] An important issue on this motion is the authority of the Court to order that part or all of the USS Claims be re-characterized as equity for purposes of these CCAA proceedings or subordinated to the claims of all other unsecured creditors. The two determinations are not synonymous.

[39] The re-characterization of a debt claim as equity proceeds on the basis that a creditor's claim is, in substance, an "Equity Claim" for purposes of the CCAA, based on the terms of the

debt claim and the circumstances in which the debt claim arose, notwithstanding the creditor's characterization of its claim as debt.

[40] Equitable subordination proceeds on the basis that it is equitable to subordinate in whole or in part an otherwise valid debt claim based on some form of inequitable conduct on the part of a creditor that has resulted in loss to the other creditors of a debtor corporation generally or that has conferred an unfair advantage on the creditor. In this regard, I note that, in *Canada Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Canadian Commercial Bank*, [1992] 3 S. C. R. 558 at p. 609, Iacobucci J. referred to the following three-part test for the application of the principle of equitable subordination in the United States: (1) the claimant must have engaged in some type of inequitable conduct; (2) the misconduct must have resulted in injury to the creditors of the bankrupt or conferred an unfair advantage on the claimant; and (3) equitable subordination of the claim must not be inconsistent with the provisions of the bankruptcy statute.

[41] For the following reasons, I conclude that the Court has the authority to re-characterize a debt claim as equity in accordance with the test for equity implied by the definition of an "Equity Claim" or to invalidate security in favour of a creditor if the granting of such security constituted a fraudulent preference or a transaction at an undervalue. However, I am not persuaded that the Court has the authority under the CCAA to subordinate a valid debt claim to the claims of other creditors of the debtor corporation based on the actions of the creditor pursuant to the principle of equitable subordination.

[42] The CCAA establishes a structure for the adjudication of claims of creditors. It contemplates two categories of claims – "Claims" and "Equity Claims". Under the CCAA, a creditor's valid "Claim" is recognized for all purposes as such unless the Court determines that it shall be treated as an "Equity Claim" for purposes of proceedings under the statute. The definition of "Equity Claim" provides that an "Equity Claim" is "a claim that is in respect of an equity interest". "Equity Interest" is, in turn, defined in very specific terms to mean, in the case of a corporation, a share of the corporation.

[43] The CCAA also provides that, in certain circumstances, creditors can challenge prior transactions of the debtor corporation with a view to invalidating such transactions. Section 36.1 provides, among other things, that the provisions of the BIA pertaining to fraudulent preference transactions and transactions at an undervalue apply to proceedings under the CCAA on the basis provided for therein. Such provision has not been the subject of any litigation of which the Court is aware. However, on its face, such provision appears to be available to creditors to invalidate security granted by a debtor corporation in favour of a creditor if a fraudulent preference under section 95, as amended by section 36.1, can be demonstrated or possibly if a transfer at undervalue under section 96, as so amended, can be established.

[44] Given this framework, the Court has authority to determine whether a valid debt claim is, in substance, an equity claim, that is, to find that a debt claim should be re-characterized as equity. This is inherent in the definition of "Equity Claim" which, by the language of that definition, contains the test to be applied by a court - whether the claim represents, in substance, a share of the debtor corporation. As mentioned, the Court also has the authority to, in effect, subordinate a secured claim of a creditor if the Court determines that the security granted by the debtor constituted a fraudulent preference or a transaction at an undervalue pursuant to the

provisions of section 36.1 of the CCAA. Such a determination proceeds, however, on the basis of a determination that the actions and intentions of the debtor corporation constituted a fraudulent preference, or that the nature of the transaction itself together with the intentions of the debtor corporation, constituted a transaction at an undervalue. Neither a re-characterization of a debt claim nor an invalidation of security pursuant to section 36.1 of the CCAA would engage the principle of equitable subordination inasmuch as neither determination would address the question of whether the actions of the creditor call for a remedy in favour of the other creditors of the debtor corporation in the form of an equitable subordination of the creditor's claim.

[45] In this CCAA proceeding, however, the principal actions upon which the USW and the Milbournes base their claim of subordination do not fall within the circumstances that would trigger a remedy in the form of a re-characterization of debt as equity or in the form of an invalidation of security under section 36.1. The Court must therefore address the issue of whether a court also has the authority to determine that a valid "Claim" that is not an "Equity Claim", and that was not the subject of a transaction that falls within the circumstances addressed by section 36.1 of the CCAA, should be subordinated to the claims of the other unsecured creditors of a debtor corporation in reliance on equitable principles based on actions of the creditor.

[46] I am not aware of any Canadian case law in which the doctrine of equitable subordination has expressly applied. In *Canada Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Canadian Commercial Bank*, Iacobucci J., speaking for the Supreme Court, declined to express a view on whether the doctrine exists in Canada. In this proceeding, neither the USW nor the Milbournes submits that the doctrine exists in Canada. However, they argue that the Supreme Court has not excluded the possibility of application of the doctrine. They argue that, in addition to the authority to grant an order re-characterizing debt as equity, the Court also has the authority to grant an order of equitable subordination in the exercise of its statutory jurisdiction under section 11 of the CCAA.

[47] If it exists, the authority for the Court's jurisdiction to impose equitable subordination must be found in the authority granted to a court under section 11 of the CCAA. As set out above, section 11 provides that "the court ... may, *subject to the restrictions set out in this Act*, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances" (italics added).

[48] Given the definition of "Equity Claim" and the scope of section 36.1 of the CCAA, I am not persuaded that a court has authority under section 11 of the CCAA to subordinate a valid debt claim to the claims of other creditors, based on the actions of the creditor pursuant to the principle of equitable subordination as that doctrine is understood in the United States.

[49] There is no case law supporting such an authority. Moreover, given the silence of the Supreme Court on this issue when presented with the opportunity to affirm its existence in Canadian law, one might infer that the Supreme Court has, in effect, rejected the principle of equitable subordiantion. As mentioned, the Supreme Court refused to endorse the principle outside of the CCAA in *Canada Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Canadian Commercial Bank.* More recently, the Supreme Court also refused to endorse the principle within the operation of the CCAA: see, in particular, Deschamps J. in *Sun Indalex Finance, LLC v. United Steel Workers*,

[2013] 1 S.C.R. 271 at para. 77. Insofar as the issue remains open, however, I am of the opinion that the CCAA indicates as intention on the part of Parliament to exclude equitable subordination claims based on the conduct of a creditor for the following reason.

[50] Parliament could have provided the authority to order that a "Claim" should be treated as a subordinated claim, or as an "Equity Claim", based on conduct of the creditor. It chose not to do so. There is no language in the definition of "Equity Claim" that gives a court the authority to consider conduct of the creditor, including without limitation conduct in its capacity as a shareholder or as an alleged administrator of a pension plan, as a basis for subordinating a valid debt claim to the claims of other creditors, secured or otherwise. Similarly, Parliament could have drafted section 36.1 of the CCAA more broadly to extend beyond the specidic circumstances in sections 95 and 96 of the BIA. It has chosen instead not to make any such provision in respect of the authority of a court under the CCAA.

[51] In these circumstances, the absence of any provision that would permit the application off the doctrine of equitable subordination must be taken as indicative of an intention to exclude the operation of the doctrine under the CCAA. As a matter of statutory interpretation, therefore, I consider that the language of the definition of an "Equity Claim" and of the provisions of section 36.1 operates as a "restriction set out in the Act" for the purposes of section 11 of the CCAA which has the effect of limiting the authority of the Court in any determination regarding an "Equity Claim" or in any proceeding brought under section 36.1.

[52] I note that the conclusion expressed herein is consistent with the views expressed by Pepall J. (as she then was) in *Nelson Financial Group Ltd., Re.*, 2010 ONSC 6229 (S. Ct.) at para. 34 in respect of actions of a debtor corporation in relation to the issuance of an equity interest:

> In substance, the Styles' claim is for an equity obligation. At a minimum, it is a claim in respect of an equity interest as described in section 2 of the CCAA. Parliament's intention is clear and the types of claims advanced in this case by the preferred shareholders are captured by the language of the amended statute. While some, and most notably Professor Janis Sarra, advocated a statutory amendment that provided for some judicial flexibility in cases involving damages arising from egregious conduct on the part of a debtor corporation and its officers, Parliament opted not to include such a provision. Sections 6(8) and 22.1 allow for little if any flexibility. That said, they do provide for greater certainty in the appropriate treatment to be accorded equity claims.

I acknowledge that that the issue raised in *Nelson* was whether the actions of the debtor corporation could create a debt obligation. However, I do not see any difference in principle, for present purposes, between the circumstances in *Nelson* and the circumstances of the present case, in which it is suggested that the actions of the creditor could give rise to an "Equity Claim", that is, could support the conclusion that a broader test would apply beyond that contemplated by the definition of an "Equity Claim".

[53] In addition, I note that the Court must also have regard to the caution articulated by Deschamps J. in *Sun Indalex* at para. 82 that "courts should not use equity to do what they wish

Parliament had done through legislation." As addressed above, Parliament could have expressly introduced the law of equitable subordination into the CCAA at the time of the most recent amendments but chose not to do so. The Court must respect that policy decision.

Analysis and Conclusions Regarding the Process for Adjudication of the Equitable Subordination Claims of the USW and the Milbournes

[54] In furtherance of the determination of the secured and unsecured claims of USSC, including the USS Claims, the Court issued the Claims Process Order. It is agreed that the claims contemplated by the Objections of the Province and the USW, to the extent they constitute debt re-characterization claims and claims for the invalidation of security based on allegations of a fraudulent preference, a transaction at an undervalue, or similar concepts under provincial legislation, will be addressed pursuant to such process. The principal issue on this motion is whether the remaining claims described in the Objections of the USW and the Milbournes (herein, the "Subordination Claims") are properly addressed pursuant to the process set out in the Claims Process Order.

[55] As mentioned, the Court advised the parties at the conclusion of the hearing on the motion that it had concluded that the Subordination Claims were not appropriately dealt with pursuant to the Claims Process Order. I reach this conclusion for the following reasons.

[56] For the reasons set out above, I have concluded that the CCAA grants a court the following authority regarding the determination of the Objections of the Province, the USW and the Milbournes in these CCAA proceedings. First, the Court has the authority to address the debt re-characterization claims of the Province, the USW and the Milbournes that some or all of the USS Claims are "Equity Claims" according to the test implied by the definition of an "Equity Claim". Second, the Court has the authority to determine whether any security for the USS Claims should be invalidated pursuant to the provisions of section 36.1 of the CCAA. I would note that I am not addressing in this Endorsement whether such authority also extends to similar proceedings in respect of provincial insolvency legislation. Third, however, the Court does not otherwise have the authority to order that some or all of the USS Claims, if otherwise valid, shall be subordinated to the claims of the other creditors of USSC for the purposes of the CCAA proceedings based on application of the doctrine of equitable subordination to the actions of USS.

[57] As discussed above, the Subordination Claims of the USW and the Milbournes can be approached in two ways. Insofar as the Subordination Claims are based on application of the doctrine of equitable subordination, it necessarily follows from the conclusions set out above that the Court does not have the authority to determine the Subordination Claims pursuant to the Claims Process Order or otherwise.

[58] There remains a question, however, of the proper means of addressing the Subordination Claims of the USW and the Milbournes insofar as they are approached as claims of oppression and breach of fiduciary duty. Approached in this manner, the Subordination Claims are clearly third-party claims between USS and each of the USW and the Milbournes. The issue in the remainder of this section is therefore whether such third-party claims fall to be determined within the process contemplated by the Claims Process Order. I find that such claims

are not properly determined within such process by virtue of both the express language of the Claims Process Order as well as the provisions of the CCAA.

[59] The CCAA is a facilitative statute aimed at allowing financially distressed businesses to devise a plan of compromise or arrangement with their creditors with a view to becoming a viable business again. Section 19(1) of the CCAA provides, in effect, that a plan of compromise or arrangement may only deal with claims that relate to debts or liabilities to which a debtor company is subject at the time of commencement of proceedings under the CCAA or may become subject, prior to sanctioning of a plan of arrangement, by reason of an obligation incurred before the date of commencement of such proceedings.

[60] Section 20(1) provides the manner in which the amount of claims of secured and unsecured creditors are to be determined for the purposes of the CCAA. In particular, in the present circumstances, paragraphs 20(1)(a)(iii) and 20(1)(b) provide that "the amount is to be determined by the court on summary application by the company or the creditor", in respect of unsecured and secured claims, respectively.

[61] Neither the Claims Process Order nor the CCAA contemplate that inter-creditor claims will be addressed, or will be relevant, to a plan of arrangement or compromise under the CCAA.

[62] The Claims Process Order addresses the determination of "Claims" as defined therein. The relevant provisions of the definition of a "Claim" are as follows:

> (i) *any right or claim of any Person that may be asserted or made in whole or in part against the Applicant*, whether or not asserted or made, in connection with any indebtedness, liability or obligation of any kind whatsoever, and any interest accrued thereon or costs payable in respect thereof, including by reason of the commission of a tort (intentional or unintentional), by reason of any breach of contract or other agreement (oral or written), by reason of any breach of duty (including any legal, statutory, equitable or fiduciary duty) or by reason of any right of ownership of or title to property or assets or right to a trust or deemed trust (statutory, express, implied, resulting, constructive or otherwise), and whether or not any indebtedness, liability or obligation is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, unsecured, present or future, known or unknown, by guarantee, surety or otherwise, and whether or not any right or claim is executory or anticipatory in nature, including any right or ability of any Person to advance a claim for contribution or indemnity or otherwise with respect to any matter, action, cause or chose in action, whether existing at present or commenced in the future, *which indebtedness, liability or obligation, and any interest accrued thereon or costs payable in respect thereof (A) is based in whole or in part on facts existing prior to the Filing Date, (B) relates to a time period prior to the Filing Date, or (C) is a right or claim of any kind that would be a claim provable in bankruptcy within the meaning of the BIA*

> *had the Applicant become bankrupt on the Filing Date and includes an Equity Claim and a Secured Claim; ...* [emphasis added]

[63] As indicated in the italicized language, the definition of a "Claim" is restricted to a claim that may be asserted against USSC. Accordingly, on the plain reading of the Claims Process Order, the claims asserted by the USW and the Milbournes do not give rise to a "Claim" for purposes of the Claims Process Order. This restriction of the Claims Process Order to determination of claims asserted against USSC is also consistent with the language, and the policy, of the CCAA.

[64] In this regard, the Claims Process Order is consistent with, and reflects, the approach contemplated by section 20(1) of the CCAA insofar as it provides for a summary application to resolve the determination of any "Claim" under the CCAA. As set out above, a "Claim" for such purposes under the CCAA is a claim against the debtor company, in this case USSC. It does not extend to inter-creditor claims of the nature asserted by the USW and the Milbournes.

[65] The CCAA is directed towards the creation, approval and implementation of a plan of arrangement or compromise proposed between a debtor company and its secured and unsecured creditors, or any claim thereof. Section 19 sets out the only claims that may be dealt with by a compromise or arrangement. Section 19 uses the defined term "claim" throughout, evidencing an intention that only claims against a debtor company are to be the subject of a plan of arrangement or compromise under the CCAA. Similarly, as mentioned, section 20 addresses the determination of claims for the purposes of the CCAA. Again, the operative concept is a "claim" as defined under the CCAA. In addition, pursuant to section 22, the debtor company may establish classes of creditors for purposes of voting upon a plan of arrangement. Pursuant to section 22(2), the factors that determine a commonality of interest for inclusion of creditors in the same class are related to the "claims" of such creditors, as defined in section 2 of the CCAA. In short, the CCAA does not contemplate incorporation of inter-creditor claims into any plan of arrangement or compromise or into the voting process in respect of any proposed plan.

[66] There is, in fact, a strict separation between claims between a creditor and a debtor corporation, on the one hand, and between or among creditors, on the other hand. The former are determined pursuant to the summary application procedure, or otherwise, pursuant to section 20 of the CCAA. The Court's determination of such claims governs for all purposes of the CCAA proceeding proper. The latter are determined outside the process contemplated by section 20 of the CCAA unless specifically incorporated into the restructuring plan as approved by the parties or otherwise ordered. The Court's determination of such claims would govern only the respective rights and obligations of the particular creditors with respect to actual distributions by the debtor corporation.

The Forum for the Remaining Objections

[67] Given the foregoing determination, the Court must also address the forum for determination of the Subordination Claims of the USW and the Milbournes. For clarity, for the reason set out above, in considering this issue, I approach the Subordination Claims of the USW and the Milbournes as claims of oppressive behavior and of breach of fiduciary duty asserted by these parties against USS for which the remedy sought is an order subordinating some or all of the USS Claims to the claims of these parties.

[68] USS makes a number of arguments against determination of the Subordination Claims against it within the CCAA process. First, it argues that use of the CCAA proceedings to adjudicate inter-creditor claims not involving the debtor company is an impermissible use of the CCAA proceedings with the result that a court would lack jurisdiction to determine such an action. Second, USS argues that the Subordination Claims can only justify a monetary award if successful, which can just as easily be paid by USS directly out of its own assets as it could be paid by USSC pursuant to a plan of arrangement, even if subordination of the position of USS were ordered. Third, USS argues that it would be prejudiced in four respects from a procedural and/or substantive perspective if the Subordination Claims were determined under the CCAA process. Lastly, USS argues that the adjudication of the Subordination Claims within the CCAA process would complicate the adjudication of those claims by, for example, potentially involving unnecessary parties such as USSC and the Monitor. Conversely, it says that any efficiencies associated with determination under the CCAA process could equally be achieved outside that process by having a judge familiar with the CCAA proceedings hear the actions.

[69] The USW and the Milbournes make a number of different arguments which will be addressed in the anlaysis below. The Province supports the USW, principally on the basis that, if the USW were successful in either of its Subordination Claims, it would be entitled to relief that would include relief in respect of distributions under any plan of arrangement. On this basis, the Province argues that the Subordination Claims are sufficiently related to the CCAA proceedings that a timely and orderly resolution of these claims is necessary for a successful plan of arrangement.

[70] I propose to address the USW claims and the Milbourne claims in turn. Before doing so, however, I will address the threshold issue of whether the Court has the authority to order that these claims be determined within this CCAA process. In addition, I will also set out certain observations that inform the conclusions below.

The Jurisdictional Issue

[71] As mentioned, USS argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the USW 's oppression and breach of fiduciary duty claims under the CCAA proceedings. It says that the use of the CCAA proceedings to determine inter-creditor claims not involving the debtor company is not permissible under the CCAA as such use does not further the purpose of the CCAA. In support of its position, USS relies on dicta of Blair J.A. in *Stelco Inc., Re*, (2005), 78 O.R. (3d) 241 (C.A.) [*Stelco*] at para. 32, which also cited with approval the statement of Paperny J. in *Pacific Coastal Airlines Ltd. v. Air-Canada*, [2001] B.C.J. No. 2580 (B.C.S.C.) at para. 24.

[72] I acknowledge that the purpose of the CCAA is to facilitiate a compromise or arrangement between an insolvent debtor corporation and its creditors to allow the business to continue as a going concern. Accordingly, in most situations, it would be expected that the resolution of inter-creditor disputes would not further such process and may, in fact, delay and possibly hinder such process. In such circumstances, there is no reasonable basis for a determination of such claims within the CCAA process.

[73] The issue for the Court, however, is whether the broad jurisdiction of a court granted under section 11 of the CCAA permits a court to exercise its discretion to determine inter-

creditor claims within a CCAA process if it determines that, in its judgment, such action would further the purposes of the CCAA. USS argues, in effect, for an inflexible rule that excludes such a possibility. I am not persuaded, however, that this is correct as a matter of the statutory interpretation of section 11 of the CCAA. I am also not persuaded that the case law relied upon by USS precludes such an approach.

[74] On its face, section 11 of the CCAA confers broad authority on a court. As mentioned above, it provides that, subject to the restrictions set out in the CCAA, a court may make "any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances". It is not suggested that there is any express restriction in the CCAA that prevents a court from ordering that inter-creditor claims, such as the Subordination Claims, shall be heard under the CCAA proceeding outside the process contemplated by the Claims Process Order.

[75] Case law establishes that the authority of a court under section 11 is to be interpreted broadly subject, in any particular case, to satisfaction of the baseline requirements of "appropriateness, good faith and due diligence": see *Century Services Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)*, 2010 SCC 60 at para. 70. In the present case, USS raises the consideration of appropriateness.

[76] In *Century Services*, the Supreme Court defined the test for appropriateness as "whether the order will usefully further efforts to achieve the remedial purpose of the CCAA – avoiding the social and economic losses resulting from liquidation of an insolvent company". The application of this test argues against a hard and fast rule of the nature implied by USS and in favour of a more flexible rule that addresses, in any particular case, whether determination of inter-creditor issues will, in such case, further the remedial purpose of the CCAA.

[77] Two further observations in *Century Services* support this conclusion.

[78] First, at para. 60, the Supreme Court stressed that, in exercising a court's authority under the CCAA, the broader public interest may support determination of particular actions in a CCAA proceeding that would not otherwise be addressed within the CCAA process:

> Judicial decision making under the *CCAA* takes many forms. A court must first of all provide the conditions under which the debtor can attempt to reorganize. This can be achieved by staying enforcement actions by creditors to allow the debtor's business to continue, preserving the *status quo* while the debtor plans the compromise or arrangement to be presented to creditors, and supervising the process and advancing it to the point where it can be determined whether it will succeed ... In doing so, the court must often be cognizant of the various interests at stake in the reorganization, which can extend beyond those of the debtor and creditors to include employees, directors, shareholders, and even other parties doing business with the insolvent company ... In addition, courts must recognize that on occasion the broader public interest will be engaged by aspects of the reorganization and may be a factor against which the decision of whether to allow a particular action will be weighed ... [citations omitted]

[79] In addition, the Supreme Court noted with approval in para. 61 that, in exercising authority under the CCAA, and in particular under section 11 of the CCAA, courts must necessarily be flexible and innovative in order to further efforts to achieve the remedial purposes of the CCAA.

[80] All of these considerations argue in favour of a broad authority under section 11 that does not preclude the determination of inter-creditor claims within CCAA proceedings in appropriate circumstances. I do not suggest that such circumstances are presented in most circumstances before the courts. I do, however, think that the discretion or authority of a court under section 11 of the CCAA extends to the determination of inter-creditor matters within a CCAA proceeding if, on balance, such action would appear to further the remedial purpose of the CCAA.

[81] I turn then to the two authorities upon which USS relies. I do not read either of these cases as addressing the issue before the Court on this motion.

[82] In *Re Stelco Inc.*, the Court of Appeal addressed adjudication of an inter-creditor dispute in the context of the issue of classification of creditors for purposes of a vote on a plan of arrangement. At para. 30, Blair J.A. refers to the principle of that case in stating that "the classification of creditors is determined by their legal rights in relation to the debtor company, as opposed to their rights as creditors in relation to each other." This case therefore does not address whether the inter-creditor issue was appropriately dealt with inside or outside of the CCAA process. In fact, in the end, the plan of arrangement made provision for a determination of that issue within the CCAA proceedings after implementation of the plan.

[83] The circumstances in *Pacific Coastal Airlines* were also very different from the present circumstances. In that case, the tort claim against Air Canada was not connected in any way to the restructuring of Canadian Airlines. The issue was whether the plaintiff retained a claim after implementation of the plan of arrangement of Canadian Airlines. The plan of arrangement released the plaintiffs' claim against Canadian Airlines but not against its parent, Air Canada. Accordingly, the statement of Paperny J. at para. 24 of *Pacific Coastal Airlines* that "it is not a proper use of a CCAA proceeding to determine disputes between parties other than the debtor company" addresses a totally different situation from the present circumstances.

[84] Based on the foregoing, I conclude that the Court has authority under section 11 of the CCAA to order that the Subordination Claims be determined by a process within the CCAA proceedings, other than the process contemplated by the Claims Process Order, if the Court is of the opinion that, on balance, such action is likely to further the remedial prupose of the CCAA.

Preliminary Observations

[85] The following four general observations establish the framework within which the Court has reached the conclusions in this section of this Endorsement.

[86] First, USS argues that it would be prejudiced in its ability to assert certain defences to the claims of the USW if the Subordination Claims were adjudicated under the CCAA proceedings. I do not believe this to be correct.

[87] To the extent that the determination of the Subordination Claims were to proceed under the CCAA, it would proceed outside of the procedure provided for under the Claims Process Order. Accordingly, the Subordination Claims would have to be asserted in a separate process determined by the Court. I see no reason why such a process could not substantially reflect the normal litigation process contemplated by the *Rules of Civil Procedure*, including an exchange of pleadings, the right to pre-trial motions under, among other provisions Rules 20 and 21 of the *Rules of Civil Procedure*, and appropriate documentary production and discovery.

[88] Second, in their submissions, each of USS and the USW mischaracterizes important aspects of the Subordination Claims that are significant for present purposes.

[89] USS argues that the USW would only be entitled to a monetary award if it were successful on either or both of its claims. However, as pleaded, the USW seeks an order of subordination if it were successful based on the broad remedial statutory authority of a court in respect of the oppression claim and the equitable authority of a court in respect of its breach of fiduciary claim. It is not appropriate for the Court to take a position on this motion on the relative likelihood of such relief in the event the USW were successful on either or both of these claims. The Court must instead proceed on the basis that there is a possibility that such relief might be ordered.

[90] In such event, however, as mentioned, given that such relief would be ordered in the context of an inter-creditor claim, the relief would be limited to an order affecting the priority entitlement to any proceeds of distribution pursuant to the plan of arrangement as between the USW and USS. To be clear, given that any such claim would not be a "Claim" to be determined pursuant to the Claims Process Order, there is no basis on which any relief could extend more generally for the benefit of creditors or other stakeholders who are not a proper party to the action between the USW and USS. Accordingly, the USW's claim for "equitable subordination" of some or all of the USS Claims in the context of its claims for oppression and breach of fiduciary duty is effectively limited to a claim for subordination of the proceeds receivable by USS from USSC pursuant to any plan of arrangement to the extent of any claim of the USW against USSC. The Milbournes' claim for "equitable subordination" in the context of their claims for breach of fiduciary duty is also effectively limited in the same manner.

[91] More generally, the USW suggests that, if successful, the equitable remedies in its favour could directly affect, among other things, the sale of the assets of USSC and any approval of a plan of arrangement in which USSC proposes to make any payment or give any credit to USS. As mentioned, it also suggests that the equitable remedies could disallow or subordinate some or all of the USS Claims, or set off some or all of the USS Claims against not only the USW claim but also the claims of the other creditors of USSC. I understand this submission to contemplate the operation of such remedies within the plan of arrangement rather than outside it.

[92] This concept of the remedies available to the USW is also inconsistent with the earlier determination in this Endorsement that the USW claims are not "Claims" against USSC to be dealt with in the Claims Process Order. Determination of the USW Claims under the CCAA process cannot obscure the difference in nature, and consequence, of inter-creditor claims and claims against USSC. In particular, determination of the inter-creditor claims under the CCAA proceedings does not have the result that any such claims, as so determined, will be applicable in

respect of any plan of arrangement and compromise in the proceedings without express inclusion of such claims in the plan of arrangement by the debtor company and approval of all the stakeholders. Nor would any such determination affect or alter the amount of a creditor's claim that the creditor could bid in any sales process conducted in the CCAA proceedings.

[93] Third, similarly, inclusion of the determination of the USW's claims within the CCAA process does not imply, as the USW appears to assume, that such determination must be completed before the SARP process is completed or any plan of reorganization is approved. Clearly, resolution of such claims as quickly as possible is highly desirable as addressed further below. However, as inter-creditor claims, the timing of the determination of such claims is not tied to the timing of the various actions of USSC in formulating and proposing a plan of arrangement.

[94] Fourth, given the inherent jurisdiction of a court to control its own processes and the fact that the inter-creditor issues raised by the USW and the Milbournes are not to be determined within the process contemplated by the Claims Process Order, the Court also retains the authority to require, at a later date, that the claims of either or both of the USW and the Milbournes be continued in proceedings outside of the CCAA. Such a determination would be appropriate if, at such time, the Court is of the opinion that continuation of a process for determination of such claims within the CCAA proceeding no longer furthers the remedial purpose of the CCAA.

The Forum for Determination of the USW Subordination Claims

[95] I turn then to the issue of whether the USW oppression and breach of fiduciary claims against USS, as set out in the USW Objection, should be determined within these CCAA proceedings or in a separate action in the Superior Court outside of these proceedings. The comparable question regarding the Milbournes' Subordination Claims will be addressed in the next section.

[96] As set out above, there is little case law on the considerations which should inform the Court's decision. As a practical matter, the easiest answer would be to exclude the USW claims from the CCAA proceedings on the basis proposed by USS – that is, as inter-creditor claims they are not contemplated by the provisions of section 20 of the CCAA. Moreover, there is always the concern that, for strategic purposes, either or both of the USW or USS will seek to tie resolution of these claims to the completion of the SARP or the approval and implementation of a plan of arrangement notwithstanding the Court's determination, for the reasons above, that these are separate and unconnected issues.

[97] Nevertheless, I think there are good reasons in the particular circumstances of this case to order that determination of the USW Subordination Claims should proceed within the CCAA process. In reaching this conclusion, the guiding principle is whether, on balance, such an approach to the determination of the USW Subordination Claims would render a successful plan of arrangement more or less likely. In this regard, the following considerations are relevant.

[98] First, the circumstances giving rise to the USW Subordination Claims are unique in the context of a CCAA restructuring. USS is the predominant creditor of USSC. It has also controlled USSC since 2007. It is important to recognize that the USW position that USS must

bear the financial consequences for the circumstances in which USSC finds itself is honestly and forcefully asserted. Whether there is any legal merit in the specific claims that the USW asserts is not being determined at this time. Under certain scenarios, however, as a practical matter, a resolution of the legal viability of these claims as soon as possible could be an important factor in realising a successful plan of arrangement, insofar as USW support for any such plan is necessary.

[99] Second, as a related matter, it is possible that inclusion of the process for determination of the USW claims within the CCAA process will allow for a more expeditious process based on the dynamic of the related CCAA process. In any event, without in any way intending to cast aspersions on the motives of any of the parties that would be involved in the determination of the USW Subordination Claims, I think it is probable that the process of determining such claims outside the CCAA process would, as the Province suggests, involve protracted and more expensive litigation if any connection to the dynamic of the CCAA process is removed.

[100] Third, as a related matter, inclusion of the determination of the USW Subordination Claims within the CCAA process will permit consideration by a court on an expeditious basis of a certain number of threshold issues pertaining to the USW claims that have been raised by USS and USSC. In addition, the USW says it continues to be prepared to work co-operatively with USS and USSC to ensure that the USW Objection is resolved quickly and efficiently. To the extent it is possible within the CCAA proceedings to significantly advance identification of the factual basis upon which the USW Subordination Claims are asserted, and consideration of the legal merit of such claims, it is possible that the prospects for a negotiated arrangement among the parties would be furthered.

[101] Lastly, as mentioned, I am not persuaded that USS would be prejudiced, or that the USW would gain a tactical advantage, by inclusion of the USW Subordination Claims within the CCAA process, given the procedural approach to determination of those claims described above. In particular, I do not consider that USS would be prejudiced in respect of any of the four specific matters raised by it for the following reasons.

[102] First, inclusion of the claims within the CCAA process does not remove the need for the USW to assert claims based on recognized principles of law – in this case, oppressive behaviour under the *Canada Business Corporations Act* and breach of fiduciary duty under traditional principles of the law of equity as supplemented by applicable statutory provisions. The CCAA does not create or establish any new rights, or remove or affect, any existing defences of either of the parties. Accordingly, determination of the USW claims within the CCAA proceedings would still require the USW to establish that it had standing as a "complainant" under section 238 of the CBCA. Second, there is nothing in the procedures governing the conduct of CCAA proceedings that precludes a costs award in respect of inter-creditor claims in appropriate circumstances in the discretion of the court. Third, I am not persuaded that appeal rights from a determination of inter-creditor claims in a proceeding conducted within the CCAA proceedings should be subject to any different standard from that which would apply in respect of an appeal from a determination in a separate action. In particular, there is nothing in the CCAA that otherwise alters or narrows rights of appeal in the circumstances contemplated in this Endorsement. It is also important to note that the factors referred to by Blair J.A. in *Stelco* at para. 15 that result in leave being granted only sparingly in CCAA matters – the "real-time" dynamic and the

discretionary character underlying many orders under the CCAA – would not be present in any meaningful way in respect of any determination under the CCAA proceedings of the USW Subordination Claims. Lastly, USS submits that the USW is positioning itself to seek a holdback or escrow arrangement within the CCAA proceedings without having to satisfy the requirements for pre-judgement relief. This concern is entirely speculative and premature. In any event, any such request would require an order of the Court in the exercise of its discretion. I do not think that the considerations that would govern the exercise of that discretion in CCAA proceedings would differ from the applicable considerations in respect of a request for such relief in a separate proceeding commenced in the Superior Court.

The Forum for Determination of the Milbournes' Subordination Claim

[103] The Milbournes also seek to have the Subordination Claim raised in the Milbourne Objection determined within the CCAA proceeding.

[104] The argument for doing so is not a strong one. It is far less clear that determination of the claim will further the remedial purpose of the CCAA proceeding of USSC. In particular, the Milbournes have no continuing relationship with USSC. Other things being equal, the Court would be inclined to require the Milbournes to commence a separate action in the Superior Court.

[105] However, the Subordination Claim of the Milbournes overlaps substantially with the Subordination Claims of the USW. In these circumstances, considerations of efficiency and the avoidance of a multiplicity of actions, with the possibility of conflicting judgments by different courts, argue for determination of all of these claims within the CCAA proceedings so long as the corresponding USW claim is also being determined within the CCAA proceeding. In my view, these latter considerations should be determinative in the present circumstances.

Conclusion

[106] The issues addressed in this Endorsement have been superceded by subsequent events. In particular, since the hearing of this motion, the parties have concentrated on the process for a determination of the debt re-characterization claims of the Province and the USW. Based on the foregoing, however, to the extent that at some stage in these CCAA proceedings, the USW and the Milbournes wish to have their Subordination Claims determined, I conclude that such claims can be determined within the CCAA proceedings pursuant to a process, other than the process contemplated by the Claims Process Order, to be established by the Court and reflecting the procedural considerations discussed herein.

Wilton-Siegel J.

Date: August 13, 2015

Schedule "A"

3. The Union's Objection is based on a number of grounds:

   (a) USS's secured claim is based on security interests effectively granted by USS to itself, at a time when there was no independent board of directors or advisors, for insufficient consideration, and in a manner which amounted to an improper preference and/or fraudulent conveyance;

   (b) a significant portion of USS's "debt" is really in the nature of equity an should be re-characterized as such. For instance:

      (i) much of the debt was incurred to acquire Stelco Inc.;

      (ii) USS completely controlled USSC;

      (iii) USS was the sole source of USSC's financing;

      (iv) USS provided commercially unreasonable interest and repayment terms;

      (v) USS had no reasonable expectation of repayment on the purported loans; and

      (vi) USSC was significantly undercapitalized throughout the years following its acquisition by USS;

   (c) USS has acted in a manner that is oppressive, unfairly prejudicial to, and unfairly disregards the interests of the Union's members in respect of all of USSC's obligations. USS has failed to:

      (i) comply with its obligations to the federal and provincial government to maintain and/or increase production levels;

      (ii) make good faith efforts to run USSC as a viable business, managed in Canada;

      (iii) maintain the viability of the USW pension plans; and

      (iv) avoid incurring debts which would give USS repayment priority over USSC's other creditors or which would seriously dilute any recovery by them on their claims;

   (d) USS has engaged in business practices which breached legally binding undertakings it provided to the Canadian government, and which undermined USSC's ability to meet its obligations to the employees, retirees and beneficiaries of the USW pension plans (collectively, the "Beneficiaries"). USS's conduct in this regard is in breach of fiduciary

duties that it owed to the Beneficiaries by virtue of its role as administrator of the Pension Plans, including:

(i) failing to meet its undertakings to the Canadian government with respect to production and employment levels;

(ii) directing USSC's operations in a way which caused it to incur significant debts;

(iii) diverting production from Canadian facilities to its American facilities; and

(iv) locking out the Union's members in order to slow down Canadian production rather than for genuine labour relations purposes.

4. USS controlled USSC to further its own interests, to the detriment of USSC's business, its employees, pensioners, and other stakeholders. This conduct directly affects the validity of many or all of USS's claims. It would be inequitable to allow USS's claims in these circumstances, at the expense of USSC's other creditors, and in particular the Union and Beneficiaries. Its claims should be disallowed in their entirety, reduced, or subordinated to the claims of the Union and the Beneficiaries.

TAB 25

1993 CarswellBC 555
British Columbia Supreme Court

Woodward's Ltd., Re

1993 CarswellBC 555, 20 C.B.R. (3d) 74, 39 A.C.W.S. (3d) 981, 84 B.C.L.R. (2d) 206

Re COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36; Re COMPANY ACT, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 59; Re WOODWARD'S LIMITED, WOODWARD STORES LIMITED and ABERCROMBIE & FITCH CO. (CANADA) LTD.

Tysoe J. [in Chambers]

Heard: April 13, 14 and 15, 1993
Judgment: April 20, 1993
Docket: Doc. Vancouver A924791

Counsel: *Michael A. Fitch, Susan M. Eyre* and *D. Geoffrey Cowper*, for Woodward's Ltd., Woodward Stores Ltd. and Abercrombie & Fitch Co. (Canada) Ltd.
Paul J. Pearlman, for Hans Andriessen and certain other terminated employees.
James E. Howell, for R. Longine and certain other terminated employees.
Vincent Morgan, for Royal Trust Corp. of Canada.
Digby R. Leigh, for National Bank Leasing.
Douglas B. Hyndman, for North American Trust Co.
B.A.R. Smith, Q.C., for Triple Five Corp. Ltd.
William E.J. Skelly, for Bucci Investment Corp. and Prospero International Realty Inc.
Douglas I. Knowles and *Clayton W. Caverly*, for Cambridge Shopping Centres Ltd.
Sean Donovan, for Neptune Foods.
Robert G. Kuhn and *Nicolas A. Blom*, for Park Royal Shopping Centre Ltd. and others.
Robert P. Sloman, for Laing Properties.
Gordon K. Mitchell and *L.M. Candido*, for Oakbridge Centre Holdings Inc. and others.
Alan H. Brown, for General Electric Capital Canada Inc.
James P. Taylor, Q.C., Scott A. Turner and *Michael Harquail*, for Zellers Inc.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

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Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd. (1988), 72 C.B.R. 20, 64 Alta. L.R. (2d) 139, [1989] 2 W.W.R. 566 (Q.B.) — *considered*

Northland Properties Ltd., Re, 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195, (sub nom *Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada*) 34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 122, [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363 (B.C. C.A.) — *followed*

Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312, 86 D.L.R. (4th) 621 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — *considered*

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229531 B.C. Ltd., Re (1989), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 310 (B.C. S.C.) — *considered*

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3.

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.

Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act, 1870 (U.K.), 33 & 34 Vict., c. 104.

Application for order approving classes of creditors designated in plan of arrangement under *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.

***Tysoe J.* [In Chambers]:**

Introduction

1 The Petitioners ("Woodward's") apply for an order approving the classes of creditors designated in their plan of arrangement under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (the "CCAA") filed on April 7, 1993 (the "Reorganization Plan"). Woodward's proposes to hold meetings of these classes of creditors during the first part of May 1993 for the purpose of voting on the Reorganization Plan.

2 The classes of creditors designated by the Reorganization Plan are Secured Creditors, Noteholders, Landlords and General Creditors. Each of these terms is defined in the Reorganization Plan. There is no issue as to the appropriateness of classes of secured creditors, noteholders, landlords and general creditors. The question is whether or not there should be additional classes.

3 The definitions in the Reorganization Plan of the classes of creditors are as follows:

"*Secured Creditors*" means the Secured Trustee as holder of the Secured Notes;

"*Noteholders*" means the A & F Debentureholders, the Stores Debentureholders, the 9% Noteholders and the 10% Noteholders;

"*Landlord*" means any landlord, head lessor, sublessor or owner of premises which has entered into any Lease with any member of the Woodward's Group and includes any mortgagee or successor in title of such premises who has taken possession of such premises or is collecting rent in respect of such premises as well as any party who has taken an assignment of rents or assignment of lease in respect of such premises, whether as security or otherwise; provided, however, that if more than one person would otherwise come within this definition of Landlord in respect of any particular Lease, the rights and claims of all such persons in respect of such Lease will be dealt with collectively under this Plan and each reference herein to such Landlord shall be construed as a collective reference to all such persons;

"*General Creditors*" means all persons with unsecured claims for any Indebtedness against Woodward's Group as at the General Creditor Meeting Date, including the Pre-Filing Trade Creditors, Employee Creditors, the Landlords and the Equipment Financiers but, for the Landlords and the Equipment Financiers, only to the extent of their claims to be dealt with

in the General Creditor class as provided herein, and specifically excluding Post-Filing Trade Creditors, the Noteholders and the holders of the Unaffected Obligations.

4 The additional classes that have been proposed are as follows:

(a) employees of Woodward's that have been terminated since the commencement of these proceedings on December 11, 1992 (these employees made a formal application for separate classification);

(b) Royal Trust Corporation of Canada which holds a debenture creating a fixed charge against certain equipment purchased by Woodward's with the financing provided by Royal Trust;

(c) equipment financiers (which could include Royal Trust);

(d) creditors of Woodward Stores Limited (the "Operating Company") that hold the guarantee or joint covenant of its holding company, Woodward's Limited (the "Holding Company");

(e) one of more classes of landlords whose leases are being repudiated.

5 There is the potential that two parties having agreements to lease with Woodward's will want to make submissions that they should be in a separate or different class. These parties were only served with the Petition in this proceeding recently and it was agreed that my ruling would not affect their ability to make submissions at a subsequent time. It was also agreed that General Electric Capital Canada Inc. would not be bound by my ruling and could make submissions that it should be in a separate or different class or that it should be considered to be a holder of an Unaffected Obligation.

6 I will return to the positions of the various parties but I think it will be useful to first review the authorities setting forth the general principles applicable to the issue of creditor classification.

General Principles

7 The starting point of the case authorities is the decision of the English Court of Appeal in *Sovereign Life Assurance Co. v. Dodd*, [1892] 2 Q.B. 573 (C.A.) where Lord Esher said the following at pp. 579-80 in relation to the meeting of creditors to consider a plan of arrangement under the *Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act*:

> The Act says that the persons to be summoned to the meeting (all of whom, be it said in passing, are creditors) are persons who can be divided into different classes — classes which the Act of Parliament recognises, though it does not define them. This, therefore, must be done: they must be divided into different classes. What is the reason for such a course? It is because the creditors composing the different classes have different interests; and, therefore, if we find a different state of facts existing among different creditors which may differently affect their minds and their judgment, they must be divided into different classes.

Bowen L.J. made the following comments at p. 583:

> The word "class" is vague, and to find out what is meant by it we must look at the scope of the section, which is a section enabling the Court to order a meeting of a class or classes to be called. It seems plain that we must give such a meaning to the term "class" as will prevent the section being so worked as to result in confiscation and injustice, and that it must be confined to those persons whose rights are not so dissimilar as to make it impossible for them to consult together with a view to their common interest.

8 There has been some jurisprudence over the years regarding creditor classification but, like the jurisprudence on other issues under the CCAA, it has intensified over the past five to ten years. One of the earlier cases of the present wave of jurisprudence dealing with creditor classification is *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.* (1988), 72 C.B.R. 20 (Alta. Q.B.). In that case Forsyth J. rejected the argument that different secured creditors should be placed in separate classes because they held separate security over different assets or because the relative values of their security were different. The Court rejected

the "identity of interest" approach, which involves each class only containing creditors with identical interests. Instead, the Court followed the approach which I will call the "non-fragmentation" approach. This approach avoids the creation of a multiplicity of classes by including creditors with different legal rights in the same class as long as their legal rights are not so dissimilar that it is not possible for them to vote with a common interest. This is essentially the approach that was suggested by Bowen L.J. in the passage from the *Sovereign Life* quoted above (although his words have been incorrectly attributed to Lord Esher in at least one case authority and one article).

9 The approach taken in the *Oakwood Petroleums* case has been specifically adopted by the B.C. Court of Appeal in *Northland Properties Ltd., Re* (sub nom. *Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada*) (1989), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195 (B.C. C.A.). In the lower court decision in that case the Court considered the similarities and dissimilarities of various mortgagees holding mortgages against different properties and concluded that they should be in the same class. Dealing with the points of dissimilarity, Trainor J. said as follows at p. 192 of (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 (B.C. S.C.):

> The points of dissimilarity are that they are separate properties and that there are deficiencies in value of security for the loan, which vary accordingly for particular priority mortgagees. Specifically with respect to Guardian and Excelsior, they are both in a deficiency position.
>
> Now, either of the reasons for points of dissimilarity, if effect was given to them, could result in fragmentation to the extent that a plan would be a realistic impossibility. The distinction which is sought is based on property values, not on contractual rights or legal interests.

10 After the Court of Appeal in *Northland Properties* quoted the above passage, it said the following (at p. 203):

> I agree with that, but I wish to add that in any complicated plan under this Act, there will often be some secured creditors who appear to be oversecured, some who do not know if they are fully secured or not, and some who appear not to be fully secured. This is a variable cause arising not by any difference in legal interests, but rather as a consequence of bad lending, or market values, or both.

11 As the B.C. Court of Appeal has specifically adopted the reasoning in *Oakwood Petroleums*, the approach which I have called the "non-fragmentation" approach is the one to be followed in British Columbia. As will be seen shortly, the "non-fragmentation" approach has also been preferred over the "identity of interest" approach by the Ontario courts.

12 There have been two recent cases that are particularly relevant because they deal with employees, landlords and equipment lessors in circumstances that are similar to the situation at hand. The first of these cases is *Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312 (Ont. Gen. Div.) where one of the proposed classes consisted of all creditors other than two secured creditors, including holders of unsecured debentures, terminated employees, landlords whose leases had been repudiated and equipment lessors whose leases were to be repudiated (although the report does not specifically say it, I assume that the proposed class also included the general trade creditors). The Court rejected the argument of one of the landlords that there should be a separate class of creditors consisting of the landlords and the equipment lessors. Borins J. utilized the "non-fragmentation" approach as illustrated by the following passage on pp. 317-318:

> In my view, an important principle to consider in approaching ss. 4 and 5 of the C.C.A.A. is that followed in *Re Wellington Building Corp.*, 16 C.B.R. 48, [1934] O.R. 653, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 626 (S.C.), in which it was emphasized that the object of ss.4 and 5 is not confiscation but is to enable compromises to be made for the common benefit of the creditors as creditors, or for the common benefit of some class of creditors as such. To this I would add that recognition must be given to the legislative intent to facilitate corporate reorganization and that in the modern world of large and complicated business enterprises the excessive fragmentation of classes could be counter-productive to the fulfilment of this intent. In this regard, to approach the classification of creditors on the basis of identity of interest, as suggested by counsel for H & R Properties, would in some instances result in the multiplicity of classes, which would make any re-organization difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. In my view, in placing a broad and purposive interpretation upon the provisions

of the C.C.A.A. the court should take care to resist approaches which would potentially fragment creditors and thereby jeopardize potentially viable plans of arrangement, such as the plan advanced in this application.

13 The other recent decision is *Grafton-Fraser Inc. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce* (1992), 90 D.L.R. (4th) 285 (Ont. Gen. Div.). In that case Houlden J.A. approved the classification of creditors into secured creditors, landlords and unsecured creditors. It appears from the report that the plan contemplated that some leases would be repudiated and there would be rent reductions in respect of certain of the continuing premises. I am told that the final plan of Grafton-Fraser Inc. did not include the landlords with continuing leases at reduced rental rates in the same class as the landlords whose leases were repudiated, but the decision of Houlden J.A. appears to be predicated on the fact that the two types of landlords would be in the same class. It had been argued that the landlords should be in the same class as the unsecured creditors. Houlden J.A. felt that it was appropriate to have the landlords in a separate class for two reasons; namely, there would be great difficulty in ascertaining the amounts of the claims of the landlords and the plan enjoined the landlords from exercising their contractual and statutory remedies.

14 Before I apply the general principles outlined above to the circumstances of this case, I wish to add some comments regarding the classification of creditors. The case authorities focus on the dif ferences in the legal rights of the creditors in determining whether their interests are sufficiently similar or dissimilar to warrant creditors being placed in the same class or separate classes. I agree that it is the legal rights of the creditors that must be considered and that other external matters that could influence the interests of a creditor are not to be taken in account. However, it is my view that the legal rights should not be considered in isolation and that they must be considered within the context of the provisions of the reorganization plan. It would be appropriate to segregate two sets of creditors with similar legal interests into separate classes if the plan treats them differently. Conversely, it may be appropriate to include two sets of creditors with different legal rights in the same class if the plan treats them in a fashion that gives them a commonality of interest despite their different legal rights. In addition, when the Court is assessing whether there is a sufficient commonality of interest to include two sets of creditors in the same class, it is necessary in my view to examine their legal rights within the context of the potential failure of the reorganization plan. The treatment of the two sets of creditors under the plan should be compared to the rights they would have in the event of the failure of the plan (i.e., bankruptcy or other liquidation).

Terminated Employees

15 The first set of creditors that submitted that it should be in a separate class is the group of former employees of Woodward's who were terminated after December 11, 1992, the date of commencement of these CCAA proceedings. These former employees all have claims against Woodward's for damages as a result of Woodward's failure to give them reasonable notice of termination. The Reorganization Plan includes the terminated employees in the class of General Creditors which also includes the trade suppliers and other unsecured claims of the Operating Company. The Reorganization Plan proposes that the General Creditors receive 37% of the principal amounts of their proven claims.

16 The two counsel acting for former employees on this application submitted that their clients should comprise a separate class of creditors for several reasons. They say that the terminated employees are largely middle-aged, long service employees with limited education who have little prospect of finding alternate employment. They point to the fact that the courts recognize the difference between a contract of employment and an ordinary commercial contract. They further make reference to the fact that the trade suppliers will be selling merchandise to the reorganized company and that they will have a potentially continuing relationship which may influence the manner in which they vote on the plan. Finally, they say that the trade suppliers have the ability to "write off" their losses and that they will receive different income tax treatment in respect of their losses than the terminated employees.

17 In arguing that the terminated employees should form their own class, counsel relied on the article *Reorganizations under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (1947) 25 Can. Bar Rev. 587 by Stanley E. Edwards. This article has been relied upon extensively by the courts in interpreting the CCAA. However, the article has not been followed with respect to the classification of creditors. Mr. Edwards proposes the "identity of interest" approach which was not been adopted by the Alberta, British Columbia and Ontario courts. The preferred approach is the "non-fragmentation" approach.

18 The legal rights of the terminated employees are the same as the legal rights of the trade suppliers. They are both creditors with unsecured claims against the Operating Company (the secured and preferred amounts payable to employees under provincial legislation and the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* have already been paid to the terminated employees). In a bankruptcy or other liquidation they would both receive the same pro rata amount of their claims. They are to receive the same pro rata amount of their claims under the Reorganization Plan.

19 The fact that there is a recognized difference between contracts of employment and ordinary commercial contracts is not relevant because the contracts of employment of the terminated employees have come to an end. The terminated employees have claims for damages against Woodward's for wrongful dismissal. Once the amount of damages for an employee has been agreed upon or determined by the Court, the difference between the two types of contracts becomes historical and the employee has the same rights as any other unsecured creditor. The differences between the two types of contracts may result in the employees receiving higher amounts of damages but the differences do not warrant the terminated employees being entitled to a higher distribution than the other unsecured creditors.

20 I am satisfied that there is a sufficient commonality of interest between the terminated employees and the other members of the General Creditors class that they should be included in the same class.

Equipment Financiers and Royal Trust Corporation of Canada

21 It is convenient to deal with the submissions of the equipment lessors and Royal Trust at the same time because if Royal Trust is not put in a class of its own, its alternate position was that it should be included in a class with the equipment lessors.

22 The term "Equipment Financiers" is defined in the Reorganization Plan. In brief, the term means any person who has provided financing for the acquisition or installation of office equipment or trade fixtures and who has retained a security interest by way of a lease or a security instrument. Woodward's has notified or will be notifying certain equipment financiers that it no longer requires their equipment. These equipment financiers will then have a claim against Woodward's for damages resulting from the repudiation of their contractual arrangements. It is these equipment financiers who wish to be in a separate class. The Reorganization Plan proposes that the terminated equipment financiers be treated as General Creditors and that they receive 37% of the amounts of their claims. The amount of each claim would presumably be the discounted value of future payments owing by Woodward's to the equipment financier less the present value of the equipment.

23 Most of the equipment financiers are parties that bought the equipment and are leasing it to Woodward's on a normal type of term lease. The equipment financiers who are lessors include National Bank Leasing, North American Trust Company and Royal Bank Leasing. Royal Trust also falls within the definition of "Equipment Financier" but it is not a lessor. It financed the acquisition by Woodward's of certain equipment by way of a traditional financing arrangement. It loaned money to Woodward's on a term basis and it took security in the form of a debenture creating a fixed charge against the equipment that it financed.

24 In other contexts under the CCAA the treatment of equipment leases in relation to the treatment of security documents causes me considerable doubts. Should equipment leases be treated the same as security instruments in all or some cases? Does it make a difference whether the lease is classified as an operating lease or a capital lease? Should the extent of depreciation of the subject asset be taken into account? Fortunately these questions can be left for another time because they do not need to be resolved in order to deal with the classification issue.

25 Lessors and debentureholders do have different legal rights but the question to be answered is whether the different rights result in a lack of commonality of interest. In a bankruptcy a lessor is entitled to retake possession of the leased goods upon default and, if the lease is worded properly, the lessor is entitled to prove as an unsecured creditor for its damages. In the case of a debentureholder in a bankruptcy situation, the debentureholder has the right to cause the charged assets to be sold and it is entitled to prove as an unsecured creditor for the deficiency on its loan. In most cases the damages of the lessor and the deficiency on the debentureholder's loan will be equivalent; namely, the difference between the present value of the monies that are owed and the value of the leased goods or the charged assets. Hence, the rights of an equipment lessor and the rights of a debentureholder with a fixed charge on financed equipment in a bankruptcy situation are roughly the same. The equipment

lessors and Royal Trust are being treated the same under the Reorganization Plan. Therefore, there is a sufficient commonality of interest for Royal Trust to be included in the same class as the equipment lessors.

26 Some submissions were made with respect to the priority between Royal Trust and The R-M Trust Company which is the sole Secured Creditor under the Reorganization Plan. I do not accept the contention that Royal Trust has priority over The R-M Trust Company on any of Woodward's assets other than the ones that are covered by the fixed charge in favour of Royal Trust.

27 The question then becomes whether the equipment financiers (including Royal Trust) belong in a separate class or in the class of General Creditors. This is an example of why the legal rights of the parties must be examined within the context of the Reorganization Plan. In isolation the rights of the equipment financiers and the rights of unsecured creditors are very different. But the treatment of the two groups in the Reorganization Plan could affect their interests.

28 If the Reorganization Plan provided that Woodward's was to retain the financed equipment and the equipment financiers were to be paid the same proportion of their indebtedness as the unsecured creditors, the equipment financiers would be entitled to be included in a different class from the unsecured creditors. They would be losing their proprietary or security rights in the equipment and they would be receiving the same pro rata distribution as unsecured creditors who do not have same rights. However, that is not what the Reorganization Plan is proposing.

29 The Reorganization Plan does not affect any of the proprietary or security rights of the equipment financiers. Woodward's is allowing the equipment financiers to fully exercise those rights outside of the Reorganization Plan. All the Reorganization Plan is purporting to affect are the claims of the equipment financiers for damages or the deficiencies on loans. These claims are unsecured claims and there is no reason why they should be treated any differently than the claims of unsecured creditors. There is a sufficient commonality of interest between the unsecured creditors and the equipment financiers with respect to their unsecured claims for damages or the deficiencies on loans. It is appropriate to include the equipment financiers in the class of General Creditors with respect to these claims.

30 This classification of the equipment financiers is consistent with the decision in *Sklar-Peppler*, *supra*, where the Ontario Court of Justice approved the grouping of equipment lessors in the same class as the unsecured creditors.

Holders of Guarantees or Joint Covenants

31 The class of General Creditors is comprised of creditors of the Operating Company. However, at least two of these creditors hold a guarantee or joint covenant of the Holding Company. National Bank Leasing holds a guarantee from the Holding Company and the debenture held by Royal Trust is a joint debenture from the Operating Company and the Holding Company. For ease of reference I will refer to a creditor holding a guarantee or joint covenant of the Holding Company as the holder of a guarantee and such reference shall also include the holder of a joint covenant.

32 The Holding Company does not own any tangible assets. Other than the shares in the Operating Company, the only asset owned by the Holding Company is an inter-company account owed to it by the Operating Company. This inter-company account means that upon the bankruptcy or other liquidation of the Operating Company, the Holding Company would be an unsecured creditor entitled to share on a pro rata basis in distributions to the unsecured creditors of the Operating Company. If the Holding Company was also to be liquidated, the money received on account of the inter-company receivable would be distributed to the creditors of the Holding Company, including creditors of the Operating Company with guarantees from the Holding Company and other unsecured creditors if sufficient monies were available to fully satisfy the secured and preferred creditors of the Holding Company. The result is that unsecured creditors of the Operating Company with guarantees from the Holding Company may receive more money than the other unsecured creditors of the Operating Company in the event of bankruptcies or other liquidations of the two companies.

33 On April 16, 1993 the Monitor appointed in these proceedings issued a report confirming that upon a liquidation of the two companies, the unsecured creditors of the Holding Company would receive a distribution. The Monitor estimates a liquidation distribution for the unsecured creditors of the Holding Company to be in the range from 2% to 12%.

34 The distinction between the interests of the unsecured creditors of the Operating Company and the interests of the unsecured creditors of the Holding Company is recognized in the classification of the creditors in the Reorganization Plan. The unsecured creditors of the Holding Company are included in the class of Noteholders which is a different class from the General Creditors, the class that includes the unsecured creditors of the Operating Company. It is proposed in the Reorganization Plan that the Noteholders receive 32% of their indebtedness.

35 The Reorganization Plan ignores the fact that the holders of guarantees are unsecured creditors of both companies. It proposes that they receive the same 37% proportion of their indebtedness as the other General Creditors and their status as creditors of the Holding Company is not reflected.

36 In view of the fact that the holders of guarantees do have different legal rights from the other members of the class of General Creditors, it is necessary to decide whether the rights are so dissimilar that they cannot vote on the Reorganization Plan with a common interest. It was submitted by counsel for Woodward's that there is a common interest because the holders of guarantees will still receive more under the Reorganization Plan that they will be paid upon a liquidation of the two companies. I do not think that this is sufficient to create a commonality of interest with the other members in the class of General Creditors who have lesser legal rights. To the contrary, I believe that this is an example of what Bowen L.J. had in mind in the *Sovereign Life* case, *supra*, when he used the term "confiscation". By being a minority in the class of General Creditors, the holders of guarantees can have their guarantees confiscated by a vote of the requisite majority of the class who do not have the same rights. The holders of guarantees could be forced to accept the same proportionate amount as the other members of the class and to receive no value in respect of legal rights that they uniquely enjoy and that would have value in a liquidation of the two companies.

37 The passage from *Sklar-Peppler* quoted above made reference to the decision in *Re Wellington Building Corp., supra* [(1934), 16 C.B.R. 48 (Ont. S.C.)]. In that case the Court was asked to approve a scheme of arrangement under the CCAA that had one class of secured creditors which included boldholders, lienholders, third mortgagee and fourth mortgagees. The Court refused to approve the scheme on the basis that there should have been more than one class of secured creditors. Kingstone J. said the following at p. 54 of 16 C.B.R.:

> ... it was necessary under the Act that they should vote in classes and that three-fourths of the value of each class should be obtained in support of the scheme before the Court could or should approve of it. Particularly is this the case where the holders of the senior securities' (in this case the bondholders') rights are seriously affected by the proposal as they are deprived of the arrears of interest on their bonds if the proposal is carried through. It was never the intention under the Act, I am convinced, to deprive creditors in the position of the bondholders of their right to approve as a class by the necessary majority of a scheme propounded by the company which would permit the holders of junior securities to put through a scheme inimicable to this class and amounting to confiscation of the vested interest of the bondholders.

38 In *Re 229531 B.C. Ltd.* (1989), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 310 (B.C. S.C.) the Court refused to approve a plan of arrangement under the CCAA for numerous reasons. One of the reasons was that a guarantee held by one creditor was to be released as a result of the reorganization plan and the creditor was to receive the same proportionate distribution as all of the other unsecured creditors. In other words, the guarantee was being confiscated by the vote of other creditors who did not enjoy the same rights as the creditor which held the guarantee.

39 If it was clear that no monies would be available to unsecured creditors upon a liquidation of the Holding Company, the legal rights of the holders of the guarantees would have no practical value and there would then be no objection to their inclusion in the class of General Creditors. There is also a point where the prospects of the unsecured creditors of the Holding Company receiving any monies upon its liquidation would be so uncertain that the commonality of interest between the holders of the guarantees and the other members of the class of General Creditors would not be affected. However, I am not satisfied in this case that such prospects are so uncertain that the holders of guarantees should be forced to be in the same class as the other unsecured creditors of the Operating Company. In making this statement, I note that the unsecured creditors of the Holding Company are to receive 32% of their indebtedness under the Reorganization Plan.

40 I should stress that it is important in my view that there is only one difference between the rights of the holders of the guarantees and the rights of the other members of the class of General Creditors. It is clear that the one additional right enjoyed by the holders of the guarantees is not being given any value under the Reorganization Plan. The result could be different if the other members of the class of General Creditors had additional rights that were not enjoyed by the holders of the guarantees. There could be a trade-off between the rights that were not commonly shared and the groups could have a sufficient commonality of interest to be included in the same class. Here, there is no potential trade-off between the two groups and the one additional right of the holders of the guarantees is being confiscated without compensation.

41 Counsel for Woodward's suggested that the issue of the guarantees be left to the fairness hearing (i.e., the hearing to consider the sanctioning of the Reorganization Plan). As I believe that the holders of guarantees have a sufficiently different legal right to warrant a separate classification, it follows that I would consider the Reorganization Plan to be unfair to them if they are included in the class of General Creditors. I should not order meetings for the creditors to vote on the Reorganization Plan when I know that those meetings would be fruitless because I would refuse to approve the outcome of the meetings.

Landlords

42 Counsel for Triple Five Corporation Limited submitted that there should be two classes of landlords, one class consisting of landlords with anchor tenants whose leases are being repudiated and the other class consisting of the remaining landlords. Counsel for Bucci Investment Corporation and Prospero International Realty Inc. submitted that there should be three classes of landlords, one class consisting of landlords with anchor tenants whose leases are being repudiated, a second class consisting of landlords without anchor tenants whose leases are being repudiated and the third class consisting of the remaining landlords.

43 Counsel for Triple Five Corporation Limited put forward three reasons in support of his position. A fourth reason was also put forward initially but it was withdrawn and reserved for the fairness hearing. The three reasons are as follows:

(a) a repudiation of a lease by an anchor tenant will cause the landlord to be in breach of other contractual obligations and the consequences of such a repudiation go beyond the liquidated damages that result from the repudiation of a lease by a tenant other than an anchor tenant;

(b) there is no precedent for the selective repudiation of leases under the CCAA and Woodward's has chosen not utilize the proposal provisions of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* that now has a procedure for the repudiation of leases;

(c) Zellers Inc. (and its parent, The Hudson's Bay Company) is a stranger to the relationship between Woodward's and its creditors and its involvement in Woodward's reorganization (by way of a merger with the reorganized company) requires a higher degree of fairness.

44 In my view, none of these reasons is a valid justification for the creation of a separate class of landlords:

(a) the additional consequences of a repudiation by an anchor tenant flow from external considerations and the different consequences to different landlords does not result from different legal rights existing between the landlords and Woodward's. As was held in *Northland Properties, supra*, separate creditor classification must be based on a difference in legal interests or rights;

(b) *Sklar-Peppler, supra*, and *Grafton-Fraser, supra*, are both examples of reorganizations involving repudiations of leases. The fact that the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* now specifically provides for the repudiation of leases does not mean that a reorganization involving lease repudiation cannot be attempted under the CCAA and it certainly does not mean that there should be separate classes of landlords;

(c) the aspect of fairness is a matter to be considered on the application for the Court to sanction the Reorganization Plan. The application is commonly called the fairness hearing. There is nothing in the involvement of Zellers Inc. that requires the creation of separate classes for landlords.

45 Counsel for Bucci and Prospero did not put forward any independent grounds for the creation of separate landlord classes. His point was that if there was justification for the creation of a separate class for landlords with anchor tenants whose leases were being repudiated, there was equal justification for the creation of a separate class for the other landlords whose leases were being repudiated.

46 There was one point that bothered me about the grouping of all the landlords into a single class. In addition to including landlords whose leases were being repudiated, the class includes landlords who are having their leases partially repudiated by the unilateral reduction in the amount of leased space and landlords who are having the rent under their leases unilaterally reduced. Both of these two groups of landlords would be having a continuing relationship with Woodward's. Unlike the trade suppliers, the continuing relationship between these landlords and Woodward's is based on legal rights. I was concerned that the continuing legal relationship between these landlords and Woodward's may give them a different interest from interests of the landlords whose leases are being wholly repudiated. For example, the continuing landlords may be more willing to vote in favour of the Reorganization Plan because they will be able to recoup some of their losses from the profits generated out of the continuing relationship with Woodward's. The answer to my concern is that the rent under all of the continuing leases is to be adjusted to market rent. The landlords whose leases are being repudiated will also be leasing their premises to new tenants at market rent. Accordingly, the landlords with continuing leases will not have any advantage over the other landlords and there will be sufficient commonality of interest to include all of the landlords in one class.

47 During submissions I queried whether the landlords should be included in the class of General Creditors. At first blush a landlord whose lease is being repudiated is in the same position as the other unsecured creditors of the Operating Company. The reason why it is appropriate for the Landlords to be in a different class is that they receive different treatment under the Reorganization Plan. The General Creditors are to be paid 37% of their claims while the Landlords are to be paid an amount equal to six months' rent. One reason for the different treatment is the fact that it is very difficult to properly quantify the claims of the Landlords and the efforts of the Landlords to mitigate their damages will not be known prior to the implementation of the Reorganization Plan. This rationale was accepted in *Grafton-Fraser*, *supra*, where the Court approved a separate classification for the landlords. Another justification for the different treatment is the fact that the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* provides that landlords whose leases are repudiated are entitled to compensation equal to six months' rent.

48 In the *Grafton-Fraser* case, *supra*, the Court approved a landlord class which, at least at the time of the decision, appeared to include both landlords with repudiated leases and landlords with continuing leases at reduced rental rates.

