

**ONTARIO  
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE  
(COMMERCIAL LIST)**

**IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT,  
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED**

**AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF  
CLOVER LEAF HOLDINGS COMPANY, CONNORS BROS. CLOVER LEAF  
SEAFOODS COMPANY, K.C.R. FISHERIES LTD., 6162410 CANADA LIMITED,  
CONNORS BROS. HOLDING COMPANY AND CONNOR BROS. SEAFOODS  
COMPANY**

**APPLICANTS' BOOK OF AUTHORITIES  
(CCAA Application)**

**January 27, 2020**

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Lawyers for the Applicants

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4.	<i>Re Sanjel Corp</i> , 2016 ABQB 257
5.	<i>Re Nelson Education Ltd</i> , 2015 ONSC 5557
6.	<i>Canwest Global Communications Corp</i> , (September 8, 2010), Toronto, CV-09-8396-00CL (Approval and Vesting Order)
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13.	<i>Nortel Networks Corp, Re</i> , 2009 CarswellOnt 9378
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16.	<i>Century Services Inc v Attorney General (Canada)</i> , 2010 SCC 60
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# TAB 1

2010 ONSC 2870  
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re

2010 CarswellOnt 3509, 2010 ONSC 2870, 189 A.C.W.S. (3d) 598, 68 C.B.R. (5th) 233

**IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS  
ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED**

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT  
OF CANWEST PUBLISHING INC./PUBLICATIONS CANWEST INC.,  
CANWEST BOOKS INC., AND CANWEST (CANADA) INC. (Applicants)

Pepall J.

Judgment: May 21, 2010  
Docket: CV-10-8533-00CL

Counsel: Lyndon Barnes, Alex Cobb, Betsy Putnam for Applicant, LP Entities  
Mario Forte for Special Committee of the Board of Directors  
David Byers, Maria Konyukhova for Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc.  
Andrew Kent, Hilary Clarke for Administrative Agent of the Senior Secured Lenders Syndicate  
M.P. Gottlieb, J.A. Swartz for Ad Hoc Committee of 9.25% Senior Subordinated Noteholders  
Robert Chadwick, Logan Willis for 7535538 Canada Inc.  
Deborah McPhail for Superintendent of Financial Services (FSCO)  
Thomas McRae for Certain Canwest Employees

**Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency

XIV Administration of estate

XIV.6 Sale of assets

XIV.6.b Sale by tender

XIV.6.b.ii Miscellaneous

Bankruptcy and insolvency

XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

XIX.3 Arrangements

XIX.3.b Approval by court

XIX.3.b.i "Fair and reasonable"

Bankruptcy and insolvency

XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

## XIX.5 Miscellaneous

### **Headnote**

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Administration of estate — Sale of assets — Sale by tender — Miscellaneous

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Sale and investor solicitation process — In earlier order, court approved support agreement between LP entities and senior lenders (support transaction) and commencement of sale and investor solicitation process (SISP) — AHC bid was only superior offer as defined in SISP — AHC bid would allow for full payout of debt owed to secured lenders and provide additional value to be available for unsecured creditors — AHC transaction would be implemented pursuant to plan of compromise or arrangement — LP entities brought application for order authorizing them to enter into asset purchase agreement based on AHC bid and conditionally sanctioning support transaction, among other relief — Application granted — AHC transaction was approved — Proposed disposition of assets met criteria in s. 36 of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and common law — Process was reasonable — Sufficient efforts were made to attract best possible bid — AHC bid was better than support transaction — Effect of proposed sale on interested parties was positive.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Miscellaneous

Procedure — Court approved commencement of sale and investor solicitation process (SISP) in earlier order — AHC bid was only superior offer as defined in SISP — AHC bid would allow for full payout of debt owed to secured lenders and provide additional value to be available for unsecured creditors — LP entities brought application for order approving amended claims procedure, authorizing them to call meeting of unsecured creditors to vote on AHC plan, and amending SISP procedures so LP entities could advance AHC transaction, among other relief — Application granted — Requested claims procedure order was approved — Because AHC plan was approved, scope of process had to be expanded to ensure as many creditors as possible could participate in meeting to consider AHC plan — Meeting order to convene meeting of unsecured creditors to vote on AHC plan was granted — On consent, SISP was amended to extend date for closing of AHC transaction and to permit proposed dual track procedure — Amendments were warranted as practical matter and to procure best available going concern outcome for stakeholders and LP entities.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — "Fair and reasonable"

In earlier order, court approved support agreement between LP entities and senior lenders (support transaction) and commencement of sale and investor solicitation process (SISP) — AHC bid was only superior offer as defined in SISP — AHC bid would allow for full payout of debt owed to secured lenders and provide additional value to be available for unsecured creditors — AHC transaction would be implemented pursuant to plan of compromise or arrangement — LP entities brought application for order authorizing them to enter into asset purchase agreement based on AHC bid and conditionally sanctioning support transaction, among other relief — Application granted — It was prudent for LP entities to simultaneously advance AHC transaction and support

transaction — Support transaction was conditionally sanctioned — Excess of required majorities of senior lenders voted in favour of support transaction — Absent closing of AHC transaction, support transaction was fair and reasonable as between LP entities and creditors — There were no available commercial going concern alternatives to support transaction — There had been strict compliance with statutory requirements.

### **Table of Authorities**

#### **Cases considered by *Pepall J.*:**

*Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* (2000), [2000] 10 W.W.R. 269, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 1, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 9, 9 B.L.R. (3d) 41, 2000 CarswellAlta 662, 2000 ABQB 442, 265 A.R. 201 (Alta. Q.B.)

— followed

*Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* (2000), 2000 CarswellAlta 919, [2000] 10 W.W.R. 314, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 46, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 52, 9 B.L.R. (3d) 86, 2000 ABCA 238, 266 A.R. 131, 228 W.A.C. 131 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]) — referred to

*Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* (2000), 88 Alta. L.R. (3d) 8, 2001 ABCA 9, 2000 CarswellAlta 1556, [2001] 4 W.W.R. 1, 277 A.R. 179, 242 W.A.C. 179 (Alta. C.A.) — referred to

*Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* (2001), 2001 CarswellAlta 888, 2001 CarswellAlta 889, 275 N.R. 386 (note), 293 A.R. 351 (note), 257 W.A.C. 351 (note) (S.C.C.) — referred to

*Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) — followed

#### **Statutes considered:**

*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 6 — referred to

s. 6(3) — referred to

s. 6(5) — referred to

s. 6(6) — referred to

s. 11 — referred to

s. 36 — considered

#### ***Pepall J.*:**

#### **Endorsement**

#### ***Relief Requested***

1 The LP Entities seek an order: (1) authorizing them to enter into an Asset Purchase Agreement based on a bid from the Ad Hoc Committee of 9.25% Senior Subordinated Noteholders ("the AHC

Bid"); (2) approving an amended claims procedure; (3) authorizing the LP Entities to resume the claims process; and (4) amending the SISP procedures so that the LP Entities can advance the Ad Hoc Committee transaction (the AHC Transaction") and the Support Transaction concurrently. They also seek an order authorizing them to call a meeting of unsecured creditors to vote on the Ad Hoc Committee Plan on June 10, 2010. Lastly, they seek an order conditionally sanctioning the Senior Lenders' CCAA Plan.

### *AHC Bid*

2 Dealing firstly with approval of the AHC Bid, in my Initial Order of January 8, 2010, I approved the Support Agreement between the LP Entities and the Administrative Agent for the Senior Lenders and authorized the LP Entities to file a Senior Lenders' Plan and to commence a sale and investor solicitation process (the SISP). The objective of the SISP was to test the market and obtain an offer that was superior to the terms of the Support Transaction.

3 On January 11, 2010, the Financial Advisor, RBC Capital Markets, commenced the SISP. Qualified Bids (as that term was defined in the SISP) were received and the Monitor, in consultation with the Financial Advisor and the LP CRA, determined that the AHC Bid was a Superior Cash Offer and that none of the other bids was a Superior Offer as those terms were defined in the SISP.

4 The Monitor recommended that the LP Entities pursue the AHC Transaction and the Special Committee of the Board of Directors accepted that recommendation.

5 The AHC Transaction contemplates that 7535538 Canada Inc. ("Holdco") will effect a transaction through a new limited partnership (Opco LP) in which it will acquire substantially all of the financial and operating assets of the LP Entities and the shares of National Post Inc. and assume certain liabilities including substantially all of the operating liabilities for a purchase price of \$1.1 billion. At closing, Opco LP will offer employment to substantially all of the employees of the LP Entities and will assume all of the pension liabilities and other benefits for employees of the LP Entities who will be employed by Opco LP, as well as for retirees currently covered by registered pension plans or other benefit plans. The materials submitted with the AHC Bid indicated that Opco LP will continue to operate all of the businesses of the LP Entities in substantially the same manner as they are currently operated, with no immediate plans to discontinue operations, sell material assets or make significant changes to current management. The AHC Bid will also allow for a full payout of the debt owed by the LP Entities to the LP Secured Lenders under the LP credit agreement and the Hedging Creditors and provides an additional \$150 million in value which will be available for the unsecured creditors of the LP Entities.

6 The purchase price will consist of an amount in cash that is equal to the sum of the Senior Secured Claims Amount (as defined in the AHC Asset Purchase Agreement), a promissory note of

\$150 million (to be exchanged for up to 45% of the common shares of Holdco) and the assumption of certain liabilities of the LP Entities.

7 The Ad Hoc Committee has indicated that Holdco has received commitments for \$950 million of funded debt and equity financing to finance the AHC Bid. This includes \$700 million of new senior funded debt to be raised by Opco LP and \$250 million of mezzanine debt and equity to be raised including from the current members of the Ad Hoc Committee.

8 Certain liabilities are excluded including pre-filing liabilities and restructuring period claims, certain employee related liabilities and intercompany liabilities between and among the LP Entities and the CMI Entities. Effective as of the closing date, Opco LP will offer employment to all full-time and part-time employees of the LP Entities on substantially similar terms as their then existing employment (or the terms set out in their collective agreement, as applicable), subject to the option, exercisable on or before May 30, 2010, to not offer employment to up to 10% of the non-unionized part-time or temporary employees employed by the LP Entities.

9 The AHC Bid contemplates that the transaction will be implemented pursuant to a plan of compromise or arrangement between the LP Entities and certain unsecured creditors (the "AHC Plan"). In brief, the AHC Plan would provide that Opco LP would acquire substantially all of the assets of the LP Entities. The Senior Lenders would be unaffected creditors and would be paid in full. Unsecured creditors with proven claims of \$1,000 or less would receive cash. The balance of the consideration would be satisfied by an unsecured demand note of \$150 million less the amounts paid to the \$1,000 unsecured creditors. Ultimately, affected unsecured creditors with proven claims would receive shares in Holdco and Holdco would apply for the listing of its common shares on the Toronto Stock Exchange.

10 The Monitor recommended that the AHC Asset Purchase Agreement based on the AHC Bid be authorized. Certain factors were particularly relevant to the Monitor in making its recommendation:

- the Senior Lenders will received 100 cents on the dollar;
- the AHC Transaction will preserve substantially all of the business of the LP Entities to the benefit of the LP Entities' suppliers and the millions of people who rely on the LP Entities' publications each day;
- the AHC Transaction preserves the employment of substantially all of the current employees and largely protects the interests of former employees and retirees;
- the AHC Bid contemplates that the transaction will be implemented through a Plan under which \$150 million in cash or shares will be available for distribution to unsecured creditors;

- unlike the Support Transaction, there is no option *not* to assume certain pension or employee benefits obligations.

11 The Monitor, the LP CRA and the Financial Advisor considered closing risks associated with the AHC Bid and concluded that the Bid was credible, reasonably certain and financially viable. The LP Entities agreed with that assessment. All appearing either supported the AHC Transaction or were unopposed.

12 Clearly the SISP was successful and in my view, the LP Entities should be authorized to enter the Ad Hoc Committee Asset Purchase Agreement as requested.

