Court File No. CV-16-11452-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF H.B. WHITE CANADA CORP.

(the "**Applicant**")

BOOK OF AUTHORITIES OF THE APPLICANT

October 31, 2016

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In The Matter of the Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of

AbitibiBowater Inc., Abitibi-Consolidated Inc., Bowater Canadian Holdings Inc. and The Other Petitioners Listed on Schedules "A", "B" and "C" (Debtors) and Ernst & Young Inc. (Monitor)

Clément Gascon, J.S.C.

Heard: September 20-21, 2010
Judgment: September 23, 2010
Docket: C.S. Montréal 500-11-036133-094

Counsel: Mr. Sean Dunphy, Me Guy P. Martel, Me Joseph Reynaud, for the Debtors
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Me Jocelyn Perreault, for Bank of Nova Scotia (as Administrative and Collateral Agent)
Me Marc Duchesne, Me François Gagnon, for the Ad hoc Committee of the Senior Secured Noteholders and U.S. Bank National Association, Indenture Trustee for the Senior Secured Noteholders
Mr. Frederick L. Myers, Mr. Robert J. Chadwick, for the Ad hoc Committee of Bondholders
Mr. Michael B. Rotsztein, for Fairfax Financial Holdings Ltd.
Me Louise Hélène Guimond, for Syndicat canadien des communications, de l'énergie et du papier (SCEP) et ses sections locales 59-N, 63, 84, 84-35, 88, 90, 92, 101, 109, 132, 138, 139, 161, 209, 227, 238, 253, 306, 352, 375, 1256 et 1455 and for Syndicat des employés(es) et employés(es) professionnels(-les) et de bureau - Québec (SEPB) et les sections locales 110, 151 et 526
Me Neil Peden, Mr. Raj Sahni, for The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of AbitibiBowater Inc. & al.
Me Sébastien Guy, for Cater Pillar Financial Services and Desjardins Trust inc.
Mr. Richard Butler, for Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of British Columbia and the Attorney General of British Columbia
Me Louis Dumont, Mr. Neil Rabinovitch, for Aurelius Capital Management LLC and Contrarian Capital Management LLC
Mr. Christopher Besant, for NPower Cogen Limited
Mr. Len Marsello, for the Attorney General for Ontario
Mr. Carl Holm, for Bowater Canada Finance Company
Mr. David Ward, for Wilmington Trust US Indenture Trustee of Unsecured Notes issued by BCFC

Subject: Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications
For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Bankruptcy and insolvency

XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.3 Arrangements
XIX.3.b Approval by court

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — "Fair and reasonable"

Pulp and paper company experienced financial difficulties and sought protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — In order to complete its restructuring process, company prepared plan of arrangement — Under plan, company's secured debt obligations would be paid in full while unsecured debt obligations would be converted to equity of reorganized entity — Monitor as well as overwhelming majority of stakeholders strongly supported plan while only handful of stakeholders raised limited objections — Company brought motion seeking approval of plan by Court — Motion granted — Sole issue to be determined was whether plan was fair and reasonable — Here, level of approval by creditors was significant factor to consider — Monitor's recommendation to approve plan was another significant factor, given his professionalism, objectivity and competence — As most of objecting parties had agreed upon "carve-out" wording to be included in Court's order, only two creditors actually objected to plan and it was Court's view that their objections were either ill-founded or moot — Should Court decide to go against vast majority of stakeholders' will and reject plan, not only would those stakeholders be adversely prejudiced but company would also go bankrupt — Court should not seek perfection as plan was result of many compromises and of favourable market window — Court was of view that it was important to allow company to move forthwith towards emergence from 18-month restructuring process — Therefore, Court considered it appropriate and justified to approve plan of arrangement.

Faillite et insolvabilité --- Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies — Arrangements — Approbation par le tribunal — « Juste et équitable »

Compagnie papetière a connu des problèmes financiers et s'est mise sous la protection de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies — Afin de compléter son processus de restructuration, la compagnie a préparé un plan d'arrangement — Dans le cadre du plan, les dettes de la compagnie faisant l'objet d'une garantie seraient payées au complet tandis que les dettes de la compagnie ne faisant pas l'objet d'une garantie seraient converties en actions de l'entité restructurée — Contrôleur de même que la vaste majorité des parties intéressées étaient fortement en faveur du plan tandis qu'une poignée seulement des personnes intéressées soulevaient des objections limitées — Compagnie a déposé une requête visant l'approbation du plan par le Tribunal — Requête accueillie — Seule question à trancher était de savoir si le plan était juste et raisonnable — En l'espèce, la proportion des créanciers s'étant prononcés en faveur du plan était un élément important à considérer — Recommandation du contrôleur d'approuver le plan était un autre élément important, compte tenu de son professionnalisme, de son objectivité et de sa compétence — Comme la majeure partie des parties s'étant prononcées contre le plan avaient donné leur accord à la rédaction d'une clause de « retranchement » destinée à faire partie de l'ordonnance du Tribunal, seuls deux créanciers s'objectaient au plan dans les faits et le Tribunal était d'avis que leurs objections étaient soient sans fondement ou sans objet — S'il fallait que le Tribunal décide d'aller à l'encontre de la volonté de la vaste majorité des personnes intéressées et de rejeter le plan, non seulement ces personnes subiraient-elles des impacts négatifs mais aussi la compagnie ferait-elle faillite — Tribunal ne devrait pas chercher la perfection puisque le plan était le fruit de plusieurs compromis et le résultat d'une fenêtre d'opportunité favorable en terme de marché — Tribunal était d'avis qu'il était important que la compagnie puisse dès à présent mener à son terme un processus de restructuration long de dix-huit mois — Par conséquent, de l'avis du Tribunal, il était approprié et justifié de sanctionner le plan d'arrangement.

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s. 117 — referred to

MOTION by debtor company seeking Court's approval of plan of arrangement.

***Clément Gascon, J.S.C.*:**

Introduction

1 This judgment deals with the sanction and approval of a plan of arrangement under the *CCAA*[1]. The sole issue to resolve is the fair and reasonable character of the plan. While the debtor company, the monitor and an overwhelming majority of stakeholders strongly support this sanction and approval, three dissenting voices raise limited objections. The Court provides these reasons in support of the Sanction Order it considers appropriate and justified to issue under the circumstances.

The Relevant Background

2 On April 17, 2009 [2009 CarswellQue 14194 (C.S. Que.)], the Court issued an Initial Order pursuant to the *CCAA* with respect to the Abitibi Petitioners (listed in Schedule A), the Bowater Petitioners (listed in Schedule B) and the Partnerships (listed in Schedule C).

3 On the day before, April 16, 2009, AbitibiBowater Inc., Bowater Inc. and certain of their U.S. and Canadian Subsidiaries (the "*U.S. Debtors*") had, similarly, filed Voluntary Petitions for Relief under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.

4 Since the Initial Order, the Abitibi Petitioners, the Bowater Petitioners and the Partnerships (collectively, "*Abitibi*") have, under the protection of the Court, undertaken a huge and complex restructuring of their insolvent business.

5 The restructuring of Abitibi's imposing debt of several billion dollars was a cross-border undertaking that affected tens of thousands of stakeholders, from employees, pensioners, suppliers, unions, creditors and lenders to government authorities.

6 The process has required huge efforts on the part of many, including important sacrifices from most of the stakeholders involved. To name just a few, these restructuring efforts have included the closure of certain facilities, the sale of assets, contracts repudiations, the renegotiation of collective agreements and several costs saving initiatives[2].

7 In a span of less than 18 months, more than 740 entries have been docketed in the Court record that now comprises in excess of 12 boxes of documents. The Court has, so far, rendered over 100 different judgments and orders. The Stay Period has been extended seven times. It presently expires on September 30, 2010.

8 Abitibi is now nearing emergence from this *CCAA* restructuring process.

9 In May 2010, after an extensive review of the available alternatives, and pursuant to lengthy negotiations and consultations with creditors' groups, regulators and stakeholders, Abitibi filed its Plan of Reorganization and Compromise in the *CCAA* restructuring process (the "*CCAA Plan*[3]"). A joint Plan of Reorganization was also filed at the same time in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court process (the "*U.S. Plan*").

10 In essence, the Plans provided for the payment in full, on the Implementation Date and consummation of the U.S. Plan, of all of Abitibi's and U.S. Debtors' secured debt obligations.

11 As for their unsecured debt obligations, save for few exceptions, the Plans contemplated their conversion to equity of the post emergence reorganized Abitibi. If the Plans are implemented, the net value would likely translate into a recovery

under the *CCAA* Plan corresponding to the following approximate rates for the various Affected Unsecured Creditors Classes:

(a) 3.4% for the ACI Affected Unsecured Creditor Class;

(b) 17.1% for the ACCC Affected Unsecured Creditor Class;

(c) 4.2% for the Saguenay Forest Products Affected Unsecured Creditor Class;

(d) 36.5% for the BCFPI Affected Unsecured Creditor Class;

(e) 20.8% for the Bowater Maritimes Affected Unsecured Creditor Class; and

(f) 43% for the ACNSI Affected Unsecured Creditor Class.

12 With respect to the remaining Petitioners, the illustrative recoveries under the *CCAA* Plan would be nil, as these entities have nominal assets.

13 As an alternative to this debt to equity swap, the basic structure of the *CCAA* Plan included as well the possibility of smaller unsecured creditors receiving a cash distribution of 50% of the face amount of their Proven Claim if such was less than $6,073, or if they opted to reduce their claim to that amount.

14 In short, the purpose of the *CCAA* Plan was to provide for a coordinated restructuring and compromise of Abitibi's debt obligations, while at the same time reorganizing and simplifying its corporate and capital structure.

15 On September 14, 2010, Abitibi's Creditors' Meeting to vote on the *CCAA* Plan was convened, held and conducted. The resolution approving the *CCAA* Plan was overwhelmingly approved by the Affected Unsecured Creditors of Abitibi, save for the Creditors of one the twenty Classes involved, namely, the BCFC Affected Unsecured Creditors Class.

16 Majorities well in excess of the statutorily required simple majority in number and two-third majority in value of the Affected Unsecured Claims held by the Affected Unsecured Creditors were attained. On a combined basis, the percentages were 97.07% in number and 93.47% in value.

17 Of the 5,793 votes cast by creditors holding claims totalling some 8,9 billion dollars, over 8,3 billion dollars worth of claims voted in favour of approving the *CCAA* Plan.

The Motion[4] at Issue

18 Today, as required by Section 6 of the *CCAA*, the Court is asked to sanction and approve the *CCAA* Plan. The effect of the Court's approval is to bind Abitibi and its Affected Unsecured Creditors to the terms of the *CCAA* Plan.

19 The exercise of the Court's authority to sanction a compromise or arrangement under the *CCAA* is a matter of judicial discretion. In that exercise, the general requirements to be met are well established. In summary, before doing so, the Court must be satisfied that[5]:

a) There has been strict compliance with all statutory requirements;

b) Nothing has been done or purported to be done that was not authorized by the *CCAA*; and

c) The Plan is fair and reasonable.

20 Only the third condition is truly at stake here. Despite Abitibi's creditors' huge support of the fairness and the reasonableness of the *CCAA* Plan, some dissenting voices have raised objections.

21 They include:

a) The BCFC Noteholders' Objection;

b) The Contestations of the Provinces of Ontario and British Columbia; and

c) The Contestation of NPower Cogen Limited.

22 For the reasons that follow, the Court is satisfied that the *CCAA* Plan is fair and reasonable. The Contestations of the Provinces of Ontario and British Columbia and of NPower Cogen Limited have now been satisfactorily resolved by adding to the Sanction Order sought limited "carve-out" provisions in that regard. As for the only other objection that remains, namely that of some of the BCFC Noteholders, the Court considers that it should be discarded.

23 It is thus appropriate to immediately approve the *CCAA* Plan and issue the Sanction Order sought, albeit with some minor modifications to the wording of specific conclusions that the Court deems necessary.

24 In the Court's view, it is important to allow Abitibi to move forthwith towards emergence from the *CCAA* restructuring process it undertook eighteen month ago.

25 No one seriously disputes that there is risk associated with delaying the sanction of the *CCAA* Plan. This risk includes the fact that part of the exit financing sought by Abitibi is dependent upon the capital markets being receptive to the high yield notes or term debt being offered, in a context where such markets are volatile. There is, undoubtedly, continuing uncertainty with respect to the strength of the economic recovery and the effect this could have on the financial markets.

26 Moreover, there are numerous arrangements that Abitibi and their key stakeholders have agreed to or are in the process of settling that are key to the successful implementation of the *CCAA* Plan, including collective bargaining agreements with employees and pension funding arrangements with regulators. Any undue delay with implementation of the *CCAA* Plan increases the risk that these arrangements may require alterations or amendments.

27 Finally, at hearing, Mr. Robertson, the Chief Restructuring Officer, testified that the monthly cost of any delay in Abitibi's emergence from this *CCAA* process is the neighbourhood of 30 million dollars. That includes the direct professional costs and financing costs of the restructuring itself, as well as the savings that the labour cost reductions and the exit financing negotiated by Abitibi will generate as of the Implementation Date.

28 The Court cannot ignore this reality in dealing rapidly with the objections raised to the sanction and approval of the *CCAA* Plan.

Analysis

1. The Court's approval of the CCAA Plan

29 As already indicated, the first and second general requirements set out previously dealing with the statutory requirements and the absence of unauthorized conduct are not at issue.

30 On the one hand, the Monitor has reached the conclusion that Abitibi is and has been in strict compliance with all statutory requirements. Nobody suggests that this is not the case.

31 On the other hand, all materials filed and procedures taken by Abitibi were authorized by the *CCAA* and the orders of this Court. The numerous reports of the Monitor (well over sixty to date) make no reference to any act or conduct by Abitibi that was not authorized by the *CCAA*; rather, the Monitor is of the view that Abitibi has not done or purported to do anything that was not authorized by the *CCAA*[6].

32 In fact, in connection with each request for an extension of the stay of proceedings, the Monitor has reported that Abitibi was acting in good faith and with due diligence. The Court has not made any contrary finding during the course of these proceedings.

33 Turning to the fairness and reasonableness of a *CCAA* Plan requirement, its assessment requires the Court to consider the relative degrees of prejudice that would flow from granting or refusing the relief sought. To that end, in reviewing the fairness and reasonableness of a given plan, the Court does not and should not require perfection[7].

34 Considering that a plan is, first and foremost, a compromise and arrangement reached, between a debtor company and its creditors, there is, indeed, a heavy onus on parties seeking to upset a plan where the required majorities have overwhelmingly supported it. From that standpoint, a court should not lightly second-guess the business decisions reached by the creditors as a body[8].

35 In that regard, courts in this country have held that the level of approval by the creditors is a significant factor in determining whether a *CCAA* Plan is fair and reasonable[9]. Here, the majorities in favour of the *CCAA* Plan, both in number and in value, are very high. This indicates a significant and very strong support of the *CCAA* Plan by the Affected Unsecured Creditors of Abitibi.

36 Likewise, in its Fifty-Seventh Report, the Monitor advised the creditors that their approval of the *CCAA* Plan would be a reasonable decision. He recommended that they approve the *CCAA* Plan then. In its Fifty-Eighth Report, the Monitor reaffirmed its view that the *CCAA* Plan was fair and reasonable. The recommendation was for the Court to sanction and approve the *CCAA* Plan.

37 In a matter such as this one, where the Monitor has worked through out the restructuring with professionalism, objectivity and competence, such a recommendation carries a lot of weight.

38 The Court considers that the *CCAA* Plan represents a truly successful compromise and restructuring, fully in line with the objectives of the *CCAA*. Despite its weaknesses and imperfections, and notwithstanding the huge sacrifices and losses it imposes upon numerous stakeholders, the *CCAA* Plan remains a practical, reasonable and responsible solution to Abitibi's insolvency.

39 Its implementation will preserve significant social and economic benefits to the Canadian economy, including enabling about 11,900 employees (as of March 31, 2010) to retain their employment, and allowing hundreds of municipalities, suppliers and contractors in several regions of Ontario and Quebec to continue deriving benefits from a stronger and more competitive important player in the forest products industry.

40 In addition, the business of Abitibi will continue to operate, pension plans will not be terminated, and the Affected Unsecured Creditors will receive distributions (including payment in full to small creditors).

41 Moreover, simply no alternative to the *CCAA* Plan has been offered to the creditors of Abitibi. To the contrary, it appears obvious that in the event the Courtdoes not sanction the *CCAA* Plan, the considerable advantages that it creates will be most likely lost, such that Abitibi may well be placed into bankruptcy.

42 If that were to be the case, no one seriously disputes that most of the creditors would end up being in a more disadvantageous position than with the approval of the *CCAA* Plan. As outlined in the Monitor's 57th Report, the alternative scenario, a liquidation of Abitibi's business, will not prove to be as advantageous for its creditors, let alone its stakeholders as a whole.

43 All in all, the economic and business interests of those directly concerned with the end result have spoken vigorously

pursuant to a well-conducted democratic process. This is certainly not a case where the Court should override the express and strong wishes of the debtor company and its creditors and the Monitor's objective analysis that supports it.

44 Bearing these comments in mind, the Court notes as well that none of the objections raised support the conclusion that the *CCAA* Plan is unfair or unreasonable.

2. The BCFC Noteholders' objections

45 In the end, only Aurelius Capital Management LP and Contrarian Capital Management LLC (the "*Noteholders*") oppose the sanction of the *CCAA* Plan[10].

46 These Noteholders, through their managed funds entities, hold about one-third of some six hundred million US dollars of Unsecured Notes issued by Bowater Canada Finance Company ("*BCFC*") and which are guaranteed by Bowater Incorporated. These notes are BCFC's only material liabilities.

47 BCFC was a Petitioner under the *CCAA* proceedings and a Debtor in the parallel proceedings under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. However, its creditors voted to reject the *CCAA* Plan: while 76.8% of the Class of Affected Unsecured Creditors of BCFC approved the *CCAA* Plan in number, only 48% thereof voted in favour in dollar value. The required majorities of the *CCAA* were therefore not met.

48 As a result of this no vote occurrence, the Affected Unsecured Creditors of BCFC, including the Noteholders, are Unaffected Creditors under the *CCAA* Plan: they will not receive the distribution contemplated by the plan. As for BCFC itself, this outcome entails that it is not an "Applicant" for the purpose of this Sanction Order.

49 Still, the terms of the *CCAA* Plan specifically provide for the compromise and release of any claims BCFC may have against the other Petitioners pursuant, for instance, to any inter company transactions. Similarly, the *CCAA* Plan specifies that BCFC's equity interests in any other Petitioner can be exchanged, cancelled, redeemed or otherwise dealt with for nil consideration.

50 In their objections to the sanction of the *CCAA* Plan, the Noteholders raise, in essence, three arguments:

> (a) They maintain that BCFC did not have an opportunity to vote on the *CCAA* Plan and that no process has been established to provide for BCFC to receive distribution as a creditor of the other Petitioners;
>
> (b) They criticize the overly broad and inappropriate character of the release provisions of the *CCAA* Plan;
>
> (c) They contend that the NAFTA Settlement Funds have not been appropriately allocated.

51 With respect, the Court considers that these objections are ill founded.

52 First, given the vote by the creditors of BCFC that rejected the *CCAA* Plan and its specific terms in the event of such a situation, the initial ground of contestation is moot for all intents and purposes.

53 In addition, pursuant to a hearing held on September 16 and 17, 2010, on an Abitibi's *Motion for Advice and Directions*, Mayrand J. already concluded that BCFC had simply no claims against the other Petitioners, save with respect to the Contribution Claim referred to in that motion and that is not affected by the *CCAA* Plan in any event.

54 There is no need to now review or reconsider this issue that has been heard, argued and decided, mostly in a context where the Noteholders had ample opportunity to then present fully their arguments.

55 In her reasons for judgment filed earlier today in the Court record, Mayrand J. notably ruled that the alleged Inter

Company Claims of BCFC had no merit pursuant to a detailed analysis of what took place.

56 For one, the Monitor, in its Amended 49th Report, had made a thorough review of the transactions at issue and concluded that they did not appear to give rise to any inter company debt owing to BCFC.

57 On top of that, Mayrand J. noted as well that the Independent Advisors, who were appointed in the Chapter 11 U.S. Proceedings to investigate the Inter Company Transactions that were the subject of the Inter Company Claims, had completed their report in this regard. As explained in its 58th Report, the Monitor understands that they were of the view that BCFC had no other claims to file against any other Petitioner. In her reasons, Mayrand J. concluded that this was the only reasonable inference to draw from the evidence she heard.

58 As highlighted by Mayrand J. in these reasons, despite having received this report of the Independent Advisors, the Noteholders have not agreed to release its content. Conversely, they have not invoked any of its findings in support of their position either.

59 That is not all. In her reasons for judgment, Mayrand J. indicated that a detailed presentation of the Independent Advisors report was made to BCFC's Board of Directors on September 7, 2010. This notwithstanding, BCFC elected not to do anything in that regard since then.

60 As a matter of fact, at no point in time did BCFC ever file, in the context of the current *CCAA* Proceedings, any claim against any other Petitioner. None of its creditors, including the Noteholders, have either purported to do so for and/or on behalf of BCFC. This is quite telling. After all, the transactions at issue date back many years and this restructuring process has been going on for close to eighteen months.

61 To sum up, short of making allegations that no facts or analysis appear to support or claiming an insufficiency of process because the independent and objective ones followed so far did not lead to the result they wanted, the Noteholders simply have nothing of substance to put forward.

62 Contrary to what they contend, there is no need for yet again another additional process to deal with this question. To so conclude would be tantamount to allowing the Noteholders to take hostage the *CCAA* restructuring process and derail Abitibi's emergence for no valid reason.

63 The other argument of the Noteholders to the effect that BCFC would have had a claim as the holder of preferred shares of BCHI leads to similar comments. It is, again, hardly supported by anything. In any event, assuming the restructuring transactions contemplated under the *CCAA* Plan entail their cancellation for nil consideration, which is apparently not necessarily the case for the time being, there would be nothing unusual in having the equity holders of insolvent companies not receive anything in a compromise and plan of arrangement approved in a *CCAA* restructuring process.

64 In such a context, the Court disagrees with the Noteholders' assertion that BCFC did not have an opportunity to vote on the *CCAA* Plan or that no process was established to provide the latter to receive distribution as a potential creditor of the other Petitioners.

65 To argue that the *CCAA* Plan is not fair and reasonable on the basis of these alleged claims of BCFC against the other Petitioners has no support based on the relevant facts and Mayrand J.'s analysis of that specific point.

66 Second, given these findings, the issue of the breadth and appropriateness of the releases provided under the *CCAA* Plan simply does not concern the Noteholders.

67 As stated by Abitibi's Counsel at hearing, BCFC is neither an "Applicant" under the terms of the releases of the *CCAA* Plan nor pursuant to the Sanction Order. As such, BCFC does not give or get releases as a result of the Sanction Order. The *CCAA* Plan does not release BCFC nor its directors or officers acting as such.

68 As it is not included as an "Applicant", there is no need to provide any type of convoluted "carve-out" provision as the

Noteholders requested. As properly suggested by Abitibi, it will rather suffice to include a mere clarification at paragraph 15 of the Sanction Order to reaffirm that in the context of the releases and the Sanction Order, "Applicant" does not include BCFC.

69 As for the Noteholders themselves, they are Unaffected Creditors under the *CCAA* Plan as a result of the no vote of their Class.

70 In essence, the main concern of the Noteholders as to the scope of the releases contemplated by the *CCAA* Plan and the Sanction Order is a mere issue of clarity. In the Court's opinion, this is sufficiently dealt with by the addition made to the wording of paragraph 15 of the Sanction Order.

71 Besides that, as explained earlier, any complaint by the Noteholders that the alleged inter company claims of BCFC are improperly compromised by the *CCAA* Plan has no merit. If their true objective is to indirectly protect their contentions to that end by challenging the wording of the releases, it is unjustified and without basis. The Court already said so.

72 Save for these arguments raised by the Noteholders that the Court rejects, it is worth noting that none of the stakeholders of Abitibi object to the scope of the releases of the *CCAA* Plan or their appropriateness given the global compromise reached through the debt to equity swap and the reorganization contemplated by the plan.

73 The *CCAA* permits the inclusion of releases (even ones involving third parties) in a plan of compromise or arrangement when there is a reasonable connection between the claims being released and compromised and the restructuring achieved by the plan. Amongst others, the broad nature of the terms "compromise or arrangement", the binding nature of a plan that has received creditors' approval, and the principles that parties should be able to put in a plan what could lawfully be incorporated into any other contract support the authority of the Court to approve these kind of releases[11]. In accordance with these principles, the Quebec Superior Court has, in the past, sanctioned plans that included releases of parties making significant contribution to a restructuring[12].

74 The additional argument raised by the Noteholders with respect to the difference between the releases that could be approved by this Court as compared to those that the U.S. Bankruptcy Court may issue in respect of the Chapter 11 Plan is not convincing.

75 The fact that under the Chapter 11 Plan, creditors may elect not to provide releases to directors and officers of applicable entities does not render similar kind of releases granted under the *CCAA* Plan invalid or improper. That the result may be different in a jurisdiction as opposed to the other does not make the *CCAA* Plan unfair and unreasonable simply for that reason.

76 Third, the last objection of the Noteholders to the effect that the NAFTA Settlement Funds have not been properly allocated is simply a red herring. It is aimed at provoking a useless debate with respect to which the Noteholders have, in essence, no standing.

77 The Monitor testified that the NAFTA Settlement has no impact whatsoever upon BCFC. If it is at all relevant, all the assets involved in this settlement belonged to another of the Petitioners, ACCC, with respect to whom the Noteholders are not a creditor.

78 In addition, this apparent contestation of the allocation of the NAFTA Settlement Funds is a collateral attack on the Order granted by this Court on September 1, 2010, which approved the settlement of Abitibi's NAFTA claims against the Government of Canada, as well as the related payment to be made to the reorganised successor Canadian operating entity upon emergence. No one has appealed this NAFTA Settlement Order.

79 That said, in their oral argument, the Noteholders have finally argued that the Court should lift the Stay of Proceedings Order inasmuch as BCFC was concerned. The last extension of the Stay was granted on September 1, 2010, without objection; it expires on September 30, 2010. It is clear from the wording of this Sanction Order that any extension beyond September 30, 2010 will not apply to BCFC.

80 The Court considers this request made verbally by the Noteholders as unfounded.

81 No written motion was ever served in that regard to start with. In addition, the Stay remains in effect against BCFC up until September 30, 2010, that is, for about a week or so. The explanations offered by Abitibi's Counsel to leave it as such for the time being are reasonable under the circumstances. It appears proper to allow a few days to the interested parties to ascertain the impact, if any, of the Stay not being applicable anymore to BCFC, if alone to ascertain how this impacts upon the various charges created by the Initial Order and subsequent Orders issued by the Court during the course of these proceedings.

82 There is no support for the concern of the Noteholders as to an ulterior motive of Abitibi for maintaining in place this Stay of Proceedings against BCFC up until September 30, 2010.

83 All things considered, in the Court's opinion, it would be quite unfair and unreasonable to deny the sanction of the *CCAA* Plan for the benefit of all the stakeholders involved on the basis of the arguments raised by the Noteholders.

84 Their objections either reargue issues that have been heard, considered and decided, complain of a lack a clarity of the scope of releases that the addition of a few words to the Sanction Order properly addresses, or voice queries about the allocation of important funds to the Abitibi's emergence from the *CCAA* that simply do not concern the entities of which the Noteholders are allegedly creditors, be it in Canada or in the U.S.

85 When one remains mindful of the relative degrees of prejudice that would flow from granting or refusing the relief sought, it is obvious that the scales heavily tilt in favour of granting the Sanction Order sought.

3. The Contestations of the Provinces of Ontario and British Columbia

86 Following negotiations that the Provinces involved and Abitibi pursued, with the assistance of the Monitor, up to the very last minute, the interested parties have agreed upon a "carve-out" wording that is satisfactory to every one with respect to some potential environmental liabilities of Abitibi in the event future circumstances trigger a concrete dispute in that regard.

87 In the Court's view, this is, by far, the most preferred solution to adopt with respect to the disagreement that exists on their respective position as to potential proceedings that may arise in the future under environmental legislation. This approach facilitates the approval of the *CCAA* Plan and the successful restructuring of Abitibi, without affecting the right of any affected party in this respect.

88 The "carve-out" provisions agreed upon will be included in the Sanction Order.

4. The Contestation of NPower Cogen Limited

89 By its Contestation, NPower Cogen Limited sought to preserve its rights with respect to what it called the "Cogen Motion", namely a "*motion to be brought by Cogen before this Honourable Court to have various claims heard*" (para. 24(b) and 43 of NPower Cogen Limited Contestation).

90 Here again, Abitibi and NPower Cogen Limited have agreed on an acceptable "carve-out" wording to be included in the Sanction Order in that regard. As a result, there is no need to discuss the impact of this Contestation any further.

5. Abitibi's Reorganization

91 The Motion finally deals with the corporate reorganization of Abitibi and the Sanction Order includes declarations and orders dealing with it.

92 The test to be applied by the Court in determining whether to approve a reorganization under Section 191 of the *CBCA*

is similar to the test applied in deciding whether to sanction a plan of arrangement under the *CCAA*, namely: (a) there must be compliance with all statutory requirements; (b) the debtor company must be acting in good faith; and (c) the capital restructuring must be fair and reasonable[13].

93 It is not disputed by anyone that these requirements have been fulfilled here.

6. The wording of the Sanction Order

94 In closing, the Court made numerous comments to Abitibi's Counsel on the wording of the Sanction Order initially sought in the Motion. These comments have been taken into account in the subsequent in depth revisions of the Sanction Order that the Court is now issuing. The Court is satisfied with the corrections, adjustments and deletions made to what was originally requested.

For these Reasons, The Court:

1 *GRANTS* the Motion.

Definitions

2 *DECLARES* that any capitalized terms not otherwise defined in this Order shall have the meaning ascribed thereto in the *CCAA* Plan[14] and the Creditors' Meeting Order, as the case may be.

Service and Meeting

3 *DECLARES* that the notices given of the presentation of the Motion and related Sanction Hearing are proper and sufficient, and in accordance with the Creditors' Meeting Order.

4 *DECLARES* that there has been proper and sufficient service and notice of the Meeting Materials, including the *CCAA* Plan, the Circular and the Notice to Creditors in connection with the Creditors' Meeting, to all Affected Unsecured Creditors, and that the Creditors' Meeting was duly convened, held and conducted in conformity with the *CCAA*, the Creditors' Meeting Order and all other applicable orders of the Court.

5 *DECLARES* that no meetings or votes of (i) holders of Equity Securities and/or (ii) holders of equity securities of ABH are required in connection with the *CCAA* Plan and its implementation, including the implementation of the Restructuring Transactions as set out in the Restructuring Transactions Notice dated September 1, 2010, as amended on September 13, 2010.

CCAA Plan Sanction

6 *DECLARES* that:

a) the *CCAA* Plan and its implementation (including the implementation of the Restructuring Transactions) have been approved by the Required Majorities of Affected Unsecured Creditors in each of the following classes in conformity with the *CCAA*: ACI Affected Unsecured Creditor Class, the ACCC Affected Unsecured Creditor Class, the 15.5% Guarantor Applicant Affected Unsecured Creditor Classes, the Saguenay Forest Products Affected Unsecured Creditor Class, the BCFPI Affected Unsecured Creditor Class, the AbitibiBowater Canada Affected Unsecured Creditor Class, the Bowater Maritimes Affected Unsecured Creditor Class, the ACNSI Affected Unsecured Creditor Class, the Office Products Affected Unsecured Creditor Class and the Recycling Affected Unsecured Creditor Class;

b) the *CCAA* Plan was not approved by the Required Majority of Affected Unsecured Creditors in the BCFC Affected

Unsecured Creditors Class and that the Holders of BCFC Affected Unsecured Claims are therefore deemed to be Unaffected Creditors holding Excluded Claims against BCFC for the purpose of the *CCAA* Plan and this Order, and that BCFC is therefore deemed not to be an Applicant for the purpose of this Order;

c) the Court is satisfied that the Petitioners and the Partnerships have complied with the provisions of the *CCAA* and all the orders made by this Court in the context of these *CCAA* Proceedings in all respects;

d) the Court is satisfied that no Petitioner or Partnership has either done or purported to do anything that is not authorized by the *CCAA*; and

e) the *CCAA* Plan (and its implementation, including the implementation of the Restructuring Transactions), is fair and reasonable, and in the best interests of the Applicants and the Partnerships, the Affected Unsecured Creditors, the other stakeholders of the Applicants and all other Persons stipulated in the *CCAA* Plan.

7 *ORDERS* that the *CCAA* Plan and its implementation, including the implementation of the Restructuring Transactions, are sanctioned and approved pursuant to Section 6 of the *CCAA* and Section 191 of the *CBCA*, and, as at the Implementation Date, will be effective and will enure to the benefit of and be binding upon the Applicants, the Partnerships, the Reorganized Debtors, the Affected Unsecured Creditors, the other stakeholders of the Applicants and all other Persons stipulated in the *CCAA* Plan.

CCAA Plan Implementation

8 *DECLARES* that the Applicants, the Partnerships, the Reorganized Debtors and the Monitor, as the case may be, are authorized and directed to take all steps and actions necessary or appropriate, as determined by the Applicants, the Partnerships and the Reorganized Debtors in accordance with and subject to the terms of the *CCAA* Plan, to implement and effect the *CCAA* Plan, including the Restructuring Transactions, in the manner and the sequence as set forth in the *CCAA* Plan, the Restructuring Transactions Notice and this Order, and such steps and actions are hereby approved.

9 *AUTHORIZES* the Applicants, the Partnerships and the Reorganized Debtors to request, if need be, one or more order(s) from this Court, including *CCAA* Vesting Order(s), for the transfer and assignment of assets to the Applicants, the Partnerships, the Reorganized Debtors or other entities referred to in the Restructuring Transactions Notice, free and clear of any financial charges, as necessary or desirable to implement and effect the Restructuring Transactions as set forth in the Restructuring Transactions Notice.

10 *DECLARES* that, pursuant to Section 191 of the *CBCA*, the articles of AbitibiBowater Canada will be amended by new articles of reorganization in the manner and at the time set forth in the Restructuring Transactions Notice.

11 *DECLARES* that all Applicants and Partnerships to be dissolved pursuant to the Restructuring Transactions shall be deemed dissolved for all purposes without the necessity for any other or further action by or on behalf of any Person, including the Applicants or the Partnerships or their respective securityholders, directors, officers, managers or partners or for any payments to be made in connection therewith, provided, however, that the Applicants, the Partnerships and the Reorganized Debtors shall cause to be filed with the appropriate Governmental Entities articles, agreements or other documents of dissolution for the dissolved Applicants or Partnerships to the extent required by applicable Law.

12 *DECLARES* that, subject to the performance by the Applicants and the Partnerships of their obligations under the *CCAA* Plan, and in accordance with Section 8.1 of the *CCAA* Plan, all contracts, leases, Timber Supply and Forest Management Agreements (”TSFMA”) and outstanding and unused volumes of cutting rights (backlog) thereunder, joint venture agreements, agreements and other arrangements to which the Applicants or the Partnerships are a party and that have not been terminated including as part of the Restructuring Transactions or repudiated in accordance with the terms of the Initial Order will be and remain in full force and effect, unamended, as at the Implementation Date, and no Person who is a party to any such contract, lease, agreement or other arrangement may accelerate, terminate, rescind, refuse to perform or otherwise repudiate its obligations thereunder, or enforce or exercise any right (including any right of dilution or other remedy) or make any demand under or in respect of any such contract, lease, agreement or other arrangement and no

automatic termination will have any validity or effect by reason of:

a) any event that occurred on or prior to the Implementation Date and is not continuing that would have entitled such Person to enforce those rights or remedies (including defaults, events of default, or termination events arising as a result of the insolvency of the Applicants and the Partnerships);

b) the insolvency of the Applicants, the Partnerships or any affiliate thereof or the fact that the Applicants, the Partnerships or any affiliate thereof sought or obtained relief under the *CCAA*, the CBCA or the Bankruptcy Code or any other applicable legislation;

c) any of the terms of the *CCAA* Plan, the U.S. Plan or any action contemplated therein, including the Restructuring Transactions Notice;

d) any settlements, compromises or arrangements effected pursuant to the *CCAA* Plan or the U.S. Plan or any action taken or transaction effected pursuant to the *CCAA* Plan or the U.S. Plan; or

e) any change in the control, transfer of equity interest or transfer of assets of the Applicants, the Partnerships, the joint ventures, or any affiliate thereof, or of any entity in which any of the Applicants or the Partnerships held an equity interest arising from the implementation of the *CCAA* Plan (including the Restructuring Transactions Notice) or the U.S. Plan, or the transfer of any asset as part of or in connection with the Restructuring Transactions Notice.

13 *DECLARES* that any consent or authorization required from a third party, including any Governmental Entity, under any such contracts, leases, TSFMAs and outstanding and unused volumes of cutting rights (backlog) thereunder, joint venture agreements, agreements or other arrangements in respect of any change of control, transfer of equity interest, transfer of assets or transfer of any asset as part of or in connection with the Restructuring Transactions Notice be deemed satisfied or obtained, as applicable.

14 *DECLARES* that the determination of Proven Claims in accordance with the Claims Procedure Orders, the Cross-border Claims Protocol, the Cross-border Voting Protocol and the Creditors' Meeting Order shall be final and binding on the Applicants, the Partnerships, the Reorganized Debtors and all Affected Unsecured Creditors.

Releases and Discharges

15 *CONFIRMS* the releases contemplated by Section 6.10 of the *CCAA* Plan and *DECLARES* that the said releases constitute good faith compromises and settlements of the matters covered thereby, and that such compromises and settlements are in the best interests of the Applicants and its stakeholders, are fair, equitable, and are integral elements of the restructuring and resolution of these proceedings in accordance with the *CCAA* Plan, it being understood that for the purpose of these releases and/or this Order, the terms "Applicants" or "Applicant" are not meant to include Bowater Canada Finance Corporation ("*BCFC*").

16 *ORDERS* that, upon payment in full in cash of all BI DIP Claims and ULC DIP Claim in accordance with the *CCAA* Plan, the BI DIP Lenders and the BI DIP Agent or ULC, as the case may be, shall at the request of the Applicants, the Partnerships or the Reorganized Debtors, without delay, execute and deliver to the Applicants, the Partnerships or the Reorganized Debtors such releases, discharges, authorizations and directions, instruments, notices and other documents as the Applicants, the Partnerships or the Reorganized Debtors may reasonably request for the purpose of evidencing and/or registering the release and discharge of any and all Financial Charges with respect to the BI DIP Claims or the ULC DIP Claim, as the case may be, the whole at the expense of the Applicants, the Partnerships or the Reorganized Debtors.

17 *ORDERS* that, upon payment in full in cash of their Secured Claims in accordance with the *CCAA* Plan, the ACCC Administrative Agent, the ACCC Term Lenders, the BCFPI Administrative Agent, the BCFPI Lenders, the Canadian Secured Notes Indenture Trustee and any Holders of a Secured Claim, as the case may be, shall at the request of the Applicants, the Partnerships or the Reorganized Debtors, without delay, execute and deliver to the Applicants, the Partnerships or the Reorganized Debtors such releases, discharges, authorizations and directions, instruments, notices and

other documents as the Applicants, the Partnerships or the Reorganized Debtors may reasonably request for the purpose of evidencing and/or registering the release and discharge of any and all Financial Charges with respect to the ACCC Term Loan Claim, BCFPI Secured Bank Claim, Canadian Secured Notes Claim or any other Secured Claim, as the case may be, the whole at the expense of the Applicants, the Partnerships or the Reorganized Debtors.
For the purposes of the present paragraph [17], in the event of any dispute as to the amount of any Secured Claim, the Applicants, Partnerships or Reorganized Debtors, as the case may be, shall be permitted to pay to the Monitor the full amount in dispute (as specified by the affected Secured Creditor or by this Court upon summary application) and, upon payment of the amount not in dispute, receive the releases, discharges, authorizations, directions, instruments notices or other documents as provided for therein. Any amount paid to the Monitor in accordance with this paragraph shall be held in trust by the Monitor for the holder of the Secured Claim and the payer as their interests shall be determined by agreement between the parties or, failing agreement, as directed by this Court after summary application.

18 *PRECLUDES* the prosecution against the Applicants, the Partnerships or the Reorganized Debtors, whether directly, derivatively or otherwise, of any claim, obligation, suit, judgment, damage, demand, debt, right, cause of action, liability or interest released, discharged or terminated pursuant to the *CCAA* Plan.

Accounts with Financial Institutions

19 *ORDERS* that any and all financial institutions (the "Financial Institutions") with which the Applicants, the Partnerships and the Reorganized Debtors have or will have accounts (the "Accounts") shall process and/or facilitate the transfer of, or changes to, such Accounts in order to implement the *CCAA* Plan and the transactions contemplated thereby, including the Restructuring Transactions.

20 *ORDERS* that Mr. Allen Dea, Vice-President and Treasurer of ABH, or any other officer or director of the Reorganized Debtors, is empowered to take all required acts with any of the Financial Institutions to affect the transfer of, or changes to, the Accounts in order to facilitate the implementation of the *CCAA* Plan and the transactions contemplated thereby, including the Restructuring Transactions.

Effect of failure to implement CCAA Plan

21 *ORDERS* that, in the event that the Implementation Date does not occur, Affected Unsecured Creditors shall not be bound to the valuation, settlement or compromise of their Affected Claims at the amount of their Proven Claims in accordance with the *CCAA* Plan, the Claims Procedure Orders or the Creditors' Meeting Order. For greater certainty, nothing in the *CCAA* Plan, the Claims Procedure Orders, the Creditors' Meeting Order or in any settlement, compromise, agreement, document or instrument made or entered into in connection therewith or in contemplation thereof shall, in any way, prejudice, quantify, adjudicate, modify, release, waive or otherwise affect the validity, enforceability or quantum of any Claim against the Applicants or the Partnerships, including in the *CCAA* Proceedings or any other proceeding or process, in the event that the Implementation Date does not occur.

Charges created in the CCAA Proceedings

22 *ORDERS* that, upon the Implementation Date, all *CCAA* Charges against the Applicants and the Partnerships or their property created by the *CCAA* Initial Order or any subsequent orders shall be determined, discharged and released, provided that the BI DIP Lenders Charge shall be cancelled on the condition that the BI DIP Claims are paid in full on the Implementation Date.

Fees and Disbursements

23 *ORDERS* and *DECLARES* that, on and after the Implementation Date, the obligation to pay the reasonable fees and disbursements of the Monitor, counsel to the Monitor and counsel to the Applicants and the Partnerships, in each case at their standard rates and charges and including any amounts outstanding as of the Implementation Date, in respect of the *CCAA*

Plan, including the implementation of the Restructuring Transactions, shall become obligations of Reorganized ABH.

Exit Financing

24 *ORDERS* that the Applicants are authorized and empowered to execute, deliver and perform any credit agreements, instruments of indebtedness, guarantees, security documents, deeds, and other documents, as may be required in connection with the Exit Facilities.

Stay Extension

25 *EXTENDS* the Stay Period in respect of the Applicantsuntil the Implementation Date.

26 *DECLARES* that all orders made in the *CCAA* Proceedings shall continue in full force and effect in accordance with their respective terms, except to the extent that such Orders are varied by, or inconsistent with, this Order, the Creditors' Meeting Order, or any further Order of this Court.

Monitor and Chief Restructuring Officer

27 *DECLARES* that the protections afforded to Ernst & Young Inc., as Monitor and as officer of this Court, and to the Chief Restructuring Officer pursuant to the terms of the Initial Order and the other Orders made in the *CCAA* Proceedings, shall not expire or terminate on the Implementation Date and, subject to the terms hereof, shall remain effective and in full force and effect.

28 *ORDERS* and *DECLARES* that any distributions under the *CCAA* Plan and this Order shall not constitute a "distribution" and the Monitor shall not constitute a "legal representative" or "representative" of the Applicants for the purposes of section 159 of the Income Tax Act (Canada), section 270 of the Excise Tax Act (Canada), section 14 of the Act Respecting the Ministère du Revenu (Québec), section 107 of the Corporations Tax Act (Ontario), section 22 of the Retail Sales Tax Act (Ontario), section 117 of the Taxation Act, 2007 (Ontario) or any other similar federal, provincial or territorial tax legislation (collectively the "Tax Statutes") given that the Monitor is only a Disbursing Agent under the *CCAA* Plan, and the Monitor in making such payments is not "distributing", nor shall be considered to "distribute" nor to have "distributed", such funds for the purpose of the Tax Statutes, and the Monitor shall not incur any liability under the Tax Statutes in respect of it making any payments ordered or permitted hereunder, and is hereby forever released, remised and discharged from any claims against it under or pursuant to the Tax Statutes or otherwise at law, arising in respect of payments made under the *CCAA* Plan and this Order and any claims of this nature are hereby forever barred.

29 *ORDERS* and *DECLARES* that the Disbursing Agent, the Applicants and the Reorganized Debtors, as necessary, are authorized to take any and all actions as may be necessary or appropriate to comply with applicable Tax withholding and reporting requirements, including withholding a number of shares of New ABH Common Stock equal in value to the amount required to comply with such withholding requirements from the shares of New ABH Common Stock to be distributed to current or former employees and making the necessary arrangements for the sale of such shares on the TSX or the New York Stock Exchange on behalf of the current or former employees to satisfy such withholding requirements. All amounts withheld on account of Taxes shall be treated for all purposes as having been paid to the Affected Unsecured Creditor in respect of which such withholding was made, provided such withheld amounts are remitted to the appropriate Governmental Entity.

Claims Officers

30 *DECLARES* that, in accordance with paragraph [25] hereof, any claims officer appointed in accordance with the Claims Procedure Orders shall continue to have the authority conferred upon, and to the benefit from all protections afforded to, claims officers pursuant to Orders in the *CCAA* Proceedings.

General

31 *ORDERS* that, notwithstanding any other provision in this Order, the *CCAA* Plan or these *CCAA* Proceedings, the rights of the public authorities of British Columbia, Ontario or New Brunswick to take the position in or with respect to any future proceedings under environmental legislation that this or any other Order does not affect such proceedings by reason that such proceedings are not in relation to a claim within the meaning of the *CCAA* or are otherwise beyond the jurisdiction of Parliament or a court under the *CCAA* to affect in any way is fully reserved; as is reserved the right of any affected party to take any position to the contrary.