49 It is my view that there is sufficient commonality of interest among the landlords for all of them to be included in a single class. I am reinforced in my decision by the positions of the other landlords represented by counsel at the hearing. Mr. Kuhn, Mr. Knowles and Mr. Mitchell, who each represent landlords in each of the three proposed landlord classes, all supported the single class for the landlords and that position in itself demonstrates that the landlords do have a commonality of interest.

Conclusion

50 I approve the classes of creditors designated in the Reorganization Plan with the exception that the class of General Creditors should not include creditors of the Operating Company who hold guarantees or joint covenants from the Holding Company. I dismiss the application of the terminated employees for separate classification and I reject the other submissions for separate classifications.

Order accordingly.

TAB 26

1991 CarswellOnt 220
Ontario Court of Justice (General Division), Commercial List

Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia

1991 CarswellOnt 220, 31 A.C.W.S. (3d) 93, 86 D.L.R. (4th) 621, 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312

SKLAR-PEPPLER FURNITURE CORPORATION v. BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA, 949073 ONTARIO INC., H & R PROPERTIES LIMITED, SHERMIC INC., JOANTE INVESTMENTS LTD., CANADIAN EQUIPMENT LEASING (A DIVISION OF TRIATHLON LEASING INC.), PITNEY BOWES LEASING (A DIVISION OF PITNEY BOWES OF CANADA LTD.), MICHAEL WEINIG AG and all other affected creditors of applicant

Borins J.

Judgment: October 31, 1991
Docket: Doc. B301/91

Counsel: *Barbara Grossman*, for applicant and for respondent 949073 Ontario Inc.
L. Crozier and *Catherine Francis*, for H & R Properties Ltd.
Kent E. Thomson, for Bank of Nova Scotia.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Table of Authorities

Cases considered:

Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, *(*sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey)* 41 O.A.C. 282, 1 O.R. (3d) 289 — *referred to*

Wellington Building Corp., Re, 61 C.B.R. 48, [1934] O.R. 653, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 626 (S.C.) — *applied*

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3.

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 —

s. 2

s. 3

s. 4

s. 5

s. 6

s. 11

Winding-Up Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. W-11.

Application for relief under *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.

***Borins J.*:**

1 This is an application brought by Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. (subsequently referred to as "Sklar") pursuant to ss. 4, 5 and 11 of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (subsequently referred to as "C.C.A.A.") for the relief contained in the draft order annexed to the notice of application.

2 The essential nature of the relief requested is the maintenance of the status quo in regard to the business operations conducted by Sklar by preventing any of its creditors from taking proceedings against it under the *Bankruptcy Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 and the *Winding-Up Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. W-11, or commencing or continuing any lawsuit or related proceedings against Sklar until further order of the court, pending the consideration of a plan of compromise or arrangement between Sklar and the classes of its creditors affected by the proposed plan.

3 Before the court is the proposed plan. It is a most comprehensive document, 39 pages in length, to which is appended an additional 33 pages containing information referred to in the plan, including the classification of creditors for the purpose of voting in respect to the approval of the plan as required by s. 6 of the Act. The urgent nature of this application, with the resulting need to provide an early decision in respect to it, as well as a limited time available to me since the conclusion of submissions late yesterday, do not permit me to review in detail the provisions of the plan. However, I am able to say that I have examined in detail the plan and the evidence before the court and, subject to what follows, I would have had no hesitation in granting the order as sought because the order and the plan, in my view, provide a compelling example of the very situation to which the C.C.A.A. is intended to address. The proposed plan exemplifies the policy and objectives of the Act as it proposes a regime for the court-supervised re-organization of the applicant company intended to avoid the devastating social and economic effects of a creditor-initiated termination of its ongoing business operations and enabling the company to carry on its business in a manner in which it is intended to cause the least possible harm to the company, its creditors, its employees and former employees and the communities in which it carries on and carried on its business operations.

4 Two of the named respondents, the Bank of Nova Scotia and 949073 Ontario Inc., are the major creditors of Sklar and their combined indebtedness is about $60,000,000. The bank is a secured creditor and 949073 Ontario Inc. is an unsecured creditor which is the guarantor of a debt of Sklar and which has given security to the bank. Counsel for the bank advised the court of the bank's strong support for the order sought by Sklar. The applicant is indebted to trade and other secured creditors in the aggregate amount of about $10,500,000. There are six other named respondents. Three of these respondents are the landlords of premises under lease to Sklar which Sklar, as part of its proposed re-organization, can no longer afford and which, therefore, it no longer requires for what it hopes will be its continuing business operations. Two of the other three respondents are lessors of equipment to Sklar, the continued use of which Sklar also considers to be uneconomical. The sixth respondent is a conditional-sales vendor of certain equipment purchased by Sklar.

5 On October 24, 1991, Sklar delivered a notice to each of the three realty landlords advising them that due to its financial situation it was unable to continue to occupy the leased premises, that it has vacated the premises in question and that it would make delivery of the keys to the premises and expressing the view that each landlord would take appropriate steps to protect its interest and secure the leased premises. Each of the landlords replied to the notice stating, inter alia, that Sklar's letter constituted a repudiation of its lease.

6 As for the respondents, Mr. Hess was in attendance as a representative of Michael Weinig AG and through counsel for the applicant advised the court that Michael Weinig AG neither opposed nor consented to the granting of the order. A similar position was taken by two realty lessors, Shermic Inc. and Joante Investments Ltd., who appeared respectively by counsel and a representative. Nothing was heard from the remaining two equipment lessors, Triathlon Leasing Inc. and Pitney Bowes of Canada Ltd. The only opposition to the granting of the order was that of the realty lessor H & R Properties Ltd. As I will explain,

as I understand, the principal objections of H & R Properties Ltd. are not to the plan as such, but are in respect to the way in which certain provisions of the plan purport to interfere with its contractual rights as landlord and its remedies against Sklar consequent to its repudiation of the lease and in respect to the classification of creditors for the purposes of the vote required to consider the approval or rejection of the plan.

7 However, before I discuss the submissions made by counsel for H & R Properties, there are some observations which I wish to make by way of background. Sklar is a long-established company, which has carried on the business of manufacturing and marketing wooden furniture and upholstered furniture for many years in southern Ontario. A subsidiary carries on its business in the United States. Until its financial circumstances caused the company to reduce its operations, it formerly employed approximately 212 people in Hanover and 60 people in Toronto. It now employs about 400 people in Whitby, and about 200 people are employed by the American subsidiary, in operations which it purposes to continue if the plan is approved.

8 Since late 1989 Sklar has experienced financial difficulties and is now insolvent. Among the reasons for its insolvency are the combined effects of economic recession, the introduction of free trade, the strong Canadian dollar, the high volume of bankruptcies among Canadian furniture manufacturers and the effects of the Goods and Services Tax on consumer spending. It has already introduced economic measures designed to deal with its financial problems. If the plan is not approved, the Bank of Nova Scotia will enforce its security. This will result in Sklar's bankruptcy, which in turn will result in its remaining employees losing their jobs and no funds being available to satisfy the claims of unsecured creditors, including terminated employees. The plan provides for a fund of $1.5 million to pay, on a pro rata basis, the amounts due to the over 1,000 unsecured creditors to whom the proposed plan will be mailed and who will be given the opportunity to vote, in person or by proxy, with respect to its approval or rejection. Sklar has issued the debentures necessary to qualify it as a debtor company within the meaning of ss. 2 and 3 of the C.C.A.A. Although an issue was raised as to whether H & R Properties Ltd. is an unsecured creditor within s. 2 of the Act, I am satisfied that under the broad definition of unsecured creditor contained in the Act in the cases in which I have considered the question, H & R Properties is an unsecured creditor both in respect to the outstanding rent which is now owed to it by Sklar, and any contingent claim for unliquidated damages to which it may become entitled as a result of Sklar's apparent repudiation of its lease.

9 This brings me to the objections raised by counsel for H & R Properties in their submissions. There are two main objections, which are, in a sense, related. The first objection relates to para. 20 of the draft order, which stipulates that H & R Properties is an "Affected Creditor" as defined in the order and the plan and provides that the claims of every such creditor include claims for contingent and unliquidated claims arising, inter alia, under any lease. The first objection relates as well to the provisions of para. 26 of the plan, which states that if the plan is approved, realty leases will be terminated as of the date the order is granted, and the lessors "will be treated insofar as the situation permits in a manner equivalent to treatment to which they would be entitled if the company had gone into bankruptcy" on the date the order is granted. The second objection relates to the classification of the creditors in the plan. The plan provides for two classes of creditors. The first class was comprised of the two secured creditors, Bank of Nova Scotia and 949073 Ontario Inc. The second class contains all other affected creditors, numbering over 1,000, and includes the holders of debentures issued by the company, all terminated employees of the company, the three realty lessors and the three equipment lessors.

10 In considering the objections raised by H & R Properties, I wish to emphasize that while I have read the authorities provided by counsel for all parties, time has not permitted me to discuss and analyze them in these reasons. I have, however, in an appendix to my reasons, listed the authorities provided by counsel for all parties. I have also read the helpful article by D.H. Goldman, D.E. Baird and M.A. Weinczok, "Arrangements Under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*" (1991) 1 C.B.R. (3d) 135, in which the authorities are reviewed.

11 With respect to the first objection, I am satisfied that on the broad interpretation which the authorities have placed on s. 11 of the C.C.A.A. and the discretionary powers which it provides to the court in considering an application under the C.C.A.A. and the purposes of the legislation, the provisions of para. 20 of the draft order are appropriate to avoid impairment to the ability of Sklar to continue its business operations during the period while the plan of compromise or arrangement is under consideration. To the extent that it is appropriate to comment on para. 26 of the plan, I see nothing inappropriate in its terms. However, the plan is yet to be approved by the creditors and it is only after it has been approved by them that it is, in

my view, appropriate for the court, in considering whether or not court approval is to be given, to comment specifically on a proposed plan except, of course, in regard to the classification of creditors and its probability of success or failure in relation to the circumstances of the application.

12 The second objection concerns the classification of creditors. This objection emanates from the fact that H & R Properties is displeased with the impact of the plan and in particular para. 26 on any claims which it might have for future rent subsequent to the date its lease with Sklar is terminated. It fears that because it is in a class with over 1,000 creditors the negative vote which one presumes it proposes to cast against the plan will be meaningless and the plan will be approved. It, therefore, submits that a third class of creditors should be established consisting of the three realty lessors and the other three respondents. It submits that because there is no community of interest between itself and the other creditors, the applicant is attempting to isolate it by placing it in a class in which it does not belong and to thereby force upon it conditions which it feels are unacceptable.

13 The subject of the appropriate classification of creditors has attracted considerable attention over the past decade. The earlier cases and the recent cases are discussed at pp. 157-169 of the article to which I have referred. In my view, an important principle to consider in approaching ss. 4 and 5 of the C.C.A.A. is that followed in *Re Wellington Building Corp.*, 16 C.B.R. 48, [1934] O.R. 653, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 626 (S.C.), in which it was emphasized that the object of ss. 4 and 5 is not confiscation but is to enable compromises to be made for the common benefit of the creditors as creditors, or for the common benefit of some class of creditors as such. To this I would add that recognition must be given to the legislative intent to facilitate corporate re-organization and that in the modern world of large and complex business enterprises the excessive fragmentation of classes could be counter-productive to the fulfilment of this intent. In this regard, to approach the classification of creditors on the basis of identity of interest, as suggested by counsel for H & R Properties, would in some instances result in the multiplicity of classes, which would make any re-organization difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. In my view, in placing a broad and purposive interpretation upon the provisions of the C.C.A.A. the court should take care to resist approaches which would potentially fragment creditors and thereby jeopardize potentially viable plans of arrangement, such as the plan advanced in this application.

14 In *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, *(*sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey)* 41 O.A.C. 282, 1 O.R. (3d) 289, Finlayson J.A. discussed the factors to be considered in the classification of shareholders. Based upon the factors considered by him, and agreed with by Doherty J.A. in his dissenting reasons, and the factors discussed in the various cases reviewed in the article, I am not persuaded that a separate class should be created consisting of the realty lessors, the equipment lessors and the conditional-sales vendor. Not every difference in the nature of a debt due to a creditor or a group of creditors warrants the creation of a separate class. What is required is some community of interest and rights which are not so dissimilar as to make it impossible for the creditors in the class to consult with a view toward a common interest. I do not see any reason for lessors, simply because they are lessors, to constitute a separate class of creditors. In reaching this conclusion I have also considered that para. 26 of the plan does take into account the rights given to landlords under the *Bankruptcy Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 and incorporates these rights into the plan. By the same token it would be improper to create a special class simply for the benefit of the opposing creditor, which would give that creditor the potential to exercise an unwarranted degree of power. The proposed plan is not for the exclusive benefit of H & R Properties but is intended to be for the benefit of all of the creditors. In my view, it presents a realistic proposal of compromise and reorganization which has a probable chance of success if presented to the creditors for their consideration.

15 Accordingly, the order will go as asked.

Application under C.C.A.A. granted.

End of Document

TAB 27

[IN THE COURT OF APPEAL.]

C. A.
1892
July 6

SOVEREIGN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY *v.* DODD.

Company—Winding-up—Set-off—Mutual Credits or Dealings—Life Insurance Company—Action by Company for Money Lent—Policy not matured at Commencement of Winding-up, but matured at Date of Action—Release—Bankruptcy Act, 1883 (46 & 47 *Vict. c.* 52), *s.* 38—*Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act*, 1870 (33 & 34 *Vict. c.* 104), *s.* 2.

The defendant in 1879 effected with the plaintiffs two policies of life insurance for 1000*l.*, each upon his own life, from the date thereof to May 7, 1888, by which policies the plaintiffs contracted that in the event of the defendant being alive on that day they would then pay the moneys assured to the defendant. In April and June, 1887, the defendant obtained two loans of 570*l.* and 600*l.* respectively from the plaintiffs upon mortgage of the policies. In August, 1887, a petition was presented for the winding-up of the plaintiff company, and a provisional liquidator was appointed. The defendant continued to pay to the plaintiffs the premiums upon the policies down to May 7, 1888; but the moneys assured by the policies were never paid to him. In July, 1889, a winding-up order was made. In April, 1890, an arrangement under the Joint Stock Companies Act, 1870, was entered into between the plaintiff company and the Sun Life Assurance Company, whereby it was provided that the policies of the plaintiff company should be transferred to the Sun Company, and that the holders of policies in the plaintiff company should, in full satisfaction of all claims upon the plaintiffs, accept certain reduced payments from the Sun Company. A meeting of policy-holders was summoned under s. 2 of the Act, at which a statutory majority agreed to the arrangement, but the defendant did not himself assent to it; it was in June, 1890, duly sanctioned by the Court, In December, 1890, the plaintiffs brought an action against the defendant to recover the amount of the loans, and the defendant sought to set off against the plaintiffs' claim the sums which, but for the winding-up, would have been payable to him upon the policies:—

Held, that the defendant was entitled to the set-off.

By s. 2 of the Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act, 1870, where an arrangement is proposed between a company in the course of being wound up and "the creditors of such company, or any class of such creditors," the Court may order that a meeting of "such creditors or class of creditors" shall be summoned, and if a majority in number, representing three-fourths in value of "such creditors or class of creditors," agree to the arrangement, it shall, if sanctioned by an order of the Court, be binding on "all such creditors or class of creditors, as the case may be," and also on the liquidator and contributories of the company.

The persons summoned to the meeting under the above section were the policy-holders of the company, and no separate meeting was summoned of those whose policies had, as distinct from those whose policies had not, matured:—

Held, that the insured persons whose policies had matured formed a distinct

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class of creditors from those whose policies had not matured; that a separate meeting of such class ought to have been held under the Act in order to make the arrangement binding upon the members of that class; and that the arrangement did not, therefore, operate as a release by the defendant of his claim against the plaintiffs.

APPEAL from a judgment of Charles, J. (1)

The action was brought to recover the amount of two loans of 570*l.* and 600*l.*, with interest. The facts, which were not in dispute, were as follows:—

On February 5, 1879, the defendant effected with the plaintiffs two policies of 1000*l.*, each upon his own life, from the date thereof to May 7, 1888, whereby the amount assured was to be payable to him if he was living on May 7, 1888, or to his executors if he died within the term of the insurance. On September 10, 1880, he obtained from the plaintiffs a loan of 320*l.*, and in April, 1887, an additional sum of 250*l.* was advanced to him by the plaintiffs, making altogether 570*l.*, which sum was secured by a mortgage to the secretary of the plaintiff company of the first of the two policies above mentioned. In June, 1887, 600*l.* was advanced by the company on a similar mortgage of the second policy.

On August 5, 1887, a petition to wind up the plaintiff company was presented; and on September 2, 1887, a provisional liquidator was appointed. On September 5, the secretary forwarded receipts to the defendant for his premiums. "The petition," he wrote, "is to be heard on Wednesday next; the object, I am informed, being to obtain a scheme for reduction of contracts." No arrangement, however, was made at that time for any scheme, and after the lapse of nearly two years, namely, on July 30, 1889, a winding-up order was made, and on September 17, 1889, a liquidator was appointed. Meanwhile, on May 7, 1888, the money insured by the defendant's policies became due to him. He had regularly paid all the premiums, which were payable quarterly, both before and after the date of the petition to wind-up.

On April 11, 1890, a deed of arrangement was entered into between the plaintiff company and the Sun Life Assurance Com-

(1) [1892] 1 Q. B. 405.

pany under the Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 104), which was sanctioned by the Court on June 14, 1890. A meeting of policy-holders was summoned, under s. 2 of the Act, to agree to the arrangement; but no separate meeting was summoned of those whose policies had, as distinct from those whose policies had not, matured. (1) The defendant did not assent to the arrangement; but at the meeting a majority, representing three-fourths in value, did assent. The deed recited, among other things, that it would be advantageous, in the opinion of the liquidator, to the persons claiming in the liquidation, to effect an arrangement under which the policies held by them on August 4, 1887, should be transferred on agreed terms to some other office, and that the liquidator considered that the terms of the agreement thereinafter expressed would, if sanctioned by the Court, be for the benefit of the persons interested; and then provided, in clause 1, for the issue of new policies by the Sun Life Assurance Company to policy-holders whose policies, if subsisting, would not have matured by August 4, 1890, guaranteeing, first, "the payment on death, or other time specified in the said policy, of the reduced sum set against the policy-holder's name in the thirteenth column of the second schedule thereto;" and, secondly, the payment at such times as aforesaid of a certain dividend, payable out of the assets of the Sovereign Life Assurance Company.

By clause 2 it was provided that, "As to policies of the Sovereign Company, which, but for the said winding-up order,

(1) By s. 2 of the Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 104): "Where any compromise or arrangement shall be proposed between a company which is .... in the course of being wound up .... and the creditors of such company, or any class of such creditors, it shall be lawful for the Court, in addition to any other of its powers, on the application in a summary way of any creditor or the liquidator, to order that a meeting of such creditors or class of creditors shall be summoned in such manner as the Court shall direct; and if a majority in number representing three-fourths in value of such creditors or class of creditors present either in person or by proxy at such meeting shall agree to any arrangement or compromise, such arrangement or compromise shall, if sanctioned by an order of the Court, be binding on all such creditors or class of creditors, as the case may be, and also on the liquidator and contributories of the said company."

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would have matured between August 4, 1887, and August 4, 1890 .... the Sun Company will, within one month after proof of death and title, make the same reduced payments to the representatives of such policy-holders or their assigns, and on the same terms and conditions, as if such policy had been a subsisting policy, and had matured after August 4, 1890."

By clause 7 it was provided that, as the consideration for the obligations imposed on the Sun Company, the liquidator would from time to time pay over or transfer to the Sun Company all such parts of the assets of the Sovereign Company as would be properly applicable to meet the claims of the policy-holders of the Sovereign Company who were such on August 4, 1887.

Clause 11 provided as follows: "If this agreement is sanctioned by the Court, all policy-holders of the Sovereign Company who were such on August 4, 1887, shall accept the provisions hereof in full satisfaction of all claims on the Sovereign Company and the assets thereof." The deed further provided that the winding-up should be continued so far as might be necessary to settle the rights of all parties.

The reduced sums which, under clause 2 of the deed of arrangement, were set against the defendant's name in the thirteenth column of the second schedule thereto, were 26*l.* in respect of each of his two policies; and the estimated dividends, payment of which was guaranteed to him out of the assets of the plaintiffs by the Sun Company, amounted to 241*l.* on each policy.

In December, 1890, the plaintiffs by their liquidator brought this action against the defendant to recover the sum of 1345*l.* 19*s.* 5*d.*, being the amount of the above-mentioned two loans and interest thereon. The defendant pleaded a set-off of the 2000*l.* which was payable to him by the plaintiffs in respect of his two policies on May 7, 1888. He also counter-claimed for the difference between the money so due on the policies and the amount of the loans; but the counter-claim was not insisted upon at the trial.

The learned judge held that the defendant was entitled to the set-off (1), and the plaintiffs appealed.

(1) [1892] 1 Q. B. 405.

Buckley, Q.C., and *Hull*, (*H. Tindal Atkinson*, with them), for the plaintiffs, argued as in the Court below, and contended, in addition, that it was unnecessary under the Act of 1870 to call a separate meeting of the class of policy-holders whose policies had matured, as the whole body of policy-holders formed only one class of creditors, whether their policies had matured or not.

Crump, Q.C., and *Morton Smith*, for the defendant, were not called upon.

LORD ESHER, M.R. I am of opinion that this appeal must be dismissed. The plaintiff company, which is in liquidation, has brought an action by its liquidator to recover money lent by the company to the defendant before the liquidation, and the defendant sets up as a defence a right of set-off against the company or the liquidator, or both of them. In that state of facts it is argued, first, that the defendant has no right of set-off at all; and, secondly, that the claim upon which he relies has been released.

The first point which we have to consider is, what will destroy the right of set-off; when an action of debt is brought, will the fact of the plaintiff being in liquidation or bankrupt (the action being brought by the liquidator or trustee) of itself destroy the right, and drive the defendant into bankruptcy to prove his claim? Let us try what the rights of the parties would have been under the old law in such a case. A trustee brings an action to recover a debt due; a set-off is pleaded, and it is suggested that it would have been a good replication that the bankrupt could only pay 1*s.* in the pound, thus wiping out the set-off or reducing it to 1*s.* in the pound. It is enough to say that such a thing was never heard of. A set-off can only be set up where an action is brought; what is the right of the defendant after an action is commenced against him? Clearly it is to set off a debt due to him from the plaintiff; if the debt due to him is of the same kind as that in respect of which he is being sued, he can set it off. The right of set-off depends on the existence of a debt due to the defendant, and the fact of his debtor being a bankrupt does not prevent the set-off arising, though it prevents his obtaining in the bankruptcy more than his share of the assets;

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the whole debt is still in existence. Therefore, where an action is brought by a trustee in bankruptcy, he is in within the terms of the statute of set-off, and the defendant can set off a debt due to him from the bankrupt. What is the result of a plea of set-off? It is not a counter-claim or a cross-action, but a plea in bar; and therefore, in cases where the plea is made out, although it may be true that when the action was brought the defendant was a debtor of the plaintiff, yet, the plaintiff being the defendant's debtor to the same amount, the plaintiff's claim is barred. Bankruptcy, therefore, makes no difference to the right of set-off.

Now, the cases in which a debt could be set off in bankruptcy were limited, and many difficulties arose; but the subject was dealt with by s. 39 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, and s. 38 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, which enlarged the subject-matter of the plea of set-off; they made, however, no alteration in the result of a set-off, and a debt can, therefore, now be treated as a set-off which could not have been so treated under the old law, and when pleaded and proved it is still a bar to the action. We have, therefore, to see whether, when this action was brought, the defendant had a right to set off this debt. Now, when an action is brought by a company, through its liquidator, to recover a sum of money lent, the defendant may answer that the claim is true, but that the company is indebted to him in an equal or larger sum, which he has a right to set off against the claim. Was the company so indebted to the defendant in the present case? At the time when the action was brought the date for payment of the policies had arrived; the company was, therefore, then indebted to the defendant, who had a claim against them for a liquidated and ascertained amount, the sums insured by the policies. The company was indebted to him, and he to the company; but the winding-up prevented him from getting payment of the 2000*l.*, though he could prove in the winding-up in respect of it. The winding-up had no effect upon his right to plead a set-off; he had, therefore, a right to plead that the plaintiffs were indebted to him in a sum of 2000*l.*, and claim to set that sum off against the plaintiffs' claim, though he could not, of course, actually recover the 2000*l.* from the plaintiffs.

It seems to me clear that in this case the defendant had a right to plead a set-off, which, if proved, was a bar to the action; and it is immaterial whether it would have been a set-off before the statute (though I incline to think that it was), for I have no doubt that it comes within the terms of the section.

It is said that the decision in *Ex parte Price, In re Lankester* (1), is to a contrary effect; but the distinguishing feature of that case is, as was pointed out in *In re Asphaltic Wood Pavement Co., Lee and Chapman's Case* (2), that there was no action at all, and that the Court was only considering the rights of proof in bankruptcy. Had there been no action in the present case, and had the proceedings been in bankruptcy, it is unnecessary to consider what would then have been the rights of the defendant; we have to consider his rights in the action only, and in that point of view his set-off is so great as to bar the plaintiffs' claim. That is in accordance with the judgment in the *Asphaltic Wood Pavement Company's Case* (2); and it is not in conflict with the decision in *Ex parte Price, In re Lankester.* (1) The defendant, therefore, is entitled to the benefit of his set-off, unless the plaintiffs can say that the debt had been released as against them, and that the defendant had assented to take, and had taken, somebody else as his debtor. This question depends on what was done at the meeting of creditors, and whether what was there done bound the defendant, and bound him to the extent of releasing the plaintiffs from their liability; the time at which the action was brought is the date to which we must look for the purpose of determining this question.

Now, as to the meeting, we have to consider the persons who must be summoned to it, and who are to be dealt with as different classes; that is, we must consider the state of affairs at the date of the meeting, for the persons to attend it are those who have a right to attend it at that time, and it is that state of affairs, and not the position of things at the date of the original contract, that we must look at. The Act says that the persons to be summoned to the meeting (all of whom, be it said in passing, are creditors) are persons who can be divided into different classes—classes which the Act of Parliament recognises, though

(1) Law Rep. 10 Ch. 648. (2) 30 Ch. D. 216.

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it does not define them. This, therefore, must be done: they must be divided into different classes. What is the reason for such a course? It is because the creditors composing the different classes have different interests; and, therefore, if we find a different state of facts existing among different creditors which may differently affect their minds and their judgment, they must be divided into different classes.

In the present case, the persons who had notice of the meeting were policy-holders—that is to say, policy-holders whose policies had to be dealt with. But the defendant was not a policy-holder at all; his policies had been fulfilled, and he was a creditor for the amount of the policies, and could have sued the company for money due; he had a vested cause of action, the policy-holders had none; and it is obvious that he could not consider the matter with the same mind and from the same point of view as the policy-holders who were summoned to the meeting. I do not say that, when there is nothing left to be done but the payment of the money, a person in the defendant's position may not be said properly to be in the same class as others who are creditors of the society; but, at any rate, he cannot fall within the same class as those whose policies have not matured. The defendant, therefore, belongs to a different class from those persons who were summoned as policy-holders, for his policies had not to be dealt with in any way; they had already matured; he has, therefore, not been summoned to the meeting, and what was done there does not bind him. The judgment of the learned judge in the Court below must be affirmed; he was right in holding that the section applied so as to enlarge the subject-matter of a plea of set-off. As I have already intimated, I think that apart from the statute there would have been a set-off; but, if the right depends upon the statute, I entirely agree with the judgment of Charles, J., that the defence is available to the defendant, and is a bar to the action.

BOWEN, L.J. I am of the same opinion. The action is for money lent, and the defendant seeks to rely upon the defence that he is entitled as against the company to treat as a set-off money due on policies granted by the company to him, which

policies accrued due on May 7, 1888. At that date a petition to wind up the company had already been presented; the defendant had paid all the premiums on the policies both before and after the date of the presentation of the winding-up petition, and on the day when the policies matured there was a large sum of money owing to him by the company. What was the defendant's position on that day? The company was being wound up, for the winding-up order, though not then made, dated back when made to the presentation of the petition, and the defendant was in the position of a person who had effected a policy and assigned it to the company as security for a loan, and also of a person who was entitled to say that 2000*l.* was owed to him by the company. It is true that he could not successfully prosecute an action for the 2000*l.* against the company because of the winding-up; but he was entitled to prove against the company for the value of his claim. His case is, therefore, distinguished from that of other policy-holders whose policies had not matured; he had gone on paying his premiums after the winding-up until the date when his policies became due, and his claim on his policies had therefore a fixed and ascertained value; this operated to his benefit, and the case has considerable resemblance to *Macfarlane's Claim, In re Northern Counties of England Fire Insurance Co.* (1), and *In re Bridges, Hill* v. *Bridges.* (2) Further, the defendant had the company's money in his pocket, and was entitled to make use of a counter-claim, or, more correctly, a set-off, against any action which the company might bring against him to recover the money; he could not sue the company or counter-claim against them in the strictest sense of the term because of the liquidation; but he could say that the transactions had resulted in mutual debts, and that he had a right to set off the debt of the company to him against his own debt to the company. That was his position when his policies matured, and he could be in no worse position when the company brought their action; he was entitled to set up his defence of set-off, which is so large in amount as to be a bar to the company's claim. That being so, I agree with the Master of the Rolls that it is unnecessary to consider what would have been the position

(1) 17 Ch. D. 337. (2) 17 Ch. D. 342.

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Bowen, L.J.

of the parties had there been only bankruptcy proceedings and no action had been brought. What is there to prevent the defendant's right of set-off in this action? Certainly not the winding-up, which has not altered the position and rights of the parties in this respect. As far as I can see, this is a good set-off at law; but if it were not a good legal set-off by reason of the existence of an assignment of the policies to the secretary of the company, it would, at all events, be a good set-off in equity.

The operation of s. 39 of the Act of 1869 and s. 38 of the Act of 1883 has been to enlarge, not the effect of a set-off, but the meaning of the term. This is clear from the decision in *In re Asphaltic Wood Pavement Co.* (1), and is especially clear in the judgment of Cotton, L.J., which is cited at some length by Charles, J., in his judgment now appealed against. It is said, however, that the decision in *Ex parte Price, In re Lankester* (2), is inconsistent with that case, and covers the present one; but I am unable to agree with that contention. The case of *Ex parte Price, In re Lankester* (2), dealt only with the doctrine of mutual rights in relation to the proof of a set-off in a winding-up, not in a case where an action had been brought; and the Court was dealing with the valuation of current policies subsisting at the time of the accrual of the right of set-off which was under consideration. In the present case, however, the policy had ceased or matured, and we are dealing with the rights of a person who is entitled to the full value of the policy. There is, therefore, in the present case, either a mutual debt or a mutual dealing; and unless there has been a release of the defendant's claim against the plaintiffs, the latter are out of court.

This question of a release depends, first, upon the construction of the document; secondly, upon the effect of the statute on that document. I feel grave doubt whether the term "policy-holder" includes those persons who have been policy-holders, but whose policies have matured not by death but by the happening of the stipulated event; but it is unnecessary to decide that question if we think that under the Act of 1870 the deed of arrangement did not bind dissentient creditors. What is the proper construction of that statute? It makes the majority of the creditors

(1) 30 Ch. D. 216. (2) Law Rep. 10 Ch. 648.

or of a class of creditors bind the minority; it exercises a most formidable compulsion upon dissentient, or would-be dissentient, creditors; and it therefore requires to be construed with care, so as not to place in the hands of some of the creditors the means and opportunity of forcing dissentients to do that which it is unreasonable to require them to do, or of making a mere jest of the interests of the minority. If we are to construe the section as it is suggested on behalf of the plaintiffs it ought to be construed, we should be holding that a class of policy-holders whose interests are uncertain may by a mere majority in value override the interests of those who have nothing to do with futurity, and whose rights have been already ascertained. It is obvious that these two sets of interests are inconsistent, and that those whose policies are still current are deeply interested in sacrificing the interests of those whose policies have matured. They are bound by no community of interest, and their claims are not capable of being ascertained by any common system of valuation. Are we, then, justified in so construing the Act of Parliament as to include these persons in one class? The word "class" is vague, and to find out what is meant by it we must look at the scope of the section, which is a section enabling the Court to order a meeting of a class of creditors to be called. It seems plain that we must give such a meaning to the term "class" as will prevent the section being so worked as to result in confiscation and injustice, and that it must be confined to those persons whose rights are not so dissimilar as to make it impossible for them to consult together with a view to their common interest. If that be so, in considering the deed of arrangement made with the company which took over the business of the Sovereign, we must so construe it as not to include in one class those whose policies had already ripened into debts, and those whose policies might not ripen into debts for years to come; for the position of a person like the defendant, who had an ascertained sum of 2000*l.* due to him from the company, was entirely different from that of those policy-holders whose future was entirely uncertain. It was, therefore, not right to summon as members of one and the same class those who had an absolute bar against any claim of the company and those who had not. I think, therefore, that

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there was no release of the defendant's claim against the plaintiffs, and that the appeal must be dismissed. I am not sorry to have had the opportunity of calling attention to s. 2 of the Act of 1870, which is constantly utilized, and often, I think, very carelessly and unjustly.

KAY, L.J. I am of the same opinion. My judgment depends upon the facts of the case, which are very peculiar and may possibly never recur. The defendant took out two policies on the same day in a form which gave his representatives a right to recover the amount if he died before May 7, 1888, and made it payable on that day to him if he were then alive. There were two events in which he or his representatives became entitled to the money, subject to the premiums being kept up. The defendant afterwards mortgaged the policies to the company to secure moneys lent to him, and the company have brought this action to recover the moneys so lent. The form of the policy shews that the capital funds of the company alone were liable for the amount insured, and the effect of this, as appears from *In re State Fire Insurance Co.* (1), is not to create a charge on the funds; it amounts to a condition that the company will only be liable in case they have sufficient funds to pay the amount of the policy. Then on August 5, 1887, there was a winding-up petition; and on September 2 a provisional liquidator was appointed. The time for the maturing of the defendant's policies was drawing near, and the premiums were paid by him to the provisional liquidator. On May 7, 1888, the policies matured. No winding-up order had then been made, and the defendant was entitled to the debt of 2000*l.* owing by the company to him. It is said that the debt was not owing to the defendant because he had executed an assignment of his policies to a trustee for the company, and so mortgaged them to secure advances from the company, and therefore there was no liability on the part of the latter to the defendant, who was not entitled to a re-assignment of the policies until he had paid off the amount of the advances. On July 30, 1889, the winding-up order was made, and this related back to August 5, 1887, the date of the winding-up petition. Then a

(1) 1 D. J. & S. 634.

long time elapsed; and on April 11, 1890, a deed of arrangement was entered into, which is relied upon as a release. The company has now brought this action to recover the moneys lent, and the defendant claims to be entitled to a set-off for the moneys due on the policies, basing his claim chiefly upon the fact of the transaction amounting to a mutual credit or dealing within s. 38 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883. It is not denied that when the policies matured the company had sufficient funds to pay them. They were, therefore, then indebted to the defendant in the full amount of these policies.

The case of *Ex parte Price, In re Lankester* (1), is the only decision which has been cited to us as throwing any difficulty in the way of the defendant's set-off; but there is a very broad distinction between the two cases; in that case a proof was tendered by the company in the bankruptcy of the assured, and an attempt was made on behalf of the trustee in bankruptcy to avail himself of the mutual credit clause, because at the date of the bankruptcy the bankrupt was entitled to a current policy which had not matured; in other words, the bankrupt was indebted to the company, and tried to set off what was not due, but the value of what might become due upon the policy. In the present case, however, the claim which the defendant seeks to set off had already accrued due; it was a sum ascertained and liquidated; this makes all the difference. I do not in any way desire to dissent from the decision in *Ex parte Price, In re Lankester* (1), but it is distinguishable on the ground I have indicated from the present case, which more nearly approaches the case of *In re Asphaltic Wood Pavement Co.* (2) There was a clear debt due upon these policies when the present action was brought; and I think we may discard the argument founded upon the fact that there had been an assignment of the policies to the company, for there will be a set-off in equity in cases where, but for some such circumstance as this assignment, there would have been a legal set-off. The company were liable to the defendant for the amount of the policies, subject of course to their charge upon the policies for the advances, and I think that in this action the defendant probably had a set-off against

(1) Law Rep. 10 Ch. 648. (2) 30 Ch. D. 216.

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Kay, L.J.

the company wholly independent of the section. If, however, he had not, there was clearly a mutual dealing between the company and the assured which entitled the latter to have the accounts between them taken, and to bring in his claim against the company under the mutual credit clause.

Then comes the question under the deed of arrangement, which makes provision for the liquidation of current policies, and clause 2 of which provides for policies "which but for the said winding-up order would have matured between August 4, 1887, and August 4, 1890." The expression "would have matured" is a loose one, and does not apply to a case where the policy has matured on a fixed date which the assured has outlived. Then, by clause 11, all policy-holders who were policy-holders on August 4, 1887, are to accept the provisions of the deed in full satisfaction of their claims on the plaintiff company. Without deciding whether this clause is binding on any particular policy-holder, I am not satisfied that it amounts to a release of the defendant's claim against the company. He claims to set off his claim against that of the company; can it be contended that clause 11 operates to deprive a man of an existing right of set-off? I think not; and, as the defendant had such an existing right, I do not think that this clause applies.

I also agree that it is exceedingly doubtful whether this deed relates at all to a policy-holder in the position of the defendant. There never was a separate meeting of the class of policy-holders to which he belonged, and he ought not to have been mixed up with those whose policies had not matured. It is not contested that his policies had matured; the sum secured by them was due, and he had a claim to set off that sum in order to liquidate the sum due from him to the company. I think, therefore, that this deed of arrangement cannot be treated as a release by him of the debt due from the company.

Appeal dismissed.

Solicitor for plaintiffs: *J. Robinson.*
Solicitor for defendant: *N. Jourdain.*

W. J. B.

TAB 28

THE 2015 ANNOTATED BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY ACT

Including
General Rules under the Act
Orderly Payment of Debts Regulations
Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
CCAA Regulations and Forms
Farm Debt Mediation Act
Wage Earner Protection Program Act
Directives and Circulars

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

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22.1 Class — creditors having equity claims — Despite subsection 22(1), creditors having equity claims are to be in the same class of creditors in relation to those claims unless the court orders otherwise and may not, as members of that class, vote at any meeting unless the court orders otherwise.

2007, c. 36, s. 71

N§149 — Classification of Creditors

The *CCAA* contemplates that the plan will be approved by the various classes of secured or unsecured creditors affected by it. Section 22(1) specifies that a debtor company may divide its creditors into classes for the purpose of a meeting to be held to vote on a proposed plan of compromise or arrangement relating to the company and, if the debtor company does so, it is to apply to the court for approval of the division before the meeting is held. Under s. 22(2), the court is to consider the following factors: creditors may be included in the same class if their interests or rights are sufficiently similar to give them a commonality of interest, taking into account (a) the nature of the debts, liabilities or obligations giving rise to their claims; (b) the nature and rank of any security in respect of their claims; (c) the remedies available to the creditors in the absence of the compromise or arrangement being sanctioned, and the extent to which the creditors would recover their claims by exercising those remedies; and (d) any further criteria, consistent with those set out in paragraphs (a) to (c), that are prescribed. These criteria are essentially a codification of previous caselaw and thus the cases below continue to be relevant in terms of the courts' reasoning.

The primary responsibility for making the classification is on the debtor company: *Re Hellenic Trust Ltd.*, [1975] 3 All E.R. 382, 119 Sol. Jo. 845, [1976] 1 W.L.R. 123 (S.C.).

Classification of creditors must be crafted with the underlying purpose of the *CCAA* in mind, namely facilitation of the reorganization of an insolvent company through the negotiation and approval of a plan of compromise or arrangement between the debtor company and its creditors, so that the debtor company can continue to carry on its business to the benefit of all concerned. In addition to commonality of interest concerns, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that a court dealing with a classification of creditors issue needs to be alert to concerns about the confiscation of legal rights and about avoiding what the parties have referred to as "a tyranny of the minority". The classification of creditors is determined by their legal rights in relation to the debtor company, as opposed to their rights as creditors in relation to each other: *Re Stelco Inc.* (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 6818, 15 C.B.R. (5th) 307 (C.A.).

The reason for dividing creditors into different classes is that creditors have different interests, and they should only be permitted to bind other creditors who have the same interest; however, the classification must not be so fine that it renders it impossible to get a plan approved. Class "must be confined to those persons whose rights are not so dissimilar as to make it impossible for them to consult together with a view to their common interests": *Sovereign Life Assur. Co. v. Dodd*, [1892] 2 Q.B. 573, 41 W.R. 4, 36 Sol. Jo. 644, 4 R 17 (C.A.); *Savage v. Amoco Acquisition Co.* (1988), 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 154, 59 Alta. L.R. (2d) 260, 40 B.L.R. 188, 87 A.R. 321 (C.A.); leave to apeal to S.C.C. refused (1988), 70 C.B.R. (N.S.) xxxii (note).

In making the classification, the court is concerned with what the claimant holds, not with who holds the claim. However, the court ordered that the vote of the creditor should be separately recorded and tabulated so that the court could, if the creditors voted to accept the plan, consider the matter on the application to sanction the plan in deciding whether the plan was fair and reasonable: *Re Canadian Airlines Corp.* (2000), 19 C.B.R. (4th) 12, 2000 CarswellAlta 623 (Alta. Q.B.); application for leave to appeal dismissed (2000), 2000 CarswellAlta 503, 19 C.B.R. (4th) 33 (C.A. [In Chambers.]).

In *Re Oblats de Marie Immaculée du Manitoba* (2004), 2004 CarswellMan 104, 1 C.B.R. (5th) 279 (Man. Q.B.), the Federal Crown was a creditor in a *CCAA* plan proposal and also a co-defendant in a class action commenced by former residents of a First Nations residential school. The plan provided that the plaintiffs in the class action and the Federal Crown be grouped in the same class. The court found that there was no commonality of interest and that this attempt at classification was "a blatant effort to compromise" the Crown's claim as the single largest creditor, without allowing the Crown an appropriate say in the vote.

A creditor that claimed a common lien over tapes prepared with respect to the production of a television series was not entitled to be classified with the senior secured creditor banks on the basis that the property on which the lien was asserted was not that valuable, and it was not unfair or unreasonable to exclude the creditor from the senior secured creditor category: *Minds Eye Entertainment Ltd. v. Royal Bank* (2003), 2003 CarswellSask 921, 1 C.B.R. (5th) 85 (Sask. Q.B.).

The classification of classes of secured creditors must take into account variations tailored to the situations of various creditors within a particular class. Equality of treatment, as opposed to equitable treatment, is not a necessary, nor even a desirable goal: *Re Keddy Motor Inns Ltd.* (1992), 13 C.B.R. (3d) 245, 6 B.L.R. (2d) 116, 90 D.L.R. (4th) 175, 110 N.S.R. (2d) 246, (sub nom. *Keddy Motor Inns Ltd., Re (No. 4))* 299 A.P.R. 246 (C.A.).

In *Re Steinberg Inc.* (1993), 23 C.B.R. (3d) 243, 1993 CarswellQue 39 (C.S. Qué.), the plan classified unsecured creditors into six sub-classes. One sub-class, those under $1,000, was to be paid in full; the court found nothing improper in this arrangement, finding that the sub-classification was not unreasonable or inequitable. It also held that it was unnecessary to obtain a majority vote of each sub-class, but a majority vote of the entire class was sufficient.

Where the term lenders, both Crown corporations, objected to the classification of the operating lender in a separate class, arguing that two classes of secured creditors would create fragmentation and was contrary to the "commonality of interest" principle, the court observed that if the debtor were liquidated, the operating lender would recover the full amount of its operating loan, while there would be a substantial shortfall in respect to the term lenders, and there was also a very real difference in the nature of the assets on which they were secured: *Re Federal Gypsum Co.* (2007), 2007 CarswellNS 630, 40 C.B.R. (5th) 39 (N.S. S.C.) (December 14, 2007).

The Ontario Superior Court held that it was appropriate that all creditors be placed in a single class as the plan was, in essence, an offer to all investors that must be accepted by or made binding on all investors. The plan treated all asset backed commercial paper (ABCP) holders equitably, and while the risks differed among traditional assets, ineligible assets, and synthetic assets, the calculation of the differing risks and corresponding interests had been taken into account consistently across all of the ABCP in the plan. Campbell J. was also satisfied that fragmentation of classes would have rendered it excessively difficult to have obtained approval of a *CCAA* plan, which was contrary to the purpose of the *CCAA*. He also took into account the commonality of interest approach in deciding that the proposed classification was, at this stage, appropriate: *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.* (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 2652, 42 C.B.R. (5th) 90 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

Justice Romaine of the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench noted that classification is a key issue in *CCAA* proceedings as the debtor seeks to frame a class or classes in order to ensure that the plan receives the maximum level of support; creditors have an interest in classifications that would allow them enhanced bargaining power in the negotiation of the plan; and creditors aggrieved by the process may seek to ensure that classification will give them an effective veto. The starting point in determining classification is the statute; the primary pur-

pose of the *CCAA* is to facilitate the reorganization of the insolvent debtor. Romaine J. referenced the principles set out in *Re Canadian Airlines Corp.* and amendments to the *CCAA* proclaimed in force September 18, 2009 that set out factors to consider in approving a classification for voting purposes. Creditors may be included in the same class if their interests or rights are sufficiently similar to give them a commonality of interest, taking into account: (a) the nature of the debts, liabilities or obligations giving rise to their claims; (b) the nature and rank of any security in respect of their claims; (c) the remedies available to the creditors in the absence of the compromise or arrangement being sanctioned, and the extent to which the creditors would recover their claims by exercising those remedies; and (d) any further criteria, consistent with those set out in paragraphs (a) to (c), that are prescribed. Justice Romaine held that these factors did not change in any material way the factors that have been identified in case law, nor would they have had a material effect on consideration of the proposed classification in this case. Romaine J. concluded that there was no good reason to exclude the secured lenders and noteholders from the single classification of voters. There were no material distinctions between the claims of the two creditors and the claims of the remaining unsecured creditors that were not more properly the subject of the sanction hearing, apart from the deferred issue of whether the secured lenders were entitled to vote their entire guarantee claim: *Re SemCanada Crude Co.* (2009), 2009 CarswellAlta 1269, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 205 (Alta. Q.B.).

The British Columbia Supreme Court sanctioned a plan of arrangement over the objections of a major unsecured creditor. The objecting unsecured creditor contended that the major secured creditor should not have been permitted to vote its deficiency claim and assigned claims in the general creditor class. Masuhara J. noted that the objecting creditor had not objected to the secured creditor voting its assigned votes earlier in the proceedings. The court had not been provided with any evidence to establish that the secured creditor somehow controlled shares of the debtor and there was no evidence that the creditor's arrangement with the debtor was anything but an arm's-length debt financing. It was an arm's-length creditor, and although it had initiated the *CCAA* proceedings, the CRO and the monitor, both court officers, had been appointed to oversee the debtor and provide the appropriate level of independence: *HSBC Bank Canada v. Bear Mountain Master Partnership* (2010), 2010 CarswellBC 2962, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 276 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]).

N§150 — Criteria for Determining Class

Section 22(2) sets out the factors that must be consider in dividing creditors into classes, including the nature of the debts, liabilities or obligations giving rise to their claims; the nature and rank of any security in respect of the claims; the remedies available to the creditors in the absence of the compromise being sanctioned and the extent to which the creditors would recover their claims by exercising those remedies, and any further criteria consistent with these criteria that may be prescribed.

Commonality of interest should be viewed based on the non-fragmentation test; the interests to be considered are the legal interest that a creditor holds *qua* creditor in relationship to the debtor company prior to and under the plan; the commonality of interests are to be viewed purposively, bearing in mind the object of the *CCAA*; in placing a purposive interpretation on the *CCAA*, the court should be careful to resist classification approaches that would potentially jeopardize viable plans; absent bad faith, the motivations of creditors to approve or disapprove of the plan are irrelevant; the requirement of creditors being able to consult together means being able to assess their legal entitlement as creditors; since the *CCAA* is to be given a liberal interpretation, classification hearings should be dealt with on a fact specific basis and the court should avoid rigid rules of general application; and finally, in determin-

TAB 29

I.I.C. Ct. Filing 44993447021

The T. Eaton Company Ltd. — Court File Nos. 31-OR-364921, 99-CL-3516, 99-CL-3514
21 **— Amended and Restated Plan of Compromise and Arrangement as approved by creditors pursuant to ss. 4 & 5 of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act**

Re. The T. Eaton Company Limited, Court File No. 99-CL-3516:Toronto

Amended and Restated Plan of Compromise and Arrangement

Pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (Canada) and the *Business Corporations Act* (Ontario) concerning, affecting and involving

The T. Eaton Company Limited

Article 1 — Interpretation

1.1 — Definitions

In this Plan, unless otherwise stated or unless the subject matter or context otherwise requires:

"Abandoned Premises" means any premises under a Lease in whole or in part with Eaton's, abandoned by Eaton's, or for which Eaton's has delivered or delivers an abandonment notice or a repudiation notice after the Valuation Date.

"Affiliate" means affiliate as defined in the OBCA.

"Agency Agreement" means the agreement among the Agent, Eaton's and the Interim Receiver dated as of July 29, 1999, as amended from time to time.

"Agent" means, collectively, Gordon Brothers Retail Partners, LLC, Schottenstein/Bernstein Capital Group, LLC, Hilco Trading Co., Inc. and Garcel, Inc. and their successors and permitted assigns.

"Articles of Arrangement" means the Articles of Arrangement for each of Distributionco and Eaton's contemplated by the Plan.

"BIA" means the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3.

"BIA Orders" means those Orders made in the BIA Proceedings on August 23, 27, 29 and September 2 and 20, 1999, and *"BIA Order"* means any one of them.

"BIA Proceedings" means the proceedings commenced under Part III of the BIA by Eaton's by the filing of a notice of intention to make a proposal on August 20, 1999.

"Business Day" means a day, other than Saturday, Sunday or a statutory holiday, on which banks are generally open for business in Toronto, Ontario.

"Calendar Day" means a day, including Saturday, Sunday and any statutory holiday.

"Canadian Dollars" or *"$"* means dollars denominated in lawful currency of Canada.

"CCAA" means the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.

"CCAA Proceedings" means the proceedings in respect of Eaton's under the CCAA commenced pursuant to the Initial CCAA Order.

"CCAA Sanction Order" means the Order to be made in the CCAA Proceedings to sanction this Plan, as such Order may be amended, varied or modified by the Court from time to time.

"Chair" means Mr. John Swidler, F.C.A., President of the Monitor, or another official of the Monitor designated by the Monitor, appointed to preside as the chair of the Meetings.

"Charge" means a valid mortgage, charge, pledge, assignment by way of security, lien, privilege, hypothec or security interest.

"Claim" means any right of any Person against Eaton's in connection with any indebtedness, liability or obligation of any kind of Eaton's, whether in contract, tort, or otherwise, which indebtedness, liability or obligation is in existence prior to the Valuation Date and any interest that may accrue thereon, whether liquidated, reduced to judgment, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, statutory, penal, equitable, secured, unsecured, present, future, known or unknown, by guarantee, surety or otherwise, and whether or not such right is executory or anticipatory in nature, including without limitation, any claim relating to the administration or winding up of the Pension Plans including, without limitation, any unfunded liability, or the administration, distribution or investment of the funds relating to the Pension Plans or any employee benefit plans including, without limitation, any long term disability plan, fund or arrangement, and any claim made or asserted against Eaton's through any affiliate, associate or related person (as such terms are defined in the OBCA), or any right or ability of any Person to advance a claim for subrogation, contribution or indemnity or otherwise with respect to any matter, action, cause or chose in action, whether existing at present or commenced in the future with respect to any matter, action, cause or chose in action whether existing at present or commenced in the future (including, without limitation, any claims which may exist or arise against Eaton's as assignor of any contract, right, licence or property) based in whole or in part on facts, contracts or arrangements which exist prior to the Valuation Date, together with any other claims that would have been claims provable in bankruptcy had Eaton's become bankrupt on the Valuation Date.

"Claims Administrator" means the Person identified in the schedules to the Claims Procedure for purposes of receiving the notices described in those schedules.

"Claims Officer" means each of The Honourable W. David Griffiths, Q.C., The Honourable Robert F. Reid, Q.C., The Honourable Robert S. Montgomery, Q.C., The Honourable Joseph W. O'Brien, Q.C., The Honourable John B. Webber, Q.C., The Honourable Hilda M. McKinlay and The Honourable Alvin B. Rosenberg, Q.C. or such other Person or Persons as may be appointed by the Court for the purposes of determining a Claim or an Interim Period Claim for voting and distribution purposes.

"Claims Procedure" means the claims procedure and the schedules thereto, attached to this Plan as Schedule "A", for determining Claims and Interim Period Claims for voting and distribution purposes approved in the Initial CCAA Order, as may be amended from time to time.

"Classes" means the two classes of Creditors grouped in accordance with their Claims and Interim Period Claims for the purposes of considering and voting upon this Plan in accordance with the provisions of this Plan, and receiving distributions hereunder, such classes being comprised of Unsecured Creditors and Landlord Creditors, and the single class of Shareholders, respectively, and *"Class"* means any one of such classes.

"Common Shares" means the authorized, issued and outstanding common shares of Eaton's.

"Court" means the Superior Court of Justice for the Province of Ontario, Canada.

"Creditor" means any Person having a Claim or an Interim Period Claim and may, where the context requires, include the assignee of a Claim or an Interim Period Claim, or a trustee, liquidator, interim receiver, receiver, receiver and manager or other Person acting on behalf of such Person.

"Creditor Approval" means the approval of this Plan by all of the Classes of Creditors voting on this Plan under the CCAA.

"Distribution Claim" of a Creditor means the compromised amount of the Claim or Interim Period Claim of such Creditor as finally determined for distribution purposes, in accordance with the provisions of the Claims Procedure, the Plan, the Initial CCAA Order and the CCAA.

"Distributionco" means a business corporation incorporated under the OBCA that will assume the Distributionco Assumed Liabilities and the Unsatisfied Unaffected Liabilities in exchange for the Distributionco Transferred Assets and the Eaton's Note (which will be satisfied by Eaton's upon the receipt of the Sears Equity Contribution), that will distribute the net cash proceeds from the Distributionco Transferred Assets and the satisfaction of the Eaton's Note to Creditors pursuant to this Plan and the OBCA Sanction Order, that will receive the Sears Variable Note for distribution to Shareholders pursuant to this Plan and the OBCA Sanction Order and that will act as agent and nominee for the holders of the Participation Units to hold the Sears Variable Note for their benefit.

"Distributionco Assumed Liabilities" means all of the obligations, indebtedness and liabilities of Eaton's which are compromised on the Plan Implementation Date.

"Distributionco Common Share" means the single common share of Distributionco issued to Eaton's for the subscription price of $1 (which common share is only entitled to receive $1 on dissolution of Distributionco), and which common share will be transferred to the Liquidator on the Plan Implementation Date for $1.

"Distributionco Transferred Assets" means all of the assets of Eaton's on the Plan Implementation Date (including the benefit of all insurance policies of Eaton's in effect as of the Plan Implementation Date) other than the Eaton's Remaining Assets, excluding the Sears Equity Contribution.

"Eaton's" means The T. Eaton Company Limited and, from and after the Plan Implementation Date, any successor thereof.

"Eaton's Elected Stores" means Eaton's leasehold interests in such of the stores listed on Schedule B to the Sears Agreement as Sears elects should be retained by Eaton's under the Sears Agreement.

"Eaton's Note" means the promissory note in the principal amount of $60 million (subject to any adjustment of the Sears Equity Contribution which may be required on closing of the Sears Transaction pursuant to the Sears Agreement) to be issued by Eaton's to Distributionco on the Plan Implementation Date in part consideration for the assumption by Distributionco of the Distributionco Assumed Liabilities and the Unsatisfied Unaffected Liabilities.

"Eaton's Operating Stores" means those stores under the Sears Agreement which Eaton's will continue to operate under the Sears Operating Agreement.

"Eaton's Remaining Assets" means those assets of Eaton's which under the Sears Agreement will remain with Eaton's from and after the Plan Implementation Date, and includes:

(i) Eaton's leasehold interests in the Eaton's Remaining Stores and the Eaton's Elected Stores;

(ii) Eaton's freehold and leasehold interests in and pertaining to its Calgary Eaton Centre downtown store location;

(iii) any inventory of saleable merchandise owned by Eaton's and located at the Eaton's Operating Stores;

(iv) subject to any valid Charge or other ownership rights of third parties, the furniture, fixtures and equipment in the Eaton's Remaining Stores and the Eaton's Elected Stores, other than those specifically excluded under the Sears Agreement;

(v) the goodwill, names (including private label brand names), trade-marks, trade names, copyrights, other intellectual property, contractual rights and accrued benefits relating to the assets described above (including the benefit of prepaid

expenses) and licenses, sub-leases and contracts relating to the assets described above (except for those which Sears elects not be retained by Eaton's) owned or used by Eaton's, books and records owned or used by Eaton's in connection with Eaton's business, the assets of Eaton's used in connection with the credit card operations owned and operated by NRCS, software and websites, rights to the licensed departments, concession arrangements or subleases designated by Sears in the Eaton's Remaining Stores and the Eaton's Elected Stores and any contracts retained by Eaton's upon election by Sears, customer lists, exclusive rights and all assets of Eaton's relating to the carrying on of Eaton's credit card operations or any other credit services for or in respect of Eaton's (including cardholders' lists, account property, the right to use and operate the Eaton's credit card operations and the right to use Eaton's intellectual property in connection with credit services);

(vi) the Eaton's Tax Losses;

(vii) Eaton's interest under the trademark license agreements in respect of:

(a) Victoria Eaton Centre dated July 27, 1995;

(b) Toronto Eaton Centre dated July 14, 1997; and

(c) Montreal Eaton Centre dated September 19, 1997 (unless repudiated by Eaton's prior to November 19, 1999); and

as each has been modified or amended from time to time.

(viii) the interests of any subsidiaries or affiliates of Eaton's in any of the assets described above.

"Eaton's Remaining Liabilities" means:

(i) those liabilities (except in respect of Pension Plans) to those employees of Eaton's selected by Sears currently working at the Eaton's Operating Stores (as indicated in a written notice to be provided by Sears to Eaton's in accordance with the Sears Agreement) and other current employees of Eaton's selected by Sears (as indicated in a written notice to be provided by Sears to Eaton's in accordance with the Sears Agreement) who agree to continue to work for Eaton's upon the completion of the Sears Transaction on terms which are substantially comparable to the terms of employment of employees of Sears in comparable positions and (except in respect of Pension Plans) comparable seniority;

(ii) all Lease liabilities and obligations to Landlords commencing the day after the Plan Implementation Date in respect of stores included in the Eaton's Remaining Assets:

(iii) Eaton's obligations to Sears pursuant to the Sears Agreement, the Sears Operating Agreement and any other agreements entered into by Eaton's and Sears pursuant thereto; and

(iv) Eaton's obligations commencing the day after the Plan Implementation Date under the trademark license agreements in respect of:

(a) Victoria Eaton Centre dated July 27, 1995;

(b) Toronto Eaton Centre dated July 14, 1997; and

(c) Montreal Eaton Centre dated September 19, 1997 (unless repudiated by Eaton's prior to November 19, 1999);

as each has been modified or amended from time to time.

"Eaton's Remaining Stores" means the stores listed in Schedule "A" to the Sears Agreement, being (i) Brentwood Mall, Burnaby; (ii) St. Vitale Centre, Winnipeg; (iii) Les Galleries de la Capitale, Quebec; (iv) Westmount Shopping Centre,

London; (v) Sherway Gardens, Etobicoke; (vi) Yorkdale Shopping Centre, North York; (vii) Halifax Shopping Centre, Halifax; (viii) Scarborough Town Centre, Scarborough; (ix) Eaton Centre, Victoria; (x) Pacific Centre, Vancouver; (xi) Polo Park, Winnipeg; (xii) Eaton Centre, Toronto; and (xiii) such other stores as may be added to Schedule "A" from time to time under the Sears Agreement.

"Eaton's Tax Losses" means all the non-capital loss carryforwards of Eaton's for income tax purposes, including such tax losses of Eaton's amounting to approximately $294.3 million as of January 30, 1999, additional non-capital loss carryforwards generated since January 30, 1999 estimated at $100 million, subject to the increase or decrease in such tax losses which may be created by the Sears Transaction, including the Plan, and the transfer of the Distributionco Transferred Assets to Distributionco at fair market value.

"Eaton's Tax Savings" means an amount equal to 45% of the Eaton's Tax Losses utilized by Sears from time to time, provided that aggregate Eaton's Tax Savings shall not exceed $20 million.

"Employee Representative" means Carmen Siciliano, as appointed by the BIA Order made August 27, 1999 as such BIA Order was continued by the Initial CCAA Order, or such other Person as the Court may appoint to represent former and present employees of Eaton's or a group or class of them.

"Initial CCAA Order" means the Order made in respect of Eaton's on September 28, 1999 under the CCAA, as such Order may be amended or varied from time to time.

"Initial Director" means the first director of Distributionco under Subsection 119(1) of the OBCA.

"Initial OBCA Order" means the Order made in respect of Eaton's on September 28, 1999 under the OBCA, as such Order may be amended or varied from time to time.

"Interim Period Claim" means any right of any Person against Eaton's in connection with any indebtedness, liability or obligation of any kind of Eaton's, whether in contract, tort or otherwise, and any interest that may accrue thereon, whether liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, statutory, penal, equitable, secured, unsecured, present, future, known or unknown, by guarantee, surety or otherwise, and whether or not such right is executory or anticipatory in nature, arising from and after the Valuation Date up to and including the Plan Implementation Date, including any claim made or asserted against Eaton's through any affiliate, associate or related person (as such terms are defined in the OBCA), or any right or ability of any Person to advance a claim for subrogation, contribution or indemnity or otherwise with respect to any matter, action, cause or chose in action, whether existing at present or commenced in the future, whether or not arising from or caused by, directly or indirectly, the implementation of, or any action taken pursuant to, the Plan, including claims arising from the abandonment of any premises or the repudiation of any Lease, lease, licence, or contract, agreement or arrangement, the assignment of any contract, Lease or lease of personal, real, moveable or immoveable property (including any future liability as assignor thereof) or the repudiation of any Lease, lease, licence, contract, agreement or arrangement to take effect up to and including the Plan Implementation Date (including any anticipatory breach thereof), by express notice or by virtue of this Plan, the repudiation of any contract of employment, the termination, administration, distribution or winding up of any of the Pension Plans including, without limitation, any unfunded liability, or the administration or investment of the funds relating to the Pension Plans or employee benefit plans, including, without limitation, any long term disability plan, fund or arrangement, and any other claim whatsoever arising at law or equity against Eaton's.

"Interim Period Suppliers" means those Persons who supply goods and services in the ordinary course of business to Eaton's from and after the Valuation Date up to the Plan Implementation Date including concessionaires, suppliers under consignment arrangements and Landlord Creditors in respect of amounts constituting rent or payable as rent as provided for in the applicable Leases (excluding for greater certainty any amounts payable in connection with Abandoned Premises) for premises occupied by Eaton's for the period from the Valuation Date to the effective date of abandonment or repudiation of the premises in accordance with the provisions of the Initial CCAA Order.

"Interim Receiver" means Richter & Partners Inc., in its capacity as interim receiver as defined in the BIA Order made on August 23, 1999 and continued under the Initial CCAA Order, and any successor thereof.

"Known Creditors" means those Creditors whose Claims are identified in Eaton's books and records, and *"Known Creditor"* means any one of them.

"Known Interim Period Creditors" means those Persons Eaton's believes may have Interim Period Claims, and *"Known Interim Period Creditor"* means any one of them.

"Landlord Creditor" means:

(i) a landlord, head landlord or owner of real property, whether or not in direct privity with Eaton's, who has a Claim or Interim Period Claim in respect of any premises leased by Eaton's pursuant to a Lease to which such landlord, head landlord or owner is a party or by which such landlord, head landlord or owner is bound, and includes (i) any mortgagee of such premises who has taken possession of such premises or is collecting rent in respect of such premises; (ii) any Person who has taken an assignment of rents or assignment of Lease in respect of such premises, whether as security or otherwise; and (iii) any Person whose Claim or Interim Period Claim would be duplicative of or derivative from the Claim or Interim Period of Claim of such landlord, head landlord or owner; and

(ii) any Person who has a Claim or Interim Period Claim in such Person's capacity as a co-owner, partner, shareholder or trust beneficiary of a Person which is the landlord, head landlord or owner of any premises leased by Eaton's and includes (i) any holder of a Charge against such ownership, partnership, shareholder or beneficial interest who is entitled to receive any dividends or distributions thereon; (ii) any Person who has taken an assignment of such ownership, partnership, shareholder or beneficial interest; and (iii) any Person whose Claim or Interim Period Claim would be duplicative of or derivative from the Claim or Interim Period Claim of such first mentioned Person,

and *"Landlord Creditors"* means all of them.

"Landlord Interim Period Claim" means an Interim Period Claim of a Landlord Creditor under Class 2 in connection with Abandoned Premises, which shall be determined for voting and distribution purposes as the amount equal to the lesser of:

(i) the aggregate of

(A) the rent provided for in the Lease in respect of the Abandoned Premises for the first year of such Lease following the date on which the repudiation and/or abandonment becomes effective; and

(B) fifteen percent of the rent for the remainder of the Term of such Lease after that year; and

(ii) three years' rent.

"Landlord Pool" means an amount of $12 million (plus the amounts remittable by the Landlord Creditors in respect of federal goods and services tax, harmonized sales tax and Quebec sales tax exigible on the distribution of the $12 million) held by the Liquidator on behalf of Distributionco on and after the Plan Implementation Date, representing a portion of the net cash proceeds from the realization of the Distributionco Transferred Assets and the Sears Equity Contribution.

"Lease" means any lease, sublease, licence, sublicence, agreement to lease, offer to lease, or similar agreement, whether written or oral, pursuant to which Eaton's has or had the right to occupy premises and includes all amendments and supplements thereto and all documents ancillary thereto.

"Liquidator" means Richter & Partners Inc. in its capacity as the liquidator of Distributionco, to be appointed by the Court under the OBCA Sanction Order, or any successor thereof.

"Meetings" means the special meetings of the Creditors and Shareholders called for the purpose of considering and voting in respect of this Plan pursuant to the CCAA and the OBCA, and *"Meeting"* means any one of them.

"Merchandising Funds and Discounts" means merchandise funds including but not limited to volume rebates, co-op advertising, marketing allowances, fixturing allowances, research and development expenses, demonstrator wages and commissions pursuant to agreements with Eaton's entered into on, prior to or following the Valuation Date and any discounts taken with respect to payments on account of supplier invoices in accordance with Eaton's standard business practices.