13 The proposed disposition of assets meets the section 36 CCAA criteria and those set forth in the *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.*<sup>1</sup> decision. Indeed, to a large degree, the criteria overlap. The process was reasonable and the Monitor was content with it. Sufficient efforts were made to attract the best possible bid; the SISP was widely publicized; ample time was given to prepare offers; and there was integrity and no unfairness in the process. The Monitor was intimately involved in supervising the SISP and also made the Superior Cash Offer recommendation. The Monitor had previously advised the Court that in its opinion, the Support Transaction was preferable to a bankruptcy. The logical extension of that conclusion is that the AHC Transaction is as well. The LP Entities' Senior Lenders were either consulted and/or had the right to approve the various steps in the SISP. The effect of the proposed sale on other interested parties is very positive. Amongst other things, it provides for a going concern outcome and significant recoveries for both the secured and unsecured creditors. The consideration to be received is reasonable and fair. The Financial Advisor and the Monitor were both of the opinion that the SISP was a thorough canvassing of the market. The AHC Transaction was the highest offer received and delivers considerably more value than the Support Transaction which was in essence a "stalking horse" offer made by the single largest creditor constituency. The remaining subsequent provisions of section 36 of the CCAA are either inapplicable or have been complied with. In conclusion the AHC Transaction ought to be and is approved.

### ***Claims Procedure Order and Meeting Order***

14 Turning to the Claims Procedure Order, as a result of the foregoing, the scope of the claims process needs to be expanded. Claims that have been filed will move to adjudication and resolution and in addition, the scope of the process needs to be expanded so as to ensure that as many creditors as possible have an opportunity to participate in the meeting to consider the Ad Hoc Committee Plan and to participate in distributions. Dates and timing also have to be adjusted. In these circumstances the requested Claims Procedure Order should be approved. Additionally, the Meeting Order required to convene a meeting of unsecured creditors on June 10, 2010 to vote on the Ad Hoc Committee Plan is granted.

### ***SISP Amendment***

15 It is proposed that the LP Entities will work diligently to implement the AHC Transaction while concurrently pursuing such steps as are required to effect the Support Transaction. The SISP procedures must be amended. The AHC Transaction which is to be effected through the Ad Hoc Committee Plan cannot be completed within the sixty days contemplated by the SISP. On consent of the Monitor, the LP Administrative Agent, the Ad Hoc Committee and the LP Entities, the SISP is amended to extend the date for closing of the AHC Transaction and to permit the proposed dual track procedure. The proposed amendments to the SISP are clearly warranted as a practical matter and so as to procure the best available going concern outcome for the LP Entities and their stakeholders. Paragraph 102 of the Initial Order contains a comeback clause which provides that interested parties may move to amend the Initial Order on notice. This would include a motion to amend the SISP which is effectively incorporated into the Initial Order by reference. The Applicants submit that I have broad general jurisdiction under section 11 of the CCAA to make such amendments. In my view, it is unnecessary to decide that issue as the affected parties are consenting to the proposed amendments.

### ***Dual Track and Sanction of Senior Lenders' CCAA Plan***

16 In my view, it is prudent for the LP Entities to simultaneously advance the AHC Transaction and the Support Transaction. To that end, the LP Entities seek approval of a conditional sanction order. They ask for conditional authorization to enter into the Acquisition and Assumption Agreement pursuant to a Credit Acquisition Sanction, Approval and Vesting Order.

17 The Senior Lenders' meeting was held January 27, 2010 and 97.5% in number and 88.7% in value of the Senior Lenders holding Proven Principal Claims who were present and voting voted in favour of the Senior Lenders' Plan. This was well in excess of the required majorities.

18 The LP Entities are seeking the sanction of the Senior Lenders' CCAA Plan on the basis that its implementation is conditional on the delivery of a Monitor's Certificate. The certificate will not be delivered if the AHC Bid closes. Satisfactory arrangements have been made to address closing timelines as well as access to advisor and management time. Absent the closing of the AHC Transaction, the Senior Lenders' CCAA Plan is fair and reasonable as between the LP Entities and its creditors. If the AHC Transaction is unable to close, I conclude that there are no available commercial going concern alternatives to the Senior Lenders' CCAA Plan. The market was fully canvassed during the SISP; there was ample time to conduct such a canvass; it was professionally supervised; and the AHC Bid was the only Superior Offer as that term was defined in the SISP. For these reasons, I am prepared to find that the Senior Lenders' CCAA Plan is fair and reasonable and may be conditionally sanctioned. I also note that there has been strict compliance with statutory requirements and nothing has been done or purported to have been done which was not authorized

by the CCAA. As such, the three part test set forth in the *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*<sup>2</sup> has been met. Additionally, there has been compliance with section 6 of the CCAA. The Crown, employee and pension claims described in section 6 (3),(5), and (6) have been addressed in the Senior Lenders' Plan at sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4.

### ***Conclusion***

19 In conclusion, it is evident to me that the parties who have been engaged in this CCAA proceeding have worked diligently and cooperatively, rigorously protecting their own interests but at the same time achieving a positive outcome for the LP Entities' stakeholders as a whole. As I indicated in Court, for this they and their professional advisors should be commended. The business of the LP Entities affects many people - creditors, employees, retirees, suppliers, community members and the millions who rely on their publications for their news. This is a good chapter in the LP Entities' CCAA story. Hopefully, it will have a happy ending.

*Application granted.*

### Footnotes

1 [1991] O.J. No. 1137 (Ont. C.A.).

2 2000 ABQB 442 (Alta. Q.B.), leave to appeal refused 2000 ABCA 238 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]), affirmed 2001 ABCA 9 (Alta. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused July 12, 2001 [2001 CarswellAlta 888 (S.C.C.)].

# **TAB 2**

2009 CarswellOnt 5450  
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Eddie Bauer of Canada Inc., Re

2009 CarswellOnt 5450, [2009] O.J. No. 3784, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 241

**IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS  
ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED  
AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR  
ARRANGEMENT OF EDDIE BAUER OF CANADA, INC. AND  
EDDIE BAUER CUSTOMER SERVICES INC. (Applicants)**

C. Campbell J.

Heard: July 22, 2009  
Judgment: July 30, 2009  
Docket: CV-09-8240-00CL

Counsel: Fred Myers, L. Joseph Latham, Christopher G. Armstrong for Applicants  
Jay Swartz for RSM Richter  
Linda Galessiere for Landlords  
Maria Konyukhova for Everest Holdings  
Alexander Cobb for Bank of America

**Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency  
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act  
XIX.3 Arrangements  
XIX.3.e Miscellaneous

**Headnote**

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Miscellaneous

Company commenced reorganization under Chapter 11 of US Bankruptcy Code — Two subsidiaries of company were granted protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Stalking horse process and bidding procedures were approved by court — Bid by purchaser was deemed best offer yielding highest net recovery for creditors — Bid included assignment of real property leases, offers of employment to all Canadian employees, and assumption of ordinary course liabilities — Monitor was of opinion that value allocated to purchased assets exceeded net value on liquidation basis — Application was brought for approval of sale and vesting order in respect of asset purchase agreement — Application granted — Process was fair and reasonable

and produced fair and reasonable result — No party opposed order sought — Sale and purchase of assets assured compromise of debt accepted by debtholders which preserved value of name and reputation of business as going concern — Once sales process is put forward, court should to extent possible uphold business judgment of court officer and parties supporting it.

#### **Table of Authorities**

##### **Cases considered by C. Campbell J.:**

*Bakemates International Inc., Re* (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 2339 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to  
*Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg* (1986), 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 1986 CarswellOnt 235, 22 C.P.C. (2d) 131, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526, 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 320 (note) (Ont. H.C.) — considered  
*Eddie Bauer of Canada Inc., Re* (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 3657, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 33 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to  
*Ivaco Inc., Re* (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 3563 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to  
*Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) — considered  
*Tiger Brand Knitting Co., Re* (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 1240, 9 C.B.R. (5th) 315 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered

##### **Statutes considered:**

*Bankruptcy Code*, 11 U.S.C.

Chapter 11 — referred to

*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

##### **C. Campbell J.:**

1 A joint hearing between this Court and the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware was held on July 22, 2009 for Sale Approval and a Vesting Order in respect of an Asset Purchase Agreement dated as of July 17, 2009 among Everest Holdings LLC as buyer and Eddie Bauer Holdings Inc. ("EB Holdings") and each of its subsidiaries.

2 These are the reasons for approval of the Order granted.

3 On June 17, 2009, Eddie Bauer Canada Inc. and Eddie Bauer Customer Services Inc. (together, "EB Canada"), two of the EB Holdings subsidiaries, were granted protection under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36, as amended ("CCAA") in an Initial Order of this Court, with RSM Richter Inc. appointed as Monitor.

4 On the same day, EB Holdings commenced reorganization under Chapter 11 of the United States Code in bankruptcy. A cross-border protocol was approved by this Court [2009 CarswellOnt 3657 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])] and the U.S. Court on June 25, 2009.

5 The purpose of what is described in the Orders as "Restructuring Proceedings" was a process to enable the Eddie Bauer Group to have an opportunity to maximize the value of its business and assets in a unified, Court-approved sale process.

6 EB Holdings is a publicly traded company with shares trade on the NASDAQ Global Market. Eddie Bauer branded products are sold at over 300 retail outlets in the United States and 36 retail stores and one warehouse store throughout Canada, together with online and catalogue sales employing 933 individuals in Canada.

7 The joint hearing conducted on June 29, 2009 before the U.S. Court and this Court approved a Stalking Horse process and certain prescribed bidding procedures. Rainer Holdings LLC, an affiliate of CCMP Capital Advisors and indirectly of the buyer, became the Stalking Horse bidder.

8 The Stalking Horse offer of US\$202.3 million was for substantially all of the assets, property and undertaking of the Eddie Bauer Group.

9 The Bidding Procedure Order provided that the Stalking Horse offeror would be entitled to a break fee and to have its expenses of approximately \$250,000 reimbursed and would offer employment to substantially all of the Company's employees, assume at least 250 U.S. retail locations and all Canadian locations and pay all of the Group's post-filing supplier claims.

10 The bidding was completed in the early hours of July 17, 2009. The three stage basis of the auction process included (1) the best inventory offer from Inventory Bidders; (2) the best intellectual property offer of the IP bidders; and (3) the best going-concern offer from Going-Concern Bidders. The best inventory and intellectual offers were to be compared against the best going-concern offer.

11 The US\$286 million bid by Everest (a company unrelated to Rainer) was deemed the best offer, yielding the highest net recovery for creditors (including creditors in consultation.) A US \$250 million back-up bid was also identified.

12 The Canadian real property leases are to be assigned, assuming consent of landlords, and offers of employment to all Canadian employees to be made and ordinary course liabilities assumed.

13 The value allocated to the Canadian Purchased Assets of US\$11 million exceeds in the analysis and opinion of the Monitor the net value on a liquidation basis, particularly as the only two material assets are inventory and equity (if any) in realty leases.

14 All parties represented at the joint hearing, including counsel for the landlords, either supported or did not oppose the Order sought.

15 The process that has been undertaken in a very short time is an example of a concerted and dedicated effort of a variety of stakeholders to achieve a restructuring without impairing the going-concern nature of the Eddie Bauer business.

16 The sale and purchase of assets assures a compromise of debt accepted by those debtholders (with a process of certain leases not taken up in the US), which to the extent possible preserves the value of the name and reputation of the business as a going concern.

17 Had it not been for the cooperative effort of counsel for the parties on both sides of the border and a joint hearing process to approve on an efficient and timely basis, the restructuring regime would undoubtedly have been more time-consuming and more costly.

18 I am satisfied that the statement of law that set out the duties of a Court in reviewing the propriety of the actions of a Court officer (Monitor) are applicable and have been met here.

19 The duties were set out by Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg* (1986), 60 O.R. (2d) 87 (Ont. H.C.) at pp 92-94 and are as follows:

1. It should consider the interests of all parties.
2. It should consider the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained.
3. It should consider whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

20 Galligan J.A. for the majority in the Court of Appeal in Ontario in *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.) at p. 8 further accepted and adopted the further statement of Anderson J. in *Crown Trust* at p. 551 that "its decision was made as a matter of business judgement on the elements then available to it. It is the very essence of a receiver's function to make such judgments and in the making of them, to act seriously and responsibly, so as to be prepared to stand behind them."

21 What have come to be known as the *Soundair* principles have been accepted in a number of Ontario cases, including *Bakemates International Inc., Re* [2004 CarswellOnt 2339 (Ont. C.A.)], 2004 CanLII 59994. The same principles have been accepted to approval of Asset Purchase Agreements and Vesting Orders. See *Ivaco Inc., Re* [2004 CarswellOnt 3563 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])] 2004 CanLII 21547. In *Tiger Brand Knitting Co., Re* [2005 CarswellOnt 1240 (Ont. S.C.J.)] 2005 CanLII 9680, I declined to extend the time for a bid and directed the Monitor not to accept a bid it had received and to negotiate with another party.