32 *DECLARES* that nothing in this Order or the *CCAA* Plan shall preclude NPower Cogen Limited (”Cogen”) from bringing a motion for, or this Court from granting, the relief sought in respect of the facts and issues set out in the Claims Submission of Cogen dated August 10, 2010 (the “Claim Submission”), and the Reply Submission of Cogen dated August 24, 2010, provided that such relief shall be limited to the following:

a) a declaration that Cogen’s claim against Abitibi Consolidated Inc. (”Abitibi”) and its officers and directors, arising from the supply of electricity and steam to Bridgewater Paper Company Limited between November 1, 2009 and February 2, 2010 in the amount of £9,447,548 plus interest accruing at the rate of 3% *per annum* from February 2, 2010 onwards (the “Claim Amount”) is (i) unaffected by the *CCAA* Plan or Sanction Order; (ii) is an Excluded Claim; or (iii) is a Secured Claim; (iv) is a D&O Claim; or (v) is a liability of Abitibi under its Guarantee;

b) an Order directing Abitibi and its Directors and Officers to pay the Claim Amount to Cogen forthwith; or

c) in the alternative to (b), an order granting leave, if leave be required, to commence proceedings for the payment of the Claim Amount under s. 241 of the *CBCA* and otherwise against Abitibi and its directors and officers in respect of same.

33 *DECLARES* that any of the Applicants, the Partnerships, the Reorganized Debtors or the Monitor may, from time to time, apply to this Court for directions concerning the exercise of their respective powers, duties and rights hereunder or in respect of the proper execution of the Order on notice to the Service List.

34 *DECLARES* that this Order shall have full force and effect in all provinces and territories in Canada.

35 *REQUESTS* the aid and recognition of any Court or administrative body in any Province of Canada and any Canadian federal court or administrative body and any federal or state court or administrative body in the United States of America and any court or administrative body elsewhere, to act in aid of and to be complementary to this Court in carrying out the terms of the Order, including the registration of this Order in any office of public record by any such court or administrative body or by any Person affected by the Order.

Provisional Execution

36 *ORDERS* the provisional execution of this Order notwithstanding any appeal and without the necessity of furnishing any security;

37 *WITHOUT COSTS.*

Schedule ”A” — Abitibi Petitioners

1. *ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED INC.*

2. *ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED COMPANY OF CANADA*

3. *3224112 NOVA SCOTIA LIMITED*

4. *MARKETING DONOHUE INC.*
5. *ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED CANADIAN OFFICE PRODUCTS HOLDINGS INC.*
6. *3834328 CANADA INC.*
7. *6169678 CANADA INC.*
8. *4042140 CANADA INC.*
9. *DONOHUE RECYCLING INC.*
10. *1508756 ONTARIO INC.*
11. *3217925 NOVA SCOTIA COMPANY*
12. *LA TUQUE FOREST PRODUCTS INC.*
13. *ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED NOVA SCOTIA INCORPORATED*
14. *SAGUENAY FOREST PRODUCTS INC.*
15. *TERRA NOVA EXPLORATIONS LTD.*
16. *THE JONQUIERE PULP COMPANY*
17. *THE INTERNATIONAL BRIDGE AND TERMINAL COMPANY*
18. *SCRAMBLE MINING LTD.*
19. *9150-3383 QUÉBEC INC.*
20. *ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED (U.K.) INC.*

Schedule ”B” — Bowater Petitioners

1. *BOWATER CANADIAN HOLDINGS INC.*
2. *BOWATER CANADA FINANCE CORPORATION*
3. *BOWATER CANADIAN LIMITED*
4. *3231378 NOVA SCOTIA COMPANY*
5. *ABITIBIBOWATER CANADA INC.*
6. *BOWATER CANADA TREASURY CORPORATION*
7. *BOWATER CANADIAN FOREST PRODUCTS INC.*
8. *BOWATER SHELBURNE CORPORATION*
9. *BOWATER LAHAVE CORPORATION*
10. *ST-MAURICE RIVER DRIVE COMPANY LIMITED*

11. *BOWATER TREATED WOOD INC.*
12. *CANEXEL HARDBOARD INC.*
13. *9068-9050 QUÉBEC INC.*
14. *ALLIANCE FOREST PRODUCTS (2001) INC.*
15. *BOWATER BELLEDUNE SAWMILL INC.*
16. *BOWATER MARITIMES INC.*
17. *BOWATER MITIS INC.*
18. *BOWATER GUÉRETTE INC.*
19. *BOWATER COUTURIER INC.*

Schedule ”C” — 18.6 CCAA Petitioners

1. *ABITIBIBOWATER INC.*
2. *ABITIBIBOWATER US HOLDING 1 CORP.*
3. *BOWATER VENTURES INC.*
4. *BOWATER INCORPORATED*
5. *BOWATER NUWAY INC.*
6. *BOWATER NUWAY MID-STATES INC.*
7. *CATAWBA PROPERTY HOLDINGS LLC*
8. *BOWATER FINANCE COMPANY INC.*
9. *BOWATER SOUTH AMERICAN HOLDINGS INCORPORATED*
10. *BOWATER AMERICA INC.*
11. *LAKE SUPERIOR FOREST PRODUCTS INC.*
12. *BOWATER NEWSPRINT SOUTH LLC*
13. *BOWATER NEWSPRINT SOUTH OPERATIONS LLC*
14. *BOWATER FINANCE II, LLC*
15. *BOWATER ALABAMA LLC*
16. *COOSA PINES GOLF CLUB HOLDINGS LLC*

Motion granted.

Footnotes

1 *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.

2 See Monitor's Fifty-Seventh Report dated September 7, 2010, and Monitor's Fifty-Ninth Report dated September 17, 2010.

3 This Plan of Reorganisation and Compromise (as modified, amended or supplemented by CCAA Plan Supplements 3.2, 6.1(a)(i) (as amended on September 13, 2010) and 6.1(a)(ii) dated September 1, 2010, CCAA Plan Supplements 6.8(a), 6.8(b) (as amended on September 13, 2010), 6.8(d), 6.9(1) and 6.9(2) dated September 3, 2010, and the First Plan Amendment dated September 10, 2010, and as may be further modified, amended, or supplemented in accordance with the terms of such Plan of Reorganization and Compromise) (collectively, the "*CCAA Plan*") is included as Schedules E and F to the Supplemental 59th Report of the Monitor dated September 21, 2010.

4 Motion for an Order Sanctioning the Plan of Reorganization and Compromise and Other Relief (the "Motion"), pursuant to Sections 6, 9 and 10 of the CCAA and Section 191 of the Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44 (the "CBCA").

5 *Boutiques San Francisco Inc. (Arrangement relatif aux)*, SOQUIJ AZ-50263185, B.E. 2004BE-775 (S.C.); *Cable Satisfaction International Inc. v. Richter & Associés inc.*, J.E. 2004-907 (C.S. Que.) [2004 CarswellQue 810 (C.S. Que.)].

6 See Monitor's Fifty-Eight Report dated September 16, 2010.

7 *T. Eaton Co., Re* (1999), 15 C.B.R. (4th) 311 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); *Sammi Atlas Inc. (Re)* (1998), 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); *PSINET Ltd., Re* (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

8 *Uniforêt inc., Re* (C.S. Que.) [2003 CarswellQue 3404 (C.S. Que.)], *TQS inc., Re*, 2008 QCCS 2448 (C.S. Que.), B.E. 2008BE-834; *PSINET Ltd., Re* (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Re)* (1993), 12 O.R. (3d) 500 (Ont. Gen. Div.).

9 *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Re)* (1993), 12 O.R. (3d) 500 (Ont. Gen. Div.); *Boutiques San Francisco inc. (Arrangement relatif aux)*, SOQUIJ AZ-50263185 , B.E. 2004BE-775; *PSINET Ltd., Re* (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); *Northland Properties Ltd., Re* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 (B.C. S.C.), affirmed 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195 (B.C. C.A.).

10 The Indenture Trustee acting under the Unsecured Notes supports the Noteholders in their objections.

11 See, in this respect, *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.*, 2008 ONCA 587 (Ont. C.A.); *Charles-Auguste Fortier inc., Re* (2008), J.E. 2009-9, 2008 QCCS 5388 (C.S. Que.); *Hy Bloom inc. c. Banque Nationale du Canada*, [2010] R.J.Q. 912 (C.S. Que.).

12 *Quebecor World Inc. (Arrangement relatif à)*, S.C. Montreal, Nº 500-11-032338-085, 2009-06-30, Mongeon J.

13 *Raymor Industries inc. (Proposition de)*, [2010] R.J.Q. 608, 2010 QCCS 376 (C.S. Que.); *Quebecor World Inc. (Arrangement relatif à)*, S.C. Montreal, Nº 500-11-032338-085, 2009-06-30, Mongeon J., at para. 7-8; *MEI Computer Technology Group Inc., Re* [2005 CarswellQue 13408 (C.S. Que.)], (S.C., 2005-11-14), SOQUIJ AZ-50380254, 2005 CanLII 54083; *Doman Industries Ltd., Re*, 2003 BCSC 375 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]); *Laidlaw, Re* (Ont. S.C.J.).

14 It is understood that for the purposes of this Sanction Order, the CCAA Plan is the Plan of Reorganisation and Compromise (as modified, amended or supplemented by CCAA Plan Supplements 3.2, 6.1(a)(i) (as amended on September 13, 2010) and 6.1(a)(ii)

dated September 1, 2010, CCAA Plan Supplements 6.8(a), 6.8(b) (as amended on September 13, 2010), 6.8(d), 6.9(1) and 6.9(2) dated September 3, 2010, and the First Plan Amendment dated September 10, 2010, and as may be further modified, amended, or supplemented in accordance with the terms of such Plan of Reorganization and Compromise) included as Schedules E and F to the Supplemental 59th Report of the Monitor dated September 21, 2010.

End of Document

TAB 2

Most Negative Treatment: Distinguished
Most Recent Distinguished: Shermag Inc., Re | 2009 QCCS 537, 2009 CarswellQue 2487, [2009] R.J.Q. 1289, EYB 2009-156550, J.E. 2009-897, 51 C.B.R. (5th) 95 | (C.S. Qué., Mar 26, 2009)

2000 ABQB 442
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re

2000 CarswellAlta 662, 2000 ABQB 442, [2000] 10 W.W.R. 269, [2000] A.W.L.D. 654, [2000] A.J. No. 771, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 1, 265 A.R. 201, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 9, 98 A.C.W.S. (3d) 334, 9 B.L.R. (3d) 41

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended

In the Matter of the Business Corporations Act (Alberta) S.A. 1981, c. B-15, as Amended, Section 185

In the Matter of Canadian Airlines Corporation and Canadian Airlines International Ltd.

Paperny J.

Heard: June 5-19, 2000
Judgment: June 27, 2000*
Docket: Calgary 0001-05071

Counsel: *A.L. Friend, Q.C.*, *H.M. Kay, Q.C.*, *R.B. Low, Q.C.*, and *L. Goldbach*, for Petitioners.
S.F. Dunphy, *P. O'Kelly*, and *E. Kolers*, for Air Canada and 853350 Alberta Ltd.
D.R. Haigh, Q.C., *D.N. Nishimura*, *A.Z.A. Campbell* and *D. Tay*, for Resurgence Asset Management LLC.
L.R. Duncan, Q.C., and *G. McCue*, for Neil Baker, Michael Salter, Hal Metheral, and Roger Midiaty.
F.R. Foran, Q.C., and *P.T. McCarthy, Q.C.*, for Monitor, PwC.
G.B. Morawetz, *R.J. Chadwick* and *A. McConnell*, for Senior Secured Noteholders and the Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Co.
C.J. Shaw, Q.C., for Unionized Employees.
T. Mallett and *C. Feasby*, for Amex Bank of Canada.
E.W. Halt, for J. Stephens Allan, Claims Officer.
M. Hollins, for Pacific Costal Airlines.
P. Pastewka, for JHHD Aircraft Leasing No. 1 and No. 2.
J. Thom, for Royal Bank of Canada.
J. Medhurst-Tivadar, for Canada Customs and Revenue Agency.
R. Wilkins, Q.C., for Calgary and Edmonton Airport Authority.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications
For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Bankruptcy and insolvency

XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.3 Arrangements
XIX.3.b Approval by court

Headnote

Corporations --- Arrangements and compromises — Under Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — “Fair and reasonable”

Airline brought application for approval of plan of arrangement under Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act — Investment corporation brought counter-application for declaration that plan constituted merger or transfer of airline’s assets to AC Corp., that plan would not affect investment corporation, and directing repurchase of notes pursuant to trust indenture, and that actions of airline and AC Corp. in formulating plan were oppressive and unfairly prejudicial to them — Application granted; counter-application dismissed — All statutory conditions were fulfilled and plan was fair and reasonable — Fairness did not require equal treatment of all creditors — Aim of plan was to allow airline to sustain operations and permanently adjust debt structure to reflect current market for asset values and carrying costs, in return for AC Corp. providing guarantee of restructured obligations — Plan was not oppressive to minority shareholders who, in alternative bankruptcy scenario, would receive less than under plan — Reorganization of share capital did not cancel minority shareholders’ shares, and did not violate s. 167 of Business Corporations Act of Alberta — Act contemplated reorganizations in which insolvent corporation would eliminate interests of common shareholders, without requiring shareholder approval — Proposed transaction was not “sale, lease or exchange” of airline’s property which required shareholder approval — Requirements for “related party transaction” under Policy 9.1 of Ontario Securities Commission were waived, since plan was fair and reasonable — Plan resulted in no substantial injustice to minority creditors, and represented reasonable balancing of all interests — Evidence did not support investment corporation’s position that alternative existed which would render better return for minority shareholders — In insolvency situation, oppression of minority shareholder interests must be assessed against altered financial and legal landscape, which may result in shareholders’ no longer having true interest to be protected — Financial support and corporate integration provided by other airline was not assumption of benefit by other airline to detriment of airline, but benefited airline and its stakeholders — Investment corporation was not oppressed — Corporate reorganization provisions in plan could not be severed from debt restructuring — Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 5.1(2) — Business Corporations Act, S.A. 1981, c. B-15, s. 167.

Table of Authorities

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Alabama, New Orleans, Texas & Pacific Junction Railway, Re (1890), [1891] 1 Ch. 213, 60 L.J. Ch. 221, [1886-90] All E.R. Rep. Ext. 1143, 64 L.T. 127, 7 T.L.R. 171, 2 Meg. 377 (Eng. C.A.) — referred to

Algoma Steel Corp. v. Royal Bank (1992), 11 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Algoma Steel Corp. v. Royal Bank (April 16, 1992), Doc. Toronto B62/91-A (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Bruce Agra Foods Inc. v. Everfresh Beverages Inc. (Receiver of) (1996), 45 C.B.R. (3d) 169, 22 O.T.C. 247 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Cadillac Fairview Inc., Re (February 6, 1995), Doc. B348/94 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Cadillac Fairview Inc., Re (March 7, 1995), Doc. B28/95 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Campeau Corp., Re (1992), 10 C.B.R. (3d) 104 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

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Crabtree (Succession de) c. Barrette, 47 C.C.E.L. 1, 10 B.L.R. (2d) 1, *(*sub nom. *Barrette v. Crabtree (Succession de))* 53 Q.A.C. 279, *(*sub nom. *Barrette v. Crabtree (Succession de))* 150 N.R. 272, *(*sub nom. *Barrette v. Crabtree Estate)* 101 D.L.R. (4th) 66, *(*sub nom. *Barrette v. Crabtree Estate)* [1993] 1 S.C.R. 1027 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Diligenti v. RWMD Operations Kelowna Ltd. (1976), 1 B.C.L.R. 36 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

First Edmonton Place Ltd. v. 315888 Alberta Ltd. (1988), 60 Alta. L.R. (2d) 122, 40 B.L.R. 28 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Hochberger v. Rittenberg (1916), 54 S.C.R. 480, 36 D.L.R. 450 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Keddy Motor Inns Ltd., Re (1992), 90 D.L.R. (4th) 175, 13 C.B.R. (3d) 245, 6 B.L.R. (2d) 116, *(*sub nom. *Keddy Motor Inns Ltd., Re (No. 4))* 110 N.S.R. (2d) 246, *(*sub nom. *Keddy Motor Inns Ltd., Re (No. 4))* 299 A.P.R. 246 (N.S. C.A.) — referred to

Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd. (1988), 64 Alta. L.R. (2d) 139, [1989] 2 W.W.R. 566, 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 20, 72 C.R. (N.S.) 20 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Northland Properties Ltd., Re (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 (B.C. S.C.) — considered

Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada, 34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 122, 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195, [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363 (B.C. C.A.) — considered

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Quintette Coal Ltd., Re (1992), 13 C.B.R. (3d) 146, 68 B.C.L.R. (2d) 219 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

Repap British Columbia Inc., Re (1998), 1 C.B.R. (4th) 49, 50 B.C.L.R. (3d) 133 (B.C. S.C.) — considered

Royal Oak Mines Inc., Re (1999), 14 C.B.R. (4th) 279 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Sammi Atlas Inc., Re (1998), 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Savage v. Amoco Acquisition Co. (1988), 59 Alta. L.R. (2d) 260, 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 154, 40 B.L.R. 188, *(*sub nom. *Amoco Acquisition Co. v. Savage)* 87 A.R. 321 (Alta. C.A.) — considered

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Generally — referred to

Air Canada Public Participation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 35 (4th Supp.)

Generally — referred to

Business Corporations Act, S.A. 1981, c. B-15
Generally — referred to

s. 167 [am. 1996, c. 32, s. 1(4)] — considered

s. 167(1) [am. 1996, c. 32, s. 1(4)] — considered

s. 167(1)(e) — considered

s. 167(1)(f) — considered

s. 167(1)(g.1) [en. 1996, c. 32, s. 1(4)] — considered

s. 183 — considered

s. 185 — considered

s. 185(2) — considered

s. 185(7) — considered

s. 234 — considered

Canada Transportation Act, S.C. 1996, c. 10
Generally — referred to

s. 47 — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — considered

s. 2 "debtor company" — referred to

s. 5.1 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 122] — considered

s. 5.1(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 122] — referred to

s. 5.1(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 122] — referred to

s. 6 [am. 1992, c. 27, s. 90(1)(f); am. 1996, c. 6, s. 167(1)(d)] — considered

s. 12 — referred to

Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34
Generally — referred to

APPLICATION by airline for approval of plan of arrangement; COUNTER-APPLICATION by investment corporation for declaration that plan constituted merger or transfer of airline's assets to AC Corp., that plan would not affect investment

corporation, and directing repurchase of notes pursuant to trust indenture, and that actions of airline and AC Corp. in formulating plan were oppressive and unfairly prejudicial; COUNTER-APPLICATION by minority shareholders.

***Paperny J.*:**

I. Introduction

1 After a decade of searching for a permanent solution to its ongoing, significant financial problems, Canadian Airlines Corporation (”CAC”) and Canadian Airlines International Ltd. (”CAIL”) seek the court’s sanction to a plan of arrangement filed under the *Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act* (”CCAA”) and sponsored by its historic rival, Air Canada Corporation (”Air Canada”). To Canadian, this represents its last choice and its only chance for survival. To Air Canada, it is an opportunity to lead the restructuring of the Canadian airline industry, an exercise many suggest is long overdue. To over 16,000 employees of Canadian, it means continued employment. Canadian Airlines will operate as a separate entity and continue to provide domestic and international air service to Canadians. Tickets of the flying public will be honoured and their frequent flyer points maintained. Long term business relationships with trade creditors and suppliers will continue.

2 The proposed restructuring comes at a cost. Secured and unsecured creditors are being asked to accept significant compromises and shareholders of CAC are being asked to accept that their shares have no value. Certain unsecured creditors oppose the plan, alleging it is oppressive and unfair. They assert that Air Canada has appropriated the key assets of Canadian to itself. Minority shareholders of CAC, on the other hand, argue that Air Canada’s financial support to Canadian, before and during this restructuring process, has increased the value of Canadian and in turn their shares. These two positions are irreconcilable, but do reflect the perception by some that this plan asks them to sacrifice too much.

3 Canadian has asked this court to sanction its plan under s. 6 of the CCAA. The court’s role on a sanction hearing is to consider whether the plan fairly balances the interests of all the stakeholders. Faced with an insolvent organization, its role is to look forward and ask: does this plan represent a fair and reasonable compromise that will permit a viable commercial entity to emerge? It is also an exercise in assessing current reality by comparing available commercial alternatives to what is offered in the proposed plan.

II. Background

Canadian Airlines and its Subsidiaries

4 CAC and CAIL are corporations incorporated or continued under the *Business Corporations Act* of Alberta, S.A. 1981, c. B-15 (”ABCA”). 82% of CAC’s shares are held by 853350 Alberta Ltd.(”853350”) and the remaining 18% are held publicly. CAC, directly or indirectly, owns the majority of voting shares in and controls the other Petitioner, CAIL and these shares represent CAC’s principal asset. CAIL owns or has an interest in a number of other corporations directly engaged in the airline industry or other businesses related to the airline industry, including Canadian Regional Airlines Limited (”CRAL”). Where the context requires, I will refer to CAC and CAIL jointly as “Canadian” in these reasons.

5 In the past fifteen years, CAIL has grown from a regional carrier operating under the name Pacific Western Airlines (”PWA”) to one of Canada’s two major airlines. By mid-1986, Canadian Pacific Air Lines Limited (”CP Air”), had acquired the regional carriers Nordair Inc. (”Nordair”) and Eastern Provincial Airways (”Eastern”). In February, 1987, PWA completed its purchase of CP Air from Canadian Pacific Limited. PWA then merged the four predecessor carriers (CP Air, Eastern, Nordair, and PWA) to form one airline, “Canadian Airlines International Ltd.”, which was launched in April, 1987.

6 By April, 1989, CAIL had acquired substantially all of the common shares of Wardair Inc. and completed the integration of CAIL and Wardair Inc. in 1990.

7 CAIL and its subsidiaries provide international and domestic scheduled and charter air transportation for passengers and cargo. CAIL provides scheduled services to approximately 30 destinations in 11 countries. Its subsidiary, Canadian Regional Airlines (1998) Ltd. (”CRAL 98”) provides scheduled services to approximately 35 destinations in Canada and the United States. Through code share agreements and marketing alliances with leading carriers, CAIL and its subsidiaries provide

service to approximately 225 destinations worldwide. CAIL is also engaged in charter and cargo services and the provision of services to third parties, including aircraft overhaul and maintenance, passenger and cargo handling, flight simulator and equipment rentals, employee training programs and the sale of Canadian Plus frequent flyer points. As at December 31, 1999, CAIL operated approximately 79 aircraft.

8 CAIL directly and indirectly employs over 16,000 persons, substantially all of whom are located in Canada. The balance of the employees are located in the United States, Europe, Asia, Australia, South America and Mexico. Approximately 88% of the active employees of CAIL are subject to collective bargaining agreements.

Events Leading up to the CCAA Proceedings

9 Canadian's financial difficulties significantly predate these proceedings.

10 In the early 1990s, Canadian experienced significant losses from operations and deteriorating liquidity. It completed a financial restructuring in 1994 (the "1994 Restructuring") which involved employees contributing $200,000,000 in new equity in return for receipt of entitlements to common shares. In addition, Aurora Airline Investments, Inc. ("Aurora"), a subsidiary of AMR Corporation ("AMR"), subscribed for $246,000,000 in preferred shares of CAIL. Other AMR subsidiaries entered into comprehensive services and marketing arrangements with CAIL. The governments of Canada, British Columbia and Alberta provided an aggregate of $120,000,000 in loan guarantees. Senior creditors, junior creditors and shareholders of CAC and CAIL and its subsidiaries converted approximately $712,000,000 of obligations into common shares of CAC or convertible notes issued jointly by CAC and CAIL and/or received warrants entitling the holder to purchase common shares.

11 In the latter half of 1994, Canadian built on the improved balance sheet provided by the 1994 Restructuring, focussing on strict cost controls, capacity management and aircraft utilization. The initial results were encouraging. However, a number of factors including higher than expected fuel costs, rising interest rates, decline of the Canadian dollar, a strike by pilots of Time Air and the temporary grounding of Inter-Canadien's ATR-42 fleet undermined this improved operational performance. In 1995, in response to additional capacity added by emerging charter carriers and Air Canada on key transcontinental routes, CAIL added additional aircraft to its fleet in an effort to regain market share. However, the addition of capacity coincided with the slow-down in the Canadian economy leading to traffic levels that were significantly below expectations. Additionally, key international routes of CAIL failed to produce anticipated results. The cumulative losses of CAIL from 1994 to 1999 totalled $771 million and from January 31, 1995 to August 12, 1999, the day prior to the issuance by the Government of Canada of an Order under Section 47 of the *Canada Transportation Act* (relaxing certain rules under the *Competition Act* to facilitate a restructuring of the airline industry and described further below), the trading price of Canadian's common shares declined from $7.90 to $1.55.

12 Canadian's losses incurred since the 1994 Restructuring severely eroded its liquidity position. In 1996, Canadian faced an environment where the domestic air travel market saw increased capacity and aggressive price competition by two new discount carriers based in western Canada. While Canadian's traffic and load factor increased indicating a positive response to Canadian's post-restructuring business plan, yields declined. Attempts by Canadian to reduce domestic capacity were offset by additional capacity being introduced by the new discount carriers and Air Canada.

13 The continued lack of sufficient funds from operations made it evident by late fall of 1996 that Canadian needed to take action to avoid a cash shortfall in the spring of 1997. In November 1996, Canadian announced an operational restructuring plan (the "1996 Restructuring") aimed at returning Canadian to profitability and subsequently implemented a payment deferral plan which involved a temporary moratorium on payments to certain lenders and aircraft operating lessors to provide a cash bridge until the benefits of the operational restructuring were fully implemented. Canadian was able successfully to obtain the support of its lenders and operating lessors such that the moratorium and payment deferral plan was able to proceed on a consensual basis without the requirement for any court proceedings.

14 The objective of the 1996 Restructuring was to transform Canadian into a sustainable entity by focussing on controllable factors which targeted earnings improvements over four years. Three major initiatives were adopted: network enhancements, wage concessions as supplemented by fuel tax reductions/rebates, and overhead cost reductions.

15 The benefits of the 1996 Restructuring were reflected in Canadian's 1997 financial results when Canadian and its subsidiaries reported a consolidated net income of $5.4 million, the best results in 9 years.

16 In early 1998, building on its 1997 results, Canadian took advantage of a strong market for U.S. public debt financing in the first half of 1998 by issuing U.S. $175,000,000 of senior secured notes in April, 1998 ("Senior Secured Notes") and U.S. $100,000,000 of unsecured notes in August, 1998 ("Unsecured Notes").

17 The benefits of the 1996 Restructuring continued in 1998 but were not sufficient to offset a number of new factors which had a significant negative impact on financial performance, particularly in the fourth quarter. Canadian's eroded capital base gave it limited capacity to withstand negative effects on traffic and revenue. These factors included lower than expected operating revenues resulting from a continued weakness of the Asian economies, vigorous competition in Canadian's key western Canada and the western U.S. transborder markets, significant price discounting in most domestic markets following a labour disruption at Air Canada and CAIL's temporary loss of the ability to code-share with American Airlines on certain transborder flights due to a pilot dispute at American Airlines. Canadian also had increased operating expenses primarily due to the deterioration of the value of the Canadian dollar and additional airport and navigational fees imposed by NAV Canada which were not recoverable by Canadian through fare increases because of competitive pressures. This resulted in Canadian and its subsidiaries reporting a consolidated loss of $137.6 million for 1998.

18 As a result of these continuing weak financial results, Canadian undertook a number of additional strategic initiatives including entering the *oneworldTM* Alliance, the introduction of its new "Proud Wings" corporate image, a restructuring of CAIL's Vancouver hub, the sale and leaseback of certain aircraft, expanded code sharing arrangements and the implementation of a service charge in an effort to recover a portion of the costs relating to NAV Canada fees.

19 Beginning in late 1998 and continuing into 1999, Canadian tried to access equity markets to strengthen its balance sheet. In January, 1999, the Board of Directors of CAC determined that while Canadian needed to obtain additional equity capital, an equity infusion alone would not address the fundamental structural problems in the domestic air transportation market.

20 Canadian believes that its financial performance was and is reflective of structural problems in the Canadian airline industry, most significantly, over capacity in the domestic air transportation market. It is the view of Canadian and Air Canada that Canada's relatively small population and the geographic distribution of that population is unable to support the overlapping networks of two full service national carriers. As described further below, the Government of Canada has recognized this fundamental problem and has been instrumental in attempts to develop a solution.

Initial Discussions with Air Canada

21 Accordingly, in January, 1999, CAC's Board of Directors directed management to explore all strategic alternatives available to Canadian, including discussions regarding a possible merger or other transaction involving Air Canada.

22 Canadian had discussions with Air Canada in early 1999. AMR also participated in those discussions. While several alternative merger transactions were considered in the course of these discussions, Canadian, AMR and Air Canada were unable to reach agreement.

23 Following the termination of merger discussions between Canadian and Air Canada, senior management of Canadian, at the direction of the Board and with the support of AMR, renewed its efforts to secure financial partners with the objective of obtaining either an equity investment and support for an eventual merger with Air Canada or immediate financial support for a merger with Air Canada.

Offer by Onex

24 In early May, the discussions with Air Canada having failed, Canadian focussed its efforts on discussions with Onex Corporation ("Onex") and AMR concerning the basis upon which a merger of Canadian and Air Canada could be accomplished.

25 On August 23, 1999, Canadian entered into an Arrangement Agreement with Onex, AMR and Airline Industry Revitalization Co. Inc. (”AirCo”) (a company owned jointly by Onex and AMR and controlled by Onex). The Arrangement Agreement set out the terms of a Plan of Arrangement providing for the purchase by AirCo of all of the outstanding common and non-voting shares of CAC. The Arrangement Agreement was conditional upon, among other things, the successful completion of a simultaneous offer by AirCo for all of the voting and non-voting shares of Air Canada. On August 24, 1999, AirCo announced its offers to purchase the shares of both CAC and Air Canada and to subsequently merge the operations of the two airlines to create one international carrier in Canada.

26 On or about September 20, 1999 the Board of Directors of Air Canada recommended against the AirCo offer. On or about October 19, 1999, Air Canada announced its own proposal to its shareholders to repurchase shares of Air Canada. Air Canada’s announcement also indicated Air Canada’s intention to make a bid for CAC and to proceed to complete a merger with Canadian subject to a restructuring of Canadian’s debt.

27 There were several rounds of offers and counter-offers between AirCo and Air Canada. On November 5, 1999, the Quebec Superior Court ruled that the AirCo offer for Air Canada violated the provisions of the *Air Canada Public Participation Act*. AirCo immediately withdrew its offers. At that time, Air Canada indicated its intention to proceed with its offer for CAC.

28 Following the withdrawal of the AirCo offer to purchase CAC, and notwithstanding Air Canada’s stated intention to proceed with its offer, there was a renewed uncertainty about Canadian’s future which adversely affected operations. As described further below, Canadian lost significant forward bookings which further reduced the company’s remaining liquidity.

Offer by 853350

29 On November 11, 1999, 853350 (a corporation financed by Air Canada and owned as to 10% by Air Canada) made a formal offer for all of the common and non-voting shares of CAC. Air Canada indicated that the involvement of 853350 in the take-over bid was necessary in order to protect Air Canada from the potential adverse effects of a restructuring of Canadian’s debt and that Air Canada would only complete a merger with Canadian after the completion of a debt restructuring transaction. The offer by 853350 was conditional upon, among other things, a satisfactory resolution of AMR’s claims in respect of Canadian and a satisfactory resolution of certain regulatory issues arising from the announcement made on October 26, 1999 by the Government of Canada regarding its intentions to alter the regime governing the airline industry.

30 As noted above, AMR and its subsidiaries and affiliates had certain agreements with Canadian arising from AMR’s investment (through its wholly owned subsidiary, Aurora Airline Investments, Inc.) in CAIL during the 1994 Restructuring. In particular, the Services Agreement by which AMR and its subsidiaries and affiliates provided certain reservations, scheduling and other airline related services to Canadian provided for a termination fee of approximately $500 million (as at December 31, 1999) while the terms governing the preferred shares issued to Aurora provided for exchange rights which were only retractable by Canadian upon payment of a redemption fee in excess of $500 million (as at December 31, 1999). Unless such provisions were amended or waived, it was practically impossible for Canadian to complete a merger with Air Canada since the cost of proceeding without AMR’s consent was simply too high.

31 Canadian had continued its efforts to seek out all possible solutions to its structural problems following the withdrawal of the AirCo offer on November 5, 1999. While AMR indicated its willingness to provide a measure of support by allowing a deferral of some of the fees payable to AMR under the Services Agreement, Canadian was unable to find any investor willing to provide the liquidity necessary to keep Canadian operating while alternative solutions were sought.

32 After 853350 made its offer, 853350 and Air Canada entered into discussions with AMR regarding the purchase by 853350 of AMR’s shareholding in CAIL as well as other matters regarding code sharing agreements and various services provided to Canadian by AMR and its subsidiaries and affiliates. The parties reached an agreement on November 22, 1999 pursuant to which AMR agreed to reduce its potential damages claim for termination of the Services Agreement by approximately 88%.

33 On December 4, 1999, CAC's Board recommended acceptance of 853350's offer to its shareholders and on December 21, 1999, two days before the offer closed, 853350 received approval for the offer from the Competition Bureau as well as clarification from the Government of Canada on the proposed regulatory framework for the Canadian airline industry.

34 As noted above, Canadian's financial condition deteriorated further after the collapse of the AirCo Arrangement transaction. In particular:

> a) the doubts which were publicly raised as to Canadian's ability to survive made Canadian's efforts to secure additional financing through various sale-leaseback transactions more difficult;
>
> b) sales for future air travel were down by approximately 10% compared to 1998;
>
> c) CAIL's liquidity position, which stood at approximately $84 million (consolidated cash and available credit) as at September 30, 1999, reached a critical point in late December, 1999 when it was about to go negative.

35 In late December, 1999, Air Canada agreed to enter into certain transactions designed to ensure that Canadian would have enough liquidity to continue operating until the scheduled completion of the 853350 take-over bid on January 4, 2000. Air Canada agreed to purchase rights to the Toronto-Tokyo route for $25 million and to a sale-leaseback arrangement involving certain unencumbered aircraft and a flight simulator for total proceeds of approximately $20 million. These transactions gave Canadian sufficient liquidity to continue operations through the holiday period.

36 If Air Canada had not provided the approximate $45 million injection in December 1999, Canadian would likely have had to file for bankruptcy and cease all operations before the end of the holiday travel season.

37 On January 4, 2000, with all conditions of its offer having been satisfied or waived, 853350 purchased approximately 82% of the outstanding shares of CAC. On January 5, 1999, 853350 completed the purchase of the preferred shares of CAIL owned by Aurora. In connection with that acquisition, Canadian agreed to certain amendments to the Services Agreement reducing the amounts payable to AMR in the event of a termination of such agreement and, in addition, the unanimous shareholders agreement which gave AMR the right to require Canadian to purchase the CAIL preferred shares under certain circumstances was terminated. These arrangements had the effect of substantially reducing the obstacles to a restructuring of Canadian's debt and lease obligations and also significantly reduced the claims that AMR would be entitled to advance in such a restructuring.

38 Despite the $45 million provided by Air Canada, Canadian's liquidity position remained poor. With January being a traditionally slow month in the airline industry, further bridge financing was required in order to ensure that Canadian would be able to operate while a debt restructuring transaction was being negotiated with creditors. Air Canada negotiated an arrangement with the Royal Bank of Canada ("Royal Bank") to purchase a participation interest in the operating credit facility made available to Canadian. As a result of this agreement, Royal Bank agreed to extend Canadian's operating credit facility from $70 million to $120 million in January, 2000 and then to $145 million in March, 2000. Canadian agreed to supplement the assignment of accounts receivable security originally securing Royal's $70 million facility with a further Security Agreement securing certain unencumbered assets of Canadian in consideration for this increased credit availability. Without the support of Air Canada or another financially sound entity, this increase in credit would not have been possible.

39 Air Canada has stated publicly that it ultimately wishes to merge the operations of Canadian and Air Canada, subject to Canadian completing a financial restructuring so as to permit Air Canada to complete the acquisition on a financially sound basis. This pre-condition has been emphasized by Air Canada since the fall of 1999.

40 Prior to the acquisition of majority control of CAC by 853350, Canadian's management, Board of Directors and financial advisors had considered every possible alternative for restoring Canadian to a sound financial footing. Based upon Canadian's extensive efforts over the past year in particular, but also the efforts since 1992 described above, Canadian came to the conclusion that it must complete a debt restructuring to permit the completion of a full merger between Canadian and

Air Canada.

41 On February 1, 2000, Canadian announced a moratorium on payments to lessors and lenders. As a result of this moratorium Canadian defaulted on the payments due under its various credit facilities and aircraft leases. Absent the assistance provided by this moratorium, in addition to Air Canada's support, Canadian would not have had sufficient liquidity to continue operating until the completion of a debt restructuring.

42 Following implementation of the moratorium, Canadian with Air Canada embarked on efforts to restructure significant obligations by consent. The further damage to public confidence which a CCAA filing could produce required Canadian to secure a substantial measure of creditor support in advance of any public filing for court protection.

43 Before the Petitioners started these CCAA proceedings, Air Canada, CAIL and lessors of 59 aircraft in its fleet had reached agreement in principle on the restructuring plan.

44 Canadian and Air Canada have also been able to reach agreement with the remaining affected secured creditors, being the holders of the U.S. $175 million Senior Secured Notes, due 2005, (the "Senior Secured Noteholders") and with several major unsecured creditors in addition to AMR, such as Loyalty Management Group Canada Inc.

45 On March 24, 2000, faced with threatened proceedings by secured creditors, Canadian petitioned under the CCAA and obtained a stay of proceedings and related interim relief by Order of the Honourable Chief Justice Moore on that same date. Pursuant to that Order, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Inc. was appointed as the Monitor, and companion proceedings in the United States were authorized to be commenced.

46 Since that time, due to the assistance of Air Canada, Canadian has been able to complete the restructuring of the remaining financial obligations governing all aircraft to be retained by Canadian for future operations. These arrangements were approved by this Honourable Court in its Orders dated April 14, 2000 and May 10, 2000, as described in further detail below under the heading "The Restructuring Plan".

47 On April 7, 2000, this court granted an Order giving directions with respect to the filing of the plan, the calling and holding of meetings of affected creditors and related matters.

48 On April 25, 2000 in accordance with the said Order, Canadian filed and served the plan (in its original form) and the related notices and materials.

49 The plan was amended, in accordance with its terms, on several occasions, the form of Plan voted upon at the Creditors' Meetings on May 26, 2000 having been filed and served on May 25, 2000 (the "Plan").

The Restructuring Plan

50 The Plan has three principal aims described by Canadian:

> (a) provide near term liquidity so that Canadian can sustain operations;
>
> (b) allow for the return of aircraft not required by Canadian; and
>
> (c) permanently adjust Canadian's debt structure and lease facilities to reflect the current market for asset values and carrying costs in return for Air Canada providing a guarantee of the restructured obligations.

51 The proposed treatment of stakeholders is as follows:

1. Unaffected Secured Creditors- Royal Bank, CAIL's operating lender, is an unaffected creditor with respect to its operating credit facility. Royal Bank holds security over CAIL's accounts receivable and most of CAIL's operating assets not specifically secured by aircraft financiers or the Senior Secured Noteholders. As noted above, arrangements entered into between Air Canada and Royal Bank have provided CAIL with liquidity necessary for it to continue operations since January 2000.

Also unaffected by the Plan are those aircraft lessors, conditional vendors and secured creditors holding security over CAIL's aircraft who have entered into agreements with CAIL and/or Air Canada with respect to the restructuring of CAIL's obligations. A number of such agreements, which were initially contained in the form of letters of intent ("LOIs"), were entered into prior to the commencement of the CCAA proceedings, while a total of 17 LOIs were completed after that date. In its Second and Fourth Reports the Monitor reported to the court on these agreements. The LOIs entered into after the proceedings commenced were reviewed and approved by the court on April 14, 2000 and May 10, 2000.

The basis of the LOIs with aircraft lessors was that the operating lease rates were reduced to fair market lease rates or less, and the obligations of CAIL under the leases were either assumed or guaranteed by Air Canada. Where the aircraft was subject to conditional sale agreements or other secured indebtedness, the value of the secured debt was reduced to the fair market value of the aircraft, and the interest rate payable was reduced to current market rates reflecting Air Canada's credit. CAIL's obligations under those agreements have also been assumed or guaranteed by Air Canada. The claims of these creditors for reduced principal and interest amounts, or reduced lease payments, are Affected Unsecured Claims under the Plan. In a number of cases these claims have been assigned to Air Canada and Air Canada disclosed that it would vote those claims in favour of the Plan.

2. Affected Secured Creditors- The Affected Secured Creditors under the Plan are the Senior Secured Noteholders with a claim in the amount of US$175,000,000. The Senior Secured Noteholders are secured by a diverse package of Canadian's assets, including its inventory of aircraft spare parts, ground equipment, spare engines, flight simulators, leasehold interests at Toronto, Vancouver and Calgary airports, the shares in CRAL 98 and a $53 million note payable by CRAL to CAIL.

The Plan offers the Senior Secured Noteholders payment of 97 cents on the dollar. The deficiency is included in the Affected Unsecured Creditor class and the Senior Secured Noteholders advised the court they would be voting the deficiency in favour of the Plan.

3. Unaffected Unsecured Creditors-In the circular accompanying the November 11, 1999 853350 offer it was stated that:

> The Offeror intends to conduct the Debt Restructuring in such a manner as to seek to ensure that the unionized employees of Canadian, the suppliers of new credit (including trade credit) and the members of the flying public are left unaffected.
>
> The Offeror is of the view that the pursuit of these three principles is essential in order to ensure that the long term value of Canadian is preserved.

Canadian's employees, customers and suppliers of goods and services are unaffected by the CCAA Order and Plan.

Also unaffected are parties to those contracts or agreements with Canadian which are not being terminated by Canadian pursuant to the terms of the March 24, 2000 Order.

4. Affected Unsecured Creditors- CAIL has identified unsecured creditors who do not fall into the above three groups and listed these as Affected Unsecured Creditors under the Plan. They are offered 14 cents on the dollar on their claims. Air Canada would fund this payment.

The Affected Unsecured Creditors fall into the following categories:

a. Claims of holders of or related to the Unsecured Notes (the "Unsecured Noteholders");

b. Claims in respect of certain outstanding or threatened litigation involving Canadian;

c. Claims arising from the termination, breach or repudiation of certain contracts, leases or agreements to which Canadian is a party other than aircraft financing or lease arrangements;

d. Claims in respect of deficiencies arising from the termination or re-negotiation of aircraft financing or lease arrangements;

e. Claims of tax authorities against Canadian; and

f. Claims in respect of the under-secured or unsecured portion of amounts due to the Senior Secured Noteholders.

52 There are over $700 million of proven unsecured claims. Some unsecured creditors have disputed the amounts of their claims for distribution purposes. These are in the process of determination by the court-appointed Claims Officer and subject to further appeal to the court. If the Claims Officer were to allow all of the disputed claims in full and this were confirmed by the court, the aggregate of unsecured claims would be approximately $1.059 million.

53 The Monitor has concluded that if the Plan is not approved and implemented, Canadian will not be able to continue as a going concern and in that event, the only foreseeable alternative would be a liquidation of Canadian's assets by a receiver and/or a trustee in bankruptcy. Under the Plan, Canadian's obligations to parties essential to ongoing operations, including employees, customers, travel agents, fuel, maintenance and equipment suppliers, and airport authorities are in most cases to be treated as unaffected and paid in full. In the event of a liquidation, those parties would not, in most cases, be paid in full and, except for specific lien rights and statutory priorities, would rank as ordinary unsecured creditors. The Monitor estimates that the additional unsecured claims which would arise if Canadian were to cease operations as a going concern and be forced into liquidation would be in excess of $1.1 billion.

54 In connection with its assessment of the Plan, the Monitor performed a liquidation analysis of CAIL as at March 31, 2000 in order to estimate the amounts that might be recovered by CAIL's creditors and shareholders in the event of disposition of CAIL's assets by a receiver or trustee. The Monitor concluded that a liquidation would result in a shortfall to certain secured creditors, including the Senior Secured Noteholders, a recovery by ordinary unsecured creditors of between one cent and three cents on the dollar, and no recovery by shareholders.

55 There are two vociferous opponents of the Plan, Resurgence Asset Management LLC ("Resurgence") who acts on behalf of its and/or its affiliate client accounts and four shareholders of CAC. Resurgence is incorporated pursuant to the laws of New York, U.S.A. and has its head office in White Plains, New York. It conducts an investment business specializing in high yield distressed debt. Through a series of purchases of the Unsecured Notes commencing in April 1999, Resurgence clients hold $58,200,000 of the face value of or 58.2% of the notes issued. Resurgence purchased 7.9 million units in April 1999. From November 3, 1999 to December 9, 1999 it purchased an additional 20,850,000 units. From January 4, 2000 to February 3, 2000 Resurgence purchased an additional 29,450,000 units.

56 Resurgence seeks declarations that: the actions of Canadian, Air Canada and 853350 constitute an amalgamation, consolidation or merger with or into Air Canada or a conveyance or transfer of all or substantially all of Canadian's assets to Air Canada; that any plan of arrangement involving Canadian will not affect Resurgence and directing the repurchase of their notes pursuant to the provisions of their trust indenture and that the actions of Canadian, Air Canada and 853350 are oppressive and unfairly prejudicial to it pursuant to section 234 of the Business Corporations Act.

57 Four shareholders of CAC also oppose the plan. Neil Baker, a Toronto resident, acquired 132,500 common shares at a cost of $83,475.00 on or about May 5, 2000. Mr. Baker sought to commence proceedings to "remedy an injustice to the minority holders of the common shares". Roger Midiaty, Michael Salter and Hal Metheral are individual shareholders who were added as parties at their request during the proceedings. Mr. Midiaty resides in Calgary, Alberta and holds 827 CAC

shares which he has held since 1994. Mr. Metheral is also a Calgary resident and holds approximately 14,900 CAC shares in his RRSP and has held them since approximately 1994 or 1995. Mr. Salter is a resident of Scottsdale, Arizona and is the beneficial owner of 250 shares of CAC and is a joint beneficial owner of 250 shares with his wife. These shareholders will be referred in the Decision throughout as the "Minority Shareholders".