"Monitor" means Richter & Partners Inc., in its capacity as the monitor appointed pursuant to the Initial CCAA Order, and any successor thereof.

"NRCS" means National Retail Credit Services Company.

"OBCA" means the *Business Corporations Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16.

"OBCA Proceedings" means the proceedings instituted by Eaton's under Section 182 of the OBCA on September 24, 1999.

"OBCA Sanction Order" means the Order to be made in the OBCA Proceedings to approve the Plan, as such Order may be amended, varied or modified by the Court from time to time.

"Omnibus Proof of Claim (Employees)" means the Proof of Claim to be sent by the Employee Representative to Eaton's as described in paragraph 6 of the Claims Procedure.

"Optionholders" means holders of Options.

"Options" means the options issued by Eaton's for the issue of common shares of Eaton's and all agreements relating thereto.

"Order" means any order of the Court in the CCAA Proceedings, the OBCA Proceedings, or the BIA Proceedings.

"Participation Unit" means a unit of participation allocated to a Shareholder on the basis of one unit per each Common Share held by such Shareholder and representing a *pari passu* beneficial ownership interest in the proceeds of the Sears Variable Note and any payment thereof after deducting the costs and expenses of Distributionco as agent and nominee for the holders of Participation Units and the costs, expenses and fees of the Liquidator incurred in administering the Sears Variable Note, including the costs of enforcing the Sears Variable Note.

"Pension Plans" means:

(i) Eaton Retirement Annuity Plan — Registration No. 337238;

(ii) Eaton Retirement Annuity Plan II — Registration No. 1036102;

(iii) Eaton Retirement Annuity Plan III — Registration No. 1037035;

(iv) Eaton Superannuation Plan for Designated Employees — Registration No. 593673;

(v) Pension Plan of The T. Eaton Company Limited for C. Reginald Hunter — Registration No. 1031780;

(vi) Pension Plan of The T. Eaton Company Limited for R. A. Hubert — Registration No. 1029321;

(vii) Pension Plan of The T. Eaton Company Limited for Roy Evans — Registration No. 1031798; and

(viii) Pension Plan of The T. Eaton Company Limited for Rex P. Prangley — Registration No. 1031806.

"Person" means any individual, partnership, joint venture, trust, corporation, unincorporated organization, government or any agency or instrumentality thereof, or any other juridical entity howsoever designated or constituted.

"Plan" means this plan of compromise and arrangement filed by Eaton's pursuant to the Initial CCAA Order, as such Plan may be amended, varied or supplemented by Eaton's from time to time in accordance with Article 9 hereof.

"Plan Filing Date" means October 8, 1999, being the date upon which this Plan is to be filed with the Court in the CCAA Proceedings, or such later date as the Court may set for the filing of the Plan.

"Plan Implementation Date" means a Business Day selected by Eaton's which is on or before December 31, 1999.

"Proof of Claim" means a proof of claim referred to in paragraphs 4 and 16 of the Claims Procedure.

"RFI" means Retail Funding, Inc.

"Sears" means Sears Canada Inc., and on or following the Plan Implementation Date, any corporation formed by the amalgamation of Sears and Eaton's as restructured under the Plan, and any successor of either of them.

"Sears Agreement" means the agreement between Sears and Eaton's dated September 19, 1999, as amended by Addendum No. 1 dated as of September 29, 1999 and Addendum No. 2 dated October 3, 1999, as further amended or supplemented from time to time, pursuant to which Sears will acquire all the issued and outstanding shares of Eaton's.

"Sears Equity Contribution" means the sum of $60 million (subject to any adjustment which may be required on closing of the Sears Transaction pursuant to the Sears Agreement) paid to Eaton's on the Plan Implementation Date pursuant to the Sears Agreement for the issue to Sears of common shares of Eaton's, which amount is to be transferred to Distributionco in satisfaction of the Eaton's Note.

"Sears Operating Agreement" means the agreement dated as of October 1, 1999 among Sears, Eaton's and the Interim Receiver for the continued operation of the Eaton's Operating Stores, as may be amended or supplemented from time to time.

"Sears Transaction" means the transaction or transactions which are required to be completed pursuant to the Sears Agreement.

"Sears Variable Note" means the promissory note made payable to Distributionco to be issued by Sears on the Plan Implementation Date in the principal amount of up to $20 million to be paid by Sears only from the use of the Eaton's Tax Losses in accordance with the Sears Agreement, and which will bear interest at the same rate of interest as earned by the Liquidator on the funds received by Distributionco from Sears under the terms of the Sears Variable Note.

"Secured Creditors" means Persons with Claims or Interim Period Claims secured by a Charge against the property, assets or undertaking of Eaton's, including, without limitation, any co-owner of Eaton's who has a Charge against Eaton's interest in the co-owned property.

"Shareholder Approval" means the approval of this Plan by the Shareholders voting on this Plan under the OBCA.

"Shareholders" means all of the holders of Common Shares, and *"Shareholder"* means any one of them.

"Stay Period" means the period from and after the Valuation Date up to and including the Stay Termination Date.

"Stay Termination Date" means October 28, 1999, or such later date as may be ordered by the Court.

"Term" means the balance of the then existing term of a Lease assuming that renewal rights are not exercised, and any right of early termination is exercised.

"Trustee" means Richter & Partners Inc., in its capacity as trustee in the BIA Proceedings.

"Unaffected Creditors" means Persons having Claims or Interim Period Claims which are described in Section 3.2 hereof, and *"Unaffected Creditor"* means any one of such Creditors.

"Unsatisfied Unaffected Liabilities" means all of the Claims and Interim Period Claims of the Unaffected Creditors which are not satisfied by Eaton's on or before the Plan Implementation Date.

"Unsecured Creditors" means all Persons with Claims and/or Interim Period Claims, other than Landlord Interim Period Claims and Unaffected Creditors (other than as provided in Section 3.3 hereof) and *"Unsecured Creditor"* means any one of such Creditors.

"Unsecured Creditors Pool" means all amounts held by the Liquidator on and after the Plan Implementation Date representing proceeds from the realization of the Distributionco Transferred Assets and the satisfaction of the Eaton's Note with the Sears Equity Contribution, less amounts paid by Distributionco in payment of Unsatisfied Unaffected Liabilities, the Landlord Pool, the costs and expenses of Distributionco (except those in connection with the Sears Variable Note) including any taxes payable by Distributionco and the costs, expenses and remuneration of the Liquidator (except those in connection with the Sears Variable Note).

"Valuation Date" means August 20, 1999.

"Voting Claim" of a Creditor means the amount of the Claim and/or Interim Period Claim of such Creditor determined for voting purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Claims Procedure, the Plan, the Initial CCAA Order and the CCAA.

1.2 — Certain Rules of Interpretation

In this Plan and any Schedules hereto:

(a) all accounting terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to them, from time to time, in accordance with Canadian generally accepted accounting principles, including those prescribed by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants;

(b) all references to currency are to Canadian Dollars;

(c) if, for the purposes of voting or distribution, an amount denominated in a currency other than Canadian Dollars must be converted to Canadian Dollars, such amount shall be regarded as having been converted at the noon spot rate of exchange quoted by the Bank of Canada for exchanging such currency to Canadian Dollars as at the Valuation Date;

(d) the division of this Plan into Articles and Sections and the insertion of a table of contents are for convenience of reference only and do not affect the construction or interpretation of this Plan, nor are the descriptive headings of Articles and Sections intended as complete or accurate descriptions of the content thereof;

(e) the use of words in the singular or plural, or with a particular gender, shall not limit the scope or exclude the application of any provision of this Plan or a Schedule hereto to such Person (or Persons) or circumstances as the context otherwise permits;

(f) the words "includes" and "including" and similar terms of inclusion shall not, unless expressly modified by the words "only" or "solely", be construed as terms of limitation, but rather shall mean "includes but is not limited to" and "including but not limited to", so that references to included matters shall be regarded as illustrative without being either characterizing or exhaustive;

(g) unless otherwise specified, all references to time herein and in any document issued pursuant hereto mean local time in Toronto, Ontario and any reference to an event occurring on a Business Day shall mean prior to 5:00 p.m. on such Business Day;

(h) unless otherwise specified, time periods within or following which any payment is to be made or act is to be done shall be calculated by excluding the day on which the period commences and including the day on which the period ends and by extending the period to the next succeeding Business Day if the last day of the period is not a Business Day;

(i) whenever any payment to be made or action to be taken under this Plan is required to be made or to be taken on a day other than a Business Day, such payment shall be made or action taken on the next succeeding Business Day;

(j) unless otherwise provided, any reference to a statute or other enactment of parliament or a legislature includes all regulations made thereunder, all amendments to or re-enactments of such statute or regulations in force from time to time, and, if applicable, any statute or regulation that supplements or supersedes such statute or regulation; and

(k) references to a specified Article, Section or Schedule shall, unless something in the subject matter or context is inconsistent therewith, be construed as references to that specified Article or Section of, or Schedule to, this Plan, whereas the terms "this Plan", "hereof", "herein", "hereto", "hereunder" and similar expressions shall be deemed to refer generally to this Plan and not to any particular Article, Section, Schedule or other portion of this Plan and include any documents supplemental hereto.

1.3 — Schedules

The following Schedules annexed hereto are an integral part of this Plan:

Schedule "A" — Claims Procedure for Voting and Distribution Purposes

Schedule "B" — Entities Eligible for Investments by Liquidator

To the extent that any definition in Schedule "A" differs from a definition in the Plan, the Plan definition governs for the purposes of the Plan.

1.4 — Successors and Assigns

This Plan shall be binding upon and shall enure to the benefit of the heirs, administrators, executors, legal personal representatives, successors and assigns of any Person named or referred to in, or subject to, this Plan.

1.5 — Governing Law

This Plan shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of Ontario and the federal laws of Canada applicable therein. All questions as to the interpretation of or application of this Plan and all proceedings taken in connection with this Plan and its provisions shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court.

Article 2 — Purpose and Effect of the Plan

2.1 — Purpose

The purpose of this Plan is to effect a reorganization of the Common Shares and certain of the assets of Eaton's and a compromise of Eaton's liabilities to permit the disposition of Eaton's as a going concern to Sears and the orderly disposition of certain of the assets of Eaton's for the benefit of Creditors. The Plan is an intrinsic part of the Sears Transaction pursuant to which Sears has agreed to acquire Eaton's on a going concern basis. Pursuant to the Plan, the Distributionco Transferred Assets will be transferred from Eaton's to Distributionco, Distributionco will assume the Distributionco Assumed Liabilities and the Unsatisfied Unaffected Liabilities, Sears will acquire the Common Shares and make the Sears Equity Contribution and

Distributionco will ultimately receive the benefit of the Sears Equity Contribution as a repayment of the Eaton's Note. The Sears Equity Contribution will then be distributed to Creditors and as soon as practicable in the circumstances the Distributionco Transferred Assets will be realized and the net cash proceeds thereof will be distributed to Creditors. Sears will acquire the Common Shares from Distributionco after Distributionco acquires the Common Shares from the Shareholders in consideration for the issuance to the Shareholders of rights to receive undivided interests in the Sears Variable Note. Eaton's believes that Creditors will derive greater benefit from the continued operation of Eaton's and the orderly disposition of the Distributionco Transferred Assets than they would recover in a bankruptcy. In addition, this Plan provides for a recovery for Shareholders that would not otherwise be available. Accordingly, this Plan is designed to provide a fair recovery to all Creditors and Shareholders and to provide Eaton's with the financial stability necessary to implement a disposition plan for the benefit of all Creditors and to continue its business operations from and after the Plan Implementation Date.

2.2 — Overview of Plan

The restructuring contemplated by this Plan is to be implemented under the CCAA and OBCA. This Plan involves the following essential elements:

(a) the compromise of the Claims and Interim Period Claims of the Unsecured Creditors and Landlord Creditors;

(b) the transfer of the Distributionco Transferred Assets to Distributionco for the orderly disposition of the Distributionco Transferred Assets, and the delivery by Eaton's of the Sears Equity Contribution to Distributionco by means of the repayment of the Eaton's Note by Eaton's to Distributionco;

(c) the assumption by Distributionco of the Distributionco Assumed Liabilities as compromised under this Plan and of the Unsatisfied Unaffected Liabilities and the release of Eaton's from any liability for or arising from the Distributionco Assumed Liabilities and the Unsatisfied Unaffected Liabilities;

(d) the winding up of Distributionco for the purposes of the distribution of proceeds from the realization of the Distributionco Transferred Assets, and the Sears Equity Contribution, to the Creditors;

(e) the exchange of all of the Common Shares for the Participation Units;

(f) the cancellation of the Options; and

(g) the acquisition by Sears of the Common Shares.

Article 3 — Creditors and Shareholders

3.1 — Classification of Creditors

Subject to Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of this Plan, the classification of Creditors for the purposes of considering and voting on this Plan and receiving distributions hereunder is based upon the commonality of interest of such Creditors, such that Creditors with essentially similar rights against Eaton's and which Creditors are to receive essentially similar treatment have been grouped together in the following Classes for voting and distribution purposes:

(a) *Class 1*

Claims and Interim Period Claims of the Unsecured Creditors and Landlord Creditors (excluding in respect of Landlord Interim Period Claims) shall be designated as Class 1, and shall include the Claims relating to the notes in the aggregate principal amount of $5 million issued by Eaton's pursuant to the amended and restated plan of compromise or arrangement sanctioned by the Court on September 12, 1997, and all amounts pertaining to arrears of rent or other amounts payable as rent under the Leases, Claims in respect of tenant inducements or any other Claims or Interim Period Claims in respect of premises not constituting Abandoned Premises, but for greater certainty shall exclude Landlord Interim Period Claims, which amounts shall be included in Class 2.

(b) *Class 2*

Landlord Interim Period Claims shall be designated as Class 2.

3.2 — Unaffected Creditors

This Plan does not affect or compromise the Claims or Interim Period Claims of the following Creditors and others, except to the extent provided for in Section 3.3 hereof:

(a) RFI, which shall be paid by Eaton's on or before the Plan Implementation Date in accordance with Eaton's credit facility arrangements with RFI;

(b) the Agent, which shall be paid by Eaton's in accordance with the Agency Agreement on or before the Plan Implementation Date;

(c) the Trustee, the Monitor and the Interim Receiver, including legal and other advisors retained by any of them in accordance with the BIA Orders and the Initial CCAA Order, which shall be paid by Eaton's on or before the Plan Implementation Date:

(d) Sears;

(e) those Creditors having Claims or Interim Period Claims which constitute Eaton's Remaining Liabilities, which Claims or Interim Period Claims shall be satisfied by Eaton's in the ordinary course of business prior to, on or after the Plan Implementation Date and those Landlord Creditors having arrears of amounts constituting rent or payable as rent as provided for in the applicable Leases (excluding for greater certainty any amounts payable in connection with Abandoned Premises) in respect of Leases constituting Eaton's Remaining Assets, which shall be paid such rent prior to or on the Plan Implementation Date;

(f) those Landlord Creditors having Claims in respect of Leases, where such Leases are assigned by Eaton's on or prior to the Plan Implementation Date to Persons other than Distributionco, to the extent such Landlord Creditors deliver a full release to Eaton's;

(g) Interim Period Suppliers, which shall be paid by Eaton's in the ordinary course prior to, on or after the Plan Implementation Date;

(h) the legal, accounting and financial advisors and sales agents engaged by Eaton's for the purposes of assisting Eaton's in reorganizing its assets, debt and equity pursuant to this Plan, which shall be paid by Eaton's on or before the Plan Implementation Date;

(i) Secured Creditors, unless the Claims or Interim Period Claims of such Secured Creditors are otherwise provided for in this Plan, or their Claims or Interim Period Claims are settled by agreement with Eaton's;

(j) Creditors having claims arising in the ordinary course of business against Eaton's to the extent that such claims are covered by Eaton's insurance policies or are required by law or otherwise to be paid by Eaton's insurers;

(k) Her Majesty in right of Canada or any province, in respect of any environmental matters, but only to the extent of the Charge granted under Subsection 11.8(8) of the CCAA and, in respect of other matters, only to the extent that such matters or obligations (i) give rise to deemed trusts which are not paid pursuant to Subsection 18.2(1) of the CCAA or are the subject of other deemed trusts protected by Subsection 18.3(2) of the CCAA; or (ii) are secured by a Charge which complies with Subsection 18.5(1) of the CCAA; and

(l) the members of the Board of Directors of Eaton's in respect of their fees and disbursements up to and including the Plan Implementation Date.

3.3 — Affected Claims of Unaffected Creditors

(a) — Secured Creditors

Secured Creditors shall have no Voting Claim or Distribution Claim, except to the extent of any deficiency Claim or deficiency Interim Period Claim to which they may be entitled in respect of the Charge held by them. The Claims and Interim Period Claims of the Secured Creditors (other than the Monitor and Interim Receiver in respect of the Charge granted to them in the BIA Order made on August 23, 1999 and continued under the Initial CCAA Order, Sears, RFI, and the Agent) to the extent compromised by this Plan, and the Unsatisfied Unassumed Liabilities shall be assumed by Distributionco and thereupon all of the obligations of Eaton's to such Secured Creditors, including obligations arising under guarantees, sureties, indemnities and similar covenants and all Charges in favour of the Secured Creditors against the Eaton's Remaining Assets, shall be and shall be deemed to be released and discharged. Distributionco shall satisfy its obligations to the Secured Creditors from the realization of the Distributionco Transferred Assets to the extent of any Charges attaching to any of the Distributionco Transferred Assets, and any deficiency Claims to the extent such Secured Creditors may be entitled thereto from such realization shall constitute such Secured Creditors' Claims or Interim Period Claims to be compromised as Distribution Claims.

(b) — Insurance Claims

To the extent that any Claim or Interim Period Claim of a Creditor is not fully insured under Eaton's insurance policies or at law, the Creditor will be entitled to pursue a Claim or Interim Period Claim in respect of such uninsured portion, in accordance with this Plan and the Claims Procedure.

(c) — Claims Against Distributionco

The Unaffected Creditors shall have no Claims or Interim Period Claims against Distributionco except to the extent of the Unsatisfied Unaffected Liabilities, which shall be assumed and satisfied by Distributionco.

(d) — Owned Properties

All obligations of Eaton's continuing after the Plan Implementation Date under shareholder agreements, co-ownership agreements, rights of first refusal, co-tenancy agreements and other project documents (excluding for greater certainty operating agreements with adjacent land owners which shall be deemed to be repudiated on the Plan Implementation Date unless expressly affirmed by Eaton's before the Plan Implementation Date) in respect of Eaton's interest in owned or co-owned real or immoveable properties which constitute Distributionco Transferred Assets shall be assumed by Distributionco and the rights and obligations thereunder shall continue with Distributionco, and thereupon all obligations of Eaton's to such Persons who are parties to such agreements, including obligations arising under guarantees, securities, indemnities and similar covenants in favour of such Persons shall be and shall be deemed to be released and discharged, provided however, that any amounts or obligations owing by Eaton's to such Persons which constitute Claims or Interim Period Claims shall be compromised only to the extent provided by this Plan, including subsection 3.3(a), and any right to demand against Eaton's any reconveyance of Eaton's interest in such owned or co-owned real or immoveable properties shall be forever barred and stayed. Co-owner and other Charges affecting owned and co-owned properties which constitute Distributionco Transferred Assets shall be dealt with pursuant to subsections 3.2(i) and 3.3(a) of this Plan.

3.4 — Classification of Shareholders

The Shareholders shall constitute a single class which shall be designated as Class 3. The Optionholders shall not have the right to vote or receive any distributions under the Plan.

Article 4 — Treatment of Creditors and Shareholders

For purposes of this Plan, the Creditors shall receive the treatment provided in this Article 4 on account of their Claims and Interim Period Claims and on the Plan Implementation Date, the Claims and Interim Period Claims affected by this Plan will be compromised in accordance with the terms of this Plan.

4.1 — Unsecured Creditors

(a) — Voting Claims

(i) — Voting Claims of Greater than $500

Subject to Subsection 4.1(a)(ii) hereof, each Unsecured Creditor having a Voting Claim as an Unsecured Creditor shall be entitled to vote in Class 1 to the extent of the amount which is equal to its Voting Claim as an Unsecured Creditor.

(ii) — Voting Claims of $500 or Less

An Unsecured Creditor with a Voting Claim as an Unsecured Creditor of $500 or less, or an Unsecured Creditor with a Voting Claim greater than $500 which elects to value its Voting Claim at $500 in accordance with the procedure set out below, shall not be entitled to vote at the Meeting of Creditors for the Class of Unsecured Creditors.

(b) — Distribution Claims

(i) — Unsecured Creditors Pool

The distribution to the Unsecured Creditors shall not exceed in the aggregate the Unsecured Creditors Pool. For purposes of distribution of the Unsecured Creditors Pool, the Distribution Claims of the Unsecured Creditors shall rank *pari passu*, except to the extent that they receive payments of $500 or less in full satisfaction of their Distribution Claims.

(ii) — Distribution Claims of Greater than $500

After the Plan Implementation Date, each Unsecured Creditor with a Distribution Claim as an Unsecured Creditor which is greater than $500 and who did not elect to value such Distribution Claim at $500 shall receive from the Liquidator from time to time, in full satisfaction of such Distribution Claim as an Unsecured Creditor, a *pari passu* cash distribution from the Unsecured Creditors Pool.

(iii) — Distribution Claims of $500 or Less

As soon as practicable after the Plan Implementation Date, each Unsecured Creditor with a Distribution Claim as an Unsecured Creditor not exceeding in the aggregate $500, and each Unsecured Creditor with a Distribution Claim as an Unsecured Creditor which is greater than $500 which elects to value such Distribution Claim at $500 shall receive, from the Liquidator in priority to any distributions under Section 4(b)(ii) hereof, in full satisfaction of such Distribution Claim as an Unsecured Creditor, cash in an amount equal to the lesser of $500 and the amount of such Distribution Claim. Such election must be made in writing and delivered to Eaton's prior to December 1, 1999 and, in the case of an employee or former employee of Eaton's, prior to January 14, 2000. For greater certainty, such election must be made in respect of the whole amount of such Distribution Claim.

4.2 — Landlord Creditors

(a) — Voting Claims

Each Landlord Creditor shall be entitled to vote in Class 2 to the extent of the amount which is equal to its Voting Claim in respect only of its Landlord Interim Period Claim. Each Landlord Creditor shall be entitled to vote in Class 1 in respect of Claims or Interim Period Claims not constituting Landlord Interim Period Claims.

(b) — Distribution Claims

(i) — Landlord Pool

The distributions to the Landlord Creditors of their Distribution Claims in respect of or relating to their Landlord Interim Period Claims shall not exceed in the aggregate the Landlord Pool. For purposes of distribution of the Landlord Pool, the Distribution Claims of the Landlord Creditors in respect of or relating to their Landlord Interim Period Claims shall rank *pari passu*.

(ii) — Distribution to Landlord Creditors

After the Plan Implementation Date, each Landlord Creditor with a Distribution Claim in respect of or relating to its Landlord Interim Period Claim shall receive from the Liquidator from time to time, in full satisfaction of such Distribution Claim, a *pari passu* cash distribution from the Landlord Pool.

(c) — Abandonment or Repudiation

If Eaton's has delivered an abandonment notice or a repudiation notice with respect to Abandoned Premises, the relevant Lease pursuant to which Eaton's occupied or was obligated to occupy such Abandoned Premises and any obligation of Eaton's thereunder shall terminate in accordance with the Initial CCAA Order and the Plan without affecting the relevant Landlord's Distribution Claim.

4.3 — Unaffected Creditors

For greater certainty, each Unaffected Creditor shall not be entitled to vote or to receive any distributions under this Plan.

4.4 — Guarantees and Similar Covenants

No Person who has a Claim or Interim Period Claim under any guarantee, surety, indemnity or similar covenant (other than the holder of a guarantee, surety, indemnity or similar covenant from Eaton's) in respect of any Claim or Interim Period Claim which is compromised under this Plan or who has any right to claim over in respect of or to be subrogated to the rights of any Person in respect of a Claim or Interim Period Claim which is compromised under this Plan shall be entitled to any greater rights than the Creditor whose Claim or Interim Period Claim was compromised under this Plan.

4.5 — Claims Generally

(a) — Assignment of Claims and Interim Period Claims

If a Creditor who has a Voting Claim transferred or transfers all or part of its Voting Claim and the transferee delivers evidence of its ownership of all or part of such Voting Claim and a written request to Eaton's, no later than five (5) Calendar Days prior to the date of the Meeting of the Creditors of the Class to which such Voting Claim is subject, that such transferee's name be included on the list of Creditors entitled to vote at such Meeting, such transferee shall be entitled to attend and vote the transferred portion of such Voting Claim at such Meeting if and to the extent such Voting Claim may otherwise be voted at such Meeting; provided, however, that for the purposes of determining whether this Plan has been approved by a majority in number of the Creditors of such Class, only the vote of the transferor or the transferee, whichever holds the highest dollar value of such Voting Claim, will be counted, and, if such value shall be equal, only the vote of the transferee will be counted. If a Voting Claim has been transferred to more than one transferee, for purposes of determining whether this Plan has been approved by a majority in number of the Creditors of the Class, to which such Voting Claim is subject, only the vote of the transferee with the highest value of such Voting Claim will be counted unless all of the transferees of such Voting Claim deliver a notice to Eaton's at least five (5) Calendar Days prior to the date of the Meeting of the Creditors of the Class to which such Voting Claim is subject and designate therein the name of the transferee whose vote is to be counted, in which case the vote of such designated transferee will be counted.

(b) — Voting by Landlord Creditors

For the purpose of determining whether this Plan has been approved by a majority in number of the Landlord Creditors under Class 2, the vote of the Person which is the landlord of premises leased to Eaton's shall be counted as one vote notwithstanding that such Person may be under common ownership with or may be an Affiliate or a Person who is a landlord of other Premises leased to Eaton's. Each co-ownership, joint venture or partnership in respect only of a particular leased premises shall be regarded as a separate Person and counted as one vote. For greater certainty, if the same Person is a Landlord Creditor voting under this Plan in respect of more than one leased premises, the vote of such Person shall be counted as only one vote.

(c) — Merchandising Funds and Discounting

A Distribution Claim of a Creditor shall be net of any amount owing by the Creditor to Eaton's prior to the Valuation Date. For greater certainty, Eaton's shall be entitled to exercise rights of set-off prior to the Valuation Date in respect of Merchandising Funds and Discounts relating to purchases and transactions occurring prior to the Valuation Date on a per diem basis notwithstanding that the relevant contract, agreement or arrangement relating to such Merchandising Funds and Discounts may provide for a calculation of or entitlement to Merchandising Funds and Discounts on a different basis. No amount shall be provable as a Claim by a Creditor in respect of Merchandising Funds and Discounts which have been taken or claimed by Eaton's prior to the Valuation Date.

(d) — Allocation of Distributions

All distributions made by the Liquidator to Creditors pursuant to this Plan and the OBCA Sanction Order shall be applied first in payment of accrued and unpaid interest, if any, which form part of the Claim or Interim Period Claim, and the balance shall then be applied in payment of the outstanding principal amount of such Claim or Interim Period Claim. Each Creditor shall be responsible for providing for any non-resident withholding tax imposed under Part XIII of the *Income Tax Act* (Canada) as a condition of receiving any amounts under this Plan.

(e) — Interest

No interest shall accrue from and after the Valuation Date for the purpose of valuing Voting Claims and Distribution Claims.

(f) — Set-Off

Without limiting the provisions of Subsection 4.5(c) in respect of Merchandising Funds and Discounts, the law of set-off shall apply as of the Plan Implementation Date to all Distribution Claims filed against Eaton's in the same manner and to the same extent as if Eaton's or Distributionco were plaintiff or defendant, as the case may be provided, however, that there shall be no set-off (i) between a Claim and any indebtedness, liability or obligation owed by a Creditor to Eaton's which arose or occurred from and after the Valuation Date and (ii) between an Interim Period Claim and any indebtedness, liability or obligation owed by a Creditor to Eaton's which arose or occurred before the Valuation Date.

4.6 — Shareholders

(a) — Exchange of Common Shares

On the Plan Implementation Date. the Shareholders shall exchange and shall be deemed to have exchanged the Common Shares for the right of each of them to receive Participation Units. Each Shareholder shall have the right to receive a Participation Unit on the basis of one Participation Unit for each Common Share held.

(b) — Exercise of Right to Receive Participation Units

On the Plan Implementation Date, on the receipt by Distributionco of the Sears Variable Note, the Shareholders shall exercise and shall be deemed to have exercised their right to receive Participation Units, and Distributionco, through the Liquidator, shall issue Participation Units to each Shareholder in accordance with its entitlement, on the basis of one Participation Unit for each Common Share.

(c) — Participation Units

The Liquidator will hold the Sears Variable Note on behalf of Distributionco. The Liquidator will hold the proceeds received on the repayment or maturity of the Sears Variable Note and income earned thereon on behalf of Distributionco, and Distributionco will hold such proceeds and income for the benefit of Persons holding from time to time Participation Units in accordance with their respective entitlements. The Sears Variable Note shall be paid by Sears only from the use of the Eaton's Tax Losses. There shall be no other recourse against Sears or Eaton's in respect of the Sears Variable Note. Upon the filing of a tax return by Sears in which any of the Eaton's Tax Losses are utilized, a payment will be made by Sears to the Liquidator equal to the Eaton's Tax Savings with the aggregate of all the Eaton's Tax Savings being a maximum of $20 million. The Liquidator shall invest such funds, plus any interest thereon earned by the Liquidator, until the later of (i) the expiry of the relevant assessment period, and (ii) the resolution of any appeal from an assessment in respect of the use by Sears of such Eaton's Tax Losses. Thereupon, the Eaton's Tax Savings, plus interest earned thereon by the Liquidator, shall reduce the amount payable under the Sears Variable Note and the Liquidator shall distribute such amounts to the holders of Participation Units. To the extent that Sears is not ultimately able to utilize the Eaton's Tax Losses to a maximum amount of $44.44 million, the difference between the Eaton's Tax Savings paid to the Liquidator and 45% of the Eaton's Tax Losses actually utilized, plus any interest earned thereon, shall be repaid by the Liquidator to Sears upon the expiry of all appeal rights of Sears in respect of any disallowance of such Eaton's Tax Losses and, in that event, Sears shall have no obligation to pay such amounts under the Sears Variable Note. Sears shall claim sufficient of the Eaton's Tax Losses to generate no less than $20 million in Eaton's Tax Savings prior to claiming any tax losses of Sears.

(d) — No Dissent Rights

The Shareholders shall not have any rights of dissent under Section 185 of the OBCA in respect of this Plan.

4.7 — Optionholders

On the Plan Implementation Date, the Options shall be cancelled and shall be deemed to be cancelled, and the Optionholders shall have no further rights against Eaton's, Distributionco or the Liquidator nor shall they be entitled to receive any Participation Units.

4.8 — Effect of Plan Generally

On the Plan Implementation Date, the treatment of Claims and Interim Period Claims under this Plan shall be final and binding on Eaton's and all Creditors affected thereby (and their respective heirs, executors, administrators, legal personal representatives, successors and assigns) and this Plan shall constitute (i) a full, final and absolute settlement of all rights of the holders of all Claims and Interim Period Claims affected hereby; (ii) an absolute release and discharge of all indebtedness, liabilities and obligations of Eaton's of or in respect of the Claims and Interim Period Claims, including, without limitation, the Unsatisfied Unaffected Liabilities, and any Charges against the Eaton's Remaining Assets in respect thereof (whether created by contract, statute or otherwise); and (iii) a termination of all Leases pertaining to Abandoned Premises and all contracts, rights and licenses granted by Eaton's not constituting Eaton's Remaining Assets, Distributionco Transferred Assets or Eaton's existing insurance policies of any kind whatsoever in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Plan.

4.9 — Waiver of Defaults by Persons

From and after the Plan Implementation Date, all Persons shall be deemed to have waived any and all defaults of Eaton's then existing or previously committed by Eaton's or caused by Eaton's, or non-compliance with any covenant, warranty, representation, term, provision, condition or obligation, express or implied, in any contract, credit document, agreement for sale, Lease, lease or other agreement, written or oral, and any and all amendments or supplements thereto, existing between such Person and Eaton's, and any and all notices of default and demands for payment under any instrument, including any guarantee, shall be deemed to have been rescinded and Distributionco and the Liquidator shall be entitled to the benefit of such waiver.

4.10 — Waiver of Defaults by Eaton's

From and after the Plan Implementation Date, Eaton's shall be deemed to have waived any and all defaults of a Person then existing or previously committed by such Person or caused by such Person, or non-compliance with any covenant, warranty, representation, term, provision, condition or obligation, express or implied, in any contract, credit document, agreement for sale, lease, Lease or other agreement, written or oral, constituting Eaton's Remaining Assets and any and all amendments or supplements thereto, existing between Eaton's and such Person, and any and all notices of default and demands for payment under any instrument, including any guarantee, shall be deemed to have been rescinded provided, however, that such waiver shall not apply to any defaults which are continuing after the Plan Implementation Date.

Article 5 — Steps of the Plan and Closing Procedures

5.1 — Implementation of Plan

Prior to the Plan Implementation Date, Eaton's shall incorporate Distributionco as a wholly owned subsidiary, Eaton's shall hold the Distributionco Common Share and shall cause Distributionco to become subject to the OBCA Proceedings. Subject to the satisfaction or waiver (in accordance with Section 9.1 hereof), of the conditions set forth in Article 6 hereof, the following shall occur, and be deemed to occur, sequentially in the following order on the Plan Implementation Date:

(a) all of the subsidiaries of Eaton's shall release and be deemed to have released Eaton's from all obligations, indebtedness and liabilities, including, without limitation, all Unsatisfied Unaffected Liabilities, and all Claims and Interim Period Claims which they may have against Eaton's;

(b) the Initial Director shall resign and be deemed to have resigned without any ongoing liability as a director of Distributionco;

(c) the appointment of the Liquidator will take effect in accordance with the provisions of the OBCA Sanction Order;

(d) the compromise of the Claims and Interim Period Claims between the Creditors and Eaton's shall be effected and be deemed to be effected at the amounts which the Creditors are to be entitled to receive from Distributionco;

(e) Eaton's shall transfer and be deemed to have transferred to Distributionco the Distributionco Transferred Assets and issued the Eaton's Note to Distributionco in exchange for which Distributionco shall assume and be deemed to have assumed the Distributionco Assumed Liabilities, as compromised under paragraph (d) hereof and, the Unsatisfied Unaffected Liabilities;

(f) Eaton's shall be released and be deemed to be released by all Creditors from all Claims and Interim Period Claims including, without limitation, from the Unsatisfied Unaffected Liabilities, excluding Eaton's Remaining Liabilities;

(g) the Shareholders shall exchange and be deemed to exchange their Common Shares for the right to receive Participation Units;

(h) the Options shall be cancelled and shall be deemed to be cancelled and Eaton's shall be released and be deemed to be released from all obligations and liabilities to the Optionholders;

(i) the Articles of Arrangement shall be filed;

(j) Sears will acquire the Common Shares held by Distributionco in exchange for the Sears Variable Note to be issued to Distributionco;

(k) the Liquidator shall hold the Sears Variable Note on behalf of Distributionco, and Distributionco shall in turn hold the Sears Variable Note for the benefit of the holders of Participation Units from time to time in accordance with their respective interests;

(l) Distributionco shall deliver and be deemed to have delivered Participation Units to the Shareholders in full satisfaction of the Shareholders' right to receive such Participation Units;

(m) Sears will subscribe for new common shares of Eaton's and will pay to Eaton's the Sears Equity Contribution;

(n) the Sears Equity Contribution shall be paid by Eaton's to Distributionco in full satisfaction of the Eaton's Note; and

(o) Eaton's shall transfer the Distributionco Common Share to the Liquidator.

5.2 — Effect of CCAA Sanction Order

In addition to sanctioning this Plan, the CCAA Sanction Order shall, among other things:

(a) declare that the compromises effected hereby are approved, binding and effective as herein set out upon all Creditors affected by this Plan;

(b) declare that agreements (including without limitation, Leases) to which Eaton's is a party and which are not repudiated or not deemed to be repudiated by Eaton's shall be and shall remain in full force and effect, unamended, as at the Plan Implementation Date and no Person party to any such agreements shall, following the Plan Implementation Date, accelerate, terminate, rescind, refuse to perform or otherwise repudiate its obligations thereunder, or enforce or exercise any right (including any right of set-off, dilution, buy-out, divestiture, forced sale, option or other remedy) or make any demand under or in respect of any such obligations or agreements, by reason:

(i) of any event(s) which occurred on or prior to the Valuation Date which would have entitled any other Person party thereto to enforce those rights or remedies (including defaults or events of default arising as a result of the financial condition or insolvency of Eaton's);

(ii) of the fact that Eaton's has sought or obtained relief under the CCAA Proceedings, BIA Proceedings or the OBCA Proceedings or that the Plan has been implemented;

(iii) of the effect on Eaton's of the completion of any of the transactions contemplated by this Plan; or

(iv) of any compromises or arrangements effected pursuant to this Plan;

(c) with respect to those leases, contracts, licences, agreements or arrangements, or other rights, which do not constitute Eaton's Remaining Assets or Eaton's insurance policies Col any kind whatsoever), all such leases, contracts, licences, agreements or arrangements, or other rights, shall be deemed to be repudiated and abandoned, as applicable, as of the Plan Implementation Date and the other Persons who are party thereto shall be deemed to be Creditors having Interim Period Claims unless Distributionco expressly agrees to assume any such lease (other than a Lease), contract, licence, agreement, or arrangements, or other rights, by written notice within ten (10) Calendar Days after the Plan Implementation Date;

(d) with respect to those Leases in respect of Abandoned Premises, declare that all such Leases shall be deemed to be repudiated and abandoned on the effective date specified in the notice delivered by Eaton's;

(e) provide that paragraph 11 of the Initial CCAA Order be extended and remain in full force and effect until August 31, 2000;

(f) discharge the Monitor and the Interim Receiver;

(g) stay any and all steps or proceedings, including, without limitation, administrative orders, declarations or assessments, commenced, taken or proceeded with or that may be commenced, taken or proceeded with against any or all past, present and future directors and officers of Eaton's and the Initial Director in respect of any Claim or Interim Period Claim;

(h) discharge all past, present and future directors and officers of Eaton's and the Initial Director from any liability with respect to all Claims and Interim Period Claims;

(i) release and discharge Eaton's from any and all indebtedness, obligations and liabilities (other than in respect of Eaton's Remaining Liabilities) including without limitation, any liability with respect to Claims or Interim Period Claims, including, without limitation, the Unsatisfied Unaffected Liabilities, or any liability as an assignor of any rights, or as employer under, or administrator of, the Pension Plans;

(j) to make provision for the creation of adequate reserves to be held by Distributionco, or the Liquidator appointed under the OBCA Sanction Order, to pay Unsatisfied Unaffected Liabilities; and

(k) provide that the Distributionco Transferred Assets, wherever situate, shall vest in Distributionco free and clear of all Charges, estate, right, title, or interest except as otherwise provided under this Plan.

5.3 — Effect of OBCA Sanction Order

In addition to sanctioning this Plan, the OBCA Sanction Order shall provide, among other things, that:

(a) Distributionco shall be wound up commencing on the Plan Implementation Date;

(b) the Liquidator shall be appointed effective on the Plan Implementation Date to receive and liquidate all of the Distributionco Transferred Assets and the Sears Equity Contribution for distribution to the Creditors in accordance with the Plan and the Claims Procedure;

(c) the Liquidator shall have all necessary powers to carry out its duties and obligations as described in this Plan and the OBCA Sanction Order, including the authority to pay any taxes exigible as a result of the transfer of the Distributionco Transferred Assets to Distributionco, and all of the rights, powers, duties and obligations of a court-appointed liquidator under Part XVI of the OBCA, except as may be varied by the OBCA Sanction Order, and Distributionco and the Liquidator shall have all of the rights, privileges, protections and immunities typically afforded to an indenture trustee in connection with the enforcement and administration of the Sears Variable Note;

(d) from and after the Plan Implementation Date, the Liquidator shall assume the functions of Eaton's (as defined in the Claims Procedure) under the Claims Procedure for the determination of Distribution Claims and shall distribute (including on an interim basis) to the Creditors amounts realized from the Distributionco Transferred Assets and the Sears Equity Contribution, in accordance with the Plan, including the Claims Procedure;

(e) the Liquidator shall hold the Sears Variable Note and the proceeds thereof received on the maturity of the Sears Variable Note on behalf of Distributionco and distribute on behalf of Distributionco such proceeds and all interest thereon in accordance with the provisions of this Plan and the Sears Variable Note to the holders of Participation Units;

(f) the Liquidator shall keep any funds received under the Sears Variable Note prior to any repayment thereunder or the maturity thereof segregated from any other funds held by the Liquidator, and shall return such funds (and any interest thereon) to Sears to the extent provided in the Sears Variable Note, and upon such return of funds to Sears, no Person shall have any claim including, without limitation, the holders of Participation Units or Distributionco, in respect of such funds;

(g) the Liquidator shall invest all funds held or received by Distributionco under the Sears Variable Note, pending distribution as contemplated under the Sears Variable Note, in deposits, bankers acceptances and Treasury Bills with or of the financial institutions and the Canadian or provincial governments and their respective agencies or agents listed or referred to in Schedule "B" attached to this Plan;

(h) the Liquidator shall invest all funds held or received from the Distributionco Transferred Assets, the Sears Equity Contribution and any reserves held pending distributions to Creditors in deposits, bankers acceptances and Treasury Bills

with or of the financial institutions and the Canadian or provincial governments and their respective agencies or agents listed or referred to in Schedule "B" attached to this Plan;

(i) the Liquidator shall keep and maintain a register of holders of Participation Units and of transfers thereof;

(j) neither Distributionco nor the Liquidator shall have any obligation to take any proceedings or any other steps to enforce the Sears Variable Note or the rights of the Participation Unit holders to receive monies thereunder, unless the Liquidator is provided with funds and the appropriate indemnities from Participation Unit holders;

(k) the form and terms of the Sears Variable Note shall be approved;

(l) a committee of Creditors of up to 5 members may be appointed by the Liquidator to assist the Liquidator in reviewing and settling Distribution Claims and establishing reserves to allow the Liquidator to make interim distributions to the Creditors;

(m) the Initial Director shall be discharged from any liability with respect to the Claims and Interim Period Claims effective on the Plan Implementation Date;

(n) no further directors shall be appointed for Distributionco;

(o) no action or other proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against Distributionco or the Liquidator and no attachment, sequestration, distress or execution shall be put in force against the estate or effects of Distributionco except by leave of the Court;

(p) Distributionco shall not assume any liability in respect of any Claims or Interim Period Claims, except those liabilities compromised under this Plan and the Unsatisfied Unaffected Liabilities;

(q) no Person who is a party to any agreement assigned to Distributionco as part of the Distributionco Transferred Assets shall, from and after the Plan Implementation Date, have any right to accelerate, terminate, rescind, refuse to perform or otherwise repudiate its obligations thereunder, or enforce or exercise any right (including without limitation any charge, right of set-off, dilution, buy-out, reconveyance, divestiture, forced sale, option or other remedy) or make any demand under or in respect of such agreement by reasons of:

(i) the fact that Distributionco is the transferee of the Distributionco Transferred Assets;

(ii) the fact that Distributionco has sought or obtained relief under the OBCA Proceedings;

(iii) the fact that the Plan has been implemented: or

(iv) the fact that Distributionco is being wound up and the Liquidator has been appointed; and

(r) the Liquidator shall only apply for an Order dissolving Distributionco when all funds received under the Sears Variable Note and any income earned thereon have been fully distributed to the holders of the Participation Units and when all proceeds of realization from the Distributionco Transferred Assets have been distributed to the Creditors, in each case in accordance with this Plan and the OBCA Sanction Order.

Article 6 — Conditions Precedent

6.1 — Application for Sanction Orders

If the Creditor Approval and Shareholder Approval are obtained, Eaton's shall apply for the CCAA Sanction Order and the OBCA Sanction Order on November 23, 1999. The CCAA Sanction Order and the OBCA Sanction Order shall not become effective until the Plan Implementation Date. On the Plan Implementation Date, subject to the satisfaction or waiver of the conditions contained in Section 6.2, the Plan will be implemented by Eaton's, Distributionco and the Liquidator and shall be binding upon all Persons having Claims, Interim Period Claims, and Unsatisfied Unaffected Liabilities against Eaton's or

Distributionco or the Liquidator to the extent of their Claims, Interim Period Claims or Unsatisfied Unaffected Liabilities. If the conditions contained in Section 6.2 are not satisfied or waived on or before the Plan Implementation Date, this Plan, the CCAA Sanction Order and the OBCA Sanction Order shall cease to have any further force or effect (other than the provisions therein protecting the Interim Receiver, the Monitor and the Liquidator, including with respect to their fees and disbursements).

Eaton's may apply for an Order extending the Stay Period so that the application for the CCAA Sanction Order may be made before the Stay Period expires and the Stay Period shall not expire until the Plan Implementation Date.

6.2 — Conditions Precedent to Implementation of Plan

The implementation of this Plan shall be conditional upon the fulfilment or waiver (in accordance with Section 9.1) of the following conditions:

(a) — Expiry of Appeal Period

The appeal period with respect to the CCAA Sanction Order and OBCA Sanction Order shall have expired without an appeal of such Orders having been commenced or, in the event of an appeal or application for leave to appeal, a final determination shall have been made by the applicable appellate tribunal.

(b) — Sears Agreement

The satisfaction of all conditions in the Sears Agreement unless waived by Sears.

(c) — Deliveries of Documents

All relevant Persons shall have executed, delivered and filed all documentation which in the opinion of Eaton's, acting reasonably, are necessary to give effect to all material terms and provisions of this Plan including, without limitation, the Articles of Arrangement.

(d) — Governmental Approvals

All applicable governmental, regulatory and Judicial consents, orders and similar consents and approvals and all filings with all governmental authorities, securities commissions, stock exchanges and other regulatory authorities having jurisdiction, in each case to the extent deemed necessary or desirable by counsel to Eaton's and in form and substance satisfactory to Eaton's for the completion of the transactions contemplated by this Plan or any aspect hereof, shall have been obtained or received.

Article 7 — Meetings and Procedural Matters

7.1 — Meetings of Creditors

(a) Meetings of Creditors shall be held in accordance with this Plan, the Initial CCAA Order and any further Order.

(b) Subject to the Initial CCAA Order, the Chair shall decide all matters relating to the conduct of each Meeting of Creditors and the validity of proxies and the voting of Voting Claims.

(c) The quorum required at each Meeting of Creditors shall be the lesser of two or the number of Creditors in the Class of Creditors present in person or by proxy.

(d) The Monitor shall appoint scrutineers for the supervision and tabulation of the attendance at, quorum at and votes cast at each Meeting of Creditors. A Person designated by the Monitor shall act as secretary at the Meeting of Creditors.

(e) The only Persons entitled to notice of or to attend, speak and vote at each Meeting of Creditors are the Creditors of the Class of Creditors to which the Meeting relates (including, for purposes of attendance and speaking, their proxy holders),

representatives of Eaton's, the Monitor, the Employee Representative, and their respective legal and financial advisors. Any other Person may be admitted to a Meeting of Creditors on the invitation of Eaton's representatives or the Chair.

(f) If the requisite quorum is not present at a Meeting of Creditors, or if a Meeting of Creditors is postponed by the vote of the majority in number of the Creditors present in person or by proxy, then the Meeting of Creditors shall be adjourned by the Chair to a date thereafter and to such time and place as may be appointed by the Chair.

(g) Any proxy which any Creditor wishes to submit in respect of a Meeting of Creditors (or any adjournment thereof) must be received by Eaton's one Business Day prior to the day on which the Meeting of Creditors (or any adjournment thereof) is to be held, provided that proxies may also be deposited with the Chair at the Meeting of Creditors (or any adjournment thereof) prior to the commencement of such Meeting.

(h) The Employee Representative shall file an Omnibus Proof of Claim (Employees) (as defined in the Claims Procedure) on behalf of all former and present employees of Eaton's and shall be deemed to hold an omnibus proxy for voting purposes for all former and present employees of Eaton's. The omnibus proxy for voting purposes shall be without prejudice to the ability of any former or present employee to file his or her own Proof of Claim and to appear in person or by proxy held by a Person other than the Employee Representative. In the event that the employee files his or her own Proof of Claim, the Omnibus Proof of Claim (Employees) and omnibus proxy for voting purposes shall be reduced or revised accordingly. The omnibus proxy shall be counted for the total number of individual employees voting and the total value of their Claims and Interim Period Claims.

(i) In respect of any Meeting of Creditors, the Chair shall direct a vote, by written ballot, with respect to a resolution to approve this Plan and any amendments thereto as Eaton's may consider appropriate.

(j) For voting purposes, Eaton's shall keep a separate record and tabulation of any votes cast in respect of Claims and Interim Period Claims which have not been allowed in whole or in part by Eaton's by the time of the Meeting.

7.2 — Creditor Approval

In order that this Plan be binding on the Creditors in accordance with the CCAA, it must first be accepted by each Class of Creditors as prescribed by this Plan by a majority in number of the Creditors in such Class who actually vote on this Plan (in person or by proxy) at the relevant Meeting. representing two-thirds (66 $2/_3$%) in value of the Voting Claims of the Creditors in such Class who actually vote on this Plan (whether in person or by proxy) at the relevant Meeting.

7.3 — Meeting of Shareholders

(a) The Meeting of Shareholders shall be called, held and conducted in accordance with the OBCA, other applicable laws and the articles and by-laws of Eaton's, subject to the terms of the Initial OBCA Order and subject to any further Order.

(b) Subject to the Initial OBCA Order, the Chair shall decide all matters relating to the conduct of the Meeting of Shareholders and the annual meeting of Shareholders postponed to November 19, 1999 by Order made September 24, 1999 and the validity of proxies and the voting of Common Shares relating to each.

(c) The only Persons entitled to notice of or to attend the Meeting of Shareholders shall be the Shareholders as at the record date for the Meeting of Shareholders, holders of valid proxies from Shareholders, Eaton's representatives, Eaton's directors, Eaton's auditors, and the Monitor. The only Persons entitled to be represented and to vote at the Meeting of Shareholders shall be the Shareholders as at the record date for the Meeting of Shareholders, subject to the provisions of the OBCA with respect to Persons who become registered Shareholders after that date. Other Persons may attend at the Meeting of Shareholders only on the invitation of Eaton's representatives or the Chair.

(d) Eaton's, if it deems it advisable, is specifically authorized to adjourn or postpone the Meeting of Shareholders on one or more occasions, without the necessity of first convening the Meeting of Shareholders or first obtaining any vote of any Shareholders respecting the adjournment or postponement.

(e) The accidental omission to give notice of the Meeting of Shareholders, or the non-receipt of such notice, shall not invalidate any resolution passed or proceedings taken at the Meeting of Shareholders.

(f) Eaton's is authorized, at its expense, to solicit proxies, directly and through its officers, directors and employees, and through such agents or representatives as it may retain for the purpose, and by mail or such other forms of personal or electronic communication as it may determine.

(g) Votes shall be taken at the Meeting of Shareholders on the basis of one (1) vote per Common Share.

(h) Optionholders shall not be entitled to vote at the Meeting of Shareholders.

7.4 — Shareholder Approval

In order that this Plan be binding on the Shareholders in accordance with the OBCA, it must first be accepted by an affirmative vote by not less than two-thirds (66 2/3%) of the votes cast (for this purpose any spoiled votes, illegible votes, defective votes and abstentions shall be deemed not to be votes cast) by the Shareholders present in person or represented by proxy at the Meeting of Shareholders.

Article 8 — Claims Procedure

8.1 — Claims Procedure

(a) The Claims and Interim Period Claims for voting and distribution purposes are to be determined in accordance with the Claims Procedure.

(b) All steps to be taken by Eaton's under the Claims Procedure from and after the Plan Implementation Date shall be performed by the Liquidator.

Article 9 — Amendment of Plan

9.1 — Plan Amendment

(a) Subject to the provisions of the Sears Agreement, Eaton's reserves the right, at any time and from time to time, to amend, modify and/or supplement this Plan, or to waive in whole or in part any condition from time to time set forth in Article 6, provided that any such amendment, modification, supplement or waiver must be contained in a written document which is filed with the Court and (i) if made prior to the Meetings, communicated to the Creditors and/or Shareholders in the manner required by the Court (if so required); and (ii) if made following the Meetings, approved by the Court following notice to the Creditors and/or Shareholders affected thereby.

(b) Subject to the provisions of the Sears Agreement, any amendment, modification, supplement or waiver may be made unilaterally by the Liquidator following the OBCA Sanction Order and CCAA Sanction Order, provided that it concerns a matter which, in the opinion of the Liquidator, acting reasonably, is of an administrative nature required to better give effect to the implementation of this Plan and to the OBCA Sanction Order and/or CCAA Sanction Order and is not adverse to the financial or economic interests of any Class of Creditors or Shareholders.

(c) Any supplementary plan or plans of compromise or arrangement filed with the Court and, if required by this Section, approved by the Court, shall, for all purposes, be and be deemed to be a part of and incorporated in this Plan.

Article 10 — General Provisions

10.1 — Termination

Subject to the provisions of the Sears Agreement, at any time prior to the Plan Implementation Date, Eaton's may determine not to proceed with this Plan, notwithstanding any prior approvals given at any of the Meetings.

10.2 — Paramountcy

From and after the Plan implementation Date, any conflict between this Plan and the covenants, warranties, representations, terms, conditions, provisions or obligations, express or implied, of any contract, credit document, agreement for sale, by-laws of Eaton's, lease or other agreement, written or oral and any and all amendments or supplements thereto existing between one or more of the Creditors and Eaton's as at the Plan Implementation Date will be deemed to be governed by the terms, conditions and provisions of this Plan and the OBCA Sanction Order and CCAA Sanction Order, which shall take precedence and priority.

10.3 — Compromise Effective For All Purposes

The compromise or other satisfaction of any Claim or Interim Period Claim under this Plan, if sanctioned and approved by the Court under the CCAA Sanction Order shall, in the case of any Creditor whose Claim or Interim Period Claim is in a Class voting in favour of this Plan, be binding on the Plan Implementation Date on such Creditor and such Creditor's heirs, executors, administrators, legal personal representatives, successors and assigns, for all purposes.

10.4 — Consents, Waivers And Agreements

On the Plan Implementation Date, each Creditor and Shareholder shall be deemed to have consented and agreed to all of the provisions of this Plan in their entirety. In particular, each Creditor and Shareholder shall be deemed:

(a) to have executed and delivered to Eaton's all consents, releases, assignments and waivers, statutory or otherwise, required to implement and carry out this Plan in its entirety;

(b) to have waived any non-compliance by Eaton's with any provision, express or implied, in any agreement or other arrangement, written or oral, existing between such Creditor and Eaton's that has occurred on or prior to the Plan Implementation Date and, where provided for in the CCAA Sanction Order, after the Plan Implementation Date; and

(c) to have agreed that, if there is any conflict between the provisions, express or implied, of any agreement or other arrangement, written or oral, existing between such Creditor and Eaton's at the Plan Implementation Date (other than those entered into by Eaton's on, or with effect from, the Plan Implementation Date) and the provisions of this Plan, the provisions of this Plan take precedence and priority and the provisions of such agreement or other arrangement shall be deemed to be amended accordingly.

10.5 — Releases

On the Plan Implementation Date, Eaton's and each and every present and former Shareholder, officer, director, employee, auditor, financial advisor, legal counsel (other than in respect of legal opinions) and agent of Eaton's, the Initial Director, the Interim Receiver and the Monitor (individually, a "Released Party") shall be released and discharged from any and all demands, claims, actions, causes of action, counterclaims, suits, debts, sums of money, accounts, covenants, damages, judgments, expenses, executions, Charges and other recoveries on account of any liability, obligation, demand or cause of action of whatever nature which any Person may be entitled to assert, including, without limitation, any and all claims in respect of potential statutory liabilities of the former, present and future directors and officers of Eaton's and the Initial Director, whether known or unknown, matured or unmatured, foreseen or unforeseen, existing or hereafter arising, based in whole or in part on any act or omission, transaction, dealing or other occurrence existing or taking place on or prior to the Plan Implementation Date relating to, arising out of or in connection with Claims or Interim Period Claims, the business and affairs of Eaton's, the administration and winding up of the Pension Plans including, without limitation, any unfunded liability, and the administration, distribution, and investment of the funds relating to the Pension Plans, any employee benefit plan, including without limitation, any long

tern disability plan, fund or arrangement, this Plan, the BIA Proceedings, the CCAA Proceedings and the OBCA Proceedings, provided that nothing herein shall release or discharge a Released Party (other than Eaton's) if the Released Party (other than Eaton's) is adjudged by the express terms of a judgment rendered on a final determination on the merits to have committed fraud or wilful misconduct.

10.6 — Deeming Provisions

In this Plan, the deeming provisions are not rebuttable and are conclusive and irrevocable.

10.7 — Information Circular

Copies of this Plan will be included with an information circular mailed to Shareholders, Optionholders, Known Creditors, Known Interim Period Creditors, and Creditors who submit Proofs of Claim.

10.8 — Notices

Any notice or communication to be delivered hereunder shall be in writing and shall reference this Plan and may, subject as hereinafter provided, be made or given by personal delivery or by telecopier addressed to the respective parties as follows:

(a) if to Eaton's:

The T. Eaton Company Limited

c/o Richter & Partners Inc.

Court-Appointed Monitor of Eaton's

90 Eglinton Avenue East, Suite 700

Toronto, Ontario M4P 2Y3

Attention: Messrs. John J. Swidler, F.C.A. and Robert Harlang, C.A.

Telephone: (416) 932-6261

Telecopier: (416) 932-6262

(b) if to a Creditor:

to the known address (including telecopier number) for such Creditor or the address for such Creditor specified in the Proofs of Claim filed by such Creditor in the CCAA Proceedings;

(c) if to the Monitor:

Richter & Partners Inc.

Court-Appointed Monitor of Eaton's

90 Eglinton Avenue East, Suite 700

Toronto, ON M4P 2Y3

Attention: Messrs. John J. Swidler, F.C.A. and Robert Harlang, C.A.

Telecopier: (416) 932-6200

Telephone: (416) 932-8000

or to such other address as any party may from time to time notify the others in accordance with this Section. All such notices and communications which are delivered shall be deemed to have been received on the date of delivery. All such notices and communications which are telecopied shall be deemed to be received on the date telecopied if sent before 5:00 p.m. on a Business Day and otherwise shall be deemed to be received on the Business Day next following the day upon which such telecopy was sent. Any notice or other communication sent by mail shall be deemed to have been received on the fifth Business Day after the date of mailing. The unintentional failure by Eaton's to give a notice contemplated hereunder shall not invalidate any action taken by any Person pursuant to this Plan.

10.9 — Different Capacities

Creditors whose Claims and Interim Period Claims are affected by this Plan may be affected in more than one capacity. Unless expressly provided herein to the contrary, each such Creditor shall be entitled to participate hereunder in each such capacity. Any action taken by a Creditor in any one capacity shall not affect the Creditor in any other capacity, unless expressly agreed by the Creditor in writing or unless the Claims or Interim Period Claims overlap or are otherwise duplicative.

10.10 — Further Assurances

Notwithstanding that the transactions and events set out in this Plan shall be deemed to occur without any additional act or formality other than as set out herein, each of the Persons affected hereby shall make, do and execute or cause to be made, done or executed all such further acts, deeds, agreements, transfers, assurances, instruments, documents or discharges as may be reasonably required by Eaton's (and after the Plan Implementation Date, by Distributionco or the Liquidator) in order to better implement this Plan.

Dated at Toronto, Ontario this 19th day of November, 1999.

Schedule "A" — Claims Procedure for Voting and Distribution Purposes

Claims Procedure for Voting Purposes

Definitions

1. The following terms shall have the following meanings ascribed thereto:

(a) "Eaton's" means The T. Eaton Company Limited and after the Plan Implementation Date, the Person under the Plan which will be making the distribution under the Plan;

(b) "Business Day" means a day, other than Saturday, Sunday or a statutory holiday, on which banks are generally open for business in Toronto, Ontario;

(c) "Calendar Day" means a day, including, Saturday, Sunday and any statutory holidays;

(d) "CCAA" means the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36;

(e) "Claim" means any right of any Person against Eaton's in connection with any indebtedness, liability or obligation of any kind of Eaton's, which indebtedness, liability or obligation is in existence prior to the Valuation Date, and any interest that may accrue thereon, whether liquidated, reduced to judgment, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, unsecured, present, future, known, or unknown, by guarantee, surety or otherwise, and whether or not such right is executory or anticipatory in nature, including without limitation, any claim made or asserted against Eaton's through any affiliate, associate or related Person as such terms are defined in the Ontario *Business Corporations Act*, or any right or ability of any Person to advance a claim for contribution or indemnity or otherwise with respect to any matter, action, cause or chose in action, whether existing at present or commenced in the

future with respect to any matter, action, cause or chose in action whether existing at present or commenced in the future based in whole or in part on facts which exist prior to the Valuation Date, together with any other claims that would have been claims provable in bankruptcy had Eaton's become bankrupt on the Valuation Date;

(f) "Claims Administrator" means the person identified in the Schedules for purposes of receiving the notices described in those Schedules;

(g) "Claims Officer" means the Person or Persons to be designated by this Court;

(h) "Claims\Procedure" means the claims procedure and schedules set out herein and as approved in the Initial Order, as may be amended from time to time;

(i) "Court" means the Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) in the Province of Ontario;

(j) "Creditor" means any Person having a Claim or an Interim Period Claim and may, where the context requires, include the assignee of a Claim or Interim Period Claim or a trustee, interim receiver, receiver, receiver and manager, or other Person acting on behalf of such Person;

(k) "Dispute Notice" means the notices referred to in paragraphs 9 and 17 hereof, being Schedule "7" hereto;

(l) "Distribution Claim" of a Creditor means the compromised amount of the Claim of such Creditor as finally determined for distribution purposes, in accordance with the provisions of the Claims Procedure described herein, in the Plan and in the CCAA;

(m) "Distribution Claims Bar Date" means 11:59 p.m. (Toronto time) on January 25, 2000 or such later date as may be ordered by the Court;

(n) "Employee Representative" means Carmen Siciliano, as appointed by the Order of the Court made August 27th, 1999 as continued in the Initial Order, or such other Person as the Court may appoint to represent former and present employees of Eaton's or a group or class of them;

(o) "Initial Order" means the Order of this Court made in respect of Eaton's on September 28, 1999 under the CCAA, as amended from time to time;

(p) "Instruction Letter for Distribution Purposes" means the instruction letter to Creditors regarding completion by Creditors of the Dispute Notice described in paragraph 17 hereof;

(q) "Instruction Letter for Voting Purposes" means the instruction letter to Creditors regarding completion by Creditors of the Proof of Claim and Dispute Notice described in paragraphs 4 and 9 hereof;

(r) "Interim Period" means the period from and after the Valuation Date to and including the Plan Implementation Date;

(s) "Interim Period Claim" means any right of any Person against Eaton's in connection with any indebtedness, liability or obligation of any kind of Eaton's, and any interest that may accrue thereon, whether liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, unsecured, present, future, known, or unknown, by guarantee, surety or otherwise, and whether or not such right is executory or anticipatory in nature, including without limitation, any claim made or asserted against Eaton's through any affiliate, associate or related Person as such terms are defined in the Ontario *Business Corporations Act*, or any right or ability of any Person to advance a claim for contribution or indemnity or otherwise with respect to any matter, action, cause or chose in action, whether existing at present or commenced in the future, arising from or caused by, directly or indirectly, the implementation of, or any action taken pursuant to, the Plan, including claims arising from the abandonment of any premises or the repudiation or variation of any lease, the assignment of any contract or lease of personal, real, moveable or immoveable property (including any future liability as assignor thereof) or the repudiation or variation of any contract to take effect up to and including Plan

Implementation Date (including any anticipatory breach thereof), repudiation or variation of any contract of employment, the termination or winding up of any pension or employee benefit plans and any other claim arising at law or equity;

(t) "Interim Period Creditors" means those Creditors having an Interim Period Claim;

(u) "Known Creditors" means those Creditors whose Claims are identified in Eaton's books and records;

(v) "Known Interim Period Creditors" means those Persons Eaton's believes may have Interim Period Claims;

(w) "Monitor" means the monitor appointed under the Initial Order;

(x) "Notice to Creditors" means the notice for publication as described in paragraph 4 hereof;

(y) "Notice of Dispute of Valuation for Voting Purposes" means the Notice of Dispute of Valuation for Voting Purposes referred to in paragraph 3 hereof, delivered by a Known Creditor disputing a Notice of Voting Claim with reasons for its dispute;

(z) "Notice of Distribution Claim" means the notice referred to in paragraph 16 hereof, advising a Creditor of the value ascribed by Eaton's for such Creditor's Distribution Claim;

(aa) "Notice of Revision or Disallowance for Voting Purposes" means the notice referred to in paragraph 8 hereof, advising a Creditor that Eaton's has revised or rejected all or part of such Creditor's Claim or Interim Period Claim set out in its Proof of Claim or advising a Known Creditor that Eaton's has revised or rejected all or part of such Creditor's Claim or Interim Period Claim as set out in the Notice of Dispute of Valuation for Voting Purposes;

(bb) "Notice of Voting Claim" means the notice referred to in paragraph 3 hereof, advising a Creditor of the value ascribed by Eaton's for such Creditor's Voting Claim;

(cc) "Omnibus Proof of Claim (Employees)" means the Proof of Claim to be sent by the Employee Representative to Eaton's as described in paragraph 6 hereof;

(dd) "Person" means any and all of Eaton's shareholders and former shareholders, creditors, customers, employees, retirees, pension plans, clients, suppliers, contractors, lenders, factors, customs brokers, purchasing agents, landlords (including, without limitation, equipment lessors and lessors of real property and immoveables), sub-landlords, tenants, sub-tenants, licensors, licensees, concessionaires, co-owners, co-tenants, joint venture partners, co-venturers, partners, the Crown (except as provided under subsections 11.4(2) and (3) of the CCAA), municipalities or any other entity exercising executive, legislative, judicial, regulatory or administrative functions of or pertaining to government in Canada or elsewhere and any corporation or other entity owned or controlled by or which is the agent of any of the foregoing, and any other person, firm, corporation or entity wherever situate or domiciled (collectively, "Persons" and, individually, "Person");

(ee) "Plan" means the plan of compromise or arrangement to be filed by Eaton's pursuant to the Initial Order, which Plan may be amended or supplemented from time to time;

(ff) "Plan Implementation Date" means the date on which the Plan is to be effective, as provided for in the Plan;

(gg) "Proof of Claim" means the form of Proof of Claim referred to in paragraph 4 hereof;

(hh) "Unknown Creditor" means a Creditor whose claim is not recorded or shown in Eaton's books and records;

(ii) "Unknown Interim Period Creditors" means those Interim Period Creditors of which Eaton's has no knowledge;

(jj) "Valuation Date" means August 20, 1999;

(kk) "Voting Claim" of a Creditor means the amount of the Claim and/or Interim Period Claim of such Creditor determined for voting purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Claims Procedure described herein and the CCAA; and

(ll) "Voting Claims Bar Date" means 11:59 p.m. (Toronto time) on October 25, 1999.