22 The concern in *Tiger Brand*, as in this case, is that once a sales process is put forward, the Court should to the extent possible uphold the business judgment of the Court officer and the

parties supporting it. Absent a violation of the *Soundair* principles, the result of that process should as well be upheld.

23 A Stalking Horse bid has become an important feature of the CCAA process. In this case, the fact that the Stalking Horse bidder promoted other bids and put in the highest bid satisfies me that the process was fair and reasonable and produced a fair and reasonable result.

24 One can readily understand that the goodwill attached to a recognized name such as Eddie Bauer will likely only retain its value if there is a seamless and orderly transfer.

25 For the foregoing reasons the draft Orders of Approval and Vesting will issue as approved and signed.

*Application granted.*

**TAB 3**

**Most Negative Treatment:** Distinguished

**Most Recent Distinguished:** PCAS Patient Care Automation Services Inc., Re | 2012 ONSC 3367, 2012 CarswellOnt 7248, 91 C.B.R. (5th) 285, 216 A.C.W.S. (3d) 551 | (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List], Jun 9, 2012)

1991 CarswellOnt 205  
Ontario Court of Appeal

Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.

1991 CarswellOnt 205, [1991] O.J. No. 1137, 27 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1178,  
46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76

**ROYAL BANK OF CANADA (plaintiff/respondent) v.  
SOUNDAIR CORPORATION (respondent), CANADIAN  
PENSION CAPITAL LIMITED (appellant) and CANADIAN  
INSURERS' CAPITAL CORPORATION (appellant)**

Goodman, McKinlay and Galligan JJ.A.

Heard: June 11, 12, 13 and 14, 1991

Judgment: July 3, 1991

Docket: Doc. CA 318/91

Counsel: *J. B. Berkow* and *S. H. Goldman* , for appellants Canadian Pension Capital Limited and Canadian Insurers' Capital Corporation.

*J. T. Morin, Q.C.* , for Air Canada.

*L.A.J. Barnes* and *L.E. Ritchie* , for plaintiff/respondent Royal Bank of Canada.

*S.F. Dunphy* and *G.K. Ketcheson* , for Ernst & Young Inc., receiver of respondent Soundair Corporation.

*W.G. Horton* , for Ontario Express Limited.

*N.J. Spies* , for Frontier Air Limited.

**Related Abridgment Classifications**

Debtors and creditors

VII Receivers

VII.6 Conduct and liability of receiver

VII.6.a General conduct of receiver

**Headnote**

Receivers --- Conduct and liability of receiver — General conduct of receiver

Court considering its position when approving sale recommended by receiver.

S Corp., which engaged in the air transport business, had a division known as AT. When S Corp. experienced financial difficulties, one of the secured creditors, who had an interest in the assets of AT, brought a motion for the appointment of a receiver. The receiver was ordered to operate AT and to sell it as a going concern. The receiver had two offers. It accepted the offer made by OEL and rejected an offer by 922 which contained an unacceptable condition. Subsequently, 922 obtained an order allowing it to make a second offer removing the condition. The secured creditors supported acceptance of the 922 offer. The court approved the sale to OEL and dismissed the motion to approve the 922 offer. An appeal was brought from this order.

**Held:**

The appeal was dismissed.

Per Galligan J.A.: When a court appoints a receiver to use its commercial expertise to sell an airline, it is inescapable that it intends to rely upon the receiver's expertise and not upon its own. The court should be reluctant to second-guess, with the benefit of hindsight, the considered business decisions made by its receiver.

The conduct of the receiver should be reviewed in the light of the specific mandate given to him by the court. The order appointing the receiver did not say how the receiver was to negotiate the sale. The order obviously intended, because of the unusual nature of the asset being sold, to leave the method of sale substantially to the discretion of the receiver.

To determine whether a receiver has acted providently, the conduct of the receiver should be examined in light of the information the receiver had when it agreed to accept an offer. On the date the receiver accepted the OEL offer, it had only two offers: that of OEL, which was acceptable, and that of 922, which contained an unacceptable condition. The decision made was a sound one in the circumstances. The receiver made a sufficient effort to obtain the best price, and did not act improvidently.

The court must exercise extreme caution before it interferes with the process adopted by a receiver to sell an unusual asset. It is important that prospective purchasers know that, if they are acting in good faith, bargain seriously with a receiver and enter into an agreement with it, a court will not lightly interfere with the commercial judgment of the receiver to sell the assets to them.

Per McKinlay J.A. (concurring in the result): It is most important that the integrity of procedures followed by court-appointed receivers be protected in the interests of both commercial morality and the future confidence of business persons in their dealings with receivers. In all cases, the court should carefully scrutinize the procedure followed by the receiver. While the procedure carried out by the receiver in this case was appropriate, given the unfolding of events and the unique nature of the asset involved, it may not be a procedure that is likely to be appropriate in many receivership sales.

Per Goodman J.A. (dissenting): It was imprudent and unfair on the part of the receiver to ignore an offer from an interested party which offered approximately triple the cash down payment without giving a chance to the offeror to remove the conditions or other terms which made the offer unacceptable to the receiver. The offer accepted by the receiver was improvident and unfair insofar as two creditors were concerned.

## Table of Authorities

### Cases considered:

*Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd., Re* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. S.C.) — referred to  
*British Columbia Development Corp. v. Spun Cast Industries Ltd.* (1977), 26 C.B.R. (N.S.)  
28, 5 B.C.L.R. 94 (S.C.) — referred to

*Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R.  
303 (C.A.) — referred to

*Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenburg* (1986), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 320n, 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 22 C.P.C. (2d)  
131, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526 (H.C.) — applied

*Salima Investments Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal* (1985), 59 C.B.R. (N.S.) 242, 41 Alta. L.R. (2d)  
58, 65 A.R. 372, 21 D.L.R. (4th) (C.A.) — referred to

*Selkirk, Re* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 (Ont. S.C.) — referred to

*Selkirk, Re* (1987), 64 C.B.R. (N.S.) 140 (Ont. S.C.) — referred to

### Statutes considered:

Employment Standards Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 137.

Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 141.

### *Galligan J.A. :*

1 This is an appeal from the order of Rosenberg J. made on May 1, 1991. By that order, he approved the sale of Air Toronto to Ontario Express Limited and Frontier Air Limited, and he dismissed a motion to approve an offer to purchase Air Toronto by 922246 Ontario Limited.

2 It is necessary at the outset to give some background to the dispute. Soundair Corporation ("Soundair") is a corporation engaged in the air transport business. It has three divisions. One of them is Air Toronto. Air Toronto operates a scheduled airline from Toronto to a number of mid-sized cities in the United States of America. Its routes serve as feeders to several of Air Canada's routes. Pursuant to a connector agreement, Air Canada provides some services to Air Toronto and benefits from the feeder traffic provided by it. The operational relationship between Air Canada and Air Toronto is a close one.

3 In the latter part of 1989 and the early part of 1990, Soundair was in financial difficulty. Soundair has two secured creditors who have an interest in the assets of Air Toronto. The Royal Bank of Canada (the "Royal Bank") is owed at least \$65 million dollars. The appellants Canadian Pension Capital Limited and Canadian Insurers' Capital Corporation (collectively called "CCFL") are owed approximately \$9,500,000. Those creditors will have a deficiency expected to be in excess of \$50 million on the winding up of Soundair.

4 On April 26, 1990, upon the motion of the Royal Bank, O'Brien J. appointed Ernst & Young Inc. (the "receiver") as receiver of all of the assets, property and undertakings of Soundair. The order required the receiver to operate Air Toronto and sell it as a going concern. Because of the close

relationship between Air Toronto and Air Canada, it was contemplated that the receiver would obtain the assistance of Air Canada to operate Air Toronto. The order authorized the receiver:

(b) to enter into contractual arrangements with Air Canada to retain a manager or operator, including Air Canada, to manage and operate Air Toronto under the supervision of Ernst & Young Inc. until the completion of the sale of Air Toronto to Air Canada or other person.

Also because of the close relationship, it was expected that Air Canada would purchase Air Toronto. To that end, the order of O'Brien J. authorized the Receiver:

(c) to negotiate and do all things necessary or desirable to complete a sale of Air Toronto to Air Canada and, if a sale to Air Canada cannot be completed, to negotiate and sell Air Toronto to another person, subject to terms and conditions approved by this Court.

5 Over a period of several weeks following that order, negotiations directed towards the sale of Air Toronto took place between the receiver and Air Canada. Air Canada had an agreement with the receiver that it would have exclusive negotiating rights during that period. I do not think it is necessary to review those negotiations, but I note that Air Canada had complete access to all of the operations of Air Toronto and conducted due diligence examinations. It became thoroughly acquainted with every aspect of Air Toronto's operations.

6 Those negotiations came to an end when an offer made by Air Canada on June 19, 1990, was considered unsatisfactory by the receiver. The offer was not accepted and lapsed. Having regard to the tenor of Air Canada's negotiating stance and a letter sent by its solicitors on July 20, 1990, I think that the receiver was eminently reasonable when it decided that there was no realistic possibility of selling Air Toronto to Air Canada.

7 The receiver then looked elsewhere. Air Toronto's feeder business is very attractive, but it only has value to a national airline. The receiver concluded reasonably, therefore, that it was commercially necessary for one of Canada's two national airlines to be involved in any sale of Air Toronto. Realistically, there were only two possible purchasers, whether direct or indirect. They were Air Canada and Canadian Airlines International.

8 It was well known in the air transport industry that Air Toronto was for sale. During the months following the collapse of the negotiations with Air Canada, the receiver tried unsuccessfully to find viable purchasers. In late 1990, the receiver turned to Canadian Airlines International, the only realistic alternative. Negotiations began between them. Those negotiations led to a letter of intent dated February 11, 1990. On March 6, 1991, the receiver received an offer from Ontario Express Limited and Frontier Airlines Limited, who are subsidiaries of Canadian Airlines International. This offer is called the OEL offer.

9 In the meantime, Air Canada and CCFL were having discussions about making an offer for the purchase of Air Toronto. They formed 922246 Ontario Limited ("922") for the purpose of purchasing Air Toronto. On March 1, 1991, CCFL wrote to the receiver saying that it proposed to make an offer. On March 7, 1991, Air Canada and CCFL presented an offer to the receiver in the name of 922. For convenience, its offers are called the "922 offers."

10 The first 922 offer contained a condition which was unacceptable to the receiver. I will refer to that condition in more detail later. The receiver declined the 922 offer and on March 8, 1991, accepted the OEL offer. Subsequently, 922 obtained an order allowing it to make a second offer. It then submitted an offer which was virtually identical to that of March 7, 1991, except that the unacceptable condition had been removed.

11 The proceedings before Rosenberg J. then followed. He approved the sale to OEL and dismissed a motion for the acceptance of the 922 offer. Before Rosenberg J., and in this court, both CCFL and the Royal Bank supported the acceptance of the second 922 offer.

12 There are only two issues which must be resolved in this appeal. They are:

(1) Did the receiver act properly when it entered into an agreement to sell Air Toronto to OEL?

(2) What effect does the support of the 922 offer by the secured creditors have on the result?

13 I will deal with the two issues separately.

### **1. Did the Receiver Act Properly in Agreeing to Sell to OEL?**

14 Before dealing with that issue, there are three general observations which I think I should make. The first is that the sale of an airline as a going concern is a very complex process. The best method of selling an airline at the best price is something far removed from the expertise of a court. When a court appoints a receiver to use its commercial expertise to sell an airline, it is inescapable that it intends to rely upon the receiver's expertise and not upon its own. Therefore, the court must place a great deal of confidence in the actions taken and in the opinions formed by the receiver. It should also assume that the receiver is acting properly unless the contrary is clearly shown. The second observation is that the court should be reluctant to second-guess, with the benefit of hindsight, the considered business decisions made by its receiver. The third observation which I wish to make is that the conduct of the receiver should be reviewed in the light of the specific mandate given to him by the court.