58 The Minority Shareholders oppose the portion of the Plan that relates to the reorganization of CAIL, pursuant to section 185 of the *Alberta Business Corporations Act* ("ABCA"). They characterize the transaction as a cancellation of issued shares unauthorized by section 167 of the ABCA or alternatively is a violation of section 183 of the ABCA. They submit the application for the order of reorganization should be denied as being unlawful, unfair and not supported by the evidence.

III. Analysis

59 Section 6 of the CCAA provides that:

> 6. Where a majority in number representing two-thirds in value of the creditors, or class of creditors, as the case may be, present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting or meetings thereof respectively held pursuant to sections 4 and 5, or either of those sections, agree to any compromise or arrangement either as proposed or as altered or modified at the meeting or meetings, the compromise or arrangement may be sanctioned by the court, and if so sanctioned is binding
>
> (a) on all the creditors or the class of creditors, as the case may be, and on any trustee for any such class of creditors, whether secured or unsecured, as the case may be, and on the company; and
>
> (b) in the case of a company that has made an authorized assignment or against which a receiving order has been made under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act or is in the course of being wound up under the Winding-up and Restructuring Act, on the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator and contributories of the company.

60 Prior to sanctioning a plan under the CCAA, the court must be satisfied in regard to each of the following criteria:

> (1) there must be compliance with all statutory requirements;
>
> (2) all material filed and procedures carried out must be examined to determine if anything has been done or purported to be done which is not authorized by the CCAA; and
>
> (3) the plan must be fair and reasonable.

61 A leading articulation of this three-part test appears in *Re Northland Properties Ltd.* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 (B.C. S.C.) at 182-3, aff'd (1989), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195 (B.C. C.A.) and has been regularly followed, see for example *Re Sammi Atlas Inc.* (1998), 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at 172 and *Re T. Eaton Co.* (1999), 15 C.B.R. (4th) 311 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paragraph 7. Each of these criteria are reviewed in turn below.

1. Statutory Requirements

62 Some of the matters that may be considered by the court on an application for approval of a plan of compromise and arrangement include:

(a) the applicant comes within the definition of "debtor company" in section 2 of the CCAA;

(b) the applicant or affiliated debtor companies have total claims within the meaning of section 12 of the CCAA in excess of $5,000,000;

(c) the notice calling the meeting was sent in accordance with the order of the court;

(d) the creditors were properly classified;

(e) the meetings of creditors were properly constituted;

(f) the voting was properly carried out; and

(g) the plan was approved by the requisite double majority or majorities.

63 I find that the Petitioners have complied with all applicable statutory requirements. Specifically:

(a) CAC and CAIL are insolvent and thus each is a "debtor company" within the meaning of section 2 of the CCAA. This was established in the affidavit evidence of Douglas Carty, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Canadian, and so declared in the March 24, 2000 Order in these proceedings and confirmed in the testimony given by Mr. Carty at this hearing.

(b) CAC and CAIL have total claims that would be claims provable in bankruptcy within the meaning of section 12 of the CCAA in excess of $5,000,000.

(c) In accordance with the April 7, 2000 Order of this court, a Notice of Meeting and a disclosure statement (which included copies of the Plan and the March 24th and April 7th Orders of this court) were sent to the Affected Creditors, the directors and officers of the Petitioners, the Monitor and persons who had served a Notice of Appearance, on April 25, 2000.

(d) As confirmed by the May 12, 2000 ruling of this court (leave to appeal denied May 29, 2000), the creditors have been properly classified.

(e) Further, as detailed in the Monitor's Fifth Report to the Court and confirmed by the June 14, 2000 decision of this court in respect of a challenge by Resurgence Asset Management LLC ("Resurgence"), the meetings of creditors were properly constituted, the voting was properly carried out and the Plan was approved by the requisite double majorities in each class. The composition of the majority of the unsecured creditor class is addressed below under the heading "Fair and Reasonable".

2. Matters Unauthorized

64 This criterion has not been widely discussed in the reported cases. As recognized by Blair J. in *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co.* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. Gen. Div.) and Farley J. in *Re Cadillac Fairview Inc.* (February 6, 1995), Doc. B348/94 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), within the CCAA process the court must rely on the reports of the Monitor as well as the parties in ensuring nothing contrary to the CCAA has occurred or is contemplated by the plan.

65 In this proceeding, the dissenting groups have raised two matters which in their view are unauthorized by the CCAA: firstly, the Minority Shareholders of CAC suggested the proposed share capital reorganization of CAIL is illegal under the ABCA and Ontario Securities Commission Policy 9.1, and as such cannot be authorized under the CCAA and secondly,

certain unsecured creditors suggested that the form of release contained in the Plan goes beyond the scope of release permitted under the CCAA.

a. Legality of proposed share capital reorganization

66 Subsection 185(2) of the ABCA provides:

> (2) If a corporation is subject to an order for reorganization, its articles may be amended by the order to effect any change that might lawfully be made by an amendment under section 167.

67 Sections 6.1(2)(d) and (e) and Schedule "D" of the Plan contemplate that:

> a. All CAIL common shares held by CAC will be converted into a single retractable share, which will then be retracted by CAIL for $1.00; and
>
> b. All CAIL preferred shares held by 853350 will be converted into CAIL common shares.

68 The Articles of Reorganization in Schedule "D" to the Plan provide for the following amendments to CAIL's Articles of Incorporation to effect the proposed reorganization:

> (a) consolidating all of the issued and outstanding common shares into one common share;
>
> (b) redesignating the existing common shares as "Retractable Shares" and changing the rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions attaching to the Retractable Shares so that the Retractable Shares shall have attached thereto the rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions as set out in the Schedule of Share Capital;
>
> (c) cancelling the Non-Voting Shares in the capital of the corporation, none of which are currently issued and outstanding, so that the corporation is no longer authorized to issue Non-Voting Shares;
>
> (d) changing all of the issued and outstanding Class B Preferred Shares of the corporation into Class A Preferred Shares, on the basis of one (1) Class A Preferred Share for each one (1) Class B Preferred Share presently issued and outstanding;
>
> (e) redesignating the existing Class A Preferred Shares as "Common Shares" and changing the rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions attaching to the Common Shares so that the Common Shares shall have attached thereto the rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions as set out in the Schedule of Share Capital; and
>
> (f) cancelling the Class B Preferred Shares in the capital of the corporation, none of which are issued and outstanding after the change in paragraph (d) above, so that the corporation is no longer authorized to issue Class B Preferred Shares;

Section 167 of the ABCA

69 Reorganizations under section 185 of the ABCA are subject to two preconditions:

> a. The corporation must be "subject to an order for re-organization"; and

b. The proposed amendments must otherwise be permitted under section 167 of the ABCA.

70 The parties agreed that an order of this court sanctioning the Plan would satisfy the first condition.

71 The relevant portions of section 167 provide as follows:

> 167(1) Subject to sections 170 and 171, the articles of a corporation may by special resolution be amended to
>
> (e) change the designation of all or any of its shares, and add, change or remove any rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions, including rights to accrued dividends, in respect of all or any of its shares, whether issued or unissued,
>
> (f) change the shares of any class or series, whether issued or unissued, into a different number of shares of the same class or series into the same or a different number of shares of other classes or series,
>
> (g.1) cancel a class or series of shares where there are no issued or outstanding shares of that class or series,

72 Each change in the proposed CAIL Articles of Reorganization corresponds to changes permitted under s. 167(1) of the ABCA, as follows:

Proposed Amendment in Schedule "D"	**Subsection 167(1), ABCA**
(a) — consolidation of Common Shares	167(1)(f)
(b) — change of designation and rights	167(1)(e)
(c) — cancellation	167(1)(g.1)
(d) — change in shares	167(1)(f)
(e) — change of designation and rights	167(1)(e)
(f) — cancellation	167(1)(g.1)

73 The Minority Shareholders suggested that the proposed reorganization effectively cancels their shares in CAC. As the above review of the proposed reorganization demonstrates, that is not the case. Rather, the shares of CAIL are being consolidated, altered and then retracted, as permitted under section 167 of the ABCA. I find the proposed reorganization of CAIL's share capital under the Plan does not violate section 167.

74 In R. Dickerson et al, *Proposals for a New Business Corporation Law for Canada*, Vol.1: Commentary (the "Dickerson Report") regarding the then proposed Canada Business Corporations Act, the identical section to section 185 is described as having been inserted with the object of enabling the "court to effect any necessary amendment of the articles of the corporation in order to achieve the objective of the reorganization without having to comply with the formalities of the Draft Act, particularly shareholder approval of the proposed amendment".

75 The architects of the business corporation act model which the ABCA follows, expressly contemplated reorganizations in which the insolvent corporation would eliminate the interest of common shareholders. The example given in the Dickerson Report of a reorganization is very similar to that proposed in the Plan:

> For example, the reorganization of an insolvent corporation may require the following steps: first, reduction or even elimination of the interest of the common shareholders; second, relegation of the preferred shareholders to the status of common shareholders; and third, relegation of the secured debenture holders to the status of either unsecured Noteholders or preferred shareholders.

76 The rationale for allowing such a reorganization appears plain; the corporation is insolvent, which means that on liquidation the shareholders would get nothing. In those circumstances, as described further below under the heading "Fair and Reasonable", there is nothing unfair or unreasonable in the court effecting changes in such situations without shareholder approval. Indeed, it would be unfair to the creditors and other stakeholders to permit the shareholders (whose interest has the lowest priority) to have any ability to block a reorganization.

77 The Petitioners were unable to provide any case law addressing the use of section 185 as proposed under the Plan. They relied upon the decisions of *Re Royal Oak Mines Inc.* (1999), 14 C.B.R. (4th) 279 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) and *T. Eaton Co.*, *supra* in which Farley J.of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice emphasized that shareholders are at the bottom of the hierarchy of interests in liquidation or liquidation related scenarios.

78 Section 185 provides for amendment to articles by court order. I see no requirement in that section for a meeting or vote of shareholders of CAIL, quite apart from shareholders of CAC. Further, dissent and appraisal rights are expressly removed in subsection (7). To require a meeting and vote of shareholders and to grant dissent and appraisal rights in circumstances of insolvency would frustrate the object of section 185 as described in the Dickerson Report.

79 In the circumstances of this case, where the majority shareholder holds 82% of the shares, the requirement of a special resolution is meaningless. To require a vote suggests the shares have value. They do not. The formalities of the ABCA serve no useful purpose other than to frustrate the reorganization to the detriment of all stakeholders, contrary to the CCAA.

Section 183 of the ABCA

80 The Minority Shareholders argued in the alternative that if the proposed share reorganization of CAIL were not a cancellation of their shares in CAC and therefore allowed under section 167 of the ABCA, it constituted a "sale, lease, or exchange of substantially all the property" of CAC and thus required the approval of CAC shareholders pursuant to section 183 of the ABCA. The Minority Shareholders suggested that the common shares in CAIL were substantially all of the assets of CAC and that all of those shares were being "exchanged" for $1.00.

81 I disagree with this creative characterization. The proposed transaction is a reorganization as contemplated by section 185 of the ABCA. As recognized in *Savage v. Amoco Acquisition Co.* (1988), 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 154 (Alta. C.A.) aff'd (1988), 70 C.B.R. (N.S.) xxxii (S.C.C.), the fact that the same end might be achieved under another section does not exclude the section to be relied on. A statute may well offer several alternatives to achieve a similar end.

Ontario Securities Commission Policy 9.1

82 The Minority Shareholders also submitted the proposed reorganization constitutes a "related party transaction" under Policy 9.1 of the Ontario Securities Commission. Under the Policy, transactions are subject to disclosure, minority approval and formal valuation requirements which have not been followed here. The Minority Shareholders suggested that the Petitioners were therefore in breach of the Policy unless and until such time as the court is advised of the relevant requirements of the Policy and grants its approval as provided by the Policy.

83 These shareholders asserted that in the absence of evidence of the going concern value of CAIL so as to determine whether that value exceeds the rights of the Preferred Shares of CAIL, the Court should not waive compliance with the Policy.

84 To the extent that this reorganization can be considered a "related party transaction", I have found, for the reasons discussed below under the heading "Fair and Reasonable", that the Plan, including the proposed reorganization, is fair and reasonable and accordingly I would waive the requirements of Policy 9.1.

b. Release

85 Resurgence argued that the release of directors and other third parties contained in the Plan does not comply with the

provisions of the CCAA.

86 The release is contained in section 6.2(2)(ii) of the Plan and states as follows:

> As of the Effective Date, each of the Affected Creditors will be deemed to forever release, waive and discharge all claims, obligations, suits, judgments, damages, demands, debts, rights, causes of action and liabilities...that are based in whole or in part on any act, omission, transaction, event or other occurrence taking place on or prior to the Effective Date in any way relating to the Applicants and Subsidiaries, the CCAA Proceedings, or the Plan against:(i) The Applicants and Subsidiaries; (ii) The Directors, Officers and employees of the Applicants or Subsidiaries in each case as of the date of filing (and in addition, those who became Officers and/or Directors thereafter but prior to the Effective Date); (iii) The former Directors, Officers and employees of the Applicants or Subsidiaries, or (iv) the respective current and former professionals of the entities in subclauses (1) to (3) of this s.6.2(2) (including, for greater certainty, the Monitor, its counsel and its current Officers and Directors, and current and former Officers, Directors, employees, shareholders and professionals of the released parties) acting in such capacity.

87 Prior to 1997, the CCAA did not provide for compromises of claims against anyone other than the petitioning company. In 1997, section 5.1 was added to the CCAA. Section 5.1 states:

> 5.1 (1) A compromise or arrangement made in respect of a debtor company may include in its terms provision for the compromise of claims against directors of the company that arose before the commencement of proceedings under this Act and relate to the obligations of the company where the directors are by law liable in their capacity as directors for the payment of such obligations.
>
> (2) A provision for the compromise of claims against directors may not include claims that:
>
> (a) relate to contractual rights of one or more creditors; or
>
> (b) are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors to creditors or of wrongful or oppressive conduct by directors.
>
> (3) The Court may declare that a claim against directors shall not be compromised if it is satisfied that the compromise would not be fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

88 Resurgence argued that the form of release does not comply with section 5.1 of the CCAA insofar as it applies to individuals beyond directors and to a broad spectrum of claims beyond obligations of the Petitioners for which their directors are "by law liable". Resurgence submitted that the addition of section 5.1 to the CCAA constituted an exception to a long standing principle and urged the court to therefore interpret s. 5.1 cautiously, if not narrowly. Resurgence relied on *Crabtree (Succession de) c. Barrette*, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 1027 (S.C.C.) at 1044 and *Bruce Agra Foods Inc. v. Everfresh Beverages Inc. (Receiver of)* (1996), 45 C.B.R. (3d) 169 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 5 in this regard.

89 With respect to Resurgence's complaint regarding the breadth of the claims covered by the release, the Petitioners asserted that the release is not intended to override section 5.1(2). Canadian suggested this can be expressly incorporated into the form of release by adding the words "*excluding the claims excepted by s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA*" immediately prior to subsection (iii) and clarifying the language in Section 5.1 of the Plan. Canadian also acknowledged, in response to a concern raised by Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, that in accordance with s. 5.1(1) of the CCAA, directors of CAC and CAIL could only be released from liability arising before March 24, 2000, the date these proceedings commenced. Canadian suggested this was also addressed in the proposed amendment. Canadian did not address the propriety of including individuals in addition to directors in the form of release.

90 In my view it is appropriate to amend the proposed release to expressly comply with section 5. 1(2) of the CCAA and to clarify Section 5.1 of the Plan as Canadian suggested in its brief. The additional language suggested by Canadian to achieve this result shall be included in the form of order. Canada Customs and Revenue Agency is apparently satisfied with the Petitioners' acknowledgement that claims against directors can only be released to the date of commencement of proceedings under the CCAA, having appeared at this hearing to strongly support the sanctioning of the Plan, so I will not address this concern further.

91 Resurgence argued that its claims fell within the categories of excepted claims in section 5.1(2) of the CCAA and accordingly, its concern in this regard is removed by this amendment. Unsecured creditors JHHD Aircraft Leasing No. 1 and No. 2 suggested there may be possible wrongdoing in the acts of the directors during the restructuring process which should not be immune from scrutiny and in my view this complaint would also be caught by the exception captured in the amendment.

92 While it is true that section 5.2 of the CCAA does not authorize a release of claims against third parties other than directors, it does not prohibit such releases either. The amended terms of the release will not prevent claims from which the CCAA expressly prohibits release. Aside from the complaints of Resurgence, which by their own submissions are addressed in the amendment I have directed, and the complaints of JHHD Aircraft Leasing No. 1 and No. 2, which would also be addressed in the amendment, the terms of the release have been accepted by the requisite majority of creditors and I am loathe to further disturb the terms of the Plan, with one exception.

93 Amex Bank of Canada submitted that the form of release appeared overly broad and might compromise unaffected claims of affected creditors. For further clarification, Amex Bank of Canada's potential claim for defamation is unaffected by the Plan and I am prepared to order Section 6.2(2)(ii) be amended to reflect this specific exception.

3. Fair and Reasonable

94 In determining whether to sanction a plan of arrangement under the CCAA, the court is guided by two fundamental concepts: "fairness" and "reasonableness". While these concepts are always at the heart of the court's exercise of its discretion, their meanings are necessarily shaped by the unique circumstances of each case, within the context of the Act and accordingly can be difficult to distill and challenging to apply. Blair J. described these concepts in *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co.*, *supra*, at page 9:

> "Fairness" and "reasonableness" are, in my opinion, the two keynote concepts underscoring the philosophy and workings of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act. Fairness is the quintessential expression of the court's equitable jurisdiction — although the jurisdiction is statutory, the broad discretionary powers given to the judiciary by the legislation which make its exercise an exercise in equity — and "reasonableness" is what lends objectivity to the process.

95 The legislation, while conferring broad discretion on the court, offers little guidance. However, the court is assisted in the exercise of its discretion by the purpose of the CCAA: to facilitate the reorganization of a debtor company for the benefit of the company, its creditors, shareholders, employees and, in many instances, a much broader constituency of affected persons. Parliament has recognized that reorganization, if commercially feasible, is in most cases preferable, economically and socially, to liquidation: *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.* (1988), [1989] 2 W.W.R. 566 (Alta. Q.B.) at 574; *Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada*, [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363 (B.C. C.A.) at 368.

96 The sanction of the court of a creditor-approved plan is not to be considered as a rubber stamp process. Although the majority vote that brings the plan to a sanction hearing plays a significant role in the court's assessment, the court will consider other matters as are appropriate in light of its discretion. In the unique circumstances of this case, it is appropriate to consider a number of additional matters:

a. The composition of the unsecured vote;

b. What creditors would receive on liquidation or bankruptcy as compared to the Plan;

c. Alternatives available to the Plan and bankruptcy;

d. Oppression;

e. Unfairness to Shareholders of CAC; and

f. The public interest.

a. Composition of the unsecured vote

97 As noted above, an important measure of whether a plan is fair and reasonable is the parties' approval and the degree to which it has been given. Creditor support creates an inference that the plan is fair and reasonable because the assenting creditors believe that their interests are treated equitably under the plan. Moreover, it creates an inference that the arrangement is economically feasible and therefore reasonable because the creditors are in a better position then the courts to gauge business risk. As stated by Blair J. at page 11 of *Olympia & York Developments Ltd.*, *supra*:

> As other courts have done, I observe that it is not my function to second guess the business people with respect to the "business" aspect of the Plan or descending into the negotiating arena or substituting my own view of what is a fair and reasonable compromise or arrangement for that of the business judgment of the participants. The parties themselves know best what is in their interests in those areas.

98 However, given the manner of voting under the CCAA, the court must be cognizant of the treatment of minorities within a class: see for example *Re Quintette Coal Ltd.* (1992), 13 C.B.R. (3d) 146 (B.C. S.C.) and *Re Alabama, New Orleans, Texas & Pacific Junction Railway* (1890), 60 L.J. Ch. 221 (Eng. C.A.). The court can address this by ensuring creditors' claims are properly classified. As well, it is sometimes appropriate to tabulate the vote of a particular class so the results can be assessed from a fairness perspective. In this case, the classification was challenged by Resurgence and I dismissed that application. The vote was also tabulated in this case and the results demonstrate that the votes of Air Canada and the Senior Secured Noteholders, who voted their deficiency in the unsecured class, were decisive.

99 The results of the unsecured vote, as reported by the Monitor, are:

1. For the resolution to approve the Plan: 73 votes (65% in number) representing $494,762,304 in claims (76% in value);

2. Against the resolution: 39 votes (35% in number) representing $156,360,363 in claims (24% in value); and

3. Abstentions: 15 representing $968,036 in value.

100 The voting results as reported by the Monitor were challenged by Resurgence. That application was dismissed.

101 The members of each class that vote in favour of a plan must do so in good faith and the majority within a class must act without coercion in their conduct toward the minority. When asked to assess fairness of an approved plan, the court will not countenance secret agreements to vote in favour of a plan secured by advantages to the creditor: see for example, *Hochberger v. Rittenberg* (1916), 36 D.L.R. 450 (S.C.C.)

102 In *Re Northland Properties Ltd.* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 (B.C. S.C.) at 192-3 aff'd (1989), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195 (B.C. C.A.), dissenting priority mortgagees argued the plan violated the principle of equality due to an agreement between the debtor company and another priority mortgagee which essentially amounted to a preference in exchange for voting in favour of the plan. Trainor J. found that the agreement was freely disclosed and commercially reasonable and went on to approve the plan, using the three part test. The British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld this result and in commenting on the minority complaint McEachern J.A. stated at page 206:

> In my view, the obvious benefits of settling rights and keeping the enterprise together as a going concern far outweigh the deprivation of the appellants' wholly illusory rights. In this connection, the learned chambers judge said at p.29:
>
> > I turn to the question of the right to hold the property after an order absolute and whether or not this is a denial of something of that significance that it should affect these proceedings. There is in the material before me some evidence of values. There are the principles to which I have referred, as well as to the rights of majorities and the rights of minorities.
> >
> > Certainly, those minority rights are there, but it would seem to me that in view of the overall plan, in view of the speculative nature of holding property in the light of appraisals which have been given as to value, that this right is something which should be subsumed to the benefit of the majority.

103 Resurgence submitted that Air Canada manipulated the indebtedness of CAIL to assure itself of an affirmative vote. I disagree. I previously ruled on the validity of the deficiency when approving the LOIs and found the deficiency to be valid. I found there was consideration for the assignment of the deficiency claims of the various aircraft financiers to Air Canada, namely the provision of an Air Canada guarantee which would otherwise not have been available until plan sanction. The Monitor reviewed the calculations of the deficiencies and determined they were calculated in a reasonable manner. As such, the court approved those transactions. If the deficiency had instead remained with the aircraft financiers, it is reasonable to assume those claims would have been voted in favour of the plan. Further, it would have been entirely appropriate under the circumstances for the aircraft financiers to have retained the deficiency and agreed to vote in favour of the Plan, with the same result to Resurgence. That the financiers did not choose this method was explained by the testimony of Mr. Carty and Robert Peterson, Chief Financial Officer for Air Canada; quite simply it amounted to a desire on behalf of these creditors to shift the "deal risk" associated with the Plan to Air Canada. The agreement reached with the Senior Secured Noteholders was also disclosed and the challenge by Resurgence regarding their vote in the unsecured class was dismissed There is nothing inappropriate in the voting of the deficiency claims of Air Canada or the Senior Secured Noteholders in the unsecured class. There is no evidence of secret vote buying such as discussed in *Re Northland Properties Ltd.*

104 If the Plan is approved, Air Canada stands to profit in its operation. I do not accept that the deficiency claims were devised to dominate the vote of the unsecured creditor class, however, Air Canada, as funder of the Plan is more motivated than Resurgence to support it. This divergence of views on its own does not amount to bad faith on the part of Air Canada. Resurgence submitted that only the Unsecured Noteholders received 14 cents on the dollar. That is not accurate, as demonstrated by the list of affected unsecured creditors included earlier in these Reasons. The Senior Secured Noteholders did receive other consideration under the Plan, but to suggest they were differently motivated suggests that those creditors did not ascribe any value to their unsecured claims. There is no evidence to support this submission.

105 The good faith of Resurgence in its vote must also be considered. Resurgence acquired a substantial amount of its claim after the failure of the Onex bid, when it was aware that Canadian's financial condition was rapidly deteriorating. Thereafter, Resurgence continued to purchase a substantial amount of this highly distressed debt. While Mr. Symington maintained that he bought because he thought the bonds were a good investment, he also acknowledged that one basis for purchasing was the hope of obtaining a blocking position sufficient to veto a plan in the proposed debt restructuring. This was an obvious ploy for leverage with the Plan proponents

106 The authorities which address minority creditors' complaints speak of "substantial injustice" (*Re Keddy Motor Inns*

Ltd. (1992), 13 C.B.R. (3d) 245 (N.S. C.A.), "confiscation" of rights (*Re Campeau Corp.* (1992), 10 C.B.R. (3d) 104 (Ont. Gen. Div.); *Re SkyDome Corp.* (March 21, 1999), Doc. 98-CL-3179 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List])) and majorities "feasting upon" the rights of the minority (*Re Quintette Coal Ltd.* (1992), 13 C.B.R. (3d) 146 (B.C. S.C.). Although it cannot be disputed that the group of Unsecured Noteholders represented by Resurgence are being asked to accept a significant reduction of their claims, as are all of the affected unsecured creditors, I do not see a "substantial injustice", nor view their rights as having been "confiscated" or "feasted upon" by being required to succumb to the wishes of the majority in their class. No bad faith has been demonstrated in this case. Rather, the treatment of Resurgence, along with all other affected unsecured creditors, represents a reasonable balancing of interests. While the court is directed to consider whether there is an injustice being worked within a class, it must also determine whether there is an injustice with respect the stakeholders as a whole. Even if a plan might at first blush appear to have that effect, when viewed in relation to all other parties, it may nonetheless be considered appropriate and be approved: *Algoma Steel Corp. v. Royal Bank* (1992), 11 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. Gen. Div.) and *Re Northland Properties Ltd.*, *supra* at 9.

107 Further, to the extent that greater or discrete motivation to support a Plan may be seen as a conflict, the Court should take this same approach and look at the creditors as a whole and to the objecting creditors specifically and determine if their rights are compromised in an attempt to balance interests and have the pain of compromise borne equally.

108 Resurgence represents 58.2% of the Unsecured Noteholders or $96 million in claims. The total claim of the Unsecured Noteholders ranges from $146 million to $161 million. The affected unsecured class, excluding aircraft financing, tax claims, the noteholders and claims under $50,000, ranges from $116.3 million to $449.7 million depending on the resolutions of certain claims by the Claims Officer. Resurgence represents between 15.7% - 35% of that portion of the class.

109 The total affected unsecured claims, excluding tax claims, but including aircraft financing and noteholder claims including the unsecured portion of the Senior Secured Notes, ranges from $673 million to $1,007 million. Resurgence represents between 9.5% - 14.3% of the total affected unsecured creditor pool. These percentages indicate that at its very highest in a class excluding Air Canada's assigned claims and Senior Secured's deficiency, Resurgence would only represent a maximum of 35% of the class. In the larger class of affected unsecured it is significantly less. Viewed in relation to the class as a whole, there is no injustice being worked against Resurgence.

110 The thrust of the Resurgence submissions suggests a mistaken belief that they will get more than 14 cents on liquidation. This is not borne out by the evidence and is not reasonable in the context of the overall Plan.

b. Receipts on liquidation or bankruptcy

111 As noted above, the Monitor prepared and circulated a report on the Plan which contained a summary of a liquidation analysis outlining the Monitor's projected realizations upon a liquidation of CAIL ("Liquidation Analysis").

112 The Liquidation Analysis was based on: (1) the draft unaudited financial statements of Canadian at March 31, 2000; (2) the distress values reported in independent appraisals of aircraft and aircraft related assets obtained by CAIL in January, 2000; (3) a review of CAIL's aircraft leasing and financing documents; and (4) discussions with CAIL Management.

113 Prior to and during the application for sanction, the Monitor responded to various requests for information by parties involved. In particular, the Monitor provided a copy of the Liquidation Analysis to those who requested it. Certain of the parties involved requested the opportunity to question the Monitor further, particularly in respect to the Liquidation Analysis and this court directed a process for the posing of those questions.

114 While there were numerous questions to which the Monitor was asked to respond, there were several areas in which Resurgence and the Minority Shareholders took particular issue: pension plan surplus, CRAL, international routes and tax pools. The dissenting groups asserted that these assets represented overlooked value to the company on a liquidation basis or on a going concern basis.

Pension Plan Surplus

115 The Monitor did not attribute any value to pension plan surplus when it prepared the Liquidation Analysis, for the following reasons:

> 1) The summaries of the solvency surplus/deficit positions indicated a cumulative net deficit position for the seven registered plans, after consideration of contingent liabilities;
>
> 2) The possibility, based on the previous splitting out of the seven plans from a single plan in 1988, that the plans could be held to be consolidated for financial purposes, which would remove any potential solvency surplus since the total estimated contingent liabilities exceeded the total estimated solvency surplus;
>
> 3) The actual calculations were prepared by CAIL's actuaries and actuaries representing the unions could conclude liabilities were greater; and
>
> 4) CAIL did not have a legal opinion confirming that surpluses belonged to CAIL.

116 The Monitor concluded that the entitlement question would most probably have to be settled by negotiation and/or litigation by the parties. For those reasons, the Monitor took a conservative view and did not attribute an asset value to pension plans in the Liquidation Analysis. The Monitor also did not include in the Liquidation Analysis any amount in respect of the claim that could be made by members of the plan where there is an apparent deficit after deducting contingent liabilities.

117 The issues in connection with possible pension surplus are: (1) the true amount of any of the available surplus; and (2) the entitlement of Canadian to any such amount.

118 It is acknowledged that surplus prior to termination can be accessed through employer contribution holidays, which Canadian has taken to the full extent permitted. However, there is no basis that has been established for any surplus being available to be withdrawn from an ongoing pension plan. On a pension plan termination, the amount available as a solvency surplus would first have to be further reduced by various amounts to determine whether there was in fact any true surplus available for distribution. Such reductions include contingent benefits payable in accordance with the provisions of each respective pension plan, any extraordinary plan wind up cost, the amounts of any contribution holidays taken which have not been reflected, and any litigation costs.

119 Counsel for all of Canadian's unionized employees confirmed on the record that the respective union representatives can be expected to dispute all of these calculations as well as to dispute entitlement.

120 There is a suggestion that there might be a total of $40 million of surplus remaining from all pension plans after such reductions are taken into account. Apart from the issue of entitlement, this assumes that the plans can be treated separately, that a surplus could in fact be realized on liquidation and that the Towers Perrin calculations are not challenged. With total pension plan assets of over $2 billion, a surplus of $40 million could quickly disappear with relatively minor changes in the market value of the securities held or calculation of liabilities. In the circumstances, given all the variables, I find that the existence of any surplus is doubtful at best and I am satisfied that the Monitor's Liquidation Analysis ascribing it zero value is reasonable in this circumstances.

CRAL

121 The Monitor's liquidation analysis as at March 31, 2000 of CRAL determined that in a distress situation, after payments were made to its creditors, there would be a deficiency of approximately $30 million to pay Canadian Regional's unsecured creditors, which include a claim of approximately $56.5 million due to Canadian. In arriving at this conclusion, the Monitor reviewed internally prepared unaudited financial statements of CRAL as of March 31, 2000, the Houlihan Lokey Howard and Zukin, distress valuation dated January 21, 2000 and the Simat Helliesen and Eichner valuation of selected CAIL assets dated January 31, 2000 for certain aircraft related materials and engines, rotables and spares. The Avitas Inc.,

and Avmark Inc. reports were used for the distress values on CRAL's aircraft and the CRAL aircraft lease documentation. The Monitor also performed its own analysis of CRAL's liquidation value, which involved analysis of the reports provided and details of its analysis were outlined in the Liquidation Analysis.

122 For the purpose of the Liquidation Analysis, the Monitor did not consider other airlines as comparable for evaluation purposes, as the Monitor's valuation was performed on a distressed sale basis. The Monitor further assumed that without CAIL's national and international network to feed traffic into and a source of standby financing, and considering the inevitable negative publicity which a failure of CAIL would produce, CRAL would immediately stop operations as well.

123 Mr. Peterson testified that CRAL was worth $260 million to Air Canada, based on Air Canada being a special buyer who could integrate CRAL, on a going concern basis, into its network. The Liquidation Analysis assumed the windup of each of CRAL and CAIL, a completely different scenario.

124 There is no evidence that there was a potential purchaser for CRAL who would be prepared to acquire CRAL or the operations of CRAL 98 for any significant sum or at all. CRAL has value to CAIL, and in turn, could provide value to Air Canada, but this value is attributable to its ability to feed traffic to and take traffic from the national and international service operated by CAIL. In my view, the Monitor was aware of these features and properly considered these factors in assessing the value of CRAL on a liquidation of CAIL.

125 If CAIL were to cease operations, the evidence is clear that CRAL would be obliged to do so as well immediately. The travelling public, shippers, trade suppliers, and others would make no distinction between CAIL and CRAL and there would be no going concern for Air Canada to acquire.

International Routes

126 The Monitor ascribed no value to Canadian's international routes in the Liquidation Analysis. In discussions with CAIL management and experts available in its aviation group, the Monitor was advised that international routes are unassignable licenses and not property rights. They do not appear as assets in CAIL's financials. Mr. Carty and Mr. Peterson explained that routes and slots are *not* treated as assets by airlines, but rather as rights in the control of the Government of Canada. In the event of bankruptcy/receivership of CAIL, CAIL's trustee/receiver could not sell them and accordingly they are of no value to CAIL.

127 Evidence was led that on June 23, 1999 Air Canada made an offer to purchase CAIL's international routes for $400 million cash plus $125 million for aircraft spares and inventory, along with the assumption of certain debt and lease obligations for the aircraft required for the international routes. CAIL evaluated the Air Canada offer and concluded that the proposed purchase price was insufficient to permit it to continue carrying on business in the absence of its international routes. Mr. Carty testified that something in the range of $2 billion would be required.

128 CAIL was in desperate need of cash in mid December, 1999. CAIL agreed to sell its Toronto — Tokyo route for $25 million. The evidence, however, indicated that the price for the Toronto — Tokyo route was not derived from a valuation, but rather was what CAIL asked for, based on its then-current cash flow requirements. Air Canada and CAIL obtained Government approval for the transfer on December 21, 2000.

129 Resurgence complained that despite this evidence of offers for purchase and actual sales of international routes and other evidence of sales of slots, the Monitor did not include Canadian's international routes in the Liquidation Analysis and only attributed a total of $66 million for all intangibles of Canadian. There is some evidence that slots at some foreign airports may be bought or sold in some fashion. However, there is insufficient evidence to attribute any value to other slots which CAIL has at foreign airports. It would appear given the regulation of the airline industry, in particular, the *Aeronautics Act* and the *Canada Transportation Act*, that international routes for a Canadian air carrier only have full value to the extent of federal government support for the transfer or sale, and its preparedness to allow the then-current license holder to sell rather than act unilaterally to change the designation. The federal government was prepared to allow CAIL to sell its Toronto — Tokyo route to Air Canada in light of CAIL's severe financial difficulty and the certainty of cessation of operations during the Christmas holiday season in the absence of such a sale.

130 Further, statements made by CAIL in mid-1999 as to the value of its international routes and operations in response to an offer by Air Canada, reflected the amount CAIL needed to sustain liquidity without its international routes and was not a representation of market value of what could realistically be obtained from an arms length purchaser. The Monitor concluded on its investigation that CAIL's Narida and Heathrow slots had a realizable value of $66 million, which it included in the Liquidation Analysis. I find that this conclusion is supportable and that the Monitor properly concluded that there were no other rights which ought to have been assigned value.

Tax Pools

131 There are four tax pools identified by Resurgence and the Minority Shareholders that are material: capital losses at the CAC level, undepreciated capital cost pools, operating losses incurred by Canadian and potential for losses to be reinstated upon repayment of fuel tax rebates by CAIL.

Capital Loss Pools

132 The capital loss pools at CAC will not be available to Air Canada since CAC is to be left out of the corporate reorganization and will be severed from CAIL. Those capital losses can essentially only be used to absorb a portion of the debt forgiveness liability associated with the restructuring. CAC, who has virtually all of its senior debt compromised in the plan, receives compensation for this small advantage, which cost them nothing.

Undepreciated capital cost ("UCC")

133 There is no benefit to Air Canada in the pools of UCC unless it were established that the UCC pools are in excess of the fair market value of the relevant assets, since Air Canada could create the same pools by simply buying the assets on a liquidation at fair market value. Mr. Peterson understood this pool of UCC to be approximately $700 million. There is no evidence that the UCC pool, however, could be considered to be a source of benefit. There is no evidence that this amount is any greater than fair market value.

Operating Losses

134 The third tax pool complained of is the operating losses. The debt forgiven as a result of the Plan will erase any operating losses from prior years to the extent of such forgiven debt.

Fuel tax rebates

135 The fourth tax pool relates to the fuel tax rebates system taken advantage of by CAIL in past years. The evidence is that on a consolidated basis the total potential amount of this pool is $297 million. According to Mr. Carty's testimony, CAIL has not been taxable in his ten years as Chief Financial Officer. The losses which it has generated for tax purposes have been sold on a 10 - 1 basis to the government in order to receive rebates of excise tax paid for fuel. The losses can be restored retroactively if the rebates are repaid, but the losses can only be carried forward for a maximum of seven years. The evidence of Mr. Peterson indicates that Air Canada has no plan to use those alleged losses and in order for them to be useful to Air Canada, Air Canada would have to complete a legal merger with CAIL, which is not provided for in the plan and is not contemplated by Air Canada until some uncertain future date. In my view, the Monitor's conclusion that there was no value to any tax pools in the Liquidation Analysis is sound.

136 Those opposed to the Plan have raised the spectre that there may be value unaccounted for in this liquidation analysis or otherwise. Given the findings above, this is merely speculation and is unsupported by any concrete evidence.

c. Alternatives to the Plan

137 When presented with a plan, affected stakeholders must weigh their options in the light of commercial reality. Those options are typically liquidation measured against the plan proposed. If not put forward, a hope for a different or more favourable plan is not an option and no basis upon which to assess fairness. On a purposive approach to the CCAA, what is fair and reasonable must be assessed against the effect of the Plan on the creditors and their various claims, in the context of their response to the plan. Stakeholders are expected to decide their fate based on realistic, commercially viable alternatives (generally seen as the prime motivating factor in any business decision) and not on speculative desires or hope for the future. As Farley J. stated in *T. Eaton Co.* (1999), 15 C.B.R. (4th) 311 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paragraph 6:

> One has to be cognizant of the function of a balancing of their prejudices. Positions must be realistically assessed and weighed, all in the light of what an alternative to a successful plan would be. Wishes are not a firm foundation on which to build a plan; nor are ransom demands.

138 The evidence is overwhelming that all other options have been exhausted and have resulted in failure. The concern of those opposed suggests that there is a better plan that Air Canada can put forward. I note that significant enhancements were made to the plan during the process. In any case, this is the Plan that has been voted on. The evidence makes it clear that there is not another plan forthcoming. As noted by Farley J. in *T. Eaton Co.*, *supra*, "no one presented an alternative plan for the interested parties to vote on" (para. 8).

d. Oppression

Oppression and the CCAA

139 Resurgence and the Minority Shareholders originally claimed that the Plan proponents, CAC and CAIL and the Plan supporters 853350 and Air Canada had oppressed, unfairly disregarded or unfairly prejudiced their interests, under Section 234 of the ABCA. The Minority Shareholders (for reasons that will appear obvious) have abandoned that position.

140 Section 234 gives the court wide discretion to remedy corporate conduct that is unfair. As remedial legislation, it attempts to balance the interests of shareholders, creditors and management to ensure adequate investor protection and maximum management flexibility. The Act requires the court to judge the conduct of the company and the majority in the context of equity and fairness: *First Edmonton Place Ltd. v. 315888 Alberta Ltd.* (1988), 40 B.L.R. 28 (Alta. Q.B.). Equity and fairness are measured against or considered in the context of the rights, interests or reasonable expectations of the complainants: *Diligenti v. RWMD Operations Kelowna Ltd.* (1976), 1 B.C.L.R. 36 (B.C. S.C.).

141 The starting point in any determination of oppression requires an understanding as to what the rights, interests, and reasonable expectations are and what the damaging or detrimental effect is on them. MacDonald J. stated in *First Edmonton Place*, *supra* at 57:

> In deciding what is unfair, the history and nature of the corporation, the essential nature of the relationship between the corporation and the creditor, the type of rights affected in general commercial practice should all be material. More concretely, the test of unfair prejudice or unfair disregard should encompass the following considerations: The protection of the underlying expectation of a creditor in the arrangement with the corporation, the extent to which the acts complained of were unforeseeable where the creditor could not reasonably have protected itself from such acts and the detriment to the interests of the creditor.

142 While expectations vary considerably with the size, structure, and value of the corporation, all expectations must be reasonably and objectively assessed: *Pente Investment Management Ltd. v. Schneider Corp.* (1998), 42 O.R. (3d) 177 (Ont. C.A.).

143 Where a company is insolvent, only the creditors maintain a meaningful stake in its assets. Through the mechanism of liquidation or insolvency legislation, the interests of shareholders are pushed to the bottom rung of the priority ladder. The

expectations of creditors and shareholders must be viewed and measured against an altered financial and legal landscape. Shareholders cannot reasonably expect to maintain a financial interest in an insolvent company where creditors' claims are not being paid in full. It is through the lens of insolvency that the court must consider whether the acts of the company are in fact oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregarded. CCAA proceedings have recognized that shareholders may not have "a true interest to be protected" because there is no reasonable prospect of economic value to be realized by the shareholders given the existing financial misfortunes of the company: *Royal Oak Mines Ltd., supra*, para. 4., *Re Cadillac Fairview Inc.* (March 7, 1995), Doc. B28/95 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), and *T. Eaton Company, supra*.

144 To avail itself of the protection of the CCAA, a company must be insolvent. The CCAA considers the hierarchy of interests and assesses fairness and reasonableness in that context. The court's mandate not to sanction a plan in the absence of fairness necessitates the determination as to whether the complaints of dissenting creditors and shareholders are legitimate, bearing in mind the company's financial state. The articulated purpose of the Act and the jurisprudence interpreting it, "widens the lens" to balance a broader range of interests that includes creditors and shareholders and beyond to the company, the employees and the public, and tests the fairness of the plan with reference to its impact on all of the constituents.

145 It is through the lens of insolvency legislation that the rights and interests of both shareholders and creditors must be considered. The reduction or elimination of rights of both groups is a function of the insolvency and not of oppressive conduct in the operation of the CCAA. The antithesis of oppression is fairness, the guiding test for judicial sanction. If a plan unfairly disregards or is unfairly prejudicial it will not be approved. However, the court retains the power to compromise or prejudice rights to effect a broader purpose, the restructuring of an insolvent company, provided that the plan does so in a fair manner.

Oppression allegations by Resurgence

146 Resurgence alleges that it has been oppressed or had its rights disregarded because the Petitioners and Air Canada disregarded the specific provisions of their trust indenture, that Air Canada and 853350 dealt with other creditors outside of the CCAA, refusing to negotiate with Resurgence and that they are generally being treated inequitably under the Plan.

147 The trust indenture under which the Unsecured Notes were issued required that upon a "change of control", 101% of the principal owing thereunder, plus interest would be immediately due and payable. Resurgence alleges that Air Canada, through 853350, caused CAC and CAIL to purposely fail to honour this term. Canadian acknowledges that the trust indenture was breached. On February 1, 2000, Canadian announced a moratorium on payments to lessors and lenders, including the Unsecured Noteholders. As a result of this moratorium, Canadian defaulted on the payments due under its various credit facilities and aircraft leases.

148 The moratorium was not directed solely at the Unsecured Noteholders. It had the same impact on other creditors, secured and unsecured. Canadian, as a result of the moratorium, breached other contractual relationships with various creditors. The breach of contract is not sufficient to found a claim for oppression in this case. Given Canadian's insolvency, which Resurgence recognized, it cannot be said that there was a reasonable expectation that it would be paid in full under the terms of the trust indenture, particularly when Canadian had ceased making payments to other creditors as well.

149 It is asserted that because the Plan proponents engaged in a restructuring of Canadian's debt before the filing under the CCAA, that its use of the Act for only a small group of creditors, which includes Resurgence is somehow oppressive.

150 At the outset, it cannot be overlooked that the CCAA does not require that a compromise be proposed to *all* creditors of an insolvent company. The CCAA is a flexible, remedial statute which recognizes the unique circumstances that lead to and away from insolvency.

151 Next, Air Canada made it clear beginning in the fall of 1999 that Canadian would have to complete a financial restructuring so as to permit Air Canada to acquire CAIL on a financially sound basis and as a wholly owned subsidiary. Following the implementation of the moratorium, absent which Canadian could not have continued to operate, Canadian and Air Canada commenced efforts to restructure significant obligations by consent. They perceived that further damage to public confidence that a CCAA filing could produce, required Canadian to secure a substantial measure of creditor support in advance of any public filing for court protection. Before the Petitioners started the CCAA proceedings on March 24, 2000,

Air Canada, CAIL and lessors of 59 aircraft in its fleet had reached agreement in principle on the restructuring plan.

152 The purpose of the CCAA is to create an environment for negotiations and compromise. Often it is the stay of proceedings that creates the necessary stability for that process to unfold. Negotiations with certain key creditors in advance of the CCAA filing, rather than being oppressive or conspiratorial, are to be encouraged as a matter of principle if their impact is to provide a firm foundation for a restructuring. Certainly in this case, they were of critical importance, staving off liquidation, preserving cash flow and allowing the Plan to proceed. Rather than being detrimental or prejudicial to the interests of the other stakeholders, including Resurgence, it was beneficial to Canadian and all of its stakeholders.

153 Resurgence complained that certain transfers of assets to Air Canada and its actions in consolidating the operations of the two entities prior to the initiation of the CCAA proceedings were unfairly prejudicial to it.