Schedules

2. The following Schedules form part of this Claims Procedure:

(a) Schedule "1" — Notice of Voting Claim

(b) Schedule "2" — Notice of Dispute of Valuation for Voting Purposes

(c) Schedule "3" — Notice To Creditors

(d) Schedule "4" — Proof of Claim

(e) Schedule "5" — Instruction Letter for Voting Purposes

(f) Schedule "6" — Notice of Revision or Disallowance for Voting Purposes

(g) Schedule "7" — Dispute Notice

(h) Schedule "8" — Notice of Distribution Claim

(i) Schedule "9" — Instruction Letter for Distribution Purposes

3. Eaton's shall send, on or before 11:59 p.m. (Toronto time) on October 4, 1999, by ordinary mail, courier or telecopier to each of the Known Creditors (other than employees represented by the Employee Representative), to each of the Known Interim Period Creditors (other than employees represented by the Employee Representative) and by facsimile transmission to each Person on the service list in Eaton's CCAA proceeding a Notice of Voting Claim substantially in the form attached as Schedule "1". In so doing, Eaton's is not admitting liability to such Persons. The Notice of Voting Claim shall set out, to the extent possible, Eaton's best estimate of the Creditor's Voting Claim, as may be shown in Eaton's books and records. Where not practicable to estimate the Creditor's Interim Period Claim, Eaton's intends to ascribe a value of $1 to such Creditor's Interim Period Claim. With respect to the Notice of Voting Claim for the landlords of Eaton's, Eaton's shall value each landlord's Interim Period Claim in accordance with the formula set out in subsection 65.2(4) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, irrespective of actual damages suffered, if any. A Creditor shall be deemed to have received the Notice of Voting Claim three Calendar Days after the mailing of the Notice of Voting Claim. If the Creditor disputes the amount of the Voting Claim set out therein, the Creditor shall deliver to Eaton's Claims Administrator a Notice of Dispute of Valuation for Voting Purposes in the form attached as Schedule "2" no later than the Voting Claims Bar Date. Where the Creditor does not deliver to Eaton's by such date a completed Notice of Dispute of Valuation for Voting Purposes, then the Creditor shall be deemed to have accepted the Creditor's Claim or Interim Period Claim as set out in the Notice of Voting Claim, which Creditor's Claim or Interim Period Claim shall be treated as a Voting Claim for voting purposes under the Plan.

4. Commencing on October 7, 1999, Eaton's shall publish the Notice to Creditors substantially in the form attached as Schedule "3" hereto, for a period of two consecutive Business Days in the Globe & Mail (National Edition), National Post, La Presse, and the Wall Street Journal (National Edition). The Notice to Creditors shall provide that any Creditor of Eaton's who has not received a Notice of Voting Claim, must provide notice of that Creditor's Claim or Interim Period Claim to Eaton's by no later than 11:59 p.m. (Toronto time) on October 13, 1999 which notice shall include particulars as to the Creditor's name, address and facsimile number, in order to be able to vote on the Plan. Eaton's shall send by facsimile or courier to each such Creditor, a Proof of Claim in substantially the form attached as Schedule "4" and the Instruction Letter for Voting Purposes in substantially

the form attached as Schedule "5" as soon as practicable. Such Creditor's Proof of Claim must be returned to Eaton's by no later than the Voting Claims Bar Date unless Eaton's otherwise agrees or this Court otherwise orders.

5. A Creditor that does not receive a Notice of Voting Claim and that does not file a Proof of Claim by the Voting Claims Bar Date shall not be entitled to vote at any Creditors' meeting in respect of the Plan unless Eaton's otherwise agrees or this Court otherwise orders.

6. Notwithstanding any other provision in this Claims Procedure, Koskie Minsky as Court-appointed counsel to the Employee Representative, shall, on behalf of the Employee Representative, deliver to Eaton's by the Voting Claims Bar Date an Omnibus Proof of Claim (Employees) for all present and former employees of Eaton's. In addition, the Employee Representative shall be given an omnibus proxy for voting purposes for all former and present employees of Eaton's. The Omnibus Proof of Claim (Employees) and the omnibus proxy for voting purposes shall be without prejudice to the ability of any former or present employee to file his or her own Proof of Claim by the Voting Claims Bar Date and to appear in person or by proxy at a Creditors' meeting to approve the Plan. In the event that an employee files his or her own Proof of Claim, the Omnibus Proof of Claim (Employees) and the omnibus proxy for voting purposes shall be reduced or revised accordingly. The omnibus proxy for voting purposes shall be counted for the total number of individual employees voting and the total value of their Claims and Interim Period Claims.

7. On or about October 12, 1999, Eaton's shall mail its Management Information Circular, in connection with the Plan, to Known Creditors and to Known Interim Period Creditors. Eaton's shall also provide a copy of the Management Information Circular (once mailing of same has commenced) to those Creditors to whom Eaton's provides a Proof of Claim in accordance with paragraph 4 hereof.

8. Eaton's, with the assistance of the Monitor, shall review all Notices of Dispute of Valuation for Voting Purposes and all Proofs of Claim, including the Omnibus Proof of Claim (Employees), received by the Voting Claims Bar Date and shall accept, revise or reject the amount of each Claim and Interim Period Claim set out therein for voting purposes under the Plan. Eaton's shall by no later than 11:59 p.m. (Toronto time) on October 29, 1999, notify each Creditor who has filed a Notice of Dispute of Valuation for Voting Purposes or a Proof of Claim if such Creditor's Claim or Interim Period Claim as set out therein has been revised or rejected, and the reasons therefor, by sending on or before October 29, 1999 by facsimile or courier a Notice of Revision or Disallowance for Voting Purposes substantially in the form attached as Schedule "6" hereto. Where Eaton's does not send by such date a Notice of Revision or Disallowance for Voting Purposes to a Creditor who has submitted a Notice of Dispute of Valuation for Voting Purposes or a Proof of Claim, Eaton's shall be deemed to have accepted such Creditor's Claim or Interim Period Claim for voting purposes only, which shall be deemed to be that Creditor's Voting Claim.

9. Any Creditor who intends to dispute a Notice of Revision or Disallowance for Voting Purposes shall by no later than 11:59 p.m. (Toronto time) on November 5, 1999, deliver by facsimile or courier to the Claims Administrator, a Dispute Notice substantially in the form attached as Schedule "7" hereto in order to have the value of such Creditor's Voting Claim determined by the Claims Officer. Eaton's, with the assistance of the Monitor, shall attempt to resolve any dispute as to the value of the Creditor's Voting Claim as set out in the Dispute Notice by no later than November 9, 1999. In the event that Eaton's is unable to resolve the dispute with the Creditor by November 9, 1999, Eaton's shall so notify the Claims Officer, the Monitor and the Creditor.

10. Where a Creditor that receives a Notice of Revision or Disallowance for Voting Purposes does not file a Dispute Notice, the value of such Creditor's Voting Claim under the Plan shall be deemed for voting purposes to be as set out in the Notice of Revision or Disallowance for Voting Purposes.

11. Upon receiving notice that Eaton's is unable to resolve a dispute with a Creditor in respect of a Voting Claim, the Claims Officer shall resolve the dispute between Eaton's and such Creditor, and the Claims Officer shall, by no later than 11:59 p.m. (Toronto time) on November 17, 1999, notify Eaton's, such Creditor and the Monitor of the Claims Officer's determination of the value of the Creditor's Voting Claim for voting purposes under the Plan. Such determination of the value of the Voting Claim by the Claims Officer shall be deemed to be the Creditor's Voting Claim for voting purposes under the Plan.

12. Subject to the direction of the Court, the Claims Officer shall determine the manner, if any, in which evidence may be brought before him or her by the parties as well as any other procedural matters which may arise in respect of his or her determination of a Creditor's Voting Claim. The resolution shall be on an expedited basis and the determination of the value by the Claims Officer for voting purposes shall not prohibit a Creditor from a further hearing under paragraph 17 hereof with respect to the value of such Creditor's Distribution Claim.

13. The decision of the Claims Officer in determining the value of the Creditor's Voting Claim shall be final and binding on the Creditor and Eaton's for voting purposes only and not for distribution purposes under the Plan and there shall be no rights of appeal or recourse to the Court from the Claims Officer's final determination for voting purposes only and not for distribution purposes.

14. Where any Creditor applies to have the value of its Voting Claim determined by the Claims Officer, but the Voting Claim has not been finally determined by the Claims Officer prior to the date of the meeting at which the Creditor is to vote, as provided in the Initial Order, Eaton's shall either:

(a) accept the Creditor's determination and the value of the Claim only for the purposes of voting on the Plan, and conduct the vote of the particular class(es) of creditors into which such Creditor falls, subject to a final determination of its Distribution Claim;

(b) delay the vote of the class(es) into which that Creditor falls until a final determination of the Claim is made;or

(c) deal with the matter as the Court may otherwise direct.

Claims Procedure for Distribution Purposes

15. Eaton's shall publish commencing on January 4, 2000 a notice of the Distribution Claims Bar Date for a period of two consecutive Business Days in The Globe and Mail (National Edition), National Post, La Presse, and The Wall Street Journal (National Edition). This notice shall advise Creditors of the Distribution Claims Bar Date.

16. Eaton's shall review and consider all Voting Claims (including the Voting Claim of the Employee Representative) for the purpose of valuing such Voting Claims to determine Distribution Claims. Eaton's shall accept, revise or reject the amount of all Voting Claims for distribution purposes under the Plan. Eaton's shall by no later than the Distribution Claims Bar Date, notify each Creditor as to whether such Creditor's Voting Claim as set out therein has been confirmed, revised or rejected for distribution purposes and the reasons therefor by delivery of a Notice of Distribution Claim together with an Instruction Letter for Distribution Purposes by facsimile or courier in the forms attached as Schedules "8" and "9" respectively. Creditors who did not receive a Notice of Voting Claim and who were not part of the voting process must file a Proof of Claim with the Claims Administrator, which Proof of Claim shall set out such Creditor's Claim and Interim Period Claim, by the Distribution Claims Bar Date. Any such Creditor who fails to file a Proof of Claim by the Distribution Claims Bar Date shall be forever barred from advancing any Claims or Interim Period Claims against Eaton's or from receiving a distribution under the Plan and such Creditor's Claims and Interim Period Claims shall be forever extinguished and barred. Eaton's shall review and consider all Proofs of Claim which it receives in respect of Distribution Claims for distribution purposes under the Plan to determine if it accepts, revises or rejects the amount set out therein. If Eaton's does not contact a Creditor who has filed a Proof of Claim to advise that it disputes the amount set out in such Creditor's Proof of Claim by February 29, 2000, Eaton's shall be deemed to have accepted the amount set out in such Creditor's Proof of Claim as such Creditor's Distribution Claim for distribution purposes under the Plan. If Eaton's disputes the amount of a Claim or Interim Period Claim set out in a Proof of Claim filed in accordance with this paragraph it shall with the assistance of the Monitor attempt to resolve the dispute with the Creditor by February 29, 2000. In the event that Eaton's is unable to resolve the dispute by such date, it shall so notify the Claims Officer, the Monitor and the Creditor.

17. A Creditor who intends to dispute a Notice of Distribution Claim shall by 11:59 p.m. (Toronto time), on February 15, 2000, notify the Claims Administrator in writing of such intent, by delivery of a Dispute Notice in the form attached as Schedule "7"

hereto by facsimile or courier. Eaton's, with the assistance of the Monitor, shall attempt to resolve the dispute with the Creditor by February 29, 2000. In the event that Eaton's is unable to resolve the dispute with the Creditor by February 29, 2000, Eaton's shall so notify the Claims Officer, the Monitor and the Creditor. If a Creditor does not deliver a Dispute Notice by 11:59 p.m. (Toronto time) on February 15, 2000, such Creditor will be deemed to have accepted the value of its Distribution Claim as set out in the Notice of Distribution Claim and will be thereafter barred from otherwise disputing or appealing same.

18. Upon receiving notice that Eaton's is unable to resolve a dispute with a Creditor regarding any Distribution Claim, the Claims Officer shall resolve the dispute between Eaton's and such Creditor, and shall, by no later than 11:59 p.m. (Toronto time) on March 31, 2000, notify Eaton's, such Creditor and the Monitor of the Claims Officer's determination of the value of the Creditor's Distribution Claim.

19. Subject to the direction of the Court, the Claims Officer shall determine the manner, if any, in which evidence may be brought before him or her by the parties, as well as any other procedural matters which may arise in respect of his or her determination of a Creditor's Distribution Claim.

20. If neither party appeals the determination of value of Distribution Claim by the Claims Officer in accordance with paragraph 21 below, the decision of the Claims Officer in determining the value of the Creditor's Distribution Claim shall be final and binding upon Eaton's and the Creditor for distribution purposes under the Plan and there shall be no further right of appeal, review or recourse to the Court from the Claims Officer's final determination.

21. Either a Creditor or Eaton's may, within five (5) Calendar Days of notification of the Claims Officer's determination of the value of a Creditor's Distribution Claim, appeal such determination to the Court, which appeal shall be made returnable within five (5) Calendar Days of the filing of the notice of appeal. The determination of such appeal shall be final and binding upon Eaton's and the Creditor for all purposes under the Plan. There shall be no further rights of appeal, review or recourse to the courts.

General Provisions

22. In the event that Eaton's makes interim distribution payments under the Plan, to the extent that it is thereafter determined that the Creditor's Distribution Claim is greater than that for which Eaton's made interim payments, then Eaton's shall forthwith make such further payments contemplated by the Plan to such Creditor so that such Creditor shall receive the aggregate amount of payments which such Creditor would have received if its Distribution Claim had been finally determined prior to the interim distribution under the Plan.

23. In the event that no Plan is approved by the Court, the Voting Claims Bar Date shall be of no effect with respect to any and all claims made by Creditors in any subsequent proceeding or distribution.

Schedule "1" — In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, C. C-36, as amended — and — In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of the T. Eaton Company Limited

Court File No. 99-CL-3516

Superior Court of Justice Commercial List

..... Applicant

Notice of Voting Claim

Please read carefully the Instruction Letter for Voting Purposes accompanying this Notice.

The T. Eaton Company Limited ("Eaton's") proposes to present a plan of arrangement to its Creditors (the "Plan") under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (the "CCAA"). The Order of Mr. Justice Farley made September 28, 1999 in the CCAA proceedings provides for a Claims Procedure for Creditors for voting and distribution under the Plan.

TAKE NOTICE that Eaton's has valued your Voting Claim (comprised of your Claim and Interim Period Claim) against Eaton's for voting purposes (and NOT for distribution purposes) as set out in the attached Schedule. Claims in a foreign currency were converted to Canadian Dollars at the Bank of Canada noon spot rate as at August 20, 1999. U.S. exchange rate conversion on such date was $1.4941.

If you DISAGREE with the value of your VOTING CLAIM as set out in the Schedule attached to this Notice, please be advised of the following:

1. If you intend to dispute this Notice of Voting Claim, you must, by no later than 11:59 p.m. (Toronto time) on *October 25, 1999*, deliver to Eaton's (to the attention of the Claims Administrator) a Notice of Dispute of Valuation for Voting Purposes by facsimile, courier or registered mail to the address/fax number indicated thereon. The form of Notice of Dispute of Valuation for Voting Purposes is enclosed.

2. If you do not deliver a Notice of Dispute of Valuation for Voting Purposes to Eaton's (to the attention of the Claims Administrator), *the value of your Voting Claim for voting purposes under the Plan shall be deemed to be as set out in this Notice of Voting Claim.*

IF YOU FAIL TO TAKE ACTION WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME PERIOD, THE AMOUNT SET OUT IN THIS NOTICE SHALL BE DEEMED TO BE YOUR VOTING CLAIM FOR VOTING PURPOSES UNDER THE PLAN.

DATED at Toronto, the ..... day of ..... 1999.

THE T. EATON COMPANY LIMITED

Schedule "2" — In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended — and — In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of the T. Eaton Company Limited

Court File No. 99-CL-3516

Superior Court of Justice Commercial List

..... Applicant

Notice of Dispute of Valuation for Voting Purposes

Please read carefully the Instruction Letter for Voting Purposes accompanying this Notice.

A. PARTICULARS OF CREDITOR:

(1) Full Legal Name of Creditor: ..... *(Full legal name should be the name of the original Creditor of Eaton's, notwithstanding whether an assignment of a claim, or a portion thereof, has occurred. Do not file separate Notices of Dispute of Valuation For Voting Purposes by division or Dun and Bradstreet Number.)*

(2) Full Mailing Address of Creditor (not the Assignee): .....

(3) Telephone Number of Creditor: .....

(4) Facsimile Number of Creditor: .....

(5) Attention (Contact Person): .....

(6) Has the Claim been sold or assigned by Creditor to another party?..... [_] Yes [_] No

B. PARTICULARS OF ASSIGNEE(S) (IF ANY):

(1) Full Legal Name of Assignee(s): ..... *(If Claim has been assigned, insert full legal name of assignee(s) of Claim (if all or a portion of the Claim has been sold). If there is more than one assignee, please attach separate sheet with the required information).*

(2) Full Mailing Address of Assignee(s): .....

(3) Telephone Number of Assignee(s): .....

(4) Facsimile Number of Assignee(s): .....

(5) Attention (Contact Person): .....

C. NOTICE OF DISPUTE OF VALUATION:

(Claims in foreign currency are to be converted to Canadian dollars at the Bank of Canada noon spot rate as at August 20, 1999. U.S. exchange rate conversion on such date was $1.4941.)

We hereby disagree with the value of our Voting Claim as set out in Eaton's Notice of Voting Claim dated .....

(1) Creditor's valuation of Claim prior to August 20, 1999: ..... *$[insert value of claim] CAD*

(2) Creditor's valuation of Interim Period Claim from and after August 20, 1999: ..... *$[insert value of claim] CAD*

(3) Creditor's total valuation of Voting Claim (Total 1 and 2): ..... *$[total (1) plus (2)] CAD*

D. REASONS FOR DISPUTE:

(Provide full particulars of the Claim and supporting documentation, including amount, description of transaction(s) or agreement(s) giving rise to the Claim, name of any guarantor which has guaranteed the Claim, any relevant Dun and Bradstreet Numbers and amount of Claim allocated thereto, date and number of all invoices, particulars of all credits, discounts, etc. claimed; description of the security, if any, granted by Eaton's to Creditor and estimated value of such security, particulars of loss attributable to implementation of the Plan including loss from the repudiation or variation of any lease and the abandonment of premises, and any contingent liability of Eaton's as assignor, or the repudiation or variation of any contract, including any contingent liability of Eaton's as assignor).

This Notice of Dispute of Valuation For Voting Purposes must be returned to and received by Eaton's by no later than 11:59 p.m. (Toronto Time) on October 25, 1999, at the following address or facsimile:

Courier Address

Claims Administrator

The T. Eaton Company Limited

c/o Richter & Partners Inc.

Court-appointed Monitor of Eaton's

90 Eglinton Avenue East, Suite 700

Toronto, ON M4P 2Y3

Telephone: ..... (416) 932-6261

Fax: ..... (416) 932-6262

Schedule "3" — Notice to Creditors of the T. Eaton Company Limited

RE: NOTICE OF VOTING CLAIMS BAR DATE IN COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT ("CCAA") PROCEEDINGS

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to an Order of the Superior Court of Justice made September 28, 1999 (the "Order"), any person with any claim whatsoever against The T. Eaton Company Limited ("Eaton's") prior to August 20, 1999, contingent or otherwise, including without limitation any claim made against Eaton's through any affiliate or associate of Eaton's, who has not received a Notice of Voting Claim from Eaton's, must contact Eaton's with notice of its claim by no later than 11:59 p.m. (Toronto time) on *October 13, 1999* in order to obtain a Proof of Claim from Eaton's. Proofs of Claim must be filed with Eaton's on or before 11:59 p.m. (Toronto time) on *October 25, 1999* (the "Voting Claims Bar Date") for the purpose of voting on the Plan of Arrangement under the CCAA to be presented by Eaton's to its Creditors (the "Plan").

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT the Claims Procedure approved by the Order also addresses all Creditor claims which have arisen or may arise from and after August 20, 1999 as a result of the implementation of the Plan. Such claims may include losses arising from the repudiation or variation of any lease and the abandonment of premises and any contingent liability of Eaton's as assignor, or the repudiation or variation of any contract or agreement with Eaton's, including any contingent liability of Eaton's as assignor, and, further, including any employment contracts and any contracts in relation to Eaton's pension plans. If you have a contract with Eaton's, and have not been advised that Eaton's or any Purchaser wishes to continue that contract, you should treat the contract as terminated for the purpose of determining your claims against Eaton's.

HOLDERS OF CLAIMS WHICH ARE NOT FILED BY THE VOTING CLAIMS BAR DATE WILL BE BARRED FROM VOTING ON THE PLAN.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that any former or present employees with claims against Eaton's should contact Carmen Siciliano, Employee Representative, c/o Susan Rowland, Koskie Minsky, Box 52, 900-20 Queen Street West, Toronto, Ontario, M5H 3R3, (Telephone: (416) 977-8353; fax (416) 977-3316).

Creditors who have not received a Notice of Voting Claim should contact the Eaton's Claims Administrator, c/o Richter & Partners Inc., Court-Appointed Monitor of Eaton's (*Telephone 416-932-6261 and fax 416-932-6262*) by no later than 11:59 p.m. (Toronto time) on October 13, 1999 to obtain a Proof of Claim package.

DATED this 7th day of October, 1999 at Toronto, Canada.

RICHTER & PARTNERS INC.

in its capacity as Court-appointed Monitor of Eaton's

Schedule "4" — In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended — and — In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of the T. Eaton Company Limited

Court File No. 99-CL-3516

Superior Court of Justice Commercial List

..... Applicant

Proof of Claim

Please read carefully the enclosed Instruction Letter for completing this Proof of Claim.

A. PARTICULARS OF CREDITOR:

(1) Full Legal Name of Creditor: ..... *(Full legal name should be the name of the original Creditor of Eaton's, notwithstanding whether an assignment of a claim, or a portion thereof, has occurred).*

(2) Full Mailing Address of Creditor (original Creditor not the Assignee): .....

(3) Telephone Number: .....

(4) Facsimile Number: .....

(5) Attention (Contact Person): .....

(6) Has the Claim been sold or assigned by Creditor to another party?..... Yes [_] No [_]

B. PARTICULARS OF ASSIGNEE(S) (IF ANY):

(1) Full Legal Name of Assignee(s): ..... *(If Claim has been assigned, insert full legal name of assignee(s) of Claim (if all or a portion of the claim has been sold). If there is more than one assignee, please attach separate sheet with the required information.)*

(2) Full Mailing Address of Assignee(s): .....

(3) Telephone Number of Assignee(s): .....

(4) Facsimile Number of Assignee(s): .....

(5) Attention (Contact Person): .....

C. PROOF OF CLAIM:

I, ... *[name of Creditor or Representative of the Creditor]*, do hereby certify:

(a) that I am a *[Creditor of Eaton's or hold the position of ..... of the Creditor of Eaton's]*, and have knowledge of all the circumstances connected with the Claim described herein; and

(b) Eaton's is indebted to *[Creditor]* as follows:

(i) CLAIM PRIOR TO AUGUST 20, 1999: ..... *$[insert $ value of claim] CAD*

(Claims in a foreign currency are to be converted to Canadian Dollars at the Bank of Canada noon spot rate as at August 20, 1999. U.S. exchange rate conversion on such date was 1.4941.)

(ii) INTERIM PERIOD CLAIM: ..... *$[insert $ value of claim] CAD*

(Interim Period Claim against Eaton's which has or may have arisen during the period from and after August 20, 1999 to the Plan Implementation Date as a result of the proposed implementation of the Plan. Include loss from the repudiation or variation of any lease and the abandonment of premises and any contingent liability of Eaton's as assignor, or the repudiation or variation of any contract, including any contingent liability of Eaton's as assignor. If Eaton's has not notified you that it wishes to continue your contract, then you should treat the contract as if it has been terminated for the purposes of calculating your Proof of Claim.)

(iii) TOTAL VOTING CLAIM: ..... *$[total (i) plus (ii)] CAD*

D. PARTICULARS OF VOTING CLAIM:

The Particulars of the undersigned's total Voting Claim are attached.

(Provide full particulars of the Voting Claim and supporting documentation, including amount, description of transaction(s) or agreement(s) giving rise to the Voting Claim, name of any guarantor which has guaranteed the Voting Claim, any relevant Dun and Bradstreet Numbers and amount of Voting Claim allocated thereto, date and number of all invoices, particulars of all credits, discounts, etc. claimed, description of the security, if any, granted by Eaton's to Creditor and estimated value of such security, particulars of loss attributable to implementation of Plan including loss from the repudiation or variation of any lease and the abandonment of premises and any contingent liability of Eaton's as assignor or repudiation or variation of any contract, including any contingent liability of Eaton's as assignor.)

This Proof of Claim must be returned to Eaton's at the following address or facsimile:

Mailing Address

Claims Administrator

The T. Eaton Company Limited

c/o Richters & Partners Inc. Court-appointed Monitor of Eaton's

90 Eglinton Avenue East

Toronto, ON M4P 2Y3

Telephone: ..... (416) 932-6261

Fax: ..... (416) 932-6262

Dated at ..... this ..... day of .....,1999.

•, Creditor

Per: .....

Schedule "5" — In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended — and — In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of the T. Eaton Company Limited

Court File No. 99-CL-3516

Superior Court of Justice Commercial List

..... Applicant

Instruction Letter Claims Procedure for Voting Purposes

A. — Claims Procedure

The T. Eaton Company Limited ("Eaton's") proposes to present a Plan of Arrangement to its creditors (the "Plan") under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (the "CCAA"). The Order of Mr. Justice Farley made September 28, 1999 in Eaton's CCAA proceedings provides for a Claims Procedure with respect to voting and distribution under the Plan.

This letter provides instructions for responding to or completing the following forms:

- Notice of Voting Claim

- Proof of Claim
- Notice of Dispute of Valuation for Voting Purposes
- Notice of Revision or Disallowance for Voting Purposes
- Dispute Notice

The Claims Procedure is intended for any Person with any claims whatsoever against Eaton's prior to August 20, 1999 contingent or otherwise, including without limitation any claims made against Eaton's through any affiliate or associate of Eaton's ("Claims").

The Claims Procedure also addresses all claims which have arisen or may arise from and after August 20, 1999, up to and including the Plan Implementation Date as a result of the implementation of the Plan ("Interim Period Claims"). Such Interim Period Claims may include losses arising from the repudiation or variation of any lease or the abandonment of any premises and any contingent liability of Eaton's as assignor, the repudiation or variation of any contract or agreement with Eaton's, including any contingent liability of Eaton's as assignor, and further, including employment contracts and any contracts in relation to Eaton's pension plans.

The value of your claims against Eaton's for the purposes of voting at a meeting of Creditors to approve the Plan is the total of your Claim and Interim Period Claim which is described as your *Voting Claim*.

If you have a contract with Eaton's and have not been advised that Eaton's or any purchaser wishes to continue your contract, you should treat your contract as terminated for the purposes of assessing your Interim Period Claim under the Claims Procedure.

If you have any questions regarding the Claims Procedure for ensuring that your claim is valued and that you are entitled to vote on the Plan, please contact the Eaton's Claims Administrator at the address provided below.

All notices and enquiries with respect to Eaton's Claims Procedure should be addressed to:

Claims Administrator

The T. Eaton Company Limited

c/o Richter & Partners Inc.

Court-appointed Monitor of Eaton's

90 Eglinton Avenue East, Suite 700

Toronto, ON M4P 2Y3

Telephone: ..... (416) 932-6261

Fax: ..... (416) 932-6262

B. — For Creditors Receiving Notice of Voting Claim

Eaton's has already mailed to all Known Creditors (apart from former and present employees of Eaton's) a Notice of Voting Claim.

Any former or present employees with claims against Eaton's should contact Carmen Siciliano, Employee Representative, c/o. Susan Rowland, Koskie Minsky, Box 52, 900 - 20 Queen Street West, Toronto, Ontario, M5H 3R3 Telephone: (416) 977-8353; fax: (416) 977-3316. The Claims Procedure provides that the Employee Representative shall file an Omnibus Proof of Claim

(Employees) by the Voting Claims Bar Date *(October 25, 1999)* on behalf of all former and present employees of Eaton's and has been given an omnibus proxy for voting purposes for all such former and present employees of Eaton's. Employees retain their right to file their own Proofs of Claim by the Voting Claims Bar Date *(October 25, 1999)* and to appear at the meeting of creditors to consider the Plan in person or by proxy. If you are a former or present employee and wish to file your own Proof of Claim, you must follow the procedure set out in this letter (see section C below for instructions on filing a Proof of Claim).

If you are a Landlord, your Interim Period Claim has been valued according to the formula set out in subsection 65.2(4) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, irrespective of any actual damages you may have suffered.

If you have received a Notice of Voting Claim there is no need to submit a Proof of Claim in order to be entitled to vote on the Plan. Please note, however, that Eaton's does not admit liability to any Creditor by sending a Notice of Voting Claim to such Creditor.

If you have received a Notice of Voting Claim and you wish to dispute the value of your Claim or Interim Period Claim as set out in the Notice of Voting Claim, you should fill out a Notice of Dispute of Valuation for Voting Purposes (enclosed with your Notice of Voting Claim) (see Section D below for instructions).

C. — For Creditors Submitting a Proof of Claim

If you have not received a Notice of Voting Claim from Eaton's and do not have any claims against Eaton's, there is no need to file a Proof of Claim with the Eaton's Claims Administrator.

If you have not received a Notice of Voting Claim from Eaton's and believe that you have a claim against Eaton's, you should file a Proof of Claim with the Eaton's Claims Administrator. *The Proof of Claim must be filed by OCTOBER 25, 1999, the Voting Claims Bar Date, if you intend to vote in respect of the Plan.* Failure to send the Proof of Claim by this date will disentitle you from voting on the Plan, unless Eaton's agrees or the Court orders that the Proof of Claim be accepted after that date.

Proof of Claim forms can be obtained by contacting the Eaton's Claims Administrator at the phone and fax numbers indicated above by *no later than October 13, 1991* and providing particulars as to your name, address and facsimile number. Once Eaton's has this information, you will receive, as soon as practicable, a Proof of Claim form.

If Eaton's disagrees with the value that you have ascribed to your Claim or Interim Period Claim as set out in your Proof of Claim, you will receive from Eaton's a Notice of Revision or Disallowance for Voting Purposes (see section E below for details).

D. — For Creditors Submitting Notice of Dispute of Valuation for Voting Purposes

If you have received a Notice of Voting Claim, you are entitled to dispute the value of your Claim or Interim Period Claim as set out in such notice by sending a Notice of Dispute of Valuation for Voting Purposes to the Eaton's Claims Administrator at the address and fax number indicated above (the form for this Notice is enclosed with your Notice of Voting Claim). *The Notice of Dispute of Valuation for Voting Purposes must be delivered to Eaton's no later than the Voting Claims Bar Date, 11:59 p.m. on October 25,1999. Failure to deliver a Notice of Dispute of Valuation for Voting Purposes to Eaton's by this date will mean that the value of your Claim or Interim Period Claim for the purposes of voting on the Plan will be as set out in the Notice of Voting Claim and you will have no further right to dispute the value of your Voting Claim for the purposes of voting on the Plan.*

If you have sent a Notice of Dispute of Valuation for Voting Purposes to the Eaton's Claims Administrator and Eaton's has rejected or revised your Claim or Interim Period Claim, Eaton's will notify you of such rejection or disallowance by sending to you a Notice of Revision or Disallowance for Voting Purposes (see section E below for details). The last day for Eaton's to have sent out this notice is *no later than 11:59 p.m. on October 19, 1999.*

If you do NOT receive a Notice of Revision or Disallowance for Voting Purposes, the value of your Claim or Interim Period Claim has been *accepted* by Eaton's for voting purposes as set out in your Notice of Dispute of Valuation for Voting Purposes.

E. — For Creditors Receiving Notice of Revision or Disallowance for Voting Purposes

If you have sent a Proof of Claim or a Notice of Dispute of Valuation for Voting Purposes to Eaton's, Eaton's is entitled to challenge the valuation of your claim by sending to you a Notice of Revision or Disallowance for Voting Purposes no later than *11:59 p.m. on October 29, 1999*. If you do not receive such a Notice, Eaton's has accepted the value of your Claim or Interim Period Claim for voting purposes as set out in your Proof of Claim or Notice of Dispute of Valuation for Voting Purposes.

If you have received a Notice of Revision or Disallowance for Voting Purposes, you are entitled to dispute the revision or disallowance of your Claim as set out in the Notice of Revision or Disallowance for Voting Purposes by sending a Dispute Notice to Eaton's (see Section F below for instructions).

F. — For Creditors Submitting Dispute Notice

If you have received a Notice of Revision or Disallowance for Voting Purposes, you are entitled to dispute the revision or disallowance of your Claim or Interim Period Claim by delivering by facsimile or courier a Dispute Notice (enclosed with your Notice of Revision or Disallowance for Voting Purposes) to the Eaton's Claims Administrator *no later than 11:59 p.m. on November 5, 1999*. If you do not deliver a Dispute Notice to Eaton's by November 5, 1999, the value of your Claim or Interim Period Claim for the purposes of voting on the Plan will be as set out in your Notice of Revision or Disallowance for Voting Purposes.

Once Eaton's has received your Dispute Notice, you will be contacted by Eaton's, and/or by Richter & Partners Inc., the Monitor assisting Eaton's with its Plan, to see if the dispute can be resolved.

If the dispute has not been resolved by November 9, 1999, you will be notified that your Claim will be determined by the Claims Officer. You may be required to attend a hearing and to present evidence documenting your Claim or Interim Period Claim and its value. The Claims Officer must resolve the dispute by November 17, 1999. You will be notified by that date of the Claims Officer's determination of the value of your Voting Claim. The decision of the Claims Officer will be final and binding on you and Eaton's for the purposes of voting on the Plan at a meeting of Creditors. You will have no right to appeal.

In the event that the Claims Officer cannot resolve the dispute regarding the value of your Voting Claim by November 17, 1999, there are three alternatives:

- you may be permitted to vote on the Plan and the dispute regarding your Voting Claim will be resolved later for the purposes of any distribution under the Plan;

- Eaton's may determine that it is necessary to delay the vote of the class of Creditors to which you belong until your Voting Claim has been finally determined; or

- Eaton's may request that the Court determine how your Voting Claim will be addressed for voting purposes.

Schedule "6" — In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended — and — In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of the T. Eaton Company Limited

Superior Court of Justice Commercial List

Court File No. 99-CL-3516

..... Applicant

Notice of Revision or Disallowance for Voting Purposes

Please read carefully the Instruction Letter for Voting Purposes accompanying this Notice.

TO:

[insert name of creditor]

The T. Eaton Company Limited ("Eaton's) hereby gives you notice that it has reviewed your Voting Claim and has revised or rejected your Voting Claim for voting purposes only (and NOT for distribution purposes) as follows:

A. CLAIM PRIOR TO AUGUST 20, 1999: ..... *$[insert $value of claim] CAD*

B. INTERIM PERIOD CLAIM FROM AND AFTER AUGUST 20, 1999: ..... *$[insert $value of claim] CAD*

C. TOTAL VOTING CLAIM: ..... *$[total A plus B] CAD*

D. REASONS FOR DISALLOWANCE OR REVISION:

[insert explanation]

If you do not agree with this Notice of Revision or Disallowance for Voting Purposes, please take notice of the following:

1. If you intend to dispute this Notice of Revision or Disallowance for Voting Purposes, you must, no later than 11:59 p.m. (Toronto time) on *November 5, 1999*, notify Eaton's, the Monitor and the Claims Officer of such intent by delivery of a Dispute Notice in accordance with the accompanying Instruction Letter for Voting Purposes. The form of Dispute Notice is enclosed.

2. If you do not deliver a Dispute Notice, *the value of your Claim for voting purposes under the Plan shall be deemed to be as set out in this Notice of Revision or Disallowance for Voting Purposes.*

IF YOU FAIL TO TAKE ACTION WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME PERIOD, THIS NOTICE OF REVISION OR DISALLOWANCE FOR VOTING PURPOSES WILL BE BINDING UPON YOU FOR VOTING PURPOSES UNDER THE PLAN.

DATED at Toronto, this ..... day of, ... 1999.

THE T. EATON COMPANY LIMITED

Schedule "7" — In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended — and — In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of the T. Eaton Company Limited

Court File No. 99-CL-3516

Superior Court of Justice Commercial List

..... Applicant

Dispute Notice

TO: The T. Eaton Company Limited ("Eaton's")

We hereby give you notice of our intention to dispute the *(Check one)*:

[_] Notice of Revision or Disallowance for Voting Purposes dated .....

[_] Notice of Distribution Claim dated .....

issued by Eaton's in respect of our claim as detailed below.

A. Name of Creditor: .....

(For completion of claim amounts in sections B, C, or D, claims in foreign currency are to be converted to Canadian dollars at the Bank of Canada noon spot rate as at August 20, 1999. U.S. exchange rate conversion on such date was $1.4941.)

B. If a Secured Creditor:

Description of Security held: ..... Claim Amount $..... CAD

C. If an Unsecured Creditor:

Dun and Bradstreet Number: ..... Claim Amount $..... CAD

(If more than one Dun and Bradstreet Number, attach schedule showing numbers and corresponding claims.)

D. If a Landlord:

Location of Premises: ..... Claim Amount $..... CAD

(If more than one location, attach schedule.)

E. Reasons for Dispute (attach additional sheet and copies of all supporting documentation if necessary):

..... (Signature of Individual competing this Dispute)

..... Date

..... (Please print name)

.....

Telephone Number: ..... ( ) .....

Facsimile Number: ..... ( ) .....

Full Mailing Address:

THIS FORM IS TO BE RETURNED BY COURIER OR FACSIMILE TO ALL OF THE FOLLOWING:

CLAIMS ADMINISTRATOR

The T. Eaton Company Limited

c/o Richter & Partners Inc.

Court-appointed Monitor of Eaton's

90 Eglinton Avenue East, Suite 700

Toronto, ON M4P 2Y3

Telephone: ..... (416) 932-6261

Fax: ..... (416) 932-6262

— AND —

Mr. Robert Harlang

RICHTER & PARTNERS INC.

in its capacity as Monitor of

The T. Eaton Company Limited

90 Eglinton Avenue East, Suite 700

Toronto, ON M4P 2Y3

Telephone: ..... (416) 932-8000

Fax: ..... (416) 932-6200

— AND —

CLAIMS OFFICER FOR

THE T. EATON COMPANY LIMITED

ADR CHAMBERS

48 Yonge Street, Suite 1100

Toronto, ON M5W 1G6

Telephone: ..... (416) 362-8555/1-800-856-5154

Fax: ..... (416) 362-8825

Schedule "8" — In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended — and — In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of the T. Eaton Company Limited

Court File No. 99-CL-3516

Superior Court of Justice Commercial List

..... Applicant

Notice of Distribution Claim

Please read carefully the Instruction Letter for Distribution Purposes accompanying this Notice.

The T. Eaton Company Limited ("Eaton's") proposes to present a plan of arrangement to its Creditors (the "Plan") under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (the "CCAA"). The Order of Mr. Justice Farley made September 28, 1999 in the CCAA proceedings provides for a Claims Procedure for Creditors for voting and distribution under the Plan.

TAKE NOTICE that Eaton's has valued your Distribution Claim (comprised of your Claim and Interim Period Claim) against Eaton's for distribution purposes as set out in the attached Schedule. Claims in a foreign currency were converted to Canadian Dollars at the Bank of Canada noon spot rate as at August 20, 1999. U.S. exchange rate conversion on such date was $1.4941.

If you DISAGREE with the value of your DISTRIBUTION CLAIM as set out in the Schedule attached to this Notice, please be advised of the following:

1. If you intend to dispute this Notice of Distribution Claim, you must, by no later than 11:59 p.m. (Toronto time) on *February 15, 2000*, deliver to Eaton's (to the attention of the Claims Administrator) a Dispute Notice by facsimile, courier or registered mail to the address/fax number indicated thereon. The form of Dispute Notice is enclosed.

2. If you do not deliver a Dispute Notice to Eaton's (to the attention of the Claims Administrator), the value of your claim for distribution purposes under the Plan shall be deemed to be as set out in this Notice of Distribution Claim.

IF YOU FAIL TO TAKE ACTION WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME PERIOD, THE AMOUNT SET OUT IN THIS NOTICE SHALL BE DEEMED TO BE YOUR DISTRIBUTION CLAIM FOR DISTRIBUTION PURPOSES UNDER THE PLAN.

DATED at Toronto, the day, of ....., ... 1999.

THE T. EATON COMPANY LIMITED

Schedule "9" — In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended — and — In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of the T. Eaton Company Limited

Court File No. 99-CL-3516

Superior Court of Justice Commercial List

..... Applicant

Instruction Letter Claims Procedure for Distribution Purposes

A. — Claims Procedure

The T. Eaton Company Limited ("Eaton's") has presented a Plan of Arrangement to its creditors (the "Plan") under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (the "CCAA") which Plan has been approved by Eaton's creditors and by Order of Mr. Justice Farley made *[insert date]* in Eaton's CCAA proceedings.

The Order of Mr. Justice Farley made September 28, 1999 in Eaton's CCAA proceedings provided for a Claims Procedure dealing in part with distribution under the Plan.

This letter provides instructions for responding to or completing the following forms:

- Notice of Distribution Claim
- Proof of Claim
- Dispute Notice

The Claims Procedure is intended for any Person with any claims whatsoever against Eaton's prior to August 20, 1999, contingent or otherwise, including without limitation any claims made against Eaton's through any affiliate or associate of Eaton's ("Claims").

The Claims Procedure also addresses all claims which have arisen or may arise from and after August 20, 1999, up to and including the Plan Implementation Date of *[insert date]* as a result of the implementation of the Plan ("Interim Period Claims"). Such Interim Period Claims may include losses arising from the repudiation or variation of any lease, and the abandonment of premises and any contingent liability of Eaton's as assignor, or the repudiation or variation of any contract or agreement with Eaton's including any contingent liability of Eaton's as assignor, and further, including employment contracts and any contracts in relation to Eaton's pension plans.

The value of your claims against Eaton's for the purposes of receiving a distribution under the Plan is the total of your Claim and Interim Period Claim, which amount is described as your Distribution Claim.

If you have any questions regarding the Claims Procedure for ensuring that your claim is valued and that you are entitled to receive a distribution under the Plan, please contact the Eaton's Claims Administrator at the address provided below.

All notices and enquiries with respect to Eaton's Claims Procedure should be addressed to:

Claims Administrator

The T. Eaton Company Limited

c/o Richter & Partners Inc.

Court-appointed Monitor of Eaton's

90 Eglinton Avenue East, Suite 700

Toronto, ON M4P 2Y3

Telephone: ..... (416) 932-6261

Fax: ..... (416) 932-6262

B. — For Creditors Receiving Notice of Distribution Claim

Eaton's has already mailed to all Known Creditors (apart from former and present employees of Eaton's) a Notice of Voting Claim for the purposes of facilitating the voting on the Plan. Pursuant to the Claims Procedure, Eaton's has reviewed all Voting Claims for the purposes of valuing Distribution Claims of its Creditors, to enable a distribution under the Plan. Accordingly, all Creditors whose Voting Claims were determined for voting purposes have received a Notice of Distribution Claim from Eaton's wherein Eaton's has accepted, revised or rejected such Creditors' Voting Claims for distribution purposes and setting out the reasons therefor.

Any former or present employees with claims against Eaton's should contact Carmen Siciliano, Employee Representative, c/o. Susan Rowland, Koskie Minsky, Box 52, 900 — 20 Queen Street West, Toronto, Ontario, M5H 3R3 phone: (416) 977-8353; fax: (416) 977-3316. The Claims Procedure provides that the Employee Representative was to file an Omnibus Proof of Claim (Employees) by the Voting Claims Bar Date (October 25, 1999) on behalf of all former and present employees of Eaton's and was given an omnibus proxy for voting purposes for all such former and present employees of Eaton's. Employees retained their right to file their own Proofs of Claim by the Voting Claims Bar Date (October 25, 1999) and to appear at the meeting of creditors to consider the Plan in person or by proxy. If you are a former or present employee for the purposes of receiving a distribution under the Plan, there is no need to file a Proof of Claim if your claim is included in the Omnibus Proof of Claim (Employees) filed by thc Employee Representative in this regard. In the alternative, if you wish to file your own Proof of Claim, you must follow the procedure set out in this letter (see section D below for instructions on filing a Proof of Claim).

C. — For Creditors Receiving Notice of Distribution Claim

If you have received a Notice of Distribution Claim and do not agree with the value ascribed by Eaton's to your Distribution Claim, you are entitled to dispute same. To do so, you must deliver a Dispute Notice in the form enclosed by facsimile or courier to the Eaton's Claims Administrator by no later than 11:59 p.m. (Toronto time) on February 15, 2000. If you fail to deliver a Dispute Notice by such date, you will be deemed to have accepted the value of your Distribution Claim as set out in the Notice of Distribution Claim and will be thereafter barred from otherwise disputing or appealing same.

Once Eaton's has received your Dispute Notice, you will be contacted by Eaton's and/or by Richter & Partners Inc., the Monitor assisting Eaton's with its Plan, to see if the dispute can be resolved. A resolution must be achieved on or before February 29, 2000. If the dispute is not resolved by such date, Eaton's shall refer the dispute to the Claims Officer (see Section E for instructions in this regard).

D. — For Creditors Submitting a Proof of Claim

If you did not receive a Notice of Voting Claim or Notice of Distribution Claim from Eaton's and were not part of the Voting Process and do not have any claims against Eaton's, there is no need to file a Proof of Claim with the Eaton's Claims Administrator.

If you did not receive a Notice of Voting Claim from Eaton's and were not part of the voting process and believe that you have a claim against Eaton's, you should file a Proof of Claim with the Eaton's Claims Administrator.

The Proof of Claim must be filed by January 25, 2000, the Distribution Claims Bar Date. Failure to file the Proof of Claim by the Distribution Claims Bar Date will disentitle you from receiving a distribution under the Plan.

Proof of Claim forms can be obtained by contacting the Eaton's Claims Administrator at the phone and fax numbers indicated above and providing particulars as to your name, address and facsimile number. Once Eaton's has this information, you will receive, as soon as practicable, a Proof of Claim form *which must be filed with Eaton's by no later than January 25, 2000, the Distribution Claims Bar Date.*

If Eaton's disagrees with the value that you have ascribed to your Distribution Claim as set out in your Proof of Claim, you will be contacted by Eaton's and/or by Richter & Panners Inc., the Monitor assisting Eaton's with its Plan, to see if the dispute can be resolved. A resolution must be achieved on or before February 29, 2000. If the dispute is not resolved by such date, Eaton's will refer the dispute to the Claims Officer (see Section E below for instructions on resolution of disputes by Claims Officers).

E. — Resolution of Disputes by Claims Officers

If the dispute has not been resolved by February 29, 2000, Eaton's will notify you on or before such date that the value of your Distribution Claim will be determined by the Claims Officer appointed by the Court. The Claims Officer must resolve the dispute by March 31, 2000. You will be notified by that date of the Claims Officer's determination of the value of your Distribution Claim.

Either party will have the right to appeal the Claims Officer's determination of value of the Distribution Claim to the Court, within five (5) Calendar Days of notification by Claims Officer's determination of value. The appeal must be made returnable within five (5) Calendar Days of filing the notice of appeal. The determination of such appeal shall be final and binding on Eaton's and the Creditor for all purposes under the Plan. There shall be no further rights of appeal, review or recourse to the Court.

Schedule "B" — Entities Eligible for Investments by Liquidator

ENTITIES	*STANDARD & POOR'S "ISSUER CREDIT RATING"*
Financial Institutions	
SCHEDULE I BANKS	
Bank of Montreal	AA-
The Bank of Nova Scotia	A+
Royal Bank of Canada	AA-
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce	AA-
The Toronto-Dominion Bank	AA-
National Bank Canada	A
	DOMINION BOND RATING SERVICES RATING — Short Term Debt

SCHEDULE II BANKS	
ABN AMRO Bank Canada	R1H
Banque Nationale de Paris (Canada)	R1M
Credit Suisse First Boston (Canada)	R1M
Deutsche Bank Canada	R1M
Dresdner Bank of Canada	R1M
HSBC Bank Canada	R1M
Société Générale (Canada)	R1M

No authorized investment with a Schedule II Bank shall exceed at any time $5,000,000 in the aggregate.

	STANDARD & POOR'S "ISSUER CREDIT RATING"
Public Sector	
Government of Canada	AAA
Province of Alberta	AA+
Province of British Columbia	AA-
Province of New Brunswick	AA-
Province of Ontario	AA-

Any agency or agent of the Government of Canada or the Provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, New Brunswick or Ontario having a credit rating similar to those specifically noted above.

Other Entities

All other investments in other entities must be fully guaranteed by one of the public sector entities, agencies or agents described above.

End of Document

TAB 30

I.I.C. Ct. Filing 376509950013

Canwest Global Communications Corp. and the Other
Applicants on Schedule "A" — Court File No. CV-09-8396-00CL
204. **— Consolidated Plan of Compromise, Arrangement and Reorganization, June 23, 2010**

Canwest Global Communications Corp. and the Other Applicants on Schedule "A", Court File No. CV-09-8396-00CL (Ontario Superior Court of Justice)

In the Matter of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended and In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Canwest Global Communications Corp. and the Other Entities Listed on Schedule a Hereto Applicants

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE COMMERCIAL LIST

Consolidated Plan of Compromise, Arrangement and Reorganization — Pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* and the *Canada Business Corporations Act* Concerning, Affecting and Involving — Canwest Global Communications Corp., Canwest Media Inc., Canwest Television GP Inc., Canwest Television Limited Partnership, Canwest Global Broadcasting Inc/Radiodiffusion Canwest Global Inc., Fox Sports World Canada Holdco Inc., Fox Sports World Canada Partnership, National Post Holdings Ltd., the National Post Company/La Publication National Post, MBS Productions Inc., Yellow Card Productions Inc., Global Centre Inc. and 4501063 Canada Inc.

June 23, 2010

Consolidated Plan of Compromise, Arrangement and Reorganization

This is the consolidated plan of compromise, arrangement and reorganization of Canwest Global Communications Corp., Canwest Media Inc., Canwest Television GP Inc., Canwest Television Limited Partnership, Canwest Global Broadcasting Inc./ Radiodiffusion Canwest Global Inc., Fox Sports World Canada Holdco Inc., Fox Sports World Canada Partnership, National Post Holdings Ltd., The National Post Company/La Publication National Post, MBS Productions Inc., Yellow Card Productions Inc., Global Centre Inc. and 4501063 Canada Inc. pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (Canada) and the *Canada Business Corporations Act.*

Article 1 — Interpretation

1.1 — Definitions

In the Plan, unless otherwise stated or the context otherwise requires:

"*30109*" means 30109, LLC, a limited liability company governed by the laws of Delaware.

"*4414616 Canada*" means 4414616 Canada Inc., a corporation governed by the CBCA.

"*4501063 Canada*" means 4501063 Canada Inc., a corporation governed by the CBCA.

"*4501071 Canada*" means 4501071 Canada Inc., a corporation governed by the CBCA.

"*7316712 Canada*" means 7316712 Canada Inc., a corporation governed by the CBCA, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Shaw that is a "Canadian" (as defined in the Direction) designated by Shaw pursuant to the provisions of section 9.5(h) of the Subscription Agreement.

"*Ad Hoc Committee*" means the informal *ad hoc* committee of certain Noteholders represented by its legal counsel, Goodmans LLP, as such committee may be constituted from time to time.

"*Administration Charge*" means the charge created under paragraph 33 of the Initial Order, not to exceed $15,000,000, as security for the reasonable professional fees and disbursements of the Monitor, counsel to the Monitor, the Chief Restructuring Advisor, counsel and the financial advisor to the CMI Entities, counsel and the financial advisor to the Special Committee, counsel to the Directors of the Applicants and counsel and the financial advisor to the Ad Hoc Committee.

"*Affected Claims*" means Claims other than Unaffected Claims.

"*Affected Creditor*" means any Person having an Affected Claim and includes the transferee or assignee of a transferred or assigned Affected Claim who is recognized as an Affected Creditor by the relevant CMI Entity and the Monitor in accordance with the Claims Procedure Order, or a trustee, executor, liquidator, receiver, receiver and manager, or other Person acting on behalf of or through such Person, including, for greater certainty, and without duplication, a Noteholder and the Trustee.

"*April 28 Severance Schedule*" means the schedule delivered by CMI to the Plan Sponsor on April 28, 2010, setting out certain severance obligations in respect of certain Employees of CMI and as revised on April 29, 2010 and June 14, 2010, and as may be updated from time to time.

"*April 28 Severance Schedule Employees*" means those Employees of CMI identified in the April 28 Severance Schedule.

"*Applicants*" means, collectively, the applicants under the Initial Order, as listed on Schedule A hereto, and "*Applicant*" means any one of them.

"*Assumption Consideration Amount*" has the meaning set out in Section 5.5(k)(ii).

"*Bankruptcy Costs*" means the costs and disbursements of the Monitor (both in its capacity as the Monitor and as trustee in bankruptcy), its legal counsel and advisors provided for in the Plan Emergence Agreement which are required after the Plan Implementation Date to bankrupt, liquidate, wind-up, or dissolve Canwest, CMI and certain of their remaining Subsidiaries (including for the avoidance of doubt Fireworks Entertainment Inc., Canwest Entertainment Inc., CEID (Canada) I Inc. and CEID (Canada) II Inc.), but not including National Post, National Post Holdings, and the Subsidiaries of 4501071 Canada.

"*BIA*" means the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Canada).

"*Beneficial Noteholder*" means a beneficial or entitlement holder of Notes holding such Notes in a securities account with the Depository, a Depository participant or other securities intermediary, including for greater certainty, such Depository participant or other securities intermediary only if and to the extent such Depository participant or other securities intermediary holds Notes as principal and for its own account.

"*Broadcast Licences*" means the broadcasting licences issued by the CRTC to CMI as limited partner and GP Inc. as general partner carrying on business as CTLP as listed on Schedule D.2.

"*Business*" means the free-to-air television broadcast business and subscription-based specialty television business carried on by Canwest and certain Canwest Subsidiaries.

"*Business Day*" means a day, other than a Saturday, Sunday or a statutory holiday, on which banks are generally open for business in Toronto, Ontario.

"*Business-Related Post-Filing Claims*" means Post-Filing Claims incurred by the CMI Entities in connection with the Business or the management or provision of head office and corporate services to and/or for the benefit of CTLP Group Entities.

"*Canwest*" means Canwest Global Communications Corp., a corporation governed by the CBCA.

"*Canwest Articles of Reorganization*" means the articles of reorganization referred to in Section 5.2B to be filed by Canwest pursuant to section 191 of the CBCA.

"*Canwest Broadcasting*" means Canwest Global Broadcasting Inc./Radiodiffusion Canwest Global Inc., a corporation governed by the laws of Quebec.

"*Canwest/CMI Group Intercompany Receivables*" means, in respect of Canwest or any Subsidiary that is neither a CTLP Group Entity nor a CWI Group Entity (including any investee entity), the amounts, if any, owing as of the Effective Time to Canwest or such Subsidiary from any given CTLP Group Entity and/or any given CWI Group Entity (including any investee entity), Men TV General Partnership and/or Mystery Partnership (other than any such amounts owing under the Shared Services Agreement and/or the Omnibus Transition and Reorganization Agreement), and includes, for the avoidance of doubt, the CMI-CTLP Receivable.

"*Canwest Communications*" means Canwest International Communications Inc., a corporation governed by the laws of Barbados.

"*Canwest Finance*" means Canwest Finance Inc./Financière Canwest Inc., a corporation governed by the laws of Quebec.

"*Canwest International*" means Canwest International Management Inc., a corporation governed by the laws of Barbados.

"*Canwest International Distribution*" means Canwest International Distribution Limited, a corporation governed by the laws of Ireland.

"*Canwest Irish Holdco*" means Canwest Irish Holdings (Barbados) Inc., a corporation governed by the laws of Barbados.

"*Canwest MediaWorks Turkish Holdings*" means Canwest MediaWorks Turkish Holdings (Netherlands) B.V., a corporation governed by the laws of the Netherlands.

"*Canwest MediaWorks US*" means Canwest MediaWorks Holdings Corp., a corporation governed by the laws of Delaware.

"*Canwest New Shares*" means collectively, the Canwest New Multiple Voting Shares, the Canwest New Subordinate Voting Shares and the Canwest New Non-Voting Shares.

"*Canwest New Multiple Voting Shares*" means the new multiple voting shares to be created under Canwest Articles of Reorganization.

"*Canwest New Non-Voting Shares*" means the new non-voting shares to be created under the Canwest Articles of Reorganization.

"*Canwest New Preferred Shares*" means the new non-voting preference shares to be created under the Canwest Articles of Reorganization.

"*Canwest New Subordinate Voting Shares*" means the new subordinate voting shares to be created under the Canwest Articles of Reorganization.

"*Canwest Publishing*" means Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., a corporation governed by the CBCA.

"*Canwest Subsidiaries*" means, collectively, Subsidiaries of Canwest other than (a) CW Investments and its Subsidiaries, and (b) Subsidiaries of 4501071 Canada.

"*Cash*" means all cash, certificates of deposits, bank deposits, commercial paper, treasury bills, bills of exchange and other cash equivalents of the Plan Entities, other than the cash, certificates of deposits, bank deposits, commercial paper, treasury bills, bills of exchange and other cash equivalents held at the Effective Time by CTLP and GP Inc. and their Subsidiaries after giving

effect to the steps set out in Section 5.5, and for greater certainty "Cash" includes the net proceeds of sale from the Corporate Jet, the Red Deer Property, but excludes the proceeds of sale of the National Post Transaction remaining after National Post has repaid to CMI all post-filing amounts loaned by CMI to National Post, if any. For greater certainty, "Cash" shall exclude monies needed by CTLP to pay the CH Plan Settlement Amount in accordance with Article 5 of the Plan.

"*Cash Collateral Agreement*" means the use of cash collateral and consent agreement dated as of September 23, 2009 between Canwest, CMI, certain Subsidiaries of CMI and certain Noteholders, as amended by the amendment agreement dated as of December 14, 2009, the amendment agreement No. 2 dated as of January 29, 2010, the amendment agreement No. 3 dated as of February 11, 2010, the amendment agreement No. 4 dated as of April 15, 2010 and the amendment agreement No. 5 dated as of May 3, 2010.

"*CBCA*" means the *Canada Business Corporations Act.*

"*CCAA*" means the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (Canada).

"*CCAA Proceedings*" means the proceedings under the CCAA commenced by the Applicants pursuant to a notice of application dated October 6, 2009 in which the Initial Order was made.

"*CEP*" means the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada.

"*CEP CH Plan Grievance*" means CEP policy grievance (No. 1100-2009-03) dated July 20, 2009.

"*CEP Counsel*" means CaleyWray LLP.

"*CEP Representative Order*" means the Order of the Court made on October 27, 2009 authorizing CEP to represent Current and Former Members of the CEP including for the purpose of advancing, settling or compromising claims of the Current and Former Members in the CCAA Proceedings, and authorizing CEP Counsel to act as counsel to the CEP and the Current and Former Members in the CCAA Proceedings.

"*CEP Retirees*" means all former employees of the CMI Entities (or their predecessors, as applicable) who were represented by the CEP when they were so employed and who are not entitled to benefits under the CH Plan, or the surviving spouses of such former employees, if applicable.

"*CEP Terminal Deficiency Claim*" means the Claim filed on November 17, 2009 under the Claims Procedure Order by CEP on behalf of the Current and Former Members in the amount of $15,438,739 in respect of the terminal deficiency in the CH Plan.

"*CGS Debenture*" means CGS Debenture Holding (Netherlands) B.V., a corporation governed by the laws of the Netherlands.

"*CGS International*" means CGS International Holdings (Netherlands) B.V., a corporation governed by the laws of the Netherlands.

"*CGS NZ Radio*" means CGS NZ Radio Shareholding (Netherlands) B.V., a corporation governed by the laws of the Netherlands.

"*CGS Shareholding*" means CGS Shareholding (Netherlands) B.V., a corporation governed by the laws of the Netherlands.

"*CH Plan*" means the "Global Communications Limited Retirement Plan for CH Employees", a defined benefit pension plan for full-time and part-time employees who worked at CHCH-TV, sponsored by CTLP and registered under the PBSA.

"*CH Plan Settlement Agreement*" means the settlement agreement made on April 16, 2010 among Canwest, CMI, CTLP, the Retiree Representative Counsel, the Retiree Representatives and the CEP on behalf of the Current and Former Members in respect of the CEP Terminal Deficiency Claim, the Retiree Terminal Deficiency Claim and the CEP CH Plan Grievance.

"*CH Plan Settlement Amount*" means the amount of $350,000 to be paid on the Plan Implementation Date by CTLP to the CH Plan pursuant to the CH Plan Settlement Agreement.

"*CH Plan Trustee*" means RBC Dexia Investor Services Trust, in its capacity as trustee of the CH Plan.

"*Chief Restructuring Advisor*" means, collectively, Mr. Hap S. Stephen and Stonecrest Capital Inc.

"*CIBC*" means CIBC Asset-Based Lending Inc. (formerly known as "CIT Business Credit Canada Inc.").

"*CIT Credit Agreement*" means the credit agreement dated as of May 22, 2009, as amended, among CMI, the guarantors named therein, the lenders party thereto from time to time and CIBC in its capacity as agent with respect to the CIT Facility and approved in the Initial Order, as it may be further amended, supplemented or otherwise modified from time to time.

"*CIT Facility*" means the asset-based loan facility, secured by a first priority security interest in all property, assets and undertaking of CMI, including the DIP Charge, and the guarantors named in the CIT Credit Agreement, including its conversion to a debtor-in-possession financing arrangement pursuant to the Initial Order.

"*Claim*" means (a) any right or claim of any Person against one or more of the CMI Entities, whether or not asserted, in connection with any indebtedness, liability or obligation of any kind whatsoever of one or more of the CMI Entities in existence on the Filing Date, including on account of Wages and Benefits, and any accrued interest thereon and costs payable in respect thereof to and including the Filing Date, whether or not such right or claim is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, unsecured, perfected, unperfected, present, future, known, or unknown, by guarantee, surety or otherwise, and whether or not such right is executory or anticipatory in nature, including the right or ability of any Person to advance a claim for contribution or indemnity or otherwise with respect to any matter, action, cause or chose in action, whether existing at present or commenced in the future, which indebtedness, liability or obligation is based in whole or in part on facts which existed prior to the Filing Date, and includes any other claims that would have been claims provable in bankruptcy had the applicable CMI Entity become bankrupt on the Filing Date; (b) any Restructuring Period Claim; and (c) any right or claim of any Person against one or more of the Directors or Officers of one or more of the Applicants or any of them, that relates to a Claim described in paragraph (a) of this definition or a Restructuring Period Claim howsoever arising for which one or more of the Directors or Officers of an Applicant are by statute or otherwise by law liable to pay in their capacity as a Director or Officer or in any other capacity.

"*Claims Procedure Order*" means the Order made October 14, 2009 in respect of the procedures governing the determination of Claims for voting and distribution purposes, as such Order was amended on November 30, 2009 and as it may be further amended and supplemented from time to time.

"*Class*" means a class of Affected Creditors established for the purpose of voting on the Plan as set out in Section 3.2.

"*CMI*" means Canwest Media Inc., a corporation governed by the CBCA.

"*CMI-CTLP Receivable*" means the amount, if any, owing by CTLP to CMI as of the Effective Time, which amount for the avoidance of doubt, excludes any Canwest/CMI Group Intercompany Receivable transferred to CMI under Sections 5.5(k) or 5.5(1).

"*CMI Claims Bar Date*" means 5:00 p.m. on November 19, 2009, except where a Notice of Claim was sent by one of the CMI Entities after October 22, 2009 pursuant to the Claims Procedure Order, in which case, pursuant to the Order made on November 30, 2009 amending the Claims Procedure Order, the CMI Claims Bar Date in respect of such Claim is 5:00 p.m. on December 17, 2009.

"*CMI Entities*" means, collectively, the Applicants, CTLP, Fox Sports and National Post and "*CMI Entity*" means any one of them.

"*CMI Notice of Dispute of Claim*" shall have the meaning ascribed thereto in the Claims Procedure Order.

"*CMI Proof of Claim*" shall have the meaning ascribed thereto in the Claims Procedure Order.

"*Collateral Agency Agreement*" means the intercreditor and collateral agency agreement dated as of October 13, 2005 among certain of the CMI Entities and the Collateral Agent, as amended by the credit confirmation and amendment to the intercreditor and collateral agency agreement dated as of May 22, 2009, and as further amended by the credit confirmation and amendment to the intercreditor and collateral agency agreement dated as of October 1, 2009.

"*Collateral Agent*" means CIBC Mellon Trust Company, in its capacity as collateral agent under the Collateral Agency Agreement.

"*Conditions Precedent*" means the conditions precedent to the transactions contemplated in the Plan as set out in Section 6.3.

"*Continued Support Payment*" means (a) in the event that the Plan Implementation Date occurs on or before September 30, 2010, $0, and (b) in the event that the Plan Implementation Date occurs after September 30, 2010, the product of US$2,900,000 multiplied by the number of months elapsed after September 30, 2010 and prior to the Plan Implementation Date; provided that if the Plan Implementation Date occurs prior to the end of a month, the payment in (b) in respect of such partial month shall be pro-rated based on the number of days elapsed in such month (to but excluding the Plan Implementation Date).

"*Convenience Class Claim*" means (a) any Claim of an Affected Creditor of a Plan Entity, other than a Noteholder, in an amount that is less than or equal to $5,000, and (b) any Claim of an Affected Creditor of a Plan Entity, other than a Noteholder, in an amount in excess of $5,000 that the relevant Affected Creditor has validly elected to value at $5,000 for purposes of the Plan in accordance with Section 3.7.

"*Convenience Class Claim Declaration*" means an executed declaration substantially in the form attached hereto as Schedule E.

"*Convenience Class Creditor*" means an Affected Creditor with a Convenience Class Claim.

"*Convenience Class Pool*" means the aggregate amount taken from the Subscription Price sufficient to pay in full all Convenience Class Claims.