15 The order of O'Brien J. provided that if the receiver could not complete the sale to Air Canada that it was "to negotiate and sell Air Toronto to another person." The court did not say how the receiver was to negotiate the sale. It did not say it was to call for bids or conduct an auction. It told the receiver to negotiate and sell. It obviously intended, because of the unusual nature of

the asset being sold, to leave the method of sale substantially in the discretion of the receiver. I think, therefore, that the court should not review minutely the process of the sale when, broadly speaking, it appears to the court to be a just process.

16 As did Rosenberg J., I adopt as correct the statement made by Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg* (1986), 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 320n, 22 C.P.C. (2d) 131, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526 (H.C.) , at pp. 92-94 [O.R.], of the duties which a court must perform when deciding whether a receiver who has sold a property acted properly. When he set out the court's duties, he did not put them in any order of priority, nor do I. I summarize those duties as follows:

1. It should consider whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently.
2. It should consider the interests of all parties.
3. It should consider the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained.
4. It should consider whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

17 I intend to discuss the performance of those duties separately.

**1. Did the Receiver make a sufficient effort to get the best price and did it act providently?**

18 Having regard to the fact that it was highly unlikely that a commercially viable sale could be made to anyone but the two national airlines, or to someone supported by either of them, it is my view that the receiver acted wisely and reasonably when it negotiated only with Air Canada and Canadian Airlines International. Furthermore, when Air Canada said that it would submit no further offers and gave the impression that it would not participate further in the receiver's efforts to sell, the only course reasonably open to the receiver was to negotiate with Canadian Airlines International. Realistically, there was nowhere else to go but to Canadian Airlines International. In doing so, it is my opinion that the receiver made sufficient efforts to sell the airline.

19 When the receiver got the OEL offer on March 6, 1991, it was over 10 months since it had been charged with the responsibility of selling Air Toronto. Until then, the receiver had not received one offer which it thought was acceptable. After substantial efforts to sell the airline over that period, I find it difficult to think that the receiver acted improvidently in accepting the only acceptable offer which it had.

20 On March 8, 1991, the date when the receiver accepted the OEL offer, it had only two offers, the OEL offer, which was acceptable, and the 922 offer, which contained an unacceptable condition. I cannot see how the receiver, assuming for the moment that the price was reasonable, could have done anything but accept the OEL offer.

21 When deciding whether a receiver had acted providently, the court should examine the conduct of the receiver in light of the information the receiver had when it agreed to accept an offer. In this case, the court should look at the receiver's conduct in the light of the information it had when it made its decision on March 8, 1991. The court should be very cautious before deciding that the receiver's conduct was improvident based upon information which has come to light after it made its decision. To do so, in my view, would derogate from the mandate to sell given to the receiver by the order of O'Brien J. I agree with and adopt what was said by Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg* , supra, at p. 112 [O.R.]:

Its decision was made as a matter of business judgment *on the elements then available to it* . It is of the very essence of a receiver's function to make such judgments and in the making of them to act seriously and responsibly so as to be prepared to stand behind them.

If the court were to reject the recommendation of the Receiver in any but the most exceptional circumstances, it would materially diminish and weaken the role and function of the Receiver both in the perception of receivers and in the perception of any others who might have occasion to deal with them. It would lead to the conclusion that the decision of the Receiver was of little weight and that the real decision was always made upon the motion for approval. That would be a consequence susceptible of immensely damaging results to the disposition of assets by court-appointed receivers.

[Emphasis added.]

22 I also agree with and adopt what was said by Macdonald J.A. in *Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303 (C.A.) , at p. 11 [C.B.R.]:

In my opinion if the decision of the receiver to enter into an agreement of sale, subject to court approval, with respect to certain assets is reasonable and sound under the circumstances *at the time existing* it should not be set aside simply because a later and higher bid is made. To do so would literally create chaos in the commercial world and receivers and purchasers would never be sure they had a binding agreement.

[Emphasis added.]

23 On March 8, 1991, the receiver had two offers. One was the OEL offer, which it considered satisfactory but which could be withdrawn by OEL at any time before it was accepted. The receiver also had the 922 offer, which contained a condition that was totally unacceptable. It had no other offers. It was faced with the dilemma of whether it should decline to accept the OEL offer and run the risk of it being withdrawn, in the hope that an acceptable offer would be forthcoming from 922. An affidavit filed by the president of the receiver describes the dilemma which the receiver faced, and the judgment made in the light of that dilemma:

24. An asset purchase agreement was received by Ernst & Young on March 7, 1991 which was dated March 6, 1991. This agreement was received from CCFL in respect of their offer to purchase the assets and undertaking of Air Toronto. Apart from financial considerations, which will be considered in a subsequent affidavit, the *Receiver determined that it would not be prudent to delay acceptance of the OEL agreement to negotiate a highly uncertain arrangement with Air Canada and CCFL* . Air Canada had the benefit of an 'exclusive' in negotiations for Air Toronto and had clearly indicated its intention take itself out of the running while ensuring that no other party could seek to purchase Air Toronto and maintain the Air Canada connector arrangement vital to its survival. The CCFL offer represented a radical reversal of this position by Air Canada at the eleventh hour. However, it contained a significant number of conditions to closing which were entirely beyond the control of the Receiver. As well, the CCFL offer came less than 24 hours before signing of the agreement with OEL which had been negotiated over a period of months, at great time and expense.

[Emphasis added.] I am convinced that the decision made was a sound one in the circumstances faced by the receiver on March 8, 1991.

24 I now turn to consider whether the price contained in the OEL offer was one which it was provident to accept. At the outset, I think that the fact that the OEL offer was the only acceptable one available to the receiver on March 8, 1991, after 10 months of trying to sell the airline, is strong evidence that the price in it was reasonable. In a deteriorating economy, I doubt that it would have been wise to wait any longer.

25 I mentioned earlier that, pursuant to an order, 922 was permitted to present a second offer. During the hearing of the appeal, counsel compared at great length the price contained in the second 922 offer with the price contained in the OEL offer. Counsel put forth various hypotheses supporting their contentions that one offer was better than the other.

26 It is my opinion that the price contained in the 922 offer is relevant only if it shows that the price obtained by the receiver in the OEL offer was not a reasonable one. In *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg* , supra, Anderson J., at p. 113 [O.R.], discussed the comparison of offers in the following way:

No doubt, as the cases have indicated, situations might arise where the disparity was so great as to call in question the adequacy of the mechanism which had produced the offers. It is not so here, and in my view that is substantially an end of the matter.

27 In two judgments, Saunders J. considered the circumstances in which an offer submitted after the receiver had agreed to a sale should be considered by the court. The first is *Re Selkirk* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 (Ont. S.C.) , at p. 247:

If, for example, in this case there had been a second offer of a substantially higher amount, then the court would have to take that offer into consideration in assessing whether the receiver had properly carried out his function of endeavouring to obtain the best price for the property.

28 The second is *Re Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd.* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. S.C.), at p. 243:

If a substantially higher bid turns up at the approval stage, the court should consider it. Such a bid may indicate, for example, that the trustee has not properly carried out its duty to endeavour to obtain the best price for the estate.

29 In *Re Selkirk* (1987), 64 C.B.R. (N.S.) 140 (Ont. S.C.), at p. 142, McRae J. expressed a similar view:

The court will not lightly withhold approval of a sale by the receiver, particularly in a case such as this where the receiver is given rather wide discretionary authority as per the order of Mr. Justice Trainor and, of course, where the receiver is an officer of this court. Only in a case where there seems to be some unfairness in the process of the sale or *where there are substantially higher offers which would tend to show that the sale was improvident* will the court withhold approval. It is important that the court recognize the commercial exigencies that would flow if prospective purchasers are allowed to wait until the sale is in court for approval before submitting their final offer. This is something that must be discouraged.

[Emphasis added.]

30 What those cases show is that the prices in other offers have relevance only if they show that the price contained in the offer accepted by the receiver was so unreasonably low as to demonstrate that the receiver was improvident in accepting it. I am of the opinion, therefore, that if they do not tend to show that the receiver was improvident, they should not be considered upon a motion to confirm a sale recommended by a court-appointed receiver. If they were, the process would be changed from a sale by a receiver, subject to court approval, into an auction conducted by the court at the time approval is sought. In my opinion, the latter course is unfair to the person who has entered bona fide into an agreement with the receiver, can only lead to chaos, and must be discouraged.

31 If, however, the subsequent offer is so substantially higher than the sale recommended by the receiver, then it may be that the receiver has not conducted the sale properly. In such circumstances, the court would be justified itself in entering into the sale process by considering competitive bids. However, I think that that process should be entered into only if the court is satisfied that the receiver has not properly conducted the sale which it has recommended to the court.

32 It is necessary to consider the two offers. Rosenberg J. held that the 922 offer was slightly better or marginally better than the OEL offer. He concluded that the difference in the two offers did not show that the sale process adopted by the receiver was inadequate or improvident.

33 Counsel for the appellants complained about the manner in which Rosenberg J. conducted the hearing of the motion to confirm the OEL sale. The complaint was that when they began to discuss a comparison of the two offers, Rosenberg J. said that he considered the 922 offer to be better than the OEL offer. Counsel said that when that comment was made, they did not think it necessary to argue further the question of the difference in value between the two offers. They complain that the finding that the 922 offer was only marginally better or slightly better than the OEL offer was made without them having had the opportunity to argue that the 922 offer was substantially better or significantly better than the OEL offer. I cannot understand how counsel could have thought that by expressing the opinion that the 922 offer was better, Rosenberg J. was saying that it was a significantly or substantially better one. Nor can I comprehend how counsel took the comment to mean that they were foreclosed from arguing that the offer was significantly or substantially better. If there was some misunderstanding on the part of counsel, it should have been raised before Rosenberg J. at the time. I am sure that if it had been, the misunderstanding would have been cleared up quickly. Nevertheless, this court permitted extensive argument dealing with the comparison of the two offers.

34 The 922 offer provided for \$6 million cash to be paid on closing with a royalty based upon a percentage of Air Toronto profits over a period of 5 years up to a maximum of \$3 million. The OEL offer provided for a payment of \$2 million on closing with a royalty paid on gross revenues over a 5-year period. In the short term, the 922 offer is obviously better because there is substantially more cash up front. The chances of future returns are substantially greater in the OEL offer because royalties are paid on gross revenues, while the royalties under the 922 offer are paid only on profits. There is an element of risk involved in each offer.

35 The receiver studied the two offers. It compared them and took into account the risks, the advantages and the disadvantages of each. It considered the appropriate contingencies. It is not necessary to outline the factors which were taken into account by the receiver because the manager of its insolvency practice filed an affidavit outlining the considerations which were weighed in its evaluation of the two offers. They seem to me to be reasonable ones. That affidavit concluded with the following paragraph:

24. On the basis of these considerations the Receiver has approved the OEL offer and has concluded that it represents the achievement of the highest possible value at this time for the Air Toronto division of SoundAir.

36 The court appointed the receiver to conduct the sale of Air Toronto, and entrusted it with the responsibility of deciding what is the best offer. I put great weight upon the opinion of the

receiver. It swore to the court which appointed it that the OEL offer represents the achievement of the highest possible value at this time for Air Toronto. I have not been convinced that the receiver was wrong when he made that assessment. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the 922 offer does not demonstrate any failure upon the part of the receiver to act properly and providently.

37 It follows that if Rosenberg J. was correct when he found that the 922 offer was in fact better, I agree with him that it could only have been slightly or marginally better. The 922 offer does not lead to an inference that the disposition strategy of the receiver was inadequate, unsuccessful or improvident, nor that the price was unreasonable.

38 I am, therefore, of the opinion the the receiver made a sufficient effort to get the best price, and has not acted improvidently.

## **2. Consideration of the Interests of all Parties**

39 It is well established that the primary interest is that of the creditors of the debtor: see *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, and *Re Selkirk*, supra (Saunders J.). However, as Saunders J. pointed out in *Re Beauty Counsellors*, supra at p. 244 [C.B.R.], "it is not the only or overriding consideration."

40 In my opinion, there are other persons whose interests require consideration. In an appropriate case, the interests of the debtor must be taken into account. I think also, in a case such as this, where a purchaser has bargained at some length and doubtless at considerable expense with the receiver, the interests of the purchaser ought to be taken into account. While it is not explicitly stated in such cases as *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, *Re Selkirk* (1986), supra, *Re Beauty Counsellors*, supra, *Re Selkirk* (1987), supra, and (*Cameron*), supra, I think they clearly imply that the interests of a person who has negotiated an agreement with a court-appointed receiver are very important.