154 The evidence demonstrates that the sales of the Toronto — Tokyo route, the Dash 8s and the simulators were at the suggestion of Canadian, who was in desperate need of operating cash. Air Canada paid what Canadian asked, based on its cash flow requirements. The evidence established that absent the injection of cash at that critical juncture, Canadian would have ceased operations. It is for that reason that the Government of Canada willingly provided the approval for the transfer on December 21, 2000.

155 Similarly, the renegotiation of CAIL's aircraft leases to reflect market rates supported by Air Canada covenant or guarantee has been previously dealt with by this court and found to have been in the best interest of Canadian, not to its detriment. The evidence establishes that the financial support and corporate integration that has been provided by Air Canada was not only in Canadian's best interest, but its only option for survival. The suggestion that the renegotiations of these leases, various sales and the operational realignment represents an assumption of a benefit by Air Canada to the detriment of Canadian is not supported by the evidence.

156 I find the transactions predating the CCAA proceedings, were in fact Canadian's life blood in ensuring some degree of liquidity and stability within which to conduct an orderly restructuring of its debt. There was no detriment to Canadian or to its creditors, including its unsecured creditors. That Air Canada and Canadian were so successful in negotiating agreements with their major creditors, including aircraft financiers, without resorting to a stay under the CCAA underscores the serious distress Canadian was in and its lenders recognition of the viability of the proposed Plan.

157 Resurgence complained that other significant groups held negotiations with Canadian. The evidence indicates that a meeting was held with Mr. Symington, Managing Director of Resurgence, in Toronto in March 2000. It was made clear to Resurgence that the pool of unsecured creditors would be somewhere between $500 and $700 million and that Resurgence would be included within that class. To the extent that the versions of this meeting differ, I prefer and accept the evidence of Mr. Carty. Resurgence wished to play a significant role in the debt restructuring and indicated it was prepared to utilize the litigation process to achieve a satisfactory result for itself. It is therefore understandable that no further negotiations took place. Nevertheless, the original offer to affected unsecured creditors has been enhanced since the filing of the plan on April 25, 2000. The enhancements to unsecured claims involved the removal of the cap on the unsecured pool and an increase from 12 to 14 cents on the dollar.

158 The findings of the Commissioner of Competition establishes beyond doubt that absent the financial support provided by Air Canada, Canadian would have failed in December 1999. I am unable to find on the evidence that Resurgence has been oppressed. The complaint that Air Canada has plundered Canadian and robbed it of its assets is not supported but contradicted by the evidence. As described above, the alternative is liquidation and in that event the Unsecured Noteholders would receive between one and three cents on the dollar. The Monitor's conclusions in this regard are supportable and I accept them.

e. Unfairness to Shareholders

159 The Minority Shareholders essentially complained that they were being unfairly stripped of their only asset in CAC — the shares of CAIL. They suggested they were being squeezed out by the new CAC majority shareholder 853350, without any compensation or any vote. When the reorganization is completed as contemplated by the Plan, their shares will remain in CAC but CAC will be a bare shell.

160 They further submitted that Air Canada's cash infusion, the covenants and guarantees it has offered to aircraft financiers, and the operational changes (including integration of schedules, "quick win" strategies, and code sharing) have all added significant value to CAIL to the benefit of its stakeholders, including the Minority Shareholders. They argued that they should be entitled to continue to participate into the future and that such an expectation is legitimate and consistent with the statements and actions of Air Canada in regard to integration. By acting to realign the airlines before a corporate reorganization, the Minority Shareholders asserted that Air Canada has created the expectation that it is prepared to consolidate the airlines with the participation of a minority. The Minority Shareholders take no position with respect to the debt restructuring under the CCAA, but ask the court to sever the corporate reorganization provisions contained in the Plan.

161 Finally, they asserted that CAIL has increased in value due to Air Canada's financial contributions and operational changes and that accordingly, before authorizing the transfer of the CAIL shares to 853350, the current holders of the CAIL Preferred Shares, the court must have evidence before it to justify a transfer of 100% of the equity of CAIL to the Preferred Shares.

162 That CAC will have its shareholding in CAIL extinguished and emerge a bare shell is acknowledged. However, the evidence makes it abundantly clear that those shares, CAC's "only asset", have no value. That the Minority Shareholders are content to have the debt restructuring proceed suggests by implication that they do not dispute the insolvency of both Petitioners, CAC and CAIL.

163 The Minority Shareholders base their expectation to remain as shareholders on the actions of Air Canada in acquiring only 82% of the CAC shares before integrating certain of the airlines' operations. Mr. Baker (who purchased *after* the Plan was filed with the Court and almost six months after the take over bid by Air Canada) suggested that the contents of the bid circular misrepresented Air Canada's future intentions to its shareholders. The two dollar price offered and paid per share in the bid must be viewed somewhat skeptically and in the context in which the bid arose. It does not support the speculative view that some shareholders hold, that somehow, despite insolvency, their shares have some value on a going concern basis. In any event, any claim for misrepresentation that Minority Shareholders might have arising from the take over bid circular against Air Canada or 853350, if any, is unaffected by the Plan and may be pursued after the stay is lifted.

164 In considering Resurgence's claim of oppression I have already found that the financial support of Air Canada during this restructuring period has benefited Canadian and its stakeholders. Air Canada's financial support and the integration of the two airlines has been critical to keeping Canadian afloat. The evidence makes it abundantly clear that without this support Canadian would have ceased operations. However it has not transformed CAIL or CAC into solvent companies.

165 The Minority Shareholders raise concerns about assets that are ascribed limited or no value in the Monitor's report as does Resurgence (although to support an opposite proposition). Considerable argument was directed to the future operational savings and profitability forecasted for Air Canada, its subsidiaries and CAIL and its subsidiaries. Mr. Peterson estimated it to be in the order of $650 to $800 million on an annual basis, commencing in 2001. The Minority Shareholders point to the tax pools of a restructured company that they submit will be of great value once CAIL becomes profitable as anticipated. They point to a pension surplus that at the very least has value by virtue of the contribution holidays that it affords. They also look to the value of the compromised claims of the restructuring itself which they submit are in the order of $449 million. They submit these cumulative benefits add value, currently or at least realizable in the future. In sharp contrast to the Resurgence position that these acts constitute oppressive behaviour, the Minority Shareholders view them as enhancing the value of their shares. They go so far as to suggest that there may well be a current going concern value of the CAC shares that has been conveniently ignored or unquantified and that the Petitioners must put evidence before the court as to what that value is.

166 These arguments overlook several important facts, the most significant being that CAC and CAIL are insolvent and will remain insolvent until the debt restructuring is fully implemented. These companies are not just technically or temporarily insolvent, they are massively insolvent. Air Canada will have invested upward of $3 billion to complete the restructuring, while the Minority Shareholders have contributed nothing. Further, it was a fundamental condition of Air Canada's support of this Plan that it become the sole owner of CAIL. It has been suggested by some that Air Canada's share purchase at two dollars per share in December 1999 was unfairly prejudicial to CAC and CAIL's creditors. Objectively, any expectation by Minority Shareholders that they should be able to participate in a restructured CAIL is not reasonable.

167 The Minority Shareholders asserted the plan is unfair because the effect of the reorganization is to extinguish the common shares of CAIL held by CAC and to convert the voting and non-voting Preferred Shares of CAIL into common shares of CAIL. They submit there is no expert valuation or other evidence to justify the transfer of CAIL's equity to the Preferred Shares. There is no equity in the CAIL shares to transfer. The year end financials show CAIL's shareholder equity at a deficit of $790 million. The Preferred Shares have a liquidation preference of $347 million. There is no evidence to suggest that Air Canada's interim support has rendered either of these companies solvent, it has simply permitted operations to continue. In fact, the unaudited consolidated financial statements of CAC for the quarter ended March 31, 2000 show total shareholders equity went from a deficit of $790 million to a deficit of $1.214 million, an erosion of $424 million.

168 The Minority Shareholders' submission attempts to compare and contrast the rights and expectations of the CAIL preferred shares as against the CAC common shares. This is not a meaningful exercise; the Petitioners are not submitting that the Preferred Shares have value and the evidence demonstrates unequivocally that they do not. The Preferred Shares are merely being utilized as a corporate vehicle to allow CAIL to become a wholly owned subsidiary of Air Canada. For example, the same result could have been achieved by issuing new shares rather than changing the designation of 853350's Preferred Shares in CAIL.

169 The Minority Shareholders have asked the court to sever the reorganization from the debt restructuring, to permit them to participate in whatever future benefit might be derived from the restructured CAIL. However, a fundamental condition of this Plan and the expressed intention of Air Canada on numerous occasions is that CAIL become a wholly owned subsidiary. To suggest the court ought to sever this reorganization from the debt restructuring fails to account for the fact that it is not two plans but an integral part of a single plan. To accede to this request would create an injustice to creditors whose claims are being seriously compromised, and doom the entire Plan to failure. Quite simply, the Plan's funder will not support a severed plan.

170 Finally, the future profits to be derived by Air Canada are not a relevant consideration. While the object of any plan under the CCAA is to create a viable emerging entity, the germane issue is what a prospective purchaser is prepared to pay in the circumstances. Here, we have the one and only offer on the table, Canadian's last and only chance. The evidence demonstrates this offer is preferable to those who have a remaining interest to a liquidation. Where secured creditors have compromised their claims and unsecured creditors are accepting 14 cents on the dollar in a potential pool of unsecured claims totalling possibly in excess of $1 billion, it is not unfair that shareholders receive nothing.

e. The Public Interest

171 In this case, the court cannot limit its assessment of fairness to how the Plan affects the direct participants. The business of the Petitioners as a national and international airline employing over 16,000 people must be taken into account.

172 In his often cited article, *Reorganizations Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (1947), 25 Can.Bar R.ev. 587 at 593 Stanley Edwards stated:

> Another reason which is usually operative in favour of reorganization is the interest of the public in the continuation of the enterprise, particularly if the company supplies commodities or services that are necessary or desirable to large numbers of consumers, or if it employs large numbers of workers who would be thrown out of employment by its liquidation. This public interest may be reflected in the decisions of the creditors and shareholders of the company and is undoubtedly a factor which a court would wish to consider in deciding whether to sanction an arrangement under the C.C.A.A.

173 In *Re Repap British Columbia Inc.* (1998), 1 C.B.R. (4th) 49 (B.C. S.C.) the court noted that the fairness of the plan must be measured against the overall economic and business environment and against the interests of the citizens of British Columbia who are affected as "shareholders" of the company, and creditors, of suppliers, employees and competitors of the company. The court approved the plan even though it was unable to conclude that it was necessarily fair and reasonable. In *Re Quintette Coal Ltd.*, *supra*, Thackray J. acknowledged the significance of the coal mine to the British Columbia economy,

its importance to the people who lived and worked in the region and to the employees of the company and their families. Other cases in which the court considered the public interest in determining whether to sanction a plan under the CCAA include *Re Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge* (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) and *Algoma Steel Corp. v. Royal Bank* (April 16, 1992), Doc. Toronto B62/91-A (Ont. Gen. Div.)

174 The economic and social impacts of a plan are important and legitimate considerations. Even in insolvency, companies are more than just assets and liabilities. The fate of a company is inextricably tied to those who depend on it in various ways. It is difficult to imagine a case where the economic and social impacts of a liquidation could be more catastrophic. It would undoubtedly be felt by Canadian air travellers across the country. The effect would not be a mere ripple, but more akin to a tidal wave from coast to coast that would result in chaos to the Canadian transportation system.

175 More than sixteen thousand unionized employees of CAIL and CRAL appeared through counsel. The unions and their membership strongly support the Plan. The unions represented included the Airline Pilots Association International, the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Transportation District 104, Canadian Union of Public Employees, and the Canadian Auto Workers Union. They represent pilots, ground workers and cabin personnel. The unions submit that it is essential that the employee protections arising from the current restructuring of Canadian not be jeopardized by a bankruptcy, receivership or other liquidation. Liquidation would be devastating to the employees and also to the local and national economies. The unions emphasize that the Plan safeguards the employment and job dignity protection negotiated by the unions for their members. Further, the court was reminded that the unions and their members have played a key role over the last fifteen years or more in working with Canadian and responsible governments to ensure that Canadian survived and jobs were maintained.

176 The Calgary and Edmonton Airport authorities, which are not for profit corporations, also supported the Plan. CAIL's obligations to the airport authorities are not being compromised under the Plan. However, in a liquidation scenario, the airport authorities submitted that a liquidation would have severe financial consequences to them and have potential for severe disruption in the operation of the airports.

177 The representations of the Government of Canada are also compelling. Approximately one year ago, CAIL approached the Transport Department to inquire as to what solution could be found to salvage their ailing company. The Government saw fit to issue an order in council, pursuant to section 47 of the *Transportation Act*, which allowed an opportunity for CAIL to approach other entities to see if a permanent solution could be found. A standing committee in the House of Commons reviewed a framework for the restructuring of the airline industry, recommendations were made and undertakings were given by Air Canada. The Government was driven by a mandate to protect consumers and promote competition. It submitted that the Plan is a major component of the industry restructuring. Bill C-26, which addresses the restructuring of the industry, has passed through the House of Commons and is presently before the Senate. The Competition Bureau has accepted that Air Canada has the only offer on the table and has worked very closely with the parties to ensure that the interests of consumers, employees, small carriers, and smaller communities will be protected.

178 In summary, in assessing whether a plan is fair and reasonable, courts have emphasized that perfection is not required: see for example *Re Wandlyn Inns Ltd.* (1992), 15 C.B.R. (3d) 316 (N.B. Q.B.), *Quintette Coal*, *supra* and *Repap*, *supra*. Rather, various rights and remedies must be sacrificed to varying degrees to result in a reasonable, viable compromise for all concerned. The court is required to view the "big picture" of the plan and assess its impact as a whole. I return to *Algoma Steel v. Royal Bank*, *supra* at 9 in which Farley J. endorsed this approach:

> What might appear on the surface to be unfair to one party when viewed in relation to all other parties may be considered to be quite appropriate.

179 Fairness and reasonableness are not abstract notions, but must be measured against the available commercial alternatives. The triggering of the statute, namely insolvency, recognizes a fundamental flaw within the company. In these imperfect circumstances there can never be a perfect plan, but rather only one that is supportable. As stated in *Re Sammi Atlas Inc.* (1998), 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at 173:

> A plan under the CCAA is a compromise; it cannot be expected to be perfect. It should be approved if it is fair, reasonable and equitable. Equitable treatment is not necessarily equal treatment. Equal treatment may be contrary to equitable treatment.

180 I find that in all the circumstances, the Plan is fair and reasonable.

IV. Conclusion

181 The Plan has obtained the support of many affected creditors, including virtually all aircraft financiers, holders of executory contracts, AMR, Loyalty Group and the Senior Secured Noteholders.

182 Use of these proceedings has avoided triggering more than $1.2 billion of incremental claims. These include claims of passengers with pre-paid tickets, employees, landlords and other parties with ongoing executory contracts, trade creditors and suppliers.

183 This Plan represents a solid chance for the continued existence of Canadian. It preserves CAIL as a business entity. It maintains over 16,000 jobs. Suppliers and trade creditors are kept whole. It protects consumers and preserves the integrity of our national transportation system while we move towards a new regulatory framework. The extensive efforts by Canadian and Air Canada, the compromises made by stakeholders both within and without the proceedings and the commitment of the Government of Canada inspire confidence in a positive result.

184 I agree with the opposing parties that the Plan is not perfect, but it is neither illegal nor oppressive. Beyond its fair and reasonable balancing of interests, the Plan is a result of bona fide efforts by all concerned and indeed is the only alternative to bankruptcy as ten years of struggle and creative attempts at restructuring by Canadian clearly demonstrate. This Plan is one step toward a new era of airline profitability that hopefully will protect consumers by promoting affordable and accessible air travel to all Canadians.

185 The Plan deserves the sanction of this court and it is hereby granted. The application pursuant to section 185 of the ABCA is granted. The application for declarations sought by Resurgence are dismissed. The application of the Minority Shareholders is dismissed.

Application granted; counter-applications dismissed.

Footnotes

[*] Leave to appeal refused 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 52, 9 B.L.R. (3d) 86, [2000] 10 W.W.R. 314, 2000 ABCA 238, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 46 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]).

TAB 3

2010 ONSC 4209
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re

2010 CarswellOnt 5510, 2010 ONSC 4209, 191 A.C.W.S. (3d) 378, 70 C.B.R. (5th) 1

IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 11 OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF CANWEST GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS AND THE OTHER APPLICANTS

Pepall J.

Judgment: July 28, 2010
Docket: CV-09-8396-00CL

Counsel: Lyndon Barnes, Jeremy Dacks, Shawn Irving for CMI Entities
David Byers, Marie Konyukhova for Monitor
Robin B. Schwill, Vince Mercier for Shaw Communications Inc.
Derek Bell for Canwest Shareholders Group (the "Existing Shareholders")
Mario Forte for Special Committee of the Board of Directors
Robert Chadwick, Logan Willis for Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders
Amanda Darrach for Canwest Retirees
Peter Osborne for Management Directors
Steven Weisz for CIBC Asset-Based Lending Inc.

Subject: Insolvency; Corporate and Commercial

Related Abridgment Classifications
For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Bankruptcy and insolvency

XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.3 Arrangements
XIX.3.b Approval by court
XIX.3.b.i "Fair and reasonable"

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — "Fair and reasonable"

Debtors were group of related companies that successfully applied for protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Competitor agreed to acquire all of debtors' television broadcasting interests — Acquisition price was to be used to satisfy claims of certain senior subordinated noteholders and certain other creditors — All of television company's

equity-based compensation plans would be terminated and existing shareholders would not receive any compensation — Remaining debtors would likely be liquidated, wound-up, dissolved, placed into bankruptcy, or otherwise abandoned — Noteholders and other creditors whose claims were to be satisfied voted overwhelmingly in favour of plan of compromise, arrangement, and reorganization — Debtors brought application for order sanctioning plan and for related relief — Application granted — All statutory requirements had been satisfied and no unauthorized steps had been taken — Plan was fair and reasonable — Unequal distribution amongst creditors was fair and reasonable in this case — Size of noteholder debt was substantial and had been guaranteed by several debtors — Noteholders held blocking position in any restructuring and they had been cooperative in exploring alternative outcomes — No other alternative transaction would have provided greater recovery than recoveries contemplated in plan — Additionally, there had not been any oppression of creditor rights or unfairness to shareholders — Plan was in public interest since it would achieve going concern outcome for television business and resolve various disputes.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Pepall J.*:

Air Canada, Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 469, 47 C.B.R. (4th) 169 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

A&M Cookie Co. Canada, Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 3473 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Armbro Enterprises Inc., Re (1993), 1993 CarswellOnt 241, 22 C.B.R. (3d) 80 (Ont. Bktcy.) — considered

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 ONCA 587, 2008 CarswellOnt 4811, *(*sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re)* 240 O.A.C. 245, *(*sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re)* 296 D.L.R. (4th) 135, *(*sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re)* 92 O.R. (3d) 513, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 123 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Beatrice Foods Inc., Re (1996), 43 C.B.R. (4th) 10, 1996 CarswellOnt 5598 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Cadillac Fairview Inc., Re (1995), 1995 CarswellOnt 3702 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re (2007), 2007 CarswellAlta 1050, 2007 ABQB 504, 35 C.B.R. (5th) 1, 415 A.R. 196, 33 B.L.R. (4th) 68 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2000), [2000] 10 W.W.R. 269, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 1, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 9, 9 B.L.R. (3d) 41, 2000 CarswellAlta 662, 2000 ABQB 442, 265 A.R. 201 (Alta. Q.B.) — considered

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2000), 2000 CarswellAlta 919, [2000] 10 W.W.R. 314, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 46, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 52, 9 B.L.R. (3d) 86, 2000 ABCA 238, 266 A.R. 131, 228 W.A.C. 131 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]) — referred to

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2000), 88 Alta. L.R. (3d) 8, 2001 ABCA 9, 2000 CarswellAlta 1556, [2001] 4 W.W.R. 1, 277 A.R. 179, 242 W.A.C. 179 (Alta. C.A.) — referred to

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2001), 2001 CarswellAlta 888, 2001 CarswellAlta 889, 275 N.R. 386 (note), 293 A.R. 351 (note), 257 W.A.C. 351 (note) (S.C.C.) — referred to

Laidlaw, Re (2003), 39 C.B.R. (4th) 239, 2003 CarswellOnt 787 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

MEI Computer Technology Group Inc., Re (2005), 2005 CarswellQue 13408 (C.S. Que.) — referred to

Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co. (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 1, *(*sub nom. *Olympia & York Developments Ltd., Re)* 12 O.R. (3d) 500, 1993 CarswellOnt 182 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Uniforêt inc., Re (2003), 43 C.B.R. (4th) 254, 2003 CarswellQue 3404 (C.S. Que.) — considered

Statutes considered:

Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44
s. 173 — considered

s. 173(1)(e) — considered

s. 173(1)(h) — considered

s. 191 — considered

s. 191(1) “reorganization” (c) — considered

s. 191(2) — referred to

Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

s. 2(1) “debtor company” — referred to

s. 6 — considered

s. 6(1) — considered

s. 6(2) — considered

s. 6(3) — considered

s. 6(5) — considered

s. 6(6) — considered

s. 6(8) — referred to

s. 36 — considered

APPLICATION by debtors for order sanctioning plan of compromise, arrangement, and reorganization and for related relief.

***Pepall J.*:**

1 This is the culmination of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*[1] restructuring of the CMI Entities. The proceeding started in court on October 6, 2009, experienced numerous peaks and valleys, and now has resulted in a request for an order sanctioning a plan of compromise, arrangement and reorganization (the "Plan"). It has been a short road in relative terms but not without its challenges and idiosyncrasies. To complicate matters, this restructuring was hot on the heels of the amendments to the CCAA that were introduced on September 18, 2009. Nonetheless, the CMI Entities have now successfully concluded a Plan for which they seek a sanction order. They also request an order approving the Plan Emergence Agreement, and other related relief. Lastly, they seek a post-filing claims procedure order.

2 The details of this restructuring have been outlined in numerous previous decisions rendered by me and I do not propose to repeat all of them.

The Plan and its Implementation

3 The basis for the Plan is the amended Shaw transaction. It will see a wholly owned subsidiary of Shaw Communications Inc. ("Shaw") acquire all of the interests in the free-to-air television stations and subscription-based specialty television channels currently owned by Canwest Television Limited Partnership ("CTLP") and its subsidiaries and all of the interests in the specialty television stations currently owned by CW Investments and its subsidiaries, as well as certain other assets of the CMI Entities. Shaw will pay to CMI US $440 million in cash to be used by CMI to satisfy the claims of the 8% Senior Subordinated Noteholders (the "Noteholders") against the CMI Entities. In the event that the implementation of the Plan occurs after September 30, 2010, an additional cash amount of US $2.9 million per month will be paid to CMI by Shaw and allocated by CMI to the Noteholders. An additional $38 million will be paid by Shaw to the Monitor at the direction of CMI to be used to satisfy the claims of the Affected Creditors (as that term is defined in the Plan) other than the Noteholders, subject to a pro rata increase in that cash amount for certain restructuring period claims in certain circumstances.

4 In accordance with the Meeting Order, the Plan separates Affected Creditors into two classes for voting purposes:

(a) the Noteholders; and

(b) the Ordinary Creditors. Convenience Class Creditors are deemed to be in, and to vote as, members of the Ordinary Creditors' Class.

5 The Plan divides the Ordinary Creditors' pool into two sub-pools, namely the Ordinary CTLP Creditors' Sub-pool and the Ordinary CMI Creditors' Sub-pool. The former comprises two-thirds of the value and is for claims against the CTLP Plan Entities and the latter reflects one-third of the value and is used to satisfy claims against Plan Entities other than the CTLP Plan Entities. In its 16th Report, the Monitor performed an analysis of the relative value of the assets of the CMI Plan Entities and the CTLP Plan Entities and the possible recoveries on a going concern liquidation and based on that analysis, concluded that it was fair and reasonable that Affected Creditors of the CTLP Plan Entities share pro rata in two-thirds of the Ordinary Creditors' pool and Affected Creditors of the Plan Entities other than the CTLP Plan Entities share pro rata in one-third of the

Ordinary Creditors' pool.

6 It is contemplated that the Plan will be implemented by no later than September 30, 2010.

7 The Existing Shareholders will not be entitled to any distributions under the Plan or other compensation from the CMI Entities on account of their equity interests in Canwest Global. All equity compensation plans of Canwest Global will be extinguished and any outstanding options, restricted share units and other equity-based awards outstanding thereunder will be terminated and cancelled and the participants therein shall not be entitled to any distributions under the Plan.

8 On a distribution date to be determined by the Monitor following the Plan implementation date, all Affected Creditors with proven distribution claims against the Plan Entities will receive distributions from cash received by CMI (or the Monitor at CMI's direction) from Shaw, the Plan Sponsor, in accordance with the Plan. The directors and officers of the remaining CMI Entities and other subsidiaries of Canwest Global will resign on or about the Plan implementation date.

9 Following the implementation of the Plan, CTLP and CW Investments will be indirect, wholly-owned subsidiaries of Shaw, and the multiple voting shares, subordinate voting shares and non-voting shares of Canwest Global will be delisted from the TSX Venture Exchange. It is anticipated that the remaining CMI Entities and certain other subsidiaries of Canwest Global will be liquidated, wound-up, dissolved, placed into bankruptcy or otherwise abandoned.

10 In furtherance of the Minutes of Settlement that were entered into with the Existing Shareholders, the articles of Canwest Global will be amended under section 191 of the CBCA to facilitate the settlement. In particular, Canwest Global will reorganize the authorized capital of Canwest Global into (a) an unlimited number of new multiple voting shares, new subordinated voting shares and new non-voting shares; and (b) an unlimited number of new non-voting preferred shares. The terms of the new non-voting preferred shares will provide for the mandatory transfer of the new preferred shares held by the Existing Shareholders to a designated entity affiliated with Shaw for an aggregate amount of $11 million to be paid upon delivery by Canwest Global of the transfer notice to the transfer agent. Following delivery of the transfer notice, the Shaw designated entity will donate and surrender the new preferred shares acquired by it to Canwest Global for cancellation.

11 Canwest Global, CMI, CTLP, New Canwest, Shaw, 7316712 and the Monitor entered into the Plan Emergence Agreement dated June 25, 2010 detailing certain steps that will be taken before, upon and after the implementation of the plan. These steps primarily relate to the funding of various costs that are payable by the CMI Entities on emergence from the CCAA proceeding. This includes payments that will be made or may be made by the Monitor to satisfy post-filing amounts owing by the CMI Entities. The schedule of costs has not yet been finalized.

Creditor Meetings

12 Creditor meetings were held on July 19, 2010 in Toronto, Ontario. Support for the Plan was overwhelming. 100% in number representing 100% in value of the beneficial owners of the 8% senior subordinated notes who provided instructions for voting at the Noteholder meeting approved the resolution. Beneficial Noteholders holding approximately 95% of the principal amount of the outstanding notes validly voted at the Noteholder meeting.

13 The Ordinary Creditors with proven voting claims who submitted voting instructions in person or by proxy represented approximately 83% of their number and 92% of the value of such claims. In excess of 99% in number representing in excess of 99% in value of the Ordinary Creditors holding proven voting claims that were present in person or by proxy at the meeting voted or were deemed to vote in favour of the resolution.

Sanction Test

14 Section 6(1) of the CCAA provides that the court has discretion to sanction a plan of compromise or arrangement if it has achieved the requisite double majority vote. The criteria that a debtor company must satisfy in seeking the court's approval are:

> (a) there must be strict compliance with all statutory requirements;
>
> (b) all material filed and procedures carried out must be examined to determine if anything has been done or purported to be done which is not authorized by the CCAA; and
>
> (c) the Plan must be fair and reasonable.
>
> See *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*[2]

(a) Statutory Requirements

15 I am satisfied that all statutory requirements have been met. I already determined that the Applicants qualified as debtor companies under section 2 of the CCAA and that they had total claims against them exceeding $5 million. The notice of meeting was sent in accordance with the Meeting Order. Similarly, the classification of Affected Creditors for voting purposes was addressed in the Meeting Order which was unopposed and not appealed. The meetings were both properly constituted and voting in each was properly carried out. Clearly the Plan was approved by the requisite majorities.

16 Section 6(3), 6(5) and 6(6) of the CCAA provide that the court may not sanction a plan unless the plan contains certain specified provisions concerning crown claims, employee claims and pension claims. Section 4.6 of Plan provides that the claims listed in paragraph (l) of the definition of "Unaffected Claims" shall be paid in full from a fund known as the Plan Implementation Fund within six months of the sanction order. The Fund consists of cash, certain other assets and further contributions from Shaw. Paragraph (l) of the definition of "Unaffected Claims" includes any Claims in respect of any payments referred to in section 6(3), 6(5) and 6(6) of the CCAA. I am satisfied that these provisions of section 6 of the CCAA have been satisfied.

(b) Unauthorized Steps

17 In considering whether any unauthorized steps have been taken by a debtor company, it has been held that in making such a determination, the court should rely on the parties and their stakeholders and the reports of the Monitor: *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*[3].

18 The CMI Entities have regularly filed affidavits addressing key developments in this restructuring. In addition, the Monitor has provided regular reports (17 at last count) and has opined that the CMI Entities have acted and continue to act in good faith and with due diligence and have not breached any requirements under the CCAA or any order of this court. If it was not obvious from the hearing on June 23, 2010, it should be stressed that there is no payment of any equity claim pursuant to section 6(8) of the CCAA. As noted by the Monitor in its 16th Report, settlement with the Existing Shareholders did not and does not in any way impact the anticipated recovery to the Affected Creditors of the CMI Entities. Indeed I referenced the inapplicability of section 6(8) of the CCAA in my Reasons of June 23, 2010. The second criterion relating to unauthorized steps has been met.

(c) Fair and Reasonable

19 The third criterion to consider is the requirement to demonstrate that a plan is fair and reasonable. As Paperny J. (as she then was) stated in *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*:

> The court's role on a sanction hearing is to consider whether the plan fairly balances the interests of all stakeholders. Faced with an insolvent organization, its role is to look forward and ask: does this plan represent a fair and reasonable compromise that will permit a viable commercial entity to emerge? It is also an exercise in assessing current reality by comparing available commercial alternatives to what is offered in the proposed plan.[4]

20 My discretion should be informed by the objectives of the CCAA, namely to facilitate the reorganization of a debtor company for the benefit of the company, its creditors, shareholders, employees and in many instances, a much broader

constituency of affected persons.

21 In assessing whether a proposed plan is fair and reasonable, considerations include the following:

> (a) whether the claims were properly classified and whether the requisite majority of creditors approved the plan;
>
> (b) what creditors would have received on bankruptcy or liquidation as compared to the plan;
>
> (c) alternatives available to the plan and bankruptcy;
>
> (d) oppression of the rights of creditors;
>
> (e) unfairness to shareholders; and
>
> (f) the public interest.

22 I have already addressed the issue of classification and the vote. Obviously there is an unequal distribution amongst the creditors of the CMI Entities. Distribution to the Noteholders is expected to result in recovery of principal, pre-filing interest and a portion of post-filing accrued and default interest. The range of recoveries for Ordinary Creditors is much less. The recovery of the Noteholders is substantially more attractive than that of Ordinary Creditors. This is not unheard of. In *Armbro Enterprises Inc., Re*[5] Blair J. (as he then was) approved a plan which included an uneven allocation in favour of a single major creditor, the Royal Bank, over the objection of other creditors. Blair J. wrote:

> "I am not persuaded that there is a sufficient tilt in the allocation of these new common shares in favour of RBC to justify the court in interfering with the business decision made by the creditor class in approving the proposed Plan, as they have done. RBC's cooperation is a sine qua non for the Plan, or any Plan, to work and it is the only creditor continuing to advance funds to the applicants to finance the proposed re-organization."[6]

23 Similarly, in *Uniforêt inc., Re*[7] a plan provided for payment in full to an unsecured creditor. This treatment was much more generous than that received by other creditors. There, the Québec Superior Court sanctioned the plan and noted that a plan can be more generous to some creditors and still fair to all creditors. The creditor in question had stepped into the breach on several occasions to keep the company afloat in the four years preceding the filing of the plan and the court was of the view that the conduct merited special treatment. See also Romaine J.'s orders dated October 26, 2009 in *SemCanada Crude Company et al.*

24 I am prepared to accept that the recovery for the Noteholders is fair and reasonable in the circumstances. The size of the Noteholder debt was substantial. CMI's obligations under the notes were guaranteed by several of the CMI Entities. No issue has been taken with the guarantees. As stated before and as observed by the Monitor, the Noteholders held a blocking position in any restructuring. Furthermore, the liquidity and continued support provided by the Ad Hoc Committee both prior to and during these proceedings gave the CMI Entities the opportunity to pursue a going concern restructuring of their businesses. A description of the role of the Noteholders is found in Mr. Strike's affidavit sworn July 20, 2010, filed on this motion.

25 Turning to alternatives, the CMI Entities have been exploring strategic alternatives since February, 2009. Between November, 2009 and February, 2010, RBC Capital Markets conducted the equity investment solicitation process of which I have already commented. While there is always a theoretical possibility that a more advantageous plan could be developed than the Plan proposed, the Monitor has concluded that there is no reason to believe that restarting the equity investment solicitation process or marketing 100% of the CMI Entities assets would result in a better or equally desirable outcome. Furthermore, restarting the process could lead to operational difficulties including issues relating to the CMI Entities' large studio suppliers and advertisers. The Monitor has also confirmed that it is unlikely that the recovery for a going concern liquidation sale of the assets of the CMI Entities would result in greater recovery to the creditors of the CMI Entities. I am not satisfied that there is any other alternative transaction that would provide greater recovery than the recoveries contemplated in

the Plan. Additionally, I am not persuaded that there is any oppression of creditor rights or unfairness to shareholders.

26 The last consideration I wish to address is the public interest. If the Plan is implemented, the CMI Entities will have achieved a going concern outcome for the business of the CTLP Plan Entities that fully and finally deals with the Goldman Sachs Parties, the Shareholders Agreement and the defaulted 8% senior subordinated notes. It will ensure the continuation of employment for substantially all of the employees of the Plan Entities and will provide stability for the CMI Entities, pensioners, suppliers, customers and other stakeholders. In addition, the Plan will maintain for the general public broad access to and choice of news, public and other information and entertainment programming. Broadcasting of news, public and entertainment programming is an important public service, and the bankruptcy and liquidation of the CMI Entities would have a negative impact on the Canadian public.

27 I should also mention section 36 of the CCAA which was added by the recent amendments to the Act which came into force on September 18, 2009. This section provides that a debtor company may not sell or otherwise dispose of assets outside the ordinary course of business unless authorized to do so by a court. The section goes on to address factors a court is to consider. In my view, section 36 does not apply to transfers contemplated by a Plan. These transfers are merely steps that are required to implement the Plan and to facilitate the restructuring of the Plan Entities' businesses. Furthermore, as the CMI Entities are seeking approval of the Plan itself, there is no risk of any abuse. There is a further safeguard in that the Plan including the asset transfers contemplated therein has been voted on and approved by Affected Creditors.

28 The Plan does include broad releases including some third party releases. In *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.*[8], the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the CCAA court has jurisdiction to approve a plan of compromise or arrangement that includes third party releases. The *Metcalfe* case was extraordinary and exceptional in nature. It responded to dire circumstances and had a plan that included releases that were fundamental to the restructuring. The Court held that the releases in question had to be justified as part of the compromise or arrangement between the debtor and its creditors. There must be a reasonable connection between the third party claim being compromised in the plan and the restructuring achieved by the plan to warrant inclusion of the third party release in the plan.

29 In the *Metcalfe* decision, Blair J.A. discussed in detail the issue of releases of third parties. I do not propose to revisit this issue, save and except to stress that in my view, third party releases should be the exception and should not be requested or granted as a matter of course.

30 In this case, the releases are broad and extend to include the Noteholders, the Ad Hoc Committee and others. Fraud, wilful misconduct and gross negligence are excluded. I have already addressed, on numerous occasions, the role of the Noteholders and the Ad Hoc Committee. I am satisfied that the CMI Entities would not have been able to restructure without materially addressing the notes and developing a plan satisfactory to the Ad Hoc Committee and the Noteholders. The release of claims is rationally connected to the overall purpose of the Plan and full disclosure of the releases was made in the Plan, the information circular, the motion material served in connection with the Meeting Order and on this motion. No one has appeared to oppose the sanction of the Plan that contains these releases and they are considered by the Monitor to be fair and reasonable. Under the circumstances, I am prepared to sanction the Plan containing these releases.

31 Lastly, the Monitor is of the view that the Plan is advantageous to Affected Creditors, is fair and reasonable and recommends its sanction. The board, the senior management of the CMI Entities, the Ad Hoc Committee, and the CMI CRA all support sanction of the Plan as do all those appearing today.

32 In my view, the Plan is fair and reasonable and I am granting the sanction order requested.[9]

33 The Applicants also seek approval of the Plan Emergence Agreement. The Plan Emergence Agreement outlines steps that will be taken prior to, upon, or following implementation of the Plan and is a necessary corollary of the Plan. It does not confiscate the rights of any creditors and is necessarily incidental to the Plan. I have the jurisdiction to approve such an agreement: *Air Canada, Re*[10] and *Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re*[11] I am satisfied that the agreement is fair and reasonable and should be approved.

34 It is proposed that on the Plan implementation date the articles of Canwest Global will be amended to facilitate the settlement reached with the Existing Shareholders. Section 191 of the CBCA permits the court to order necessary

amendments to the articles of a corporation without shareholder approval or a dissent right. In particular, section 191(1)(c) provides that reorganization means a court order made under any other Act of Parliament that affects the rights among the corporation, its shareholders and creditors. The CCAA is such an Act: *Beatrice Foods Inc., Re*[12] and *Laidlaw, Re*[13]. Pursuant to section 191(2), if a corporation is subject to a subsection (1) order, its articles may be amended to effect any change that might lawfully be made by an amendment under section 173. Section 173(1)(e) and (h) of the CBCA provides that:

> (1) Subject to sections 176 and 177, the articles of a corporation may by special resolution be amended to
>
> (e) create new classes of shares;
>
> (h) change the shares of any class or series, whether issued or unissued, into a different number of shares of the same class or series or into the same or a different number of shares of other classes or series.

35 Section 6(2) of the CCAA provides that if a court sanctions a compromise or arrangement, it may order that the debtor's constating instrument be amended in accordance with the compromise or arrangement to reflect any change that may lawfully be made under federal or provincial law.

36 In exercising its discretion to approve a reorganization under section 191 of the CBCA, the court must be satisfied that: (a) there has been compliance with all statutory requirements; (b) the debtor company is acting in good faith; and (c) the capital restructuring is fair and reasonable: *A&M Cookie Co. Canada, Re*[14] and *MEI Computer Technology Group Inc., Re*[15]

37 I am satisfied that the statutory requirements have been met as the contemplated reorganization falls within the conditions provided for in sections 191 and 173 of the CBCA. I am also satisfied that Canwest Global and the other CMI Entities were acting in good faith in attempting to resolve the Existing Shareholder dispute. Furthermore, the reorganization is a necessary step in the implementation of the Plan in that it facilitates agreement reached on June 23, 2010 with the Existing Shareholders. In my view, the reorganization is fair and reasonable and was a vital step in addressing a significant impediment to a satisfactory resolution of outstanding issues.

38 A post-filing claims procedure order is also sought. The procedure is designed to solicit, identify and quantify post-filing claims. The Monitor who participated in the negotiation of the proposed order is satisfied that its terms are fair and reasonable as am I.

39 In closing, I would like to say that generally speaking, the quality of oral argument and the materials filed in this CCAA proceeding has been very high throughout. I would like to express my appreciation to all counsel and the Monitor in that regard. The sanction order and the post-filing claims procedure order are granted.

Application granted.

Footnotes

[1] R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 as amended.

[2] 2000 ABQB 442 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 60, leave to appeal denied 2000 ABCA 238 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]), aff'd 2001 ABCA 9 (Alta. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused July 12, 2001 [2001 CarswellAlta 888 (S.C.C.)].

[3] Ibid,at para. 64 citing *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co.*, [1993] O.J. No. 545 (Ont. Gen. Div.) and *Cadillac Fairview Inc., Re*, [1995] O.J. No. 274 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).

4 Ibid, at para. 3.

5 (1993), 22 C.B.R. (3d) 80 (Ont. Bktcy.).

6 *Ibid*, at para. 6.

7 (2003), 43 C.B.R. (4th) 254 (C.S. Que.).

8 (2008), 92 O.R. (3d) 513 (Ont. C.A.).

9 The Sanction Order is extraordinarily long and in large measure repeats the Plan provisions. In future, counsel should attempt to simplify and shorten these sorts of orders.

10 (2004), 47 C.B.R. (4th) 169 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

11 (2007), 35 C.B.R. (5th) 1 (Alta. Q.B.).

12 (1996), 43 C.B.R. (4th) 10 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).

13 (2003), 39 C.B.R. (4th) 239 (Ont. S.C.J.).

14 [2009] O.J. No. 2427 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 8/

15 [2005] Q.J. No. 22993 (C.S. Que.) at para. 9.

TAB 4

2015 ONSC 622, 2015 CarswellOnt 3285, 23 C.B.R. (6th) 194, 252 A.C.W.S. (3d) 8

2015 ONSC 622
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Cline Mining Corp., Re

2015 CarswellOnt 3285, 2015 ONSC 622, 23 C.B.R. (6th) 194, 252 A.C.W.S. (3d) 8

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise and Arrangement of Cline Mining Corporation, New ELK Coal Company LLC and North Central Energy Company

G.B. Morawetz R.S.J.

Heard: January 27, 2015
Judgment: January 30, 2015
Docket: CV-14-10781-00CL

Counsel: Robert J. Chadwick, Logan Willis for Applicants, Cline Mining Corporation et al.
Michael DeLellis, David Rosenblatt for FTI Consulting Canada Inc., Monitor of the Applicants
Jay Swartz for Secured Noteholders

Subject: Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications
For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Bankruptcy and insolvency

XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.3 Arrangements
XIX.3.b Approval by court
XIX.3.b.i "Fair and reasonable"

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — "Fair and reasonable"

Insolvent mining companies (applicants) were involved in Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act proceedings — Applicants brought motion to approve plan of arrangement which involved release of certain claims and recapitalization of applicants — Motion granted — Plan was fair and reasonable in circumstances — Plan represented compromise and treated affected creditors fairly — Third party releases were rationally related to purpose of plan and were necessary for successful restructuring — Release of directors and officers was appropriate — Monitor supported applicants' position and plan had unanimous support from creditors.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *G.B. Morawetz R.S.J.*:

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 ONCA 587, 2008 CarswellOnt 4811, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re)* 240 O.A.C. 245, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re)* 296 D.L.R. (4th) 135, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re)* 92 O.R. (3d) 513, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 123 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Cline Mining Corp., Re (2014), 2014 CarswellOnt 18943, 2014 ONSC 6998 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered

Sino-Forest Corp., Re (2012), 2012 ONSC 7050, 2012 CarswellOnt 15913 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Sino-Forest Corp., Re (2013), 2013 ONCA 456, 2013 CarswellOnt 8896 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

SkyLink Aviation Inc., Re (2013), 2013 ONSC 2519, 2013 CarswellOnt 7670, 3 C.B.R. (6th) 83 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

s. 5.1(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 122] — considered

s. 6(1) — considered

s. 11.02(2) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 19(2) — considered

MOTION by insolvent companies for approval or plan of arrangement and other relief.

***G.B. Morawetz R.S.J.*:**

1 Cline Mining Corporation, New Elk Coal Company LLC and North Central Energy Company (collectively, the "Applicants") seek an order (the "Sanction Order"), among other things:

a. sanctioning the Applicants' Amended and Restated Plan of Compromise and Arrangement dated January 20, 2015 (the "Plan") pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended (the "CCAA"); and

b. extending the stay, as defined in the Initial Order granted December 3, 2014 (the "Initial Order"), to and including April 1, 2015.

2 Counsel to the Applicants submits that the Recapitalization is the result of significant efforts by the Applicants to achieve a resolution of their financial challenges and, if implemented, the Recapitalization will maintain the Applicants as a unified corporate enterprise and result in an improved capital structure that will enable the Applicants to better withstand prolonged weakness in the global market for metallurgical coal.

3 Counsel submits that the Applicants believe that the Recapitalization achieves the best available outcome for the Applicants and their stakeholders in the circumstances and achieves results that are not attainable under any other bankruptcy, sale or debt enforcement scenario.

4 The position of the Applicants is supported by the Monitor, and by Marret, on behalf of the Secured Noteholders.

5 The Plan has the unanimous support from the creditors of the Applicants. The Plan was approved by 100% in number and 100% in value of creditors voting in each of the Secured Noteholders Class, the Affected Unsecured Creditors Class and the WARN Act Plaintiffs Class.

6 The background giving rise to (i) the insolvency of the Applicants; (ii) the decision to file under the CCAA; (iii) the finding made that the court had the jurisdiction under the CCAA to accept the filing; (iv) the finding of insolvency; and (v) the basis for granting the Initial Order and the Claims Procedure Order was addressed in *Cline Mining Corp., Re*, 2014 ONSC 6998 (Ont. S.C.J.) and need not be repeated.

7 The Applicants report that counsel to the WARN Act Plaintiffs in the class action proceedings (the "Class Action Counsel") submitted a class proof of claim on behalf of the 307 WARN Act Plaintiffs in the aggregate amount of U.S. $3.7 million. Class Action Counsel indicated that the WARN Act Plaintiffs were not prepared to vote in favour of the Plan dated December 3, 2014 (the "Original Plan") without an enhancement of the recovery. The Applicants report that after further discussions, agreement was reached with Class Action Counsel on the form of a resolution that provides for an enhanced recovery for the WARN Act Plaintiffs Class of $210,000 (with $90,000 paid on the Plan implementation date) as opposed to the recovery offered in the Original Plan of $100,000 payable in eight years from the Plan implementation date.

8 As a result of reaching this resolution, the Original Plan was amended to reflect the terms of the WARN Act resolution.

9 The Applicants served the Amended Plan on the Service List on January 20, 2015.

10 The Plan provides for a full and final release and discharge of the Affected Claims and Released Claims, a settlement of, and consideration for, all Allowed Affected Claims and a recapitalization of the Applicants.