"*Copyrights and Other IP*" means all copyrights and other intellectual property owned by Canwest or CMI including those set out in Schedule D.6.

"*Corporate Jet*" means the 1988 British Aerospace model BAE 125 Series 800A airplane known in the airline industry as a Hawker 800A, Serial No. 258123 and Canadian registration C-GCGS, together with the engines, propellers and avionics.

"*Court*" means the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List).

"*Court Charges*" means, collectively, the Administration Charge, the Directors Charge, the DIP Charge, the KERP Charge and the Investor Charge.

"*CRTC*" means the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission.

"*CTLP*" means Canwest Television Limited Partnership, a limited partnership established by CMI, as limited partner, and GP Inc., as general partner, and governed by the laws of the Province of Manitoba.

"*CTLP Assumption Consideration Amount*" means that portion of the Assumption Consideration Amount relating to Claims against CTLP.

"*CTLP Assumption Consideration Note*" has the meaning set out in Section 5.5(k)(iii).

"*CTLP Limited Partnership Agreement*" means the amended and restated limited partnership agreement dated as of December 31, 2008 governing CTLP.

"*CTLP-CMI Receivable*" means the amount, if any, owing by CMI to CTLP as of the Effective Time.

"*CTLP Group Entities*" means CTLP, GP Inc., and each Subsidiary thereof, and "*CTLP Group Entity*" means any one of them.

"*CTLP Plan Entities*" means CTLP, GP Inc., Canwest Broadcasting, Fox Sports Holdco, and Fox Sports, and "*CTLP Plan Entity*" means any one of them.

"*Current and Former Members*" has the meaning ascribed thereto in the CEP Representative Order.

"*CWI Group Entities*" means CW Investments and each Subsidiary thereof, and "*CWI Group Entity*" means any one of them.

"*CW Investments*" means CW Investments Co., an unlimited liability company governed by the laws of Nova Scotia.

"*CW Investments Shares*" means the 352,986 Class A Common Shares and 666 Class A Preferred Shares of CW Investments owned by CMI.

"*CW Media Holdings*" means CW Media Holdings Inc.

"*CW Media Trademarks Licence Agreements*" means, collectively, the trademarks licence agreement dated August 13, 2007 between Canwest and CW Media Holdings and the trademarks licence agreement dated August 13, 2007 between Canwest and AA Acquisition Corp. (now CW Media Inc.).

"*Depository*" means The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation or a successor as custodian for its participants, as applicable, and any nominee thereof.

"*DIP Charge*" means the charge in favour of CIBC as agent and lender in respect of the CIT Facility as created under paragraph 46 of the Initial Order.

"*Direction*" means the *Direction to the CRTC (Ineligibility of Non-Canadians)* issued by the Governor General in Council pursuant to section 26 of the *Broadcasting Act* (Canada).

"*Directors Charge*" means the charge in favour of the Directors and Officers created under paragraph 22 of the Initial Order, not to exceed an aggregate amount of $20,000,000, as security for the indemnity granted in favour of the Directors and Officers under paragraph 21 of the Initial Order.

"*Directors and Officers*" means, collectively, all current and former directors and officers (or their respective estates) of one or more of the CMI Entities and/or any of their Subsidiaries and, individually, any one of them, a "*Director*" or "*Officer"*.

"*Distribution Date*" means the dates from time to time on or after the Plan Implementation Date set by the Monitor to effect distributions from the Ordinary Creditors Pool in respect of the Proven Distribution Claims of Ordinary Creditors, and the Convenience Class Pool in respect of the Proven Distribution Claims of Convenience Class Creditors.

"*Distribution Record Date*" means the date that is five (5) Business Days prior to the Plan Implementation Date.

"*Effective Time*" means 12:05 a.m. (Toronto time) on the Plan Implementation Date.

"*Employees*" means (a) all active or inactive employees employed by CTLP including, any employees on disability leave, maternity leave, statutory leave or other absence, and (b) any active or inactive employees of Canwest or CMI including any employees on disability leave, maternity leave, statutory leave or other absence, to be transferred to CTLP.

"*Equity Claims*" means any Claim (a) of the Existing Shareholders (i) constituting an equity claim under section 2(1) of the CCAA, (ii) arising from any shareholder agreement in connection with or related to the Existing Shares, or (b) of any Person who is a beneficiary under or the holder or owner of any option, restricted share unit or other security issued pursuant to an Equity Compensation Plan.

"*Equity Compensation Plan*" means any of the equity compensation plans established by one or more of the Applicants, as more particularly set out on Schedule F.

"*Excluded Claim*" means those Claims identified as "Excluded Claims" under the Claims Procedure Order.

"*Existing Security*" means the security held by the Collateral Agent.

"*Existing Shareholders*" means, collectively, holders of the Existing Shares immediately prior to the Effective Time on the Plan Implementation Date.

"*Existing Shares*" means, collectively, the Multiple Voting Shares, Subordinate Voting Shares and Non-Voting Shares.

"*Filing Date*" means October 6, 2009.

"*Fireworks Claim*" means any and all amounts, liabilities and other obligations owing to Fireworks Entertainment Inc. by Canwest Broadcasting.

"*Fireworks Indemnity*" means, collectively, the four indemnity agreements between Canwest and each of Fireworks Entertainment Inc., Canwest Entertainment Inc., CEID (Canada) I Inc. and CEID (Canada) II Inc. each dated November 19, 2009 which have been provided to the Fireworks Trustee in Bankruptcy pursuant to which Canwest: (a) unconditionally guaranteed the payment of all of the reasonable fees and disbursements (including the reasonable fees and disbursements of legal counsel), which FTI may incur in acting as trustee in bankruptcy in respect of each such Canwest Subsidiary; and (b) agreed to indemnify FTI from and against all Claims (as defined in such indemnity agreements) and all liability, costs and expenses (including reasonable fees and disbursements) incurred in connection with the enforcement of each such indemnity agreement.

"*Fireworks Trustee in Bankruptcy*" means FTI in its capacity as trustee in bankruptcy of each of Fireworks Entertainment Inc., Canwest Entertainment Inc., CEID (Canada) I Inc. and CEID (Canada) II Inc.

"*FTI*" means FTI Consulting Canada Inc. and any of its affiliates, partners, officers, directors, employees, agents and subcontractors.

"Fox *Sports*" means Fox Sports World Canada Partnership, a general partnership governed by the laws of Ontario.

"*Fox Sports Holdco*" means Fox Sports World Canada Holdco Inc., a corporation governed by the CBCA.

"*Genuity*" means Canaccord Genuity, the global capital markets division of Canaccord Financial Inc., in its capacity as financial advisor to the Special Committee.

"*Genuity Engagement Letter*" means the engagement letter between Genuity and Canwest dated May 29, 2009 retaining Genuity as financial advisor to the Special Committee, as amended by letter agreement dated November 30, 2009.

"*Global Centre*" means Global Centre Inc., a corporation governed by the OBCA.

"*Governmental Entity*" means any (a) multinational, federal, provincial, territorial, state, regional, municipal, local or other government, governmental or public department, central bank, court, tribunal, arbitral body, commission, board, bureau or agency; (b) subdivision, agent, commission, board, or authority of any of the entities listed in paragraph (a) of this definition; or (c) quasi-governmental or private body exercising any regulatory, expropriation or taxing authority under or, for the account of, any of the entities listed in paragraph (a) of this definition.

"*GP Inc.*" means Canwest Television GP Inc., a corporation governed by the CBCA and the general partner of CTLP.

"*Head Office Lease*" means the lease agreement between Portage & Main Development Ltd., nominee for and on behalf of Bentall Properties Ltd. and Canadian National Railway Company, as landlord, and Canwest, as tenant, dated June 1, 1995, as amended and extended, in respect of floors 31 to 33 of Canwest Place, 201 Portage Avenue, Winnipeg, Manitoba.

"*Houlihan*" means Houlihan Lokey Howard & Zukin Capital, Inc. in its capacity as financial advisory to the Ad Hoc Committee.

"*Houlihan Engagement Letter*" means the engagement letter between Houlihan, Goodmans LLP, in its capacity as counsel to the Ad Hoc Committee, and CMI, on behalf of itself and its wholly-owned subsidiaries, dated March 24, 2009.

"*Indenture*" means, collectively, the trust indenture dated as of November 18, 2004 among 3815668 Canada Inc. (now CMI), the guarantors named therein and the Trustee, pursuant to which the Notes were issued, as amended by the first supplemental indenture thereto dated as of November 18, 2004, the second supplemental indenture thereto dated as of August 30, 2005, the third supplemental indenture thereto dated as of August 31, 2005, the fourth supplemental indenture thereto dated as of September 1, 2005, the fifth supplemental indenture thereto dated as of May 31, 2006, the sixth supplemental indenture thereto dated as of August 29, 2008, the seventh supplemental indenture dated as of September 1, 2008, the eighth supplemental indenture dated as of April 2, 2009, the ninth supplemental indenture dated as of June 29, 2009, and the tenth supplemental indenture dated as of September 30, 2009, and as such trust indenture may be further amended, supplemented or otherwise modified from time to time in accordance with its terms.

"*Initial Directors*" means the initial directors of New Canwest appointed at the time of incorporation of New Canwest under the CBCA.

"*Initial Order*" means the Order made October 6, 2009 pursuant to which the CMI Entities were provided protection under the CCAA, as amended, restated or varied from time to time.

"*Insured Litigation*" means the insured litigation notices and claims involving Canwest, CMI, CTLP, GP Inc., Canwest Broadcasting, Fox Sports Holdco and/or Fox Sports, and in respect of insured litigation claims for libel, slander and/or defamation arising in the ordinary course of business, all of which relate to the Business and comprise notices and claims that are Excluded Claims as set out in the schedule delivered to Shaw on June 7, 2010 and as further updated from time to time.

"*Insured Litigation Deductibles*" means any remaining deductibles under insurance policies maintained by or on behalf of Canwest, CMI, CTLP, GP Inc., Canwest Broadcasting, Fox Sports Holdco and/or Fox Sports, in respect of the Insured Litigation.

"*Intercompany Claim*" means any claim of Canwest or any Subsidiary thereof against any CMI Entity.

"*Investor Charge*" means the charge created by an Order made on February 19, 2010 to secure the payment to the Plan Sponsor of termination fees pursuant to section 4.6 of the Subscription Agreement and the expense reimbursement payable to the Plan Sponsor pursuant to section 9.2 of the Subscription Agreement.

"*Irish Holdco*" means Canwest MediaWorks Ireland Holdings, an unlimited liability company governed by the laws of Ireland.

"*Irish Holdco Aggregate Redemption Price*" means $690,126,000.

"*Irish Holdco Intercompany Receivable*" means the amount of $72,307,000, constituting an unsecured intercompany loan owing by CMI to Irish Holdco.

"*Irish Holdco Preference "A" Shares*" means the Redeemable Preference "A" Shares in the capital of Irish Holdco.

"*Ireland Nominee*" means Canwest Ireland Nominee Limited, a company governed by the laws of Ireland.

"*ITA*" means the *Income Tax Act* (Canada).

"*KERPs*" means the key employee retention plans for certain Employees of the CMI Entities approved under paragraph 62 of the Initial Order.

"*KERP Charge*" means the charge in favour of the KERP Participants as created under paragraph 64 of the Initial Order.

"*KERP Participants*" means the employees of the CMI Entities that have been granted KERPs in the Initial Order.

"*Labour Parties*" means collectively the Retiree Representatives, Retiree Representative Counsel, the CEP and CEP Counsel on behalf of the Current and Former Members.

"*Law*" means any and all statutes, regulations, statutory rules, orders, judgments, decrees and terms and conditions or any grant of approval, permission, authority, permit or licence of any court, Governmental Entity, statutory body or self-regulatory authority.

"*Limited Partnership Units*" means all of the limited partnership units held by CMI in CTLP.

"*Management and Administrative Services Agreement*" means the management and administrative services agreement dated August 15, 2007 between Canwest Media Works Inc. (now CMI) and CW Media Inc.

"*MBS Productions*" means MBS Productions Inc., a corporation governed by the CBCA.

"*Meeting*" means a meeting of a Class of Affected Creditors held pursuant to the Meeting Order and includes any meeting resulting from an adjournment thereof.

"*Meeting Order*" means an Order to be made classifying the Affected Creditors for voting purposes, directing the calling and holding of the Noteholder Meeting, the Ordinary Creditors Meeting and any other meetings of Affected Creditors, setting the date of the Plan Sanction Hearing and expanding the Monitor's powers in relation to the Meetings, as such Order may be amended from time to time.

"*Monitor*" means FTI, in its capacity as the monitor of the CMI Entities appointed pursuant to the Initial Order and any successor thereto appointed in accordance with any further Order.

"*Monitor's Certificate*" means the Certificate to be delivered by the Monitor substantially in the form of Schedule G.

"*Multiple Voting Shares*" means any and all multiple voting shares in the capital of Canwest that are issued and outstanding immediately prior to the Effective Time.

"*Multisound Publishers*" means Multisound Publishers Ltd., a corporation governed by the CBCA.

"*National Post*" means National Post Company/La Publication National Post, a general partnership established under the laws of Ontario.

"*National Post Consolidated Bankruptcy Estate*" means the bankruptcy estate of National Post and National Post Holdings resulting from the consolidation of the bankruptcy estates of National Post and National Post Holdings pursuant to Section 5.6.

"*National Post Holdings*" means National Post Holdings Ltd., a corporation governed by the OBCA.

"*National Post Transaction*" means the transaction approved by the Court on October 30, 2009 as part of the Transition and Reorganization Agreement whereby the assets and newspaper business of the National Post were transferred as a going concern to a new wholly-owned subsidiary of Publishing LP (New National Post).

"*New Canwest*" means a body corporate to be incorporated by CMI under the CBCA prior to the Plan Implementation Date as a wholly-owned subsidiary of CMI.

"*New Canwest Articles of Incorporation*" means the articles of incorporation of New Canwest, substantially in the form attached as Schedule B.

"*New Canwest Assets*" means the assets, property and undertakings listed in Schedule D. 1.

"*New Canwest By-Laws*" means the by-laws of New Canwest, substantially in the form attached as Schedule C.

"*New Canwest Liabilities*" means the debts, liabilities and obligations listed in Schedule D.3.

"*New Canwest Note*" means a demand note of New Canwest issued in favour of CMI having a principal amount equal to the aggregate principal amount of the Canwest/CMI Group Intercompany Receivables owing to CMI by CTLP, the CTLP Assumption Consideration Note and any amounts receivable by CMI under the Shared Services Agreement and/or the Omnibus Transition and Reorganization Agreement.

"*New National Post*" means National Post Inc., a corporation governed by the CBCA.

"*Non-Voting Shares*" means any and all non-voting shares in the capital of Canwest that are issued and outstanding immediately prior to the Effective Time.

"*Noteholder*" means the Depository with whom Notes are registered or an account is held for a Depository participant, another securities intermediary holding Notes for the account of another Person, or a Beneficial Noteholder, as applicable.

"*Noteholders Class*" means the Class of Affected Creditors comprised of the Noteholders and the Trustee.

"*Noteholder Meeting*" means the Meeting of the Noteholders Class called to consider and vote on the Plan.

"*Noteholder Pool*" means the amount taken from the Subscription Price equal to the sum of (a) US$440 million plus (b) the Continued Support Payment.

"*Noteholder Pro Rata Amount*" means each Beneficial Noteholder's *pro rata* share of the Noteholder Pool calculated based upon such Beneficial Noteholder's Proven Distribution Claim relative to the total Proven Distribution Claims of all Beneficial Noteholders.

"*Noteholder Released Parties*" has the meaning set out in Section 7.3(b).

"*Noteholder Voting Record Date*" means June 28, 2010.

"*Notes*" means the 8% senior subordinated notes due 2012 that are issued and outstanding under the Indenture.

"*OBCA*" means the *Business Corporations Act* (Ontario).

"*Omnibus Transition and Reorganization Agreement*" means the agreement among Canwest, CMI, CTLP, National Post, Publishing LP and Canwest Publishing dated as of June 8, 2010, as approved by the Court.

"*Order*" means any order of the Court in the CCAA Proceedings.

"*Ordinary CMI Creditors*" means the Ordinary Creditors, other than Ordinary CTLP Creditors, including Ordinary Creditors having Claims against one or more of the Directors and Officers of the Plan Entities other than the CTLP Plan Entities.

"*Ordinary CMI Creditor Pro Rata Amount*" means, at the relevant time, the proportion that each Ordinary CMI Creditor's Proven Distribution Claim bears to the total of Proven Distribution Claims and Unresolved Claims of all Ordinary CMI Creditors.

"*Ordinary CMI Creditors Sub-Pool*" means an amount equal to one-third (1/3) of the Ordinary Creditors Pool net of the fees and costs incurred by the Monitor on a solicitor and own client full indemnity basis to resolve Unresolved Claims of Ordinary

Creditors and effect distributions from and after the Plan Implementation Date in the event that there are insufficient funds to cover such fees and costs in the Plan Implementation Fund.

"*Ordinary Creditors*" means those Affected Creditors of the Plan Entities who are not Noteholders and do not have a Convenience Class Claim, which for greater certainty includes all Creditors having Claims against one or more of the Directors and Officers.

"*Ordinary Creditors Class*" means the Class of creditors comprised of Ordinary Creditors.

"*Ordinary Creditors Meeting*" means the meeting of the Ordinary Creditors Class called to consider and vote on the Plan.

"*Ordinary Creditors Pool*" means an amount taken from the Subscription Price equal to the difference between (a) the sum of (i) $38 million, plus (ii) in the event that there are any Restructuring Period Claims relating to either (A) the termination of arrangements made before the Filing Date with the existing management employees of Canwest and the Canwest Subsidiaries listed in the Plan Emergence Agreement who will not become employees of New Canwest, GP Inc., CTLP or one of their respective Subsidiaries or otherwise will not remain as employees of the Business following the Effective Time or (B) the disclaimer, resiliation, termination, repudiation or renegotiation of terms agreed to by Canwest and the Plan Sponsor of any material contracts or agreements of the CMI Entities that will not remain following the Effective Time as ongoing obligations of New Canwest or any of its Subsidiaries, an additional cash amount equal to the amount that is required to maintain the recovery rate (*pro rata* as among the Ordinary Creditors) that would otherwise be received by the Ordinary Creditors, assuming there were no such Restructuring Period Claims arising from (A) and (B) above, and (b) the amount of the Convenience Class Pool.

"*Ordinary Creditors Proven Voting Claim*" means, a Proven Voting Claim of an Affected Creditor of a Plan Entity, other than a Noteholder.

"*Ordinary CTLP Creditors*" means the Ordinary Creditors having Claims against any one of the CTLP Plan Entities, which for greater certainty includes Ordinary Creditors having Claims against one or more of the Directors and Officers of the CTLP Plan Entities.

"*Ordinary CTLP Creditor Pro Rata Amount*" means, at the relevant time, the proportion that each Ordinary CTLP Creditor's Proven Distribution Claim bears to the total of Proven Distribution Claims and Unresolved Claims of all Ordinary CTLP Creditors.

"*Ordinary CTLP Creditors Sub-Pool*" means an amount equal to two-thirds (2/3) of the Ordinary Creditors Pool net of the fees and costs incurred by the Monitor on a solicitor and own client full indemnity basis to resolve Unresolved Claims of Ordinary Creditors and effect distributions from and after the Plan Implementation Date in the event that there are insufficient funds to cover such fees and costs in the Plan Implementation Fund.

"*Other Canwest Assets*" means the assets listed on Schedule D.5.

"*Other CTLP Plan Entity Assumption Consideration Note*" has the meaning set out in Section 5.5(k)(iv).

"*Other PIF Assets*" means Tax refunds of the Plan Entities (other than the CTLP Plan Entities), the Winnipeg Condo, and any and all dividends, distributions or other amounts payable to a Plan Entity (other than the CTLP Plan Entities) from any estate in bankruptcy or liquidation of any Canwest Subsidiary (including any dividend or distribution payable to CMI from National Post Holdings, National Post and/or the National Post Consolidated Bankruptcy Estate).

"*PBSA*" means the *Pension Benefit Standards Act* (Canada).

"*Person*" means any individual, corporation, limited or unlimited liability company, general or limited partnership, association, trust, unincorporated organization, joint venture, government or any agency or instrumentality thereof or any other entity or any successor or legal representative thereof.

"*PIF Schedule*" means the PIF Schedule appended as a schedule to the Plan Emergence Agreement.

"*Plan*" means this consolidated plan of compromise under the CCAA, including the Schedules hereto, as amended, supplemented or replaced from time to time.

"*Plan Emergence Agreement*" means the Plan Emergence Agreement to be entered into on or prior to a date which is at least 23 days prior to the Meetings by Canwest, CMI, the Plan Sponsor and the Monitor as contemplated by the Subscription Agreement together with all Schedules thereto.

"*Plan Entities*" means Canwest, CMI, the CTLP Plan Entities, 4501063 Canada, MBS Productions, Yellow Card and Global Centre.

"*Plan Implementation Date*" means the day on which the Monitor delivers the Monitor's Certificate to the CMI Entities, the Ad Hoc Committee and the Plan Sponsor pursuant to Section 6.4.

"*Plan Implementation Fund*" means the fund established pursuant to the Plan and the Plan Emergence Agreement consisting of the Cash, the Other PIF Assets and further contributions from Shaw, if any, as provided for in the Plan Emergence Agreement (which for the avoidance of doubt does not include amounts from the Subscription Price) to be maintained in one or more segregated accounts by the Monitor and to be used by the Monitor, to pay, *inter alia*, the costs and expenses to be incurred by the Monitor, its legal counsel and any advisors retained by the Monitor from and after the Plan Implementation Date to perform any of its statutory or Court-ordered duties including (a) to resolve any Unresolved Claims and to make any distributions in respect of any Unresolved Claims that have become Proven Distribution Claims pursuant to Section 4.4, (b) to make distributions under the Plan including the costs of wire transfers and the issuance of cheques (provided, for greater certainty, that the Monitor shall not fund the actual distributions from the Plan Implementation Fund), (c) to determine and pay Unaffected Claims (including termination and severance amounts as set out on the April 28 Severance Schedule together with accrued and unpaid vacation pay in respect of April 28 Severance Schedule Employees and amounts secured by the Court Charges but excluding the CH Plan Settlement Amount), (d) to pay the costs of legal counsel to the Directors and Officers in connection with the determination and resolution of Unaffected Claims and Unresolved Claims against the Directors and Officers, including to fund the resolution of Restructuring Period Claims or insured Claims against the Directors or Officers to the extent that such Restructuring Period Claims or insured Claims are not released or extinguished under Section 7.3, (e) to pay the Bankruptcy Costs, and (f) to pay the fees and expenses charged by the replacement administrator for the CH Plan appointed by the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (but for great certainty such fees and expenses shall not include fees and expenses for the provision of services in relation to the administration of the CH Plan or the investment of the assets of the CH Plan where such fees and expenses have, in the normal course, been paid from the assets of the CH Plan, such as fees payable to the CH Plan Trustee, to the investment manager in respect of CH Plan assets, to the actuary for the CH Plan and to any pension consultant for pension plan administration services), to the extent that such claims are described in and specifically funded pursuant to the Plan Emergence Agreement.

"*Plan Sanction Hearing*" means the Court hearing at which the Applicants' motion for approval and sanction of the Plan will be heard.

"*Plan Sponsor*" means Shaw and 7316712 Canada.

"*Post-Filing Claim*" means any indebtedness, liability or obligation of any kind that arises after the Filing Date from or in respect of (a) any executory contract or unexpired lease that has not been restructured, terminated, repudiated or resiliated by a CMI Entity, (b) the supply of services or goods, or funds advanced, to any of the CMI Entities on or after the Filing Date, or (c) all amounts to be remitted to a tax authority pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Initial Order during the period after the Filing Date to but excluding the Plan Implementation Date; provided that "Post-Filing Claim" shall not include any Claim or Restructuring Period Claim or any Unaffected Claim.

"*Proven Distribution Claims*" means Claims of Affected Creditors as finally determined for distribution purposes in accordance with the Claims Procedure Order, the Meeting Order and the Plan.

"*Proven Voting Claim*" means the Claim of an Affected Creditor of any of the Plan Entities as finally determined for purposes of voting at a Meeting, in accordance with the Claims Procedure Order, the CCAA, the Meeting Order and the Plan, provided that a Claim which is an Unresolved Claim will be dealt with pursuant to Sections 3.10 and 3.11.

"*Publishing LP*" means Canwest Limited Partnership/Canwest Société en Commandite, a limited partnership governed by the laws of the Province of Ontario.

"*RBC*" means RBC Dominion Securities Inc., a member company of RBC Capital Markets, in its capacity as financial advisor to the CMI Entities.

"*RBC Engagement Letter*" means the engagement letter between RBC and Canwest dated December 10, 2008, as amended by a letter dated January 20, 2009, as further amended by a letter dated October 5, 2009 and as further amended by a letter dated as of December 10, 2009.

"*Red Deer Property*" means the real property located at 2840 Bremner Avenue in Red Deer, Alberta together with the single commercial building situated thereon and certain related assets. The Red Deer Property is legally described as Lot 10A Block 14 Plan 7922866 excepting thereout all mines and minerals. The Red Deer Property is located in the neighbourhood of Bower, in the City of Red Deer, in the Province of Alberta, just north of the Bower Mall, and fronting onto Bremner Avenue. The property consists of one lot measuring 350 ft × 250 ft, with the site area totalling 2.01 acres.

"*Released Parties*" has the meaning set out in Section 7.3(a).

"*Representative Counsel Order*" means the Order made on October 27, 2009 appointing the Retiree Representatives as representatives for the Retirees, including without limitation for the purpose of settling or compromising claims by the Retirees in the CCAA Proceedings, and appointing the Retiree Representative Counsel to represent the Retirees in the CCAA Proceedings.

"*Required Majority*" means that number of Affected Creditors of the Plan Entities representing at least a majority in number of the Proven Voting Claims, whose Affected Claims represent at least two-thirds in value of the Proven Voting Claims of (a) the Ordinary Creditors and Convenience Class Creditors who validly vote (in person or by proxy or who are deemed to vote pursuant to the Plan and the Meeting Order) on the resolution approving the Plan at the Ordinary Creditors Meeting, and (b) the Beneficial Noteholders who provide a proxy, ballot or other instructions for voting or otherwise validly vote at the Noteholder Meeting as provided for in the Meeting Order.

"*Restructuring Period Claim*" means any right or claim of any Person against one or more of the CMI Entities in connection with any indebtedness, liability or obligation of any kind whatsoever owed by one or more of the CMI Entities to such Person arising out of the restructuring, disclaimer, resiliation, termination or breach after the Filing Date of any contract, lease or other agreement, whether written or oral, and whether such restructuring, disclaimer, resiliation, termination or breach took place or takes place before or after the date of the Claims Procedure Order; provided that a "Restructuring Period Claim" does not include any Excluded Claim.

"*Restructuring Period Claims Bar Date*" means July 9, 2010.

"*Retirees*" means collectively:

(a) all former employees of the CMI Entities (or their predecessors, as applicable), or the surviving spouses of such former employees if applicable, who are in receipt of a pension from a registered or unregistered pension plan sponsored by a CMI Entity;

(b) all former employees of the CMI Entities (or their predecessors, as applicable), or the surviving spouses of such former employees if applicable, who are entitled to receive a deferred vested pension from a registered or unregistered pension plan sponsored by a CMI Entity; and

(c) all former employees of the CMI Entities (or their predecessors, as applicable), or the surviving spouses of such former employees if applicable, who were, immediately before October 6, 2009, entitled to receive non-pension benefits from a CMI Entity,

but excluding the CEP Retirees in the CCAA Proceeding, including without limitation, for the purpose of settling or compromising claims by the Retirees in the CCAA Proceedings.

"*Retiree Representative Counsel*" means Cavalluzzo, Hayes, Shilton, McIntyre & Cornish LLP, in its capacity as representative counsel on behalf of all Retirees other than any Retiree who opted out of such representation in accordance with the procedures set out in the Representative Counsel Order.

"*Retiree Representatives*" means David Cremasco, Rose Stricker and Lawrence Schnurr as appointed under the Representative Counsel Order.

"*Retiree Terminal Deficiency Claim*" means the Claim filed on November 17, 2009 by the Retiree Representative Counsel on behalf of the Retirees in the approximate amount of $10,244,733 in respect of the terminal deficiency in the CH Plan.

"*Sanction Order*" means the Order to be made by the Court under the CCAA sanctioning the Plan, as such Order may be amended.

"*Second Amended and Restated Recapitalization Transaction Term Sheet*" means the term sheet attached to the Support Agreement.

"*Secured Intercompany Note*" means the senior secured interest bearing promissory note issued on October 1, 2009 by CMI to Irish Holdco evidencing $187,263,126.45 loaned to CMI by Irish Holdco, plus accrued and unpaid interest thereon.

"*Shared Services*" means services provided under the Shared Services Agreement.

"*Shared Services Agreement*" means the Agreement on Shared Services and Employees between Canwest, Publishing LP, CMI, Canwest Publishing, CTLP and National Post, dated October 26, 2009 and approved by the Court on October 30, 2009 and attached as schedule "A" to the Transition and Reorganization Agreement.

"*Shareholders Agreement*" means the shareholders agreement in respect of CW Investments as amended and restated as of January 4, 2008.

"*Shaw*" means Shaw Communications Inc., a corporation governed by the *Business Corporations Act* (Alberta).

"*Shaw Designated Entity*" means a wholly-owned subsidiary of Shaw designated by Shaw to acquire the Canwest New Preferred Shares.

"*Shaw Support Agreement*" means the support agreement made as of February 11, 2010 between Canwest, Shaw and certain Noteholders, as amended by the amendment agreement made as of May 3, 2010 and as may be further amended, supplemented or otherwise modified from time to time.

"*Special Committee*" means the special committee of the board of directors of Canwest.

"*Stonecrest Engagement Letter*" means the engagement letter between the Chief Restructuring Advisor and Canwest dated June 30, 2009, as amended on December 17, 2009 and March 25, 2010.

"*Subordinate Voting Shares*" means the subordinate voting shares in the capital of Canwest that are issued and outstanding immediately prior to the Effective Time.

"*Subscription Agreement*" means the subscription agreement, including the term sheet attached as schedule "A" thereto, between Canwest and Shaw, dated as of February 11, 2010, as amended by the amendment agreement to the subscription agreement made as of May 3, 2010, as such agreement may be further amended, supplemented or otherwise modified from time to time.

"*Subscription Price*" means the aggregate of: (a) the sum of (i) $38 million plus (ii) in the event that there are Restructuring Period Claims relating (A) to the termination of arrangements made before the Filing Date with existing management employees of Canwest and the Canadian Subsidiaries listed in the Plan Emergence Agreement who will not become employees of New Canwest, GP Inc., CTLP or Subsidiaries thereof will not remain as employees of the Business following the Effective Time or (B) the disclaimer, resiliation, termination, repudiation or renegotiation of terms as agreed to by Canwest and the Plan Sponsor of any material contracts and agreements of the CMI Entities that will not remain following the Effective Time as ongoing obligations of New Canwest or any of the Canwest Subsidiaries, an additional amount equal to the amount that is required to maintain the recovery rate *(pro rata* as among the Ordinary Creditors) that would otherwise be received by Ordinary Creditors, assuming there were no such Restructuring Period Claims arising from (A) and (B) above; and (b) the sum of (i) US $440 million plus (ii) the Continued Support Payment.

"*Subsidiary*", in respect of a Person, means (a) any corporation or company of which at least a majority of the outstanding securities having by the terms thereof ordinary voting power to elect a majority of the board of directors of such corporation or company is at the time directly, indirectly or beneficially owned or controlled by the Person or one or more of its Subsidiaries; (b) any general or limited partnership of which, at the time, the Person or one or more of its Subsidiaries directly, indirectly or beneficially own or control at least a majority of the voting interests (however designated) thereof, or otherwise control such partnership; and (c) any other Person of which at least a majority of the voting interests (however designated) are at the time directly, indirectly or beneficially owned or controlled by the Person or one or more of its Subsidiaries (and in respect of a trust that has not issued any voting interests, the beneficiaries of which are owned or controlled by the Person or one or more of its Subsidiaries).

"*Support Agreement*" means the support agreement dated October 5, 2009 between Canwest CMI, certain subsidiaries of CMI and certain Noteholders, as amended by the amendment agreement made as of January 29, 2010, the amendment agreement made as of February 11, 2010, the amendment agreement No. 3 made as of April 15, 2010, and the amendment agreement No. 4 made as of May 3, 2010, attaching and incorporating therein the Second Amended and Restated Recapitalization Transaction Term Sheet, and as it may be further amended, supplemented or otherwise modified from time to time in accordance with its terms.

"*Tax*" or "*Taxes*" means any and all Canadian and foreign taxes, duties, fees, pending assessments, reassessments and other governmental charges, duties, impositions and liabilities of any kind whatsoever (including any claims by Her Majesty the Queen, Her Majesty the Queen in right of Canada, Her Majesty the Queen in right of any province or territory of Canada, Canada Revenue Agency and any similar revenue or taxing authority of any province or territory of Canada), including all interest, penalties, fines and additions with respect to such amounts.

"*Tax Matters Agreement*" means an agreement between, among others, Canwest, CMI, New Canwest, and the Plan Sponsor governing various matters relating to Taxes in respect of the Plan, including the filing of elections and returns, the allocation of income of CTLP and the allocation of the purchase price for assets transferred under the Plan, among other things.

"*Trademarks*" means all registered and unregistered trademarks owned by Canwest or CMI, and any goodwill associated therewith, including those set out in Schedule D.4.

"*Trademarks Licence*" means the trademarks licence granted by Canwest to Canwest (Canada) Inc., Canwest Publishing, Canwest Books Inc., and Publishing LP, as described in section 6.3(a) of the Omnibus Transition and Reorganization Agreement, with such licence being governed by the same terms and conditions contained in the Trademarks Licence

Agreement, as amended by the Omnibus Transition and Reorganization Agreement, along with the obligations of Canwest under section 6.3(b) of the Omnibus Transition and Reorganization Agreement.

"*Trademarks Licence Agreement*" means the trademarks licence agreement dated October 13, 2005 between Canwest, CanWest MediaWorks (Canada) Inc. (now known as Canwest (Canada) Inc.), as general partner for and on behalf of CanWest MediaWorks Limited Partnership (now Publishing LP), CanWest MediaWorks (Canada) Inc. (now Canwest (Canada) Inc.) and CanWest MediaWorks Income Fund, as amended by the Omnibus Transition and Reorganization Agreement.

"*Transfer Agent*" means Computershare Trust Company of Canada.

"*Transfer Taxes*" means all land transfer taxes, goods and services taxes, provincial and retail sales taxes and other similar taxes which arise in relation to the transfer of the New Canwest Assets to New Canwest.

"*Transition and Reorganization Agreement*" means the agreement among Canwest, Publishing LP, CMI, Canwest Publishing, CTLP and National Post dated as of October 26, 2009 as approved by the Court on October 30, 2009.

"*Trustee*" means The Bank of New York Mellon, in its capacity as trustee under the Indenture.

"*Unaffected Claims*" means:

(a) any Claims arising from or under the Stonecrest Engagement Letter, including claims of the Chief Restructuring Advisor;

(b) any Claims arising from or under the Genuity Engagement Letter;

(c) any Claims arising from or under the RBC Engagement Letter;

(d) any Claims arising from or under the Houlihan Engagement Letter;

(e) any Claims of the KERP Participants arising from or under the KERPs;

(f) any Claims of the April 28 Severance Schedule Employees arising from or under the termination and severance obligations as set out on the April 28 Severance Schedule together with the accrued and unpaid vacation pay of the April 28 Severance Schedule Employees;

(g) any Claims up to the Plan Implementation Date secured by any of the Court Charges;

(h) any claim against any Director that cannot be compromised due to the provisions of section 5.1(2) of the CCAA;

(i) any portion of a Claim for which the applicable CMI Entities are fully insured, including the Insured Litigation;

(j) any Claims of The Bank of Nova Scotia arising from the provision of cash management services to the CMI Entities;

(k) any Claims held by CIBC and its assigns, if any, in respect of the CIT Facility and pursuant to the CIT Credit Agreement;

(l) any Claims in respect of any payments referred to in sections 6(3), 6(5) and 6(6) of the CCAA;

(m) any Post-Filing Claims;

(n) Intercompany Claims, other than (i) Claims arising under the Secured Intercompany Note, the Unsecured Intercompany Note and the Irish Holdco Intercompany Receivable, (ii) Claims of 4501063 Canada, MBS Productions or Global Centre, (iii) the CTLP-CMI Receivable, (iv) the CMI-CTLP Receivable, (v) the Canwest/CMI Group Intercompany Receivables, and (vi) the Fireworks Claim;

(o) the obligation of CTLP to pay the CH Plan Settlement Amount; and

(p) claims of the Fireworks Trustee in Bankruptcy under the Fireworks Indemnity.

"*Undeliverable Distribution*" has the meaning set out in Section 4.10.

"*Unresolved Claim*" means a Claim that at the relevant time is disputed or otherwise unresolved and has not been accepted for purposes of voting on and/or receiving distributions under the Plan and is not barred pursuant to the Claims Procedure Order.

"*Unsecured Intercompany Note*" means the unsecured promissory note dated October 1, 2009, issued by CMI to Irish Holdco evidencing $430,556,189.08 loaned to CMI by Irish Holdco plus accrued and unpaid interest thereon.

"*US Dollars*" or "*US$*" means dollars denominated in the lawful currency of the United States of America.

"*Wages and Benefits*" means all outstanding wages, salaries and employee benefits (including employee medical, dental, disability, life insurance and similar benefit plans or arrangements, incentive plans, share or other compensation plans and employee assistance programs and employee or employer contributions in respect of pension and other benefits), vacation pay, commissions, bonuses and other incentive payments, payments under collective bargaining agreements, and employee and director expenses and reimbursements, in each case incurred in the ordinary course of business and consistent with existing compensation policies and arrangements of the CMI Entities.

"*Website*" means *http://cfcanada.fticonsulting.com/cmi/*.

"*Western Communications*" means Western Communications Inc., a corporation governed by the CBCA.

"*Winnipeg Condo*" means the condominium with a civic address of 1003 — 141 Wellington Crescent, Winnipeg, Manitoba, being unit 59 in the condominium project known as River Parke.

"*Yellow Card*" means Yellow Card Productions Inc., a corporation governed by the OBCA.

1.2 — Construction

In the Plan, unless otherwise stated or the context otherwise requires:

(a) the division of the Plan into Articles and Sections and the use of headings are for convenience of reference only and do not affect the construction or interpretation of the Plan;

(b) the words "hereunder", "hereof and similar expressions refer to the Plan and not to any particular Article, Section or Schedule and references to "Articles", "Sections", and "Schedules" are to Articles and Sections of, and Schedules to the Plan;

(c) words importing the singular include the plural and *vice versa* and words importing any gender include all genders;

(d) the words "includes" and "including" and similar terms of inclusion shall not, unless expressly modified by the words "only" or "solely", be construed as terms of limitation but rather shall mean "includes without limitation" or "including without limitation", as applicable, so that references to included matters shall be regarded as illustrative without being either characterizing or exhaustive;

(e) a reference to any statute is to that statute as now enacted or as the statute may from time to time be amended, re-enacted or replaced, and includes any regulation made thereunder;

(f) a reference to any agreement, indenture or other document is to that document as amended, supplemented, restated or replaced from time to time;

(g) unless otherwise specified, all references to dollar amounts or to the symbol "$" are references to Canadian dollars;

(h) unless otherwise specified, all references to time herein and in any document issued pursuant hereto mean local time in Toronto, Ontario, and any reference to an event occurring on a Business Day shall mean prior to 5:00 p.m. on such Business Day; and

(i) unless otherwise specified, the time period within or following which any payment is to be made or act is to be done shall be calculated by excluding the day on which the period commences and including the day on which the period ends and by extending the period to the next succeeding Business Day if the last day of the period is not a Business Day; whenever any payment to be made or action to be taken under the Plan is required to be made or to be taken on a day other than a Business Day, such payment shall be made or action taken on the next succeeding Business Day.

1.3 — Currency Conversion

All Affected Claims (other than the Claims of the Noteholders) which are denominated in US Dollars shall be converted into Canadian dollars on the basis of the average US/Canadian dollar noon rate of exchange, as quoted by the Bank of Canada, over the ten Business Day period preceding the filing of the Plan as part of the CCAA Proceedings. All Affected Claims (other than the Claims of the Noteholders) denominated in a currency other than lawful money of Canada or the United States are to be converted into Canadian dollars on the basis of the average noon rate of exchange for exchange of such currency into Canadian dollars, as quoted by the Bank of Canada, over the ten Business Day period preceding the date of filing of the Plan. For greater certainty, the Proven Distribution Claims of the Noteholders and all amounts to be distributed to the Noteholders pursuant to the Plan shall be paid in US Dollars.

1.4 — CMI Claims Bar Date and Restructuring Period Claims Bar Date

Nothing in the Plan extends or shall be interpreted as extending or amending the CMI Claims Bar Date or Restructuring Period Claims Bar Date, or gives or shall be interpreted as giving any rights to any Person in respect of Claims that have been barred or extinguished pursuant to the Claims Procedure Order, the Meeting Order, the Plan and/or the Sanction Order.

1.5 — Interest

Interest shall not accrue or be paid on any Affected Claims after the Filing Date, and no Affected Claims shall be entitled to interest accruing on or after the Filing Date.

1.6 — Schedules

The following are the Schedules to the Plan:

Schedule A — Applicants

Schedule B — New Canwest Articles of Incorporation

Schedule C — New Canwest By-Laws

Schedule D.1 — New Canwest Assets

Schedule D.2 — Broadcast Licences

Schedule D.3 — New Canwest Liabilities

Schedule D.4 — Trademarks

Schedule D.5 — Other Canwest Assets

Schedule D.6 — Copyrights and Other IP

Schedule D.7 — CTLP Pension Plans

Schedule D.8 — CTLP Group Benefit Plans

Schedule E — Convenience Class Claim Declaration

Schedule F — Equity Compensation Plans

Schedule G — Monitor's Certificate

Article 2 — Purpose, Effect of Plan and Operations

2.1 — Purpose of Plan

Subject to the specific provisions hereof, the purpose of the Plan is (a) to effect a compromise and settlement of all Affected Claims against the Plan Entities as finally determined in accordance with the Claims Procedure Order, the Meeting Order, the CCAA and the Plan; (b) to facilitate the closing of the transactions contemplated in the Subscription Agreement; (c) to effect a restructuring of the Plan Entities to enable the Business to continue on a going concern basis as a viable and competitive participant in the Canadian television broadcasting industry; (d) to facilitate the continuation of substantial employment; and (e) to maintain for the general public broad access to and choice of news, public and other information and entertainment programming from public media. The Plan is put forward in the expectation that stakeholders generally will derive a greater benefit from the continued operation of the Business by New Canwest than would result from a bankruptcy or liquidation of the Business.

2.2 — Persons Affected

The Plan provides for the compromise, discharge and/or release at the Effective Time of Affected Claims against the Plan Entities, Intercompany Claims against the CTLP Group Entities, a release and discharge of Canwest and the Canwest Subsidiaries in respect of all claims pertaining to the Notes, and a release of all claims and Affected Claims against the Directors and Officers and a restructuring of the Business. The Plan will become effective at the Effective Time on the Plan Implementation Date in accordance with the steps and sequence set out in Section 5.5 and shall be binding on and enure to the benefit of the CMI Entities, the Affected Creditors, the Directors and Officers and all other Persons named or referred to in, or subject to, the Plan. For purposes of the Plan, all Affected Creditors shall receive the treatment provided in the Plan on account of their Affected Claims.

2.3 — Unaffected Claims

The Plan does not affect the Unaffected Claims (including, for great certainty, Post-Filing Claims). Persons with Unaffected Claims will not be entitled to vote or receive any distributions under the Plan in respect of such claims. Unaffected Claims shall be dealt with in accordance with Section 4.6. Nothing in the Plan shall affect any CMI Entity's rights and defences, both legal and equitable, with respect to any Unaffected Claim (including, for great certainty, any Post-Filing Claim), including all rights with respect to legal and equitable defences or entitlements to set-offs and recoupments against such claims.

2.4 — Business Operations

Subject to the terms of the Subscription Agreement, Shaw Support Agreement and Support Agreement, the CMI Entities shall continue to operate the Business during the CCAA Proceedings until the Plan Implementation Date in the ordinary course of business in accordance with the Initial Order and other Orders, having regard to their insolvency and the CCAA Proceedings.

Article 3 — Classification of Creditors, Voting Claims and Related Matters

3.1 — Claims Procedure

The procedure for determining the validity and quantum of the Affected Claims for voting and distribution purposes under the Plan shall be governed by the Claims Procedure Order, the Meeting Order, the CCAA and the Plan.

3.2 — Classes of Creditors

For purposes of voting on the Plan, there shall be two classes of Affected Creditors: (a) the Noteholders Class; and (b) the Ordinary Creditors Class. For purposes of voting on the Plan, Convenience Class Creditors shall be deemed to be in, and shall be deemed to vote in and as part of, the Ordinary Creditors Class.

3.3 — Meetings

The Meetings shall be held in accordance with the CCAA, the Claims Procedure Order, the Meeting Order, the Plan and any further Order. The only Persons entitled to attend a Meeting are the Monitor and its legal counsel and advisors; the Plan Sponsor and its legal counsel and advisors; CIBC and its legal counsel and advisors; those Persons, including the holders of proxies, ballots or other voting instruments, entitled to vote at a Meeting and their legal counsel and advisors; the CMI Entities and the Chief Restructuring Advisor, and their respective legal counsel and advisors, including RBC; the Directors and Officers, including members of the Special Committee, their legal counsel and advisors, including Genuity; members of the Ad Hoc Committee, its legal counsel and Houlihan; the Trustee and its legal counsel; and any Beneficial Noteholder. Any other Person may be admitted on invitation of the chair of a Meeting.

3.4 — Voting by Noteholders

Only the Beneficial Noteholders as of the Noteholder Voting Record Date will be entitled to provide instructions relating to voting in the Noteholders Class. The solicitation of votes from and the procedures for voting by the Beneficial Noteholders shall be conducted in accordance with the Meeting Order. Each Beneficial Noteholder shall be entitled to one (1) vote as a member of the Noteholders Class, which vote shall have a value equal to the principal and accrued and unpaid interest to the Filing Date owing under the Notes held by such Beneficial Noteholder.

3.5 — Voting by the Ordinary Creditors Class

Each Affected Creditor with an Ordinary Creditors Proven Voting Claim shall be entitled to one vote as a member of the Ordinary Creditors Class, which vote shall have a value equal to the dollar value of its Ordinary Creditors Proven Voting Claims.

3.6 — Voting of Convenience Class Claims

Each Convenience Class Creditor with a Proven Voting Claim shall be deemed to vote in favour of the Plan in respect of its Convenience Class Claim as a member of the Ordinary Creditors Class, which vote shall have a dollar value equal to the lesser of $5,000 and the actual dollar value of such Convenience Class Creditor's Proven Voting Claim.

3.7 — Election to be Treated as a Convenience Class Claim

Affected Creditors (excluding Noteholders) with Proven Distribution Claims in excess of $5,000 that wish to elect to have their Proven Distribution Claims treated as Convenience Class Claims must deliver a duly completed and executed Convenience Class Claim Declaration to the Monitor prior to 5:00 p.m. (Toronto time) on July 15, 2010, in which case such Proven Distribution Claim shall be treated for all purposes as a Convenience Class Claim in the amount of $5,000.

3.8 — Parties Not Entitled to Vote

Affected Creditors having claims against National Post, National Post Holdings, Western Communications, Multisound Publishers, 4501071 Canada, CGS Shareholding, CGS NZ Radio, CGS International, CGS Debenture, Canwest MediaWorks US, Canwest MediaWorks Turkish Holdings, Canwest Irish Holdco, Canwest International, Canwest International Distribution, Canwest Communications, Canwest Finance, or 30109 shall not vote on the Plan in respect of such claims. The Labour Parties

shall have no vote in respect of the Retiree Terminal Deficiency Claim or the CEP Terminal Deficiency Claim. Any person having an Unaffected Claim, an Intercompany Claim or an Equity Claim shall not be entitled to vote at any Meeting in respect of such Unaffected Claim, Intercompany Claim or Equity Claim, as applicable.

3.9 — Fractions

An Affected Creditor's Proven Voting Claim shall not include fractional numbers and Proven Voting Claims shall be rounded down to the nearest whole Canadian dollar amount without compensation.

3.10 — Voting of Unresolved Claims

Subject to Section 3.11, each Affected Creditor of a Plan Entity (other than a Noteholder) holding an Unresolved Claim shall be entitled to attend the Ordinary Creditors Meeting and shall be entitled to one vote at such Meeting. The Monitor shall keep a separate record of votes cast by Affected Creditors holding Unresolved Claims and shall report to the Court with respect thereto at the Plan Sanction Hearing. The votes cast in respect of any Unresolved Claim shall not be counted for any purpose unless, until and only to the extent that such Unresolved Claim is finally determined to be a Proven Voting Claim.

3.11 — Order to Establish Procedure for Valuing Voting Claims

The procedure for valuing claims and resolving Unresolved Claims for voting purposes shall be as set forth in the Claims Procedure Order, the Meeting Order, the CCAA and the Plan. The CMI Entities and the Monitor shall have the right to seek the assistance of the Court in valuing any Unresolved Claim in accordance with the Claims Procedure Order, the Meeting Order, the CCAA and the Plan, if required, to ascertain the result of any vote on the Plan.

3.12 — Approval by Creditors

In order to be approved, the Plan must receive an affirmative vote by the Required Majority.

3.13 — Assignment of Ordinary Creditor Claims and Convenience Class Creditor Claims Prior to the Ordinary Creditors Meeting

An Ordinary Creditor or a Convenience Class Creditor may transfer or assign the whole of its Claim prior to the Ordinary Creditors Meeting in accordance with paragraph 45 of the Claims Procedure Order, provided that the CMI Entities and the Monitor shall not be obliged to deal with any such transferee or assignee as an Ordinary Creditor or a Convenience Class Creditor in respect thereof, including allowing such transferee or assignee to vote at the Ordinary Creditors Meeting, unless actual notice of the transfer or assignment, together with satisfactory evidence of such transfer or assignment, has been received by the Monitor prior to 5:00 p.m. on the day that is at least ten (10) Business Days prior to the date of the Ordinary Creditors Meeting and acknowledged in writing by the Monitor and the relevant CMI Entity. Thereafter, such transferee or assignee shall, for all purposes in accordance with the Claims Procedure Order, the Meeting Order, the CCAA and the Plan constitute an Ordinary Creditor or a Convenience Class Creditor, as applicable, and shall be bound by any and all notices previously given to the transferor or assignor in respect of such Claim. Such transferee or assignee shall not be entitled to set-off, apply, merge, consolidate, or combine any Claims assigned or transferred to it against or on account or in reduction of any amounts owing by such transferee or assignee to any of the CMI Entities. For greater certainty, the CMI Entities and the Monitor shall not recognize partial transfers or assignments of Claims by Ordinary Creditors or Convenience Class Creditors.

Article 4 — Distributions and Payments

4.1 — Distributions to Noteholders

On the Plan Implementation Date, CMI shall distribute forthwith in accordance with the Plan, to the Trustee, on behalf of the Beneficial Noteholders, an amount equal to the Noteholder Pool by way of wire transfer (in accordance with the wire transfer instructions provided by the Trustee to CMI). Upon receipt by the Trustee of the wire transfer of the Noteholder Pool as contemplated in this Section 4.1, the CMI Entities shall have no further liability or obligation to any of the Noteholders or the

Trustee in respect of the Notes or the distributions contemplated in this Section 4.1. The Trustee shall remit the Noteholder Pool to the applicable Depository for distribution to each Beneficial Noteholder of such Beneficial Noteholders' Pro Rata Amount as of the Distribution Record Date in accordance with the policies, rules and regulations of the Depository.

4.2 — Distributions to Convenience Class Creditors

On one or more Distribution Dates as may be set by the Monitor from time to time, the Monitor on behalf of the CMI Entities shall distribute, from the Convenience Class Pool, to each Convenience Class Creditor with a Proven Distribution Claim on the Distribution Record Date or a Convenience Class Claim that subsequently becomes a Proven Distribution Claim an amount in cash equal to the lesser of (a) $5,000 and (b) the value of such Convenience Class Creditor's Proven Distribution Claim sent by prepaid ordinary mail to the last known address for such Convenience Class Creditor.

For greater certainty, Persons having Claims against National Post, National Post Holdings, 4501071 Canada, Western Communications, Multisound Publishers, CGS Shareholding, CGS NZ Radio, CGS International, CGS Debenture, Canwest MediaWorks US, Canwest MediaWorks Turkish Holdings, Canwest Irish Holdco, Canwest International, Canwest International Distribution, Canwest Communications, Canwest Finance or 30109 shall not receive any distribution from the Convenience Class Pool in respect of such Claims.

4.3 — Distributions to Ordinary Creditors

For purposes of distributions, Ordinary CMI Creditors shall receive distributions from the Ordinary CMI Creditors Sub-Pool and the Ordinary CTLP Creditors shall receive distributions from the Ordinary CTLP Creditors Sub-Pool. The Monitor shall distribute, on behalf of the CMI Entities, on one or more Distribution Dates as may be set by the Monitor from time to time:

(a) to each Ordinary CMI Creditor holding a Proven Distribution Claim as of the Distribution Record Date or a Claim that subsequently becomes a Proven Distribution Claim an amount that, together with any distributions previously made on account of such Claims is equal to the aggregate of such creditor's Ordinary CMI Creditor Pro Rata Amount of the Ordinary CMI Creditors Sub-Pool; and

(b) to each Ordinary CTLP Creditor holding a Proven Distribution Claim as of the Distribution Record Date or a Claim that subsequently becomes a Proven Distribution Claim an amount that, together with any distributions previously made on account of such Claims is equal to the aggregate of such creditor's Ordinary CTLP Creditor Pro Rata Amount of the Ordinary CTLP Creditors Sub-Pool.

All distributions shall be made by cheque and sent by prepaid ordinary mail to the last known address for such Ordinary Creditor. For greater certainty, the Monitor shall not be obligated to make any distribution to the Ordinary Creditors until all Unresolved Claims without a dollar value have been finally resolved for distribution purposes.

For greater certainty, the Labour Parties shall not receive any distributions from the Ordinary Creditors Pool or the Convenience Class Pool in respect of the Retiree Terminal Deficiency Claim or the CEP Terminal Deficiency Claim, and Persons having Claims against National Post, National Post Holdings, 4501071 Canada, Western Communications, Multisound Publishers, CGS Shareholding, CGS NZ Radio, CGS International, CGS Debenture, Canwest MediaWorks US, Canwest MediaWorks Turkish Holdings, Canwest Irish Holdco, Canwest International, Canwest International Distribution, Canwest Communications, Canwest Finance or 30109 shall not receive any distribution from the Ordinary Creditors Pool or the Convenience Class Pool in respect of such Claims.

4.4 — Distributions Regarding Unresolved Claims

An Affected Creditor holding an Unresolved Claim will not be entitled to receive a distribution under the Plan in respect of any portion thereof unless and until such Unresolved Claim becomes a Proven Distribution Claim.

4.5 — Plan Implementation Fund

On and/or after the Plan Implementation Date, the Monitor shall receive from the Plan Entities (other than the CTLP Group Entities) the Cash and the Other PIF Assets and such further contributions, if any, as provided in the Plan Emergence Agreement, to constitute the Plan Implementation Fund to be administered by the Monitor in accordance with the Plan Emergence Agreement and the Sanction Order.

4.6 — Payment of Unaffected Claims

The Claims listed in paragraphs (a) to (g) inclusive and (j) and (k) in the definition of Unaffected Claims shall be paid forthwith on or after the Plan Implementation Date by the Monitor, on behalf of the CMI Entities, from the Plan Implementation Fund in accordance with the Plan Emergence Agreement. To the extent that the value of an Unaffected Claim is at issue, the Monitor shall attempt to resolve such Unaffected Claim and may seek the advice and direction of the Court in connection therewith. Any outstanding Post-Filing Claims which are not New Canwest Liabilities or Post-Filing Claims of the CTLP Group Entities shall be paid by the Monitor, on behalf of the CMI Entities, from the Plan Implementation Fund in accordance with the Plan Emergence Agreement. With respect to the Claims listed in paragraph (1) of the definition of Unaffected Claims, such Unaffected Claims shall be paid in full from the Plan Implementation Fund within six months after the date of the Sanction Order.

4.7 — Allocation of Distributions

All distributions made by the Monitor and CMI pursuant to the Plan shall be made first in consideration for the outstanding principal amount of each Claim and secondly in consideration of accrued and unpaid interest and penalties.

4.8 — Cancellation of Certificates and Notes

Following completion of the steps in the sequence set forth in Section 5.5, all debentures, Notes, certificates, agreements, invoices and other instruments evidencing Affected Claims will not entitle any holder thereof to any compensation or participation other than as expressly provided for in the Plan and will be cancelled and will be null and void.

4.9 — Taxes

In connection with the Plan and all distributions hereunder, the CMI Entities shall, to the extent applicable, comply with all Tax withholding and reporting requirements imposed by any Law of a federal, state, provincial, local, or foreign taxing authority, and all distributions hereunder shall be subject to, and made net of, any such withholding and reporting requirements. Notwithstanding any other provision of the Plan: (a) each Affected Creditor that is to receive a distribution pursuant to the Plan shall have sole and exclusive responsibility for the satisfaction and payment of any Tax obligations imposed by any Governmental Entity, including income, withholding and other Tax obligations, on account of such distribution, and (b) no distribution shall be made to or on behalf of such Affected Creditor pursuant to the Plan unless and until such Affected Creditor has made arrangements satisfactory to the Monitor for the payment and satisfaction of any such Tax obligations which could result in a Tax liability for the Monitor and/or CMI Entities. Any distributions to be distributed pursuant to the Plan shall, pending the implementation of such arrangements, be treated as Undeliverable Distributions pursuant to Section 4.10. In connection with the payment in consideration for the transfer of the Canwest New Preferred Shares, the Shaw Designated Entity shall, to the extent applicable, comply with all Tax withholding and reporting requirements imposed by any Law of a federal, state, provincial, local, or foreign taxing authority, and all distributions hereunder shall be subject to, and made net of, any such withholding and reporting requirements.

4.10 — Undeliverable Distributions

If a distribution to an Ordinary Creditor, or a Convenience Class Creditor, in respect of its Proven Distribution Claim is returned as undeliverable (each, an "*Undeliverable Distribution*"), no further delivery will be required unless and until the Monitor is notified in writing of such Affected Creditor's then current address. Any obligation to an Affected Creditor relating to an Undeliverable Distribution will expire six (6) months after the date of such distribution, after which date any liability to such Affected Creditor under the Plan will be forever barred, discharged, released and extinguished with prejudice and without

compensation and the amount of such Undeliverable Distribution shall be deposited into the Plan Implementation Fund. In addition, following that date, the CMI Entities and the Monitor shall not be liable to the Affected Creditor or any other Person for any damages related to the Undeliverable Distribution. No interest shall be payable in respect of an Undeliverable Distribution.

4.11 — Assignment of Ordinary Claims Subsequent to the Ordinary Creditors Meeting

An Ordinary Creditor may transfer or assign the whole of its Claim after the Ordinary Creditors Meeting provided that the Monitor shall not be obliged to make distributions to any such transferee or assignee or otherwise deal with such transferee or assignee as an Ordinary Creditor in respect thereof unless actual notice of the transfer or assignment, together with satisfactory evidence of such transfer or assignment, has been received by the Monitor prior to 5:00 p.m. on the day that is at least ten (10) Business Days prior to the initial Distribution Date and acknowledged in writing by the Monitor and the relevant CMI Entity. Thereafter, such transferee or assignee shall, for all purposes in accordance with the Claims Procedure Order constitute an Ordinary Creditor and shall be bound by notices given and steps in respect of such Ordinary Creditor's Claim. For greater certainty, the Monitor shall not recognize partial transfers or assignments of Ordinary Creditors' Claims. A transferee or assignee of an Ordinary Creditor's Claim shall not be entitled to set-off, apply, merge, consolidate, or combine any such Claims assigned or transferred to it against or on account or in reduction of any amounts owing by such transferee or assignee to any of the CMI Entities. For greater certainty, a Convenience Class Creditor shall not be entitled to transfer or assign its Convenience Class Claim after delivering to the Monitor its Convenience Class Claim Declaration. Nothing in this Section 4.11 restricts the ability of a Noteholder to transfer all or part of its holdings of Notes subsequent to the Meeting but prior to the Effective Time.

4.12 — Treatment of Equity Claims

(a) The Existing Shareholders will not be entitled to any distributions under the Plan or any other compensation from the CMI Entities on account of their Equity Claims in connection with or as a result of the transactions contemplated by the Plan.

(b) On the Plan Implementation Date, all Equity Compensation Plans of Canwest will be terminated, and any outstanding options, restricted share units or other equity-based awards outstanding thereunder will be terminated and cancelled, and the participants therein shall not be entitled to any distributions under the Plan or any other compensation on account of any Equity Claims in connection therewith.

4.13 — Treatment of Intercompany Claims

Notwithstanding Sections 4.2 to 4.4, any Person having an Intercompany Claim shall not be entitled to any distribution under the Plan.

Article 5 — Restructuring and Plan Implementation

5.1 — Corporate and Other Authorizations

The adoption, execution, delivery, implementation and consummation of all matters contemplated under the Plan and the Plan Emergence Agreement involving corporate or other action of the CMI Entities will occur and be effective as of the Plan Implementation Date in the sequence set out in Section 5.5, and will be authorized and approved under the Plan and by the Court, where appropriate, as part of the Sanction Order, in all respects and for all purposes without any requirement of further action by the shareholders of any CMI Entity or any of the Directors or Officers. All necessary approvals to take actions, if required, shall be deemed to have been obtained from the Directors and Officers or the shareholders of the relevant CMI Entities, including the deemed passing by any class of shareholders of any resolution or special resolution and no shareholders' agreement or agreement between a shareholder and another Person limiting in any way the taking of any such steps or actions contemplated by the Plan shall be effective and shall be deemed to have no force or effect.

5.2A — Incorporation of New Canwest

Prior to the Plan Implementation Date, CMI will incorporate New Canwest under the CBCA as a wholly-owned subsidiary of CMI and will cause New Canwest to issue one (1) Class A common share to CMI for $1. The incorporating documentation shall include the New Canwest Articles of Incorporation and the New Canwest By-Laws. The Initial Directors will be individuals to be nominated by CMI.

5.2B — Canwest Reorganization

On the Plan Implementation Date, in accordance with Section 5.5, the articles of Canwest will be amended pursuant to the Canwest Articles of Reorganization as follows:

(a) To reorganize the authorized capital of Canwest into an unlimited number of Canwest New Multiple Voting Shares, Canwest New Subordinate Voting Shares and Canwest New Non-Voting Shares, and an unlimited number of Canwest New Preferred Shares, the terms of which shall provide for the mandatory transfer to the Shaw Designated Entity of the Canwest New Preferred Shares held by the Existing Shareholders for an aggregate amount equal to $11,000,000 for distribution to the Existing Shareholders upon the delivery by Canwest to the Transfer Agent of the transfer notice contemplated by the terms of the Canwest New Preferred Shares.

(b.1) At the Effective Time, each Multiple Voting Share held by an Existing Shareholder shall be changed into one (1) Canwest New Multiple Voting Share and one (1) Canwest New Preferred Share.

(b.2) At the Effective Time, each Subordinate Voting Share held by an Existing Shareholder shall be changed into one (1) Canwest New Subordinate Voting Share and one (1) Canwest New Preferred Share.

(b.3) At the Effective Time, each Non-Voting Share held by an Existing Shareholder shall be changed into one (1) Canwest New Non-Voting Share and one (1) Canwest New Preferred Share.

5.3 — CH Plan Administrator

Prior to the Plan Implementation Date, CMI and CTLP will apply to the Superintendent of Financial Institutions under section 29.1 of the PBSA to remove CTLP as administrator of the CH Plan and appoint a third party firm in its stead to effect an orderly wind-up of the CH Plan.

5.4 — 4414616 Canada

On or prior to the Plan Implementation Date, CMI shall cause 4414616 Canada to be dissolved pursuant to section 210(3) of the CBCA. CMI shall assume all debts, obligations and other liabilities of 4414616 Canada, if any, and upon such assumption, 4414616 Canada shall be fully released and discharged from all such debts, obligations and other liabilities. CMI shall have a power of attorney in respect of 4414616 Canada coupled with an interest to execute and file in the name of 4414616 Canada any elections with federal or provincial tax authorities as may be necessary or appropriate.

5.5 — Steps to be Taken on the Plan Implementation Date

Each of the following transactions contemplated by and provided for under the Plan will be consummated and effected and shall for all purposes be deemed to occur on the Plan Implementation Date, in the sequence specified in this Section 5.5, commencing at the Effective Time. Therefore all of the actions, documents, agreements and funding necessary to implement all of the following transactions must be in place and be final and irrevocable prior to the Effective Time and shall then be held in escrow and shall be released and deemed to take effect in the order specified below without any further act or formality and no other act or formality shall be required:

(a) The Cash Collateral Agreement shall be deemed to be terminated and all obligations thereunder shall be released, discharged and extinguished with prejudice.

(b) National Post and National Post Holdings shall repay to CMI from the National Post Transaction proceeds all advances or loans made to them from CMI from and after the Filing Date.

(c) The Plan Implementation Fund shall be established and funded in accordance with the Plan and the Plan Emergence Agreement and held in trust by the Monitor, to be used by the Monitor in accordance with the Plan and the Plan Emergence Agreement.

(d) The CTLP Limited Partnership Agreement shall be amended to provide that all income and losses of CTLP that would be calculated for the purposes of the ITA, or any other relevant taxation legislation of any province or other jurisdiction, and all other items of income, gain, loss, deduction, recapture and credit of CTLP (including any income arising as a result of the settlement or compromise of debts), that are allocable for purposes of the ITA or any other relevant taxation legislation of any province or other jurisdiction, earned, realized or otherwise included in the income of CTLP up to the time of the transfer by CMI to New Canwest of its units of CTLP as set out below, will be allocated to CMI as a former limited partner in CTLP except that such allocation will not include amounts otherwise allocable to GP Inc.