41 In this case, the interests of all parties who would have an interest in the process were considered by the receiver and by Rosenberg J.

## **3. Consideration of the Efficacy and Integrity of the Process by which the Offer was Obtained**

42 While it is accepted that the primary concern of a receiver is the protecting of the interests of the creditors, there is a secondary but very important consideration, and that is the integrity of the process by which the sale is effected. This is particularly so in the case of a sale of such a unique asset as an airline as a going concern.

43 The importance of a court protecting the integrity of the process has been stated in a number of cases. First, I refer to *Re Selkirk*, supra, where Saunders J. said at p. 246 [C.B.R.]:

In dealing with the request for approval, the court has to be concerned primarily with protecting the interest of the creditors of the former bankrupt. A secondary but important

consideration is that the process under which the sale agreement is arrived at should be consistent with commercial efficacy and integrity.

In that connection I adopt the principles stated by Macdonald J.A. of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Appeal Division) in *Cameron v. Bank of N.S.* (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303 (C.A.), where he said at p. 11:

In my opinion if the decision of the receiver to enter into an agreement of sale, subject to court approval, with respect to certain assets is reasonable and sound under the circumstances at the time existing it should not be set aside simply because a later and higher bid is made. To do so would literally create chaos in the commercial world and receivers and purchasers would never be sure they had a binding agreement. On the contrary, they would know that other bids could be received and considered up until the application for court approval is heard — this would be an intolerable situation.

While those remarks may have been made in the context of a bidding situation rather than a private sale, I consider them to be equally applicable to a negotiation process leading to a private sale. Where the court is concerned with the disposition of property, the purpose of appointing a receiver is to have the receiver do the work that the court would otherwise have to do.

44 In *Salima Investments Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal* (1985), 59 C.B.R. (N.S.) 242, 41 Alta. L.R. (2d) 58, 65 A.R. 372, 21 D.L.R. (4th) 473 at p. 476 [D.L.R.], the Alberta Court of Appeal said that sale by tender is not necessarily the best way to sell a business as an ongoing concern. It went on to say that when some other method is used which is provident, the court should not undermine the process by refusing to confirm the sale.

45 Finally, I refer to the reasoning of Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, at p. 124 [O.R.]:

While every proper effort must always be made to assure maximum recovery consistent with the limitations inherent in the process, no method has yet been devised to entirely eliminate those limitations or to avoid their consequences. *Certainly it is not to be found in loosening the entire foundation of the system. Thus to compare the results of the process in this case with what might have been recovered in some other set of circumstances is neither logical nor practical.*

[Emphasis added.]

46 It is my opinion that the court must exercise extreme caution before it interferes with the process adopted by a receiver to sell an unusual asset. It is important that prospective purchasers know that, if they are acting in good faith, bargain seriously with a receiver and enter into an

agreement with it, a court will not lightly interfere with the commercial judgment of the receiver to sell the asset to them.

47 Before this court, counsel for those opposing the confirmation of the sale to OEL suggested many different ways in which the receiver could have conducted the process other than the way which he did. However, the evidence does not convince me that the receiver used an improper method of attempting to sell the airline. The answer to those submissions is found in the comment of Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, at p. 109 [O.R.]:

The court ought not to sit as on appeal from the decision of the Receiver, reviewing in minute detail every element of the process by which the decision is reached. To do so would be a futile and duplicitous exercise.

48 It would be a futile and duplicitous exercise for this court to examine in minute detail all of circumstances leading up to the acceptance of the OEL offer. Having considered the process adopted by the receiver, it is my opinion that the process adopted was a reasonable and prudent one.

#### **4. Was there unfairness in the process?**

49 As a general rule, I do not think it appropriate for the court to go into the minutia of the process or of the selling strategy adopted by the receiver. However, the court has a responsibility to decide whether the process was fair. The only part of this process which I could find that might give even a superficial impression of unfairness is the failure of the receiver to give an offering memorandum to those who expressed an interest in the purchase of Air Toronto.

50 I will outline the circumstances which relate to the allegation that the receiver was unfair in failing to provide an offering memorandum. In the latter part of 1990, as part of its selling strategy, the receiver was in the process of preparing an offering memorandum to give to persons who expressed an interest in the purchase of Air Toronto. The offering memorandum got as far as draft form, but was never released to anyone, although a copy of the draft eventually got into the hands of CCFL before it submitted the first 922 offer on March 7, 1991. A copy of the offering memorandum forms part of the record, and it seems to me to be little more than puffery, without any hard information which a sophisticated purchaser would require in order to make a serious bid.

51 The offering memorandum had not been completed by February 11, 1991. On that date, the receiver entered into the letter of intent to negotiate with OEL. The letter of intent contained a provision that during its currency the receiver would not negotiate with any other party. The letter of intent was renewed from time to time until the OEL offer was received on March 6, 1991.

52 The receiver did not proceed with the offering memorandum because to do so would violate the spirit, if not the letter, of its letter of intent with OEL.

53 I do not think that the conduct of the receiver shows any unfairness towards 922. When I speak of 922, I do so in the context that Air Canada and CCFL are identified with it. I start by saying that the receiver acted reasonably when it entered into exclusive negotiations with OEL. I find it strange that a company, with which Air Canada is closely and intimately involved, would say that it was unfair for the receiver to enter into a time-limited agreement to negotiate exclusively with OEL. That is precisely the arrangement which Air Canada insisted upon when it negotiated with the receiver in the spring and summer of 1990. If it was not unfair for Air Canada to have such an agreement, I do not understand why it was unfair for OEL to have a similar one. In fact, both Air Canada and OEL in its turn were acting reasonably when they required exclusive negotiating rights to prevent their negotiations from being used as a bargaining lever with other potential purchasers. The fact that Air Canada insisted upon an exclusive negotiating right while it was negotiating with the receiver demonstrates the commercial efficacy of OEL being given the same right during its negotiations with the receiver. I see no unfairness on the part of the receiver when it honoured its letter of intent with OEL by not releasing the offering memorandum during the negotiations with OEL.

54 Moreover, I am not prepared to find that 922 was in any way prejudiced by the fact that it did not have an offering memorandum. It made an offer on March 7, 1991, which it contends to this day was a better offer than that of OEL. 922 has not convinced me that if it had an offering memorandum, its offer would have been any different or any better than it actually was. The fatal problem with the first 922 offer was that it contained a condition which was completely unacceptable to the receiver. The receiver, properly, in my opinion, rejected the offer out of hand because of that condition. That condition did not relate to any information which could have conceivably been in an offering memorandum prepared by the receiver. It was about the resolution of a dispute between CCFL and the Royal Bank, something the receiver knew nothing about.

55 Further evidence of the lack of prejudice which the absence of an offering memorandum has caused 922 is found in CCFL's stance before this court. During argument, its counsel suggested as a possible resolution of this appeal that this court should call for new bids, evaluate them and then order a sale to the party who put in the better bid. In such a case, counsel for CCFL said that 922 would be prepared to bid within 7 days of the court's decision. I would have thought that, if there were anything to CCFL's suggestion that the failure to provide an offering memorandum was unfair to 922, that it would have told the court that it needed more information before it would be able to make a bid.

56 I am satisfied that Air Canada and CCFL have, and at all times had, all of the information which they would have needed to make what to them would be a commercially viable offer to the receiver. I think that an offering memorandum was of no commercial consequence to them, but the absence of one has since become a valuable tactical weapon.

57 It is my opinion that there is no convincing proof that if an offering memorandum had been widely distributed among persons qualified to have purchased Air Toronto, a viable offer would have come forth from a party other than 922 or OEL. Therefore, the failure to provide an offering memorandum was neither unfair, nor did it prejudice the obtaining of a better price on March 8, 1991, than that contained in the OEL offer. I would not give effect to the contention that the process adopted by the receiver was an unfair one.

58 There are two statements by Anderson J. contained in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, which I adopt as my own. The first is at p. 109 [O.R.]:

The court should not proceed against the recommendations of its Receiver except in special circumstances and where the necessity and propriety of doing so are plain. Any other rule or approach would emasculate the role of the Receiver and make it almost inevitable that the final negotiation of every sale would take place on the motion for approval.

The second is at p. 111 [O.R.]:

It is equally clear, in my view, though perhaps not so clearly enunciated, that it is only in an exceptional case that the court will intervene and proceed contrary to the Receiver's recommendations if satisfied, as I am, that the Receiver has acted reasonably, prudently and fairly and not arbitrarily.

In this case the receiver acted reasonably, prudently, fairly and not arbitrarily. I am of the opinion, therefore, that the process adopted by the receiver in reaching an agreement was a just one.

59 In his reasons for judgment, after discussing the circumstances leading to the 922 offer, Rosenberg J. said this:

They created a situation as of March 8th, where the Receiver was faced with two offers, one of which was in acceptable form and one of which could not possibly be accepted in its present form. The Receiver acted appropriately in accepting the OEL offer.

I agree.

60 The receiver made proper and sufficient efforts to get the best price that it could for the assets of Air Toronto. It adopted a reasonable and effective process to sell the airline which was fair to all persons who might be interested in purchasing it. It is my opinion, therefore, that the receiver properly carried out the mandate which was given to it by the order of O'Brien J. It follows that Rosenberg J. was correct when he confirmed the sale to OEL.

## **II. The effect of the support of the 922 offer by the two secured creditors.**

61 As I noted earlier, the 922 offer was supported before Rosenberg J., and in this court, by CCFL and by the Royal Bank, the two secured creditors. It was argued that, because the interests of the creditors are primary, the court ought to give effect to their wish that the 922 offer be accepted. I would not accede to that suggestion for two reasons.

62 The first reason is related to the fact that the creditors chose to have a receiver appointed by the court. It was open to them to appoint a private receiver pursuant to the authority of their security documents. Had they done so, then they would have had control of the process and could have sold Air Toronto to whom they wished. However, acting privately and controlling the process involves some risks. The appointment of a receiver by the court insulates the creditors from those risks. But, insulation from those risks carries with it the loss of control over the process of disposition of the assets. As I have attempted to explain in these reasons, when a receiver's sale is before the court for confirmation, the only issues are the propriety of the conduct of the receiver and whether it acted providently. The function of the court at that stage is not to step in and do the receiver's work, or change the sale strategy adopted by the receiver. Creditors who asked the court to appoint a receiver to dispose of assets should not be allowed to take over control of the process by the simple expedient of supporting another purchaser if they do not agree with the sale made by the receiver. That would take away all respect for the process of sale by a court-appointed receiver.

63 There can be no doubt that the interests of the creditor are an important consideration in determining whether the receiver has properly conducted a sale. The opinion of the creditors as to which offer ought to be accepted is something to be taken into account. But if the court decides that the receiver has acted properly and providently, those views are not necessarily determinative. Because, in this case, the receiver acted properly and providently, I do not think that the views of the creditors should override the considered judgment of the receiver.

64 The second reason is that, in the particular circumstances of this case, I do not think the support of CCFL and the Royal Bank of the 922 offer is entitled to any weight. The support given by CCFL can be dealt with summarily. It is a co-owner of 922. It is hardly surprising and not very impressive to hear that it supports the offer which it is making for the debtor's assets.

65 The support by the Royal Bank requires more consideration and involves some reference to the circumstances. On March 6, 1991, when the first 922 offer was made, there was in existence an inter-lender agreement between the Royal Bank and CCFL. That agreement dealt with the share of the proceeds of the sale of Air Toronto which each creditor would receive. At the time, a dispute between the Royal Bank and CCFL about the interpretation of that agreement was pending in the courts. The unacceptable condition in the first 922 offer related to the settlement of the inter-lender dispute. The condition required that the dispute be resolved in a way which would substantially favour CCFL. It required that CCFL receive \$3,375,000 of the \$6 million cash payment and the

balance, including the royalties, if any, be paid to the Royal Bank. The Royal Bank did not agree with that split of the sale proceeds.

66 On April 5, 1991, the Royal Bank and CCFL agreed to settle the inter-lender dispute. The settlement was that if the 922 offer was accepted by the court, CCFL would receive only \$1 million, and the Royal Bank would receive \$5 million plus any royalties which might be paid. It was only in consideration of that settlement that the Royal Bank agreed to support the 922 offer.