11 Equity claimants will not receive any consideration or distributions under the Plan.

12 The Plan provides for the release of certain parties (the "Released Parties"), including:

(i) the Applicants, the Directors and Officers and employees of contractors of the Applicants; and

(ii) the Monitor, the Indenture Trustee and Marret and their respective legal counsel, the financial and legal advisors to the Applicants and other parties employed by or associated with the parties listed in sub-paragraph (ii), in each case in respect of claims that constitute or relate to, *inter alia*, any Claims, any Directors/Officer Claims and any claims arising from or connected to the Plan, the Recapitalization, the CCAA Proceedings, the Chapter 15 Proceedings, the business or affairs of the Applicants or certain other related matter (collectively, the "Released Claims").

13 The Plan does not release:

(i) the right to enforce the Applicants' obligations under the Plan;

(ii) the Applicants from or in respect of any Unaffected Claim or any Claim that is not permitted to be released pursuant to section 19(2) of the CCAA; or

(iii) any Director or Officer from any Director/Officer Claim that is not permitted to be released pursuant to section 5.1(2) of the CCAA.

14 The Plan does not release Insured Claims, provided that any recourse in respect of such claims is limited to proceeds, if any, of the Applicants' applicable Insurance Policies.

15 The Meetings Order authorized the Applicants to convene a meeting of the Secured Noteholders, a meeting of Affected Unsecured Creditors and a meeting of WARN Act Plaintiffs to consider and vote on the Plan.

16 The Meetings were held on January 21, 2015. At the Meetings, the resolution to approve the Plan was passed unanimously in each of the three classes of creditors.

17 None of the persons with Disputed Claims voted at the Meetings, in person or by proxy. Consequently, the results of the votes taken would not change based on the inclusion or exclusion of the Disputed Claims in the voting results.

18 Pursuant to section 6(1) of the CCAA, the court has the discretion to sanction a plan of compromise or arrangement where the requisite double-majority of creditors has approved the plan. The effect of the court's approval is to bind the company and its creditors.

19 The general requirements for court approval of the CCAA Plan are well established:

a. there must be strict compliance with all statutory requirements;

b. all materials filed and procedures carried out must be examined to determine if anything has been done or purported to have been done, which is not authorized by the CCAA; and

c. the plan must be fair and reasonable.

(see *SkyLink Aviation Inc., Re*, 2013 ONSC 2519 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]))

20 Having reviewed the record and hearing submissions, I am satisfied that the foregoing test for approval has been met in this case.

21 In arriving at my conclusion that the Plan is fair and reasonable in the circumstances, I have taken into account the following:

a. the Plan represents a compromise among the Applicants and the Affected Creditors resulting from discussions among the Applicants and their creditors, with the support of the Monitor;

b. the classification of the Applicants' creditors into three voting classes was previously approved by the court and

the classification was not opposed at any time;

c. the results of the Sale Process indicate that the Secured Noteholders would suffer a significant shortfall and there would be no residual value for subordinate interests;

d. the Recapitalization provides a limited recovery for unsecured creditors and the WARN Act Plaintiffs;

e. all Affected Creditors that voted on the Plan voted for its approval;

f. the Plan treats Affected Creditors fairly and provides for the same distribution among the creditors within each of the Secured Noteholders Class, the Affected Unsecured Creditors Class and the WARN Act Plaintiffs Class;

g. Unaffected Claims, which include, *inter alia*, government and employee priority claims, claims not permitted to be compromised pursuant to sections 19(2) and 5.1(2) of the CCAA and prior ranking secured claims, will not be affected by the Plan;

h. the treatment of Equity Claims under the Plan is consistent with the provisions of the CCAA; and

i. the Plan is supported by the Applicants (Marret, on behalf of the Secured Noteholders), the Monitor and the creditors who voted in favor of the Plan at the Meetings.

22 The CCAA permits the inclusion of third party releases in a plan of compromise or arrangement where those releases are reasonably connected to the proposed restructuring (see: *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.*, 2008 ONCA 587 (Ont. C.A.) (*"ATB Financial"*); *SkyLink, supra;* and *Sino-Forest Corp., Re*, 2012 ONSC 7050 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), leave to appeal denied, 2013 ONCA 456 (Ont. C.A.)).

23 The court has the jurisdiction to sanction a plan containing third party releases where the factual circumstances indicate that the third party releases are appropriate. In this case, the record establishes that the releases were negotiated as part of the overall framework of the compromises in the Plan, and these releases facilitate a successful completion of the Plan and the Recapitalization. The releases cover parties that could have claims of indemnification or contribution against the Applicants in relation to the Recapitalization, the Plan and other related matters, whose rights against the Applicants have been discharged in the Plan.

24 I am satisfied that the releases are therefore rationally related to the purpose of the Plan and are necessary for the successful restructuring of the Applicants.

25 Further, the releases provided for in the Plan were contained in the Original Plan filed with the court on December 3, 2014 and attached to the Meetings Order. Counsel to the Applicants submits that the Applicants are not aware of any objections to the releases provided for in the Plan.

26 The Applicants also contend that the releases of the released Directors/Officers are appropriate in the circumstances, given that the released Directors and Officers, in the absence of the Plan releases, could have claims for indemnification or contribution against the Applicants and the release avoids contingent claims for such indemnification or contribution against the Applicants. Further, the releases were negotiated as part of the overall framework of compromises in the Plan. I also note that no Director/Officer Claims were asserted in the Claims Procedure.

27 The Monitor supports the Applicants' request for the sanction of the Plan, including the releases contained therein.

28 I am satisfied that in these circumstances, it is appropriate to grant the releases.

29 The Plan provides for certain alterations to the Cline Articles in order to effectuate certain corporate steps required to implement the Plan, including the consolidation of shares and the cancellation of fractional interests of the Cline Common Shares. I am satisfied that these amendments are necessary in order to effect the provisions of the Plan and that it is appropriate to grant the amendments as part of the approval of the Plan.

30 The Applicants also request an extension of the stay until April 1, 2015. This request is made pursuant to section 11.02(2) of the CCAA. The court must be satisfied that:

> (i) circumstances exist that make the order appropriate; and
>
> (ii) the applicant has acted, and is acting in good faith and with due diligence.

31 The record establishes that the Applicants have made substantial progress toward the completion of the Recapitalization, but further time is required to implement same. I am satisfied that the test pursuant to section 11.02(2) has been met and it is appropriate to extend the stay until April 1, 2015.

32 Finally, the Monitor requests approval of its activities and conduct to date and also approval of its Pre-Filing Report, the First Report dated December 16, 2014 and the Second Report together with the activities described therein. No objection was raised with respect to the Monitor's request, which is granted.

33 For the foregoing reasons, the motion is granted and an order shall issue in the form requested, approving the Plan and providing certain ancillary relief.

Motion granted.

TAB 5

2012 ONSC 234, 2012 CarswellOnt 1347, 212 A.C.W.S. (3d) 631, 86 C.B.R. (5th) 274

2012 ONSC 234
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Kitchener Frame Ltd., Re

2012 CarswellOnt 1347, 2012 ONSC 234, 212 A.C.W.S. (3d) 631, 86 C.B.R. (5th) 274

In the Matter of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, as Amended

In the Matter of the Consolidated Proposal of Kitchener Frame Limited and Thyssenkrupp Budd Canada, Inc. (Applicants)

Morawetz J.

Judgment: February 3, 2012
Docket: CV-11-9298-00CL

Counsel: Edward A. Sellers, Jeremy E. Dacks for Applicants
Hugh O'Reilly — Non-Union Representative Counsel
L.N. Gottheil — Union Representative Counsel
John Porter for Proposal Trustee, Ernst & Young Inc.
Michael McGraw for CIBC Mellon Trust Company
Deborah McPhail for Financial Services Commission of Ontario

Subject: Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications
For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Bankruptcy and insolvency

VI Proposal
VI.4 Approval by court
VI.4.b Conditions
VI.4.b.i General principles

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Proposal — Approval by court — Conditions — General principles

Applicants KFL and BC were inactive entities with no operating assets and no material liquid assets — Applicants had significant and mounting obligations including pension and other non-pension post-employment benefit (OPEB) obligations to their former employees and surviving spouses of such former employees or others entitled to claim through such persons — Affiliates of BC provided up to date funding for pension and OPEB obligations, however, given that KFL and BC had no active operations status quo was unsustainable — KFL and BC brought motion to sanction amended consolidated proposal — Motion was granted — Proposal was reasonable — Proposal was calculated to benefit general body of creditors — Proposal was made in good faith — Proposal contained broad release in favour of applicants and certain third parties —

Release of third-parties was permitted — Release covered all affected claims, pension claims, and existing escrow fund claims — Release did not cover criminal or wilful misconduct with respect to any matters set out in s. 50(14) of Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act — Unaffected claims were specifically carved out of release — No creditors or stakeholders objected to scope of release which was fully disclosed in negotiations — There was no express prohibition in BIA against including third-party releases in proposal — Any provision of BIA which purported to limit ability of debtor to contract with its creditors had to be clear and explicit — Third-party releases were permissible under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) and court should strive, where language of both statutes supported it, to give both statutes harmonious interpretation — There was no principled basis on which analysis and treatment of third-party release in BIA proposal proceeding should differ from CCAA proceeding — Released parties contributed in tangle and realistic way to proposal — Without inclusion of releases it was unlikely that certain parties would have supported proposal — Releases benefited applicants and creditors generally — Applicants provided full and adequate disclosure of releases and their effect.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Morawetz J.*:

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Ashley v. Marlow Group Private Portfolio Management Inc. (2006), 2006 CarswellOnt 3449, 22 C.B.R. (5th) 126, 270 D.L.R. (4th) 744 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 ONCA 587, 2008 CarswellOnt 4811, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re)* 240 O.A.C. 245, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re)* 296 D.L.R. (4th) 135, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re)* 92 O.R. (3d) 513, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 123 (Ont. C.A.) — followed

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Farrell, Re (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 1015, 40 C.B.R. (4th) 53 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Kern Agencies Ltd., (No. 2), Re (1931), 1931 CarswellSask 3, [1931] 2 W.W.R. 633, 13 C.B.R. 11 (Sask. C.A.) — considered

Lofchik, Re (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 194, 1 C.B.R. (4th) 245 (Ont. Bktcy.) — referred to

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NAV Canada c. Wilmington Trust Co. (2006), 2006 CarswellQue 4890, 2006 CarswellQue 4891, 2006 SCC 24, (sub nom. *Greater Toronto Airports Authority v. International Lease Finance Corp.)* 80 O.R. (3d) 558 (note), (sub nom. *Canada 3000 Inc., (Bankrupt), Re)* 349 N.R. 1, (sub nom. *Canada 3000 Inc., Re)* [2006] 1 S.C.R. 865, 10 P.P.S.A.C. (3d) 66, 20 C.B.R. (5th) 1, (sub nom. *Canada 3000 Inc. (Bankrupt), Re)* 212 O.A.C. 338, (sub nom. *Canada 3000 Inc., Re)* 269 D.L.R. (4th) 79 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Olympia & York Developments Ltd., Re (1995), 34 C.B.R. (3d) 93, 1995 CarswellOnt 340 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

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Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3
Generally — referred to

Pt. III — referred to

s. 50(14) — considered

s. 54(2)(d) — considered

s. 59(2) — considered

s. 62(3) — considered

s. 136(1) — referred to

s. 178(2) — referred to

s. 179 — considered

s. 183 — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

s. 5.1 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 122] — referred to

Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15
Generally — referred to

MOTION by applicants for court sanction of proposal under Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act which contained third-party release.

***Morawetz J.*:**

1 At the conclusion of this unopposed motion, the requested relief was granted. Counsel indicated that it would be helpful if the court could provide reasons in due course, specifically on the issue of a third-party release in the context of a proposal under Part III of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* ("*BIA*").

2 Kitchener Frame Limited ("KFL") and Thyssenkrupp Budd Canada Inc. ("Budd Canada"), and together with KFL, (the

"Applicants"), brought this motion for an order (the "Sanction Order") to sanction the amended consolidated proposal involving the Applicants dated August 31, 2011 (the "Consolidated Proposal") pursuant to the provisions of the *BIA*. Relief was also sought authorizing the Applicants and Ernst & Young Inc., in its capacity as proposal trustee of each of the Applicants (the "Proposal Trustee") to take all steps necessary to implement the Consolidated Proposal in accordance with its terms.

3 The Applicants submit that the requested relief is reasonable, that it benefits the general body of the Applicants' creditors and meets all other statutory requirements. Further, the Applicants submit that the court should also consider that the voting affected creditors (the "Affected Creditors") unanimously supported the Consolidated Proposal. As such, the Applicants submit that they have met the test as set out in s. 59(2) of the *BIA* with respect to approval of the Consolidated Proposal.

4 The motion of the Applicants was supported by the Proposal Trustee. The Proposal Trustee filed its report recommending approval of the Consolidated Proposal and indicated that the Consolidated Proposal was in the best interests of the Affected Creditors.

5 KFL and Budd Canada are inactive entities with no operating assets and no material liquid assets (other than the Escrow Funds). They do have significant and mounting obligations including pension and other non-pension post-employment benefit ("OPEB") obligations to the Applicants' former employees and certain former employees of Budcan Holdings Inc. or the surviving spouses of such former employees or others who may be entitled to claim through such persons in the *BIA* proceedings, including the OPEB creditors.

6 The background facts with respect to this motion are fully set out in the affidavit of Mr. William E. Aziz, sworn on September 13, 2011.

7 Affiliates of Budd Canada have provided up to date funding to Budd Canada to enable Budd Canada to fund, on behalf of KFL, such pension and OPEB obligations. However, given that KFL and Budd Canada have no active operations, the *status quo* is unsustainable.

8 The Applicants have acknowledged that they are insolvent and, in connection with the *BIA* proposal, proceedings were commenced on July 4, 2011.

9 On July 7, 2011, Wilton-Siegel J. granted Procedural Consolidation Orders in respect of KFL and Budd Canada which authorized the procedural consolidation of the Applicants and permitted them to file a single consolidated proposal to their creditors.

10 The Orders of Wilton-Siegel J. also appointed separate representative counsel to represent the interests of the Union and Non-Union OPEB creditors and further authorized the Applicants to continue making payments to Blue Cross in respect of the OPEB Claims during the *BIA* proposal proceedings.

11 On August 2, 2011, an order was granted extending the time to file a proposal to August 19, 2011.

12 The parties proceeded to negotiate the terms of the Consolidated Proposal, which meetings involved the Applicants, the Proposal Trustee, senior members of the CAW, Union Representative Counsel and Non-Union Representative Counsel.

13 An agreement in principle was reached which essentially provided for the monetization and compromise of the OPEB claims of the OPEB creditors resulting in a one-time, lump-sum payment to each OPEB creditor term upon implementation of the Consolidated Proposal. The Consolidated Proposal also provides that the Applicants and their affiliates will forego any recoveries on account of their secured and unsecured inter-company claims, which total approximately $120 million. A condition precedent was the payment of sufficient funds to the Pension Fund Trustee such that when such funds are combined with the value of the assets held in the Pension Plans, the Pension Fund Trustee will be able to fully annuitize the Applicants' pension obligations and pay the commuted values to those creditors with pension claims who so elected so as to provide for the satisfaction of the Applicants' pension obligations in full.

14 On August 19, 2011, the Applicants filed the Consolidated Proposal. Subsequent amendments were made on August 31, 2011 in advance of the creditors' meeting to reflect certain amendments to the proposal.

15 The creditors' meeting was held on September 1, 2011 and, at the meeting, the Consolidated Proposal, as amended, was accepted by the required majority of creditors. Over 99.9% in number and over 99.8% in dollar value of the Affected Creditors' Class voted to accept the Consolidated Proposal. The Proposal Trustee noted that all creditors voted in favour of the Consolidated Proposal, with the exception of one creditor, Canada Revenue Agency (with 0.1% of the number of votes representing 0.2% of the value of the vote) who attended the meeting but abstained from voting. Therefore, the Consolidated Proposal was unanimously approved by the Affected Creditors. The Applicants thus satisfied the required "double majority" voting threshold required by the *BIA*.

16 The issue on the motion was whether the court should sanction the Consolidated Proposal, including the substantive consolidation and releases contained therein.

17 Pursuant to s. 54(2)(d) of the *BIA*, a proposal is deemed to be accepted by the creditors if it has achieved the requisite "double majority" voting threshold at a duly constituted meeting of creditors.

18 The *BIA* requires the proposal trustee to apply to court to sanction the proposal. At such hearing, s. 59(2) of the *BIA* requires that the court refuse to approve the proposal where its terms are not reasonable or not calculated to benefit the general body of creditors.

19 In order to satisfy s. 59(2) test, the courts have held that the following three-pronged test must be satisfied:

> (a) the proposal is reasonable;
>
> (b) the proposal is calculated to benefit the general body of creditors; and
>
> (c) the proposal is made in good faith.

See *Mayer, Re* (1994), 25 C.B.R. (3d) 113 (Ont. Bktcy.); *Steeves, Re* (2001), 25 C.B.R. (4th) 317 (Sask. Q.B.); *Magnus One Energy Corp., Re* (2009), 53 C.B.R. (5th) 243 (Alta. Q.B.).

20 The first two factors are set out in s. 59(2) of the *BIA* while the last factor has been implied by the court as an exercise of its equitable jurisdiction. The courts have generally taken into account the interests of the debtor, the interests of the creditors and the interests of the public at large in the integrity of the bankruptcy system. See *Farrell, Re* (2003), 40 C.B.R. (4th) 53 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

21 The courts have also accorded substantial deference to the majority vote of creditors at a meeting of creditors; see *Lofchik, Re*, [1998] O.J. No. 332 (Ont. Bktcy.). Similarly, the courts have also accorded deference to the recommendation of the proposal trustee. See *Magnus One*, *supra*.

22 With respect to the first branch of the test for sanctioning a proposal, the debtor must satisfy the court that the proposal is reasonable. The court is authorized to only approve proposals which are reasonable and calculated to benefit the general body of creditors. The court should also consider the payment terms of the proposal and whether the distributions provided for are adequate to meet the requirements of commercial morality and maintaining the integrity of the bankruptcy system. For a discussion on this point, see *Lofchik*, *supra*, and *Farrell* , *supra*.

23 In this case, the Applicants submit that, if the Consolidated Proposal is sanctioned, they would be in a position to satisfy all other conditions precedent to closing on or prior to the date of the proposal ("Proposal Implementation Date").

24 With respect to the treatment of the Collective Bargaining Agreements, the Applicants and the CAW brought a joint application before the Ontario Labour Relations Board ("OLRB") on an expedited basis seeking the OLRB's consent to an

early termination of the Collective Bargaining Agreements. Further, the CAW has agreed to abandon its collective bargaining rights in connection with the Collective Bargaining Agreements.

25 With respect to the terms and conditions of a Senior Secured Loan Agreement between Budd Canada and TK Finance dated as of December 22, 2010, TK Finance provided a secured creditor facility to the Applicants to fund certain working capital requirements before and during the *BIA* proposal proceedings. As a result of the approval of the Consolidated Proposal at the meeting of creditors, TK Finance agreed to provide additional credit facilities to Budd Canada such that the Applicants would be in a position to pay all amounts required to be paid by or on behalf of the Applicants in connection with the Consolidated Proposal.

26 On the issue as to whether creditors will receive greater recovery under the Consolidated Proposal than they would receive in the bankruptcy, it is noted that creditors with Pension Claims are unaffected by the Consolidated Proposal. The Consolidated Proposal provides for the satisfaction of Pension Claims in full as a condition precedent to implementation.

27 With respect to Affected Creditors, the Applicants submit that they will receive far greater recovery from distributions under the Consolidated Proposal than the Affected Creditors would receive in the event of the bankruptcies of the Applicants. (See Sanction Affidavit of Mr. Aziz at para. 61.)

28 The Proposal Trustee has stated that the Consolidated Proposal is advantageous to creditors for the reasons outlined in its Report and, in particular:

> (a) the recoveries to creditors with claims in respect of OPEBs are considerably greater under the Amended Proposal than in a bankruptcy;
>
> (b) payments under the Amended Proposal are expected in a timely manner shortly after the implementation of the Amended Proposal;
>
> (c) the timing and quantum of distributions pursuant to the Amended Proposal are certain while distributions under a bankruptcy are dependent on the results of litigation, which cannot be predicted with certainty; and
>
> (d) the Pension Plans (as described in the Proposal Trustee's Report) will be fully funded with funds from the Pension Escrow (as described in the Proposal Trustee's Report) and, if necessary, additional funding from an affiliate of the Companies if the funds in the Pension Escrow are not sufficient. In a bankruptcy, the Pension Plans may not be fully funded.

29 The Applicants take the position that the Consolidated Proposal meets the requirements of commercial morality and maintains the integrity of the bankruptcy system, in light of the superior coverage to be afforded to the Applicants' creditors under the Consolidated Proposal than in the event of bankruptcy.

30 The Applicants also submit that substantive consolidation inherent in the proposal will not prejudice any of the Affected Creditors and is appropriate in the circumstances. Although not expressly contemplated under the *BIA*, the Applicants submit that the court may look to its incidental, ancillary and auxiliary jurisdiction under s. 183 of the *BIA* and its equitable jurisdiction to grant an order for substantive consolidation. See *Ashley v. Marlow Group Private Portfolio Management Inc.* (2006), 22 C.B.R. (5th) 126 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]). In deciding whether to grant substantive consolidation, courts have held that it should not be done at the expense of, or possible prejudice of, any particular creditor. See *Ashley* , *supra*. However, counsel submits that this court should take into account practical business considerations in applying the *BIA*. See *A. & F. Baillargeon Express Inc., Re* (1993), 27 C.B.R. (3d) 36 (C.S. Que.).

31 In this case, the Applicants submit that substantive consolidation inherent in the Consolidated Proposal is appropriate in the circumstances due to, among other things, the intertwined nature of the Applicants' assets and liabilities. Each Applicant had substantially the same creditor base and known liabilities (other than certain Excluded Claims). In addition, KFL had no cash or cash equivalents and the Applicants are each dependant on the Escrow Funds and borrowings under the

Restated Senior Secured Loan Agreement to fund the same underlying pension and OPEB obligations and costs relating to the Proposal Proceedings.

32 The Applicants submit that creditors in neither estate will be materially prejudiced by substantive consolidation and based on the fact that no creditor objected to the substantial consolidation, counsel submits the Consolidated Proposal ought to be approved.

33 With respect to whether the Consolidated Proposal is calculated to benefit the general body of creditors, TK Finance would be entitled to priority distributions out of the estate in a bankruptcy scenario. However, the Applicants and their affiliates have agreed to forego recoveries under the Consolidated Proposal on account of their secured and unsecured intercompany claims in the amount of approximately $120 million, thus enhancing the level of recovery for the Affected Creditors, virtually all of whom are OPEB creditors. It is also noted that TK Finance will be contributing over $35 million to fund the Consolidated Proposal.

34 On this basis, the Applicants submit that the Consolidated Proposal is calculated to benefit the general body of creditors.

35 With respect to the requirement of the proposal being made in good faith, the debtor must satisfy the court that it has provided full disclosure to its creditors of its assets and encumbrances against such assets.

36 In this case, the Applicants and the Proposal Trustee have involved the creditors pursuant to the Representative Counsel Order, and through negotiations with the Union Representative Counsel and Non-Union Representative Counsel.

37 There is also evidence that the Applicants have widely disseminated information regarding their *BIA* proposal proceedings through the media and through postings on the Proposal Trustee's website. Information packages have also prepared by the Proposal Trustee for the creditors.

38 Finally, the Proposal Trustee has noted that the Applicants' conduct, both prior to and subsequent to the commencement of the *BIA* proposal proceedings, is not subject to censure in any respect and that the Applicants' have acted in good faith.

39 There is also evidence that the Consolidated Proposal continues requisite statutory terms. The Consolidated Proposal provides for the payment of preferred claims under s. 136(1) of the *BIA*.

40 Section 7.1 of the Consolidated Proposal contains a broad release in favour of the Applicants and in favour of certain third parties (the "Release"). In particular, the Release benefits the Proposal Trustee, Martinrea, the CAW, Union Representative Counsel, Non-Union Representative Counsel, Blue Cross, the Escrow Agent, the present and former shareholders and affiliates of the Applicants (including Thyssenkrupp USA, Inc. ("TK USA"), TK Finance, Thyssenkrupp Canada Inc. ("TK Canada") and Thyssenkrupp Budd Company), as well as their subsidiaries, directors, officers, members, partners, employees, auditors, financial advisors, legal counsel and agents of any of these parties and any person liable jointly or derivatively through any or all of the beneficiaries of the of the release (referred to individually as a "Released Party").

41 The Release covers all Affected Claims, Pension Claims and Escrow Fund Claims existing on or prior to the later of the Proposal Implementation Date and the date on which actions are taken to implement the Consolidated Proposal.

42 The Release provides that all such claims are released and waived (other than the right to enforce the Applicants' or Proposal Trustee's obligations under the Consolidated Proposal) to the full extent permitted by applicable law. However, nothing in the Consolidated Proposal releases or discharges any Released Party for any criminal or other wilful misconduct or any present or former directors of the Applicants with respect to any matters set out in s. 50(14) of the *BIA*. Unaffected Claims are specifically carved out of the Release.

43 The Applicants submit that the Release is both permissible under the *BIA* and appropriately granted in the context of the *BIA* proposal proceedings. Further, counsel submits, to the extent that the Release benefits third parties other than the Applicants, the Release is not prohibited by the *BIA* and it satisfies the criteria that has been established in granting

third-party releases under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("*CCAA*"). Moreover, counsel submits that the scope of the Release is no broader than necessary to give effect to the purpose of the Consolidated Proposal and the contributions made by the third parties to the success of the Consolidated Proposal.

44 No creditors or stakeholders objected to the scope of the Release which was fully disclosed in the negotiations, including the fact that the inclusion of the third-party releases was required to be part of the Consolidated Proposal. Counsel advises that the scope of the Release was referred to in the materials sent by the Proposal Trustee to the Affected Creditors prior to the meeting, specifically discussed at the meeting and adopted by the unanimous vote of the voting Affected Creditors.

45 Counsel also submits that there is no provision in the *BIA* that clearly and expressly precludes the Applicants from including the Release in the Consolidated Proposal as long as the court is satisfied that the Consolidated Proposal is reasonable and for the general benefit of creditors.

46 In this respect, it seems to me, that the governing statutes should not be technically or stringently interpreted in the insolvency context but, rather, should be interpreted in a manner that is flexible rather than technical and literal, in order to deal with the numerous situations and variations which arise from time to time. Further, taking a technical approach to the interpretation of the *BIA* would defeat the purpose of the legislation. See *N.T.W. Management Group Ltd., Re* (1994), 29 C.B.R. (3d) 139 (Ont. Bktcy.); *Olympia & York Developments Ltd., Re* (1995), 34 C.B.R. (3d) 93 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); *Olympia & York Developments Ltd., Re* (1997), 45 C.B.R. (3d) 85 (Ont. Bktcy.).

47 Moreover, the statutes which deal with the same subject matter are to be interpreted with the presumption of harmony, coherence and consistency. See *NAV Canada c. Wilmington Trust Co.*, 2006 SCC 24 (S.C.C.). This principle militates in favour of adopting an interpretation of the *BIA* that is harmonious, to the greatest extent possible, with the interpretation that has been given to the *CCAA*.

48 Counsel points out that historically, some case law has taken the position that s. 62(3) of the *BIA* precludes a proposal from containing a release that benefits third parties. Counsel submits that this result is not supported by a plain meaning of s. 62(3) and its interaction with other key sections in the *BIA*.

49 Subsection 62(3) of the *BIA* reads as follows:

> (3) The acceptance of a proposal by a creditor does not release any person who would not be released under this Act by the discharge of the debtor.

50 Counsel submits that there are two possible interpretations of this subsection:

> (a) It prohibits third party releases — in other words, the phrase "does not release any person" is interpreted to mean "cannot release any person"; or
>
> (b) It simply states that acceptance of a proposal does not automatically release any party other than the debtor — in other words, the phrase "does not release any person" is interpreted to mean "does not release any person without more"; it is protective not prohibitive.

51 I agree with counsel's submission that the latter interpretation of s. 62(3) of the *BIA* conforms with the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words used. If Parliament had intended that only the debtor could be released, s. 62(3) would have been drafted more simply to say exactly that.

52 Counsel further submits that the narrow interpretation would be a stringent and inflexible interpretation of the *BIA*, contrary to accepted wisdom that the *BIA* should be interpreted in a flexible, purposive manner.

53 The *BIA* proposal provisions are designed to offer debtors an opportunity to carry out a going concern or value maximizing restructuring in order to avoid a bankruptcy and related liquidation and that these purposes justify taking a broad, flexible and purposive approach to the interpretation of the relevant provisions. This interpretation is supported by *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re*, 2010 SCC 60 (S.C.C.).

54 Further, I agree with counsel's submissions that a more flexible purposive interpretation is in keeping with modern statutory principles and the need to give purposive interpretation to insolvency legislation must start from the proposition that there is no express prohibition in the *BIA* against including third-party releases in a proposal. At most, there are certain limited constraints on the scope of such releases, such as in s. 179 of the *BIA*, and the provision dealing specifically with the release of directors.

55 In the absence of an express prohibition against including third-party releases in a proposal, counsel submits that it must be presumed that such releases are permitted (subject to compliance with any limited express restrictions, such as in the case of a release of directors). By extension, counsel submits that the court is entitled to approve a proposal containing a third-party release if the court is able to satisfy itself that the proposal (including the third-party release) is reasonable and for the general benefit for creditors such that all creditors (including the minority who did not vote in favour of the proposal) can be required to forego their claims against parties other than the debtors.

56 The Applicants also submit that s. 62(3) of the *BIA* can only be properly understood when read together with other key sections of the *BIA*, particularly s. 179 which concerns the effect of an order of discharge:

> 179. An order of discharge does not release a person who at the time of the bankruptcy was a partner or co-trustee with the bankrupt or was jointly bound or had made a joint contract with the bankrupt, or a person who was surety or in the nature of a surety for the bankrupt.

57 The order of discharge of a bankrupt has the effect of releasing the bankrupt from all claims provable in bankruptcy (section 178(2) *BIA*). In the absence of s. 179, this release could result in the automatic release at law of certain types of claims that are identified in s. 179. For example, under guarantee law, the discharge of the principal debt results in the automatic discharge of a guarantor. Similarly, counsel points out the settlement or satisfaction of a debt by one joint obligor generally results in the automatic release of both joint obligors. Section 179 therefore serves the limited purpose of altering the result that would incur at law, indicating that the rule that the *BIA* generally is that there is no automatic release of third-party guarantors of co-obligors when a bankrupt is discharged.

58 Counsel submits that s. 62(3), which confirms that s. 179 applies to a proposal, was clearly intended to fulfil a very limited role — namely, to confirm that there is no automatic release of the specific types of co-obligors identified in s. 179 when a proposal is approved by the creditors and by the court. Counsel submits that it does not go further and preclude the creditors and the court from approving a proposal which contains the third-party release of the types of co-obligors set out in s. 179. I am in agreement with these submissions.

59 Specific considerations also apply when releasing directors of a debtor company. The *BIA* contains specific limitations on the permissible scope of such releases as set out in s. 50(14). For this reason, there is a specific section in the *BIA* proposal provisions outlining the principles governing such a release. However, counsel argues, the presence of the provisions outlining the circumstances in which a proposal can contain a release of claims against the debtor's directors does not give rise to an inference that the directors are the only third parties that can be released in a proposal. Rather, the inference is that there are considerations applicable to a release or compromise of claims against directors that do not apply generally to other third parties. Hence, it is necessary to deal with this particular type of compromise and release expressly.

60 I am also in agreement with the alternative submissions made by counsel in this area to the effect that if s. 62(3) of the *BIA* operates as a prohibition it refers only to those limitations that are expressly identified in the *BIA*, such as in s. 179 of the *BIA* and the specific limitations on the scope of releases that can benefit directors of the debtor.

61 Counsel submits that the Applicants' position regarding the proper interpretation of s. 62(3) of the *BIA* and its place in

the scheme of the *BIA* is consistent with the generally accepted principle that a proposal under the *BIA* is a contract. See *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.*, 2008 ONCA 587 (Ont. C.A.); *Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Ideal Petroleum (1959) Ltd.* (1976), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 230 (S.C.C.); and *Society of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada v. Armitage* (2000), 20 C.B.R. (4th) 160 (Ont. C.A.). Consequently, counsel submits that parties are entitled to put anything into a proposal that could lawfully be incorporated into any contract (see *Air Canada, Re* (2004), 2 C.B.R. (5th) 4 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])) and that given that the prescribed majority creditors have the statutory right under the *BIA* to bind a minority, however, this principle is subject to any limitations that are contained in the express wording of the *BIA*.

62 On this point, it seems to me, that any provision of the *BIA* which purports to limit the ability of the debtor to contract with its creditors should be clear and explicit. To hold otherwise would result in severely limiting the debtor's ability to contract with its creditors, thereby the decreasing the likelihood that a viable proposal could be reached. This would manifestly defeat the purpose of the proposal provisions of the *BIA*.

63 The Applicants further submit that creditors' interests — including the interests of the minority creditors who do not vote in favour of a proposal containing a third-party release — are sufficiently protected by the overriding ability of a court to refuse to approve a proposal with an overly broad third-party release, or where the release results in the proposal failing to demonstrate that it is for the benefit of the general body of creditors. The Applicants submit that the application of the *Metcalfe* criteria to the release is a mechanism whereby this court can assure itself that these preconditions to approve the Consolidated Proposal contained in the Release have been satisfied.

64 The Applicants acknowledge that there are several cases in which courts have held that a *BIA* proposal that includes a third-party release cannot be approved by the court but submits that these cases are based on a mistaken premise, are readily distinguishable and do not reflect the modern approach to Canadian insolvency law. Further, they submit that none of these cases are binding on this court and should not be followed.

65 In *Kern Agencies Ltd., (No. 2), Re* (1931), 13 C.B.R. 11 (Sask. C.A.), the court refused to approve a proposal that contained a release of the debtor's directors, officers and employees. Counsel points out that the court's refusal was based on a provision of the predecessor to the *BIA* which specifically provided that a proposal could only be binding on creditors (as far as relates to any debts due to them from the debtor). The current *BIA* does not contain equivalent general language. This case is clearly distinguishable.

66 In *Mister C's Ltd., Re* (1995), 32 C.B.R. (3d) 242 (Ont. Bktcy.), the court refused to approve a proposal that had received creditor approval. The court cited numerous bases for its conclusion that the proposal was not reasonable or calculated to benefit the general body of creditors, one of which was the release of the principals of the debtor company. The scope of the release was only one of the issues with the proposal, which had additional significant issues (procedural irregularities, favourable terms for insiders, and inequitable treatment of creditors generally). I agree with counsel to the Applicants that this case can be distinguished.

67 *Cosmic Adventures Halifax Inc., Re* (1999), 13 C.B.R. (4th) 22 (N.S. S.C.) relies on *Kern* and furthermore the Applicants submit that the discussion of third-party releases is technically *obiter* because the proposal was amended on consent.

68 The fourth case is *C.F.G. Construction inc., Re*, 2010 CarswellQue 10226 (C.S. Que.) where the Quebec Superior Court refused to approve a proposal containing a release of two sureties of the debtor. The case was decided on alternate grounds — either that the *BIA* did not permit a release of sureties, or in any event, the release could not be justified on the facts. I agree with the Applicants that this case is distinguishable. The case deals with the release of sureties and does not stand for any broader proposition.

69 In general, the Applicants' submission on this issue is that the court should apply the decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in *Metcalfe*, together with the binding principle set out by the Supreme Court in *Ted Leroy Trucking*, dictating a more liberal approach to the permissibility of third-party releases in *BIA* proposals than is taken by the Quebec court in *C.F.G. Construction Inc*. I agree.

70 The object of proposals under the *BIA* is to permit the debtor to restructure its business and, where possible, avoid the social and economic costs of liquidating its assets, which is precisely the same purpose as the *CCAA*. Although there are some differences between the two regimes and the *BIA* can generally be characterized as more "rules based", the thrust of the case law and the legislative reform has been towards harmonizing aspects of insolvency law common to the two statutory schemes to the extent possible, encouraging reorganization over liquidation. See *Ted Leroy Trucking*.

71 Recent case law has indicated that, in appropriate circumstances, third-party releases can be included in a plan of compromise and arrangement that is approved under the *CCAA*. See *Metcalfe*. The *CCAA* does not contain any express provisions permitting such third-party releases apart from certain limitations that apply to the compromise of claims against directors of the debtor company. See *CCAA* s. 5.1 and *Allen-Vanguard Corp., Re*, 2011 ONSC 733 (Ont. S.C.J.).

72 Counsel submits that although the mechanisms for dealing with the release of sureties and similar claimants are somewhat different in the *BIA* and *CCAA*, the differences are not of such significance that the presence of s. 62(3) of the *BIA* should be viewed as dictating a different approach to third-party releases generally from the approach that applies under the *CCAA*. I agree with this submission.

73 I also accept that if s. 62(3) of the *BIA* is interpreted as a prohibition against including the third-party release in the *BIA* proposal, the *BIA* and the *CCAA* would be in clear disharmony on this point. An interpretation of the *BIA* which leads to a result that is different from the *CCAA* should only be adopted pursuant to clear statutory language which, in my view, is not present in the *BIA*.

74 The most recent and persuasive example of the application of such a harmonious approach to the interpretation of the *BIA* and the *CCAA* can be found in *Ted Leroy Trucking*.

75 At issue in *Ted Leroy Trucking* was how to resolve an apparent conflict between the deemed trust provisions of the *Excise Tax Act* and the provisions of the *CCAA*. The language of the *Excise Tax Act* created a deemed trust over GST amounts collected by the debtor that was stated to apply "despite any other Act of Parliament". The *CCAA* stated that the deemed trust for GST did not apply under the *CCAA*, unless the funds otherwise specified the criteria for a "true" trust. The court was required to determine which federal provision should prevail.

76 By contrast, the same issue did not arise under the *BIA*, due to the language in the *Excise Tax Act* specifically indicating that the continued existence of the deemed trust depended on the terms of the *BIA*. The *BIA* contained a similar provision to the *CCAA* indicating that the deemed trust for GST amounts would no longer apply in a *BIA* proceeding.

77 Deschamps J., on behalf of six other members of the court, with Fish J. concurring and Abella J. dissenting, held that the proper interpretation of the statutes was that the *CCAA* provision should prevail, the deemed trust under the *Excise Tax Act* would cease to exist in a *CCAA* proceeding. In resolving the conflict between the *Excise Tax Act* and the *CCAA*, Deschamps J. noted the strange asymmetry which would arise if the *BIA* and *CCAA* were not in harmony on this issue:

> Moreover, a strange asymmetry would arise if the interpretation giving the *ETA* priority over the *CCAA* urged by the Crown is adopted here: the Crown would retain priority over GST claims during *CCAA* proceedings but not in bankruptcy. As courts have reflected, this can only encourage statute shopping by secured creditors in cases such as this one where the debtor's assets cannot satisfy both the secured creditors' and the Crown's claims (*Gauntlet*, at para. 21). If creditors' claims were better protected by liquidation under the *BIA*, creditors' incentives would lie overwhelmingly with avoiding proceedings under the *CCAA* and not risking a failed reorganization. Giving a key player in any insolvency such skewed incentives against reorganizing under the *CCAA* can only undermine that statute's remedial objectives and risk inviting the very social ills that it was enacted to avert.

78 It seems to me that these principles indicate that the court should generally strive, where the language of both statutes can support it, to give both statutes a harmonious interpretation to avoid the ills that can arise from "statute-shopping". These considerations, counsel submits, militate against adopting a strained reading of s. 62(3) of the *BIA* as a prohibition against third-party releases in a *BIA* proposal. I agree. In my opinion, there is no principled basis on which the analysis and treatment of a third-party release in a *BIA* proposal proceeding should differ from a CCAA proceeding.

79 The Applicants submit that it logically follows that the court is entitled to approve the Consolidated Proposal, including the Release, on the basis that it is reasonable and calculated to benefit the general body of creditors. Further, in keeping with the principles of harmonious interpretation of the *BIA* and the *CCAA*, the court should satisfy itself that the *Metcalfe* criteria, which apply to the approval of a third-party release under the CCAA, has been satisfied in relation to the Release.

80 In *Metcalfe*, the Court of Appeal for Ontario held that the requirements that must be satisfied to justify a third-party release are:

> (a) the parties to be released are necessary and essential to the restructuring of the debtor;
>
> (b) the claims to be released are rationally related to the purpose of the Plan (Proposal) and necessary for it;
>
> (c) the Plan (Proposal) cannot succeed without the releases;
>
> (d) the parties who are to have claims against them released are contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the Plan (Proposal); and
>
> (e) the Plan (Proposal) will benefit not only the debtor companies but creditors generally.

81 These requirements have also been referenced in *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re* (2010), 70 C.B.R. (5th) 1 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) and *Angiotech Pharmaceuticals Inc., Re* (2011), 76 C.B.R. (5th) 210 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]).

82 No single requirement listed above is determinative and the analysis must take into account the facts particular to each claim.

83 The Applicants submit that the Release satisfies each of the *Metcalfe* criteria. Firstly, counsel submits that following the closing of the Asset Purchase Agreement in 2006, Budd Canada had no operating assets or income and relied on inter-company advances to fund the pension and OPEB requirements to be made by Budd Canada on behalf of KFL pursuant to the Asset Purchase Agreement. Such funded amounts total approximately $112.7 million in pension payments and $24.6 million in OPEB payments between the closing of the Asset Purchase Agreement and the Filing Date. In addition, TK Finance has been providing Budd Canada and KFL with the necessary funding to pay the professional and other costs associated with the *BIA* Proposal Proceedings and will continue to fund such amounts through the Proposal Implementation Date. Moreover, TK Canada and TK Finance have agreed to forego recoveries under the Consolidated Proposal on account of their existing secured and unsecured intercompany loans in the amount of approximately $120 million.

84 Counsel submits that the releases provided in respect of the Applicants' affiliates are the *quid pro quo* for the sacrifices made by such affiliates to significantly enlarge recoveries for the unsecured creditors of the Applicants, particularly the OPEB creditors and reflects that the affiliates have provided over $135 million over the last five years in respect of the pension and OPEB amounts and additional availability of approximately $49 million to allow the Applicants to discharge their obligations to their former employees and retirees. Without the Releases, counsel submits, the Applicants' affiliates would have little or no incentive to contribute funds to the Consolidated Proposal and to waive their own rights against the Applicants.

85 The Release in favour of Martinrea is fully discussed at paragraphs 121-127 of the factum. The Applicants submit that the third-party releases set out in the Consolidated Proposal are clearly rationally related, necessary and essential to the Consolidated Proposal and are not overly broad.

86 Having reviewed the submissions in detail, I am in agreement that the Released Parties are contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the Consolidated Proposal.

87 I am also satisfied that without the Applicants' commitment to include the Release in the Consolidated Proposal to protect the Released Parties, it is unlikely that certain of such parties would have been prepared to support the Consolidated Proposal. The releases provided in respect of the Applicants' affiliates are particularly significant in this regard, since the sacrifices and monetary contributions of such affiliates are the primary reason that the Applicants have been able to make the Consolidated Proposal. Further, I am also satisfied that without the Release, the Applicants would be unable to satisfy the borrowing conditions under the Amended and Restated Senior Secured Loan Agreement with respect to the Applicants having only certain permitted liabilities after the Proposal Implementation Date. The alternative for the Applicants is bankruptcy, a scenario in which their affiliates' claims aggregating approximately $120 million would significantly erode recoveries for the unsecured creditors of the Applicants.

88 I am also satisfied that the Releases benefit the Applicants and creditors generally. The primary non-affiliated Creditors of the Applicants are the OPEB Creditors and Creditors with Pension Claims, together with the CRA. The Consolidated Proposal, in my view, clearly benefits these Creditors by generating higher recoveries than could be obtained from the bankruptcies of the Applicants. Moreover, the timing of any such bankruptcy recoveries is uncertain. As noted by the Proposal Trustee, the amount that the Affected Creditors would receive in the event of the bankruptcies of the Applicants is uncertain both in terms of quantum and timing, with the Applicants' funding of OPEB Claims terminating on bankruptcy, but distributions to the OPEB Creditors and other Creditors delayed for at least a year or two but perhaps much longer.

89 The Applicants and their affiliates also benefit from the Release as an affiliate of the Applicants may become enabled to use the net operating losses (NOL) following a series of transactions that are expected to occur immediately following the Proposal Implementation Date.

90 I am also satisfied that the Applicants have provided full and adequate disclosure of the Releases and their effect. Full disclosure was made in the proposal term sheet circulated to both Representative Counsel in early August 2011. The Release was negotiated as part of the Consolidated Proposal and the scope of the Release was disclosed by the Proposal Trustee in its Report to the creditors on the terms of the Consolidated Proposal, which Report was circulated by the Proposal Trustee to the Applicants' known creditors in advance of the creditors' meeting.

91 I am satisfied that the Applicants, with the assistance of the Proposal Trustee, took appropriate steps to ensure that the Affected Creditors were aware of the existence of the release provisions prior to the creditors' meeting.

92 For the foregoing reasons, I have concluded that the Release contained in the Consolidated Proposal meets the *Metcalfe* criteria and should be approved.

93 In the result, I am satisfied that the section 59(2) *BIA* test has been met and that it is appropriate to grant the Sanction Order in the form of the draft order attached to the Motion Record. An order has been signed to give effect to the foregoing.

Motion granted.

End of Document

TAB 6

2008 ONCA 587
Ontario Court of Appeal

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.