(e) All Claims relating to guarantees granted by any CMI Entity or any other Canwest Subsidiary (including Irish Holdco and Ireland Nominee) to the Noteholders and/or the Trustee, such guarantees and any other security granted by any such CMI Entity or Canwest Subsidiary to the Noteholders and/or the Trustee, and all rights of indemnity and subrogation arising thereunder, shall be fully released and discharged, and, in consideration of such release and discharge of Irish Holdco, each of Irish Holdco and the Collateral Agent shall be deemed to have released and discharged any security granted to it or for its benefit in respect of the Secured Intercompany Note, and Irish Holdco shall further be deemed to have fully and finally released with prejudice the CMI Entities and Ireland Nominee from their obligations to pay any interest then accrued and unpaid on the Secured Intercompany Note and the Unsecured Intercompany Note and from the guarantees granted by the CMI Entities and Ireland Nominee to Irish Holdco in connection with the Secured Intercompany Note and the Unsecured Intercompany Note.

(f) All contract defaults arising as a result of the CCAA Proceedings and the implementation of the Plan shall be deemed to be cured.

(g) CTLP shall pay or cause to be paid the CH Plan Settlement Amount to the CH Plan by way of certified cheque or wire transfer in immediately available funds payable to the CH Plan Trustee for the account of the CH Plan.

(h) (i) The Retiree Terminal Deficiency Claim shall be deemed to be fully and finally satisfied, discharged, and released and the CTLP Plan Entities shall be released of any liability in connection therewith; (ii) the CEP Terminal Deficiency Claim shall be deemed to be fully and finally satisfied, discharged and released with prejudice and the CTLP Plan Entities shall be released of any liability in connection therewith; (iii) the CEP CH Plan Grievance shall be deemed to be fully and finally satisfied and withdrawn with prejudice for all purposes, and the CEP, on behalf of the Current and Former Members, shall be deemed to fully and finally release and forever discharge with prejudice the CMI Entities from any and all Claims in relation to or arising in connection with the CH Plan and any and all Claims arising from or in relation to the CH Plan; and (iv) the Claims in relation to the CH Plan against the Directors and Officers shall be deemed to be fully and finally satisfied, discharged and released with prejudice for the purpose of the Claims Procedure Order and all other purposes, and the CEP on behalf of the Current and Former Members shall be deemed to fully and finally release and forever discharge with prejudice the Directors and Officers from any and all Claims, including the Claims against the Directors and Officers arising from or in relation to the CH Plan.

(i) Each of 4501063 Canada, MBS Productions and Global Centre will commence dissolution under section 210(3) of the CBCA or section 237 of the OBCA, as applicable. In connection therewith, and as a consequence thereof:

> (i) each such company shall distribute all of its assets, rights and properties to CMI, including, in the case of 4501063 Canada, the shares it holds in GP Inc., and, in all cases, any Canwest/CMI Group Intercompany Receivables held by such corporation, and such assets, rights and properties shall be vested into CMI free and clear of any liens, charges

and encumbrances, including the Court Charges and the Existing Security, pursuant to a vesting provision in the Sanction Order; and

(ii) all debts, liabilities and other obligations of each such corporation shall be assumed by CMI, upon which assumption, such corporation shall be fully released and discharged from all such debts, liabilities and other obligations.

CMI shall, in the case of each such corporation, have a power of attorney coupled with an interest, to execute and file in the name of such corporation any elections with federal or provincial tax authorities as may be necessary or appropriate.

(j) Canwest shall transfer or cause to be transferred the Trademarks, the Copyrights and Other IP, the Other Canwest Assets and any and all Canwest/CMI Group Intercompany Receivables owing to it to CMI in consideration for the issuance of one (1) common share of CMI. Canwest shall assign or cause to be assigned the Trademarks Licence Agreement, the Trademarks Licence, and the CW Media Trademarks Licence Agreements to CMI and CMI shall assume Canwest's liabilities and obligations under the Trademarks Licence Agreement, the Trademarks Licence, the CW Media Trademarks Licence Agreements and under section 6.4 of the Omnibus Transition and Reorganization Agreement.

(k) All Claims and Unaffected Claims against the CTLP Plan Entities excluding: (i) Intercompany Claims (other than the Fireworks Claim), (ii) the Post-Filing Claims against the CTLP Plan Entities, and (iii) the obligation of CTLP to pay the CH Plan Settlement Amount, shall be deemed to be Claims against CMI on the following basis:

(i) CMI shall assume the Fireworks Claim for consideration equal to $1;

(ii) CMI shall assume and become liable in the stead of the CTLP Plan Entities to pay the amount ultimately determined to be payable to the holders of such Claims and Unaffected Claims against the CTLP Plan Entities either as a distribution in accordance with the Plan or a payment from the Plan Implementation Fund (which amount shall be hereinafter referred to as the "*Assumption Consideration Amount*");

(iii) as consideration for the assumption by CMI referred to in this Section 5.5(k) of the obligations to pay distributions, or make payments from the Plan Implementation Fund, in respect of such Claims and Unaffected Claims against CTLP, CTLP shall concurrently with such assumption pay to CMI an amount equal to the CTLP Assumption Consideration Amount, which shall be satisfied as follows:

(A) by a reduction in the amount, if any, owing under the CTLP-CMI Receivable; and

(B) to the extent that the CTLP Assumption Consideration Amount exceeds the amount of the CTLP-CMI Receivable, by the issuance of a demand note in favour of CMI with a principal amount equal to the excess (the "*CTLP Assumption Consideration Note*").

(iv) as consideration for the assumption by CMI referred to in this Section 5.5(k) of the obligations to pay distributions, or make payments from the Plan Implementation Fund in respect of such Claims and Unaffected Claims against each other CTLP Plan Entity, each such CTLP Plan Entity shall concurrently with such assumption issue a demand note in favour of CMI with a principal amount equal to $1 in respect of the Fireworks Claim and in each other case the amount of the Assumption Consideration Amount, if any, relating to such Claims and Unaffected Claims against it (each such note, an "*Other CTLP Plan Entity Assumption Consideration Note");* and

(v) the holders of such Claims and Unaffected Claims shall have no further claims against the CTLP Plan Entities.

(l) The Court Charges and the Existing Security shall be released as they relate to (i) the New Canwest Assets; (ii) the CW Investments Shares; (iii) the assets of the CTLP Plan Entities; (iv) the CTLP Assumption Consideration Note; and (v) the Other CTLP Plan Entity Assumption Consideration Notes and any Canwest/CMI Group Intercompany Receivables owing to CMI by a CTLP Plan Entity.

(m) All amounts owing by Canwest and the Canwest Subsidiaries (excluding the CTLP Group Entities) to a CTLP Plan Entity, immediately prior to the transaction referred to in this Section 5.5(m), shall be forgiven and released.

(n) CMI shall contribute the Other CTLP Plan Entity Assumption Consideration Notes and any Canwest/CMI Group Intercompany Receivables owing to it (other than amounts owing to it by CTLP) to the capital of CTLP.

(o) CMI shall transfer and assign the New Canwest Assets to New Canwest and New Canwest shall assume the New Canwest Liabilities without recourse to the CMI Entities other than the CTLP Plan Entities. Upon the assumption by New Canwest of the New Canwest Liabilities, none of the CMI Entities (other than the CTLP Plan Entities) or the Directors and Officers shall have any further obligation or liability in respect of any of the New Canwest Liabilities and the CMI Entities (other than the CTLP Plan Entities) and the Directors and Officers shall be fully released and discharged with prejudice from the New Canwest Liabilities. To the extent that CMI does not have legal or beneficial title to the New Canwest Assets immediately prior to the transfer of the New Canwest Assets to New Canwest and such legal and beneficial title of such New Canwest Assets is held by any one of the CMI Entities, such CMI Entity shall be deemed to transfer to CMI all of its legal or beneficial interest in such New Canwest Assets immediately prior to the transfer of the New Canwest Assets by CMI to New Canwest. The transfer of the New Canwest Assets to New Canwest shall be free from any liens, charges and encumbrances including the Court Charges and the Existing Security, pursuant to a vesting provision in the Sanction Order.

(p) New Canwest shall assume the defence and responsibility for the conduct of the Insured Litigation, including the payment of the Insured Litigation Deductibles with respect thereto and responsibility for the day-to-day case management of the Insured Litigation. Such case management responsibilities are to include, without limitation, providing instructions to counsel, making employees available for examinations for discovery, providing documents, and providing witnesses at trial. New Canwest shall pay all Insured Litigation Deductibles in the same manner and to the same extent that Canwest, CMI, or any of the CTLP Plan Entities would otherwise have been required to pay such deductibles in respect of the Insured Litigation. For greater certainty, New Canwest will not assume liability of Canwest, CMI, or any of the CTLP Plan Entities with respect to the Insured Litigation beyond payment of any Insured Litigation Deductibles assumed in accordance with this Section 5.5 and distribution of any insurance proceeds received by New Canwest, and New Canwest will not be responsible for any amounts payable by Canwest, CMI, or any of the CTLP Plan Entities with respect to such litigation, except to the extent that insurance proceeds are available and in such cases shall assist as reasonably necessary including making Employees available as necessary, at New Canwest's cost.

(q) All Transfer Taxes shall be paid by New Canwest, subject to any applicable election available to reduce or eliminate such Transfer Taxes.

(r) The Broadcast Licences held by GP Inc. as general partner and CMI as limited partner carrying on business as CTLP will be "surrendered" to the CRTC following the issuance of new broadcasting licences by the CRTC to GP Inc. and New Canwest carrying on business as CTLP.

(s) In consideration for the transfer to New Canwest by CMI of the Canwest/CMI Group Intercompany Receivables owing to CMI by CTLP, the CTLP Assumption Consideration Note and any amounts receivable by CMI under the Shared Services Agreement and/or the Omnibus Transition and Reorganization Agreement, New Canwest will concurrently with such transfer issue the New Canwest Note to CMI.

(t) In consideration for the transfer to New Canwest by CMI of all other New Canwest Assets, New Canwest will concurrently with such transfer issue one (1) million Class A common shares in New Canwest to CMI and will assume the New Canwest Liabilities.

(u) As determined by CIBC and CMI prior to the Plan Implementation Date, the CIT Credit Agreement and the CIT Facility will be repaid and terminated and any existing letters of credit issued under the CIT Credit Agreement and the CIT Facility will be cash collateralized, replaced or addressed by issuing new back-to-back letters of credit.

(v) The Canwest Articles of Reorganization shall become effective.

(w) Canwest shall deliver to the Transfer Agent the transfer notice contemplated by the terms of the Canwest New Preferred Shares.

(x) The Shaw Designated Entity will, following the delivery to the Transfer Agent of the notice pursuant to Section 5.5(w), purchase all of the Canwest New Preferred Shares held by the Existing Shareholders and will pay $11,000,000 to the Transfer Agent for distribution to such holders of the Canwest New Preferred Shares as of the Effective Time, in consideration for the transfer to the Shaw Designated Entity of all of the issued and outstanding Canwest New Preferred Shares created pursuant to the Canwest Articles of Reorganization.

(y) The Shaw Designated Entity will donate and surrender the Canwest New Preferred Shares acquired by it to Canwest for cancellation.

(z) Canwest and CMI shall be deemed to provide the Plan Sponsor with an irrevocable direction to pay the Subscription Price net of the Noteholder Pool to the Monitor and the Plan Sponsor shall pay the Subscription Price net of the Noteholder Pool to the Monitor. The Monitor shall receive and hold the Subscription Price net of the Noteholder Pool in trust for the benefit of the Affected Creditors of the Plan Entities (other than the Noteholders) in accordance with the Plan. The Monitor shall divide that part of the Subscription Price which it receives into and shall establish the Ordinary Creditors Pool, including the Ordinary CMI Creditors Sub-Pool and the Ordinary CTLP Creditors Sub-Pool and the Convenience Class Pool.

(aa) The Plan Sponsor shall pay the portion of the Subscription Price equal to the Noteholder Pool to CMI and CMI shall establish the Noteholder Pool therefrom.

(bb) As consideration for the Subscription Price for the acquisition from CMI, pursuant to a vesting provision in the Sanction Order, all of the issued and outstanding shares of New Canwest, the New Canwest Note, and the CW Investments Shares shall be transferred to and vested in 7316712 Canada free and clear from any liens, charges and encumbrances, including the Court Charges and the Existing Security, pursuant to a vesting provision in the Sanction Order.

(cc) The Initial Directors, and the Directors and Officers of GP Inc. and of the Subsidiaries controlled by CTLP shall be deemed to have resigned and shall be replaced by directors and officers nominated by 7316712 Canada.

(dd) All Directors and Officers and any committee members of Canwest including the Special Committee, as applicable, CMI, National Post Holdings, CW Investments (other than the Shaw nominees) and their respective Subsidiaries and of 4501071 Canada shall be deemed to have resigned.

(ee) Contemporaneously with the transfer of the CW Investments Shares to 7316712 Canada, CMI shall assign and transfer all of its rights and obligations under the Shareholders Agreement to 7316712 Canada.

(ff) All Equity Compensation Plans will be cancelled without compensation to their participants.

(gg) In addition to the releases referred to in Sections 5.5(e) and 5.5(h) and Section 6.3(d), all of the releases set out in Section 7.3 will be effected and all Affected Claims and other matters and claims to be released by Section 7.3 shall be satisfied extinguished, released and forever barred with prejudice.

(hh) The Employees of the CTLP Group Entities shall continue to be employed by one of the CTLP Group Entities. To the extent that Persons having existing contracts (written or oral) with one of the CTLP Group Entities on the Plan Implementation Date provide services to one of the CTLP Group Entities, such CTLP Group Entity shall continue to retain such Persons as independent contractors.

(ii) All security interests in, and pledges of, the Irish Holdco Preference "A" Shares, granted by CMI, including any Court Charges and the Existing Security, shall be deemed to be fully released and discharged.

(jj) Irish Holdco shall redeem 345,063 of the Irish Holdco Preference "A" Shares for the Irish Holdco Aggregate Redemption Price.

(kk) Irish Holdco shall fully satisfy its obligation to pay the Irish Holdco Aggregate Redemption Price by set-off of the full principal amount owing under (i) the Secured Intercompany Note and (ii) the Unsecured Intercompany Note and by set-off of the $72,306,685 of the amount owing under the Irish Holdco Intercompany Receivable, so that after the completion of the set-off herein, CMP's obligations under the Secured Intercompany Note and the Unsecured Intercompany Note shall be satisfied in full and the Irish Holdco Intercompany Receivable will be reduced to $315.

5.6 — National Post and National Post Holdings

(a) The Noteholders shall not receive any distributions under the Plan from National Post or National Post Holdings. On the Plan Implementation Date, all Claims which the Noteholders have against National Post or National Post Holdings shall be barred, released and forever discharged with prejudice.

(b) On the Plan Implementation Date, National Post Holdings and National Post shall deliver to the Monitor assignments in bankruptcy under the BIA naming the Monitor as Trustee in Bankruptcy. The Trustee in Bankruptcy shall apply for an order consolidating the bankruptcy estates of National Post Holdings and National Post to create the National Post Consolidated Bankruptcy Estate.

(c) The Claims Procedure Order, the CMI Claims Bar Date, and the Restructuring Period Claims Bar Date shall continue to apply in respect of the determination of Claims against National Post Holdings, National Post and the National Post Consolidated Bankruptcy Estate, if any, for voting purposes and distributions in such estates and only Ordinary Creditors having Proven Distribution Claims against National Post Holdings, National Post and the National Post Consolidated Bankruptcy Estate, if any, shall be entitled to receive distributions from National Post Holdings, National Post or the National Post Consolidated Bankruptcy Estate.

(d) The remaining proceeds of sale from the National Post Transaction after the repayment by National Post of the advances made by CMI to National Post from and after the Filing Date shall be vested in the Trustee in Bankruptcy of the estates of National Post Holdings, National Post, or the National Post Consolidated Bankruptcy Estate, if any, free and clear of all Court Charges and the Existing Security.

5.7 — Post-Implementation Matters

(a) The Monitor shall complete the resolution of the Unresolved Claims in accordance with the Claims Procedure Order, the Meeting Order, the Sanction Order, the Plan and the Plan Emergence Agreement and complete any remaining distributions to Affected Creditors of the Plan Entities holding Proven Distribution Claims.

(b) In addition to the bankruptcy of National Post and National Post Holdings, following the Plan Implementation Date, the Sanction Order shall empower and authorize the Monitor in its discretion under the Sanction Order to assign into bankruptcy under the BIA, or effect a liquidation, winding-up or dissolution of Canwest and any Canwest Subsidiaries which remain as such following the completion of the transfer by CMI of the shares in New Canwest and the CW Investments Shares to 7316712 Canada and to take any steps necessary or incidental thereto, including effecting any required change of name where permitted. The Proven Distribution Claims of Ordinary Creditors who do not receive a distribution from the Ordinary Creditors Pool or the Convenience Class Pool in respect of any such remaining Canwest Subsidiaries being wound-up, liquidated or dissolved shall continue to remain outstanding against such remaining entities but shall be released as against the Plan Entities and the Directors and Officers. The Sanction Order shall also authorize the

Monitor to act as trustee in bankruptcy, liquidator, receiver or similar official in respect to any such bankruptcy, liquidation, winding-up or dissolution.

(c) The Monitor shall be empowered and authorized to retain such advisors and legal counsel in Canada and in other jurisdictions as it deems necessary and advisable and to pay for such advisors and counsel from the Plan Implementation Fund.

Article 6 — Sanction Order and Plan Implementation

6.1 — Application for Sanction Order

If the Plan is approved by the Requisite Majority, the Applicants shall apply to the Court for the Sanction Order. The CMI Entities shall use their commercially reasonable efforts to obtain the Sanction Order on or before August 27, 2010. Subject to the Sanction Order being granted and the satisfaction or waiver by the applicable Parties of the Conditions Precedent set out in Section 6.3, the Plan will be implemented by the CMI Entities as provided in Section 5.5.

6.2 — Effect of Sanction Order

In addition to sanctioning the Plan, the Applicants will seek a Sanction Order that will, without limitation to any other terms that it may contain:

(a) confirm that the Meetings have been duly called and held in accordance with the Meeting Order;

(b) declare that (i) the Plan has been approved by the Required Majority in conformity with the CCAA; (ii) the CMI Entities have complied with the provisions of the CCAA and the Orders in all respects; (iii) the Court is satisfied that the CMI Entities have not done or purported to do anything that is not authorized by the CCAA; and (iv) the Plan and the transactions contemplated thereby are fair and reasonable;

(c) declare that as of the Plan Implementation Date, the Plan and all associated steps, compromises, transactions, arrangements, assignments, releases and the restructuring effected thereby are approved, binding and effective as herein set out upon the CMI Entities, all Affected Creditors and all other Persons affected by the Plan;

(d) declare that the steps to be taken and the compromises and releases to be effected on the Plan Implementation Date are deemed to occur and be effected in the sequential order contemplated by Section 5.5 on the Plan Implementation Date, beginning at the Effective Time;

(e) authorize (i) the winding-up and dissolution of 4501063 Canada, MBS Productions and Global Centre under section 210(3) of the CBCA or section 237 of the OBCA, as applicable, (ii) the transfer of all of the assets, rights and properties of each such corporation, including, in the case of 4501063 Canada, the shares that it holds in GP Inc., and, in all cases, any Canwest/CMI Group Intercompany Receivables held by such corporation, to CMI on the Plan Implementation Date and that such assets, rights and properties shall vest in CMI free and clear of any liens, charges and encumbrances, including the Court Charges and the Existing Security, and (iii) the assumption by CMI of all of the debts, obligations and other liabilities of 4501063 Canada, MBS Productions and Global Centre;

(f) authorize and approve the assumption by CMI of all of the debts, obligations and other liabilities of the Canwest Subsidiaries provided for in the Plan.

(g) authorize and approve the transfer and assignment by CMI of the New Canwest Assets to New Canwest and vest the New Canwest Assets in New Canwest free and clear of all liens, charges and encumbrances, including the Court Charges and the Existing Security;

(h) declare that all shares issued by New Canwest to CMI pursuant to the Plan shall have been validly issued;

(i) authorize and approve the assumption by New Canwest of all of the New Canwest Liabilities and declare that upon such assumption, CMI shall have no further obligation in respect of the New Canwest Liabilities and CMI shall be forever released and discharged from the New Canwest Liabilities;

(j) authorize and approve of the transfer and assignment by CMI of all of the issued and outstanding shares of New Canwest, the New Canwest Note and the CW Investments Shares to 7316712 Canada and vest in 7316712 Canada such assets free and clear of all liens, charges and encumbrances, including the Court Charges and the Existing Security;

(k) declare that the compromises, arrangements, discharges and the releases referred to in Sections 5.5(e) and 5.5(h), Section 6.3(d) and Section 7.3 are approved and shall become binding and effective in accordance with the Plan;

(l) terminate and discharge the Court Charges and the Existing Security on the Plan Implementation Date, provided however that from and after the Plan Implementation Date, the Administration Charge shall only apply and extend to the Ordinary Creditors Pool and the Plan Implementation Fund;

(m) compromise, discharge and release Canwest, CMI, Yellow Card and the CTLP Plan Entities, from any and all Affected Claims and compromise, discharge and release the CTLP Plan Entities from all Intercompany Claims not affected or otherwise dealt with by the provisions of Section 5.5 and that are owed, immediately after Section 5.5(kk) to Canwest or its Subsidiaries (other than the CTLP Group Entities and CW Investments and its Subsidiaries) (as determined immediately after Section 5.5(kk)) and declare that the ability of any Person to proceed against Canwest, CMI, Yellow Card and the CTLP Plan Entities in respect of or relating to any such Affected Claims and Intercompany Claims shall be forever discharged, extinguished, released and restrained, and all proceedings with respect to, in connection with or relating to such Affected Claims and Intercompany Claims shall be permanently stayed against the Plan Entities, subject only to the right of Affected Creditors to receive distributions pursuant to the Plan in respect of their Affected Claims;

(n) declare that any Claims for which a CMI Notice of Dispute or a CMI Proof of Claim has not been filed by the CMI Claims Bar Date or the Restructuring Period Claims Bar Date, as applicable, shall be forever barred, extinguished and released with prejudice;

(o) declare that, subject to the performance by the CMI Entities of the obligations under the Plan, all obligations, contracts, agreements, leases or other arrangements to which any one of the CMI Entities is a party shall be and remain in full force and effect, unamended, as at the Plan Implementation Date, unless disclaimed or resiliated by any of the CMI Entities pursuant to the Claims Procedure Order or the Meeting Order, and no party to any such obligation or agreement shall on or following the Plan Implementation Date, accelerate, terminate, refuse to renew, rescind, refuse to perform or otherwise disclaim or resiliate its obligations thereunder, or enforce or exercise (or purport to enforce or exercise) any right or remedy under or in respect of any such obligation or agreement, by reason:

(i) of any event which occurred prior to, and not continuing after, the Plan Implementation Date or which is or continues to be suspended or waived under the Plan, which would have entitled any other party thereto to enforce those rights or remedies;

(ii) that the CMI Entities have sought or obtained relief or have taken steps as part of the Plan or under the CCAA;

(iii) of any default or event of default arising as a result of the financial condition or insolvency of the CMI Entities;

(iv) of the effect upon the CMI Entities of the completion of any of the transactions contemplated under the Plan, including the transfer of the New Canwest Assets to New Canwest; or

(v) of any compromises, settlements, restructurings and releases effected pursuant to the Plan;

(p) remove the name "Canwest" from the corporate, business, trade, or partnership names of any of the CMI Entities and their Subsidiaries other than the CTLP Plan Entities and change the registered office of the CMI Entities governed by the CBCA other than the CTLP Plan Entities to Toronto, Ontario;

(q) approve the Plan Emergence Agreement and all schedules thereto including the PIF Schedule, and declare that the Monitor and the Plan Sponsor shall have no liability in respect of amounts to be paid out of the Plan Implementation Fund pursuant to the Plan Emergence Agreement and the Plan, or for any costs or expenses associated therewith, or for any deficiencies in the Plan Implementation Fund;

(r) authorize the Monitor to perform its functions and fulfil its obligations under the Plan to facilitate the implementation of the Plan and expand the powers of the Monitor to perform its obligations under the Plan and the Plan Emergence Agreement, including to (i) administer and distribute the Plan Implementation Fund, (ii) receive the Subscription Price net of the Noteholder Pool, (iii) establish and hold the Ordinary Creditors Pool, including the Ordinary CMI Creditors Sub-Pool, the Ordinary CTLP Creditors Sub-Pool and the Convenience Class Pool, (iv) resolve any Unresolved Claims, (v) effect the distributions in respect of Proven Distribution Claims to the Ordinary Creditors and the Convenience Class Creditors and pay the Unaffected Claims (including without limitation, to resolve any unresolved Unaffected Claims) in accordance with the Plan and the Plan Emergence Agreement, (vi) effect the liquidation, bankruptcy, winding-up or dissolution of Canwest and certain of its remaining Canwest Subsidiaries including, for the avoidance of doubt, the foreign Canwest Subsidiaries, (vii) authorize the Monitor, if required, to act as trustee in bankruptcy, liquidator, receiver or a similar official of such entities, (viii) liquidate any assets of the CMI Entities (other than the CTLP Plan Entities), including the Winnipeg Condo, not transferred to New Canwest pursuant to the Plan, and to contribute any net proceeds realized therefrom to the Plan Implementation Fund, (ix) take all appropriate steps to collect all refunds, dividends, distributions or other amounts payable to Canwest or CMI, (x) implement a claims process to determine and resolve any Post-Filing Claim which is to be paid from the Plan Implementation Fund, and (xi) such other powers as may be granted by the Court from time to time;

(s) declare that all distributions and payments by the Monitor to the Ordinary Creditors and the Convenience Class Creditors under the Plan are for the account of the CMI Entities and the fulfillment of the CMI Entities' obligations under the Plan;

(t) declare that, after the Effective Time, the Applicants which are CTLP Plan Entities shall no longer be Applicants in the CCAA Proceedings; provided that in connection with the CTLP Plan Entities, the Monitor's powers and functions with respect to the resolution and administration of Unresolved Claims, making distributions under the Plan and duties under the Plan Emergence Agreement and the CCAA, including determining, resolving and paying Unaffected Claims related to the CTLP Plan Entities shall continue;

(u) authorize the Monitor to file on or after the Plan Implementation Date assignments in bankruptcy under the BIA for National Post and National Post Holdings and authorize FTI to apply for the consolidation of and to act as trustee in bankruptcy of such entities, including the National Post Consolidated Bankruptcy Estate, if any;

(v.1) provide that the Noteholders and the Trustee shall have no Claims against National Post Holdings, National Post and the National Post Consolidated Bankruptcy Estate, if any, and that the Claims Procedure Order, the CMI Claims Bar Date, the Meeting Order and the Restructuring Period Claims Bar Date shall apply to resolve all Claims against National Post Holdings, National Post or the National Post Consolidated Bankruptcy Estate, if any;

(v.2) pursuant to section 191 of the CBCA, declare that the articles of Canwest be amended pursuant to the Canwest Articles of Reorganization;

(v.3) declare that the Existing Shares are validly changed into Canwest New Shares and the Canwest New Preferred Shares and such Canwest New Shares and Canwest New Preferred Shares shall be validly created, issued and outstanding as fully-paid and non-assessable as of the Effective Time;

(v.4) declare that the Shaw Designated Entity, upon payment of $11,000,000 to the Transfer Agent, shall acquire all of the issued and outstanding Canwest New Preferred Shares, free and clear of all liens, charges, adverse claims and encumbrances, including the Court Charges and the Existing Security;

(w) declare that the Stay of Proceedings under the Initial Order continues until the discharge of the Monitor;

(x) provide that section 36.1 of the CCAA, sections 95 to 101 of the BIA and any other federal or provincial Law relating to preferences, fraudulent conveyances or transfers at undervalue, shall not apply to the Plan or to any payments or distributions made in connection with the restructuring and recapitalization of the CMI Entities, whether before or after the Filing Date, including to any and all of the payments, distributions or transactions contemplated by and to be implemented pursuant to the Plan;

(y) provide that the Chief Restructuring Advisor shall be discharged and released from its obligations on the Plan Implementation Date;

(z) discharge and release any liability of Directors and Officers and the Initial Directors in accordance with the release set out in Section 7.3(a) and declare that the ability of any Person to proceed against them in respect of or relating to any Affected Claims shall be forever discharged, extinguished, released and restrained;

(aa) confirm the releases contemplated in Sections 5.5(e) and 5.5(h), Section 6.3(d) and Section 7.3;

(bb) stay the commencing, taking, applying for or issuing or continuing any and all steps or proceedings, including, without limitation, administrative hearings and orders, declarations or assessments, commenced, taken or proceeded with or that may be commenced, taken or proceeded with against any Released Party in respect of any matter released pursuant to Sections 5.5(e) and 5.5(h) and Section 7.3;

(cc) authorize the Applicants, the Monitor and the Plan Sponsor to apply to the Court for advice and direction in respect of any matter arising from or under the Plan and/or the Plan Emergence Agreement; and

(dd) authorize and direct the Monitor to apply to the Court for its discharge.

6.3 — Conditions to Plan Implementation

The implementation of the Plan is subject to the satisfaction or waiver of the following Conditions Precedent prior to or at the Effective Time (provided that, for greater certainty, the Condition Precedent set out in Section 6.3(f) cannot be waived):

(a) the Plan, the Sanction Order, and all definitive legal documentation in connection with all of the foregoing shall be in a form agreed by Canwest, CMI, the Ad Hoc Committee and the Plan Sponsor;

(b) the Plan shall have been approved and sanctioned by the Court, and the Sanction Order shall be in full force and effect and all applicable appeal periods in respect thereof shall have expired and any appeals therefrom shall have been finally disposed of by the applicable appellate court;

(c) there shall not exist or have occurred any default or event of default (other than those defaults or events of default that are remedied or waived and other than an event of default arising from a breach of section 5(b) of the Cash Collateral Agreement which does not result in another event of default) under the CIT Credit Agreement or the Cash Collateral Agreement;

(d) CTLP shall have ceased to be the administrator of the CH Plan, a third party firm shall have been appointed in its place, and CTLP shall be released from any and all Claims as administrator of the CH Plan;

(e) the Court shall have approved the Omnibus Transition and Reorganization Agreement and the transactions contemplated therein shall have become effective;

(f) Canwest, CMI, New Canwest, GP Inc., the Plan Sponsor and the Monitor shall have entered into the Plan Emergence Agreement and shall all have agreed to the final PIF Schedule;

(g) Canwest, CMI, New Canwest and the Plan Sponsor shall have entered into the Tax Matters Agreement;

(h) CMI shall, immediately prior to the Effective Time, own, directly or indirectly, a minimum of 35.33% of the outstanding equity shares of CW Investments and CW Investments shall, at the Effective Time, own substantially all of the assets that it owned as at October 5, 2009;

(i) all filings under applicable Laws shall have been made and any material regulatory consents or approvals that are required in connection with the transactions contemplated by the Plan, including the issue of the Broadcast Licences, shall have been obtained, including under the *Competition Act* (Canada) and the *Broadcasting Act* (Canada), on terms satisfactory to CMI and the Plan Sponsor;

(j) there shall be no liabilities or contingent liabilities of any of the CTLP Plan Entities in respect of any registered pension plans, except for (i) those registered pension plans listed on Schedule D.7, and (ii) any multi-employer pension plans in which any of the CTLP Plan Entities are required to contribute pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement;

(k) the Trustee shall have delivered to CMI in writing wire instructions no later than three (3) Business Days prior to the Plan Implementation Date;

(l) all conditions of closing under the Subscription Agreement, Shaw Support Agreement and Support Agreement shall have been satisfied or waived by the applicable parties in accordance with the terms of the Subscription Agreement, Shaw Support Agreement or Support Agreement, and the Subscription Agreement, Shaw Support Agreement or Support Agreement shall not have been terminated. For greater certainty, the conditions precedent in this Section 6.3(1) may be waived only upon the consent of all Parties who benefit from the particular condition precedent in the Subscription Agreement, the Shaw Support Agreement or the Support Agreement that remains unsatisfied as at the Effective Time;

(m) the Monitor shall have received from the Plan Sponsor the Subscription Price net of the Noteholder Pool to be held in escrow until the Monitor's Certificate is delivered; and

(n) CIBC and CMI shall have entered into arrangements satisfactory to the parties for the repayment and termination of the CIT Credit Agreement and the CIT Facility, and for the cash collateralization, replacement or issuance of new back-to-back letters of credit.

6.4 — Monitor's Certificate

Upon the satisfaction or waiver of the Conditions Precedent, Canwest, the Plan Sponsor and the Ad Hoc Committee shall so advise the Monitor in writing and the Monitor shall deliver to the CMI Entities, the Ad Hoc Committee and the Plan Sponsor the Monitor's Certificate substantially in the form of Schedule G. On or forthwith following the Plan Implementation Date, the Monitor shall file such Monitor's Certificate with the Court and shall post a copy of same, once filed, on the Website.

6.5 — Outside Date

If the Conditions Precedent are not satisfied on or before September 30, 2010, unless such date is extended in accordance with the Subscription Agreement, Shaw Support Agreement and Support Agreement, the Plan and the Sanction Order shall cease to have any further force or effect and will not be binding on any Person.

Article 7 — Effect of the Plan

7.1 — Effect of the Plan Generally

Following completion of the steps in the sequence set forth in Section 5.5, the Plan will constitute: (a) full, final and absolute settlement, and a release, extinguishment and discharge of all indebtedness, liabilities and obligations of or in respect of all (i) Affected Claims except Intercompany Claims against the Plan Entities; (ii) in the case of the CTLP Plan Entities, all Intercompany Claims not affected or otherwise dealt with by the provisions of Section 5.5 and that are owed, immediately after Section 5.5(kk) to Canwest or its Subsidiaries (other than the CTLP Group Entities and CW Investments and its Subsidiaries) (determined immediately after Section 5.5(kk)); (iii) in the case of the Noteholders, Claims of the Noteholders against Canwest and the Canwest Subsidiaries including any interest and costs accruing and unpaid thereon; and (iv) Equity Claims; and (b) a reorganization of the Business.

7.2 — Prosecution of Judgments

From and after the completion of the steps to be taken at the Effective Time as set out in Section 5.5, no step or proceeding may be taken in respect of any action, suit, judgment, execution, cause of action or similar proceeding in connection with any Affected Claim against the Plan Entities and any such proceedings will be deemed to have no further effect against any Plan Entity or any of its assets and will be released, discharged, dismissed or vacated without cost to the Plan Entities. Any Plan Entity may apply to the Court or any court of competent jurisdiction to obtain a discharge or dismissal, if necessary, of any such proceedings without notice to the Affected Creditor.

7.3 — Released Parties

(a) On the Plan Implementation Date, and without limiting in any way the releases and discharges of all Claims provided for in Sections 5.5(e) and 5.5(h) and Section 6.3(d), Canwest, the CMI Entities and the Canwest Subsidiaries and each of their respective present and former shareholders, the Directors and Officers, members of the Special Committee or any pension or other committee or governance counsel, financial advisors (including RBC and Genuity), legal counsel and agents, the Monitor and its counsel, FTI, the Chief Restructuring Advisor, the Initial Directors, the Retiree Representative Counsel, the Retiree Representatives, CIBC and the Plan Sponsor and the present and former directors, officers and agents of each (collectively, the "*Released Parties*") will be released and discharged from any and all demands, claims, actions, causes of action, counterclaims, suits, debts, sums of money, accounts, covenants, damages, judgments, expenses, executions, liens and other recoveries on account of any indebtedness, liability, obligation, demand or cause of action of whatever nature that any Person (including any Person who may claim contribution or indemnification against or from them) may be entitled to assert, including any and all Claims in respect of statutory liabilities of Directors, Officers, and any alleged fiduciary (whether acting as a director, officer, member of the Special Committee or a pension or other committee or governance counsel or acting in any other capacity in connection with the administration of the CH Plan or any other pension or benefit plan of any of the CMI Entities) whether known or unknown, matured or unmatured, direct, indirect or derivative, foreseen or unforeseen, existing or hereafter arising, based in whole or in part on any act or omission, transaction, dealing or other occurrence existing or taking place on or prior to the Plan Implementation Date relating to, arising out of or in connection with any claim, including any claim arising out of (i) the restructuring, disclaimer, resiliation, breach or termination of any contract, lease, agreement or other arrangement, whether written or oral, (ii) the business and affairs of Canwest, any of the CMI Entities or any of the Canwest Subsidiaries, (iii) the administration or management of the CH Plan or any other pension or benefit plans, (iv) the Plan, (v) the CCAA Proceedings, (vi) any transaction referenced in the Support Agreement, the Subscription Agreement, the Shaw Support Agreement, the CTLP Limited Partnership Agreement or the Plan Emergence Agreement, and (vii) the Canwest Articles of Reorganization and related transactions, provided however that nothing in this Section 7.3 will release or discharge:

(A) Canwest or any of the Canwest Subsidiaries (other than the CTLP Plan Entities) from or in respect of (x) any Unaffected Claim or (y) its obligations to Affected Creditors under the Plan or under any Order;

(B) a Released Party if the Released Party is adjudged by the express terms of a judgment rendered on a final determination on the merits to have committed fraud or wilful misconduct or to have been grossly negligent or, in the case of Directors, in respect of any claim referred to in section 5.1(2) of the CCAA;

(C) any Claim (other than a Claim of a Noteholder or the Trustee) against a CMI Entity which is not a Plan Entity, and any Affected Creditor shall be allowed to continue to assert such Claim against National Post Holdings, National Post, and any National Post Consolidated Bankruptcy Estate or against any such other CMI Entity which is not a Plan Entity; and

(D) claims of creditors against Canwest Subsidiaries which are not CMI Entities.

For greater certainty and notwithstanding sub-paragraphs A, B, C and D above, all Claims including all Restructuring Period Claims filed against the Directors and Officers pursuant to the Claims Procedure Order or otherwise and all other claims against the Directors and Officers of Canwest and the Canwest Subsidiaries shall be discharged, released and forever barred with prejudice, and the Directors and Officers shall have no further liability in respect thereto.

(b) At the Effective Time, the Noteholders, the Ad Hoc Committee, the Trustee and each of their respective present and former shareholders, officers, directors, legal counsel, agents and Houlihan, (collectively, the "*Noteholder Released Parties*") will be released and discharged from any and all demands, claims, actions, causes of action, counterclaims, suits, debts, sums of money, accounts, covenants, damages, judgments, expenses, executions, liens and other recoveries on account of any indebtedness, liability, obligation, demand or cause of action of whatever nature that any Person (including any Person who may claim contribution or indemnification against or from them) may be entitled to assert whether known or unknown, matured or unmatured, direct, indirect or derivative, foreseen or unforeseen, existing or hereafter arising, based in whole or in part on any act or omission, transaction, dealing or other occurrence existing or taking place on or prior to the Effective Time relating to, arising out of or in connection with the Notes (including any guarantee obligations under the Notes or the Indenture), the recapitalization of the CMI Entities, the Plan, the CCAA Proceedings, the Support Agreement and the Shaw Support Agreement and any other actions or matters related directly or indirectly to the foregoing; provided that nothing in this Section 7.3(b) will release or discharge any of the Noteholder Released Parties in respect of their obligations under the Plan and provided further that nothing in this Section 7.3(b) will release or discharge a Noteholder Released Party if the Noteholder Released Party is adjudged by the express terms of a judgment rendered on a final determination on the merits to have committed fraud or wilful misconduct, or to have been grossly negligent.

7.4 — Guarantees and Similar Covenants

No Person who has a Claim under any guarantee, surety, indemnity or similar covenant in respect of any Claim that is compromised under the Plan or who has any right to claim over in respect of, or to be subrogated to the rights of, any Person in respect of a Claim that is compromised under the Plan will be entitled to any additional rights beyond the rights of the Affected Creditor whose Claim is compromised under the Plan.

7.5 — Consents, Waivers and Agreements

At the Effective Time, each Affected Creditor will be deemed to have consented and agreed to all of the provisions of the Plan, in its entirety. Without limitation to the foregoing, each Affected Creditor will be deemed:

(a) to have executed and delivered to the CMI Entities all consents, assignments, releases and waivers, statutory or otherwise, required to implement and carry out the Plan in its entirety;

(b) to have waived any default by or rescinded any demand for payment against any CMI Entity that has occurred on or prior to the Plan Implementation Date pursuant to, based upon or as a result of any provision, express or implied, in any agreement or other arrangement, written or oral, existing between such Affected Creditor and such CMI Entity with respect to an Affected Claim;

(c) to have agreed that, if there is any conflict between the provisions, express or implied, of any agreement or other arrangement, written or oral, existing between such Affected Creditor and any CMI Entity with respect to an Affected

Claim as at the Plan Implementation Date and the provisions of the Plan, then the provisions of the Plan take precedence and priority and the provisions of such agreement or other arrangement are amended accordingly; and

(d) from and after the Effective Time, such Affected Creditor shall be deemed to have waived any and all defaults of the CMI Entities (except defaults under the securities, contracts, instruments, releases and other documents delivered under the Plan or entered into in connection therewith or pursuant thereto) then existing or previously committed by the CMI Entities or caused by the CMI Entities, directly or indirectly, or non-compliance with any covenant, warranty, representation, term, provision, condition or obligation, express or implied, in any contract, credit document, agreement for sale, lease or other agreement, written or oral, and any and all amendments or supplements thereto, existing between such Affected Creditor and the CMI Entities arising from the filing by the Applicants under the CCAA or the transactions contemplated by the Plan and the failure by any CMI Entity to receive any consent from such Affected Creditor to any transaction contemplated by the Plan, including a default arising therefrom under a covenant relating to any affiliate or a Canwest Subsidiary other than the CMI Entities, and any and all notices of default and demands for payment under any instrument, including any guarantee arising from such default, shall be deemed to have been rescinded.

7.6 — Multiple Affected Claims

At the Effective Time, for distribution purposes under the Plan, in respect of all Affected Creditors and their rights in respect of Affected Claims: (a) all guarantees and indemnities of a Plan Entity of the payment or performance by another Plan Entity with respect to any Affected Claim will be deemed eliminated and cancelled; and (b) any Affected Claim against a Plan Entity and all guarantees and indemnities by a Plan Entity of any such Affected Claim will be treated as a single Affected Claim against the Plan Entities.

For greater certainty, the treatment of Affected Claims as provided in this Section 7.6 will not affect the legal and corporate structures of the CMI Entities or cause any CMI Entity to be liable for any Claim for which it is not otherwise liable.

Article 8 — General

8.1 — Amendments

Before and during each Meeting, the CMI Entities may at any time and from time to time, amend the Plan by written instrument and the Monitor shall post such amendment on the Website, subject to the receipt of the prior written consent to such amendment of the Plan Sponsor and the Ad Hoc Committee. The CMI Entities will give reasonable written notice to all Affected Creditors present at each Meeting of the details of any such amendment prior to the vote being taken to approve the Plan. After the Meetings, the CMI Entities may at any time and from time to time amend the Plan by written instrument if (a) the Court, the CMI Entities, the Ad Hoc Committee and the Plan Sponsor, or (b) the Monitor, the CMI Entities, the Plan Sponsor and the Ad Hoc Committee without the need for obtaining an Order, consent to such amendment and determine that such amendment would not be materially prejudicial to the interests of the Affected Creditors under the Plan or is necessary to give effect to the full intent of the Plan or the Sanction Order, provided that the CMI Entities shall give reasonable written notice of the details of any such amendment to Affected Creditors that have filed a notice of appearance in the CCAA Proceedings and shall post such notice on the Website. The Applicants will file a copy of any amendment to the Plan with the Court, but no notice will be provided to Affected Creditors, other than as provided in this Section 8.1, and no additional vote of the Affected Creditors will be necessary to give effect to such amendment to the Plan.

8.2 — Non-Consummation of the Plan

If the Sanction Order is not issued, the Plan will be null and void in all respects and any claim, settlement, compromise or assignment embodied in the Plan, any restructuring, termination, disclaimer or resiliation of executory contracts, any releases effected by the Plan and any document or agreement executed pursuant to the Plan will be deemed null and void. If the Sanction Order is not issued or subsequently the Plan is not implemented, nothing contained in the Plan, and no act taken in preparation for implementation of the Plan will: (a) constitute or be deemed to constitute a waiver or release of any Claims by or against any CMI Entity or any Person; (b) prejudice in any manner, the rights of any CMI Entity or any Person in any further proceedings

involving a CMI Entity; or (c) constitute an admission of any sort by any CMI Entity or any other Person, including in respect of the classification of creditors.

8.3 — Contracts and Leases

Except as otherwise provided in the Plan, as of the Effective Time, each Plan Entity shall be deemed to have ratified each executory contract and unexpired lease to which it is a party (other than in respect of Claims arising from such contract or lease which for greater certainty will be Affected Claims of which are compromised pursuant to the Plan), unless such contract or lease: (a) was previously disclaimed, resiliated or terminated by such Plan Entity; (b) previously expired or terminated pursuant to its own terms; or (c) was amended as evidenced by a written agreement with the Plan Entity and in such case, the amended contract or lease shall be deemed ratified.

8.4 — Preferential Transactions

Section 36.1 of the CCAA, sections 95 to 101 of the BIA and any federal or provincial Law relating to preferences, fraudulent conveyances or transfers at undervalue shall not apply to the Plan or to any payments or distributions made in connection with the restructuring and recapitalization of the CMI Entities, whether made before or after the Filing Date, including to any and all transactions contemplated by and to be implemented pursuant to the Plan.

8.5 — Severability of Plan Provisions

If, prior to the Effective Time, any provision of the Plan is held by the Court to be invalid, void or unenforceable, the Court, at the request of the Applicants and subject to the consent of the Monitor, the Plan Sponsor and the Ad Hoc Committee, may alter and interpret such provision to make it valid or enforceable to the maximum extent practicable, consistent with the original purpose of such provision, and such provision will then be applicable as altered or interpreted and the remainder of the provisions of the Plan will remain in full force and effect and will in no way be invalidated by such alteration or interpretation.

8.6 — Deeming Provisions

In the Plan, the deeming provisions are not rebuttable and are conclusive and irrevocable.

8.7 — Paramountcy

Except with respect to the Unaffected Claims, from and after the Effective Time, any conflict between the Plan and the covenants, warranties, representations, terms, conditions, provisions or obligations, expressed or implied, of any contract, mortgage, security agreement, indenture, trust indenture, loan agreement, commitment letter, agreement for sale, bylaws of the CMI Entities, lease or other agreement, written or oral and any and all amendments or supplements thereto existing between one or more of the Affected Creditors and the CMI Entities as at the Plan Implementation Date will be deemed to be governed by the terms, conditions and provisions of the Plan and the Sanction Order, which shall take precedence and priority.

8.8 — Set-Off

The law of set-off applies to all Affected Claims.

8.9 — Responsibilities of the Monitor

FTI is acting in its capacity as Monitor in the CCAA Proceedings with respect to the CMI Entities and not in its personal or corporate capacity and will not be responsible or liable for any obligations of any CMI Entity under the Plan or otherwise, including with respect to the making of distributions or the receipt of any distribution by an Affected Creditor pursuant to the Plan or the Plan Emergence Agreement. The Monitor will have the powers and protections granted to it by the Plan, the CCAA, the Initial Order, the Meeting Order, the Sanction Order and any other Order.

8.10 — Different Capacities

Persons who are affected by the Plan may be affected in more than one capacity. Unless expressly provided herein to the contrary, a Person will be entitled to participate hereunder in each such capacity in accordance with the Meeting Order. Any action taken by a Person in one capacity will not affect such Person in any other capacity, unless otherwise provided in the Meeting Order, or unless expressly agreed by the Person in writing.

8.11 — Further Assurances

At the request of the CMI Entities, each of the Persons named or referred to in, or subject to, the Plan will execute and deliver all such documents and instruments and do all such acts and things as may be necessary or desirable to carry out the full intent and meaning of the Plan and to give effect to the transactions contemplated herein, notwithstanding any provision of the Plan that deems any transaction or event to occur without further formality.

8.12 — Governing Law

The Plan will be governed by and construed in accordance with the Laws of the Province of Ontario and the Laws of Canada applicable therein.

8.13 — Notices

Any notice or communication in respect of a notice of dispute of claim filed with the Monitor must be delivered to the Monitor in accordance with the Claims Procedure Order. Any other notice or other communication to be delivered or filed hereunder must be in writing and reference the Plan and may, subject as hereinafter provided, be made or given by personal delivery, ordinary mail, facsimile or by e-mail (scanned copy) addressed to the respective parties as follows:

(a) if to the Applicants:

Canwest Global Communications Corp.

3100 Canwest Place

201 Portage Avenue

Winnipeg MB R3B 3L7

Attention: General Counsel

Fax No.: (204) 947-9841

E-mail: rleipsic@canwest.com

with a copy to:

Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP

Box 50

1 First Canadian Place

Toronto, ON M5X 1B8

Attention: Edward A. Sellers / Tracy C. Sandler

Fax No.: (416) 862-6666

E-mail: esellers@osler.com / tsandler@osler.com

(b) if to the Trustee:

The Bank of New York

101 Barclay Street

New York, New York 10286

United States

Attention: Vanessa Mack

Fax No.: (212) 815-5803

E-mail: vanessa.mack@bnymellon.com

(c) if to the Ad Hoc Committee:

Goodmans LLP

Bay Adelaide Centre

333 Bay Street, Suite 3400

Toronto, ON M5H 2S7

Attention: Robert Chadwick / Celia Rhea

Fax No.: (416) 979-1234

Email: rchadwick@goodmans.ca / crhea@goodmans.ca

(d) if to any other Affected Creditor:

to the known address (including facsimile number or e-mail) for such Affected Creditor or the address for such Affected Creditor specified in the notice of dispute of claim filed by such Affected Creditor in the CCAA Proceedings.

(e) if to the Monitor:

FTI Consulting Canada Inc.

TD Waterhouse Tower

79 Wellington Street West

Suite 2010, P.O. Box 104

Toronto, ON M5K 1G8

Attention: Greg Watson

Fax No.: (416) 649-8101

E-mail: greg.watson@fticonsulting.com

with a copy to:

Stikeman Elliott LLP

5300 Commerce Court West

199 Bay Street

Toronto, ON M5L 1B9

Attention: David Byers

Fax No.: (416) 947-0866

E-mail: dbyers@stikeman.com

(f) if to the Plan Sponsor:

Shaw Communications Inc. and

7316712 Canada Inc.

Suite 900

630 — 3rd Avenue SW,

Calgary, AB T2P 4L4

Attention: Steve Wilson/Peter Johnson

Fax No.: (403) 716-6544

E-mail: steve.wilson@sjrb.ca/peter.johnson@sjrb.ca

with a copy to:

Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP

One First Canadian Place

100 King Street West

P.O. Box 63

44th Floor

Toronto, ON M5X 1B1

Attention: Vincent Mercier / Robin Schwill

Fax No.: 416-863-0871

E-mail: vmercier@dwpv.com / rschwill@dwpv.com

or to such other address as any party may from time to time notify the others in accordance with this Section 8.13. All such communications that are delivered will be deemed to have been received on the day of delivery. All such communications that are sent by facsimile or e-mail (scanned copy) will be deemed to be received on the day sent if sent before 5:00 p.m. on a Business Day and otherwise will be deemed to be received on the Business Day next following the day upon which such

facsimile or e-mail (scanned copy) was sent. Any notice or other communication sent by mail will be deemed to have been received on the fifth Business Day after the date of mailing. The unintentional failure by any CMI Entity to give a notice contemplated hereunder will not invalidate any action taken by any Person pursuant to the Plan.

Dated as of the 23rd day of June, 2010.

Schedule A — Applicants

CANWEST GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS CORP.

CANWEST MEDIA INC.

MBS PRODUCTIONS INC.

YELLOW CARD PRODUCTIONS INC.

CANWEST GLOBAL BROADCASTING INC./RADIODIFFUSION CANWEST GLOBAL INC.

CANWEST TELEVISION GP INC.

FOX SPORTS WORLD CANADA HOLDCO INC.

GLOBAL CENTRE INC.

MULTISOUND PUBLISHERS LTD.

CANWEST INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS INC.

CANWEST IRISH HOLDINGS (BARBADOS) INC.

WESTERN COMMUNICATIONS INC.

CANWEST FINANCE INC./FINANCIÈRE CANWEST INC.

NATIONAL POST HOLDINGS LTD.

CANWEST INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT INC.

CANWEST INTERNATIONAL DISTRIBUTION LIMITED

CANWEST MEDIA WORKS TURKISH HOLDINGS (NETHERLANDS) B.V.

CGS INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS (NETHERLANDS) B.V.

CGS DEBENTURE HOLDING (NETHERLANDS) B.V.

CGS SHAREHOLDING (NETHERLANDS) B.V.

CGS NZ RADIO SHAREHOLDING (NETHERLANDS) B.V.

4501063 CANADA INC.

4501071 CANADA INC.

30109, LLC

CANWEST MEDIA WORKS (US) HOLDINGS CORP.

Schedule B — New Canwest Articles of Incorporation

FORM 1 — ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION

Item 3 —	See attached Schedule A
Item 4 —	The shares of the Corporation shall be subject to the restriction on the transfer of securities set out under other provisions, if any.
Item 5 —	Minimum of 1; Maximum of 10
Item 6 —	None
Item 7	See attached Schedule B

Schedule A — to the Articles of Incorporation

The Corporation is authorized to issue an unlimited number of class A Common, an unlimited number of Class B Common and an unlimited number of Preferred shares each subject to the rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions as set forth below:

1. The class A Common shares and the Class B Common shares shall be subject to the following rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions:

(a) The holders of class A Common shares shall be entitled to receive notice of, attend at and vote at all meetings of shareholders on the basis of one (1) vote for each class A Common share held;

(b) Subject to the provisions of the Canada *Business Corporations Act*, the holders of Class B Common shares shall not be entitled to receive notice of, attend at or vote at any meetings of shareholders;

(c) The holders of class A Common shares and Class B Common shares shall be entitled to receive dividends as and when declared by the Corporation. Dividends may be paid on the class A Common shares (to the complete exclusion of the Class B Common shares), or on the Class B Common shares (to the complete exclusion of the class A Common shares), or in part on each such class;

(d) Upon the liquidation or dissolution of the Corporation, the holders of class A Common shares and Class B Common shares shall, subject to the rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions attaching to any other class of shares of the Corporation, be entitled to share, pro rata, according to the number of class A Common shares and Class B Common shares held, in the remaining property of the Corporation; and

(e) Except as hereinbefore provided, class A Common shares and Class B Common shares shall rank pari passu with each other.

2. The Preferred shares shall be subject to the following rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions:

(a) The redemption price (the "*Redemption Price*") with respect to each Preferred share shall be fixed by the directors at the time of the first issuance of any such Preferred shares and shall equal the amount obtained when the difference, if positive, between:

(i) the fair market value, at the time of the first issuance of any Preferred shares, of all consideration received by the Corporation in connection with such issuance (whether or not, in connection with such issuance, the Corporation also issues or gives any non-share consideration in exchange for the consideration received) and

(ii) the fair market value of any non-share consideration issued by the Corporation for the consideration received is divided by the number of Preferred shares so issued. The Redemption Price may be adjusted in accordance with the provisions of any written agreement between the Corporation and the subscriber for any such Preferred shares;

(b) The holders of Preferred shares shall be entitled to receive and the Corporation shall pay thereon, as and if declared by the board of directors, out of the moneys of the Corporation properly applicable to the payment of dividends, non-cumulative dividends at a rate to be determined by the directors upon the first issuance of any such shares. In respect of the fiscal year of the Corporation in which a particular Preferred share is issued, such dividends in respect thereof shall accrue from the date of allotment of such Preferred share. The board of directors shall be entitled from time to time to declare part of the said non-cumulative dividend for any fiscal year, notwithstanding that such dividend for such fiscal year shall not be declared in full. If within three (3) months after the expiration of any fiscal year of the Corporation the board of directors in its discretion shall not declare any dividend on the Preferred shares for such fiscal year, or shall only declare a part of the said non-cumulative dividend, then the rights of the holders of the Preferred shares to such dividend for such fiscal year shall, as to the undeclared part thereof, be forever extinguished. The holders of the Preferred shares shall not be entitled to any dividends other than or in excess of the non-cumulative dividends hereinbefore provided for;

(c) In the event of the liquidation, dissolution or winding up of the Corporation or other distribution of assets or property of the Corporation among shareholders for the purpose of winding-up its affairs, the holders of Preferred shares shall be entitled to receive from the assets and property of the Corporation, a sum equivalent to the Redemption Price plus all declared but unpaid dividends thereon, in respect of each Preferred share held by them respectively, before any amount shall be paid or any property or assets of the Corporation distributed to the holders of any class of common shares or any other class or series of shares ranking junior to the Preferred shares. After payment to the holders of the Preferred shares of the amount so payable to them as hereinbefore provided for, they shall not be entitled to share any further in the distribution of the assets or property of the Corporation;

(d) Subject to the provisions of the Canada *Business Corporations Act*, the Corporation may, upon giving notice as hereinafter provided, redeem at any time the whole or from time to time any part of the then outstanding Preferred shares on payment for each share to be redeemed of the Redemption Price plus all declared but unpaid dividends thereon. In case a part only of the then outstanding Preferred shares is at any time to be redeemed, the Preferred shares so to be redeemed shall be selected from the outstanding Preferred shares held by each holder as nearly (disregarding fractions), as may be in proportion to his total holding of such shares;

(e) In the case of redemption of Preferred shares under the provisions of clause (d) hereof, the Corporation shall at least thirty (30) days before the date specified for redemption mail or deliver to each person who at the date of mailing or delivery is a holder of Preferred shares to be redeemed, a notice in writing of the intention of the Corporation to redeem such Preferred shares. In case of mailing, such notice shall be mailed by letter, postage prepaid, addressed to the holder at such holder's address as it appears on the records of the Corporation or in the event of the address of any such holder not so appearing, then to the last known address of such holder. Such notice shall specify (i) the number of Preferred shares that the Corporation desires to redeem; (ii) the business day (the "Redemption Date") on which the Corporation desires to redeem the Preferred shares; (iii) the amount of all declared but unpaid dividends with respect to the Preferred shares to be redeemed; and (iv) the place or places of redemption;

On or after the Redemption Date, the Corporation shall pay or cause to be paid in respect of each Preferred share to be redeemed, to or to the order of the holders of the Preferred shares to be redeemed, the Redemption Price thereof plus all declared but unpaid dividends thereon, if any, on presentation and surrender at the registered office of the Corporation or any other place designated in such notice of the certificates representing the Preferred shares called for redemption. Such payment shall be made by cheque payable at par at any branch of the Corporation's bankers for the time being in Canada. If a part only of the shares represented by any certificate are to be redeemed, a new certificate for the balance shall be issued at the expense of the Corporation. From and after the Redemption Date the holders of the Preferred shares called for redemption shall cease to be entitled to dividends and shall not be entitled to exercise any of the rights of shareholders in

respect thereof unless payment of the Redemption Price plus all declared but unpaid dividends thereon shall not be made upon presentation of certificates in accordance with the foregoing provisions, in which case the rights of the holders shall remain unaffected. The Corporation shall have the right at any time after the mailing of notice of its intention to redeem any Preferred shares to deposit the Redemption Price plus all declared but unpaid dividends thereon, if any, of the shares so called for redemption with respect to such of the said shares represented by certificates as have not at the date of such deposit been surrendered by the holders thereof in connection with such redemption to a special account in any chartered bank or any trust company in Canada named in such notice, to be paid without interest to or to the order of the respective holders of such Preferred shares called for redemption upon presentation and surrender to such bank or trust company of the certificates representing same. Upon such deposit being made or upon the date specified for redemption in such notice, whichever is the later, the Preferred shares in respect whereof such deposit shall have been made shall be redeemed and the rights of the holders thereof after such deposit or such redemption date, as the case may be, shall be limited to receiving, without interest, their proportionate part of the total Redemption Price plus all declared but unpaid dividends thereon, if any, so deposited against presentation and surrender of the said certificates held by them respectively;

(f) Subject to the provisions of the Canada *Business Corporations Act*, the Corporation may purchase at any time the whole or from time to time any part of the then outstanding Preferred shares on payment for each share to be purchased of the Redemption Price thereof plus all declared but unpaid dividends thereon, if any. The provisions of clauses (d) and (e) above shall apply mutatis mutandis to any such purchase;

(g) A holder of Preferred shares shall, subject to the provisions of clause (h) below, be entitled by written notice given to the Corporation at its registered office in Alberta, to require the Corporation at the option of such holder, to either redeem or purchase all or any of the issued and outstanding Preferred shares held by such holder. The holder shall tender with such notice to the Corporation at its registered office a share certificate or certificates representing the Preferred shares which the registered holder desires to have the Corporation redeem or purchase together with a request in writing specifying (i) that the registered holder desires to have the Preferred shares represented by such certificate or certificates redeemed or purchased by the Corporation and, if part only of the Preferred shares represented by such certificate or certificates is to be redeemed or purchased, the number thereof to be so redeemed or purchased; and (ii) the business day (the "Redemption Date") on which the holder desires to have the Corporation redeem or purchase such Preferred shares;

Unless waived by the Corporation, the Redemption Date shall be not less than thirty (30) days after the day on which the request in writing is given to the Corporation. Upon receipt of a share certificate or certificates representing the Preferred shares which the registered holder desires to have the Corporation redeem or purchase together with such a request, the Corporation shall on the Redemption Date redeem such Preferred shares by paying to such registered holder the Redemption Price per Preferred share for each such share being redeemed or purchased plus all declared but unpaid dividends thereon. Such payment shall be made by cheque payable at par at any branch of the Corporation's bankers for the time being in Canada. If a part only of the shares represented by any certificate be redeemed or purchased a new certificate for the balance shall be issued at the expense of the Corporation. The said Preferred shares shall be redeemed or purchased on the Redemption Date and from and after the Redemption Date such shares shall cease to be entitled to dividends and the holder thereof shall not be entitled to exercise any of the rights of holders of Preferred shares in respect thereof unless payment of the Redemption Price per Preferred share plus all declared but unpaid dividends thereon is not made on the Redemption Date, in which event the rights of the holder of the said Preferred shares shall remain unaffected;

(h) In the event that a redemption or purchase by the Corporation of those Preferred shares specified in the written notice given to it by a holder of Preferred shares pursuant to the provisions of clause (g) above cannot be complied with without contravening a provision or provisions of the Canada *Business Corporations Act* or some other applicable legislation, then the Corporation shall only redeem or purchase, as the case may be, such proportion (if any, and disregarding fractions) of the issued and outstanding Preferred shares held by each holder thereof as can be redeemed or purchased without causing such contravention and the Corporation shall redeem or purchase the balance of the outstanding Preferred shares in respect of which the Corporation has received notices for redemption or purchase on a pro rata basis, disregarding fractions, at

such time or times as such redemption or purchase can be made without causing the Corporation to be in contravention of the Canada *Business Corporations Act* or some other applicable legislation;

(i) If it is determined at any time subsequent to the date of issue of a Preferred share and prior to its redemption or purchase by the Corporation, that the Redemption Price of that share exceeded or was exceeded by the fair market value as at such date of the consideration received therefor (herein the "Fair Market Value of the Consideration"), then (i) if the Redemption Price exceeded the Fair Market Value of the Consideration, then as and from such determination the Redemption Price shall be reduced by the amount required to eliminate such excess; and (ii) if the Redemption Price is exceeded by the Fair Market Value of the Consideration, then as and from such determination the Redemption Price shall be increased by the amount required to eliminate such excess or the Corporation shall forthwith issue that number of Preferred shares as may be required to eliminate such excess;

If it is determined at any time subsequent to the date of issue of a Preferred share and subsequent to its redemption or purchase by the Corporation, that the Redemption Price of that share exceeded or was exceeded by the Fair Market Value of the Consideration as at such date, then (i) if the Redemption Price exceeded the Fair Market Value of the Consideration, then the holder of that Preferred share shall forthwith pay to the Corporation an amount equal to such excess; and (ii) if the Redemption Price is exceeded by the Fair Market Value of the Consideration, then the Corporation shall forthwith pay to the holder of that Preferred share an amount equal to such excess or shall issue that number of Preferred shares as may be required to eliminate such excess;

(j) Subject to the provisions of the Canada *Business Corporations Act*, the holders of Preferred shares shall not be entitled to receive notice of, attend at or vote at any meetings of shareholders;

3. Notwithstanding anything herein expressed or implied to the contrary, no dividend shall be declared or paid on any common shares of the Corporation if such declaration or payment would cause the realizable value of the assets of the Corporation to be less than the aggregate of:

(a) its liabilities;

(b) the stated capital of all issued and outstanding shares of the Corporation; and

(c) the amount the Corporation would be required to pay on a complete redemption or purchase of any issued and outstanding Preferred shares of the Corporation.

Schedule B — to the Articles of Incorporation

The directors may appoint one (1) or more additional directors of the Corporation, who shall hold office for a term expiring not later than the close of the next annual meeting of shareholders, provided the total number of directors so appointed may not exceed one-third (1/3) of the number of directors elected at the previous annual meeting of shareholders.

Securities of the Corporation, other than non-convertible debt securities, may not be transferred unless:

(a) in the case of shares, the consent of the directors of the Corporation is obtained; or

(b) the consent of shareholders holding not less than 50% of the shares entitled to vote at such time is obtained;

provided that this restriction shall not apply to applicable securities, other than shares, if such securities are subject to restrictions on transfer contained in a security holders' agreement.

The consent of the directors or the shareholders in this section may be evidenced (i) by a resolution of the directors or shareholders, as the case may be, or (ii) by an instrument or instruments in writing signed by all of the directors, or signed by shareholders holding shares entitling the holders thereof to vote at least 50% of the shares entitled to vote at such time, as the case may be.

The Board of Directors may from time to time delegate to such one or more of the directors and officers of the Corporation as may be designated by the Board all or any of the powers conferred on the Board above to such extent and in such manner as the Board shall determine at the time of each such delegation.

NOTE: The above provisions should be included under "Other provisions", as it refers to transfer of securities and not shares only. This is in conformity with Industry Canada's policies.

Schedule C — New Canwest By-Laws — By-Law No. 1

[Name of Corporation] — By-Law No. 1

A by-law relating generally to the conduct of the affairs of the Corporation.

Interpretation

1. — Interpretation

In this by-law and all other by-laws of the Corporation, unless the context otherwise specifies or requires:

(a) "Act" means the Canada *Business Corporations Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44 as from time to time amended and every statute that may be substituted therefor and, in the case of such substitution, any references in the by-laws of the Corporation to provisions of the Act shall be read as references to the substituted provisions therefor in the new statute or statutes;

(b) "Regulations" means the Regulations under the Act as published or from time to time amended and every regulation that may be substituted therefor and, in the case of such substitution, any references in the by-laws of the Corporation to provisions of the Regulations shall be read as references to the substituted provisions therefor in the new regulations;

(c) "by-law" means any by-law of the Corporation from time to time in force and effect;

(d) all terms which are contained in the by-laws and which are defined in the Act or the Regulations shall have the meanings given to such terms in the Act or the Regulations;

(e) words importing the singular number only shall include the plural and vice versa and words importing a specific gender shall include the other gender; and

(f) the headings used in the by-laws are inserted for reference purposes only are not to be considered or taken into account in construing the terms or provisions thereof or to be deemed in any way to clarify, modify or explain the effect of any such terms or provisions.