67 The Royal Bank's support of the 922 offer is so affected by the very substantial benefit which it wanted to obtain from the settlement of the inter-lender dispute that, in my opinion, its support is devoid of any objectivity. I think it has no weight.

68 While there may be circumstances where the unanimous support by the creditors of a particular offer could conceivably override the proper and provident conduct of a sale by a receiver, I do not think that this is such a case. This is a case where the receiver has acted properly and in a provident way. It would make a mockery out of the judicial process, under which a mandate was given to this receiver to sell this airline if the support by these creditors of the 922 offer were permitted to carry the day. I give no weight to the support which they give to the 922 offer.

69 In its factum, the receiver pointed out that, because of greater liabilities imposed upon private receivers by various statutes such as the *Employment Standards Act*, R.S.O. 1980, c. 137, and the *Environmental Protection Act*, R.S.O. 1980, c. 141, it is likely that more and more the courts will be asked to appoint receivers in insolvencies. In those circumstances, I think that creditors who ask for court-appointed receivers and business people who choose to deal with those receivers should know that if those receivers act properly and providently, their decisions and judgments will be given great weight by the courts who appoint them. I have decided this appeal in the way I have in order to assure business people who deal with court-appointed receivers that they can have confidence that an agreement which they make with a court-appointed receiver will be far more than a platform upon which others may bargain at the court approval stage. I think that persons who enter into agreements with court-appointed receivers, following a disposition procedure that is appropriate given the nature of the assets involved, should expect that their bargain will be confirmed by the court.

70 The process is very important. It should be carefully protected so that the ability of court-appointed receivers to negotiate the best price possible is strengthened and supported. Because this receiver acted properly and providently in entering into the OEL agreement, I am of the opinion that Rosenberg J. was right when he approved the sale to OEL and dismissed the motion to approve the 922 offer.

71 I would, accordingly, dismiss the appeal. I would award the receiver, OEL and Frontier Airlines Limited their costs out of the Soundair estate, those of the receiver on a solicitor-client scale. I would make no order as to the costs of any of the other parties or intervenors.

***McKinlay J.A. :***

72 I agree with Galligan J.A. in result, but wish to emphasize that I do so on the basis that the undertaking being sold in this case was of a very special and unusual nature. It is most important that the integrity of procedures followed by court-appointed receivers be protected in the interests of both commercial morality and the future confidence of business persons in their dealings with receivers. Consequently, in all cases, the court should carefully scrutinize the procedure followed by the receiver to determine whether it satisfies the tests set out by Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg* (1986), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 320n, 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 22 C.P.C. (2d) 131, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526 (H.C.) . While the procedure carried out by the receiver in this case, as described by Galligan J.A., was appropriate, given the unfolding of events and the unique nature of the assets involved, it is not a procedure that is likely to be appropriate in many receivership sales.

73 I should like to add that where there is a small number of creditors who are the only parties with a real interest in the proceeds of the sale (i.e., where it is clear that the highest price attainable would result in recovery so low that no other creditors, shareholders, guarantors, etc., could possibly benefit therefore), the wishes of the interested creditors should be very seriously considered by the receiver. It is true, as Galligan J.A. points out, that in seeking the court appointment of a receiver, the moving parties also seek the protection of the court in carrying out the receiver's functions. However, it is also true that in utilizing the court process, the moving parties have opened the whole process to detailed scrutiny by all involved, and have probably added significantly to their costs and consequent shortfall as a result of so doing. The adoption of the court process should in no way diminish the rights of any party, and most certainly not the rights of the only parties with a real interest. Where a receiver asks for court approval of a sale which is opposed by the only parties in interest, the court should scrutinize with great care the procedure followed by the receiver. I agree with Galligan J.A. that in this case that was done. I am satisfied that the rights of all parties were properly considered by the receiver, by the learned motions court judge, and by Galligan J.A.

***Goodman J.A. (dissenting):***

74 I have had the opportunity of reading the reasons for judgment herein of Galligan and McKinlay JJ.A. Respectfully, I am unable to agree with their conclusion.

75 The case at bar is an exceptional one in the sense that upon the application made for approval of the sale of the assets of Air Toronto, two competing offers were placed before Rosenberg J. Those two offers were that of OEL and that of 922, a company incorporated for the purpose of acquiring Air Toronto. Its shares were owned equally by CCFL and Air Canada. It was conceded by all parties to these proceedings that the only persons who had any interest in the proceeds of the sale were two secured creditors, viz., CCFL and the Royal Bank of Canada. Those two creditors were unanimous in their position that they desired the court to approve the sale to 922. We were

not referred to, nor am I aware of, any case where a court has refused to abide by the unanimous wishes of the only interested creditors for the approval of a specific offer made in receivership proceedings.

76 In *British Columbia Developments Corp. v. Spun Cast Industries Ltd.* (1977), 26 C.B.R. (N.S.) 28, 5 B.C.L.R. 94 (S.C.) , Berger J. said at p. 30 [C.B.R.]:

Here all of those with a financial stake in the plant have joined in seeking the court's approval of the sale to Fincas. This court does not have a roving commission to decide what is best for investors and businessmen when they have agreed among themselves what course of action they should follow. It is their money.

77 I agree with that statement. It is particularly apt to this case. The two secured creditors will suffer a shortfall of approximately \$50 million. They have a tremendous interest in the sale of assets which form part of their security. I agree with the finding of Rosenberg J. that the offer of 922 is superior to that of OEL. He concluded that the 922 offer is marginally superior. If by that he meant that mathematically it was likely to provide slightly more in the way of proceeds, it is difficult to take issue with that finding. If, on the other hand, he meant that having regard to all considerations it was only marginally superior, I cannot agree. He said in his reasons:

I have come to the conclusion that knowledgeable creditors such as the Royal Bank would prefer the 922 offer even if the other factors influencing their decision were not present. No matter what adjustments had to be made, the 922 offer results in more cash immediately. Creditors facing the type of loss the Royal Bank is taking in this case would not be anxious to rely on contingencies especially in the present circumstances surrounding the airline industry.

78 I agree with that statement completely. It is apparent that the difference between the two offers insofar as cash on closing is concerned amounts to approximately \$3 million to \$4 million. The bank submitted that it did not wish to gamble any further with respect to its investment, and that the acceptance and court approval of the OEL offer in effect supplanted its position as a secured creditor with respect to the amount owing over and above the down payment and placed it in the position of a joint entrepreneur, but one with no control. This results from the fact that the OEL offer did not provide for any security for any funds which might be forthcoming over and above the initial down payment on closing.

79 In *Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303 (C.A.) , Hart J.A., speaking for the majority of the court, said at p. 10 [C.B.R.]:

Here we are dealing with a receiver appointed at the instance of one major creditor, who chose to insert in the contract of sale a provision making it subject to the approval of the court. This, in my opinion, shows an intention on behalf of the parties to invoke the normal equitable doctrines which place the court in the position of looking to the interests of all

persons concerned before giving its blessing to a particular transaction submitted for approval. In these circumstances the court would not consider itself bound by the contract entered into in good faith by the receiver but would have to look to the broader picture to see that that contract was for the benefit of the creditors as a whole. When there was evidence that a higher price was readily available for the property the chambers judge was, in my opinion, justified in exercising his discretion as he did. Otherwise he could have deprived the creditors of a substantial sum of money.

80 This statement is apposite to the circumstances of the case at bar. I hasten to add that in my opinion it is not only price which is to be considered in the exercise of the judge's discretion. It may very well be, as I believe to be so in this case, that the amount of cash is the most important element in determining which of the two offers is for the benefit and in the best interest of the creditors.

81 It is my view, and the statement of Hart J.A. is consistent therewith, that the fact that a creditor has requested an order of the court appointing a receiver does not in any way diminish or derogate from his right to obtain the maximum benefit to be derived from any disposition of the debtor's assets. I agree completely with the views expressed by McKinlay J.A. in that regard in her reasons.

82 It is my further view that any negotiations which took place between the only two interested creditors in deciding to support the approval of the 922 offer were not relevant to the determination by the presiding judge of the issues involved in the motion for approval of either one of the two offers, nor are they relevant in determining the outcome of this appeal. It is sufficient that the two creditors have decided unanimously what is in their best interest, and the appeal must be considered in the light of that decision. It so happens, however, that there is ample evidence to support their conclusion that the approval of the 922 offer is in their best interests.

83 I am satisfied that the interests of the creditors are the prime consideration for both the receiver and the court. In *Re Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd.* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. S.C.) , Saunders J. said at p. 243:

This does not mean that a court should ignore a new and higher bid made after acceptance where there has been no unfairness in the process. The interests of the creditors, while not the only consideration, are the prime consideration.

84 I agree with that statement of the law. In *Re Selkirk* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 (Ont. S.C.) , Saunders J. heard an application for court approval of the sale by the sheriff of real property in bankruptcy proceedings. The sheriff had been previously ordered to list the property for sale subject to approval of the court. Saunders J. said at p. 246:

In dealing with the request for approval, the court has to be concerned primarily with protecting the interests of the creditors of the former bankrupt. A secondary but important

consideration is that the process under which the sale agreement is arrived at should be consistent with commercial efficacy and integrity.

85 I am in agreement with that statement as a matter of general principle. Saunders J. further stated that he adopted the principles stated by Macdonald J.A. in *Cameron*, supra, quoted by Galligan J.A. in his reasons. In *Cameron*, the remarks of Macdonald J.A. related to situations involving the calling of bids and fixing a time limit for the making of such bids. In those circumstances the process is so clear as a matter of commercial practice that an interference by the court in such process might have a deleterious effect on the efficacy of receivership proceedings in other cases. But Macdonald J.A. recognized that even in bid or tender cases where the offeror for whose bid approval is sought has complied with all requirements, a court might not approve the agreement of purchase and sale entered into by the receiver. He said at pp. 11-12 [C.B.R.]:

There are, of course, many reasons why a court might not approve an agreement of purchase and sale, viz., where the offer accepted is so low in relation to the appraised value as to be unrealistic; or, where the circumstances indicate that insufficient time was allowed for the making of bids or that inadequate notice of sale by bid was given (where the receiver sells property by the bid method); or, where it can be said that the proposed sale is not in the best interest of either the creditors or the owner. Court approval must involve the delicate balancing of competing interests and not simply a consideration of the interests of the creditors.

86 The deficiency in the present case is so large that there has been no suggestion of a competing interest between the owner and the creditors.

87 I agree that the same reasoning may apply to a negotiation process leading to a private sale, but the procedure and process applicable to private sales of a wide variety of businesses and undertakings with the multiplicity of individual considerations applicable and perhaps peculiar to the particular business is not so clearly established that a departure by the court from the process adopted by the receiver in a particular case will result in commercial chaos to the detriment of future receivership proceedings. Each case must be decided on its own merits, and it is necessary to consider the process used by the receiver in the present proceedings and to determine whether it was unfair, improvident or inadequate.

88 It is important to note at the outset that Rosenberg J. made the following statement in his reasons:

On March 8, 1991 the trustee accepted the OEL offer subject to court approval. The Receiver at that time had no other offer before it that was in final form or could possibly be accepted. The Receiver had at the time the knowledge that Air Canada with CCFL had not bargained in good faith and had not fulfilled the promise of its letter of March 1st. The Receiver was justified in assuming that Air Canada and CCFL's offer was a long way from being in an acceptable form and that Air Canada and CCFL's objective was to interrupt the finalizing of

the OEL agreement and to retain as long as possible the Air Toronto connector traffic flowing into Terminal 2 for the benefit of Air Canada.

89 In my opinion there was no evidence before him or before this court to indicate that Air Canada, with CCFL, had not bargained in good faith, and that the receiver had knowledge of such lack of good faith. Indeed, on his appeal, counsel for the receiver stated that he was not alleging Air Canada and CCFL had not bargained in good faith. Air Canada had frankly stated at the time that it had made its offer to purchase, which was eventually refused by the receiver, that it would not become involved in an "auction" to purchase the undertaking of Air Canada and that, although it would fulfil its contractual obligations to provide connecting services to Air Toronto, it would do no more than it was legally required to do insofar as facilitating the purchase of Air Toronto by any other person. In so doing, Air Canada may have been playing "hardball," as its behaviour was characterized by some of the counsel for opposing parties. It was nevertheless merely openly asserting its legal position, as it was entitled to do.