2008 CarswellOnt 4811, 2008 ONCA 587, [2008] O.J. No. 3164, 168 A.C.W.S. (3d) 698, 240 O.A.C. 245, 296 D.L.R. (4th) 135, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 123, 92 O.R. (3d) 513

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE AND ARRANGEMENT INVOLVING METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS II CORP., METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS III CORP., METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS V CORP., METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS XI CORP., METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS XII CORP., 4446372 CANADA INC. AND 6932819 CANADA INC., TRUSTEES OF THE CONDUITS LISTED IN SCHEDULE "A" HERETO

THE INVESTORS REPRESENTED ON THE PAN-CANADIAN INVESTORS COMMITTEE FOR THIRD-PARTY STRUCTURED ASSET-BACKED COMMERCIAL PAPER LISTED IN SCHEDULE "B" HERETO (Applicants / Respondents in Appeal) and METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS II CORP., METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS III CORP., METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS V CORP., METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS XI CORP., METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS XII CORP., 4446372 CANADA INC. AND 6932819 CANADA INC., TRUSTEES OF THE CONDUITS LISTED IN SCHEDULE "A" HERETO (Respondents / Respondents in Appeal) and AIR TRANSAT A.T. INC., TRANSAT TOURS CANADA INC., THE JEAN COUTU GROUP (PJC) INC., AÉROPORTS DE MONTRÉAL INC., AÉROPORTS DE MONTRÉAL CAPITAL INC., POMERLEAU ONTARIO INC., POMERLEAU INC., LABOPHARM INC., DOMTAR INC., DOMTAR PULP AND PAPER PRODUCTS INC., GIRO INC., VÊTEMENTS DE SPORTS R.G.R. INC., 131519 CANADA INC., AIR JAZZ LP, PETRIFOND FOUNDATION COMPANY LIMITED, PETRIFOND FOUNDATION MIDWEST LIMITED, SERVICES HYPOTHÉCAIRES LA PATRIMONIALE INC., TECSYS INC. SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE DE FINANCEMENT DU QUÉBEC, VIBROSYSTM INC., INTERQUISA CANADA L.P., REDCORP VENTURES LTD., JURA ENERGY CORPORATION, IVANHOE MINES LTD., WEBTECH WIRELESS INC., WYNN CAPITAL CORPORATION INC., HY BLOOM INC., CARDACIAN MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC., WEST ENERGY LTD., SABRE ENERTY LTD., PETROLIFERA PETROLEUM LTD., VAQUERO RESOURCES LTD. and STANDARD ENERGY INC. (Respondents / Appellants)

J.I. Laskin, E.A. Cronk, R.A. Blair JJ.A.

Heard: June 25-26, 2008
Judgment: August 18, 2008*
Docket: CA C48969

Proceedings: affirming *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.* (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 3523, 43 C.B.R. (5th) 269 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])

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John B. Laskin for National Bank Financial Inc., National Bank of Canada
Thomas McRae, Arthur O. Jacques for Ad Hoc Retail Creditors Committee (Brian Hunter, et al)
Howard Shapray, Q.C., Stephen Fitterman for Ivanhoe Mines Ltd.
Kevin P. McElcheran, Heather L. Meredith for Canadian Banks, BMO, CIBC RBC, Bank of Nova Scotia, T.D. Bank
Jeffrey S. Leon for CIBC Mellon Trust Company, Computershare Trust Company of Canada, BNY Trust Company of Canada, as Indenture Trustees
Usman Sheikh for Coventree Capital Inc.
Allan Sternberg, Sam R. Sasso for Brookfield Asset Management and Partners Ltd., Hy Bloom Inc., Cardacian Mortgage Services Inc.
Neil C. Saxe for Dominion Bond Rating Service
James A. Woods, Sebastien Richemont, Marie-Anne Paquette for Air Transat A.T. Inc., Transat Tours Canada Inc., Jean Coutu Group (PJC) Inc., Aéroports de Montréal, Aéroports de Montréal Capital Inc., Pomerleau Ontario Inc., Pomerleau Inc., Labopharm Inc., Agence Métropolitaine de Transport (AMT), Giro Inc., Vêtements de sports RGR Inc., 131519 Canada Inc., Tecsys Inc., New Gold Inc., Jazz Air LP
Scott A. Turner for Webtech Wireless Inc., Wynn Capital Corporation Inc., West Energy Ltd., Sabre Energy Ltd., Petrolifera Petroleum Ltd., Vaquero Resources Ltd., and Standard Energy Ltd.
R. Graham Phoenix for Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments III Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments V Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XI Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XII Corp., Quanto Financial Corporation and Metcalfe & Mansfield Capital Corp.

Subject: Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure

Related Abridgment Classifications
For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Bankruptcy and insolvency

XVII Practice and procedure in courts
  XVII.7 Appeals
    XVII.7.b To Court of Appeal
      XVII.7.b.ii Availability
        XVII.7.b.ii.D Miscellaneous cases

Bankruptcy and insolvency

XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
  XIX.3 Arrangements
    XIX.3.b Approval by court
      XIX.3.b.iv Miscellaneous

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Proposal — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — Miscellaneous issues

Releases — Parties were financial institutions, dealers and noteholders in market for Asset Backed Commercial Paper ("ABCP") — Canadian ABCP market experienced liquidity crisis — Plan of Compromise and Arrangement ("Plan") was put forward under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") — Plan included releases for claims against banks and dealers in negligence, misrepresentation and fraud, with "carve out" allowing fraudulent misrepresentations claims — Noteholders voted in favour of Plan — Minority noteholders ("opponents") opposed Plan based on releases — Applicants' application for approval of Plan was granted — Opponents brought application for leave to appeal and appeal from that decision — Application granted; appeal dismissed — CCAA permits inclusion of third party releases in plan of compromise or arrangement to be sanctioned by court where those releases were reasonably connected to proposed restructuring — It is implicit in language of CCAA that court has authority to sanction plans incorporating third-party releases that are reasonably related to proposed restructuring — CCAA is supporting framework for resolution of corporate insolvencies in public interest — Parties are entitled to put anything in Plan that could lawfully be incorporated into any contract — Plan of compromise or arrangement may propose that creditors agree to compromise claims against debtor and to release third parties, just as any debtor and creditor might agree to such terms in contract between them — Once statutory mechanism regarding voter approval and court sanctioning has been complied with, plan becomes binding on all creditors.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Practice and procedure in courts — Appeals — To Court of Appeal — Availability — Miscellaneous cases

Leave to appeal — Parties were financial institutions, dealers and noteholders in market for Asset Backed Commercial Paper ("ABCP") — Canadian ABCP market experienced liquidity crisis — Plan of Compromise and Arrangement ("Plan") was put forward under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") — Plan included releases for claims against banks and dealers in negligence, misrepresentation and fraud, with "carve out" allowing fraudulent misrepresentations claims — Noteholders voted in favour of Plan — Minority noteholders ("opponents") opposed Plan based on releases — Applicants' application for approval of Plan was granted — Opponents brought application for leave to appeal and appeal from that decision — Application granted; appeal dismissed — Criteria for granting leave to appeal in CCAA proceedings was met — Proposed appeal raised issues of considerable importance to restructuring proceedings under CCAA Canada-wide — These were serious and arguable grounds of appeal and appeal would not unduly delay progress of proceedings.

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Reference re Refund of Dues Paid under s.47 (f) of Timber Regulations in the Western Provinces (1933), [1934] 1 D.L.R. 43, 1933 CarswellNat 47, [1933] S.C.R. 616 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Reference re Refund of Dues Paid under s.47 (f) of Timber Regulations in the Western Provinces (1935), [1935] 1 W.W.R. 607, [1935] 2 D.L.R. 1, 1935 CarswellNat 2, [1935] A.C. 184 (Canada P.C.) — considered

Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., Re (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 1, 1998 CarswellOnt 2, 50 C.B.R. (3d) 163, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, 33 C.C.E.L. (2d) 173, 154 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 36 O.R. (3d) 418 (headnote only), *(*sub nom. *Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Bankrupt), Re)* 221 N.R. 241, *(*sub nom. *Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Bankrupt), Re)* 106 O.A.C. 1, *(*sub nom. *Adrien v. Ontario Ministry of Labour)* 98 C.L.L.C. 210-006 (S.C.C.) — considered

Royal Penfield Inc., Re (2003), 44 C.B.R. (4th) 302, [2003] R.J.Q. 2157, 2003 CarswellQue 1711, [2003] G.S.T.C. 195 (C.S. Que.) — referred to

Skydome Corp., Re (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 5914, 16 C.B.R. (4th) 125 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Society of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada v. Armitage (2000), 2000 CarswellOnt 4120, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 160, 50 O.R. (3d) 688, 137 O.A.C. 74 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Steinberg Inc. c. Michaud (1993), [1993] R.J.Q. 1684, 55 Q.A.C. 298, 1993 CarswellQue 229, 1993 CarswellQue 2055, 42 C.B.R. (5th) 1 (C.A. Que.) — referred to

Stelco Inc., Re (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 6483, 15 C.B.R. (5th) 297 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Stelco Inc., Re (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 6818, 204 O.A.C. 205, 78 O.R. (3d) 241, 261 D.L.R. (4th) 368, 11 B.L.R. (4th) 185, 15 C.B.R. (5th) 307 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Stelco Inc., Re (2006), 210 O.A.C. 129, 2006 CarswellOnt 3050, 21 C.B.R. (5th) 157 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

T&N Ltd., Re (2006), [2007] Bus. L.R. 1411, [2007] 1 All E.R. 851, [2006] Lloyd's Rep. I.R. 817, [2007] 1 B.C.L.C. 563, [2006] B.P.I.R. 1283 (Eng. Ch. Div.) — considered

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3
Generally — referred to

Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16
s. 182 — referred to

Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44
s. 192 — referred to

Code civil du Québec, L.Q. 1991, c. 64
en général — referred to

Companies Act, 1985, c. 6
s. 425 — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

s. 4 — considered

s. 5.1 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 122] — considered

s. 6 — considered

Constitution Act, 1867, (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5
s. 91 ¶ 21 — referred to

s. 92 — referred to

s. 92 ¶ 13 — referred to

Words and phrases considered:

arrangement

"Arrangement" is broader than "compromise" and would appear to include any scheme for reorganizing the affairs of the debtor.

APPEAL by opponents of creditor-initiated plan from judgment reported at *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.* (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 3523, 43 C.B.R. (5th) 269, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 74 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), granting application for approval of plan.

***R.A. Blair J.A.*:**

A. Introduction

1 In August 2007 a liquidity crisis suddenly threatened the Canadian market in Asset Backed Commercial Paper ("ABCP"). The crisis was triggered by a loss of confidence amongst investors stemming from the news of widespread defaults on U.S. sub-prime mortgages. The loss of confidence placed the Canadian financial market at risk generally and was reflective of an economic volatility worldwide.

2 By agreement amongst the major Canadian participants, the $32 billion Canadian market in third-party ABCP was frozen on August 13, 2007 pending an attempt to resolve the crisis through a restructuring of that market. The Pan-Canadian Investors Committee, chaired by Purdy Crawford, C.C., Q.C., was formed and ultimately put forward the creditor-initiated Plan of Compromise and Arrangement that forms the subject-matter of these proceedings. The Plan was sanctioned by Colin L. Campbell J. on June 5, 2008.

3 Certain creditors who opposed the Plan seek leave to appeal and, if leave is granted, appeal from that decision. They raise an important point regarding the permissible scope of a restructuring under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 as amended ("CCAA"): can the court sanction a Plan that calls for creditors to provide releases to third parties who are themselves solvent and not creditors of the debtor company? They also argue that, if the answer to this question is yes, the application judge erred in holding that this Plan, with its particular releases (which bar some claims even in fraud), was fair and reasonable and therefore in sanctioning it under the CCAA.

Leave to Appeal

4 Because of the particular circumstances and urgency of these proceedings, the court agreed to collapse an oral hearing for leave to appeal with the hearing of the appeal itself. At the outset of argument we encouraged counsel to combine their submissions on both matters.

5 The proposed appeal raises issues of considerable importance to restructuring proceedings under the CCAA Canada-wide. There are serious and arguable grounds of appeal and — given the expedited time-table — the appeal will not unduly delay the progress of the proceedings. I am satisfied that the criteria for granting leave to appeal in CCAA proceedings, set out in such cases as *Cineplex Odeon Corp., Re* (2001), 24 C.B.R. (4th) 201 (Ont. C.A.), and *Country Style Food Services Inc., Re* (2002), 158 O.A.C. 30 (Ont. C.A. [In Chambers]), are met. I would grant leave to appeal.

Appeal

6 For the reasons that follow, however, I would dismiss the appeal.

B. Facts

The Parties

7 The appellants are holders of ABCP Notes who oppose the Plan. They do so principally on the basis that it requires them to grant releases to third party financial institutions against whom they say they have claims for relief arising out of their purchase of ABCP Notes. Amongst them are an airline, a tour operator, a mining company, a wireless provider, a

pharmaceuticals retailer, and several holding companies and energy companies.

8 Each of the appellants has large sums invested in ABCP — in some cases, hundreds of millions of dollars. Nonetheless, the collective holdings of the appellants — slightly over $1 billion — represent only a small fraction of the more than $32 billion of ABCP involved in the restructuring.

9 The lead respondent is the Pan-Canadian Investors Committee which was responsible for the creation and negotiation of the Plan on behalf of the creditors. Other respondents include various major international financial institutions, the five largest Canadian banks, several trust companies, and some smaller holders of ABCP product. They participated in the market in a number of different ways.

The ABCP Market

10 Asset Backed Commercial Paper is a sophisticated and hitherto well-accepted financial instrument. It is primarily a form of short-term investment — usually 30 to 90 days — typically with a low interest yield only slightly better than that available through other short-term paper from a government or bank. It is said to be “asset backed” because the cash that is used to purchase an ABCP Note is converted into a portfolio of financial assets or other asset interests that in turn provide security for the repayment of the notes.

11 ABCP was often presented by those selling it as a safe investment, somewhat like a guaranteed investment certificate.

12 The Canadian market for ABCP is significant and administratively complex. As of August 2007, investors had placed over $116 billion in Canadian ABCP. Investors range from individual pensioners to large institutional bodies. On the selling and distribution end, numerous players are involved, including chartered banks, investment houses and other financial institutions. Some of these players participated in multiple ways. The Plan in this proceeding relates to approximately $32 billion of non-bank sponsored ABCP the restructuring of which is considered essential to the preservation of the Canadian ABCP market.

13 As I understand it, prior to August 2007 when it was frozen, the ABCP market worked as follows.

14 Various corporations (the “Sponsors”) would arrange for entities they control (”Conduits”) to make ABCP Notes available to be sold to investors through “Dealers” (banks and other investment dealers). Typically, ABCP was issued by series and sometimes by classes within a series.

15 The cash from the purchase of the ABCP Notes was used to purchase assets which were held by trustees of the Conduits (”Issuer Trustees”) and which stood as security for repayment of the notes. Financial institutions that sold or provided the Conduits with the assets that secured the ABCP are known as “Asset Providers”. To help ensure that investors would be able to redeem their notes, “Liquidity Providers” agreed to provide funds that could be drawn upon to meet the demands of maturing ABCP Notes in certain circumstances. Most Asset Providers were also Liquidity Providers. Many of these banks and financial institutions were also holders of ABCP Notes (”Noteholders”). The Asset and Liquidity Providers held first charges on the assets.

16 When the market was working well, cash from the purchase of new ABCP Notes was also used to pay off maturing ABCP Notes; alternatively, Noteholders simply rolled their maturing notes over into new ones. As I will explain, however, there was a potential underlying predicament with this scheme.

The Liquidity Crisis

17 The types of assets and asset interests acquired to “back” the ABCP Notes are varied and complex. They were generally long-term assets such as residential mortgages, credit card receivables, auto loans, cash collateralized debt obligations and derivative investments such as credit default swaps. Their particular characteristics do not matter for the purpose of this appeal, but they shared a common feature that proved to be the Achilles heel of the ABCP market: because of their long-term nature there was an inherent timing mismatch between the cash they generated and the cash needed to repay

maturing ABCP Notes.

18 When uncertainty began to spread through the ABCP marketplace in the summer of 2007, investors stopped buying the ABCP product and existing Noteholders ceased to roll over their maturing notes. There was no cash to redeem those notes. Although calls were made on the Liquidity Providers for payment, most of the Liquidity Providers declined to fund the redemption of the notes, arguing that the conditions for liquidity funding had not been met in the circumstances. Hence the "liquidity crisis" in the ABCP market.

19 The crisis was fuelled largely by a lack of transparency in the ABCP scheme. Investors could not tell what assets were backing their notes — partly because the ABCP Notes were often sold before or at the same time as the assets backing them were acquired; partly because of the sheer complexity of certain of the underlying assets; and partly because of assertions of confidentiality by those involved with the assets. As fears arising from the spreading U.S. sub-prime mortgage crisis mushroomed, investors became increasingly concerned that their ABCP Notes may be supported by those crumbling assets. For the reasons outlined above, however, they were unable to redeem their maturing ABCP Notes.

The Montreal Protocol

20 The liquidity crisis could have triggered a wholesale liquidation of the assets, at depressed prices. But it did not. During the week of August 13, 2007, the ABCP market in Canada froze — the result of a standstill arrangement orchestrated on the heels of the crisis by numerous market participants, including Asset Providers, Liquidity Providers, Noteholders and other financial industry representatives. Under the standstill agreement — known as the Montréal Protocol — the parties committed to restructuring the ABCP market with a view, as much as possible, to preserving the value of the assets and of the notes.

21 The work of implementing the restructuring fell to the Pan-Canadian Investors Committee, an applicant in the proceeding and respondent in the appeal. The Committee is composed of 17 financial and investment institutions, including chartered banks, credit unions, a pension board, a Crown corporation, and a university board of governors. All 17 members are themselves Noteholders; three of them also participated in the ABCP market in other capacities as well. Between them, they hold about two thirds of the $32 billion of ABCP sought to be restructured in these proceedings.

22 Mr. Crawford was named the Committee's chair. He thus had a unique vantage point on the work of the Committee and the restructuring process as a whole. His lengthy affidavit strongly informed the application judge's understanding of the factual context, and our own. He was not cross-examined and his evidence is unchallenged.

23 Beginning in September 2007, the Committee worked to craft a plan that would preserve the value of the notes and assets, satisfy the various stakeholders to the extent possible, and restore confidence in an important segment of the Canadian financial marketplace. In March 2008, it and the other applicants sought CCAA protection for the ABCP debtors and the approval of a Plan that had been pre-negotiated with some, but not all, of those affected by the misfortunes in the Canadian ABCP market.

The Plan

a) Plan Overview

24 Although the ABCP market involves many different players and kinds of assets, each with their own challenges, the committee opted for a single plan. In Mr. Crawford's words, "all of the ABCP suffers from common problems that are best addressed by a common solution." The Plan the Committee developed is highly complex and involves many parties. In its essence, the Plan would convert the Noteholders' paper — which has been frozen and therefore effectively worthless for many months — into new, long-term notes that would trade freely, but with a discounted face value. The hope is that a strong secondary market for the notes will emerge in the long run.

25 The Plan aims to improve transparency by providing investors with detailed information about the assets supporting their ABCP Notes. It also addresses the timing mismatch between the notes and the assets by adjusting the maturity

provisions and interest rates on the new notes. Further, the Plan adjusts some of the underlying credit default swap contracts by increasing the thresholds for default triggering events; in this way, the likelihood of a forced liquidation flowing from the credit default swap holder's prior security is reduced and, in turn, the risk for ABCP investors is decreased.

26 Under the Plan, the vast majority of the assets underlying ABCP would be pooled into two master asset vehicles (MAV1 and MAV2). The pooling is designed to increase the collateral available and thus make the notes more secure.

27 The Plan does not apply to investors holding less than $1 million of notes. However, certain Dealers have agreed to buy the ABCP of those of their customers holding less than the $1-million threshold, and to extend financial assistance to these customers. Principal among these Dealers are National Bank and Canaccord, two of the respondent financial institutions the appellants most object to releasing. The application judge found that these developments appeared to be designed to secure votes in favour of the Plan by various Noteholders, and were apparently successful in doing so. If the Plan is approved, they also provide considerable relief to the many small investors who find themselves unwittingly caught in the ABDP collapse.

b) The Releases

28 This appeal focuses on one specific aspect of the Plan: the comprehensive series of releases of third parties provided for in Article 10.

29 The Plan calls for the release of Canadian banks, Dealers, Noteholders, Asset Providers, Issuer Trustees, Liquidity Providers, and other market participants — in Mr. Crawford's words, "virtually all participants in the Canadian ABCP market" — from any liability associated with ABCP, with the exception of certain narrow claims relating to fraud. For instance, under the Plan as approved, creditors will have to give up their claims against the Dealers who sold them their ABCP Notes, including challenges to the way the Dealers characterized the ABCP and provided (or did not provide) information about the ABCP. The claims against the proposed defendants are mainly in tort: negligence, misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, failure to act prudently as a dealer/advisor, acting in conflict of interest, and in a few cases fraud or potential fraud. There are also allegations of breach of fiduciary duty and claims for other equitable relief.

30 The application judge found that, in general, the claims for damages include the face value of the Notes, plus interest and additional penalties and damages.

31 The releases, in effect, are part of a *quid pro quo*. Generally speaking, they are designed to compensate various participants in the market for the contributions they would make to the restructuring. Those contributions under the Plan include the requirements that:

> a) Asset Providers assume an increased risk in their credit default swap contracts, disclose certain proprietary information in relation to the assets, and provide below-cost financing for margin funding facilities that are designed to make the notes more secure;
>
> b) Sponsors — who in addition have cooperated with the Investors' Committee throughout the process, including by sharing certain proprietary information — give up their existing contracts;
>
> c) The Canadian banks provide below-cost financing for the margin funding facility and,
>
> d) Other parties make other contributions under the Plan.

32 According to Mr. Crawford's affidavit, the releases are part of the Plan "because certain key participants, whose participation is vital to the restructuring, have made comprehensive releases a condition for their participation."

The CCAA Proceedings to Date

33 On March 17, 2008 the applicants sought and obtained an Initial Order under the CCAA staying any proceedings relating to the ABCP crisis and providing for a meeting of the Noteholders to vote on the proposed Plan. The meeting was held on April 25th. The vote was overwhelmingly in support of the Plan — 96% of the Noteholders voted in favour. At the instance of certain Noteholders, and as requested by the application judge (who has supervised the proceedings from the outset), the Monitor broke down the voting results according to those Noteholders who had worked on or with the Investors' Committee to develop the Plan and those Noteholders who had not. Re-calculated on this basis the results remained firmly in favour of the proposed Plan — 99% of those connected with the development of the Plan voted positively, as did 80% of those Noteholders who had not been involved in its formulation.

34 The vote thus provided the Plan with the "double majority" approval — a majority of creditors representing two-thirds in value of the claims — required under s. 6 of the CCAA.

35 Following the successful vote, the applicants sought court approval of the Plan under s. 6. Hearings were held on May 12 and 13. On May 16, the application judge issued a brief endorsement in which he concluded that he did not have sufficient facts to decide whether all the releases proposed in the Plan were authorized by the CCAA. While the application judge was prepared to approve the releases of negligence claims, he was not prepared at that point to sanction the release of fraud claims. Noting the urgency of the situation and the serious consequences that would result from the Plan's failure, the application judge nevertheless directed the parties back to the bargaining table to try to work out a claims process for addressing legitimate claims of fraud.

36 The result of this renegotiation was a "fraud carve-out" — an amendment to the Plan excluding certain fraud claims from the Plan's releases. The carve-out did not encompass all possible claims of fraud, however. It was limited in three key respects. First, it applied only to claims against ABCP Dealers. Secondly, it applied only to cases involving an express fraudulent misrepresentation made with the intention to induce purchase and in circumstances where the person making the representation knew it to be false. Thirdly, the carve-out limited available damages to the value of the notes, minus any funds distributed as part of the Plan. The appellants argue vigorously that such a limited release respecting fraud claims is unacceptable and should not have been sanctioned by the application judge.

37 A second sanction hearing — this time involving the amended Plan (with the fraud carve-out) — was held on June 3, 2008. Two days later, Campbell J. released his reasons for decision, approving and sanctioning the Plan on the basis both that he had jurisdiction to sanction a Plan calling for third-party releases and that the Plan including the third-party releases in question here was fair and reasonable.

38 The appellants attack both of these determinations.

C. Law and Analysis

39 There are two principal questions for determination on this appeal:

> 1) As a matter of law, may a CCAA plan contain a release of claims against anyone other than the debtor company or its directors?
>
> 2) If the answer to that question is yes, did the application judge err in the exercise of his discretion to sanction the Plan as fair and reasonable given the nature of the releases called for under it?

(1) Legal Authority for the Releases

40 The standard of review on this first issue — whether, as a matter of law, a CCAA plan may contain third-party releases

— is correctness.

41 The appellants submit that a court has no jurisdiction or legal authority under the CCAA to sanction a plan that imposes an obligation on creditors to give releases to third parties other than the directors of the debtor company.[1] The requirement that objecting creditors release claims against third parties is illegal, they contend, because:

> a) on a proper interpretation, the CCAA does not permit such releases;
>
> b) the court is not entitled to "fill in the gaps" in the CCAA or rely upon its inherent jurisdiction to create such authority because to do so would be contrary to the principle that Parliament did not intend to interfere with private property rights or rights of action in the absence of clear statutory language to that effect;
>
> c) the releases constitute an unconstitutional confiscation of private property that is within the exclusive domain of the provinces under s. 92 of the *Constitution Act*, 1867;
>
> d) the releases are invalid under Quebec rules of public order; and because
>
> e) the prevailing jurisprudence supports these conclusions.

42 I would not give effect to any of these submissions.

Interpretation, "Gap Filling" and Inherent Jurisdiction

43 On a proper interpretation, in my view, the CCAA permits the inclusion of third party releases in a plan of compromise or arrangement to be sanctioned by the court where those releases are reasonably connected to the proposed restructuring. I am led to this conclusion by a combination of (a) the open-ended, flexible character of the CCAA itself, (b) the broad nature of the term "compromise or arrangement" as used in the Act, and (c) the express statutory effect of the "double-majority" vote and court sanction which render the plan binding on *all* creditors, including those unwilling to accept certain portions of it. The first of these signals a flexible approach to the application of the Act in new and evolving situations, an active judicial role in its application and interpretation, and a liberal approach to that interpretation. The second provides the entrée to negotiations between the parties affected in the restructuring and furnishes them with the ability to apply the broad scope of their ingenuity in fashioning the proposal. The latter afford necessary protection to unwilling creditors who may be deprived of certain of their civil and property rights as a result of the process.

44 The CCAA is skeletal in nature. It does not contain a comprehensive code that lays out all that is permitted or barred. Judges must therefore play a role in fleshing out the details of the statutory scheme. The scope of the Act and the powers of the court under it are not limitless. It is beyond controversy, however, that the CCAA is remedial legislation to be liberally construed in accordance with the modern purposive approach to statutory interpretation. It is designed to be a flexible instrument and it is that very flexibility which gives the Act its efficacy: *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re* (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]). As Farley J. noted in *Dylex Ltd., Re* (1995), 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), at 111, "[t]he history of CCAA law has been an evolution of judicial interpretation."

45 Much has been said, however, about the "evolution of judicial interpretation" and there is some controversy over both the source and scope of that authority. Is the source of the court's authority statutory, discerned solely through application of the principles of statutory interpretation, for example? Or does it rest in the court's ability to "fill in the gaps" in legislation? Or in the court's inherent jurisdiction?

46 These issues have recently been canvassed by the Honourable Georgina R. Jackson and Dr. Janis Sarra in their publication "Selecting the Judicial Tool to get the Job Done: An Examination of Statutory Interpretation, Discretionary Power and Inherent Jurisdiction in Insolvency Matters,"[2] and there was considerable argument on these issues before the

application judge and before us. While I generally agree with the authors' suggestion that the courts should adopt a hierarchical approach in their resort to these interpretive tools — statutory interpretation, gap-filling, discretion and inherent jurisdiction — it is not necessary in my view to go beyond the general principles of statutory interpretation to resolve the issues on this appeal. Because I am satisfied that it is implicit in the language of the CCAA itself that the court has authority to sanction plans incorporating third-party releases that are reasonably related to the proposed restructuring, there is no "gap-filling" to be done and no need to fall back on inherent jurisdiction. In this respect, I take a somewhat different approach than the application judge did.

47 The Supreme Court of Canada has affirmed generally — and in the insolvency context particularly — that remedial statutes are to be interpreted liberally and in accordance with Professor Driedger's modern principle of statutory interpretation. Driedger advocated that "the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament": *Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., Re*, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27 (S.C.C.) at para. 21, quoting E.A. Driedger, *Construction of Statutes*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983); *Bell ExpressVu Ltd. Partnership v. Rex*, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 (S.C.C.) at para. 26.

48 More broadly, I believe that the proper approach to the judicial interpretation and application of statutes — particularly those like the CCAA that are skeletal in nature — is succinctly and accurately summarized by Jackson and Sarra in their recent article, *supra*, at p. 56:

> The exercise of a statutory authority requires the statute to be construed. The plain meaning or textualist approach has given way to a search for the object and goals of the statute and the intentionalist approach. This latter approach makes use of the purposive approach and the mischief rule, including its codification under interpretation statutes that every enactment is deemed remedial, and is to be given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects. This latter approach advocates reading the statute as a whole and being mindful of Driedger's "one principle", that the words of the Act are to be read in their entire context, in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament. It is important that courts first interpret the statute before them and exercise their authority pursuant to the statute, before reaching for other tools in the judicial toolbox. Statutory interpretation using the principles articulated above leaves room for gap-filling in the common law provinces and a consideration of purpose in *Québec* as a manifestation of the judge's overall task of statutory interpretation. Finally, the jurisprudence in relation to statutory interpretation demonstrates the fluidity inherent in the judge's task in seeking the objects of the statute and the intention of the legislature.

49 I adopt these principles.

50 The remedial purpose of the CCAA — as its title affirms — is to facilitate compromises or arrangements between an insolvent debtor company and its creditors. In *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311 (B.C. C.A.) at 318, Gibbs J.A. summarized very concisely the purpose, object and scheme of the Act:

> Almost inevitably, liquidation destroyed the shareholders' investment, yielded little by way of recovery to the creditors, and exacerbated the social evil of devastating levels of unemployment. The government of the day sought, through the C.C.A.A., to create a regime whereby the principals of the company and the creditors could be brought together under the supervision of the court to attempt a reorganization or compromise or arrangement under which the company could continue in business.

51 The CCAA was enacted in 1933 and was necessary — as the then Secretary of State noted in introducing the Bill on First Reading — "because of the prevailing commercial and industrial depression" and the need to alleviate the effects of business bankruptcies in that context: see the statement of the Hon. C.H. Cahan, Secretary of State, *House of Commons Debates (Hansard)* (April 20, 1933) at 4091. One of the greatest effects of that Depression was what Gibbs J.A. described as "the social evil of devastating levels of unemployment". Since then, courts have recognized that the Act has a broader dimension than simply the direct relations between the debtor company and its creditors and that this broader public

dimension must be weighed in the balance together with the interests of those most directly affected: see, for example, *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.), *per* Doherty J.A. in dissent; *Skydome Corp., Re* (1998), 16 C.B.R. (4th) 125 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); *Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re* (1998), 7 C.B.R. (4th) 51 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).

52 In this respect, I agree with the following statement of Doherty J.A. in *Elan*, *supra*, at pp. 306-307:

> . . . [T]he Act was designed to serve a "broad constituency of investors, creditors and employees".[3] Because of that "broad constituency" the court must, when considering applications brought under the Act, *have regard not only to the individuals and organizations directly affected by the application, but also to the wider public interest*. [Emphasis added.]

Application of the Principles of Interpretation

53 An interpretation of the CCAA that recognizes its broader socio-economic purposes and objects is apt in this case. As the application judge pointed out, the restructuring underpins the financial viability of the Canadian ABCP market itself.

54 The appellants argue that the application judge erred in taking this approach and in treating the Plan and the proceedings as an attempt to restructure a financial market (the ABCP market) rather than simply the affairs between the debtor corporations who caused the ABCP Notes to be issued and their creditors. The Act is designed, they say, only to effect reorganizations between a corporate debtor and its creditors and not to attempt to restructure entire marketplaces.

55 This perspective is flawed in at least two respects, however, in my opinion. First, it reflects a view of the purpose and objects of the CCAA that is too narrow. Secondly, it overlooks the reality of the ABCP marketplace and the context of the restructuring in question here. It may be true that, in their capacity as ABCP *Dealers*, the releasee financial institutions are "third-parties" to the restructuring in the sense that they are not creditors of the debtor corporations. However, in their capacities as *Asset Providers* and *Liquidity Providers*, they are not only creditors but they are prior secured creditors to the Noteholders. Furthermore — as the application judge found — in these latter capacities they are making significant contributions to the restructuring by "foregoing immediate rights to assets and ... providing real and tangible input for the preservation and enhancement of the Notes" (para. 76). In this context, therefore, the application judge's remark at para. 50 that the restructuring "involves the commitment and participation of all parties" in the ABCP market makes sense, as do his earlier comments at paras. 48-49:

> Given the nature of the ABCP market and all of its participants, it is more appropriate to consider all Noteholders as claimants and the object of the Plan to restore liquidity to the assets being the Notes themselves. The restoration of the liquidity of the market necessitates the participation (including more tangible contribution by many) of all Noteholders.
>
> In these circumstances, *it is unduly technical to classify the Issuer Trustees as debtors and the claims of the Noteholders as between themselves and others as being those of third party creditors*, although I recognize that the restructuring structure of the CCAA requires the corporations as the vehicles for restructuring. [Emphasis added.]

56 The application judge did observe that "[t]he insolvency is of the ABCP market itself, the restructuring is that of the market for such paper ..." (para. 50). He did so, however, to point out the uniqueness of the Plan before him and its industry-wide significance and not to suggest that he need have no regard to the provisions of the CCAA permitting a restructuring as between debtor and creditors. His focus was on *the effect* of the restructuring, a perfectly permissible perspective, given the broad purpose and objects of the Act. This is apparent from his later references. For example, in balancing the arguments against approving releases that might include aspects of fraud, he responded that "what is at issue is a liquidity crisis that affects the ABCP market in Canada" (para. 125). In addition, in his reasoning on the fair-and-reasonable issue, he stated at para. 142: "Apart from the Plan itself, there is a need to restore confidence in the financial system in Canada and this Plan is a legitimate use of the CCAA to accomplish that goal."

57 I agree. I see no error on the part of the application judge in approaching the fairness assessment or the interpretation issue with these considerations in mind. They provide the context in which the purpose, objects and scheme of the CCAA are to be considered.

The Statutory Wording

58 Keeping in mind the interpretive principles outlined above, I turn now to a consideration of the provisions of the CCAA. Where in the words of the statute is the court clothed with authority to approve a plan incorporating a requirement for third-party releases? As summarized earlier, the answer to that question, in my view, is to be found in:

> a) the skeletal nature of the CCAA;
>
> b) Parliament's reliance upon the broad notions of "compromise" and "arrangement" to establish the framework within which the parties may work to put forward a restructuring plan; and in
>
> c) the creation of the statutory mechanism binding all creditors in classes to the compromise or arrangement once it has surpassed the high "double majority" voting threshold and obtained court sanction as "fair and reasonable".

Therein lies the expression of Parliament's intention to permit the parties to negotiate and vote on, and the court to sanction, third-party releases relating to a restructuring.

59 Sections 4 and 6 of the CCAA state:

> 4. Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its unsecured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company, of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors, and, if the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.
>
> 6. Where a majority in number representing two-thirds in value of the creditors, or class of creditors, as the case may be, present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting or meetings thereof respectively held pursuant to sections 4 and 5, or either of those sections, agree to any compromise or arrangement either as proposed or as altered or modified at the meeting or meetings, the compromise or arrangement may be sanctioned by the court, and if so sanctioned is binding
>
> (a) on all the creditors or the class of creditors, as the case may be, and on any trustee for any such class of creditors, whether secured or unsecured, as the case may be, and on the company; and
>
> (b) in the case of a company that has made an authorized assignment or against which a bankruptcy order has been made under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or is in the course of being wound up under the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, on the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator and contributories of the company.

Compromise or Arrangement

60 While there may be little practical distinction between "compromise" and "arrangement" in many respects, the two are not necessarily the same. "Arrangement" is broader than "compromise" and would appear to include any scheme for reorganizing the affairs of the debtor: Houlden & Morawetz, *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law of Canada*, loose-leaf, 3rd ed., vol. 4 (Toronto: Thomson Carswell) at 10A-12.2, N§10. It has been said to be "a very wide and indefinite [word]": *Reference re Refund of Dues Paid under s.47 (f) of Timber Regulations in the Western Provinces*, [1935] A.C. 184 (Canada P.C.) at

197, affirming S.C.C. [1933] S.C.R. 616 (S.C.C.). See also, *Guardian Assurance Co., Re*, [1917] 1 Ch. 431 (Eng. C.A.) at 448, 450; *T&N Ltd., Re* (2006), [2007] 1 All E.R. 851 (Eng. Ch. Div.).

61 The CCAA is a sketch, an outline, a supporting framework for the resolution of corporate insolvencies in the public interest. Parliament wisely avoided attempting to anticipate the myriad of business deals that could evolve from the fertile and creative minds of negotiators restructuring their financial affairs. It left the shape and details of those deals to be worked out within the framework of the comprehensive and flexible concepts of a "compromise" and "arrangement." I see no reason why a release in favour of a third party, negotiated as part of a package between a debtor and creditor and reasonably relating to the proposed restructuring cannot fall within that framework.

62 A proposal under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S., 1985, c. B-3 (the "BIA") is a contract: *Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Ideal Petroleum (1959) Ltd.*, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 230 (S.C.C.) at 239; *Society of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada v. Armitage* (2000), 50 O.R. (3d) 688 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 11. In my view, a compromise or arrangement under the CCAA is directly analogous to a proposal for these purposes, and therefore is to be treated as a contract between the debtor and its creditors. Consequently, parties are entitled to put anything into such a plan that could lawfully be incorporated into any contract. See *Air Canada, Re* (2004), 2 C.B.R. (5th) 4 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 6; *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co.* (1993), 12 O.R. (3d) 500 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at 518.

63 There is nothing to prevent a debtor and a creditor from including in a contract between them a term providing that the creditor release a third party. The term is binding as between the debtor and creditor. In the CCAA context, therefore, a plan of compromise or arrangement may propose that creditors agree to compromise claims against the debtor and to release third parties, just as any debtor and creditor might agree to such a term in a contract between them. Once the statutory mechanism regarding voter approval and court sanctioning has been complied with, the plan — including the provision for releases — becomes binding on all creditors (including the dissenting minority).

64 *T&N Ltd., Re*, *supra*, is instructive in this regard. It is a rare example of a court focussing on and examining the meaning and breadth of the term "arrangement". T&N and its associated companies were engaged in the manufacture, distribution and sale of asbestos-containing products. They became the subject of many claims by former employees, who had been exposed to asbestos dust in the course of their employment, and their dependents. The T&N companies applied for protection under s. 425 of the U.K. *Companies Act 1985*, a provision virtually identical to the scheme of the CCAA — including the concepts of compromise or arrangement.[4]

65 T&N carried employers' liability insurance. However, the employers' liability insurers (the "EL insurers") denied coverage. This issue was litigated and ultimately resolved through the establishment of a multi-million pound fund against which the employees and their dependants (the "EL claimants") would assert their claims. In return, T&N's former employees and dependants (the "EL claimants") agreed to forego any further claims against the EL insurers. This settlement was incorporated into the plan of compromise and arrangement between the T&N companies and the EL claimants that was voted on and put forward for court sanction.

66 Certain creditors argued that the court could not sanction the plan because it did not constitute a "compromise or arrangement" between T&N and the EL claimants since it did not purport to affect rights as between them but only the EL claimants' rights against the EL insurers. The Court rejected this argument. Richards J. adopted previous jurisprudence — cited earlier in these reasons — to the effect that the word "arrangement" has a very broad meaning and that, while both a compromise and an arrangement involve some "give and take", an arrangement need not involve a compromise or be confined to a case of dispute or difficulty (paras. 46-51). He referred to what would be the equivalent of a solvent arrangement under Canadian corporate legislation as an example.[5] Finally, he pointed out that the compromised rights of the EL claimants against the EL insurers were not unconnected with the EL claimants' rights against the T&N companies; the scheme of arrangement involving the EL insurers was "an integral part of a single proposal affecting all the parties" (para. 52). He concluded his reasoning with these observations (para. 53):

> In my judgment it is not a necessary element of an arrangement for the purposes of s 425 of the 1985 Act that it should alter the rights existing between the company and the creditors or members with whom it is made. No doubt in most cases it will alter those rights. But, provided that the context and content of the scheme are such as properly to constitute an arrangement between the company and the members or creditors concerned, it will fall within s 425. It is ... neither

> necessary nor desirable to attempt a definition of arrangement. The legislature has not done so. To insist on an alteration of rights, or a termination of rights as in the case of schemes to effect takeovers or mergers, is to impose a restriction which is neither warranted by the statutory language nor justified by the courts' approach over many years to give the term its widest meaning. *Nor is an arrangement necessarily outside the section, because its effect is to alter the rights of creditors against another party or because such alteration could be achieved by a scheme of arrangement with that party*. [Emphasis added.]

67 I find Richard J.'s analysis helpful and persuasive. In effect, the claimants in *T&N* were being asked to release their claims against the EL insurers in exchange for a call on the fund. Here, the appellants are being required to release their claims against certain financial third parties in exchange for what is anticipated to be an improved position for all ABCP Noteholders, stemming from the contributions the financial third parties are making to the ABCP restructuring. The situations are quite comparable.

The Binding Mechanism

68 Parliament's reliance on the expansive terms "compromise" or "arrangement" does not stand alone, however. Effective insolvency restructurings would not be possible without a statutory mechanism to bind an unwilling minority of creditors. Unanimity is frequently impossible in such situations. But the minority must be protected too. Parliament's solution to this quandary was to permit a wide range of proposals to be negotiated and put forward (the compromise or arrangement) and to bind *all* creditors by class to the terms of the plan, but to do so only where the proposal can gain the support of the requisite "double majority" of votes[6] *and* obtain the sanction of the court on the basis that it is fair and reasonable. In this way, the scheme of the CCAA supports the intention of Parliament to encourage a wide variety of solutions to corporate insolvencies without unjustifiably overriding the rights of dissenting creditors.

The Required Nexus

69 In keeping with this scheme and purpose, I do not suggest that any and all releases between creditors of the debtor company seeking to restructure and third parties may be made the subject of a compromise or arrangement between the debtor and its creditors. Nor do I think the fact that the releases may be "necessary" in the sense that the third parties or the debtor may refuse to proceed without them, of itself, advances the argument in favour of finding jurisdiction (although it may well be relevant in terms of the fairness and reasonableness analysis).

70 The release of the claim in question must be justified as part of the compromise or arrangement between the debtor and its creditors. In short, there must be a reasonable connection between the third party claim being compromised in the plan and the restructuring achieved by the plan to warrant inclusion of the third party release in the plan. This nexus exists here, in my view.

71 In the course of his reasons, the application judge made the following findings, all of which are amply supported on the record:

> a) The parties to be released are necessary and essential to the restructuring of the debtor;
>
> b) *The claims to be released are rationally related to the purpose of the Plan and necessary for it*;
>
> c) The Plan cannot succeed without the releases;
>
> d) *The parties who are to have claims against them released are contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the Plan*; and
>
> e) The Plan will benefit not only the debtor companies but creditor Noteholders generally.

72 Here, then — as was the case in *T&N* — there is a close connection between the claims being released and the restructuring proposal. The tort claims arise out of the sale and distribution of the ABCP Notes and their collapse in value, just as do the contractual claims of the creditors against the debtor companies. The purpose of the restructuring is to stabilize and shore up the value of those notes in the long run. The third parties being released are making separate contributions to enable those results to materialize. Those contributions are identified earlier, at para. 31 of these reasons. The application judge found that the claims being released are not independent of or unrelated to the claims that the Noteholders have against the debtor companies; they are closely connected to the value of the ABCP Notes and are required for the Plan to succeed. At paras. 76-77 he said:

> [76] I do not consider that the Plan in this case involves a change in relationship among creditors "that does not directly involve the Company." Those who support the Plan and are to be released are "directly involved in the Company" in the sense that many are foregoing immediate rights to assets and are providing real and tangible input for the preservation and enhancement of the Notes. It would be unduly restrictive to suggest that the moving parties' claims against released parties do not involve the Company, since the claims are directly related to the value of the Notes. The value of the Notes is in this case the value of the Company.
>
> [77] This Plan, as it deals with releases, doesn't change the relationship of the creditors apart from involving the Company and its Notes.

73 I am satisfied that the wording of the CCAA — construed in light of the purpose, objects and scheme of the Act and in accordance with the modern principles of statutory interpretation — supports the court's jurisdiction and authority to sanction the Plan proposed here, including the contested third-party releases contained in it.

The Jurisprudence

74 Third party releases have become a frequent feature in Canadian restructurings since the decision of the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench in *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* (2000), 265 A.R. 201 (Alta. Q.B.), leave to appeal refused by (2000), 266 A.R. 131 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]), and (2001), 293 A.R. 351 (note) (S.C.C.). In *Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re* (2006), 25 C.B.R. (5th) 231 (Ont. S.C.J.) Justice Ground remarked (para. 8):

> [It] is not uncommon in CCAA proceedings, in the context of a plan of compromise and arrangement, to compromise claims against the Applicants and other parties against whom such claims or related claims are made.

75 We were referred to at least a dozen court-approved CCAA plans from across the country that included broad third-party releases. With the exception of *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*, however, the releases in those restructurings — including *Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re* — were not opposed. The appellants argue that those cases are wrongly decided, because the court simply does not have the authority to approve such releases.

76 In *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* the releases in question were opposed, however. Paperny J. (as she then was) concluded the court had jurisdiction to approve them and her decision is said to be the well-spring of the trend towards third-party releases referred to above. Based on the foregoing analysis, I agree with her conclusion although for reasons that differ from those cited by her.

77 Justice Paperny began her analysis of the release issue with the observation at para. 87 that "[p]rior to 1997, the CCAA did not provide for compromises of claims against anyone other than the petitioning company." It will be apparent from the analysis in these reasons that I do not accept that premise, notwithstanding the decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal in *Steinberg Inc. c. Michaud*,[7] of which her comment may have been reflective. Paperny J.'s reference to 1997 was a reference to the amendments of that year adding s. 5.1 to the CCAA, which provides for limited releases in favour of directors. Given the limited scope of s. 5.1, Justice Paperny was thus faced with the argument — dealt with later in these reasons — that Parliament must not have intended to extend the authority to approve third-party releases beyond the scope of this section.

She chose to address this contention by concluding that, although the amendments "[did] not authorize a release of claims against third parties other than directors, [they did] not prohibit such releases either" (para. 92).

78 Respectfully, I would not adopt the interpretive principle that the CCAA permits releases because it does not expressly prohibit them. Rather, as I explain in these reasons, I believe the open-ended CCAA permits third-party releases that are reasonably related to the restructuring at issue because they are encompassed in the comprehensive terms "compromise" and "arrangement" and because of the double-voting majority and court sanctioning statutory mechanism that makes them binding on unwilling creditors.