Registered Office and Seal

2.

(a) — Registered Office

The registered office of the Corporation shall be in the province in Canada specified in its articles. The place and address of the registered office within such province may be changed from time to time by the directors.

(b) — Seal

The Corporation may, but need not, adopt a corporate seal, and may change a corporate seal that is adopted. Any corporate seal adopted for the Corporation shall be such as the board of directors may by resolution from time to time approve.

Directors

3. — Number and Duties

Subject to any unanimous shareholder agreement, the directors shall manage, or supervise the management of, the business and affairs of the Corporation. The board of directors may consist of the number of directors set out in the articles of the Corporation or, where a minimum and maximum number is provided for in the articles, such number of directors as may be determined from time to time by ordinary resolution of the shareholders or if the resolution of the shareholders empowers the directors to determine such number, then by resolution of the directors. Subject to the Act, at least twenty-five per cent of the directors shall be resident Canadians. However, subject to the Act, if the Corporation has less than four directors, at least one director shall be a resident Canadian. If the Corporation is a distributing corporation and any of its securities remain outstanding and are held by more than one person, at least two of the directors shall not be officers or employees of the Corporation or any affiliate of the Corporation. In exercising his or her powers and discharging his or her duties each director shall (a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the Corporation and (b) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable circumstances.

4. — Term of Office

A director's term of office (subject to (a) the provisions of the articles of the Corporation; (b) the provisions of the Act; (c) any unanimous shareholder agreement; and (d) any expressly stated term of office) shall be from the date on which the director is elected or appointed until the annual meeting next following.

5. — Vacation of Office

A director of the Corporation ceases to hold office when the director: (a) becomes bankrupt; (b) is found to be of unsound mind by a court in Canada or elsewhere; (c) by notice in writing to the Corporation, resigns, which resignation shall be effective at the time it is received by the Corporation or at the time specified in the notice, whichever is later; (d) dies; (e) is removed from office by the shareholders in accordance with paragraph 6; or (f) if required to hold shares issued by the Corporation to be qualified as a director, ceases to hold such shares.

6. — Election and Removal

Subject to Section 107 of the Act, the shareholders of the Corporation shall elect, at the first meeting of shareholders and at each succeeding annual meeting at which an election of directors is required, directors to hold office for a term expiring not later than the close of the next annual meeting of shareholders following the election. A director not elected for an expressly stated term ceases to hold office at the close of the first annual meeting of shareholders following the director's election, but, if qualified, is eligible for re-election. If directors are not elected at a meeting of shareholders, the incumbent directors continue in office until their successors are elected. Provided always that, subject to Section 109 of the Act, the shareholders of the Corporation may, by ordinary resolution passed at a special meeting of shareholders, remove any director or directors from office and a vacancy created by the removal of a director may be filled at the meeting of the shareholders at which the director is removed.

7. — Committees of Directors

The directors may appoint from among their number a committee or committees and subject to Section 115 of the Act may delegate to any such committee any of the powers of the directors. Subject to the by-laws and any resolution of the board of directors, any committee of directors may meet for the transaction of business, adjourn and otherwise regulate its meetings as it sees fit and may from time to time adopt, amend or repeal rules or procedures in this regard. Subject to the Act, except to the extent otherwise determined by the board of directors or, failing such determination, as determined by such committee of directors, the provisions of paragraphs 8 to 15, inclusive, shall apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to such committee.

Meetings of Directors

8. — Place of Meeting

Meetings of the directors may be held within or outside Canada.

9. — Notice

A meeting of directors may be convened by the Chairperson of the Board, the Vice-Chairperson of the Board, the Managing Director, the Chief Executive Officer if he is a director, the President if he is a director, a Vice-President who is a director or any two directors at any time, and the Secretary, when directed or authorized by any of such officers or any two directors, shall convene a meeting of directors. The notice of any meeting convened as aforesaid need not specify the purpose of or the business to be transacted at the meeting, except for any of the matters set out in Section 115(3) of the Act.

Notice of any such meeting shall be served in the manner specified in paragraph 60 of this by-law not less than two days (exclusive of the day on which the notice is delivered or sent but inclusive of the day for which notice is given) before the meeting is to take place; provided always that a director may in any manner waive notice of a meeting of directors (whether before or after such meeting) and attendance of a director at a meeting of directors shall constitute a waiver of notice of the meeting except where a director attends a meeting for the express purpose of objecting to the transaction of any business on the grounds that the meeting is not lawfully called; provided further that meetings of directors may be held at any time without notice if all the directors are present (except where a director attends a meeting for the express purpose of objecting to the transaction of any business on the grounds that the meeting is not lawfully called) or if all of the absent directors waive notice before or after the date of such meeting.

If the first meeting of the directors following the election of directors by the shareholders is held immediately thereafter, then for such meeting or for a meeting of the directors at which a director is appointed to fill a vacancy in the board, no notice shall be necessary to such elected or appointed directors or directors in order to legally constitute the meeting, provided that a quorum of the directors is present.

10. — Omission of Notice

The accidental omission to give notice of any meeting of directors to, or the non-receipt of any notice by, any person shall not invalidate any resolution passed or any proceeding taken at such meeting.

11. — Adjournment

Any meeting of directors may be adjourned from time to time by the Chairperson of the meeting, with the consent of the meeting, to a fixed time and place. Notice of any adjourned meeting of directors is not required to be given if the time and place of the adjourned meeting is announced at the original meeting. Any adjourned meeting shall be duly constituted if held in accordance with the terms of the adjournment and a quorum is present thereat. The directors who formed a quorum at the original meeting are not required to form the quorum at the adjourned meeting. If there is no quorum present at the adjourned meeting, the original meeting shall be deemed to have terminated forthwith after its adjournment. Any business may be brought before or dealt with at any adjourned meeting which might have been brought before or dealt with at the original meeting in accordance with the notice calling the same.

12. — Quorum

A majority of the number of directors fixed under paragraph 3 shall form a quorum for the transaction of business and, notwithstanding any vacancy among the directors, a quorum of directors may exercise all the powers of directors. No business shall be transacted at a meeting of directors unless a quorum of the board of directors is present and, except as otherwise permitted or restricted by the Act, at least twenty-five per cent of the directors present are resident Canadians or, if the Corporation has less than four directors, at least one of the directors present is a resident Canadian.

13. — Telephone Participation

A director may, in accordance with the Regulations, if any, and if all of the directors of the Corporation consent, participate in a meeting of directors or of a committee of directors by means of such telephonic, electronic or other communication facility that permits all participants to communicate adequately with each other during the meeting. A director participating in such a meeting by such means is deemed to be present at that meeting.

14. — Voting

Questions arising at any meeting of the board of directors shall be decided by a majority of votes. In case of an equality of votes the Chairperson of the meeting in addition to his or her original vote shall have a second or casting vote.

15. — Resolution in Lieu of Meeting

Notwithstanding any of the provisions of this by-law, but subject to the Act or any unanimous shareholder agreement, a resolution in writing, signed by all of the directors entitled to vote on that resolution at a meeting of the directors is as valid as if it had been passed at a meeting of the directors.

Remuneration of Directors

16. — Remuneration of Directors

The remuneration to be paid to the directors shall be such as the board of directors shall from time to time determine and such remuneration shall be in addition to the salary paid to any officer or employee of the Corporation who is also a member of the board of directors. The board of directors may also award special remuneration to any director undertaking any special services on the Corporation's behalf other than the routine work ordinarily required of a director by the Corporation and the confirmation of any such resolution or resolutions by the shareholders shall not be required. The directors shall also be entitled to be paid their travelling and other expenses properly incurred by them in connection with the affairs of the Corporation.

Submission of Contracts or Transactions to Shareholders for Approval

17. — Submission of Contracts or Transactions to Shareholders for Approval

The board of directors in its discretion may submit any contract, act or transaction for approval or ratification at any annual meeting of the shareholders or at any special meeting of the shareholders called for the purpose of considering the same and, subject to the provisions of Section 120 of the Act, any such contract, act or transaction that shall be approved or ratified or confirmed by a resolution passed by a majority of the votes cast at any such meeting (unless any different or additional requirement is imposed by the Act or by the Corporation's articles or any other by-law) shall be as valid and as binding upon the Corporation and upon all the shareholders as though it had been approved, ratified or confirmed by every shareholder of the Corporation.

For the Protection of Directors and Officers

18. — Conflict of Interest

In supplement of and not by way of limitation upon any rights conferred upon directors and officers by the Act, no director or officer shall be disqualified by his or her office from, or vacate his or her office by reason of, holding any office or place of profit under the Corporation or under any body corporate in which the Corporation shall be a shareholder; nor shall any director or officer be liable to account to the Corporation or any of its shareholders or creditors for any profit arising from any such office or place of profit; and, subject to the provisions of Section 120 of the Act, no contract or arrangement entered into by or on behalf of the Corporation in which any director or officer shall be in any way directly or indirectly interested shall be avoided or voidable and no director or officer shall be liable to account to the Corporation or any of its shareholders or creditors for any profit realized by or from any such contract or arrangement by reason of any fiduciary relationship. A director or officer of the Corporation who is a party to a material contract or transaction or proposed material contract or transaction

with the Corporation, or is a director or an officer, or an individual acting in a similar capacity of, or has a material interest in, any person who is a party to a material contract or transaction or proposed material contract or transaction with the Corporation shall disclose the nature and extent of such interest at the time and in the manner provided in the Act. Except as provided in the Act, no such director of the Corporation shall vote on any resolution to approve such contracts or transactions but each such director may be counted to determine the presence of a quorum at the meeting of directors where such vote is being taken.

19. — For the Protection of Directors and Officers

Except as otherwise provided in the Act, no director or officer for the time being of the Corporation shall be liable for the acts, receipts, neglects or defaults of any other director or officer or employee or for joining in any receipt or act for conformity or for any loss, damage or expense happening to the Corporation through the insufficiency or deficiency of title to any property acquired by the Corporation or for or on behalf of the Corporation or for the insufficiency or deficiency of any security in or upon which any of the moneys of or belonging to the Corporation shall be placed out or invested or for any loss or damage arising from the bankruptcy, insolvency or tortious act of any person, including any person with whom or which any moneys, securities or effects shall be lodged or deposited or for any loss, conversion, misapplication or misappropriation of or any damage resulting from any dealings with any moneys, securities or other assets belonging to the Corporation or for any other loss, damage or misfortune whatever which may happen in the execution of the duties of his or her respective office or trust or in relation thereto unless the same shall happen by or through his or her failure to exercise the powers and to discharge the duties of his office honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the Corporation and in connection therewith to exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable circumstances. The directors for the time being of the Corporation shall not be under any duty or responsibility in respect of any contract, act or transaction whether or not made, done or entered into in the name or on behalf of the Corporation, except such as shall have been submitted to and authorized or approved by the board of directors. If any director or officer of the Corporation shall be employed by or shall perform services for the Corporation otherwise than as a director or officer or shall have an interest in a person which is employed by or performs services for the Corporation, the fact of his or her being a shareholder, director or officer of the Corporation shall not disentitle such director or officer or such person, as the case may be, from receiving proper remuneration for such services.

20. — Indemnities to Directors and Officers

Subject to the provisions of Section 124 of the Act, the Corporation shall indemnify a director or officer, a former director or officer, or another individual who acts or acted at the Corporation's request as a director or officer, or an individual acting in a similar capacity of another entity, against all costs, charges and expenses, including an amount paid to settle an action or satisfy a judgment, reasonably incurred by the individual in respect of any civil, criminal or administrative action or proceeding to which the individual is involved because of that association with the Corporation or other entity, if (a) the individual acted honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the Corporation or, as the case may be, to the best interests of the other entity for which the individual acted as director or officer or in a similar capacity at the Corporation's request; and (b) in the case of a criminal or administrative action or proceeding that is enforced by a monetary penalty, the individual had reasonable grounds for believing that the individual's conduct was lawful. The Corporation shall also indemnify any such person in such other circumstances as the Act or law permits or requires. Nothing in this bylaw shall limit the right of any person entitled to indemnity to claim indemnity apart from the provisions of this by-law to the extent permitted by the Act or law. The Corporation may also purchase insurance for the benefit of any or all directors and/or officers or other individuals referred to above against any such liability.

Officers

21. — Appointments Generally

The board of directors may annually or oftener as may be required appoint a Chairperson of the Board, a Vice-Chairperson of the Board, a Chief Executive Officer, a President, one or more Vice-Presidents, a Secretary, a Treasurer, one or more Assistant Secretaries, one or more Assistant Treasurers, a Managing Director, a General Manager, a General Counsel or a Comptroller.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, each incumbent officer shall continue in office until the earliest of (a) the officer's resignation, which resignation shall be effective at the time a written resignation is received by the Corporation or at the time specified in the resignation, whichever is later, (b) the appointment of the officer's successor, (c) the officer ceasing to be a director or resident Canadian if such is a necessary qualification of the officer's appointment, (d) the meeting at which the board of directors annually appoints the officers of the Corporation, (e) the officer's removal, and (f) the officer's death. A director may be appointed to any office of the Corporation but none of the officers except the Chairperson of the Board, the Vice-Chairperson of the Board and the Managing Director need be a member of the board of directors. Two or more of such offices may be held by the same person. In case and whenever the same person holds the offices of Secretary and Treasurer, he may but need not be known as the Secretary-Treasurer. The board of directors may from time to time appoint such other officers and agents as it shall deem necessary who shall have such authority and shall perform such duties as may from time to time be prescribed by the board of directors. The board of directors may from time to time and subject to the provisions of the Act, vary, add to or limit the duties and powers of any officer.

22. — Remuneration and Removal

The remuneration of all officers appointed by the board of directors shall be determined from time to time by resolution of the board of directors. The fact that any officer or employee is a director or shareholder of the Corporation shall not disqualify such officer or employee from receiving such remuneration as may be determined. All officers, in the absence of agreement to the contrary, shall be subject to removal by resolution of the board of directors at any time, with or without cause.

23. — Powers and Duties

All officers shall sign such contracts, documents or instruments in writing as require their respective signatures and shall respectively have and perform all powers and duties incident to their respective offices and such other powers and duties respectively as may from time to time be assigned to them by the board of directors.

24. — Duties May be Delegated

In case of the absence or inability to act of any officer of the Corporation or for any other reason that the board of directors may deem sufficient, the board of directors may delegate all or any of the powers of such officer to any other officer or to any director for the time being.

25. — Chairperson of the Board

The Chairperson of the Board (if any) shall, when present, preside as Chairperson at all meetings of the directors, any committee of directors and the shareholders.

26. — Vice-Chairperson of the Board

If the Chairperson of the Board is absent or is unable or refuses to act, the Vice-Chairperson of the Board (if any) shall, when present, preside as chairperson at all meetings of the directors, any committee of directors and the shareholders.

27. — Chief Executive Officer

The Chief Executive Officer shall be the chief executive officer of the Corporation who shall exercise general supervision over the affairs of the Corporation. The Chief Executive Officer shall be vested with and may exercise all the powers and shall perform all the duties of the Chairperson of the Board and/or the Vice-Chairperson of the Board if none be appointed or if the Chairperson of the Board and the Vice-Chairperson of the Board are absent or are unable or refuse to act; provided, however, that unless the Chief Executive Officer is a director, he or she shall not preside as Chairperson at any meeting of directors or of any committee of directors or, subject to paragraph 44 of this by-law, at any meeting of shareholders.

28. — President

The President shall be vested with and may exercise all the powers and shall perform all the duties of the Chief Executive Officer in the absence or inability or refusal to act of the Chief Executive Officer; provided, however, that a President who is not a director shall not preside as Chairperson at any meeting of directors or of any committee of directors or, subject to paragraph 44 of this by-law, at any meeting of shareholders.

29. — Vice-President

The Vice-President or, if more than one, the Vice-Presidents, in order of seniority, shall be vested with all the powers and shall perform all the duties of the President in the absence or inability or refusal to act of the President; provided, however, that a Vice-President who is not a director shall not preside as Chairperson at any meeting of directors or of any committee of directors or, subject to paragraph 44 of this by-law, at any meeting of shareholders.

30. — Secretary

The Secretary shall give or cause to be given notices for all meetings of the directors, any committee of directors and the shareholders when directed to do so and shall have charge of the minute and record books of the Corporation and, subject to the provisions of paragraph 51 of this by-law, of the records (other than accounting records) referred to in Section 20 of the Act. The Secretary shall, when present, act as secretary of meetings of the board of directors and of the shareholders.

31. — Treasurer

Subject to the provisions of any resolution of the board of directors, the Treasurer (or any other person holding a similar function) shall have the care and custody of all the funds and securities of the Corporation and shall deposit the same in the name of the Corporation in such bank or banks or with such other depositary or depositaries as the board of directors may direct.

32. — Assistant Secretary and Assistant Treasurer

The Assistant Secretary or, if more than one, the Assistant Secretaries in order of seniority, and the Assistant Treasurer or, if more than one, the Assistant Treasurers in order of seniority, shall respectively perform all the duties of the Secretary and the Treasurer, respectively, in the absence or inability or refusal to act of the Secretary or the Treasurer, as the case may be.

33. — Managing Director

The Managing Director shall be a member of the board of directors, and a resident Canadian and shall exercise such powers and have such authority as may be delegated to the Managing Director by the board of directors in accordance with the provisions of Section 115 of the Act.

34. — General Manager

The board of directors may from time to time appoint a General Manager and may delegate to such General Manager full power to manage and direct the business and affairs of the Corporation (except such matters and duties as by law must be transacted or performed by the board of directors and/or by the shareholders) and to employ and discharge agents and employees of the Corporation or may delegate to the General Manager any lesser authority. The General Manager shall conform to all lawful orders given by the board of directors and shall at all reasonable times give to the directors or any of them all information they may require regarding the affairs of the Corporation. Any agent or employee appointed by the General Manager shall be subject to discharge by the board of directors.

35. — Vacancies

If the office of any officer of the Corporation shall be or become vacant by reason of death, resignation, disqualification or otherwise, the board of directors may appoint a person to fill such vacancy.

Shareholders' Meetings

36. — Annual Meeting

Subject to the provisions of Section 133 of the Act, the annual meeting of the shareholders shall be held on such day in each year and at such time as the board of directors may determine.

37. — Special Meetings

Special meetings of the shareholders may be convened by order of the Chairperson of the Board, the Vice-Chairperson of the Board, the Managing Director, the Chief Executive Officer if a director, the President if a director, a Vice-President if a director or by the board of directors at any date and time.

38. — Place of Meetings

Meetings of shareholders shall be held at any place within Canada that the board of directors determines, or at any place outside Canada if such place is specified in the articles or all the shareholders entitled to vote at the meeting agree that the meeting is to be held at that place. A shareholder who attends a meeting of shareholders held outside Canada is deemed to have agreed to it being held outside Canada except when the shareholder attends the meeting for the express purpose of objecting to the transaction of any business on the grounds that the meeting is not lawfully held.

39. — Participation in Meeting by Electronic Means

Any person entitled to attend a meeting of shareholders may participate in the meeting, in accordance with the Regulations, if any, by means of a telephonic, electronic or other communication facility that permits all participants to communicate adequately with each other during the meeting, if the Corporation makes available such a communication facility. A person participating in a meeting by such means is deemed for the purposes of the Act to be present at the meeting.

40. — Meeting Held by Electronic Means

If the directors or the shareholders of the Corporation call a meeting of shareholders pursuant to the Act, those directors or shareholders, as the case may be, may determine that the meeting shall be held, in accordance with the Regulations, if any, entirely by means of a telephonic, electronic or other communication facility that permits all participants to communicate adequately with each other during the meeting.

41. — Notice

A notice stating the day, hour and place of meeting shall be sent within the period prescribed by the Regulations to each shareholder entitled to vote at such meeting, to each director and to the auditor of the Corporation in the manner specified in paragraphs 60 or 75 of this by-law. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the Corporation is not a distributing corporation, the notice may be sent not less than 10 days before the date of the meeting. Notice of a meeting at which special business, as defined in Section 135(5) of the Act, is to be transacted shall state (a) the nature of that business in sufficient detail to permit the shareholder to form a reasoned judgment thereon, and (b) the text of any special resolution to be submitted to the meeting. Provided that a meeting of shareholders may be held for any purpose on any day and at any time without notice if all of the shareholders and all other persons entitled to attend such meeting are present in person or, where appropriate, represented by proxy at the meeting (except where a shareholder or other person attends the meeting for the express purpose of objecting to the transaction of any business on the grounds that the meeting is not lawfully called) or if all of the shareholders and all other persons entitled to attend such meeting who are not present in person or, where appropriate, represented by proxy thereat waive notice before or after the date of such meeting. The directors may fix in advance a date as the record date for purposes of determining shareholders entitled to receive notice of a meeting of shareholders or entitled to vote at a meeting of shareholders in accordance with the requirements of Section 134 of the Act and the Regulations.

42. — Waiver of Notice

A shareholder or any other person entitled to attend a meeting of shareholders may in any manner waive notice of a meeting of shareholders (whether before or after such meeting) and their attendance at a meeting of shareholders is a waiver of notice of the meeting, except where they attend a meeting for the express purpose of objecting to the transaction of any business on the grounds that the meeting is not lawfully called.

43. — Omission of Notice

The accidental omission to give notice of any meeting or any irregularity in the notice of any meeting or the non-receipt of any notice by any shareholder or shareholders, director or directors or the auditor of the Corporation shall not invalidate any resolution passed or any proceedings taken at any meeting of shareholders.

44. — Voting

Every question submitted to any meeting of shareholders shall be decided in the first instance by a show of hands unless a person entitled to vote at the meeting has demanded a ballot. In the case of an equality of votes, the Chairperson of the meeting shall both on a show of hands and on a ballot have a second or casting vote in addition to the vote or votes to which he or she may be otherwise entitled.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, any vote taken at a meeting of shareholders may be held, in accordance with the Regulations, if any, entirely by means of a telephonic, electronic or other communication facility, if the Corporation makes available such a communication facility. Any person participating in a meeting of shareholders by electronic means pursuant to Subsection 132(4) or (5) of the Act and entitled to vote at the meeting may vote, in accordance with the Regulations, if any, by means of the telephonic, electronic or other communication facility that the Corporation has made available for that purpose.

A ballot may be demanded either before or after any vote by show of hands by any person entitled to vote at the meeting. If at any meeting a ballot is demanded on the election of a Chairperson or on the question of adjournment it shall be taken forthwith without adjournment. If at any meeting a ballot is demanded on any other question or as to the election of directors, the vote (subject to Section 152(3) of the Act) shall be taken by ballot in such manner and either at once, later in the meeting or after adjournment as the Chairperson of the meeting directs. The result of a ballot shall be deemed to be the resolution of the meeting at which the ballot was demanded. A demand for a ballot may be withdrawn.

Where two or more persons hold the same share or shares jointly, one of these holders present at a meeting of shareholders may, in the absence of the other or others, vote the share or shares but if two or more of those persons who are present, in person or by proxy, vote, they shall vote as one on the share or shares jointly held by them.

At any meeting unless a ballot is demanded, an entry in the minutes of a meeting to the effect that the Chairperson of the meeting declared a resolution to be carried or defeated is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, proof of the fact without proof of the number or proportion of the votes recorded in favour of or against the resolution.

45. — Chairperson of the Meeting

In the event that the Chairperson of the Board and the Vice-Chairperson of the Board are absent and the Chief Executive Officer is absent or is not a director and the President is absent or is not a director and there is no Vice-President present who is a director, the persons who are present and entitled to vote shall choose another director as Chairperson of the meeting and if no director is present or if all the directors present decline to take the chair then the persons who are present and entitled to vote shall choose one of their number to be Chairperson.

46. — Proxies

Votes at meetings of shareholders may be given either personally or by proxy or, in the case of a shareholder who is a body corporate or association, by an individual authorized to represent it at meetings of shareholders of the Corporation. At every meeting at which he or she is entitled to vote, every shareholder and/or person appointed by proxy and/or individual so authorized

to represent a shareholder who is present in person shall have one vote on a show of hands. Upon a ballot at which he or she is entitled to vote, every shareholder present in person or represented by proxy or by an individual so authorized shall (subject to the provisions, if any, of the articles of the Corporation) have one vote for every share held by him or her.

A proxy shall be executed by the shareholder or the shareholder's attorney authorized in writing or, if the shareholder is a body corporate or association, by an officer or attorney thereof duly authorized and is valid only at the meeting in respect of which it is given or any adjournment thereof.

A person appointed by proxy need not be a shareholder.

Subject to the provisions of the Act and the Regulations, a proxy may be in the following form:

The undersigned shareholder of <> hereby appoints <> of <> or failing such person, <> of <> as the nominee of the undersigned to attend and act for the undersigned and on behalf of the undersigned at the <> meeting of the shareholders of the said Corporation to be held on the <> day of <>, 20<> and at any adjournment or adjournments thereof in the same manner, to the same extent and with the same power as if the undersigned were present at the said meeting or such adjournment or adjournments thereof.

DATED this <> day of <>, 20<>.

Signature of Shareholder

The board of directors may from time to time make regulations regarding the lodging of proxies at some place or places other than the place at which a meeting or adjourned meeting of shareholders is to be held and for particulars of such proxies to be provided before the meeting or adjourned meeting to the Corporation or any agent of the Corporation for the purpose of receiving such particulars and providing that proxies so lodged may be voted upon as though the proxies themselves were produced at the meeting or adjourned meeting and votes given in accordance with such regulations shall be valid and shall be counted. The Chairperson of any meeting of shareholders may, subject to any regulations made as aforesaid, in the Chairperson's discretion accept any legible form of communication as to the authority of any person claiming to vote on behalf of and to represent a shareholder notwithstanding that no proxy conferring such authority has been lodged with the Corporation, and any votes given in accordance with such communication accepted by the Chairperson of the meeting shall be valid and shall be counted.

47. — Adjournment

The Chairperson of any meeting may with the consent of the meeting adjourn the same from time to time to a fixed time and place and no notice of such adjournment need be given to the shareholders unless the meeting is adjourned by one or more adjournments for an aggregate of thirty days or more in which case, subject to Section 135(4) of the Act, notice of the adjourned meeting shall be given as for an original meeting. Any business may be brought before or dealt with at any adjourned meeting for which no notice is required which might have been brought before or dealt with at the original meeting in accordance with the notice calling the same.

Any adjourned meeting shall be duly constituted if held in accordance with the terms of the adjournment and a quorum is present thereat. The persons who formed a quorum at the original meeting are not required to form the quorum at the adjourned meeting. If there is no quorum present at the adjourned meeting, the original meeting shall be deemed to have terminated forthwith after its adjournment.

48. — Quorum

A quorum at any meeting of shareholders (unless a greater number of persons are required to be present or a greater number of shares are required to be represented by the Act or by the articles or any other by-law) shall be persons present not being less than two in number and holding or representing more than twenty per cent of the total number of the issued shares of the Corporation for the time being entitling the holders thereof to vote at such meeting. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the Corporation has only one shareholder, or only one holder of any class or series of shares, the shareholder present in person or

by proxy constitutes a meeting. No business shall be transacted at any meeting unless the requisite quorum be present at the time of the transaction of such business. If a quorum is not present at the time appointed for a meeting of shareholders or within such reasonable time thereafter as the shareholders present may determine, the persons present and entitled to vote may adjourn the meeting to a fixed time and place but may not transact any other business and the provisions of paragraph 46 with regard to notice shall apply to such adjournment.

49. — Resolution in Lieu of Meeting

Notwithstanding any of the provisions of this by-law, a resolution in writing signed by all of the shareholders entitled to vote on that resolution at a meeting of the shareholders is, subject to Section 142 of the Act, as valid as if it had been passed at a meeting of the shareholders.

Securities

50. — Issuance of Shares

Subject to the provisions of Section 25 of the Act, the articles, by-laws and any unanimous shareholder agreement, shares in the capital of the Corporation may be issued by the board of directors at such times and on such terms and conditions and to such persons or class of persons as the board of directors determines.

51. — Certificates

Certificates for shares and the instrument of transfer, if any, on the reverse side thereof shall (subject to Section 49 of the Act) be in such form as the board of directors may approve and such certificates shall be signed by at least one of the following persons, or the signature shall be printed or otherwise mechanically reproduced on the certificate:

(a) a director or officer of the Corporation;

(b) a registrar, transfer agent or branch transfer agent of the Corporation, or an individual on their behalf; and

(c) a trustee who certifies it in accordance with a trust indenture.

A share certificate containing the signature of a person which is printed, engraved, lithographed or otherwise mechanically reproduced thereon may be issued notwithstanding that the person has ceased to be a director or an officer, as the case may be, of the Corporation and shall be as valid as if the person were a director or an officer, as the case may be, at the date of its issue.

Transfer of Securities

52. — Transfer Agent and Registrar

The board of directors may from time to time appoint or remove one or more transfer agents and/or branch transfer agents and/or registrars and/or branch registrars (which may or may not be the same individual or body corporate) for the securities issued by the Corporation in registered form (or for such securities of any class or classes) and may provide for the registration of transfers of such securities (or such securities of any class or classes) in one or more places and such transfer agents and/or branch transfer agents and/or registrars and/or branch registrars shall keep all necessary books and registers of the Corporation for the registering of such securities (or such securities of the class or classes in respect of which any such appointment has been made). In the event of any such appointment in respect of the shares (or the shares of any class or classes) of the Corporation, all share certificates issued by the Corporation in respect of the shares (or the shares of the class or classes in respect of which any such appointment has been made) of the Corporation shall be countersigned by or on behalf of one of the said transfer agents and/or branch transfer agents and by or on behalf of one of the said registrars and/or branch registrars, if any.

53. — Securities Registers

A central securities register of the Corporation shall be kept at the registered office of the Corporation or at such other office or place in Canada as may from time to time be designated by the board of directors and a branch securities register or registers may be kept at such office or offices of the Corporation or other place or places, either in or outside Canada, as may from time to time be designated by the board of directors. Such register or registers shall comply with the provisions of Section 50 of the Act.

54. — Surrender of Certificates

Subject to the Act and the provisions of paragraph 52, no transfer of a security issued by the Corporation shall be registered unless the security certificate representing the security to be transferred has been surrendered or, if no security certificate has been issued by the Corporation in respect of such security, unless a duly executed instrument of transfer in respect thereof has been delivered to the Corporation or its transfer agent, as the case may be.

55. — Shareholder Indebted to the Corporation

If so provided in the articles of the Corporation, the Corporation has a lien on a share registered in the name of a shareholder or the shareholder's personal representative for a debt of that shareholder to the Corporation. Such lien on a share of the Corporation may, subject to the Act, be enforced as follows:

(a) where such share is redeemable pursuant to the articles of the Corporation, by redeeming such share and applying the redemption price to such debt;

(b) by purchasing such share for cancellation for a price equal to the book value of such share and applying the proceeds to such debt;

(c) by selling such share to any third party whether or not such party is at arm's length to the Corporation including, without limitation, any officer or director of the Corporation, for the best price which the board of directors in its sole discretion considers to be obtainable for such share and applying the proceeds to such debt;

(d) by refusing to permit the registration of a transfer of such share until such debt is paid; or

(e) by any other means permitted by law.

56. — Lost, Apparently Destroyed or Wrongfully Taken Security Certificates

Subject to the Act, in case of the loss, apparent destruction or wrongful taking of a security certificate, a new certificate may be issued in replacement of the one lost, apparently destroyed or wrongfully taken or a transfer of the securities represented by such certificate may be registered, upon such terms as the board of directors may from time to time prescribe, either generally or in respect of any particular loss, apparent destruction or wrongful taking of a security certificate.

Dividends

57. — Dividends

The board of directors may from time to time declare and the Corporation may pay dividends on the issued and outstanding shares in the capital of the Corporation subject to the provisions (if any) of the articles of the Corporation.

The board of directors shall not declare and the Corporation shall not pay a dividend if there are reasonable grounds for believing that:

(a) the Corporation is, or would after the payment be, unable to pay its liabilities as they become due; or

(b) the realizable value of the Corporation's assets would thereby be less than the aggregate of its liabilities and stated capital of all classes.

The Corporation may pay a dividend by issuing fully paid shares of the Corporation and, subject to the foregoing, the Corporation may pay a dividend in money or property.

The Corporation may fix a record date for determination of shareholders entitled to receive a dividend in accordance with the requirements of Section 134 of the Act and the Regulations.

In case several persons are registered as the joint holders of any shares, any one of such persons may give effectual receipts for all dividends and payments on account of dividends and/or redemption of shares (if any) subject to redemption.

Voting Shares and Securities in Other Bodies Corporate

58. — Voting Shares and Securities in Other Bodies Corporate

All of the shares or other securities carrying voting rights of any other body corporate held from time to time by the Corporation may be voted at any and all meetings of shareholders or holders of other securities (as the case may be) of such other body corporate and in such manner and by such person or persons as the board of directors of the Corporation shall from time to time determine. The duly authorized signing officers of the Corporation may also from time to time execute and deliver for and on behalf of the Corporation proxies and/or arrange for the issuance of voting certificates and/or other evidence of the right to vote in such names as they may determine without the necessity of a resolution or other action by the board of directors.

Information Available to Shareholders

59. — Confidential Information Not Available to Shareholders

Except as provided by the Act, no shareholder shall be entitled to any information respecting any details or conduct of the Corporation's business which in the opinion of the board of directors it would be inexpedient in the interests of the Corporation to communicate to the public.

60. — Availability of Corporate Records to Shareholders

The board of directors may from time to time, subject to rights conferred by the Act, determine whether and to what extent and at what time and place and under what conditions or regulations the documents, books and registers and accounting records of the Corporation or any of them shall be open to the inspection of shareholders and no shareholder shall have any right to inspect any document or book or register or accounting record of the Corporation except as conferred by statute or authorized by the board of directors or by a resolution of the shareholders.

Notices

61. — Service

Any notice or document required by the Act, the Regulations, the articles or the by-laws to be sent to any shareholder or director or to the auditor may be sent by prepaid mail addressed to, or may be delivered personally to, any such shareholder at the shareholder's latest address as shown in the records of the Corporation or its transfer agent and to any such director at the director's latest address as shown in the records of the Corporation or in the last notice filed under Section 106 or 113 of the Act, and to the auditor at the auditor's business address; provided always that notice may be waived or the time for the notice may be waived or abridged at any time with the consent in writing of the person entitled thereto. If a notice or document is sent to a shareholder by prepaid mail in accordance with this paragraph and the notice or document is returned on two consecutive occasions because the shareholder cannot be found, it shall not be necessary to send any further notices or documents to the shareholder until the shareholder informs the Corporation in writing of the shareholder's new address.

62. — Securities Registered in More Than One Name

All notices or documents with respect to any securities of the Corporation registered in more than one name shall be given to whichever of such persons is named first in the records of the Corporation and any notice or document so given shall be sufficient notice or delivery to all of the holders of such securities.

63. — Persons Becoming Entitled by Operation of Law

Subject to Section 51 of the Act, every person who by operation of law, transfer or by any other means whatsoever shall become entitled to any securities of the Corporation shall be bound by every notice or document in respect of such securities which, previous to such person's name and address being entered in the records of the Corporation, shall have been duly given to the person or persons from whom such person derives title to such securities.

64. — Deceased Security Holders

Subject to Section 51 of the Act, any notice or document delivered or sent pursuant to paragraph 60 of this by-law or in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 75 and 76 of this by-law to the address of any security holder as the same appears in the records of the Corporation shall, notwithstanding that such security holder be then deceased, and whether or not the Corporation has notice of such security holder's decease, be deemed to have been duly served in respect of the securities held by such security holder (whether held solely or with any other person or persons) until some other person be entered in such security holder's stead in the records of the Corporation as the holder or one of the holders thereof and such service shall for all purposes be deemed a sufficient service of such notice or document on such security holder's heirs, the personal representatives of such heirs, or the personal representatives of the estate of such security holder and oh all other persons, if any, interested with such security holder in such securities.

65. — Signature to Notices

The signature of any director or officer of the Corporation to any notice or document to be given by the Corporation may be written or mechanically reproduced.

66. — Computation of Time

Where a given number of days' notice or notice extending over a period is required to be given under any provisions of the articles or by-laws of the Corporation, the day of giving or serving the notice or document shall not, unless it is otherwise provided, be counted in such number of days or other period.

67. — Proof of Service

With respect to every notice or document sent by mail it shall be sufficient to prove that the envelope or wrapper containing the notice or other document was properly addressed as provided in paragraph 60 of this by-law and put into a post office or into a letter box. A certificate of a director or an officer of the Corporation in office at the time of the making of the certificate or of a transfer officer of any transfer agent or branch transfer agent of shares of any class of the Corporation as to facts in relation to the sending or delivery of any notice or document to any security holder, director, officer or auditor or publication of any notice or document shall be conclusive evidence thereof and shall be binding on every security holder, director, officer or auditor of the Corporation, as the case may be.

Cheques, Drafts and Notes

68. — Cheques, Drafts and Notes

All cheques, drafts or orders for the payment of money and all notes and acceptances and bills of exchange shall be signed by such director of directors or officer or officers or person or persons, whether or not officers of the Corporation, and in such manner as the board of directors may from time to time designate.

Custody of Securities

69. — Custody of Securities

All shares and other securities owned by the Corporation shall be lodged (in the name of the Corporation) with a chartered bank or a trust company or in a safety deposit box or, if so authorized by resolution of the board of directors, with such other depositaries or in such other manner as may be determined from time to time by the board of directors.

All shares and other securities belonging to the Corporation may be issued or held in the name of a nominee or nominees of the Corporation (and if issued or held in the names of more than one nominee shall be held in the names of the nominees jointly with right of survivorship).

Execution of Instruments

70. — Execution of Instruments

Contracts, documents or instruments in writing requiring the signature of the Corporation may be signed by:

(a) any two of the officers appointed pursuant to paragraph 21;

(b) any two directors; or

(c) any one of such officers together with any one director;

and all contracts, documents and instruments in writing so signed shall be binding upon the Corporation without any further authorization or formality. Provided that where one person is the only director and officer of the Corporation, that person may sign such contracts, documents or instruments in writing. The board of directors shall have power from time to time to appoint any director or directors, or any officer or officers, or any other person or persons, on behalf of the Corporation either to sign contracts, documents and instruments in writing generally or to sign specific contracts, documents or instruments in writing.

The corporate seal of the Corporation, if any, may be affixed to contracts, documents and instruments in writing signed as aforesaid or by any director or directors, officer or officers, other person or persons, appointed as aforesaid by the board of directors but any such contract, document or instrument is not invalid merely because the corporate seal, if any, is not affixed thereto.

The term "contracts, documents or instruments in writing" as used in this by-law shall include security certificates, deeds, mortgages, hypothecs, charges, conveyances, transfers and assignments of property real or personal, immovable or movable, agreements, releases, receipts and discharges for the payment of money or other obligations and conveyances, transfers and assignments of shares, share warrants, stocks, bonds, debentures or other securities and all paper writings.

In particular without limiting the generality of the foregoing:

(a) any two of the officers appointed pursuant to paragraph 21;

(b) any two directors; or

(c) any one of such officers together with any one director;

shall have authority to sell, assign, transfer, exchange, convert or convey any and all shares, stocks, bonds, debentures, rights, warrants or other securities owned by or registered in the name of the Corporation and to sign and execute (under the seal of the Corporation or otherwise) all assignments, transfers, conveyances, powers of attorney and other instruments that may be necessary for the purpose of selling, assigning, transferring, exchanging, converting or conveying any such shares, stocks,

bonds, debentures, rights, warrants or other securities. Provided that where one person is the only director and officer of the Corporation, that person shall have such authority.

The signature or signatures of the director or directors of the Corporation and/or of any officer or officers of the Corporation appointed pursuant to paragraph 21 and/or of any other person or persons, appointed as aforesaid by the board of directors may, if specifically authorized by the board of directors, be printed, engraved, lithographed or otherwise mechanically reproduced upon any contracts, documents or instruments in writing or bonds, debentures or other securities of the Corporation executed or issued by or on behalf of the Corporation and all contracts, documents or instruments in writing or bonds, debentures or other securities of the Corporation on which the signature or signatures of any one or more of the foregoing directors or officers or the other persons authorized as aforesaid shall be so reproduced pursuant to such authorization by the board of directors shall be deemed to have been manually signed by each such director, officer or other person whose signature is so reproduced and shall be as valid to all intents and purposes as if they had been signed manually and notwithstanding that any such director, officer or other person whose signature is so reproduced may have ceased to hold office at the date of the delivery or issue of such contracts, documents or instruments in writing or bonds, debentures or other securities of the Corporation.

Divisions

71. — Authority to Create Divisions

The board of directors may cause the business and operations of the Corporation or any part thereof to be divided into one or more divisions based upon character or type of operations, geographical territories, manufactured products, method of distribution, type of product or products manufactured or distributed or upon such other basis of division as the board may from time to time determine to be advisable. In particular, the board may authorize:

(i) the further division of the business and operations of any such division into sub-units and the consolidation of the business and operations of any such divisions or sub-units; and

(ii) the designation of any such division or sub-unit by, and the carrying on of the business and operations of any such division or sub-unit under, a name other than the name of the Corporation.

72. — Designation and Appointment of Divisional Officers

The board of directors may, by resolution, designate and appoint divisional officers assigned to that particular division or a sub-unit of that division provided that any such divisional officer shall not, as such, be an officer of the Corporation. The divisional officers, if any, shall be appointed by the board of directors annually or oftener as may be required. Notwithstanding the foregoing, each incumbent divisional officer shall continue in office until the earliest of (a) the divisional officer's resignation, which resignation shall be effective at the time a written resignation is received by the Corporation or at the time specified in the resignation, whichever is later, (b) the divisional officer's appointment of the divisional officer's successor, (c) the meeting at which the board of directors annually appoints the divisional officers of the Corporation, (d) the divisional officer's death, and (e) the divisional officer's removal by resolution of the board of directors, which removal may be made by the board of directors at any time, with or without cause, without prejudice to such divisional officer's rights under any employment contract or in law. For certainty, the removal of a divisional officer from his or her position as a divisional officer does not of itself constitute a termination of that person's employment with the Corporation. The divisional officers need not be directors and one person may hold more than one divisional office.

73. — Duties and Authority of Divisional Officers

The duties, responsibilities, limitations and remuneration of the divisional officers shall be such as are determined from time to time by the person or persons and/or committee or committees designated by the board of directors of the Corporation having responsibility for the division to which such divisional officer has been appointed. The authority of any such divisional officer shall, however, be limited to acts and transactions relating only to the business and operations which his or her division is

authorized to transact and perform, provided, however, that if the same person is also appointed an officer of the Corporation, the foregoing shall not limit his or her acts under the powers and duties of such corporate office.

74. — Execution of Instruments

Contracts or documents requiring the signature of the Corporation and relating only to a particular division of the Corporation may be signed in accordance with paragraph 69 or by any one of the divisional officers appointed pursuant to paragraph 71 with respect to such division. All such contracts or documents so signed shall be binding upon the Corporation without further authorization or formality. The board of directors shall have power from time to time by resolution to appoint any divisional officer or officers appointed pursuant to paragraph 71, or other person or persons, to sign specific contracts or documents on behalf of the Corporation and relating only to a particular division of the Corporation.

Any such divisional signing officer may affix the seal of the Corporation to any such contract or document, and may certify a copy of any instrument, resolution, by-law or other document of the Corporation to be a true copy thereof.

If specifically authorized by a resolution of the board of directors, the signature of any divisional signing officer may be printed, engraved, lithographed or otherwise mechanically reproduced upon all contracts or documents relating only to the division and all such contracts or documents on which the signature of any of the foregoing divisional signing officers have been so reproduced shall be deemed to have been manually signed by the divisional signing officer whose signature is so reproduced and shall be as valid as if signed manually and notwithstanding that the divisional signing officer whose signature is so reproduced may have ceased to hold office at the date of delivery or issue of such contracts or documents.

Financial Year

75. — Financial Year

The financial year of the Corporation shall terminate on such date in each year as the board of directors may from time to time determine.

Electronic Documents

76. — Creation and Provision of Information

Unless the Corporation's articles otherwise provide, and subject to and in accordance with the provisions of Part XX.I of the Act, the Regulations and paragraph 76 of this by-law, the Corporation may satisfy any requirement under the Act or the Regulations to create or provide a notice, document or other information to any person by the creation or provision of an electronic document. Except as provided in Section 252.6 of the Act, "electronic document" means any form of representation of information or of concepts fixed in any medium in or by electronic, optical or other similar means and that can be read or perceived by a person or by any means.

77. — Consent and Other Requirements

Notwithstanding the foregoing paragraph 75, a requirement under the Act or the Regulations to provide a person with a notice, document or other information shall not be satisfied by the provision of an electronic document unless

(a) the addressee has consented, in accordance with the Regulations, and has designated an information system for the receipt of the electronic document; and

(b) the electronic document is provided to the designated information system, unless the Regulations provide otherwise.

The term "information system" means a system used to generate, send, receive, store, or otherwise process an electronic document.

ENACTED this • day of •, 20•.

President Secretary

Schedule D.1 — New Canwest Assets

The following assets, property and undertakings shall constitute the New Canwest Assets:

1. The Limited Partnership Units.

2. The shares held by CMI in GP Inc.

3. All Canwest/CMI Group Intercompany Receivables owing to CMI by CTLP.

4. The CTLP Assumption Consideration Note.

5. All amounts receivable owed to CMI under the Shared Services Agreement and/or The Omnibus Transition and Reorganization Agreement.

6. The Trademarks and the Copyrights and Other IP.

7. To the extent of any right, title or interest, all broadcast licenses or other independent quasi-judicial or governmental authorizations.

8. Any Cash in excess of the amount constituting the Plan Implementation Fund.

9. Rights of CMI as a participating employer (if a participating employer) under the pension and group benefit plans listed on Schedules D.7 and D.8.

10. Owned or leased real property including transmitter sites, personal property, equipment, intellectual property or information technology which are held by CMI and relate primarily to or are used primarily in connection with the Business including the following leased property to the extent that it was not previously assigned to CTLP: (i) 201 and 203, 361 Victoria Street, Fredericton, NB; (ii) 5 Dethridge Drive, Sydney, NS; (iii) 1401 28th Street, Lethbridge, AB; and (iv) 101, 650 Martin Street, Penticton, BC.

11. CMI's rights under: (i) the Shared Services Agreement and the Omnibus Transition and Reorganization Agreement; (ii) the Trademarks Licence Agreement and the Trademarks Licence; (iii) the CW Media Trademarks Licence Agreements; and (iv) the Management and Administrative Services Agreement.

12. The Other Canwest Assets listed in Schedule D.5.

13. The office lease agreement dated May 1, 2008 between Portage & Main Development Ltd. and CMI in relation to suite number 3000, 201 Portage Avenue, Winnipeg, Manitoba together with any related rooftop licence.

For greater certainty, the New Canwest Assets shall not include the Head Office Lease.

Schedule D.2 — Broadcast Licences

Licences to be issued to GP Inc. (the general partner of CTLP) and New Canwest (the limited partner), carrying on business as CTLP upon surrender of the current licences.

Part A

Television Programming Undertakings

The chart on page D-4 outlines the originating television stations, and associated transmitters, involved in this application.

Specialty Programming Undertakings

- DejaView (Category 2)
- MovieTime (Category 2 — formerly known as Lonestar)
- Reality TV (Category 2)

Licences to be issued to GP Inc. (the general partner) and New Canwest (the limited partner), carrying on business as CTLP upon surrender of the current licences. [1]

The current licensee in each case is GP Inc. (the general partner) and CMI (the limited partner), carrying on business as CTLP (herein referred to as "partners of CTLP").

Part B

• — *Fox Sports World Canada (Category 2)*

Licence to be issued to GP Inc. (the general partner) and New Canwest (the limited partner), carrying on business as CTLP, and Fox Sports Holdco, partners in a general partnership carrying on business as Fox Sports.

The current licensee is GP Inc. (the general partner) and CMI (the limited partner), carrying on business as CTLP, and Fox Sports Holdco, partners in a general partnership carrying on business as Fox Sports.

Part C

• — *Men TV (Category 1)*

Licence to be issued to GP Inc. (the general partner) and New Canwest (the limited partner), carrying on business as CTLP, and TVA Group Inc., partners in a general partnership carrying on business as Men TV General Partnership.

The current licensee is GP Inc. (the general partner) and CMI (the limited partner), carrying on business as CTLP, and TVA Group Inc., partners in a general partnership carrying on business as Men TV General Partnership.

Part D

• — *Mystery (Category 1)*

Licence to be issued to GP Inc. (the general partner) and New Canwest (the limited partner), carrying on business as CTLP, and TVA Group Inc., partners in a general partnership carrying on business as Mystery Partnership.

The current licensee is GP Inc. (the general partner) and CMI (the limited partner), carrying on business as CTLP, and TVA Group Inc., partners in a general partnership carrying on business as Mystery Partnership.

Part E

• — *TVtropolis (Analog Speciality — Formerly Known as Prime TV)*

Licence to be issued to GP Inc. (the general partner) and New Canwest (the limited partner), carrying on business as CTLP, and Rogers Communications Inc., partners in a general partnership carrying on business as TVtropolis General Partnership.

The current licensee is GP Inc. (the general partner) and CMI (the limited partner), carrying on business as CTLP, and Rogers Communications Inc., partners in a general partnership carrying on business as TVtropolis General Partnership.

Stations Associated Transmitters

PROV	CITY	STATION	CALL SIGN
BC	VANCOUVER	CHAN	CHAN-TV
BC	VANCOUVER	CHAN	CHAN-DT
BC	CHILLIWACK	CHAN	CHAN-TV-1
BC	BOWEN ISLAND	CHAN	CHAN-TV-2
BC	SQUAMISH	CHAN	CHAN-TV-3
BC	COURTENAY	CHAN	CHAN-TV-4
BC	BRACKENDALE	CHAN	CHAN-TV-5
BC	WILSON CREEK	CHAN	CHAN-TV-6
BC	WHISTLER	CHAN	CHAN-TV-7
BC	100 MILE HOUSE	CHAN	CITM-TV
BC	WILLIAMS LAKE	CHAN	CITM-TV-1
BC	QUESNEL	CHAN	CITM-TV-2
BC	KELOWNA	CHAN	CHKL-TV
BC	PENTICTON	CHAN	CHKL-TV-1
BC	VERNON	CHAN	CHKL-TV-2
BC	REVELSTOKE	CHAN	CHKL-TV-3
BC	OLIVER/OSOYOOS	CHAN	CKKM-TV
BC	SANTA ROSA	CHAN	CISR-TV
BC	GRAND FORKS	CHAN	CISR-TV-1
BC	TRAIL	CHAN	CKTN-TV
BC	CASTLEGAR	CHAN	CKTN-TV-1
BC	TAGHUM	CHAN	CKTN-TV-2
BC	NELSON	CHAN	CKTN-TV-3
BC	CRESTON	CHAN	CKTN-TV-4
BC	KAMLOOPS	CHAN	CHKM-TV
BC	PRITCHARD	CHAN	CHKM-TV-1
BC	PR. GEORGE	CHAN	CIFG-TV
BC	KELOWNA	CHBC	CHBC-TV
BC	PENTICTON	CHBC	CHBC-TV-1
BC	VERNON	CHBC	CHBC-TV-2
BC	OLIVER	CHBC	CHBC-TV-3
BC	SALMON ARM	CHBC	CHBC-TV-4
BC	ENDERBY	CHBC	CHBC-TV-5
BC	CELISTA	CHBC	CHBC-TV-6
BC	SKAHA LAKE (Nk'Wala)	CHBC	CHBC-TV-7
BC	CANOE	CHBC	CHBC-TV-8
BC	APEX MOUNTAIN	CHBC	CHBC-TV-9
BC	REVELSTOKE	CHBC	CHRP-TV-2
AB	CALGARY	CICT	CICT-TV
AB	CALGARY	CICT	CICT-DT
AB	DRUMHELLER	CICT	CICT-TV-1
AB	BANFF	CICT	CICT-TV-2
AB	LETHBRIDGE	CISA	CISA-TV
AB	BURMIS	CISA	CISA-TV-1
AB	BROOKS	CISA	CISA-TV-2
AB	COLEMAN	CISA	CISA-TV-3
AB	WATERTON PARK	CISA	CISA-TV-4
AB	PINCHER CREEK	CISA	CISA-TV-5
AB	EDMONTON	CITV	CITV-TV
AB	EDMONTON	CITV	CITV-DT
AB	RED DEER	CIVT	CITV-TV-1
SA	REGINA	CFRE	CFRE-TV
SA	FORT QU'APPELLE	CFRE	CFRE-TV-2
SA	SASKATOON	CFSK	CFSK-TV

MB	WINNIPEG	CKND	CKND-TV
MB	MINNEDOSA	CKND	CKND-TV-2
ON	TORONTO	CIII	CIII-TV-41
ON	TORONTO	CIII	CIII-DT-41
ON	PARIS	CIII	CIII-TV
ON	BANCROFT	CIII	CHI-TV-2
ON	OWEN SOUND	CIII	CIII-TV-4
ON	OTTAWA	CIII	CIII-TV-6
ON	MIDLAND	CIII	CIII-TV-7
ON	S. S. MARIE	CIII	CIII-TV-12
ON	TIMMINS	CIII	CIII-TV-13
ON	STEVENSON	CIII	CIII-TV-22
ON	PETERBOROUGH	CIII	CIII-TV-27
ON	SARNIA (Oil Springs)	CIII	CIII-TV-29
ON	FORT ERIE	CIII	CIII-TV-55
ON	SUDBURY	CIII	CFGC-TV
ON	NORTH BAY	CIII	CFGC-TV-2
QU	MONTREAL	CKMI	CKMI-TV-1
QU	QUEBEC	CKMI	CKMI-TV
QU	SHERBROOKE	CKMI	CKMI-TV-2
NS	HALIFAX	CIHF	CIHF-TV
NB	FREDERICTON	CIHF	CIHF-TV-1
NB	SAINT JOHN	CIHF	CIHF-TV-2
NB	MONCTON	CIHF	CIHF-TV-3
NS	TRURO	CIHF	CIHF-TV-4
NS	WOLFVILLE	CIHF	CIHF-TV-5
NS	BRIDGEWATER	CIHG	CIHF-TV-6
NS	SYDNEY	CIHF	CIHF-TV-7
NS	NEW GLASGOW	CIHF	CIHF-TV-8
NS	SHELBURNE	CIHF	CIHF-TV-9
NS	YARMOUTH	CIHF	CIHF-TV-10
NB	WOODSTOCK	CIHF	CIHF-TV-11
NB	ST STEPHEN	CIHF	CIHF-TV-12
NB	MIRAMICHI	CIHF	CIHF-TV-13
PE	CHARLOTTE TOWN	CIHF	CIHF-TV-14
NS	ANTIGONISH	CIHF	CIHF-TV-15
NS	MULGRAVE	CIHF	CIHF-TV-16

Schedule D.3 — New Canwest Liabilities

The following liabilities and obligations shall constitute the New Canwest Liabilities:

1. The obligations of CMI at the Plan Implementation Date as the limited partner under the CTLP Limited Partnership Agreement.

2. All amounts payable by CMI under the Shared Services Agreement and/or the Omnibus Transition and Reorganization Agreement, and any future obligations thereunder.

3. The debts, liabilities and other obligations of CMI under all contracts constituting part of the New Canwest Assets, including Other Canwest Assets.

4. The Insured Litigation Deductibles.

5. Business-Related Post-Filing Claims.

6. The liabilities and obligations of CMI under the Trademarks Licence Agreement and the Trademarks Licence and under section 6.4 of the Omnibus Transition and Reorganization Agreement, and the liabilities and obligations of CMI under the CW Media Trademarks Licence Agreements.

7. The liabilities and obligations of CMI as a participating employer (if a participating employer) under the pension and group benefit plans listed on Schedules D.7 and D.8, and including provision of post retirement benefits to Tom Strike, John Maguire and Richard Leipsic as set out on Schedule "A" to their KERPs, together with the thirty (30) day post termination benefits made available to the April 28 Severance Schedule Employees.

8. The liabilities and obligations of CMI under the Management and Administrative Services Agreement.

For greater certainty, the New Canwest Liabilities shall not include any obligations or liabilities under or in respect of the Head Office Lease.

Schedule D.4 — Trademarks

1. The corporate name "Canwest".

2. The trademark CANWEST and all registrations and applications for trademarks consisting of or incorporating CANWEST (including the trademarks listed below), and any associated trademarks, including for greater certainty any domain names which consist of or incorporate any such trademarks.

Trademark	Goods	Status	Country	Owner on Record (Name Reporter)	Application Submit Date	Application Number	Registration Date	Registration Number (TMA)
CANWEST	Services	Pending	US	Canwest	12-Dec-07	77350298		
CANWEST	Wares Services	Registered	EU	Canwest	13-Nov-07	6508857	12-Mar-09	6508857
CANWEST	Services	Registered	CAN	Canwest	22-Jul-87	588487	30-Sep-88	345425
CANWEST & DESIGN (Horizontal Reverse Colour)	Wares Services	Pending	CAN	Canwest	17-Mar-08	1387463		
CANWEST & Design (Horizontal)	Wares Services	Pending	CAN	Canwest	13-Nov-07	1371544		
CANWEST & DESIGN (Stacked Reverse Colour)	Wares Services	Pending	CAN	Canwest	17-Mar-08	1387462		
CANWEST & DESIGN (Stacked)	Wares Services	Pending	CAN	Canwest	13-Nov-07	1371539		
CANWEST & DESIGN (Stacked)	Wares Services	Pending	US	Canwest	13-May-08	77473558		
CANWEST & DESIGN (Stacked)	Wares Services	Registered	EU	Canwest.	13-May-08	6911499	23-Mar-09	6911499
CANWEST & HONEYCOMB DESIGN (Horizontal)	Wares Services	Advertised	EU	Canwest	13-May-08	6911663		

CANWEST & HONEYCOMB DESIGN (Horizontal)	Wares Services	Pending	US	Canwest	13-May-08	77473523		
CANWEST & HONEYCOMB REVERSE DESIGN (Horizontal)		Advertised	EU	Canwest	15-Sep-08	7233414		
CANWEST & HONEYCOMB REVERSE DESIGN (Stacked)	Wares Services	Pending	US	Canwest	15-Sep-08	77570161		
CANWEST DESIGN	Wares Services	Allowed	US	Canwest	12-Dec-07	77350392		
CANWEST DESIGN (Design only)		Pending	EU	Canwest	12-Dec-07	65509376		
CANWEST MEDIA	Wares Services	Pending	TUR	Canwest	25-Jun-07			
CANWEST MEDIA	Wares Services	Pending	US	Canwest.	25-Jun-07	77214597		
CANWEST MEDIA	Wares Services	Registered	EU	Canwest	25-Jun-07	6037493	29-Jan-09	6037493
CANWEST MEDIA	Wares Services	Registered	EU	Canwest			9-Feb-09	006037593
CANWEST MEDIA	Wares Services	Approved	CAN	Canwest	02-Mar-07	1338289		
CANWEST MEDIA & DESIGN	Wares Services	Pending	TUR	Canwest	25-Jun-07			
CANWEST MEDIA & DESIGN	Wares Services	Registered	EU	Canwest	25-Jun-07	6037576	9-Feb-09	6037576
CANWEST.COM	Services	Registered	CAN	Canwest	19-Apr-99	1012375	7-Feb-01	540936
CANWESTGLOBAL.COM	Services	Registered	CAN	Canwest	19-Apr-99	1012374	7-Feb-01	540938
CGBI & DESIGN	Wares Services	Registered	CAN	Canwest	30-Apr-01	1100966	19-Nov-03	595071
CW MEDIA	Wares Services	Allowed	CAN	Canwest	14-Feb-07	1335328		
HONEYCOMB (CANWEST) DESIGN	Wares Services	Allowed	AU	Canwest	19-Dec-07	1216601		
HONEYCOMB (CANWEST) DESIGN	Wares Services	Allowed	EU	Canwest	12-Dec-07	65098376		

Schedule D.5 — Other Canwest Assets

1. Canwest's interest in the naming and promotion agreement dated October 30, 1998, among Canwest, Canwest Television Inc., Riverside Park Management Inc., and Winnipeg Goldeyes Baseball Club Inc. and any amendment or supplement thereto, together with the related Display Rental Agreement dated February 28, 2006, between Canwest and Jim Pattison Industries Ltd., Re: Canwest Global Park.

2. Canwest's interest in the deed of gift agreement dated May 28, 1998, among Canwest, Canwest Television Inc. and Manitoba Theatre For Young People Inc. and any amendment or supplement thereto, together with the related Display Rental Agreement dated February 28, 2006, between Canwest and Jim Pattison Industries Ltd., Re: Canwest Global Performing Arts Centre.

3. All art work owned by Canwest and/or CMI.

Schedule D.6 — Copyrights and Other IP

Canwest Global Communications Corp.

Type	Title	Registration No.	Owner	
Copyright	The Minnedosa Kid	464476	Canwest Communications Corp.	Global
Copyright	The CanWest Global Story: The First Twenty Years	464475	Canwest Communications Corp.	Global

Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)

Type	Title	Registration No.	Owner
Giant of Interest	Stunt	1051367	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Warrior Class	1051366	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	The Two Coreys	1051365	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	TV Match-Up	1051364	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	TV Made Me Do It	1051363	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Tube Tales	1051362	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	True Pulp Murder	1051361	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Stolen Sisters	1051360	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Still Longshots	1051359	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Stars and Their Idols	1051358	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Shaye	1051356	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	The Homefront	1051302	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Painkiller Jane	1051301	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Renegadepress.com Season IV	1051300	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Pretty Dangerous Season II	1051299	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Playing the Odds	1051298	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Tribute: The Next Best Thing	1051297	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Making the Cut	1051296	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	The Jane Show Season II	1051295	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)

Grant of Interest	James Bond: The True Story	1051294	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	From the Ground Up with Debbie Travis Season II	1051293	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	From the Ground Up with Debbie Travis Season II	1051292	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	DecAIDS: Anything is Possible	1051291	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Death In The Forest	1051290	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	The Cure for Love	1051269	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly Can West Media Works Inc.)
Grant of Interest	The Bully's Mark	1051268	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Branded: Saving Our Town	1051267	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Ad Persuasion, Season II	1051227	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Are You Smarter than a Canadian Fifth Grader	1053903	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	da Kink in My Dream	1053902	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	TVFlopolis	1053875	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Real Fight Club	1053519	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Final 24 II	1053518	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Final 24 II	1053517	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Up Against the Wal	1053095	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	The Summit	1052871	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Hip Hop Hope	1052870	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Debt Trap	1052868	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Search & Rescue	1052866	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Hijacked Future	1052865	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Til Death Do Us Part (aka Love You To Death)	1052564	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Blood and Celluloid: Hollywood's Love Affair with the Vampire	1054958	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Da Kink In My Hair	1043783	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Da Kink In My Hair	1043782	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	The Best Years	1043729	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Becoming Human	1043689	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Be Real With JR Digs	1043688	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	21{st} Annual Gemini Awards	1043687	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)

Grant of Interest	The 2005 Gemini Awards Gala	1042062	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	The Lodge	1042061	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Medium Rare	1042060	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Sabrina's Law	1042059	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Shattered Dreams	1042058	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	That News Show (aka "The News Show" formerly "And Finally")	1042057	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Time Bombs	1042056	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Vanity Insanity, Season II	1042055	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Breaking Ranks	1042054	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Corporation in the Classroom	1042053	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Durham County 401	1042052	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Durham County 401	1042051	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Inside The Box	1040528	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Ad Persuasion	1040527	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Lost Boys	1040526	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Rich Nation	1040525	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Drug Warriors	1040524	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Somba K'e — Dangerous Rock	1040523	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Next Great Chef — Season II	1040522	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	FANatical	1040521	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Risk Takers	1040520	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Gamer Girlz	1040519	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Falcon Beach — Season II	1040518	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Falcon Beach — Season II	1040517	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	The Calgary Stampede: Treaty #7	1040516	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly Can West MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	The Calgary Stampede: At The Heart of Centre Stage	1040515	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Diary of a Foreign Correspondent (8 episodes)	1037939	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Very Bad Men (13 episodes)	1037938	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	House & Home Season IX (28 episodes)	1037937	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)

Grant of Interest	Diva On A Dime III — comprising 13 episodes	1037267	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Dreamwrecks (26 episodes)	1037006	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Road to Redemption	1036123	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	The Man Who Fought Back	1036005	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	The Novel Life of Jane — comprising 13 episodes	1036004	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Renegadepress.com — comprising 9 episodes	1036003	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Ride Guide Bike 2006	1036002	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Running The Goat (aka Was Wente Right?)	1036001	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Health Care 911: The Plight of Immigrant Medical Doctors	1035999	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)
Grant of Interest	Are You Smarter Than A Canadian 5{th} Grader?	1054553	Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc.)

Entities with No Canadian Copyrights on Record

Canwest (Canada) Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks (Canada) Inc.)

Publishing LP (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Limited Partnership)

CanWest MediaWorks Limited Partnership

3848671 Canada Limited

Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Publications Inc.)

The National Post Company/La Publication National Post

National Post Inc.

4513401 Canada Inc.

Canwest Media Inc. (formerly CanWest MediaWorks Inc., CanWest Communications Enterprises, Inc. and eigwin Investments Limited)

3815668 Canada Inc.

Schedule D.7 — CTLP Pension Plans

	Plan	Sponsor
1.	Retirement Plan for Management and Non-Bargaining Unit Employees of Global Communications Limited	CTLP
2.	CanWest Maritime Television Employees Pension Plan	CTLP
3.	Global Communications Limited Retirement Plan for BCTV Staff	CTLP
4.	Global Communications Limited Retirement Plan for BCTV Senior Management	CTLP
5.	Retirement Plan for Bargaining Unit Employees of Global Communications Limited	CTLP
6.	Global Communications Limited Retirement Plan for CHBC Executive	CTLP
7.	Global Communications Limited Retirement Plan for CHBC Staff	CTLP
8.	Global Communications Limited Retirement Plan for CHBC Management	CTLP
9.	Global Communications Limited Retirement Plan for CICT and CISA Employees	CTLP

10.	Global Communications Limited Retirement Plan for Former WIC-Allarcom Employees	CTLP
11.	Global Communications Limited Retirement Plan for Former WIC Designated Executives	CTLP
12.	Global Communications Limited Employees Pension Plan	CTLP

Schedule D.8 — CTLP Group Benefit Plans

Group benefit plans providing health, dental, life, AD&D and LTD benefits which include the following contracts/policies:

- Manulife Financial contract number 24132, 24132-A, 24132-C, 24132-D, 24132-E, 24132-F, 24132-J
- Manulife Financial policy number 29704, 29704-A, 29704-C, 29704-D, 29704-E, 29704-F, 29704-J

Schedule E — Convenience Class Claim Declaration

TO: *Canwest Global Communications Corp. ("Canwest")*

—

AND TO: *FTI Consulting Canada Inc., in its capacity as the Monitor*

In connection with the consolidated plan of compromise and reorganization of Canwest and Canwest Media Inc. ("*CMI*") and certain of their respective subsidiaries pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (Canada) (the "*Plan*"), the undersigned hereby elects to have its Proven Distribution Claim(s) treated as a Convenience Class Claim.