90 Furthermore, there was no evidence before Rosenberg J. or this court that the receiver had assumed that Air Canada and CCFL's objective in making an offer was to interrupt the finalizing of the OEL agreement and to retain as long as possible the Air Toronto connector traffic flowing into Terminal 2 for the benefit of Air Canada. Indeed, there was no evidence to support such an assumption in any event, although it is clear that 922, and through it CCFL and Air Canada, were endeavouring to present an offer to purchase which would be accepted and/or approved by the court in preference to the offer made by OEL.

91 To the extent that approval of the OEL agreement by Rosenberg J. was based on the alleged lack of good faith in bargaining and improper motivation with respect to connector traffic on the part of Air Canada and CCFL, it cannot be supported.

92 I would also point out that rather than saying there was no other offer before it that was final in form, it would have been more accurate to have said that there was *no unconditional* offer before it.

93 In considering the material and evidence placed before the court, I am satisfied that the receiver was at all times acting in good faith. I have reached the conclusion, however, that the process which he used was unfair insofar as 922 is concerned, and improvident insofar as the two secured creditors are concerned.

94 Air Canada had been negotiating with Soundair Corporation for the purchase from it of Air Toronto for a considerable period of time prior to the appointment of a receiver by the court. It had given a letter of intent indicating a prospective sale price of \$18' million. After the appointment of the receiver, by agreement dated April 30, 1990, Air Canada continued its negotiations for the purchase of Air Toronto with the receiver. Although this agreement contained a clause which provided that the receiver "shall not negotiate for the sale ... of Air Toronto with any person except Air Canada," it further provided that the receiver would not be in breach of that provision merely by

receiving unsolicited offers for all or any of the assets of Air Toronto. In addition, the agreement, which had a term commencing on April 30, 1990, could be terminated on the fifth business day following the delivery of a written notice of termination by one party to the other. I point out this provision merely to indicate that the exclusivity privilege extended by the receiver to Air Canada was of short duration at the receiver's option.

95 As a result of due negligence investigations carried out by Air Canada during the months of April, May and June of 1990, Air Canada reduced its offer to \$8.1 million conditional upon there being \$4 million in tangible assets. The offer was made on June 14, 1990, and was open for acceptance until June 29, 1990.

96 By amending agreement dated June 19, 1990, the receiver was released from its covenant to refrain from negotiating for the sale of the Air Toronto business and assets to any person other than Air Canada. By virtue of this amending agreement, the receiver had put itself in the position of having a firm offer in hand, with the right to negotiate and accept offers from other persons. Air Canada, in these circumstances, was in the subservient position. The receiver, in the exercise of its judgment and discretion, allowed the Air Canada offer to lapse. On July 20, 1990, Air Canada served a notice of termination of the April 30, 1990 agreement.

97 Apparently as a result of advice received from the receiver to the effect that the receiver intended to conduct an auction for the sale of the assets and business of the Air Toronto division of Soundair Corporation, the solicitors for Air Canada advised the receiver by letter dated July 20, 1990, in part as follows:

Air Canada has instructed us to advise you that it does not intend to submit a further offer in the auction process.

98 This statement, together with other statements set forth in the letter, was sufficient to indicate that Air Canada was not interested in purchasing Air Toronto in the process apparently contemplated by the receiver at that time. It did not form a proper foundation for the receiver to conclude that there was no realistic possibility of selling Air Toronto [to] Air Canada, either alone or in conjunction with some other person, in different circumstances. In June 1990, the receiver was of the opinion that the fair value of Air Toronto was between \$10 million and \$12 million.

99 In August 1990, the receiver contacted a number of interested parties. A number of offers were received which were not deemed to be satisfactory. One such offer, received on August 20, 1990, came as a joint offer from OEL and Air Ontario (an Air Canada connector). It was for the sum of \$3 million for the good will relating to certain Air Toronto routes, but did not include the purchase of any tangible assets or leasehold interests.

100 In December 1990, the receiver was approached by the management of Canadian Partner (operated by OEL) for the purpose of evaluating the benefits of an amalgamated Air Toronto/

Air Partner operation. The negotiations continued from December of 1990 to February of 1991, culminating in the OEL agreement dated March 8, 1991.

101 On or before December 1990, CCFL advised the receiver that it intended to make a bid for the Air Toronto assets. The receiver, in August of 1990, for the purpose of facilitating the sale of Air Toronto assets, commenced the preparation of an operating memorandum. He prepared no less than six draft operating memoranda with dates from October 1990 through March 1, 1991. None of these were distributed to any prospective bidder despite requests having been received therefor, with the exception of an early draft provided to CCFL without the receiver's knowledge.

102 During the period December 1990 to the end of January 1991, the receiver advised CCFL that the offering memorandum was in the process of being prepared and would be ready soon for distribution. He further advised CCFL that it should await the receipt of the memorandum before submitting a formal offer to purchase the Air Toronto assets.

103 By late January, CCFL had become aware that the receiver was negotiating with OEL for the sale of Air Toronto. In fact, on February 11, 1991, the receiver signed a letter of intent with OEL wherein it had specifically agreed not to negotiate with any other potential bidders or solicit any offers from others.

104 By letter dated February 25, 1991, the solicitors for CCFL made a written request to the receiver for the offering memorandum. The receiver did not reply to the letter because he felt he was precluded from so doing by the provisions of the letter of intent dated February 11, 1991. Other prospective purchasers were also unsuccessful in obtaining the promised memorandum to assist them in preparing their bids. It should be noted that, exclusivity provision of the letter of intent expired on February 20, 1991. This provision was extended on three occasions, viz., February 19, 22 and March 5, 1991. It is clear that from a legal standpoint the receiver, by refusing to extend the time, could have dealt with other prospective purchasers, and specifically with 922.

105 It was not until March 1, 1991, that CCFL had obtained sufficient information to enable it to make a bid through 922. It succeeded in so doing through its own efforts through sources other than the receiver. By that time the receiver had already entered into the letter of intent with OEL. Notwithstanding the fact that the receiver knew since December of 1990 that CCFL wished to make a bid for the assets of Air Toronto (and there is no evidence to suggest that at that time such a bid would be in conjunction with Air Canada or that Air Canada was in any way connected with CCFL), it took no steps to provide CCFL with information necessary to enable it to make an intelligent bid, and indeed suggested delaying the making of the bid until an offering memorandum had been prepared and provided. In the meantime, by entering into the letter of intent with OEL, it put itself in a position where it could not negotiate with CCFL or provide the information requested.

106 On February 28, 1991, the solicitors for CCFL telephoned the receiver and were advised for the first time that the receiver had made a business decision to negotiate solely with OEL and would not negotiate with anyone else in the interim.

107 By letter dated March 1, 1991, CCFL advised the receiver that it intended to submit a bid. It set forth the essential terms of the bid and stated that it would be subject to customary commercial provisions. On March 7, 1991 CCFL and Air Canada, jointly through 922, submitted an offer to purchase Air Toronto upon the terms set forth in the letter dated March 1, 1991. It included a provision that the offer was conditional upon the interpretation of an inter-lender agreement which set out the relative distribution of proceeds as between CCFL and the Royal Bank. It is common ground that it was a condition over which the receiver had no control, and accordingly would not have been acceptable on that ground alone. The receiver did not, however, contact CCFL in order to negotiate or request the removal of the condition, although it appears that its agreement with OEL not to negotiate with any person other than OEL expired on March 6, 1991.

108 The fact of the matter is that by March 7, 1991, the receiver had received the offer from OEL which was subsequently approved by Rosenberg J. That offer was accepted by the receiver on March 8, 1991. Notwithstanding the fact that OEL had been negotiating the purchase for a period of approximately 3 months, the offer contained a provision for the sole benefit of the purchaser that it was subject to the purchaser obtaining "a financing commitment within 45 days of the date hereof in an amount not less than the Purchase Price from the Royal Bank of Canada or other financial institution upon terms and conditions acceptable to them. In the event that such a financing commitment is not obtained within such 45 day period, the purchaser or OEL shall have the right to terminate this agreement upon giving written notice of termination to the vendor on the first Business Day following the expiry of the said period." The purchaser was also given the right to waive the condition.

109 In effect, the agreement was tantamount to a 45-day option to purchase, excluding the right of any other person to purchase Air Toronto during that period of time and thereafter if the condition was fulfilled or waived. The agreement was, of course, stated to be subject to court approval.

110 In my opinion, the process and procedure adopted by the receiver was unfair to CCFL. Although it was aware from December 1990 that CCFL was interested in making an offer, it effectively delayed the making of such offer by continually referring to the preparation of the offering memorandum. It did not endeavour during the period December 1990 to March 7, 1991, to negotiate with CCFL in any way the possible terms of purchase and sale agreement. In the result, no offer was sought from CCFL by the receiver prior to February 11, 1991, and thereafter it put itself in the position of being unable to negotiate with anyone other than OEL. The receiver

then, on March 8, 1991, chose to accept an offer which was conditional in nature without prior consultation with CCFL (922) to see whether it was prepared to remove the condition in its offer.

111 I do not doubt that the receiver felt that it was more likely that the condition in the OEL offer would be fulfilled than the condition in the 922 offer. It may be that the receiver, having negotiated for a period of 3 months with OEL, was fearful that it might lose the offer if OEL discovered that it was negotiating with another person. Nevertheless, it seems to me that it was imprudent and unfair on the part of the receiver to ignore an offer from an interested party which offered approximately triple the cash down payment without giving a chance to the offeror to remove the conditions or other terms which made the offer unacceptable to it. The potential loss was that of an agreement which amounted to little more than an option in favour of the offeror.

112 In my opinion the procedure adopted by the receiver was unfair to CCFL in that, in effect, it gave OEL the opportunity of engaging in exclusive negotiations for a period of 3 months, notwithstanding the fact that it knew CCFL was interested in making an offer. The receiver did not indicate a deadline by which offers were to be submitted, and it did not at any time indicate the structure or nature of an offer which might be acceptable to it.

113 In his reasons, Rosenberg J. stated that as of March 1, CCFL and Air Canada had all the information that they needed, and any allegations of unfairness in the negotiating process by the receiver had disappeared. He said:

They created a situation as of March 8, where the receiver was faced with two offers, one of which was acceptable in form and one of which could not possibly be accepted in its present form. The Receiver acted appropriately in accepting the OEL offer.

If he meant by "acceptable in form" that it was acceptable to the receiver, then obviously OEL had the unfair advantage of its lengthy negotiations with the receiver to ascertain what kind of an offer would be acceptable to the receiver. If, on the other hand, he meant that the 922 offer was unacceptable in its form because it was conditional, it can hardly be said that the OEL offer was more acceptable in this regard, as it contained a condition with respect to financing terms and conditions "*acceptable to them* ."

114 It should be noted that on March 13, 1991, the representatives of 922 first met with the receiver to review its offer of March 7, 1991, and at the request of the receiver, withdrew the inter-lender condition from its offer. On March 14, 1991, OEL removed the financing condition from its offer. By order of Rosenberg J. dated March 26, 1991, CCFL was given until April 5, 1991, to submit a bid, and on April 5, 1991, 922 submitted its offer with the inter-lender condition removed.

115 In my opinion, the offer accepted by the receiver is improvident and unfair insofar as the two creditors are concerned. It is not improvident in the sense that the price offered by 922 greatly exceeded that offered by OEL. In the final analysis it may not be greater at all. The salient fact is

that the cash down payment in the 922 offer constitutes proximately two thirds of the contemplated sale price, whereas the cash down payment in the OEL transaction constitutes approximately 20 to 25 per cent of the contemplated sale price. In terms of absolute dollars, the down payment in the 922 offer would likely exceed that provided for in the OEL agreement by approximately \$3 million to \$4 million.

116 In *Re Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd.*, supra, Saunders J. said at p. 243 [C.B.R.]:

If a substantially higher bid turns up at the approval stage, the court should consider it. Such a bid may indicate, for example, that the trustee has not properly carried out its duty to endeavour to obtain the best price for the estate. In such a case the proper course might be to refuse approval and to ask the trustee to recommence the process.

117 I accept that statement as being an accurate statement of the law. I would add, however, as previously indicated, that in determining what is the best price for the estate, the receiver or court should not limit its consideration to which offer provides for the greater sale price. The amount of down payment and the provision or lack thereof to secure payment of the balance of the purchase price over and above the down payment may be the most important factor to be considered, and I am of the view that is so in the present case. It is clear that that was the view of the only creditors who can benefit from the sale of Air Toronto.