79 The appellants rely on a number of authorities, which they submit support the proposition that the CCAA may not be used to compromise claims as between anyone other than the debtor company and its creditors. Principal amongst these are *Steinberg Inc. c. Michaud*, *supra*; *NBD Bank, Canada v. Dofasco Inc.* (1999), 46 O.R. (3d) 514 (Ont. C.A.); *Pacific Coastal Airlines Ltd. v. Air Canada* (2001), 19 B.L.R. (3d) 286 (B.C. S.C.); and *Stelco Inc., Re* (2005), 78 O.R. (3d) 241 (Ont. C.A.) ("*Stelco I*"). I do not think these cases assist the appellants, however. With the exception of *Steinberg Inc.*, they do not involve third party claims that were reasonably connected to the restructuring. As I shall explain, it is my opinion that *Steinberg Inc.* does not express a correct view of the law, and I decline to follow it.

80 In *Pacific Coastal Airlines Ltd.*, Tysoe J. made the following comment at para. 24:

> [The purpose of the CCAA proceeding] is not to deal with disputes between a creditor of a company and a third party, even if the company was also involved in the subject matter of the dispute. While issues between the debtor company and non-creditors are sometimes dealt with in CCAA proceedings, it is not a proper use of a CCAA proceeding to determine disputes between parties other than the debtor company.

81 This statement must be understood in its context, however. Pacific Coastal Airlines had been a regional carrier for Canadian Airlines prior to the CCAA reorganization of the latter in 2000. In the action in question it was seeking to assert separate tort claims against Air Canada for contractual interference and inducing breach of contract in relation to certain rights it had to the use of Canadian's flight designator code prior to the CCAA proceeding. Air Canada sought to have the action dismissed on grounds of *res judicata* or issue estoppel because of the CCAA proceeding. Tysoe J. rejected the argument.

82 The facts in *Pacific Coastal Airlines Ltd.* are not analogous to the circumstances of this case, however. There is no suggestion that a resolution of Pacific Coastal's separate tort claim against Air Canada was in any way connected to the Canadian Airlines restructuring, even though Canadian — at a contractual level — may have had some involvement with the particular dispute. Here, however, the disputes that are the subject-matter of the impugned releases are not simply "disputes between parties other than the debtor company". They are closely connected to the disputes being resolved between the debtor companies and their creditors and to the restructuring itself.

83 Nor is the decision of this Court in the *NBD Bank, Canada* case dispositive. It arose out of the financial collapse of Algoma Steel, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dofasco. The Bank had advanced funds to Algoma allegedly on the strength of misrepresentations by Algoma's Vice-President, James Melville. The plan of compromise and arrangement that was sanctioned by Farley J. in the Algoma CCAA restructuring contained a clause releasing Algoma from all claims creditors "may have had against Algoma or its directors, officers, employees and advisors." Mr. Melville was found liable for negligent misrepresentation in a subsequent action by the Bank. On appeal, he argued that since the Bank was barred from suing Algoma for misrepresentation by its officers, permitting it to pursue the same cause of action against him personally would subvert the CCAA process — in short, he was personally protected by the CCAA release.

84 Rosenberg J.A., writing for this Court, rejected this argument. The appellants here rely particularly upon his following observations at paras. 53-54:

> 53 In my view, the appellant has not demonstrated that allowing the respondent to pursue its claim against him would undermine or subvert the purposes of the Act. As this court noted in *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey* (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289 at

> 297, the *CCAA* is remedial legislation "intended to provide a structured environment for the negotiation of compromises between a debtor company and its creditors for the benefit of both". It is a means of avoiding a liquidation that may yield little for the creditors, especially unsecured creditors like the respondent, and the debtor company shareholders. However, the appellant has not shown that allowing a creditor to continue an action against an officer for negligent misrepresentation would erode the effectiveness of the Act.
>
> 54 In fact, to refuse on policy grounds to impose liability on an officer of the corporation for negligent misrepresentation would contradict the policy of Parliament as demonstrated in recent amendments to the *CCAA* and the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3. Those Acts now contemplate that an arrangement or proposal may include a term for compromise of certain types of claims against directors of the company except claims that "are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors". L.W. Houlden and C.H. Morawetz, the editors of *The 2000 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Toronto: Carswell, 1999) at p. 192 are of the view that the policy behind the provision is to encourage directors of an insolvent corporation to remain in office so that the affairs of the corporation can be reorganized. I can see no similar policy interest in barring an action against an officer of the company who, prior to the insolvency, has misrepresented the financial affairs of the corporation to its creditors. It may be necessary to permit the compromise of claims against the debtor corporation, otherwise it may not be possible to successfully reorganize the corporation. The same considerations do not apply to individual officers. Rather, it would seem to me that it would be contrary to good policy to immunize officers from the consequences of their negligent statements which might otherwise be made in anticipation of being forgiven under a subsequent corporate proposal or arrangement. [Footnote omitted.]

85 Once again, this statement must be assessed in context. Whether Justice Farley had the authority in the earlier Algoma CCAA proceedings to sanction a plan that included third party releases was not under consideration at all. What the Court was determining in *NBD Bank, Canada* was whether the release extended by its terms to protect a third party. In fact, on its face, it does not appear to do so. Justice Rosenberg concluded only that not allowing Mr. Melville to rely upon the release did not subvert the purpose of the CCAA. As the application judge here observed, "there is little factual similarity in *NBD Bank, Canada* to the facts now before the Court" (para. 71). Contrary to the facts of this case, in *NBD Bank, Canada* the creditors had not agreed to grant a release to officers; they had not voted on such a release and the court had not assessed the fairness and reasonableness of such a release as a term of a complex arrangement involving significant contributions by the beneficiaries of the release — as is the situation here. Thus, *NBD Bank, Canada* is of little assistance in determining whether the court has authority to sanction a plan that calls for third party releases.

86 The appellants also rely upon the decision of this Court in *Stelco I*. There, the Court was dealing with the scope of the CCAA in connection with a dispute over what were called the "Turnover Payments". Under an inter-creditor agreement one group of creditors had subordinated their rights to another group and agreed to hold in trust and "turn over" any proceeds received from Stelco until the senior group was paid in full. On a disputed classification motion, the Subordinated Debt Holders argued that they should be in a separate class from the Senior Debt Holders. Farley J. refused to make such an order in the court below, stating:

> [Sections] 4, 5 and 6 [of the CCAA] talk of compromises or arrangements between a company and its creditors. There is no mention of this extending by statute to encompass a change of relationship among the creditors vis-à-vis the creditors themselves *and not directly involving the company*. [Citations omitted; emphasis added.]

See *Re Stelco Inc.* (2005), 15 C.B.R. (5th) 297 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 7.

87 This Court upheld that decision. The legal relationship between each group of creditors and Stelco was the same, albeit there were inter-creditor differences, and creditors were to be classified in accordance with their legal rights. In addition, the need for timely classification and voting decisions in the CCAA process militated against enmeshing the classification process in the vagaries of inter-corporate disputes. In short, the issues before the Court were quite different from those raised on this appeal.

88 Indeed, the Stelco plan, as sanctioned, included third party releases (albeit uncontested ones). This Court subsequently dealt with the same inter-creditor agreement on an appeal where the Subordinated Debt Holders argued that the inter-creditor subordination provisions were beyond the reach of the CCAA and therefore that they were entitled to a separate civil action

to determine their rights under the agreement: *Stelco Inc., Re* (2006), 21 C.B.R. (5th) 157 (Ont. C.A.) (*"Stelco II")*. The Court rejected that argument and held that where the creditors' rights amongst themselves were sufficiently related to the debtor and its plan, they were properly brought within the scope of the CCAA plan. The Court said (para. 11):

> In [*Stelco I*] — the classification case — the court observed that it is not a proper use of a CCAA proceeding to determine disputes between parties other than the debtor company ... [*H]owever, the present case is not simply an inter-creditor dispute that does not involve the debtor company; it is a dispute that is inextricably connected to the restructuring process*. [Emphasis added.]

89 The approach I would take to the disposition of this appeal is consistent with that view. As I have noted, the third party releases here are very closely connected to the ABCP restructuring process.

90 Some of the appellants — particularly those represented by Mr. Woods — rely heavily upon the decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal in *Steinberg Inc. c. Michaud*, *supra*. They say that it is determinative of the release issue. In *Steinberg*, the Court held that the CCAA, as worded at the time, did not permit the release of directors of the debtor corporation and that third-party releases were not within the purview of the Act. Deschamps J.A. (as she then was) said (paras. 42, 54 and 58 — English translation):

> [42] Even if one can understand the extreme pressure weighing on the creditors and the respondent at the time of the sanctioning, a plan of arrangement is not the appropriate forum to settle disputes other than the claims that are the subject of the arrangement. In other words, one cannot, under the pretext of an absence of formal directives in the Act, transform an arrangement into a potpourri.
>
> . . . . .
>
> [54] The Act offers the respondent a way to arrive at a compromise with is creditors. It does not go so far as to offer an umbrella to all the persons within its orbit by permitting them to shelter themselves from any recourse.
>
> . . . . .
>
> [58] The [CCAA] and the case law clearly do not permit extending the application of an arrangement to persons other than the respondent and its creditors and, consequently, the plan should not have been sanctioned as is [that is, including the releases of the directors].

91 Justices Vallerand and Delisle, in separate judgments, agreed. Justice Vallerand summarized his view of the consequences of extending the scope of the CCAA to third party releases in this fashion (para. 7):

> In short, the Act will have become the Companies' *and Their Officers and Employees* Creditors Arrangement Act — an awful mess — and likely not attain its purpose, which is to enable the company to survive in the face of *its* creditors and through their will, and not in the face of the creditors of its officers. This is why I feel, just like my colleague, that such a clause is contrary to the Act's mode of operation, contrary to its purposes and, for this reason, is to be banned.

92 Justice Delisle, on the other hand, appears to have rejected the releases because of their broad nature — they released directors from all claims, including those that were altogether unrelated to their corporate duties with the debtor company — rather than because of a lack of authority to sanction under the Act. Indeed, he seems to have recognized the wide range of circumstances that could be included within the term "compromise or arrangement". He is the only one who addressed that term. At para. 90 he said:

> The CCAA is drafted in general terms. It does not specify, among other things, what must be understood by "compromise or arrangement". However, it may be inferred from the purpose of this [A]ct that these terms *encompass all that should enable the person who has recourse to it to fully dispose of his debts*, both those that exist on the date

> when he has recourse to the statute and *those contingent on the insolvency in which he finds himself* ... [Emphasis added.]

93 The decision of the Court did not reflect a view that the terms of a compromise or arrangement should "encompass all that should enable the person who has recourse to [the Act] to dispose of his debts ... and those contingent on the insolvency in which he finds himself," however. On occasion such an outlook might embrace third parties other than the debtor and its creditors in order to make the arrangement work. Nor would it be surprising that, in such circumstances, the third parties might seek the protection of releases, or that the debtor might do so on their behalf. Thus, the perspective adopted by the majority in *Steinberg Inc.*, in my view, is too narrow, having regard to the language, purpose and objects of the CCAA and the intention of Parliament. They made no attempt to consider and explain why a compromise or arrangement could not include third-party releases. In addition, the decision appears to have been based, at least partly, on a rejection of the use of contract-law concepts in analysing the Act — an approach inconsistent with the jurisprudence referred to above.

94 Finally, the majority in *Steinberg Inc.* seems to have proceeded on the basis that the CCAA cannot interfere with civil or property rights under Quebec law. Mr. Woods advanced this argument before this Court in his factum, but did not press it in oral argument. Indeed, he conceded that if the Act encompasses the authority to sanction a plan containing third-party releases — as I have concluded it does — the provisions of the CCAA, as valid federal insolvency legislation, are paramount over provincial legislation. I shall return to the constitutional issues raised by the appellants later in these reasons.

95 Accordingly, to the extent *Steinberg Inc.* stands for the proposition that the court does not have authority under the CCAA to sanction a plan that incorporates third-party releases, I do not believe it to be a correct statement of the law and I respectfully decline to follow it. The modern approach to interpretation of the Act in accordance with its nature and purpose militates against a narrow interpretation and towards one that facilitates and encourages compromises and arrangements. Had the majority in *Steinberg Inc.* considered the broad nature of the terms "compromise" and "arrangement" and the jurisprudence I have referred to above, they might well have come to a different conclusion.

The 1997 Amendments

96 *Steinberg Inc.* led to amendments to the CCAA, however. In 1997, s. 5.1 was added, dealing specifically with releases pertaining to directors of the debtor company. It states:

> 5.1(1) A compromise or arrangement made in respect of a debtor company may include in its terms provision for the compromise of claims against directors of the company that arose before the commencement of proceedings under this Act and that relate to the obligations of the company where the directors are by law liable in their capacity as directors for the payment of such obligations.
>
> **Exception**
>
> (2) A provision for the compromise of claims against directors may not include claims that
>
> (a) relate to contractual rights of one or more creditors; or
>
> (b) are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors to creditors or of wrongful or oppressive conduct by directors.
>
> **Powers of court**
>
> (3) The court may declare that a claim against directors shall not be compromised if it is satisfied that the compromise would not be fair and reasonable in the circumstances.
>
> **Resignation or removal of directors**

> (4) Where all of the directors have resigned or have been removed by the shareholders without replacement, any person who manages or supervises the management of the business and affairs of the debtor company shall be deemed to be a director for the purposes of this section.
>
> 1997, c. 12, s. 122.

97 Perhaps the appellants' strongest argument is that these amendments confirm a prior lack of authority in the court to sanction a plan including third party releases. If the power existed, why would Parliament feel it necessary to add an amendment specifically permitting such releases (subject to the exceptions indicated) in favour of directors? *Expressio unius est exclusio alterius*, is the Latin maxim sometimes relied on to articulate the principle of interpretation implied in that question: to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other.

98 The maxim is not helpful in these circumstances, however. The reality is that there *may* be another explanation why Parliament acted as it did. As one commentator has noted:[8]

> Far from being a rule, [the maxim *expressio unius*] is not even lexicographically accurate, because it is simply not true, generally, that the mere express conferral of a right or privilege in one kind of situation implies the denial of the equivalent right or privilege in other kinds. Sometimes it does and sometimes its does not, and whether it does or does not depends on the particular circumstances of context. Without contextual support, therefore there is not even a mild presumption here. Accordingly, the maxim is at best a description, after the fact, of what the court has discovered from context.

99 As I have said, the 1997 amendments to the CCAA providing for releases in favour of directors of debtor companies in limited circumstances were a response to the decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal in *Steinberg Inc.*. A similar amendment was made with respect to proposals in the BIA at the same time. The rationale behind these amendments was to encourage directors of an insolvent company to remain in office during a restructuring, rather than resign. The assumption was that by remaining in office the directors would provide some stability while the affairs of the company were being reorganized: see Houlden & Morawetz, vol.1, *supra*, at 2-144, E§11A; *Royal Penfield Inc., Re*, [2003] R.J.Q. 2157 (C.S. Que.) at paras. 44-46.

100 Parliament thus had a particular focus and a particular purpose in enacting the 1997 amendments to the CCAA and the BIA. While there is some merit in the appellants' argument on this point, at the end of the day I do not accept that Parliament intended to signal by its enactment of s. 5.1 that it was depriving the court of authority to sanction plans of compromise or arrangement in all circumstances where they incorporate third party releases in favour of anyone other than the debtor's directors. For the reasons articulated above, I am satisfied that the court does have the authority to do so. Whether it sanctions the plan is a matter for the fairness hearing.

The Deprivation of Proprietary Rights

101 Mr. Shapray very effectively led the appellants' argument that legislation must not be construed so as to interfere with or prejudice established contractual or proprietary rights — including the right to bring an action — in the absence of a clear indication of legislative intention to that effect: *Halsbury's Laws of England*, 4th ed. reissue, vol. 44 (1) (London: Butterworths, 1995) at paras. 1438, 1464 and 1467; Driedger, 2nd ed., *supra*, at 183; Ruth Sullivan, *Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes*, 4th ed., (Markham: Butterworths, 2002) at 399. I accept the importance of this principle. For the reasons I have explained, however, I am satisfied that Parliament's intention to clothe the court with authority to consider and sanction a plan that contains third party releases is expressed with sufficient clarity in the "compromise or arrangement" language of the CCAA coupled with the statutory voting and sanctioning mechanism making the provisions of the plan binding on all creditors. This is not a situation of impermissible "gap-filling" in the case of legislation severely affecting property rights; it is a question of finding meaning in the language of the Act itself. I would therefore not give effect to the appellants' submissions in this regard.

The Division of Powers and Paramountcy

102 Mr. Woods and Mr. Sternberg submit that extending the reach of the CCAA process to the compromise of claims as between solvent creditors of the debtor company and solvent third parties to the proceeding is constitutionally impermissible. They say that under the guise of the federal insolvency power pursuant to s. 91(21) of the *Constitution Act, 1867*, this approach would improperly affect the rights of civil claimants to assert their causes of action, a provincial matter falling within s. 92(13), and contravene the rules of public order pursuant to the *Civil Code of Quebec*.

103 I do not accept these submissions. It has long been established that the CCAA is valid federal legislation under the federal insolvency power: *Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada)*, [1934] S.C.R. 659 (S.C.C.). As the Supreme Court confirmed in that case (p. 661), citing Viscount Cave L.C. in *Quebec (Attorney General) v. Bélanger (Trustee of)*, [1928] A.C. 187 (Canada P.C.), "the exclusive legislative authority to deal with all matters within the domain of bankruptcy and insolvency is vested in Parliament." Chief Justice Duff elaborated:

> Matters normally constituting part of a bankruptcy scheme but not in their essence matters of bankruptcy and insolvency may, of course, from another point of view and in another aspect be dealt with by a provincial legislature; but, when treated as matters pertaining to bankruptcy and insolvency, they clearly fall within the legislative authority of the Dominion.

104 That is exactly the case here. The power to sanction a plan of compromise or arrangement that contains third-party releases of the type opposed by the appellants is embedded in the wording of the CCAA. The fact that this may interfere with a claimant's right to pursue a civil action — normally a matter of provincial concern — or trump Quebec rules of public order is constitutionally immaterial. The CCAA is a valid exercise of federal power. Provided the matter in question falls within the legislation directly or as necessarily incidental to the exercise of that power, the CCAA governs. To the extent that its provisions are inconsistent with provincial legislation, the federal legislation is paramount. Mr. Woods properly conceded this during argument.

Conclusion With Respect to Legal Authority

105 For all of the foregoing reasons, then, I conclude that the application judge had the jurisdiction and legal authority to sanction the Plan as put forward.

(2) The Plan is "Fair and Reasonable"

106 The second major attack on the application judge's decision is that he erred in finding that the Plan is "fair and reasonable" and in sanctioning it on that basis. This attack is centred on the nature of the third-party releases contemplated and, in particular, on the fact that they will permit the release of some claims based in fraud.

107 Whether a plan of compromise or arrangement is fair and reasonable is a matter of mixed fact and law, and one on which the application judge exercises a large measure of discretion. The standard of review on this issue is therefore one of deference. In the absence of a demonstrable error an appellate court will not interfere: see *Ravelston Corp., Re* (2007), 31 C.B.R. (5th) 233 (Ont. C.A. [In Chambers]).

108 I would not interfere with the application judge's decision in this regard. While the notion of releases in favour of third parties — including leading Canadian financial institutions — that extend to claims of fraud is distasteful, there is no legal impediment to the inclusion of a release for claims based in fraud in a plan of compromise or arrangement. The application judge had been living with and supervising the ABCP restructuring from its outset. He was intimately attuned to its dynamics. In the end he concluded that the benefits of the Plan to the creditors as a whole, and to the debtor companies, outweighed the negative aspects of compelling the unwilling appellants to execute the releases as finally put forward.

109 The application judge was concerned about the inclusion of fraud in the contemplated releases and at the May hearing adjourned the final disposition of the sanctioning hearing in an effort to encourage the parties to negotiate a resolution. The result was the "fraud carve-out" referred to earlier in these reasons.

110 The appellants argue that the fraud carve-out is inadequate because of its narrow scope. It (i) applies only to ABCP Dealers, (ii) limits the type of damages that may be claimed (no punitive damages, for example), (iii) defines "fraud" narrowly, excluding many rights that would be protected by common law, equity and the Quebec concept of public order, and (iv) limits claims to representations made directly to Noteholders. The appellants submit it is contrary to public policy to sanction a plan containing such a limited restriction on the type of fraud claims that may be pursued against the third parties.

111 The law does not condone fraud. It is the most serious kind of civil claim. There is therefore some force to the appellants' submission. On the other hand, as noted, there is no legal impediment to granting the release of an antecedent claim in fraud, provided the claim is in the contemplation of the parties to the release at the time it is given: *Fotinis Restaurant Corp. v. White Spot Ltd* (1998), 38 B.L.R. (2d) 251 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) at paras. 9 and 18. There may be disputes about the scope or extent of what is released, but parties are entitled to settle allegations of fraud in civil proceedings — the claims here all being untested allegations of fraud — and to include releases of such claims as part of that settlement.

112 The application judge was alive to the merits of the appellants' submissions. He was satisfied in the end, however, that the need "to avoid the potential cascade of litigation that ... would result if a broader 'carve out' were to be allowed" (para. 113) outweighed the negative aspects of approving releases with the narrower carve-out provision. Implementation of the Plan, in his view, would work to the overall greater benefit of the Noteholders as a whole. I can find no error in principle in the exercise of his discretion in arriving at this decision. It was his call to make.

113 At para. 71 above I recited a number of factual findings the application judge made in concluding that approval of the Plan was within his jurisdiction under the CCAA and that it was fair and reasonable. For convenience, I reiterate them here — with two additional findings — because they provide an important foundation for his analysis concerning the fairness and reasonableness of the Plan. The application judge found that:

> a) The parties to be released are necessary and essential to the restructuring of the debtor;
>
> b) The claims to be released are rationally related to the purpose of the Plan and necessary for it;
>
> c) The Plan cannot succeed without the releases;
>
> d) The parties who are to have claims against them released are contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the Plan;
>
> e) The Plan will benefit not only the debtor companies but creditor Noteholders generally;
>
> f) The voting creditors who have approved the Plan did so with knowledge of the nature and effect of the releases; and that,
>
> g) The releases are fair and reasonable and not overly broad or offensive to public policy.

114 These findings are all supported on the record. Contrary to the submission of some of the appellants, they do not constitute a new and hitherto untried "test" for the sanctioning of a plan under the CCAA. They simply represent findings of fact and inferences on the part of the application judge that underpin his conclusions on jurisdiction and fairness.

115 The appellants all contend that the obligation to release the third parties from claims in fraud, tort, breach of fiduciary duty, etc. is confiscatory and amounts to a requirement that they — as individual creditors — make the equivalent of a greater financial contribution to the Plan. In his usual lively fashion, Mr. Sternberg asked us the same rhetorical question he posed to the application judge. As he put it, how could the court countenance the compromise of what in the future might turn

out to be fraud perpetrated at the highest levels of Canadian and foreign banks? Several appellants complain that the proposed Plan is unfair to them because they will make very little additional recovery if the Plan goes forward, but will be required to forfeit a cause of action against third-party financial institutions that may yield them significant recovery. Others protest that they are being treated unequally because they are ineligible for relief programs that Liquidity Providers such as Canaccord have made available to other smaller investors.

116 All of these arguments are persuasive to varying degrees when considered in isolation. The application judge did not have that luxury, however. He was required to consider the circumstances of the restructuring as a whole, including the reality that many of the financial institutions were not only acting as Dealers or brokers of the ABCP Notes (with the impugned releases relating to the financial institutions in these capacities, for the most part) but also as Asset and Liquidity Providers (with the financial institutions making significant contributions to the restructuring in these capacities).

117 In insolvency restructuring proceedings almost everyone loses something. To the extent that creditors are required to compromise their claims, it can always be proclaimed that their rights are being unfairly confiscated and that they are being called upon to make the equivalent of a further financial contribution to the compromise or arrangement. Judges have observed on a number of occasions that CCAA proceedings involve "a balancing of prejudices," inasmuch as everyone is adversely affected in some fashion.

118 Here, the debtor corporations being restructured represent the issuers of the more than $32 billion in non-bank sponsored ABCP Notes. The proposed compromise and arrangement affects that entire segment of the ABCP market and the financial markets as a whole. In that respect, the application judge was correct in adverting to the importance of the restructuring to the resolution of the ABCP liquidity crisis and to the need to restore confidence in the financial system in Canada. He was required to consider and balance the interests of *all* Noteholders, not just the interests of the appellants, whose notes represent only about 3% of that total. That is what he did.

119 The application judge noted at para. 126 that the Plan represented "a reasonable balance between benefit to all Noteholders and enhanced recovery for those who can make out specific claims in fraud" within the fraud carve-out provisions of the releases. He also recognized at para. 134 that:

> No Plan of this size and complexity could be expected to satisfy all affected by it. The size of the majority who have approved it is testament to its overall fairness. No plan to address a crisis of this magnitude can work perfect equity among all stakeholders.

120 In my view we ought not to interfere with his decision that the Plan is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances.

D. Disposition

121 For the foregoing reasons, I would grant leave to appeal from the decision of Justice Campbell, but dismiss the appeal.

***J.I. Laskin J.A.*:**
I agree.

***E.A. Cronk J.A.*:**
I agree.

Schedule A — Conduits

Apollo Trust

Apsley Trust

Aria Trust

Aurora Trust

Comet Trust

Encore Trust

Gemini Trust

Ironstone Trust

MMAI-I Trust

Newshore Canadian Trust

Opus Trust

Planet Trust

Rocket Trust

Selkirk Funding Trust

Silverstone Trust

Slate Trust

Structured Asset Trust

Structured Investment Trust III

Symphony Trust

Whitehall Trust

Schedule B — Applicants

ATB Financial

Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec

Canaccord Capital Corporation

Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation

Canada Post Corporation

Credit Union Central Alberta Limited

Credit Union Central of BC

Credit Union Central of Canada

Credit Union Central of Ontario

Credit Union Central of Saskatchewan

Desjardins Group

Magna International Inc.

National Bank of Canada/National Bank Financial Inc.

NAV Canada

Northwater Capital Management Inc.

Public Sector Pension Investment Board

The Governors of the University of Alberta

Schedule A — Counsel

1) Benjamin Zarnett and Frederick L. Myers for the Pan-Canadian Investors Committee

2) Aubrey E. Kauffman and Stuart Brotman for 4446372 Canada Inc. and 6932819 Canada Inc.

3) Peter F.C. Howard and Samaneh Hosseini for Bank of America N.A.; Citibank N.A.; Citibank Canada, in its capacity as Credit Derivative Swap Counterparty and not in any other capacity; Deutsche Bank AG; HSBC Bank Canada; HSBC Bank USA, National Association; Merrill Lynch International; Merill Lynch Capital Services, Inc.; Swiss Re Financial Products Corporation; and UBS AG

4) Kenneth T. Rosenberg, Lily Harmer and Max Starnino for Jura Energy Corporation and Redcorp Ventures Ltd.

5) Craig J. Hill and Sam P. Rappos for the Monitors (ABCP Appeals)

6) Jeffrey C. Carhart and Joseph Marin for Ad Hoc Committee and Pricewaterhouse Coopers Inc., in its capacity as Financial Advisor

7) Mario J. Forte for Caisse de Dépôt et Placement du Québec

8) John B. Laskin for National Bank Financial Inc. and National Bank of Canada

9) Thomas McRae and Arthur O. Jacques for Ad Hoc Retail Creditors Committee (Brian Hunter, et al)

10) Howard Shapray, Q.C. and Stephen Fitterman for Ivanhoe Mines Ltd.

11) Kevin P. McElcheran and Heather L. Meredith for Canadian Banks, BMO, CIBC RBC, Bank of Nova Scotia and T.D. Bank

12) Jeffrey S. Leon for CIBC Mellon Trust Company, Computershare Trust Company of Canada and BNY Trust Company of Canada, as Indenture Trustees

13) Usman Sheikh for Coventree Capital Inc.

14) Allan Sternberg and Sam R. Sasso for Brookfield Asset Management and Partners Ltd. and Hy Bloom Inc. and Cardacian Mortgage Services Inc.

15) Neil C. Saxe for Dominion Bond Rating Service

16) James A. Woods, Sebastien Richemont and Marie-Anne Paquette for Air Transat A.T. Inc., Transat Tours Canada Inc., The Jean Coutu Group (PJC) Inc., Aéroports de Montréal, Aéroports de Montréal Capital Inc., Pomerleau Ontario Inc., Pomerleau Inc., Labopharm Inc., Agence Métropolitaine de Transport (AMT), Giro Inc., Vêtements de sports RGR Inc., 131519 Canada Inc., Tecsys Inc., New Gold Inc. and Jazz Air LP

17) Scott A. Turner for Webtech Wireless Inc., Wynn Capital Corporation Inc., West Energy Ltd., Sabre Energy Ltd., Petrolifera Petroleum Ltd., Vaquero Resources Ltd., and Standard Energy Ltd.

18) R. Graham Phoenix for Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments III Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments V Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XI Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XII Corp., Quanto Financial Corporation and Metcalfe & Mansfield Capital Corp.

Application granted; appeal dismissed.

Footnotes

[*] Leave to appeal refused at *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.* (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 5432, 2008 CarswellOnt 5433 (S.C.C.).

[1] Section 5.1 of the CCAA specifically authorizes the granting of releases to directors in certain circumstances.

[2] Justice Georgina R. Jackson and Dr. Janis P. Sarra, "Selecting the Judicial Tool to get the Job Done: An Examination of Statutory Interpretation, Discretionary Power and Inherent Jurisdiction in Insolvency Matters" in Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law, 2007* (Vancouver: Thomson Carswell, 2007).

[3] Citing Gibbs J.A. in *Chef Ready Foods, supra*, at pp.319-320.

[4] The Legislative Debates at the time the CCAA was introduced in Parliament in April 1933 make it clear that the CCAA is patterned after the predecessor provisions of s. 425 of the *Companies Act 1985* (U.K.): see *House of Commons Debates (Hansard), supra*.

[5] See *Canada Business Corporations Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, s. 192; *Ontario Business Corporations Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16, s. 182.

[6] A majority in number representing two-thirds in value of the creditors (s. 6)

[7] *Steinberg Inc.* was originally reported in French: *Steinberg Inc. c. Michaud*, [1993] R.J.Q. 1684 (C.A. Que.). All paragraph references to *Steinberg Inc.* in this judgment are from the unofficial English translation available at 1993 CarswellQue 2055 (C.A. Que.)

[8] Reed Dickerson, *The Interpretation and Application of Statutes* (1975) at pp.234-235, cited in Bryan A. Garner, ed., Black's Law Dictionary, 8th ed. (West Group, St. Paul, Minn., 2004) at 621.

End of Document

TAB 7

Most Negative Treatment: Distinguished
Most Recent Distinguished: Stelco Inc., Re | 2005 CarswellOnt 743, 7 C.B.R. (5th) 310, 137 A.C.W.S. (3d) 476, [2005] O.J. No. 730 | (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List], Feb 28, 2005)

1998 CarswellOnt 1145
Ontario Court of Justice, General Division [Commercial List]

Sammi Atlas Inc., Re

1998 CarswellOnt 1145, [1998] O.J. No. 1089, 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171, 59 O.T.C. 153, 78 A.C.W.S. (3d) 10

In The Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-36

In The Matter of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.C.43

In The Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Sammi Atlas Inc.

Farley J.

Heard: February 27, 1998
Judgment: February 27, 1998
Docket: 97-BK-000219, B230/97

Counsel: *Norman J. Emblem*, for the applicant, Sammi Atlas Inc.
James Grout, for Agro Partners, Inc.
Thomas Matz, for the Bank of Nova Scotia.
Jay Carfagnini and *Ben Zarnett*, for Investors' Committee.
Geoffrey Morawetz, for the Trade Creditors' committee.
Clifton Prophet, for Duk Lee.

Subject: Insolvency; Corporate and Commercial

Related Abridgment Classifications
For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Bankruptcy and insolvency

XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.3 Arrangements
XIX.3.b Approval by court
XIX.3.b.i "Fair and reasonable"

Bankruptcy and insolvency

XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.3 Arrangements
XIX.3.b Approval by court
XIX.3.b.iv Miscellaneous

Headnote

Corporations --- Arrangements and compromises — Under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — Miscellaneous issues

Corporation brought motion for approval and sanctioning of plan of compromise and arrangement under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — There must be strict compliance with all statutory requirements and adherence to previous orders of court — All materials filed and procedures carried out must be examined to determine whether anything has been done or purported to be done which is not authorized by Act — Plan must be fair and reasonable — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.

Corporations --- Arrangements and compromises — Under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — "Fair and reasonable"

Corporation and majority of creditors approved plan of compromise and arrangement under Companies' Creditors Arrangements Act providing for distribution to creditors on sliding scale based on aggregate of all claims held by each claimant — Corporation brought motion for approval and sanctioning of plan — Creditor by way of assignment brought motion for direction that plan be amended — Motion for approval and sanctioning was granted, and motion for amendment was dismissed — Court should be reluctant to interfere with business decisions of creditors reached as a body — No exceptional circumstances supported motion to amend plan after it was voted on — No jurisdiction existed under Act to grant substantive change sought by creditor — Creditor and all unsecured creditors were treated fairly and reasonably — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Farley J.*:

Algoma Steel Corp. v. Royal Bank (1992), 11 C.B.R. (3d) 11, 8 O.R. (3d) 449, 93 D.L.R. (4th) 98, 55 O.A.C. 303 (Ont. C.A.) — applied

Campeau Corp., Re (1992), 10 C.B.R. (3d) 104 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — applied

Central Guaranty Trustco Ltd., Re (1993), 21 C.B.R. (3d) 139 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — applied

Northland Properties Ltd., Re (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 (B.C. S.C.) — applied

Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada, 34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 122, 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195, [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363 (B.C. C.A.) — referred to

Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co. (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 1, *(*sub nom. *Olympia & York Developments Ltd., Re)* 12 O.R. (3d) 500 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — applied

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

MOTION for approval and sanctioning of plan of compromise and arrangement under *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*; MOTION by creditor for amendment of plan.

***Farley J.*:**

1 This endorsement deals with two of the motions before me today:

1) Applicant's motion for an order approving and sanctioning the Applicant's Plan of Compromise and Arrangement, as amended and approved by the Applicant's unsecured creditors on February 25, 1998; and

2) A motion by Argo Partners, Inc. ("Argo"), a creditor by way of assignment, for an order directing that the Plan be amended to provide that a person who, on the record date, held unsecured claims shall be entitled to elect treatment with respect to each unsecured claim held by it on a claim by claim basis (and not on an aggregate basis as provided for in the Plan).

2 As to the Applicant's sanction motion, the general principles to be applied in the exercise of the court's discretion are:

1) there must be strict compliance with all statutory requirements and adherence to the previous orders of the court;

2) all materials filed and procedures carried out must be examined to determine if anything has been done or purported to be done which is not authorized by the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA"); and

3) the Plan must be fair and reasonable.

See *Northland Properties Ltd., Re* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 (B.C. S.C.); affirmed (1989), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195 (B.C. C.A.) at p.201; *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co.* (1993), 12 O.R. (3d) 500 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p.506.

3 I am satisfied on the material before me that the Applicant was held to be a corporation as to which the CCAA applies, that the Plan was filed with the court in accordance with the previous orders, that notices were appropriately given and published as to claims and meetings, that the meetings were held in accordance with the directions of the court and that the Plan was approved by the requisite majority (in fact it was approved 98.74% in number of the proven claims of creditors voting and by 96.79% dollar value, with Argo abstaining). Thus it would appear that items one and two are met.

4 What of item 3 - is the Plan fair and reasonable? A Plan under the CCAA is a compromise; it cannot be expected to be perfect. It should be approved if it is fair, reasonable and equitable. Equitable treatment is not necessarily equal treatment. Equal treatment may be contrary to equitable treatment. One must look at the creditors as a whole (i.e. generally) and to the objecting creditors (specifically) and see if rights are compromised in an attempt to balance interests (and have the pain of the compromise equitably shared) as opposed to a confiscation of rights: see *Campeau Corp., Re* (1992), 10 C.B.R. (3d) 104 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p.109. It is recognized that the CCAA contemplates that a minority of creditors is bound by the Plan which a majority have approved - subject only to the court determining that the Plan is fair and reasonable: see *Northland Properties Ltd.* at p.201; *Olympia & York Developments Ltd.* at p.509. In the present case no one appeared today to oppose the Plan being sanctioned: Argo merely wished that the Plan be amended to accommodate its particular concerns. Of course,

to the extent that Argo would be benefited by such an amendment, the other creditors would in effect be disadvantaged since the pot in this case is based on a zero sum game.

5 Those voting on the Plan (and I note there was a very significant "quorum" present at the meeting) do so on a business basis. As Blair J. said at p.510 of *Olympia & York Developments Ltd.*:

> As the other courts have done, I observe that it is not my function to second guess the business people with respect to the "business" aspects of the Plan, descending into the negotiating arena and substituting my own view of what is a fair and reasonable compromise or arrangement for that of the business judgment of the participants. The parties themselves know best what is in their interests in those areas.

The court should be appropriately reluctant to interfere with the business decisions of creditors reached as a body. There was no suggestion that these creditors were unsophisticated or unable to look out for their own best interests. The vote in the present case is even higher than in *Central Guaranty Trustco Ltd., Re* (1993), 21 C.B.R. (3d) 139 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) where I observed at p.141:

> ... This on either basis is well beyond the specific majority requirement of CCAA. Clearly there is a very heavy burden on parties seeking to upset a plan that the required majority have found that they could vote for; given the overwhelming majority this burden is no lighter. This vote by sophisticated lenders speaks volumes as to fairness and reasonableness.
>
> The Courts should not second guess business people who have gone along with the Plan....

6 Argo's motion is to amend the Plan - after it has been voted on. However I do not see any exceptional circumstances which would support such a motion being brought now. In *Algoma Steel Corp. v. Royal Bank* (1992), 11 C.B.R. (3d) 11 (Ont. C.A.) the Court of Appeal observed at p.15 that the court's jurisdiction to amend a plan should "be exercised sparingly and in exceptional circumstances only" even if the amendment were merely technical and did not prejudice the interests of the corporation or its creditors and then only where there is jurisdiction under the CCAA to make the amendment requested, I was advised that Argo had considered bringing the motion on earlier but had not done so in the face of "veto" opposition from the major creditors. I am puzzled by this since the creditor or any other appropriate party can always move in court before the Plan is voted on to amend the Plan; voting does not have anything to do with the court granting or dismissing the motion. The court can always determine a matter which may impinge directly and materially upon the fairness and reasonableness of a plan. I note in passing that it would be inappropriate to attempt to obtain a preview of the court's views as to sanctioning by brining on such a motion. See my views in *Central Guaranty Trustco Ltd., Re* at p.143:

> ... In *Algoma Steel Corp. v. Royal Bank* (1992), 8 O.R. (3d) 449, the Court of Appeal determined that there were exceptional circumstances (unrelated to the Plan) which allowed it to adjust *where no interest was adversely affected*. The same cannot be said here. FSTQ aside from s.11(c) of the CCAA also raised s.7. I am of the view that s.7 allows an amendment after an adjournment - *but not after a vote has been taken*. (emphasis in original)

What Argo wants is a substantive change; I do not see the jurisdiction to grant same under the CCAA.

7 In the subject Plan creditors are to be dealt with on a sliding scale for distribution purposes only: with this scale being on an aggregate basis of all claims held by one claimant:

> i) $7,500 or less to receive cash of 95% of the proven claim;
>
> ii) $7,501 - $100,000 to receive cash of 90% of the first $7,500 and 55% of balance; and;
>
> iii) in excess of $100,000 to receive shares on a formula basis (subject to creditor agreeing to limit claims to $100,000 so as to obtain cash as per the previous formula).

Such a sliding scale arrangement has been present in many proposals over the years. Argo has not been singled out for special treatment; others who acquired claims by assignment have also been affected. Argo has acquired 40 claims; all under $100,000 but in the aggregate well over $100,000. Argo submitted that it could have achieved the result that it wished if it had kept the individual claims it acquired separate by having them held by a different "person"; this is true under the Plan as worded. Conceivably if this type of separation in the face of an aggregation provision were perceived to be inappropriate by a CCAA applicant, then I suppose the language of such a plan could be "tightened" to eliminate what the applicant perceived as a loophole. I appreciate Argo's position that by buying up the small claims it was providing the original creditors with liquidity but this should not be a determinative factor. I would note that the sliding scale provided here does recognize (albeit imperfectly) that small claims may be equated with small creditors who would more likely wish cash as opposed to non-board lots of shares which would not be as liquidate as cash; the high percentage cash for those proven claims of $7,500 or under illustrates the desire not to have the "little person" hurt - at least any more than is necessary. The question will come down to balance - the plan must be efficient and attractive enough for it to be brought forward by an applicant with the realistic chance of its succeeding (and perhaps in that regard be "sponsored" by significant creditors) and while not being too generous so that the future of the applicant on an ongoing basis would be in jeopardy: at the same time it must gain enough support amongst the creditor body for it to gain the requisite majority. New creditors by assignment may provide not only liquidity but also a benefit in providing a block of support for a plan which may not have been forthcoming as a small creditor may not think it important to do so. Argo of course has not claimed it is a "little person" in the context of this CCAA proceeding.

8 In my view Argo is being treated fairly and reasonably as a creditor as are all the unsecured creditors. An aggregation clause is not inherently unfair and the sliding scale provisions would appear to me to be aimed at "protecting (or helping out) the little guy" which would appear to be a reasonable policy.

9 The Plan is sanctioned and approved; Argo's aggregation motion is dismissed.

Addendum:

10 I reviewed with the insolvency practitioners (legal counsel and accountants) the aspect that industrial and commercial concerns in a CCAA setting should be distinguished from "bricks and mortgage" corporations. In their reorganization it is important to maintain the goodwill attributable to employee experience and customer (and supplier) loyalty; this may very quickly erode with uncertainty. Therefore it would, to my mind be desirable to get down to brass tacks as quickly as possible and perhaps a reasonable target (subject to adjustment up or down according to the circumstances including complexity) would be for a six month period from application to Plan sanction.

Motion for approval granted; motion for amendment dismissed.

TAB 8

2012 ONSC 7050
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Sino-Forest Corp., Re

2012 CarswellOnt 15913, 2012 ONSC 7050, 224 A.C.W.S. (3d) 21

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Sino-Forest Corporation, Applicant

Morawetz J.

Heard: December 7, 2012
Judgment: December 12, 2012
Docket: CV-12-9667-00CL

Counsel: Robert W. Staley, Kevin Zych, Derek J. Bell, Jonathan Bell, for Sino-Forest Corporation
Derrick Tay, Jennifer Stam, Cliff Prophet, for Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc.
Robert Chadwick, Brendan O'Neill, for Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders
Kenneth Rosenberg, Kirk Baert, Max Starnino, A. Dimitri Lascaris, for Class Action Plaintiffs
Won J. Kim, James C. Orr, Michael C. Spencer, Megan B. McPhee, for Invesco Canada Ltd., Northwest & Ethical Investments LP, Comité Syndicale Nationale de Retraite Bâtirente Inc.
Peter Griffin, Peter Osborne, Shara Roy, for Ernst & Young Inc.
Peter Green, Ken Dekkar, for BDO Limited
Edward A. Sellers, Larry Lowenstein, for Board of Directors of Sino-Forest Corporation
John Pirie, David Gadsden, for Poyry (Beijing)
James Doris, for Plaintiff in New York Class Action
David Bish, for Underwriters
Simon Bieber, Erin Pleet, for David Horsley
James Grout, for Ontario Securities Commission
Emily Cole, Joseph Marin, for Allen Chan
Susan E. Freedman, Brandon Barnes, for Kai Kit Poon
Paul Emerson, for ACE/Chubb
Sam Sasso, for Travelers

Subject: Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure

Related Abridgment Classifications
For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Bankruptcy and insolvency

XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.3 Arrangements
XIX.3.b Approval by court
XIX.3.b.iv Miscellaneous

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — Miscellaneous

Applicant debtor corporation was integrated forest plantation operator and forest products company with majority of assets in People's Republic of China and complicated corporate structure — In 2011, reports of financial impropriety of corporation had significant negative effect, resulting in corporation defaulting under note indentures and subsequent agreement of noteholders supporting restructuring of corporation in March 2012 — At same time corporation obtained initial order under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, and subsequent orders included grant of extensions of stay of proceedings, claims procedure order, and class action proceedings in Ontario as well as other jurisdictions — On August 31, 2012, court approved filing of plan to discharge all affected claims, distribute consideration in respect of proven claims and transfer ownership of corporate business to two new corporations whose shares would be distributed to all affected creditors — Plan was approved by 99 per cent of affected creditors — Corporation brought motion for order sanctioning plan of compromise and reorganization — Motion granted — Considering relevant factors on sanction hearing, sanction of order was warranted, as corporation established strict compliance with all statutory requirements and prior court orders, did nothing not authorized by Act and had fair and reasonable plan — Monitor concluded plan was preferable alternative to liquidation or bankruptcy — Plan provided fair and reasonable balance among corporation's stakeholders and provided corporation simultaneous ability to continue as going concern for all stakeholders — Plan adequately considered public interest providing certainty to corporate employees, suppliers, customers and other stakeholders — Selection of $150 million cap on indemnified noteholders class action reflected business judgment of parties' assessment risk related to Ontario class action and was commercially reasonable — Reasonable connection existed between claims being compromised and overall purpose of plan.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Morawetz J.*:

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ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 ONCA 587, 2008 CarswellOnt 4811, *(*sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re)* 240 O.A.C. 245, *(*sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re)* 296 D.L.R. (4th) 135, *(*sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re)* 92 O.R. (3d) 513, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 123 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

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Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2001), 2001 CarswellAlta 888, 2001 CarswellAlta 889, 275 N.R. 386 (note), 293 A.R. 351 (note), 257 W.A.C. 351 (note) (S.C.C.) — referred to

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re (2010), 70 C.B.R. (5th) 1, 2010 ONSC 4209, 2010 CarswellOnt 5510 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Kitchener Frame Ltd., Re (2012), 2012 ONSC 234, 2012 CarswellOnt 1347, 86 C.B.R. (5th) 274 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Nelson Financial Group Ltd., Re (2011), 79 C.B.R. (5th) 307, 2011 CarswellOnt 3100, 2011 ONSC 2750 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Nortel Networks Corp., Re (2009), 53 C.B.R. (5th) 196, 75 C.C.P.B. 206, 2009 CarswellOnt 3028 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Nortel Networks Corp., Re (2010), 63 C.B.R. (5th) 44, 81 C.C.P.B. 56, 2010 CarswellOnt 1754, 2010 ONSC 1708 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Ravelston Corp., Re (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 4267, 14 C.B.R. (5th) 207 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Sino-Forest Corp., Re (2012), 2012 ONSC 4377, 2012 CarswellOnt 9430, 92 C.B.R. (5th) 99 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Sino-Forest Corp., Re (2012), 2012 ONSC 5011, 2012 CarswellOnt 11239 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Sino-Forest Corp., Re (2012), 2012 ONCA 816, 2012 CarswellOnt 14701 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Sino-Forest Corp., Re (2012), 2012 ONSC 7041, 2012 CarswellOnt 15919 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Stelco Inc., Re (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 6818, 204 O.A.C. 205, 78 O.R. (3d) 241, 261 D.L.R. (4th) 368, 11 B.L.R. (4th) 185, 15 C.B.R. (5th) 307 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44

Generally — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

s. 2(1) "company" — referred to

s. 2(1) "equity claim" — considered

s. 6 — pursuant to

s. 6(1) — considered

MOTION by debtor corporation for order sanctioning plan of compromise and reorganization.