For purposes of this declaration:

(a) "*Proven Distribution Claim*" means any Claim (as defined in the Plan) against any CMI Entity accepted for purposes of receiving distributions under the Plan in accordance with the Claims Procedure Order (as defined in the Plan) and the Plan;

(b) "*Convenience Class Claim*" means any Proven Distribution Claim in an amount in excess of $5,000 that the undersigned has elected to value at $5,000 for purposes of the Plan;

DATED the ..... day of ..... 2010.

..... (Entity Name)

..... (Amount of Claim on Notice of Claim)

..... (Address)

..... (Signature)

Instructions

1. *This declaration is to be completed by a person who wishes to elect to have his or her Proven Distribution Claim treated as a Convenience Class Claim.*

Please return completed declaration to FTI Consulting Canada Inc. attention Michelle Grech prior to 5:00 p.m. (Toronto time) on July 15, 2010, by mail at Brookfield Place, 79 Wellington Street West, Suite 2010, Toronto, ON, M4K 1G8, Canada or facsimile (416) 649-8101.

Schedule F — Equity Compensation Plans

1. Canwest Global Communications Corp. Stock Option and Restricted Unit Plan dated November 2, 2007

2. Canwest Global Communications Corp. Amended and Restated Share Compensation Plan

3. Canwest Global Communications Corp. Deferred Share Unit Plan for Non-Executive Directors

Schedule G — Monitor Certificate Regarding Satisfaction of Conditions Precedent

In the Matter of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act,* R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended and In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise and Reorganization of Canwest Global Communications Corp. and the Other Entities Listed on Schedule a Hereto Applicants

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE COMMERCIAL LIST

Certificate of FTI Consulting Canada Inc. as the Court-Appointed Monitor of the Applicants

All capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed thereto in the Restated Consolidated Plan of Compromise and Arrangement concerning, affecting and involving Canwest Global Communications Corp., Canwest Media Inc., Canwest Television GP Inc., Canwest Television Limited Partnership, Canwest Global Broadcasting Inc./Radiodiffusion Canwest Global Inc., Fox Sports World Canada Holdco Inc., Fox Sports World Canada Partnership, National Post Holdings Ltd., The National Post Company/La Publication National Post, MBS Productions Inc., Yellow Card Productions Inc., Global Centre Inc. and 4501063 Canada Inc. dated as of June 23, 2010 (the "*Plan*"), as the Plan may be amended, varied or supplemented from time to time in accordance with the terms thereof.

Pursuant to Section 6.4 of the Plan, FTI Consulting Canada Inc. in its capacity as the Monitor of the Applicants, hereby delivers to the CMI Entities, the Plan Sponsor and the Ad Hoc Committee this certificate and certifies that it has been informed in writing by the CMI Entities, the Plan Sponsor and the Ad Hoc Committee that all of the Conditions Precedent set out in Section 6.3 of the Plan have been satisfied or (to the extent permitted by law) waived. Pursuant to the terms of the Plan, the Plan Implementation Date has occurred on this day. This Certificate will be filed with the Court and posted on the Website.

DATED at the City of Toronto, in the Province of Ontario, this ..... day of ....., 2010.

FTI CONSULTING CANADA INC. in its capacity as the Monitor of the CMI Entities

By: .....

Name:

Title:

Footnotes

1 GP Inc. (the general partner of CTLP), will continue to hold a 0.1% partnership interest in CTLP.

TAB 31

Court File No. CV-09-8084-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF EXTREME RETAIL (CANADA) INC. AND EXTREME PROPERTIES INC.

APPLICATION UNDER THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

CONSOLIDATED PLAN OF COMPROMISE AND ARRANGEMENT OF EXTREME RETAIL (CANADA) INC. AND EXTREME PROPERTIES INC.

September 15, 2009

CONSOLIDATED PLAN OF COMPROMISE AND ARRANGEMENT OF EXTREME RETAIL (CANADA) INC. AND EXTREME PROPERTIES INC. PURSUANT TO THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT* (CANADA) DATED FOR REFERENCE SEPTEMBER 15, 2009

ARTICLE 1
DEFINITIONS AND INTERPRETATION

1.1 Definitions

In this Plan (including the Schedule hereto), unless otherwise stated or the subject matter or context should otherwise require, the following capitalized terms and phrases used but not defined herein have the following meanings:

"Administration Charge" has the meaning given to it in paragraph 32 of the CCAA Initial Order;

"Affirmative Votes" means the votes of the Eligible Voting Creditors with Proven Voting Claims, who have voted in favour of the Plan at the Creditors' Meeting, and **"Affirmative Vote"** shall mean any one of them;

"Applicable Law" means, at any time, in respect of any Person, property, transaction, event or other matter, as applicable, all laws, rules, statutes, regulations, treaties, orders, judgements and decrees, and all official requests, directives, rules, guidelines, orders, policies, practices and other requirements of any Authorized Authority;

"Applicants" means Extreme Retail (Canada) Inc. and Extreme Properties Inc., and **"Applicant"** shall mean any one of them;

"Assets" means all of the property, assets, business and undertaking of the Applicants;

"Authorized Authority" means, in relation to any Person, transaction or event, any:

(a) federal, provincial, state, municipal or local governmental body (whether administrative, legislative, executive or otherwise), both domestic and foreign;

(b) agency, authority, commission, instrumentality, regulatory body, court, or other entity exercising executive, legislative, judicial, taxing, regulatory or administrative powers or functions of or pertaining to government, including any Taxing Authority;

(c) court, arbitrator, commission or body exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, administrative or similar functions; or

(d) other body or entity created under the authority of or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of any of the foregoing, including any stock or other securities exchange, in each case having jurisdiction over such Person, transaction or event;

"BIA" means the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, as amended;

"Business Day" means any day, other than a Saturday, Sunday or statutory holiday, on which banks are generally open for business in Toronto, Ontario;

"Canadian Dollars", **"CDN $"** or **"$"** means dollars denominated in lawful currency of Canada;

"CCAA" means the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended;

"CCAA Filing Date" means March 20, 2009, being the date of the CCAA Initial Order;

"CCAA Initial Order" means the Order granted by the Court in the CCAA Proceedings on March 20, 2009, as amended, restated, varied or extended from time to time by subsequent Orders of the Court;

"CCAA Proceedings" means the proceedings commenced by the Applicants under the CCAA on March 20, 2009 in the Court under Court File No. 09-CL-8084;

"Charges" has the meaning given to it in paragraph 40 of the CCAA Initial Order;

"Claim" means any right or claim of any Person that may be asserted or made in whole or in part against the Applicants, or either of them, whether or not asserted or made, in connection with any indebtedness, liability or obligation of any kind whatsoever, and any interest accrued thereon or costs payable in respect thereof, including, without limitation, by reason of the commission of a tort (intentional or unintentional), by reason of any breach of contract or other agreement (oral or written), by reason of any breach of duty (including, without limitation, any legal, statutory, equitable or fiduciary duty) or by reason of any right of ownership of or title to property or Assets or right to a trust or deemed trust (statutory, express, implied, resulting, constructive or otherwise), and whether or not any indebtedness, liability or obligation is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, unsecured, present, future, known or unknown, by guarantee, surety or otherwise, and whether or not any right or claim is executory or anticipatory in nature, including, without limitation, any right or ability of any Person to advance a claim for contribution or indemnity or otherwise with respect to any matter, action, cause or chose in action whether existing at present or commenced in the future, and **"Claims"** means all of them;

"Claims Bar Date" means 5:00 p.m. (Toronto time) on October 23, 2009, as set out in the Claims Process and Bar Order, as such date may be extended in respect of any particular Claim by agreement of the Monitor and the Applicants and/or by Order of the Court;

"Claims Process and Bar Order" means the Order of the Court dated September 23, 2009, as amended, restated or varied from time to time by subsequent Order of the Court;

"Contract Repudiation Claim" means any Claim arising from the restructuring, repudiation, resiliation or termination of any contract or other arrangements or agreements of any nature whatsoever, whether written or oral, pursuant to a Notice of Repudiation or Termination received by any Person prior to the Repudiation Deadline, but excludes any Landlord Repudiation Claim and Employee Restructuring Claim;

"Court" means the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List);

"Creditor" means any Person having a Pre-Filing Claim or Restructuring Claim, together with his, her or its heirs, executors, administrators, legal representatives, successors and assigns, and where the context requires and subject to the Claims Process and Bar Order and Section 6.7 of the Plan, includes the assignee or transferee of such Claim, a successor in interest to such Claim, or a trustee, receiver, interim receiver, receiver and manager, liquidator or other Person acting on behalf of such Person, and, for greater certainty, includes a Landlord, and **"Creditors"** means all of them;

"Creditors' Meeting" means the meeting of Unsecured Creditors called for the purposes of considering and/or voting in respect of the Plan, which has been set by the Creditors' Meeting Order to take place at 10:00 a.m. (Toronto time) on November 6, 2009, and any postponements, adjournments or amendments thereof;

"Creditors' Meeting Order" means the Order of the Court dated September 23, 2009, as amended, restated or varied from time to time by subsequent Order of the Court;

"Crown" means Her Majesty the Queen in right of Canada or any province thereof;

"DIP Lender" means Invar (Buck or Two) Limited, in its capacity as DIP lender to the Applicants;

"DIP Lender's Charge" has the meaning given to it in paragraph 36 of the CCAA Initial Order;

"Directors' Charge" has the meaning given to it in paragraph 22 of the CCAA Initial Order;

"Disallowed Claim" means a Disputed Claim or any portion thereof which has been finally disallowed in accordance with the Claims Process and Bar Order;

"Dispute Notice" means the dispute notice, in substantially the form attached as **Schedule "F"** to the Claims Process and Bar Order, delivered by an Unsecured Creditor to the Monitor who has received a Notice of Revision or Disallowance and who intends to dispute such Notice of Revision or Disallowance pursuant to the Claims Process and Bar Order or the Plan;

"Disputed Claim" means, as applicable: (a) that portion of an Unsecured Claim which has not been allowed or accepted as proven by the Monitor for distribution purposes, which is the subject of a Dispute Notice, and which has not been resolved by the Monitor, by agreement or by further Order of the Court; or (b) in respect of any Lease Terms

which have not been allowed or accepted as proven by the Monitor for distribution purposes, which are the subject of a Dispute Notice, and which have not been resolved by the Monitor, by agreement or by further Order of the Court, the amount which is the difference between the calculation of the distribution to a Landlord: (i) based on the Lease Terms accepted by the Monitor; and (ii) based on the Lease Terms asserted by a Landlord in a Dispute Notice, and **"Disputed Claims"** means all of them;

"Disputed Claims Reserve" means the reserve, if any, established and maintained by the Monitor, in which the Monitor shall deposit the amounts which would be distributed to Holders of Disputed Claims if such Disputed Claims were to become Proven Distribution Claims for their entire amount after the Interim Distribution Date, pending the final determination or resolution of such Disputed Claims for distribution purposes under the Plan;

"Document Package" means a document package which shall include a copy of the appropriate Instruction Letter, the Proof of Claim or the Lease Terms Form, as applicable, the Claims Process and Bar Order, the Creditors' Meeting Order, and such other materials as the Monitor may consider appropriate or desirable;

"Eligible Voting Creditor" means a Creditor who holds a Proven Voting Claim or a Disputed Claim, and **"Eligible Voting Creditors"** means all of them;

"Employee Restructuring Claim" means any Claim that is, arises from, or is in any way related to the restructuring or termination of the employment of an employee of the Applicants pursuant to a Notice of Repudiation or Termination which is effective prior to the Plan Implementation Date, which, for greater certainty, are Unaffected Obligations under Section 3.2 of the Plan, and **"Employee Restructuring Claims"** means all of them;

"Final Distribution Date" means a date to be chosen by the Monitor, in consultation with the Applicants, which shall be a date which is within thirty (30) days of the date on which the Monitor certifies to the Court that the last Disputed Claim has been finally determined or settled;

"GST" means goods and services tax under the *Excise Tax Act* (Canada), R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15, as amended;

"Holder(s)" means the Unsecured Creditor who has filed a Proof of Claim or Lease Terms Form, as applicable, with the Monitor in accordance with the Claims Process and Bar Order, or, subject to Section 6.7 of the Plan, any assignee or transferee thereof;

"ITA" means the *Income Tax Act* (Canada), R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), as amended;

"Interim Distribution Date" means a date chosen by the Monitor, in its discretion, occurring as soon as practicable after the Plan Implementation Date and, in any event, no later than thirty (30) days after the Plan Implementation Date;

"Landlord" means:

(a) a landlord, head landlord or owner of real property, whether or not in direct privity with the Applicants, who has a Pre-Filing Claim or Restructuring Claim in respect of any premises leased or otherwise occupied by the Applicants pursuant to a Lease to which such landlord, head landlord or owner is a party or by which such landlord, head landlord or owner is bound or otherwise enjoys or may enjoy the benefit of, and includes:

(i) any mortgagee of such premises who has taken possession of such premises or is collecting Rent in respect of such premises; and

(ii) any Person who has taken an assignment of rents or assignment of Lease in respect of such premises, whether as security or otherwise;

(b) any Person whose Pre-Filing Claim or Restructuring Claim would be duplicative of or derivative from the Pre-Filing Claim or Restructuring Claim of such landlord, head landlord or owner; and

(c) any Person who has a Pre-Filing Claim or Restructuring Claim in such Person's capacity as co-owner, partner, shareholder or trust beneficiary of a Person which is the landlord, head landlord or owner of any premises leased or otherwise occupied by the Applicants and includes:

(i) any holder of a Lien against such ownership, partnership, shareholder or beneficial interest who is entitled to receive any dividends or distribution thereon;

(ii) any Person who has taken an assignment of such ownership, partnership, shareholder or beneficial interest; and

(iii) any Person whose Pre-Filing Claim or Restructuring Claim would be duplicative of or derivative from the Pre-Filing Claim or Restructuring Claim of such first named Person,

and **"Landlords"** means all of them;

"Landlord Repudiation Claim" means any Claim of any Landlord: (a) with respect to the waiver or reduction of any benefits to the Landlord, financial or otherwise, arising out of, or by virtue of, the granting of or entering into an agreement providing amendments to a Lease on or after the CCAA Filing Date, and prior to the Repudiation Deadline; or (b) arising from or in any way related to the abandonment by the Applicants of any Repudiated Leased Premises or the restructuring, repudiation, resiliation or termination of any Lease on or after the CCAA Filing Date by the Applicants pursuant to a Notice of Repudiation or Termination, including, without limitation, any damages or losses of any kind, direct or indirect, consequential or otherwise, incurred or suffered by such Landlord in respect of any such abandonment of Repudiated Leased Premises or any such restructuring, repudiation, resiliation or termination of any Lease, and including any

physical damage caused by the Applicants or any of its agents in abandoning Repudiated Leased Premises and in removing any signage or other equipment from such Repudiated Leased Premises, but excludes: (i) any Claim of a Landlord existing before the CCAA Filing Date; (ii) any Contract Repudiation Claim; and (iii) any Unaffected Obligation, and **"Landlord Repudiation Claims"** means all of them;

"Landlord Repudiation Claim Formula" shall be used by the Monitor to calculate a Landlord Repudiation Claim for voting and/or distribution purposes under the Plan based on the Proven Lease Terms for each Lease in respect of Repudiated Leased Premises, and equals the lesser of:

(a) the aggregate of:

  (i) the Rent for the first year of such Lease following the date on which the repudiation and/or abandonment became effective; and

  (ii) fifteen percent (15%) of the Rent for the remainder of the term of such Lease after that year; and

(b) the Rent for three (3) years of such Lease following the date on which the repudiation and/or abandonment became effective;

"Lease" means any lease, sublease, licence, sublease, agreement to lease, offer to lease or other agreement or arrangement, whether written, oral or otherwise pursuant to which the Applicants have or had a right to occupy premises, and includes all amendments and supplements thereto and all ancillary documents relating thereto existing as at the CCAA Filing Date, and for greater certainty, excludes any lease of personal property;

"Lease Terms" means the information pertaining to a Lease that has been submitted to the Monitor by a Landlord pursuant to a Lease Terms Form, which information reflects, *inter alia*, only those terms of the Lease that were in effect as of the CCAA Filing Date;

"Lease Terms Form" means the lease terms form, in substantially the form attached as Schedule "D" to the Claims Process and Bar Order, which is required to be submitted to the Monitor by any Landlord who has an Unsecured Claim by the Claims Bar Date in accordance with the Claims Process and Bar Order;

"Lien" means any mortgage, charge, pledge, assignment by way of security, lien, hypothec, security interest or other encumbrance granted or arising pursuant to a written agreement or statute or otherwise created by law which has been duly and properly registered or perfected in accordance with applicable legislation on the CCAA Filing Date or otherwise in accordance with the CCAA Initial Order;

"Monitor" means KPMG Inc., in its capacity as Court-appointed monitor of the Applicants in the CCAA Proceedings, and not in its corporate or personal capacity;

"Monitor's Certificate" has the meaning given to it in Section 8.3 of the Plan;

"Negative Votes" means the votes of the Eligible Voting Creditors with Proven Voting Claims, who have voted against the Plan at the Creditors' Meeting, and **"Negative Vote"** shall mean any one of them;

"Notice of Repudiation or Termination" means a written notice in any form issued on or after the CCAA Filing Date and prior to the Repudiation Deadline by the Applicants advising a Person of the restructuring, repudiation, resiliation or termination of any contract, Lease, employment agreement, or other arrangements or agreements of any nature whatsoever, whether written or oral, and any agreements related thereto, including, without limitation, the repudiation of any obligations under a Lease required to be performed by the Applicants before, on or concurrent with the surrender or vacating of the leased premises on the expiry of the term of the Lease prior to the Plan Implementation Date;

"Notice of Revision or Disallowance" means a notice of revision or disallowance, in substantially the form attached as Schedule "E" to the Claims Process and Bar Order, as submitted to the Monitor by a Creditor in accordance with the Claims Process and Bar Order;

"Order" means any order of the Court in the CCAA Proceedings, and **"Orders"** means all of them;

"Person" shall be broadly interpreted and includes an individual, firm, partnership, joint venture, venture capital fund, limited liability company, unlimited liability company, association, trust, corporation, unincorporated association or organization, syndicate, committee, the government of a country or any political subdivision thereof, or any agency, board, tribunal, commission, bureau, instrumentality or department of such government or political subdivision, or any other entity, howsoever designated or constituted, including any Taxing Authority, and the trustees, executors, administrators, or other legal representatives of an individual, and for greater certainty includes any Authorized Authority;

"Plan" means this Consolidated Plan of Compromise and Arrangement, as it may be restated, supplemented or amended from time to time in accordance with the provisions the Plan, the Claims Process and Bar Order and the Creditors' Meeting Order;

"Plan Distribution Fund" has the meaning given to it in Subsection 3.7 of the Plan;

"Plan Implementation Date" means the Business Day immediately following the Business Day on which all conditions to implementation of the Plan as set out in Section 8.2 of the Plan have been satisfied, fulfilled or waived, and the Monitor has filed the Monitor's Certificate with the Court confirming the foregoing;

"Pre-Filing Claim" means any Claim which is based in whole or in part on facts which existed prior to the CCAA Filing Date, together with any other rights or Claims of any kind that, if unsecured, would be a debt provable in bankruptcy within the meaning of the BIA had the Applicants become bankrupt prior to the CCAA Filing Date, together with any other rights or Claims, whether or not asserted, made after the CCAA Filing Date in

any way, directly or indirectly related to any action taken or power exercised prior to the CCAA Filing Date, and which for greater certainty, includes any Tax Claim;

"Pro Rata Share" of an Unsecured Creditor means the amount determined by the following formula:

Pro Rata Share = (A/B)

A = the amount of such Unsecured Creditor's Proven Distribution Claim excluding any Claim for which such Unsecured Creditor elected to be paid in accordance with Subsection 4.2(c) of the Plan;

B = the aggregate amount of all Unsecured Claims that are or can become Proven Distribution Claims excluding all Claims which are elected to be paid in accordance with Subsection 4.2(c) of the Plan;

"Proof of Assignment" means a notice of transfer or assignment of a Claim executed by the Creditor and the transferee or assignee, together with such other evidence of such transfer or assignment as may be reasonably required by the Monitor and/or the Applicants;

"Proof of Claim" means a proof of claim, in substantially the form attached as Schedule "B" to the Claims Process and Bar Order, which is required to be submitted to the Monitor by any Creditor, except a Landlord, who has an Unsecured Claim by the Claims Bar Date in accordance with the Claims Process and Bar Order, and **"Proofs of Claim"** means all of them;

"Proven Lease Terms" means the Lease Terms of a Landlord for voting and/or distribution purposes, as the case may be, which have become finally determined or allowed in accordance with the Claims Process and Bar Order, the Creditors' Meeting Order, and/or the Plan, as applicable;

"Proven Distribution Claim" means the amount of an Unsecured Claim as finally determined or allowed for distribution purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Claims Process and Bar Order, the Creditors' Meeting Order, and/or the Plan, as applicable, and **"Proven Distribution Claims"** means all of them;

"Proven Voting Claim" means the amount of an Unsecured Claim as finally determined or allowed for voting purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Claims Process and Bar Order, the Creditors' Meeting Order and/or the Plan, as applicable, and **"Proven Voting Claims"** means all of them;

"Proxy" means a proxy, in substantially the form attached as Schedule "C" to the Creditors' Meeting Order, or such other form acceptable to the Monitor or chair of the Creditors' Meeting, and **"Proxies"** means all of them;

"Rent" means solely for the purposes of calculating a Landlord Voting Amount and a Landlord Repudiation Claim, the amount set out in the corresponding Proven Lease

Terms, expressed on a monthly basis, that is in respect of the minimum, basic, net, or base rent, together with such additional rent as set out in the corresponding Proven Lease Terms, and where rent or additional rent is expressed in the Proven Lease Terms for a period of time and other than monthly, it shall be converted *pro rata* to a monthly basis;

"Repudiated Leased Premises" means any premises leased or otherwise occupied by the Applicants pursuant to a Lease in which the Applicants have delivered to the applicable Landlord a Notice of Repudiation or Termination, but shall not include: (a) any premises in respect of which the Applicants have expressly withdrawn, with the written consent of the Landlord, a previously delivered Notice of Repudiation or Termination; or (b) any premises surrendered or vacated by the Applicants on the expiry of the term of the Lease;

"Repudiation Deadline" means 5:00 p.m. (Toronto time) on September 25, 2009;

"Required Majority of Creditors" means: (a) the number of Affirmative Votes exceeds fifty percent (50%) of the Votes Cast; and (b) the value of Proven Voting Claims attributable to the Affirmative Votes equals or exceeds sixty-six and two-thirds percent (66-2/3%) of the value of Proven Voting Claims attributable to the Votes Cast;

"Restructuring Claim" means any: (a) Landlord Repudiation Claim; and (b), Contract Repudiation Claim, and **"Restructuring Claims"** means all of them;

"Sanction Order" means an Order sanctioning the Plan and giving all necessary directions regarding its implementation, which shall contain the provisions set forth in Section 8.1 of the Plan;

"Second Distribution Date" means a date to be chosen by the Monitor, in consultation with the Applicants, which shall be a date which is within thirty (30) days of the one (1) year anniversary of the Plan Implementation Date;

"Secured Claims" means all Claims secured by a Lien, provided that no Landlord Repudiation Claims arising under a Lease shall be treated under the Plan as Secured Claims, and **"Secured Claim"** means any one of them;

"Secured Creditors" means Creditors with Claims that are Secured Claims, and **"Secured Creditor"** means any one of them;

"Special Crown Claims" means Claims of the Crown, for all amounts that were outstanding at the CCAA Filing Date and are of a kind that could be subject to a demand under:

(a) subsection 224(1.2) of the ITA;

(b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the ITA and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium,

or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts; or

(c) any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the ITA, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum:

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the ITA; or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection;

"Stay Period" has the meaning given to it in the CCAA Initial Order;

"Tax" or **"Taxes"** means any and all amounts subject to a withholding or remitting obligation and any and all taxes, duties, fees, and other governmental charges, duties, impositions and liabilities of any kind whatsoever whether or not assessed by the Taxing Authorities (including any Claims by any of the Taxing Authorities), including all interest, penalties, fines, fees, other charges and additions with respect to such amount;

"Tax Claim" means any Claim against the Applicants for any Taxes in respect of any taxation year or period ending on or prior to the CCAA Filing Date, and in any case where a taxation year or period commences on or prior to the CCAA Filing Date, for any Taxes in respect of or attributable to the portion of the taxation period commencing prior to the CCAA Filing Date and up to and including the CCAA Filing Date. For greater certainty, a Tax Claim shall include, without limitation, any and all Claims of any Taxing Authority in respect of transfer pricing adjustments and any Canadian or non-resident Tax related thereto;

"Taxing Authorities" means Her Majesty the Queen, Her Majesty the Queen in right of Canada, Her Majesty the Queen in right of any province or territory of Canada, the Canada Revenue Agency, any similar revenue or taxing authority of each and every province or territory of Canada and any political subdivision thereof, and any Canadian or foreign governmental authority, and **"Taxing Authority"** means any one of the Taxing Authorities;

"Unaffected Obligations" has the meaning given to such term in Section 3.2 of the Plan, and **"Unaffected Obligation"** means any one of such Unaffected Claims;

"Unsecured Claims" means all Pre-Filing Claims and Restructuring Claims, but excludes any Unaffected Obligations, and **"Unsecured Claim"** means any one of them;

"Unsecured Creditors" means Creditors with Claims that are Unsecured Claims, and **"Unsecured Creditor"** means any one of them;

"Vacation Pay Claims" means Claims of employees, former and current, of the Applicants for accrued and unpaid vacation pay whether in respect of a period prior to or after the CCAA Filing Date, and **"Vacation Pay Claim"** means any one of them; and

"Votes Cast" means the sum of the Affirmative Votes and the Negative Votes of the Eligible Voting Creditors with Proven Voting Claims present at the Creditors' Meeting in person or by Proxy.

1.2 Article and Section Reference

The terms **"this Plan"**, **"hereof"**, **"hereunder"**, **"herein"**, and similar expressions refer to this Plan, and not to any particular article, section, subsection, paragraph or clause of this Plan and include any variations, amendments, modifications or supplements hereto. In this Plan, a reference to an article, section, subsection, clause or paragraph shall, unless otherwise stated, refer to an article, section, subsection, paragraph or clause of this Plan.

1.3 Extended Meanings

In this Plan, where the context so requires, any word importing the singular number shall include the plural and vice versa, and any word or words importing gender shall include all genders.

1.4 Interpretation Not Affected by Headings

The division of this Plan into articles, sections, subsections, paragraphs and clauses and the insertion of a table of contents and headings are for convenience of reference and shall not affect the construction or interpretation of this Plan.

1.5 Date of Any Action

In the event that any date on which any action is required to be taken hereunder by any Person is not a Business Day, such action shall be required to be taken on the next succeeding day that is a Business Day.

1.6 Currency

Unless otherwise stated herein, all references to currency in this Plan are to lawful money of Canada. For the purposes of voting or distribution, any Claim or Lease Terms shall be denominated in Canadian Dollars and all distributions under this Plan shall be paid in Canadian Dollars. Any Claim or Lease Terms in a currency other than Canadian Dollars must be converted to Canadian Dollars, and such amount shall be regarded as having been converted at the spot rate of exchange quoted by the Bank of Canada for exchanging such currency to Canadian Dollars as at noon on the CCAA Filing Date, which rate for greater certainty for the conversion of US Dollars to Canadian Dollars is 0.8083 or CDN $0.8083:US $1.00.

1.7 Statutory References

Any reference in this Plan to a statute includes all regulations made thereunder, all amendments to such statute or regulations in force from time to time to the date of this Plan and any statute or regulation that supplements or supersedes such statute or regulation to the date of this Plan.

1.8 Successors and Assigns

This Plan shall be binding upon and shall enure to the benefit of the heirs, administrators, executors, legal personal representatives, successors and assigns, as the case may be, of any Person named or referred to in or bound by this Plan.

1.9 Governing Law

This Plan and each of the documents contemplated or delivered under or in connection with this Plan, shall be governed by, and are to be construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the Province of Ontario and the federal laws of Canada applicable therein. All questions as to the interpretation of or application of this Plan and all proceedings taken in connection with this Plan and its revisions shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court.

1.10 Inclusive Meaning

As used in this Plan, the words **"include"**, **"includes"**, **"including"** or any other derivation thereof means, in any case, those words as modified by the words "without limitation".

1.11 Severability

If any provision of this Plan is or becomes illegal, invalid or unenforceable on or following the Plan Implementation Date in any jurisdiction, the illegality, invalidity or unenforceability of that provision will not affect the legality, validity or enforceability of the remaining provisions of this Plan, or the legality, validity or enforceability of that provision in any other jurisdiction.

1.12 Timing Generally

Unless otherwise specified, all references to time herein, and in any document issued pursuant hereto, shall mean local time in Toronto, Ontario and any reference to an event occurring on a Business Day shall mean prior to 5:00 p.m. (Toronto time) on such Business Day.

1.13 Time of Payments and Other Actions

Unless otherwise specified, time periods within or following which any payment is to be made or act is to be done shall be calculated by excluding the day on which the period commences and including the day on which the period ends and by extending the payment to the next succeeding Business Day if the last day of the period is not a Business Day. Wherever any

payment to be made or action to be taken under this Plan is required to be made or to be taken on a day other than a Business Day, such payment shall be made or action taken on the next succeeding Business Day.

1.14 Interpretation of Accounting Terms

All accounting terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to them, from time to time, in accordance with Canadian generally accepted accounting principles as now in effect, including those prescribed by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants.

1.15 Schedule

The following is a Schedule to this Plan, which is incorporated by reference into this Plan and forms an integral part hereof:

Schedule "A" - Form of Monitor's Certificate

ARTICLE 2
PURPOSE OF PLAN

2.1 Purpose

The purpose of this Plan is to effect a compromise and arrangement of all Unsecured Claims against the Applicants, in order to enable the business of the Applicants to continue, in the expectation that a greater benefit will be derived from the continued operation of the business of the Applicants than would result from the bankruptcy, the immediate sale or forced liquidation of the Applicants' Assets.

ARTICLE 3
CLAIMS

3.1 Affected Persons

On the Plan Implementation Date, this Plan shall be binding upon the Applicants and the Unsecured Creditors and their respective heirs, executors, administrators, legal representatives, successors and assigns, but, for greater certainty, shall not affect any Unaffected Obligations.

3.2 Claims Unaffected by the Plan

This Plan shall not compromise the following Claims and rights that arise in respect thereof (collectively, the **"Unaffected Obligations"**):

(a) Claims of Secured Creditors;

(b) Claims arising in the ordinary course of business for utilities, goods, materials or services provided to and received by the Applicants at the request of the Applicants from and after the CCAA Filing Date, which Claims shall be paid by

the Applicants in accordance with terms previously agreed upon by the Applicants with suppliers of such utilities, goods, materials and services;

(c) Claims for unpaid Rent (as such term is defined in the CCAA Initial Order) of any Landlord against the Applicants payable pursuant to the terms of the CCAA Initial Order for the period from and after the CCAA Filing Date;

(d) subject to any agreement with a Landlord, Claims of a Landlord arising after the CCAA Filing Date pursuant to or in respect of a Lease which is: (i) not subject to a Notice of Repudiation or Termination; and (ii) which is otherwise continuing in full force and effect as of the Plan Implementation Date with or without modification, amendment or variation with the consent of the Landlord after the CCAA Filing Date, but excluding any Claims that arose under any such Lease prior to the CCAA Filing Date or any Claims with respect to the waiver or reduction of any benefits to the Landlord, financial or otherwise, arising out of, or by virtue of the granting of or entering into an agreement providing amendments to a Lease;

(e) subject to any agreement with a Landlord, Claims of a Landlord arising from the non-performance of any obligations of the Applicants to be performed by the Applicants under the CCAA Initial Order or any other Orders made in the CCAA Proceedings in respect of any Lease which is subject to a Notice of Repudiation or Termination, for which notice of such Claim is given to the Applicants in writing no later than five (5) Business Days prior to the hearing of the Sanction Order;

(f) Claims secured by the DIP Lender's Charge;

(g) Claims secured by the Administration Charge;

(h) Special Crown Claims;

(i) that portion of a Claim arising from a cause of action for which the Applicants are covered by insurance, only to the extent of such coverage;

(j) Claims of employees of the Applicants who have not received a Notice of Repudiation or Termination on or before the Repudiation Deadline for accrued wages, accrued salary, accrued bonuses, accrued commissions, benefits and reimbursement of expenses of the Applicants;

(k) Employee Restructuring Claims;

(l) Vacation Pay Claims; and

(m) Claims of the Monitor, and all legal, real estate, accounting, tax, financial or other advisers to and consultants of the Applicants and the Monitor incurred by the Applicants and the Monitor in connection with the CCAA Proceedings and the restructuring of the Applicants, including the development and implementation of this Plan.

3.3 No Vote or Distribution in Respect of Unaffected Obligations

No holder of an Unaffected Obligation shall be entitled to vote on or receive any distributions under this Plan in respect of such Unaffected Obligation.

3.4 Claims Filed By Holders of Unaffected Obligations

Where a Proof of Claim or Lease Terms Form has been filed with the Applicants or the Monitor by any Person in respect of an Unaffected Obligation, whether pursuant to the Claims Process and Bar Order or otherwise, such Proof of Claim or Lease Terms Form will be deemed to be disallowed for voting and distribution purposes with no further action required by the Applicants or the Monitor and neither the Applicants nor the Monitor shall have any further obligation in respect of such Proof of Claim or Lease Terms Form.

3.5 Set-Off

Except as otherwise contractually agreed, the law of set-off applies to all Claims made against the Applicants and to all actions instituted by it for the recovery of debts due to the Applicants in the same manner and to the same extent as if the Applicants were plaintiffs or defendants, as the case may be.

3.6 Special Crown Claims

All Special Crown Claims in respect of all amounts that were outstanding at the CCAA Filing Date or related to the period ending on the CCAA Filing Date shall be paid in full to the Crown within six (6) months of the Sanction Order as required by subsection 18.2(1) of the CCAA.

3.7 Funding of Cash Distributions under the Plan

On the Plan Implementation Date, the Applicants shall provide the amount of CDN $750,000.00 to the Monitor to fund the cash distributions pursuant to Section 4.2 of this Plan (the **"Plan Distribution Fund"**). The Plan Distribution Fund shall be distributed to Unsecured Creditors with Proven Distribution Claims pursuant to Section 4.2 of this Plan. Any money remaining in the Plan Distribution Fund after the Interim Distribution Date shall, subject to Section 6.8 of this Plan, be returned to the Applicants. If necessary, the Applicants shall provide an additional amount to the Monitor to fund the cash distributions pursuant to Section 4.2 of this Plan five (5) Business Days prior to the Second Distribution Date.

ARTICLE 4
TREATMENT OF UNSECURED CREDITORS

4.1 Voting for Creditors

Each Unsecured Creditor with one or more Unsecured Claims shall be entitled to vote on this Plan at the Creditors' Meeting, to the extent of the amount of its Proven Voting Claim, notwithstanding the election such Unsecured Creditor has made regarding its choice of distribution on its Proof of Claim or Lease Terms Form.

4.2 Distribution to Unsecured Creditors

Commencing on the Plan Implementation Date, the Monitor shall distribute to each Unsecured Creditor with a Proven Distribution Claim, in full and final satisfaction, compromise, settlement, release and discharge of each such Proven Distribution Claim, either:

(a) such Creditor's Pro Rata Share of $750,000.00 minus the aggregate amount of the distributions that will be made in accordance with Subsection 4.2(c) of this Plan for immediate distribution;

(b) such Creditor's Pro Rata Share of $600,000.00 minus the aggregate amount of the distributions that will be made in accordance with Subsection 4.2(c) of this Plan for immediate distribution and such Creditor's Pro Rata Share of $300,000.00 for distribution in one (1) year; or

(c) the lesser of $500.00 and such Creditor's Proven Distribution Claim for immediate distribution,

to each Unsecured Creditor, pursuant to its choice of distribution on its Proof of Claim or Lease Terms Form, as the case may be.

An Unsecured Creditor's election regarding such Creditor's choice of distribution between (a), (b) and (c) above shall be clearly indicated on such Creditor's Proof of Claim or Lease Terms Form, as the case may be, and no Creditor shall be entitled to change said election after the Claims Bar Date.

4.3 Unsecured Creditors with Separate Claims against both of the Applicants

For greater certainty, Unsecured Creditors who have separate Unsecured Claims against each of the Applicants shall file a Proof of Claim or Lease Terms Form, as the case may be, in respect of each of the Applicants and make separate elections regarding its choice of distribution in respect of its Proven Distribution Claim pursuant to Section 4.2 of this Plan. However, such Unsecured Creditor shall have the right to one (1) vote on the Plan, which vote shall have the cumulative value of all Unsecured Claims that are Proven Voting Claims as determined in accordance with the Claims Process and Bar Order or the Creditors Meeting Order.

ARTICLE 5
OTHER ARRANGEMENTS

5.1 Additional Arrangements

On or immediately after the Plan Implementation Date, the Applicants shall file articles of arrangement, articles of amalgamation or articles of reorganization pursuant to which the Applicants will be amalgamated under the provisions of the *Business Corporations Act* (Ontario) and form one (1) emerging entity, the effect of which will be, among other things, that all the Unaffected Obligations (including, without limitation, all Secured Claims), as well as all the remaining distributions under this Plan will continue against and be assumed by such emerging entity.

ARTICLE 6
PROVISIONS GOVERNING DISTRIBUTIONS

6.1 Loss of Right to Receive Distributions

Unless otherwise ordered by the Court or agreed to by the Applicants and the Monitor in writing, any Unsecured Creditor that has not submitted a Proof of Claim or Lease Terms Form, as the case may be, in accordance with the procedure set out in the Claims Process and Bar Order prior to the Claims Bar Date will not be entitled to receive any distributions under this Plan in respect of its Unsecured Claim.

6.2 Distributions on the Interim Distribution Date

Except as otherwise provided herein or as ordered by the Court, distributions to be made on account of Proven Distribution Claims to Unsecured Creditors for "immediate distribution" pursuant to Section 4.2 of this Plan, as at the Plan Implementation Date, shall be made on the Interim Distribution Date.

If there are Disputed Claims which remain unresolved on the Plan Implementation Date, the Monitor will make a partial distribution to Unsecured Creditors with Proven Distribution Claims for "immediate distribution" pursuant to Section 4.2 of this Plan, calculating the partial distribution based on the assumption that all remaining Disputed Claims, will be allowed in full. Unsecured Creditors holding a Disputed Claim will not receive a distribution under this Plan in respect of such Disputed Claim until the Disputed Claim is finally determined or settled under the Claims Process and Bar Order, the Creditors' Meeting Order, this Plan or further Order of the Court and shall be made by the Monitor as soon as practicable after such Disputed Claim becomes a Proven Distribution Claim.

Distributions for "immediate distribution" pursuant to Section 4.2 of this Plan to be made on account of Disputed Claims determined to be Proven Distribution Claims after the Plan Implementation Date shall be made pursuant to Section 6.8 of this Plan.

6.3 Distributions on the Second Distribution Date

Except as otherwise provided herein or as ordered by the Court, distributions to be made on account of Proven Distribution Claims to Unsecured Creditors for "distribution in one (1) year" pursuant to Section 4.2 of this Plan shall be made on the Second Distribution Date.

If there are Disputed Claims which remain unresolved on the Second Distribution Date, the Monitor will make a partial distribution to Unsecured Creditors with Proven Distribution Claims for "distribution in one (1) year" pursuant to Section 4.2 of this Plan, calculating the partial distribution based on the assumption that all remaining Disputed Claims, will be allowed in full. Unsecured Creditors holding a Disputed Claim will not receive a distribution under this Plan in respect of such Disputed Claim until the Disputed Claim is finally determined or settled under the Claims Process and Bar Order, the Creditors' Meeting Order, this Plan or further Order of the Court and shall be made by the Monitor as soon as practicable after such Disputed Claim becomes a Proven Distribution Claim.

Distributions for "distribution in one (1) year" pursuant to Section 4.2 of this Plan to be made on account of Disputed Claims determined to be Proven Distribution Claims after the Second Distribution Date shall be made pursuant to Section 6.8 of this Plan.

6.4 Distributions by the Monitor

(a) All cash distributions to be made under this Plan to an Unsecured Creditor shall be made by the Monitor by cheque and will be sent, via regular mail, to such Unsecured Creditor at the address set out on the Unsecured Creditor's Proof of Claim or Lease Terms Form, as the case may be, or such other address as provided to the Monitor by such Unsecured Creditor in accordance with Section 11.6 of this Plan, provided, however, that notwithstanding any other provision of this Plan, the Monitor shall be entitled to delegate the responsibility for making any distributions under this Plan to the Applicants.

(b) Distribution of amounts held in the Disputed Claims Reserve in respect of the Disputed Claims which become Disallowed Claims after the Interim Distribution Date or the Second Distribution Date, as the case may be, shall be made by the Monitor in accordance with Section 6.8 of this Plan.

6.5 Interest on Unsecured Claims

Unless otherwise specifically provided for in this Plan or in the Sanction Order, no interest or penalties shall accrue or be paid on an Unsecured Claim or a Proven Distribution Claim from and after or in respect of the period following the CCAA Filing Date and no Holder of an Unsecured Claim or Proven Distribution Claim will be entitled to any interest in respect of such Unsecured Claim or Proven Distribution Claim accruing on or after or in respect of the period following the CCAA Filing Date. All interest accruing on any Unsecured Claim or Proven Distribution Claim after or in respect of the period following the CCAA Filing Date shall be forever extinguished and released under this Plan.

6.6 Interest on Plan Distribution Fund

Forthwith upon receipt, the Monitor shall deposit the Plan Distribution Fund into a segregated interest-bearing account. Interest earned on any monies in the Plan Distribution Fund, including any monies in the segregated account for unclaimed distributions referred to in Section 6.9 of this Plan, shall be the property of the Applicants and may be released to the Applicants by the Monitor from such account or accounts at any time and from time to time upon written request from the Applicants.

6.7 Distributions in respect of Transferred or Assigned Claims

With respect to distributions to Unsecured Creditors under this Plan, the Monitor shall not be obligated to deliver any distributions under this Plan to any transferee or assignee of an Unsecured Claim as the Creditor in respect of or Holder of such Unsecured Claim unless a Proof of Assignment is delivered to the Monitor and the Applicants no later than five (5) Business Days prior to the Interim Distribution Date, the Second Distribution Date, any subsequent interim distribution date(s) or Final Distribution Date, as applicable.

6.8 Disputed Claims

(a) The fact that a Proof of Claim or Lease Terms Form is allowed for voting purposes shall not preclude the Monitor from disputing such Proof of Claim or Lease Terms Form for distribution purposes. Distributions in relation to any Disputed Claim in existence at the Plan Implementation Date will be held in escrow by the Monitor pending settlement or final determination of the Disputed Claim in accordance with the Claims Process and Bar Order or this Plan.

(b) On the Interim Distribution Date, the Monitor shall establish the Disputed Claims Reserve by withholding on account of Disputed Claims, that amount of the Plan Distribution Fund which would be distributed to Holders of Disputed Claims if such Disputed Claims were to become Proven Distribution Claims, for their entire amount on the Interim Distribution Date. Such Disputed Claims Reserve shall be held in escrow by the Monitor until a final determination or settlement has been made in respect of the Disputed Claims, at which time any surplus funds arising from any Disallowed Claims, after releasing for distribution all amounts in respect of Disputed Claims that have become Proven Distribution Claims, shall be released by the Monitor from the Disputed Claims Reserve and distributed to Unsecured Creditors with Proven Distribution Claims on a *pro rata* basis in accordance with their entitlements under this Plan, provided, however, that any such further distributions to Unsecured Creditors with Proven Distribution Claims need only be made by the Monitor when the aggregate amount available for distribution in respect of such Disallowed Claims, together with the aggregate amount of undeliverable or unclaimed distributions determined in accordance with Section 6.9 of this Plan, is not less than CDN $1,500.00. If on the Final Distribution Date, the aggregate amount available for distribution in respect of the aforesaid Disallowed Claims, together with the aggregate amount of undeliverable or unclaimed distributions determined in accordance with Section 6.9 of this Plan, is less than CDN $1,500.00, the distribution amount in respect of such Disallowed Claims and undeliverable and unclaimed distributions, shall be released by the Monitor to the Applicants, free and clear of any Claims of the Holders in respect thereof, any other Unsecured Creditors and their respective successors and assigns.

6.9 Undeliverable and Unclaimed Distributions

(a) If any Unsecured Creditor entitled to a cash distribution pursuant to this Plan cannot be located on any distribution date, or if any delivery or distribution to be made pursuant to Section 4.2 of this Plan is returned as undeliverable, such cash shall be set aside by the Monitor and deposited in a segregated, interest-bearing account to be maintained by the Monitor.

(b) If such Unsecured Creditor is located within six (6) months after such distribution date, such cash (less the allocable portion of taxes, if any, paid by the Applicants on account of such Creditor), shall be distributed to such Creditor.

(c) If such Unsecured Creditor cannot be located or if any delivery or distribution to be made pursuant to Section 4.2 of this Plan is returned as undeliverable, or in the case of any distribution made by cheque, the cheque remains uncashed, for a period of more than six (6) months after the distribution date, or the date of delivery or mailing of the cheque, whichever is later, the Claim of such Creditor with respect to such undelivered or unclaimed distribution shall be discharged and forever barred, notwithstanding any federal or provincial laws to the contrary and any such cash allocable to the undeliverable or unclaimed distribution, shall be distributed to Unsecured Creditors with Proven Distribution Claims on a *pro rated* basis in accordance with this Plan, free and clear of and from any claim to such monies by or on behalf of such Creditor who shall be deemed to have released such Claim, provided, however, that any such further distributions to Unsecured Creditors with Proven Distribution Claims need only be made when the aggregate amount available for distribution, together with the aggregate amount available for distribution on account of Disputed Claims which have become Disallowed Claims after the Plan Implementation Date in accordance with Subsection 6.8(b) of this Plan, is not less than CDN $1,500.00. If on the Final Distribution Date, the aggregate amount of undeliverable or unclaimed distributions, together with the aggregate amount available for distribution on account of the aforesaid Disallowed Claims, are less than CDN $1,500.00, the amount of such undeliverable or unclaimed distributions and the amount available for distribution in respect of the aforesaid Disallowed Claims shall be released by the Monitor to the Applicants, free and clear of any Claims of the Holders in respect thereof, any other Unsecured Creditors and their respective successors and assigns. Nothing contained in this Plan shall require the Applicants and/or the Monitor to attempt to locate any Holder of any undeliverable or unclaimed distributions.

6.10 Tax Matters

(a) **Allocation of Distributions**. All distributions made pursuant to this Plan in respect of an Unsecured Claim shall be applied first in consideration for the outstanding principal amount of such Claim and secondly, in consideration for accrued and unpaid interest and penalties, if any, which form part of such Claim. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Plan, including Subsection 6.8(b) of this Plan, each Unsecured Creditor that is to receive a distribution or payment pursuant to this Plan shall have sole and exclusive responsibility for the satisfaction and payment of any Tax obligations imposed by any Authorized Authority on account of such distribution.

(b) **Withholding Rights**. All distributions hereunder shall be subject to any withholding and reporting requirements imposed by any Applicable Law or any Taxing Authority and the Monitor, on behalf of the Applicants, shall be entitled to deduct and withhold from any distributions hereunder payable to an Unsecured Creditor or to any Person on behalf of any Unsecured Creditor, such amounts as the Monitor, on behalf of the Applicants, is: (i) required to deduct and withhold with respect to such payment under the ITA or any provision of federal,

provincial, territorial, state, local or foreign tax law, in each case, as amended or succeeded; or (ii) entitled to withhold under Section 116 of the ITA or any corresponding provisions of provincial law. To the extent that amounts are so withheld, such withheld amounts shall be treated for all purposes as having been paid to the Unsecured Creditor in respect of which such deduction and withholding was made, provided that such withheld amounts are actually remitted to the appropriate Taxing Authority.

ARTICLE 7
CREDITORS' MEETING

7.1 Creditors' Meeting and Conduct

The Creditors' Meeting to consider and vote on this Plan shall be held and conducted by the Applicants and the Monitor in accordance with the terms of the Creditors' Meeting Order.

7.2 Acceptance of Plan

If the Required Majority of Creditors is obtained at the Creditors' Meeting, this Plan shall be approved and shall be deemed to have been agreed to, accepted and approved by the Unsecured Creditors and shall be binding upon all Unsecured Creditors.

ARTICLE 8
CONDITIONS OF PLAN IMPLEMENTATION

8.1 Sanction Order

In the event that this Plan is approved by the Required Majority of Creditors at the Creditors' Meeting, the Applicants shall promptly apply to the Court for the Sanction Order effective on the Plan Implementation Date or such other date as specified therein and having, *inter alia*, substantially the effect that:

(a) (i) this Plan has been approved by the Required Majority of Creditors in conformity with the CCAA; (ii) the Applicants have complied with the provisions of the CCAA and the Orders made in the CCAA Proceedings in all respects; (iii) the Court is satisfied that the Applicants have not done nor purported to do anything that is not authorized by the CCAA; and (iv) this Plan and the transactions contemplated by it are fair and reasonable;

(b) this Plan (including the compromises, arrangements and releases set out herein) shall be sanctioned and approved pursuant to Section 6 of the CCAA and will be binding and effective as set out herein on the Applicants, all Creditors and all other Persons as provided for in this Plan or in the Sanction Order;

(c) subject to the performance by the Applicants of their obligations under this Plan, and except to the extent expressly contemplated by this Plan or the Sanction Order, all obligations or agreements (including Leases) to which the Applicants are a party, other than agreements (including Leases) which were terminated or

repudiated by the Applicants prior to the Plan Implementation Date in accordance with the CCAA Initial Order, will be and remain in full force and effect as at the Plan Implementation Date, unamended except as they may have been amended by agreement of the parties subsequent to the CCAA Filing Date, and no Person who is a party to any such obligations or agreements shall, following the Plan Implementation Date, accelerate, terminate, rescind, refuse to perform or otherwise repudiate its obligations thereunder, or enforce or exercise any right (including any right of set-off, option, dilution or other remedy) or make any demand under or in respect of any such obligation or agreement, by reason of:

(i) any defaults or events of default arising as a result of the insolvency of the Applicants prior to the Plan Implementation Date;

(ii) the fact that the Applicants have sought or obtained relief under the CCAA or that this Plan has been implemented by the Applicants;

(iii) the effect on the Applicants of the completion of any of the transactions contemplated by this Plan;

(iv) any compromises or arrangements effected pursuant to this Plan; or

(v) any other event(s) which occurred on or prior to the Plan Implementation Date which would have entitled any Person thereto to enforce those rights and remedies, subject to any express provisions to the contrary in any agreements entered into with the Applicants after the CCAA Filing Date in respect of any Leases. For greater certainty, nothing in this paragraph shall waive any obligations of the Applicants in respect of any Unaffected Obligation;

(d) the commencement or prosecution, whether directly, indirectly, derivatively or otherwise, of any demands, claims, actions, counterclaims, suits, judgement, or other remedy or recovery with respect to any Claim released, discharged or terminated pursuant to this Plan shall be permanently enjoined;

(e) the releases referred to in Section 10.5 of this Plan shall be confirmed and all steps or proceedings, including, without limitation, administrative orders, declarations or assessments, commenced, taken or proceeded with or that may be commenced, taken or proceeded with against any or all past, present and future directors and officers of the Applicants in respect of any Claim are permanently enjoined;

(f) all Charges established by the CCAA Initial Order (other than the Administrative Charge and the DIP Lender's Charge) or any other Order of the Court, shall be terminated, released and discharged effective on the Plan Implementation Date;

(g) the Stay Period shall have been extended until at least November 20, 2009;

(h) the activities of the Monitor in conducting and administering the Creditors' Meeting are approved; and

(i) the Monitor is discharged upon the filing of a certificate of the Monitor confirming, *inter alia*, resolution of all Disputed Claims and the making of the final distributions under the Plan.

8.2 Conditions of Plan Implementation

This Plan is subject to the following conditions for the benefit of the Applicants:

(a) all approvals, orders, determinations or consents required pursuant to Applicable Law shall have been obtained on terms and conditions satisfactory to the Applicants, acting reasonably, and shall remain in full force and effect on the Plan Implementation Date;

(b) all necessary corporate action and proceedings of the Applicants shall have been taken to approve this Plan and to enable the Applicants to execute, deliver and perform their obligations under the agreements, documents and other instructions to be executed and delivered by it pursuant to this Plan;

(c) all agreements, resolutions, documents and other instruments, which are necessary to be executed and delivered by the Applicants in order to implement this Plan and perform their obligations under this Plan shall have been executed and delivered;

(d) this Plan shall have been approved by the Required Majority of Creditors;

(e) the Sanction Order, in form and substance satisfactory to the Applicants, acting reasonably, and which shall contain the matters set out in Section 8.1 of this Plan, shall have been granted by the Court on or before November 16, 2009 or such other date as may be consented to by the Monitor or approved by the Court, and such Sanction Order as at the Plan Implementation Date shall be in full force and effect, not stayed or amended (unless with the consent of the Applicants, acting reasonably);

(f) all applicable appeal periods in respect of the Sanction Order shall have expired and in the event of an appeal or application for leave to appeal, final determination shall have been made by the applicable appellate court;

(g) the Plan Implementation Date shall have occurred on or before November 18, 2009 or such later date as may be consented to by the Monitor or approved by the Court; and

(h) the CCAA Initial Order shall be in full force and effect, not stayed or amended after the date hereof (except with the consent of the Applicants, acting reasonably).

Each of the conditions set out in this Section 8.2 (except subsections (d) and (e) above) may be waived by the Applicants, in whole or in part, in their sole discretion by written notice to the Monitor. If a condition set out above has not been satisfied as at the date specified for its fulfillment or waived in accordance with this Section 8.2, this Plan shall automatically terminate, in which case the Applicants shall not be under any further obligation to implement this Plan.

8.3 Monitor's Certificate

Upon written notice from the Applicants to the Monitor that the conditions set out in Section 8.2 of this Plan have been satisfied or waived, the Monitor shall, as soon as possible following receipt of such written notice, file with the Court a certificate which states that all conditions precedent set out in Section 8.2 of this Plan have been satisfied or waived, in substantially the form as the certificate attached as **Schedule "A"** to this Plan (the **"Monitor's Certificate"**).

ARTICLE 9
AMENDMENTS TO THE PLAN

9.1 Amendments to Plan Prior to Approval

The Applicants reserve the right to file any variation or modification of, or amendment or supplement to, this Plan by way of a supplementary or amended and restated plan or plans of compromise or arrangement or both filed with the Court at any time or from time to time prior to the conclusion of the Creditors' Meeting, in which case any such supplementary or amended and restated plan or plans of compromise or arrangement or both shall, for all purposes, be and are deemed to be a part of and incorporated into this Plan. The Applicants shall give notice in writing by publication or otherwise to all Unsecured Creditors of the details of any variations, modifications, amendments or supplements prior to the vote being taken to approve this Plan, as varied, modified, amended or supplemented. For greater certainty, the Applicants may propose a modification of or amendment or supplement to this Plan at the Creditors' Meeting.

9.2 Amendments to Plan Following Approval

After such Creditors' Meeting (and both prior to and subsequent to the obtaining of the Sanction Order), the Applicants may at any time and from time to time vary, amend, modify or supplement this Plan without the need for obtaining an Order of the Court or providing notice to the Unsecured Creditors, if the Applicants and the Monitor, acting reasonably and in good faith, determine that such variation, amendment, modification or supplement is of a technical or administrative nature that would not be materially prejudicial to the interests of any of the Unsecured Creditors under this Plan and is necessary in order to give effect to the substance of this Plan or the Sanction Order.

ARTICLE 10
PLAN IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECT OF THE PLAN

10.1 Implementation

On the Plan Implementation Date, subject to the satisfaction or waiver of the conditions contained in Section 8.2 of this Plan, this Plan shall be implemented by the Applicants and shall be binding upon all Unsecured Creditors in accordance with the terms of this Plan and the Sanction Order.

10.2 Effect of the Plan Generally

The payment, compromise or satisfaction of any Unsecured Claims under this Plan, if sanctioned and approved by the Court, shall be binding upon each Unsecured Creditor, his, her or its heirs, executors, administrators, legal personal representatives, successors and assigns, as the case may be, for all purposes and this Plan will constitute: (a) full, final and absolute settlement of all rights of the Creditors against the Applicants in respect of the Unsecured Claims; and (b) an absolute release and discharge of all indebtedness, liabilities and obligations of or in respect of the Unsecured Claims against the Applicants, including any interest or costs accruing thereon (whether before or after the CCAA Filing Date).

10.3 Compromise Effective for All Purposes

No Person who has a Unsecured Claim as a guarantor, surety, indemnitor or similar covenant in respect of any Unsecured Claim which is compromised under this Plan or who has any right to claim over in respect of or to be subrogated to the rights of any Person in respect of an Unsecured Claim which is compromised under this Plan shall be entitled to any greater rights than the Creditor whose Unsecured Claim was compromised under this Plan. Accordingly, the payment, compromise or other satisfaction of any Unsecured Claim under this Plan, if sanctioned and approved by the Court shall, be binding upon such Unsecured Creditor, its heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns for all purposes and, to such extent, shall also be effective to relieve any third party directly or indirectly liable for such indebtedness, whether as guarantor, surety, indemnitor, director, joint covenantor, principal or otherwise.

10.4 Consents and Leases

As of the Plan Implementation Date, each executory contract and Lease to which the Applicants, or either of them, are a party as at the CCAA Filing Date, as it may have been modified, amended or varied after the CCAA Filing Date with the consent of the Landlord, remains in full force and effect as at the Plan Implementation Date (other than in respect of Unsecured Claims arising from such contract or Lease which are affected by this Plan) unless such contract or Lease: (a) is the subject of a Notice of Repudiation or Termination; or (b) has expired or terminated pursuant to its own terms.

10.5 Plan Releases

Effective on the Interim Distribution Date:

(a) the Applicants shall be forever released from all Unsecured Claims; and

(b) each Unsecured Creditor in consideration of the distributions made under this Plan and in consideration of those continuing Leases after the Interim Distribution Date, will be deemed to have forever released and discharged: (i) the Applicants; (ii) the Monitor and its directors, officers, employees, agents, affiliates, professional advisors (including legal counsel) and associates; (iii) subject to subsection 5.1(2) of the CCAA in respect of directors, each and every past and present director, officer, employee, agent, affiliate, professional advisor (including legal counsel) and associate of the Applicants; and (iv) any person who may claim contribution or indemnification against or from the Applicants, or either of them, from any and all demands, Claims, including Claims of any past and present officers, directors or employees for contribution and indemnity, actions, causes of action, counterclaims, suits, debts, sums of money, accounts, covenants, damages, judgments, expenses, executions, charges and other recoveries on account of any liability, obligation, demand or cause of action of whatever nature which any Person may be entitled to assert, including, without limitation, any and all Tax Claims, whether known or unknown, matured or unmatured, foreseen or unforeseen, existing or hereafter arising, based in whole or in part on any act or omission, transaction, dealing or other occurrence existing or taking place on or prior to the Interim Distribution Date relating to, arising out of or in connection with the Applicants, the Assets, business or affairs of the Applicants, whenever and however conducted, this Plan or the CCAA Proceedings, other than Unaffected Obligations and the right to enforce the Applicants' obligations under this Plan.

10.6 Waiver of Defaults

From and after the Plan Implementation Date, and subject to any express provisions to the contrary in any amending agreement (including in respect of any Leases) entered into with the Applicants, or either of them, after the CCAA Filing Date, all Persons shall be deemed to have waived any and all defaults of the Applicants, or either of them, then existing or previously committed by the Applicants, or either of them, or caused by the Applicants, or either of them, or any of the provisions hereof or non-compliance with any covenant, warranty, representation, term, provision, condition or obligation, express or implied, in every contract, agreement, mortgage, security agreement, indenture, trust indenture, loan agreement, commitment letter, agreement for sale, Lease, personal property lease or other agreement, written or oral, any amendments or supplements thereto, existing between such Person and the Applicants, or any of them. Any and all notices of default, acceleration of payments and demands for payments under any instrument, or other notices, including without limitation, any notices of intention to proceed to enforce security, arising from any of such aforesaid defaults shall be deemed to have been rescinded and withdrawn. For greater certainty, nothing in this paragraph shall waive any obligations of the Applicants in respect of any Unaffected Obligation.

10.7 Consents and Releases

From and after the Plan Implementation Date, all Creditors shall be deemed to have consented and to have agreed to all of the provisions of this Plan as an entirety. In particular, each Creditor shall be deemed to have executed and delivered to the Applicants all consents, releases, assignments and waivers, statutory or otherwise, required to implement and carry out this Plan in its entirety.

10.8 Deeming Provisions

In this Plan, the deeming provisions are not rebuttable and are conclusive and irrevocable.

ARTICLE 11
GENERAL PROVISIONS

11.1 Different Capacities

Unsecured Creditors whose Claims are affected by this Plan may be affected in more than one capacity. Unless expressly provided herein to the contrary, each such Creditor shall be entitled to participate hereunder in each such capacity. Any action taken by an Unsecured Creditor in any one capacity shall not affect the Creditor in any other capacity, unless expressly agreed by the Creditor in writing or unless the Claims overlap or are otherwise duplicative.

11.2 Further Assurances

Notwithstanding that the transactions and events set out in this Plan may be deemed to occur without any additional act or formality other than as may be expressly set out herein, each of the Persons affected hereby shall make, do, and execute or cause to be made, done or executed all such further acts, deeds, agreements, assignments, transfers, conveyances, discharges, assurances, instruments, documents, elections, consents or filings as may be reasonably required by the Applicants in order to implement this Plan.

11.3 Paramountcy

Without limiting any other provision hereof, from and after the Plan Implementation Date, in the event of any conflict between this Plan and the covenants, warranties, representations, terms, conditions, provisions or obligations, expressed, or implied, of any contract, mortgage, security agreement, indenture, trust indenture, loan agreement, commitment letter, agreement for sale, Lease, personal property lease or other agreement, written or oral and any and all amendments or supplements thereto existing between the Applicants, or either of them, and any other Person affected by this Plan, the terms, conditions and provisions of this Plan shall govern and shall take precedence and priority.

11.4 Revocation, Withdrawal, or Non-Consummation

The Applicants reserve the right to revoke or withdraw this Plan at any time prior to the Plan Implementation Date and to file subsequent plans of compromises or arrangement. If the

Applicants revoke or withdraw this Plan, or if the Sanction Order is not issued: (a) this Plan shall be null and void in all respects; (b) any Unsecured Claim, any settlement or compromise embodied in this Plan (including the fixing or limiting of any Unsecured Claim to an amount certain), assumption or termination, repudiation of contracts or Leases effected by this Plan, any document or agreement executed pursuant to this Plan shall be deemed null and void; and (c) nothing contained in this Plan, and no action taken in preparation for consummation of this Plan, shall: (i) constitute or be deemed to constitute a waiver or release of any Unsecured Claims by or against the Applicants or any Person; (ii) prejudice in any manner the rights of the Applicants or any Person in any further proceedings involving the Applicants; or (iii) constitute an admission of any sort by any of the Applicants or any Person.

11.5 Responsibilities of the Monitor

The Monitor is acting in its capacity as Monitor in the CCAA Proceedings with respect to the Applicants and will not be responsible or liable for any obligations of the Applicants. The Monitor will have the powers granted to it by this Plan, by the CCAA and by any Order, including the CCAA Initial Order.

11.6 Notices

Any notice or communication to be delivered hereunder will be in writing and will reference this Plan and may, subject to as hereinafter provided, be made or given by mail, personal delivery or by facsimile or email transmission addressed to the respective parties as follows:

(a) if to the Applicants:

Extreme Retail (Canada) Inc. / Extreme Properties Inc.
8200 Jane Street
Concord, Ontario L4K 5A7

Attention: Ted Agnew / Brian Worts
Telephone: (905) 738-3180
Fax: (905) 738-0680
E-mail: tagnew@extremeretail.ca / bworts@extremeretail.ca

with a copy to:

Aird & Berlis LLP
Barristers and Solicitors
Brookfield Place
181 Bay Street, Suite 1800
Toronto, Ontario M5J 2T9

Attention: Steven L. Graff / Ian E. Aversa
Fax: (416) 863-1500
Telephone: (416) 863-1515
E-mail: sgraff@airdberlis.com / iaversa@airdberlis.com

(b) if to a Creditor:

to the last known address (including fax number or email address) for such Creditor specified in the Proof of Claim or Lease Terms Form, as the case may be, filed by such Creditor or, in the absence of such Proof of Claim or Lease Terms Form, to the last known address for such Creditor set out in the books and records of the Applicants or such other address as the Creditor may from time to time notify the Monitor in accordance with this Section.

(c) if to the Monitor:

KPMG Inc.,
in its capacity as Monitor of
Extreme Retail (Canada) Inc. and Extreme Properties Inc.
Commerce Court West
199 Bay Street, Suite 3300
Toronto, Ontario M5L 1B2

Attention: Michael G. Creber / R. Michael Craig
Telephone: (416) 777-3825 / (416) 777-8822
Fax: (416) 777-3364
E-mail: mcreber@kpmg.ca / michaelcraig@kpmg.ca

with a copy to:

Borden Ladner Gervais LLP
Scotia Plaza
40 King Street West
Toronto, Ontario M5H 3Y4

Attention: Michael J. MacNaughton / Sam P. Rappos
Tel: (416) 367-6646 / (416) 367-6033
Fax: (416) 682-2837 / (416) 361-7306
Email: mmacnaughton@blgcanada.com / srappos@blgcanada.com

or to such other address as any party may from time to time notify the others in accordance with this Section. All such notices and communications which are delivered will be deemed to have been received on the date of delivery. All such notices and communications which are faxed or emailed will be deemed to be received on the date faxed or emailed if sent before 5:00 p.m. (Toronto time) on a Business Day and otherwise will be deemed to be received on the Business Day next following the day upon which such fax or email was sent. Any notice or

other communication sent by mail will be deemed to have been received on the third (3rd) Business Day after the date of mailing.

Dated at Toronto, Ontario this 15th day of September, 2009.