***Morawetz J.*:**

1 On December 10, 2012, I released an endorsement granting this motion with reasons to follow. These are those reasons.

Overview

2 The Applicant, Sino-Forest Corporation ("SFC"), seeks an order sanctioning (the "Sanction Order") a plan of compromise and reorganization dated December 3, 2012 as modified, amended, varied or supplemented in accordance with its terms (the "Plan") pursuant to section 6 of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA").

3 With the exception of one party, SFC's position is either supported or is not opposed.

4 Invesco Canada Ltd., Northwest & Ethical Investments LP and Comité Syndicale Nationale de Retraite Bâtirente Inc. (collectively, the "Funds") object to the proposed Sanction Order. The Funds requested an adjournment for a period of one month. I denied the Funds' adjournment request in a separate endorsement released on December 10, 2012 (*Sino-Forest Corp., Re*, 2012 ONSC 7041 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])). Alternatively, the Funds requested that the Plan be altered so as to remove Article 11 "Settlement of Claims Against Third Party Defendants".

5 The defined terms have been taken from the motion record.

6 SFC's counsel submits that the Plan represents a fair and reasonable compromise reached with SFC's creditors following months of negotiation. SFC's counsel submits that the Plan, including its treatment of holders of equity claims, complies with CCAA requirements and is consistent with this court's decision on the equity claims motions (the "Equity Claims Decision") (2012 ONSC 4377, 92 C.B.R. (5th) 99 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])), which was subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeal for Ontario (2012 ONCA 816 (Ont. C.A.)).

7 Counsel submits that the classification of creditors for the purpose of voting on the Plan was proper and consistent with the CCAA, existing law and prior orders of this court, including the Equity Claims Decision and the Plan Filing and Meeting Order.

8 The Plan has the support of the following parties:

(a) the Monitor;

(b) SFC's largest creditors, the Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders (the "Ad Hoc Noteholders");

(c) Ernst & Young LLP ("E&Y");

(d) BDO Limited ("BDO"); and

(e) the Underwriters.

9 The Ad Hoc Committee of Purchasers of the Applicant's Securities (the "Ad Hoc Securities Purchasers Committee", also referred to as the "Class Action Plaintiffs") has agreed not to oppose the Plan. The Monitor has considered possible alternatives to the Plan, including liquidation and bankruptcy, and has concluded that the Plan is the preferable option.

10 The Plan was approved by an overwhelming majority of Affected Creditors voting in person or by proxy. In total, 99% in number, and greater than 99% in value, of those Affected Creditors voting favoured the Plan.

11 Options and alternatives to the Plan have been explored throughout these proceedings. SFC carried out a court-supervised sales process (the "Sales Process"), pursuant to the sales process order (the "Sales Process Order"), to seek out potential qualified strategic and financial purchasers of SFC's global assets. After a canvassing of the market, SFC determined that there were no qualified purchasers offering to acquire its assets for qualified consideration ("Qualified Consideration"), which was set at 85% of the value of the outstanding amount owing under the notes (the "Notes").

12 SFC's counsel submits that the Plan achieves the objective stated at the commencement of the CCAA proceedings (namely, to provide a "clean break" between the business operations of the global SFC enterprise as a whole ("Sino-Forest") and the problems facing SFC, with the aspiration of saving and preserving the value of SFC's underlying business for the benefit of SFC's creditors).

Facts

13 SFC is an integrated forest plantation operator and forest products company, with most of its assets and the majority of its business operations located in the southern and eastern regions of the People's Republic of China ("PRC"). SFC's registered office is located in Toronto and its principal business office is located in Hong Kong.

14 SFC is a holding company with six direct subsidiaries (the "Subsidiaries") and an indirect majority interest in Greenheart Group Limited (Bermuda), a publicly-traded company. Including SFC and the Subsidiaries, there are 137 entities that make up Sino-Forest: 67 companies incorporated in PRC, 58 companies incorporated in British Virgin Islands, 7 companies incorporated in Hong Kong, 2 companies incorporated in Canada and 3 companies incorporated elsewhere.

15 On June 2, 2011, Muddy Waters LLC ("Muddy Waters"), a short-seller of SFC's securities, released a report alleging that SFC was a "near total fraud" and a "Ponzi scheme". SFC subsequently became embroiled in multiple class actions across Canada and the United States and was subjected to investigations and regulatory proceedings by the Ontario Securities Commission ("OSC"), Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

16 SFC was unable to file its 2011 third quarter financial statements, resulting in a default under its note indentures.

17 Following extensive arm's length negotiations between SFC and the Ad Hoc Noteholders, the parties agreed on a framework for a consensual resolution of SFC's defaults under its note indentures and the restructuring of its business. The parties ultimately entered into a restructuring support agreement (the "Support Agreement") on March 30, 2012, which was initially executed by holders of 40% of the aggregate principal amount of SFC's Notes. Additional consenting noteholders subsequently executed joinder agreements, resulting in noteholders representing a total of more than 72% of aggregate principal amount of the Notes agreeing to support the restructuring.

18 The restructuring contemplated by the Support Agreement was commercially designed to separate Sino-Forest's business operations from the problems facing the parent holding company outside of PRC, with the intention of saving and preserving the value of SFC's underlying business. Two possible transactions were contemplated:

(a) First, a court-supervised Sales Process to determine if any person or group of persons would purchase SFC's business operations for an amount in excess of the 85% Qualified Consideration;

(b) Second, if the Sales Process was not successful, a transfer of six immediate holding companies (that own SFC's operating business) to an acquisition vehicle to be owned by Affected Creditors in compromise of their claims against SFC. Further, the creation of a litigation trust (including funding) (the "Litigation Trust") to enable SFC's litigation claims against any person not otherwise released within the CCAA proceedings, preserved and pursued for the benefit of SFC's stakeholders in accordance with the Support Agreement (concurrently, the "Restructuring Transaction").

19 SFC applied and obtained an initial order under the CCAA on March 30, 2012 (the "Initial Order"), pursuant to which a limited stay of proceedings ("Stay of Proceedings") was also granted in respect of the Subsidiaries. The Stay of Proceedings was subsequently extended by orders dated May 31, September 28, October 10, and November 23, 2012 [2012 CarswellOnt 14701 (Ont. C.A.)], and unless further extended, will expire on February 1, 2013.

20 On March 30, 2012, the Sales Process Order was granted. While a number of Letters of Intent were received in respect of this process, none were qualified Letters of Intent, because none of them offered to acquire SFC's assets for the Qualified Consideration. As such, on July 10, 2012, SFC announced the termination of the Sales Process and its intention to proceed with the Restructuring Transaction.

21 On May 14, 2012, this court granted an order (the "Claims Procedure Order") which approved the Claims Process that was developed by SFC in consultation with the Monitor.

22 As of the date of filing, SFC had approximately $1.8 billion of principal amount of debt owing under the Notes, plus accrued and unpaid interest. As of May 15, 2012, Noteholders holding in aggregate approximately 72% of the principal amount of the Notes, and representing more than 66.67% of the principal amount of each of the four series of Notes, agreed to support the Plan.

23 After the Muddy Waters report was released, SFC and certain of its officers, directors and employees, along with SFC's former auditors, technical consultants and Underwriters involved in prior equity and debt offerings, were named as defendants in a number of proposed class action lawsuits. Presently, there are active proposed class actions in four jurisdictions: Ontario, Quebec, Saskatchewan and New York (the "Class Action Claims").

24 *Sino-Forest Corp., Re* (the "Ontario Class Action") was commenced in Ontario by Koskie Minsky LLP and Siskinds LLP. It has the following two components: first, there is a shareholder claim (the "Shareholder Class Action Claims") brought on behalf of current and former shareholders of SFC seeking damages in the amount of $6.5 billion for general damages, $174.8 million in connection with a prospectus issued in June 2007, $330 million in relation to a prospectus issued in June 2009, and $319.2 million in relation to a prospectus issued in December 2009; second, there is a $1.8 billion noteholder claim (the "Noteholder Class Action Claims") brought on behalf of former holders of SFC's Notes. The noteholder component seeks damages for loss of value in the Notes.

25 The Quebec Class Action is similar in nature to the Ontario Class Action, and both plaintiffs filed proof of claim in this proceeding. The plaintiffs in the Saskatchewan Class Action did not file a proof of claim in this proceeding, whereas the plaintiffs in the New York Class Action did file a proof of claim in this proceeding. A few shareholders filed proofs of claim separately, but no proof of claim was filed by the Funds.

26 In this proceeding, the Ad Hoc Securities Purchasers Committee - represented by Siskinds LLP, Koskie Minsky, and Paliare Roland Rosenberg Rothstein LLP - has appeared to represent the interests of the shareholders and noteholders who have asserted Class Action Claims against SFC and others.

27 Since 2000, SFC has had the following two auditors ("Auditors"): E&Y from 2000 to 2004 and 2007 to 2012 and BDO from 2005 to 2006.

28 The Auditors have asserted claims against SFC for contribution and indemnity for any amounts paid or payable in respect of the Shareholder Class Action Claims, with each of the Auditors having asserted claims in excess of $6.5 billion. The Auditors have also asserted indemnification claims in respect the Noteholder Class Action Claims.

29 The Underwriters have similarly filed claims against SFC seeking contribution and indemnity for the Shareholder

Class Action Claims and Noteholder Class Action Claims.

30 The Ontario Securities Commission ("OSC") has also investigated matters relating to SFC. The OSC has advised that they are not seeking any monetary sanctions against SFC and are not seeking monetary sanctions in excess of $100 million against SFC's directors and officers (this amount was later reduced to $84 million).

31 SFC has very few trade creditors by virtue of its status as a holding company whose business is substantially carried out through its Subsidiaries in PRC and Hong Kong.

32 On June 26, 2012, SFC brought a motion for an order declaring that all claims made against SFC arising in connection with the ownership, purchase or sale of an equity interest in SFC and related indemnity claims to be "equity claims" (as defined in section 2 of the CCAA). These claims encapsulate the commenced Shareholder Class Action Claims asserted against SFC. The Equity Claims Decision did not purport to deal with the Noteholder Class Action Claims.

33 In reasons released on July 27, 2012 [2012 CarswellOnt 9430 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])], I granted the relief sought by SFC in the Equity Claims Decision, finding that the "the claims advanced in the shareholder claims are clearly equity claims." The Auditors and Underwriters appealed the decision and on November 23, 2012, the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal.

34 On August 31, 2012 [2012 CarswellOnt 11239 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])], an order was issued approving the filing of the Plan (the "Plan Filing and Meeting Order").

35 According to SFC's counsel, the Plan endeavours to achieve the following purposes:

> (a) to effect a full, final and irrevocable compromise, release, discharge, cancellation and bar of all affected claims;
>
> (b) to effect the distribution of the consideration provided in the Plan in respect of proven claims;
>
> (c) to transfer ownership of the Sino-Forest business to Newco and then to Newco II, in each case free and clear of all claims against SFC and certain related claims against the Subsidiaries so as to enable the Sino-Forest business to continue on a viable, going concern basis for the benefit of the Affected Creditors; and
>
> (d) to allow Affected Creditors and Noteholder Class Action Claimants to benefit from contingent value that may be derived from litigation claims to be advanced by the litigation trustee.

36 Pursuant to the Plan, the shares of Newco ("Newco Shares") will be distributed to the Affected Creditors. Newco will immediately transfer the acquired assets to Newco II.

37 SFC's counsel submits that the Plan represents the best available outcome in the circumstances and those with an economic interest in SFC, when considered as a whole, will derive greater benefit from the implementation of the Plan and the continuation of the business as a going concern than would result from bankruptcy or liquidation of SFC. Counsel further submits that the Plan fairly and equitably considers the interests of the Third Party Defendants, who seek indemnity and contribution from SFC and its Subsidiaries on a contingent basis, in the event that they are found to be liable to SFC's stakeholders. Counsel further notes that the three most significant Third Party Defendants (E&Y, BDO and the Underwriters) support the Plan.

38 SFC filed a version of the Plan in August 2012. Subsequent amendments were made over the following months, leading to further revised versions in October and November 2012, and a final version dated December 3, 2012 which was voted on and approved at the meeting. Further amendments were made to obtain the support of E&Y and the Underwriters. BDO availed itself of those terms on December 5, 2012.

39 The current form of the Plan does not settle the Class Action Claims. However, the Plan does contain terms that would be engaged if certain conditions are met, including if the class action settlement with E&Y receives court approval.

40 Affected Creditors with proven claims are entitled to receive distributions under the Plan of (i) Newco Shares, (ii) Newco notes in the aggregate principal amount of U.S. $300 million that are secured and guaranteed by the subsidiary guarantors (the "Newco Notes"), and (iii) Litigation Trust Interests.

41 Affected Creditors with proven claims will be entitled under the Plan to: (a) their *pro rata* share of 92.5% of the Newco Shares with early consenting noteholders also being entitled to their *pro rata* share of the remaining 7.5% of the Newco Shares; and (b) their *pro rata* share of the Newco Notes. Affected Creditors with proven claims will be concurrently entitled to their *pro rata* share of 75% of the Litigation Trust Interests; the Noteholder Class Action Claimants will be entitled to their *pro rata* share of the remaining 25% of the Litigation Trust Interests.

42 With respect to the indemnified Noteholder Class Action Claims, these relate to claims by former noteholders against third parties who, in turn, have alleged corresponding indemnification claims against SFC. The Class Action Plaintiffs have agreed that the aggregate amount of those former noteholder claims will not exceed the Indemnified Noteholder Class Action Limit of $150 million. In turn, indemnification claims of Third Party Defendants against SFC with respect to indemnified Noteholder Class Action Claims are also limited to the $150 million Indemnified Noteholder Class Action Limit.

43 The Plan includes releases for, among others, (a) the subsidiary; (b) the Underwriters' liability for Noteholder Class Action Claims in excess of the Indemnified Noteholder Class Action Limit; (c) E&Y in the event that all of the preconditions to the E&Y settlement with the Ontario Class Action plaintiffs are met; and (d) certain current and former directors and officers of SFC (collectively, the "Named Directors and Officers"). It was emphasized that non-released D&O Claims (being claims for fraud or criminal conduct), conspiracy claims and section 5.1 (2) D&O Claims are not being released pursuant to the Plan.

44 The Plan also contemplates that recovery in respect of claims of the Named Directors and Officers of SFC in respect of any section 5.1 (2) D&O Claims and any conspiracy claims shall be directed and limited to insurance proceeds available from SFC's maintained insurance policies.

45 The meeting was carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Plan Filing and Meeting Order and that the meeting materials were sent to stakeholders in the manner required by the Plan Filing and Meeting Order. The Plan supplement was authorized and distributed in accordance with the Plan Filing and Meeting Order.

46 The meeting was ultimately held on December 3, 2012 and the results of the meeting were as follows:

(a) the number of voting claims that voted on the Plan and their value for and against the Plan;

(b) The results of the Meeting were as follows:

a. the number of Voting Claims that voted on the Plan and their value for and against the Plan:

	Number of Votes	***%***	***Value of Votes***	***%***
Total Claims Voting For	250	98.81%	1,465,766,204	99.97%
Total Claims Voting Against	3	1.19%	414,087	0.03%
Total Claims Voting	253	100.00%	1,466,180,291	100.00%

b. the number of votes for and against the Plan in connection with Class Action Indemnity Claims in respect of Indemnified Noteholder Class Action Claims up to the Indemnified Noteholder Limit:

	Vote For	***Vote Against***	***Total Votes***
Class Action Indemnity Claims	4	1	5

c. the number of Defence Costs Claims votes for and against the Plan and their value:

	Number of Votes	***%***	***Value of Votes***	***%***
Total Claims Voting For	12	92.31%	8,375,016	96.10%
Total Claims Voting Against	1	7.69%	340,000	3.90%

Total Claims Voting	13	100.00%	$	8,715,016	100.00%

d. the overall impact on the approval of the Plan if the count were to include Total Unresolved Claims (including Defence Costs Claims) and, in order to demonstrate the "worst case scenario" if the entire $150 million of the Indemnified Noteholder Class Action Limit had been voted a "no" vote (even though 4 of 5 votes were "yes" votes and the remaining "no" vote was from BDO, who has now agreed to support the Plan):

	Number of Votes	***%***		***Value of Votes***	***%***
Total Claims Voting For	263	98.50%	$	1,474,149,082	90.72%
Total Claims Voting Against	4	1.50%	$	150,754,087	9.28%
Total Claims Voting	267	100.00%	$	1,624,903,169	100.00%

47 E&Y has now entered into a settlement ("E&Y Settlement") with the Ontario plaintiffs and the Quebec plaintiffs, subject to several conditions and approval of the E&Y Settlement itself.

48 As noted in the endorsement dated December 10, 2012, which denied the Funds' adjournment request, the E&Y Settlement does not form part of the Sanction Order and no relief is being sought on this motion with respect to the E&Y Settlement. Rather, section 11.1 of the Plan contains provisions that provide a framework pursuant to which a release of the E&Y claims under the Plan will be effective if several conditions are met. That release will only be granted if all conditions are met, including further court approval.

49 Further, SFC's counsel acknowledges that any issues relating to the E&Y Settlement, including fairness, continuing discovery rights in the Ontario Class Action or Quebec Class Action, or opt out rights, are to dealt with at a further court-approval hearing.

Law and Argument

50 Section 6(1) of the CCAA provides that courts may sanction a plan of compromise if the plan has achieved the support of a majority in number representing two-thirds in value of the creditors.

51 To establish the court's approval of a plan of compromise, the debtor company must establish the following:

(a) there has been strict compliance with all statutory requirements and adherence to previous orders of the court;

(b) nothing has been done or purported to be done that is not authorized by the CCAA; and

(c) the plan is fair and reasonable.

(See *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*, 2000 ABQB 442 (Alta. Q.B.), leave to appeal denied, 2000 ABCA 238 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]), aff'd 2001 ABCA 9 (Alta. C.A.), leave to appeal to SCC refused July 21, 2001, [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 60 (S.C.C.) and *Nelson Financial Group Ltd., Re*, 2011 ONSC 2750, 79 C.B.R. (5th) 307 (Ont. S.C.J.)).

52 SFC submits that there has been strict compliance with all statutory requirements.

53 On the initial application, I found that SFC was a "debtor company" to which the CCAA applies. SFC is a corporation continued under the *Canada Business Corporations Act* ("CBCA") and is a "company" as defined in the CCAA. SFC was "reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within a reasonable proximity of time" prior to the Initial Order and, as such, was and continues to be insolvent. SFC has total claims and liabilities against it substantially in excess of the $5 million statutory threshold.

54 The Notice of Creditors' Meeting was sent in accordance with the Meeting Order and the revised Noteholder Mailing Process Order and, further, the Plan supplement and the voting procedures were posted on the Monitor's website and emailed

to each of the ordinary Affected Creditors. It was also delivered by email to the Trustees and DTC, as well as to Globic who disseminated the information to the Registered Noteholders. The final version of the Plan was emailed to the Affected Creditors, posted on the Monitor's website, and made available for review at the meeting.

55 SFC also submits that the creditors were properly classified at the meeting as Affected Creditors constituted a single class for the purposes of considering the voting on the Plan. Further, and consistent with the Equity Claims Decision, equity claimants constituted a single class but were not entitled to vote on the Plan. Unaffected Creditors were not entitled to vote on the Plan.

56 Counsel submits that the classification of creditors as a single class in the present case complies with the commonality of interests test. See *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*.

57 Courts have consistently held that relevant interests to consider are the legal interests of the creditors hold *qua* creditor in relationship to the debtor prior to and under the plan. Further, the commonality of interests should be considered purposively, bearing in mind the object of the CCAA, namely, to facilitate reorganizations if possible. See *Stelco Inc., Re* (2005), 78 O.R. (3d) 241 (Ont. C.A.), *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*, and *Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, [2009] O.J. No. 2166 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]). Further, courts should resist classification approaches that potentially jeopardize viable plans.

58 In this case, the Affected Creditors voted in one class, consistent with the commonality of interests among Affected Creditors, considering their legal interests as creditors. The classification was consistent with the Equity Claims Decision.

59 I am satisfied that the meeting was properly constituted and the voting was properly carried out. As described above, 99% in number, and more than 99% in value, voting at the meeting favoured the Plan.

60 SFC's counsel also submits that SFC has not taken any steps unauthorized by the CCAA or by court orders. SFC has regularly filed affidavits and the Monitor has provided regular reports and has consistently opined that SFC is acting in good faith and with due diligence. The court has so ruled on this issue on every stay extension order that has been granted.

61 In *Nelson Financial Group Ltd., Re*, I articulated relevant factors on the sanction hearing. The following list of factors is similar to those set out in *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*, 2010 ONSC 4209, 70 C.B.R. (5th) 1 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]):

> 1. The claims must have been properly classified, there must be no secret arrangements to give an advantage to a creditor or creditor; the approval of the plan by the requisite majority of creditors is most important;
>
> 2. It is helpful if the Monitor or some other disinterested person has prepared an analysis of anticipated receipts and liquidation or bankruptcy;
>
> 3. If other options or alternatives have been explored and rejected as workable, this will be significant;
>
> 4. Consideration of the oppression rights of certain creditors; and
>
> 5. Unfairness to shareholders.
>
> 6. The court will consider the public interest.

62 The Monitor has considered the liquidation and bankruptcy alternatives and has determined that it does not believe that liquidation or bankruptcy would be a preferable alternative to the Plan. There have been no other viable alternatives presented that would be acceptable to SFC and to the Affected Creditors. The treatment of shareholder claims and related indemnity claims are, in my view, fair and consistent with CCAA and the Equity Claims Decision.

63 In addition, 99% of Affected Creditors voted in favour of the Plan and the Ad Hoc Securities Purchasers Committee have agreed not to oppose the Plan. I agree with SFC's submission to the effect that these are exercises of those parties'

business judgment and ought not to be displaced.

64 I am satisfied that the Plan provides a fair and reasonable balance among SFC's stakeholders while simultaneously providing the ability for the Sino-Forest business to continue as a going concern for the benefit of all stakeholders.

65 The Plan adequately considers the public interest. I accept the submission of counsel that the Plan will remove uncertainty for Sino-Forest's employees, suppliers, customers and other stakeholders and provide a path for recovery of the debt owed to SFC's non-subordinated creditors. In addition, the Plan preserves the rights of aggrieved parties, including SFC through the Litigation Trust, to pursue (in litigation or settlement) those parties that are alleged to share some or all of the responsibility for the problems that led SFC to file for CCAA protection. In addition, releases are not being granted to individuals who have been charged by OSC staff, or to other individuals against whom the Ad Hoc Securities Purchasers Committee wishes to preserve litigation claims.

66 In addition to the consideration that is payable to Affected Creditors, Early Consent Noteholders will receive their *pro rata* share of an additional 7.5% of the Newco Shares ("Early Consent Consideration"). Plans do not need to provide the same recovery to all creditors to be considered fair and reasonable and there are several plans which have been sanctioned by the courts featuring differential treatment for one creditor or one class of creditors. See, for example, *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re* and *Armbro Enterprises Inc., Re* (1993), 22 C.B.R. (3d) 80 (Ont. Bktcy.). A common theme permeating such cases has been that differential treatment does not necessarily result in a finding that the Plan is unfair, as long as there is a sufficient rational explanation.

67 In this case, SFC's counsel points out that the Early Consent Consideration has been a feature of the restructuring since its inception. It was made available to any and all noteholders and noteholders who wished to become Early Consent Noteholders were invited and permitted to do so until the early consent deadline of May 15, 2012. I previously determined that SFC made available to the noteholders all information needed to decide whether they should sign a joinder agreement and receive the Early Consent Consideration, and that there was no prejudice to the noteholders in being put to that election early in this proceeding.

68 As noted by SFC's counsel, there was a rational purpose for the Early Consent Consideration. The Early Consent Noteholders supported the restructuring through the CCAA proceedings which, in turn, provided increased confidence in the Plan and facilitated the negotiations and approval of the Plan. I am satisfied that this feature of the Plan is fair and reasonable.

69 With respect to the Indemnified Noteholder Class Action Limit, I have considered SFC's written submissions and accept that the $150 million agreed-upon amount reflects risks faced by both sides. The selection of a $150 million cap reflects the business judgment of the parties making assessments of the risk associated with the noteholder component of the Ontario Class Action and, in my view, is within the "general range of acceptability on a commercially reasonable basis". See *Ravelston Corp., Re* (2005), 14 C.B.R. (5th) 207 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]). Further, as noted by SFC's counsel, while the New York Class Action Plaintiffs filed a proof of claim, they have not appeared in this proceeding and have not stated any opposition to the Plan, which has included this concept since its inception.

70 Turning now to the issue of releases of the Subsidiaries, counsel to SFC submits that the unchallenged record demonstrates that there can be no effective restructuring of SFC's business and separation from its Canadian parent if the claims asserted against the Subsidiaries arising out of or connected to claims against SFC remain outstanding. The Monitor has examined all of the releases in the Plan and has stated that it believes that they are fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

71 The Court of Appeal in *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.*, 2008 ONCA 587, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163 (Ont. C.A.) stated that the "court has authority to sanction plans incorporating third party releases that are reasonably related to the proposed restructuring".

72 In this case, counsel submits that the release of Subsidiaries is necessary and essential to the restructuring of SFC. The primary purpose of the CCAA proceedings was to extricate the business of Sino-Forest, through the operation of SFC's Subsidiaries (which were protected by the Stay of Proceedings), from the cloud of uncertainty surrounding SFC. Accordingly, counsel submits that there is a clear and rational connection between the release of the Subsidiaries in the Plan.

Further, it is difficult to see how any viable plan could be made that does not cleanse the Subsidiaries of the claims made against SFC.

73 Counsel points out that the Subsidiaries who are to have claims against them released are contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the Plan. The Subsidiaries are effectively contributing their assets to SFC to satisfy SFC's obligations under their guarantees of SFC's note indebtedness, for the benefit of the Affected Creditors. As such, counsel submits the releases benefit SFC and the creditors generally.

74 In my view, the basis for the release falls within the guidelines previously set out by this court in *ATB Financial*, *Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, 2010 ONSC 1708 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), and *Kitchener Frame Ltd., Re*, 2012 ONSC 234, 86 C.B.R. (5th) 274 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]). Further, it seems to me that the Plan cannot succeed without the releases of the Subsidiaries. I am satisfied that the releases are fair and reasonable and are rationally connected to the overall purpose of the Plan.

75 With respect to the Named Directors and Officers release, counsel submits that this release is necessary to effect a greater recovery for SFC's creditors, rather than having those directors and officers assert indemnity claims against SFC. Without these releases, the quantum of the unresolved claims reserve would have to be materially increased and, to the extent that any such indemnity claim was found to be a proven claim, there would have been a corresponding dilution of consideration paid to Affected Creditors.

76 It was also pointed out that the release of the Named Directors and Officers is not unlimited; among other things, claims for fraud or criminal conduct, conspiracy claims, and section 5.1 (2) D&O Claims are excluded.

77 I am satisfied that there is a reasonable connection between the claims being compromised and the Plan to warrant inclusion of this release.

78 Finally, in my view, it is necessary to provide brief comment on the alternative argument of the Funds, namely, the Plan be altered so as to remove Article 11 "Settlement of Claims Against Third Party Defendants". The Plan was presented to the meeting with Article 11 in place. This was the Plan that was subject to the vote and this is the Plan that is the subject of this motion. The alternative proposed by the Funds was not considered at the meeting and, in my view, it is not appropriate to consider such an alternative on this motion.

Disposition

79 Having considered the foregoing, I am satisfied that SFC has established that:

(i) there has been strict compliance with all statutory requirements and adherence to the previous orders of the court;

(ii) nothing has been done or purported to be done that is not authorized by the CCAA; and

(iii) the Plan is fair and reasonable.

80 Accordingly, the motion is granted and the Plan is sanctioned. An order has been signed substantially in the form of the draft Sanction Order.

Motion granted.

End of Document

TAB 9

2013 ONSC 2519
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

SkyLink Aviation Inc., Re

2013 CarswellOnt 7670, 2013 ONSC 2519, [2013] O.J. No. 2664, 229 A.C.W.S. (3d) 24, 3 C.B.R. (6th) 83

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise and Arrangement of Skylink Aviation Inc. Applicant

Morawetz J.

Heard: April 23, 2013
Oral reasons: April 23, 2013
Docket: CV-13-1003300CL

Counsel: Robert J. Chadwick, Logan Willis for SkyLink Aviation Inc.
Harvey Chaiton for Arbib, Babrar and Sunbeam Helicopters
Emily Stock for Certain Former and Current Directors, for Insured Claims
S.R. Orzy, Sean Zweig for Noteholders
Shayne Kukulowicz for Certain Directors and Officers
M.P. Gottlieb, A. Winton for Monitor, Duff & Phelps

Subject: Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications
For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Bankruptcy and insolvency

XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.3 Arrangements
XIX.3.b Approval by court
XIX.3.b.i "Fair and reasonable"

Bankruptcy and insolvency

XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.3 Arrangements
XIX.3.b Approval by court
XIX.3.b.iii Creditor approval

Bankruptcy and insolvency

XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.5 Miscellaneous

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — "Fair and reasonable"

Debtor entered protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act for purpose of recapitalization — Plan sought to refinance first lien debt, cancel secured notes in exchange for consideration including new common shares and new debt, and compromise of certain unsecured liabilities — Settlements were arranged with certain claimants, including releases regarding potential claims — Debtor brought application for extension of stay and sanctioning plan of arrangement and compromise — Application granted — Plan was not opposed and had strong support from creditors — Debtor complied with procedural requirements of Act, and orders including initial order — Debtor acted in good faith and with due diligence — Plan was fair and reasonable — Releases were necessary part of plan and had been negotiated amongst appropriate parties.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — Creditor approval

Debtor entered protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act for purpose of recapitalization — Plan sought to refinance first lien debt, cancel secured notes in exchange for consideration including new common shares and new debt, and compromise of certain unsecured liabilities — Settlements were arranged with certain claimants, including releases regarding potential claims — Debtor brought application for extension of stay and sanctioning plan of arrangement and compromise — Application granted — Plan was not opposed and had strong support from creditors — Debtor complied with procedural requirements of Act, and orders including initial order — Debtor acted in good faith and with due diligence — Plan was fair and reasonable — Releases were necessary part of plan and had been negotiated amongst appropriate parties.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Miscellaneous

Sealing confidential materials.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Morawetz J.*:

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 3523, 43 C.B.R. (5th) 269, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 74 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 ONCA 587, 2008 CarswellOnt 4811, *(*sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re)* 240 O.A.C. 245, *(*sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re)* 296 D.L.R. (4th) 135, *(*sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re)* 92 O.R. (3d) 513, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 123 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), *(*sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re)* 257 O.A.C. 400 (note), 2008 CarswellOnt 5432, 2008 CarswellOnt 5433, *(*sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re)* 390 N.R. 393 (note) (S.C.C.) — referred to

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2000), [2000] 10 W.W.R. 269, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 1, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 9, 9 B.L.R. (3d) 41, 2000 CarswellAlta 662, 2000 ABQB 442, 265 A.R. 201 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2000), 2000 CarswellAlta 919, [2000] 10 W.W.R. 314, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 46, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 52, 9 B.L.R. (3d) 86, 2000 ABCA 238, 266 A.R. 131, 228 W.A.C. 131 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]) — referred to

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2000), 88 Alta. L.R. (3d) 8, 2001 ABCA 9, 2000 CarswellAlta 1556, [2001] 4 W.W.R. 1, 277 A.R. 179, 242 W.A.C. 179 (Alta. C.A.) — referred to

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2001), 2001 CarswellAlta 888, 2001 CarswellAlta 889, 275 N.R. 386 (note), 293 A.R. 351 (note), 257 W.A.C. 351 (note) (S.C.C.) — referred to

Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co. (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 1, *(*sub nom. *Olympia & York Developments Ltd., Re)* 12 O.R. (3d) 500, 1993 CarswellOnt 182 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — considered

Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance) (2002), 287 N.R. 203, *(*sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada)* 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, *(*sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada)* 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823, *(*sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada)* 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.) — followed

SkyLink Aviation Inc., Re (2013), 2013 CarswellOnt 2785, 2013 ONSC 1500 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

s. 5.1(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 122] — referred to

s. 19(2) — referred to

APPLICATION by debtor for approval of plan under *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* and to extend stay.

***Morawetz J.*:**

1 SkyLink Aviation Inc. ("SkyLink Aviation", the "Company" or the "Applicant"), seeks an Order (the "Sanction Order"), among other things:

(a) sanctioning SkyLink Aviation's Plan of Compromise and Arrangement dated April 18, 2013 (as it may be amended in accordance with its terms, the "Plan") pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended (the "CCAA");

(b) declaring that the New Shareholders Agreement is effective and binding on all holders of New Common Shares and any Persons entitled to receive New Common Shares pursuant to the Plan; and

(c) extending the Stay Period, as defined in the Initial Order of this Court granted March 8, 2013 [2013 CarswellOnt 2785 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])] (the "Initial Order").

2 No party opposed the requested relief.

3 Counsel to the Company submits that the Plan has strong support from the creditors and achieves the Company's goal of a going-concern recapitalization transaction (the "Recapitalization") that minimizes any impact on operations and maximizes value for the Company's stakeholders.

4 Counsel further submits that the Plan is fair and reasonable and offers a greater benefit to the Company's stakeholders than other restructuring or sale alternatives. The Plan has been approved by the Affected Creditors with 95.3% in number representing 93.6% in value of the Affected Unsecured Creditors Class and 97.1% in number representing 99.99% in value of the Secured Noteholders Class voting in favour of the Plan (inclusive of Voting Claims and Disputed Voting Claims).

5 The request for court approval is supported by the Initial Consenting Noteholders, the First Lien Lenders and the Monitor.

The Facts

6 SkyLink Aviation, together with the SkyLink Subsidiaries (as defined in the Affidavit of Jan Ottens sworn April 21, 2013) (collectively, "SkyLink"), is a leading provider of global aviation transportation and logistics services, primarily fixed-wing and rotary-wing air transport and related activities (the "SkyLink Business").

7 SkyLink is responsible for providing non-combat life-supporting functions to both its own personnel and those of its suppliers and clients in high-risk conflict zones.

8 SkyLink Aviation experienced financial challenges that necessitated a recapitalization of the Company under the CCAA. On March 8, 2013, the Company sought protection from its creditors under the CCAA and obtained the Initial Order which appointed Duff & Phelps Canada Restructuring Inc. as the monitor of the Applicant in this CCAA Proceeding (the "Monitor").

9 The primary purpose of the CCAA Proceeding is to expeditiously implement the Recapitalization. The Recapitalization involves: (i) the refinancing of the Company's first lien debt; (ii) the cancellation of the Secured Notes in exchange for the issuance by the Company of consideration that includes new common shares and new debt; and (iii) the compromise of certain unsecured liabilities, including the portion of the Noteholders' claim that is treated as unsecured under the Plan.

10 On March 8, 2013, I granted the Claims Procedure Order approving the Claims Procedure to ascertain all of the claims against the Company and its directors and officers. SkyLink Aviation, with the assistance of the Monitor, carried out the Claims Procedure in accordance with the terms of the Claims Procedure Order.

11 Pursuant to the Claims Procedure Order, the Secured Noteholders Allowed Claim, was determined by the Applicant, with the consent of the Monitor and the Majority Initial Consenting Noteholders, to be approximately $123.4 million.

12 The Secured Noteholders Allowed Claim was allowed for both voting and distribution purposes against the Applicant as follows:

(a) $28.5 million, as agreed among the Applicant, the Monitor and the Majority Initial Consenting Noteholders, was allowed as secured Claims against the Applicant (collectively the "Secured Noteholders Allowed Secured Claim"); and

(b) $94.9 million, the balance of the Secured Noteholders Allowed Claim, was allowed as an unsecured Claim against the Applicant (collectively the "Secured Noteholders Allowed Unsecured Claim").

13 The value of the Secured Noteholders Allowed Secured Claim is consistent with the enterprise value range set out in the valuation dated March 7, 2013 (the "Valuation") prepared by Duff & Phelps Canada Limited.

14 The Claims Procedure resulted in $133.7 million in Affected Unsecured Claims, consisting of the Secured Noteholders Allowed Unsecured Claim of $94.9 million and other unsecured Claims of $38.8 million, being filed against the Company.

15 In addition, ten claims were filed against the Directors and Officers totalling approximately $21 million. Approximately $13 million of these claims were also filed against the Company.

16 Following the commencement of these proceedings, SkyLink Aviation entered into discussions with certain creditors in an effort to consensually resolve the Affected Unsecured Claims and Director/Officer Claims asserted by them. These negotiations, and the settlement agreements ultimately reached with these creditors, resulted in amendments to the original version of the Plan filed on March 8, 2013 (the "Original Plan").

Purpose and Effect of the Plan

17 In developing the Plan, counsel submits that the Company sought to, among other things: (i) ensure a going-concern result for the SkyLink Business; (ii) minimize any impact on operations; (iii) maximize value for the Company's stakeholders; and (iv) achieve a fair and reasonable balance among its Affected Creditors.

18 The Plan provides for a full and final release and discharge of the Affected Claims and Released Claims, a settlement of, and consideration for, all Allowed Affected Claims and a recapitalization of the Applicant.

19 Unaffected Creditors will not be affected by the Plan (subject to recovery in respect of Insured Claims being limited to the proceeds of applicable Insurance Policies) and will not receive any consideration or distributions under the Plan in respect of their Unaffected Claims (except to the extent their Unaffected Claims are paid in full on the Plan Implementation Date in accordance with the express terms of the Plan).

20 Equity Claims and Equity Interests will be extinguished under the Plan and any Equity Claimants will not receive any consideration or distributions under the Plan.

21 The Plan provides for the release of a number of parties (the "Released Parties"), including SkyLink Aviation, the Released Directors/Officers, the Released Shareholders, the SkyLink Subsidiaries and the directors and officers of the SkyLink Subsidiaries in respect of Claims relating to SkyLink Aviation, Director/Officer Claims and any claims arising from or connected to the Plan, the Recapitalization, the CCAA proceedings or other related matters. These releases were negotiated as part of the overall framework of compromises in the Plan, and such releases are necessary to and facilitate the successful completion of the Plan and the Recapitalization.

22 The Plan does not release: (i) the right to enforce SkyLink Aviation's obligations under the Plan; (ii) any Released Party from fraud or wilful misconduct; (iii) SkyLink Aviation from any Claim that is not permitted to be released pursuant to Section 19(2) of the CCAA; or (iv) any Director or Officer from any Director/Officer Claim that is not permitted to be released pursuant to Section 5.1(2) of the CCAA. Further, as noted above, the Plan does not release Director/Officer Wages Claims or Insured Claims, provided that any recourse in respect of such claims is limited to proceeds, if any, of the applicable Insurance Policies.

Meetings of Creditors

23 At the Meetings, the resolution to approve the Plan was passed by the required majorities in both classes of creditors. Specifically, the Affected Creditors approved the Plan by the following majorities:

(a) Affected Unsecured Creditors Class:

95.3% in number and 93.6% in value (inclusive of Voting Claims and Disputed Voting Claims);

97.4% in number and 99.9% in value (Voting Claims only); and

(b) Secured Noteholders Class:

97.1% in number and 99.99% in value.

24 Counsel to the Company submits that the results of the vote taken in the Affected Unsecured Creditors Class would not change materially based on the inclusion or exclusion of the Disputed Voting Claims as the required majorities for approval of the Plan under the CCAA would be achieved regardless of whether the Disputed Voting Claims are included in the voting results.

25 Counsel for the Company submits that the Plan provides that the shareholders agreement among the existing shareholders of SkyLink Aviation will be terminated on the Plan Implementation Date. A new shareholders agreement (the "New Shareholders' Agreement"), which is to apply in respect of the holders of the New Common Shares as of the Plan Implementation Date, has been negotiated between and among: (i) the Initial Consenting Noteholders (and each of their independent counsel), who will collectively hold more than 90% of the New Common Shares; and (ii) counsel to the Note Indenture Trustee, who acted as a representative for the interests of the post-Recapitalization minority shareholders.

Requirements for Approval

26 The general requirements for court approval of a CCAA plan are well established:

(a) there must be strict compliance with all statutory requirements;

(b) all materials filed and procedures carried out must be examined to determine if anything has been done or purported to have been done which is not authorized by the CCAA; and

(c) the plan must be fair and reasonable.

Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co. (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. Gen. Div.)).

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re, 2000 ABQB 442 (Alta. Q.B.), at para 60, leave to appeal refused 2000 ABCA 238 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]), affirmed (2000), 2001 ABCA 9 (Alta. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 60 (S.C.C.).

27 Since the commencement of the CCAA Proceeding, I am satisfied that SkyLink Aviation has complied with the

procedural requirements of the CCAA, the Initial Order and all other Orders granted by the Court during the CCAA Proceeding.

28 With respect to the second part of the test I am satisfied that throughout the course of the CCAA Proceeding, SkyLink Aviation has acted in good faith and with due diligence and has complied with the requirements of the CCAA and the Orders of this Honourable Court.

29 Counsel to SkyLink submits that the Plan is fair and reasonable for a number of reasons including:

> (a) the Plan represents a compromise among the Applicant and the Affected Creditors resulting from dialogue and negotiations among the Company and its creditors, with the support of the Monitor and its counsel;
>
> (b) the classification of the Company's creditors into two Voting Classes, the Secured Noteholders Class and the Affected Unsecured Creditors Class, was approved by this Court pursuant to the Meetings Order. This classification was not opposed at the hearing to approve the Meetings Order or thereafter at the comeback hearing;
>
> (c) the amount of the Secured Noteholders Allowed Secured Claim is consistent with the enterprise value range provided for in the Valuation and is supported by the Monitor;
>
> (d) the Affected Creditors voted to approve the Plan at the Meetings;
>
> (e) the Plan is economically feasible;
>
> (f) the Plan provides for the continued operation of the world-wide business of SkyLink with no disruption to customers and provides for an expedient recapitalization of the Company's balance sheet, thereby preserving the goingconcern value of the SkyLink Business;

I accept these submissions and conclude that the Plan is fair and reasonable.

30 In considering the appropriateness of the terms and scope of third party releases, the courts will take into account the particular circumstances of a case and the purpose of the CCAA:

> The concept that has been accepted is that the Court does have jurisdiction, taking into account the nature and purpose of the CCAA, to sanction the release of third parties where the factual circumstances are deemed appropriate for the success of a Plan.
>
> *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.* (2008), 43 C.B.R. (5th) 269 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); affirmed 2008 ONCA 587 (Ont. C.A.) leave to appeal refused (2008), 257 O.A.C. 400 (note) (S.C.C.).

31 Counsel to the Company submits that the third party releases provided under the Plan protect the Released Parties from potential claims relating to the Applicant based on conduct taking place on or prior to the later of the Plan Implementation Date and the date on which actions are taken to implement the Plan. The Plan does not release any Released Party for fraud or wilful misconduct.

32 Counsel to the Company submits the releases provided in the Plan were negotiated as part of the overall framework of compromises in the Plan, and these releases are necessary to and facilitate the successful completion of the Plan and the Recapitalization and that there is a reasonable connection between the releases contemplated by the Plan and the restructuring to be achieved by the Plan to warrant inclusion of such releases in the Plan.

33 I am satisfied that the releases of the Released Directors/Officers and the Released Shareholders contained in the Plan

are appropriate in the circumstances for a number of reasons including:

> (a) the releases of the Released Directors/Officers and the Released Shareholders were negotiated as part of the overall framework of compromises in the Plan;
>
> (b) the Released Directors/Officers consist of parties who, in the absence of the Plan releases, would have Claims for indemnification against SkyLink Aviation;
>
> (c) the inclusion of certain parties among the Released Directors/Officers and the Released Shareholders was an essential component of the settlement of several Claims and Director/Officer Claims;
>
> (d) full disclosure of the releases was made to creditors in the Initial Affidavit, the Plan, the Information Statement, the Monitor's Second Report and the Ottens' Affidavit;
>
> (e) the Monitor considers the scope of the releases contained in the Plan to be reasonable in the circumstances.

34 I am satisfied that the Plan represents a compromise that balances the rights and interests of the Company's stakeholders and the releases provided for in the Plan are integral to the framework of compromises in the Plan.

Sealing the Confidential Appendix

35 The Applicant also requests that an order to seal the confidential appendix to the Monitor's Third Report (the "Confidential Appendix"), which outlines the Monitor's analysis and conclusions with respect to the amount of the Secured Noteholders Allowed Secured Claim.

36 The Confidential Appendix contains sensitive commercial information, the disclosure of which could be harmful to stakeholders. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the test set out in *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*, 2002 SCC 41, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.) (WL Can) at para. 53 has been met and the Confidential Appendix should be sealed.

Extension of Stay Period

37 The Applicant also requests an extension of the Stay Period until May 31, 2013.

38 I am satisfied that the Company has acted and, is acting, in good faith and with due diligence such that the extension request is justified and is granted.

Application granted.

Court File No. CV-16-11452-00CL

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED
AND IN THE MATTER OF PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF H.B. WHITE CANADA CORP.

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

PROCEEDING COMMENCED AT TORONTO

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