118 I note that in the case at bar the 922 offer in conditional form was presented to the receiver before it accepted the OEL offer. The receiver, in good faith, although I believe mistakenly, decided that the OEL offer was the better offer. At that time the receiver did not have the benefit of the views of the two secured creditors in that regard. At the time of the application for approval before Rosenberg J., the stated preference of the two interested creditors was made quite clear. He found as fact that knowledgeable creditors would not be anxious to rely on contingencies in the present circumstances surrounding the airline industry. It is reasonable to expect that a receiver would be no less knowledgeable in that regard, and it is his primary duty to protect the interests of the creditors. In my view, it was an improvident act on the part of the receiver to have accepted the conditional offer made by OEL, and Rosenberg J. erred in failing to dismiss the application of the receiver for approval of the OEL offer. It would be most inequitable to foist upon the two creditors, who have already been seriously hurt, more unnecessary contingencies.

119 Although in other circumstances it might be appropriate to ask the receiver to recommence the process, in my opinion, it would not be appropriate to do so in this case. The only two interested creditors support the acceptance of the 922 offer, and the court should so order.

120 Although I would be prepared to dispose of the case on the grounds stated above, some comment should be addressed to the question of interference by the court with the process and procedure adopted by the receiver.

121 I am in agreement with the view expressed by McKinlay J.A. in her reasons that the undertaking being sold in this case was of a very special and unusual nature. As a result, the procedure adopted by the receiver was somewhat unusual. At the outset, in accordance with the terms of the receiving order, it dealt solely with Air Canada. It then appears that the receiver contemplated a sale of the assets by way of auction, and still later contemplated the preparation and distribution of an offering memorandum inviting bids. At some point, without advice to CCFL, it abandoned that idea and reverted to exclusive negotiations with one interested party. This entire process is not one which is customary or widely accepted as a general practice in the commercial world. It was somewhat unique, having regard to the circumstances of this case. In my opinion, the refusal of the court to approve the offer accepted by the receiver would not reflect on the integrity of procedures followed by court-appointed receivers, and is not the type of refusal which will have a tendency to undermine the future confidence of business persons in dealing with receivers.

122 Rosenberg J. stated that the Royal Bank was aware of the process used and tacitly approved it. He said it knew the terms of the letter of intent in February 1991, and made no comment. The Royal Bank did, however, indicate to the receiver that it was not satisfied with the contemplated price, nor the amount of the down payment. It did not, however, tell the receiver to adopt a different process in endeavouring to sell the Air Toronto assets. It is not clear from the material filed that at the time it became aware of the letter of intent that it knew that CCFL was interested in purchasing Air Toronto.

123 I am further of the opinion that a prospective purchaser who has been given an opportunity to engage in exclusive negotiations with a receiver for relatively short periods of time which are extended from time to time by the receiver, and who then makes a conditional offer, the condition of which is for his sole benefit and must be fulfilled to his satisfaction unless waived by him, and which he knows is to be subject to court approval, cannot legitimately claim to have been unfairly dealt with if the court refuses to approve the offer and approves a substantially better one.

124 In conclusion, I feel that I must comment on the statement made by Galligan J.A. in his reasons to the effect that the suggestion made by counsel for 922 constitutes evidence of lack of prejudice resulting from the absence of an offering memorandum. It should be pointed out that the court invited counsel to indicate the manner in which the problem should be resolved in the event that the court concluded that the order approving the OEL offer should be set aside. There was no evidence before the court with respect to what additional information may have been acquired by CCFL since March 8, 1991, and no inquiry was made in that regard. Accordingly, I am of the view that no adverse inference should be drawn from the proposal made as a result of the court's invitation.

125 For the above reasons I would allow the appeal one set of costs to CCFL-922, set aside the order of Rosenberg J., dismiss the receiver's motion with one set of costs to CCFL-922 and

order that the assets of Air Toronto be sold to numbered corporation 922246 on the terms set forth in its offer with appropriate adjustments to provide for the delay in its execution. Costs awarded shall be payable out of the estate of Soundair Corporation. The costs incurred by the receiver in making the application and responding to the appeal shall be paid to him out of the assets of the estate of Soundair Corporation on a solicitor-client basis. I would make no order as to costs of any of the other parties or intervenors.

*Appeal dismissed.*

**TAB 4**

2016 ABQB 257  
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench

Sanjel Corp., Re

2016 CarswellAlta 900, 2016 ABQB 257, [2016] A.W.L.D.  
2474, 266 A.C.W.S. (3d) 542, 36 C.B.R. (6th) 239

**In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors  
Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended**

In the Matter of the Compromise or Arrangement of Sanjel Corporation, Sanjel Canada Ltd., Terracor Group Ltd., Suretech Group Ltd., Suretech Completions Canada Ltd., Sanjel Energy Services (USA) Inc., Sanjel (USA) Inc., Suretech Completions (USA) Inc., Sanjel Capital (USA) Inc., Terracor (USA) Inc., Terracor Resources (USA) Inc., Terracor Logistics (USA) Inc., Sanjel Middle East Ltd., Sanjel Latin America Limited and Sanjel Energy Services DMCC

B.E. Romaine J.

Heard: April 28, 2016  
Judgment: May 16, 2016  
Docket: Calgary 1601-03143

Counsel: Chris Simard, Alexis Teasdale, for Sanjel Group

**Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency

XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

XIX.5 Miscellaneous

**Headnote**

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Miscellaneous  
Sale of assets — Debtor companies were severely impacted by economic downturn, and breached covenants under credit agreement with secured creditors — Debtors agreed with secured creditors to implement Sales and Investment Solicitation Process (SISP), which resulted in proposed asset sales that would provide no recovery for unsecured creditors — Debtors were granted Initial Order under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Debtors brought application for order approving sales transactions generated through SISP — Trustee of bonds brought application for order dismissing debtors' application, and allowing bondholders to propose plan of arrangement, among other relief — Debtors' application granted; trustee's application dismissed — As result of enactment of s. 36 of Act, there was no jurisdictional impediment to sale of assets where

such sales met requisite tests, even in absence of plan of arrangement — Fact that SISP occurred before seeking protection under Act did not amount to abuse of Act — Despite speed and economic environment, SISP was reasonable, competitive and robust, and generated range of bids significantly above liquidation value — Allegations of bad faith were not supported by evidence — Bondholders were aware of SISP and intention to obtain protection under Act, and were not improperly denied access to information — Factors in s. 36(3) of Act favoured approval of proposed sales — Further allegations raised after hearing were duly investigated by monitor and shown to be groundless.

### **Table of Authorities**

#### **Cases considered by *B.E. Romaine J.*:**

*AbitibiBowater inc., Re* (2010), 2010 QCCS 1742, 2010 CarswellQue 4082, 71 C.B.R. (5th) 220 (C.S. Que.) — considered

*Algoma Steel Inc., Re* (2001), 2001 CarswellOnt 1742, 25 C.B.R. (4th) 194, 147 O.A.C. 291 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

*Bloom Lake, g.p.l., Re* (2015), 2015 QCCS 1920, 2015 CarswellQue 4072, 27 C.B.R. (6th) 1 (C.S. Que.) — considered

*Nelson Education Ltd., Re* (2015), 2015 ONSC 5557, 2015 CarswellOnt 13576, 29 C.B.R. (6th) 140 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

*Nortel Networks Corp., Re* (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4467, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

*Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) — followed

*SemCanada Crude Co., Re* (2009), 2009 ABQB 490, 2009 CarswellAlta 1269, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 205, 479 A.R. 318 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

*Target Canada Co., Re* (2015), 2015 ONSC 303, 2015 CarswellOnt 620, 22 C.B.R. (6th) 323 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered

*Windsor Machine & Stamping Ltd., Re* (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4471, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 241 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

#### **Statutes considered:**

*Bankruptcy Code*, 11 U.S.C.

Chapter 11 — referred to

Chapter 15 — referred to

*Business Corporations Act*, R.S.A. 2000, c. B-9

Generally — referred to

*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 6 — considered

s. 36 — considered

s. 36(3) — considered

s. 36(4) — referred to

s. 36(5) — considered

***B.E. Romaine J.:***

## **I. Introduction**

1 The Sanjel debtors seek orders approving certain sales of assets generated through a SISP that was conducted prior to the debtors filing under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*. The proceeds of the sales will be insufficient to fully payout the secured creditor, and will generate no return to unsecured creditors, including the holders of unsecured Bonds.

2 The Trustee of the Bonds challenged the process under which the SISP was conducted, and the use of what he characterized as a liquidating CCAA in this situation. He alleged that the use of the CCAA to effect a pre-packaged sale of the debtors' assets for the benefit of the secured creditor was an abuse of the letter and spirit of the CCAA. He also alleged that bad faith and collusion tainted the integrity of the SISP.

3 After reviewing extensive evidence and hearing submissions from interested parties, I decided to allow the application to approve the sales, and dismiss the application of the Trustee. These are my reasons.

## **II. Facts**

4 On April 4, 2016, the Sanjel Corporation and its affiliates were granted an Initial Order under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-36, as amended. PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc., ("PWC") was appointed as Monitor of the applicants.

5 Sanjel and its affiliates (the "Sanjel Group" or "Sanjel") provide fracturing, cementing, coiled tubing and reservoir services to the oil and gas industry in Canada, the United States and Saudi Arabia. Sanjel Corporation, the parent company, is a private corporation, the shares of which are owned by the MacDonald Group Ltd. It was incorporated under the *Alberta Business Corporations Act* in 1980, and its principal executive and registered office is located in Calgary. Four of the other members of the group were incorporated in Alberta, seven in various American states and three in offshore jurisdictions.

6 The sole director of all Canadian and US Sanjel companies resides in Calgary, as do all of the officers of these companies. The affidavit in support of the Initial Order sets out a number of factors relevant to the Sanjel Group's ability to file under the CCAA and that would be relevant to

a determination of a Centre of Main Interest ("COMI") of the Sanjel Group. In subsequent Chapter 15 proceedings in the United States, the US Court declared COMI to be located in Canada and the CCAA proceedings to be a "foreign main proceeding." It is clear that the Sanjel Group is a fully integrated business centralized in Calgary.

7 Sanjel Corporation and Sanjel (USA) Inc. are borrowers under a credit agreement (the "Bank Credit Facility") dated April 21, 2015 with a banking syndicate (the "Syndicate") led by Alberta Treasury Branches as agent. The total amount outstanding under the Bank Credit Facility at the time of the CCAA filing was approximately \$415.5 million. The Syndicate has perfected security interests over substantially all of the assets of the Sanjel Group, and is the principal secured creditor of the Sanjel Group in these CCAA proceedings.

8 On June 18, 2014, Sanjel Corporation issued US \$300 million 7.5% Callable Bonds due June 19, 2019. Interest is payable on the Bonds semi-annually on June 19 and December 19. The Bonds are unsecured. Nordic Trust ASA (the "Trustee") is the trustee under the Bond Agreement.

9 The Sanjel Group has been severely impacted by the catastrophic drop in global oil and gas prices since mid-2014. Over the last 18 months, the Sanjel Group has taken aggressive steps to cut costs, including by reducing staffing levels by more than half. However, by late October, 2015, Sanjel Corporation was in breach of certain covenants under the Bank Credit Facility. By late December, 2016, the Syndicate was in a position to exercise enforcement rights. In addition, an interest payment of USD \$11,250,000 was due on the Bonds on December 19, 2015. Since late 2015, the Sanjel Group has been in negotiations with both the Syndicate and two bondholders, Ascribe Capital LLC and Clearlake Capital Group L.P., (the "Ad Hoc Bondholders"). The Ad Hoc Bondholders hold over 45% of the Bonds.

10 In the fall of 2015, Sanjel Corporation engaged Bank of America Merrill Lynch ("BAML") to identify strategic partners and attempt to raise additional capital for the Sanjel Group. BAML contacted 28 private equity firms; 19 non-disclosure agreements were executed and 9 management presentations were made. However, the BAML process did not result in a successful transaction.

11 In December, 2015, the Ad Hoc Bondholders retained a New York law firm, Fried Frank, as their legal advisor and Moelis & Company as their financial advisor.

12 On December 10, 2015, Fried Frank conveyed a proposal from the Ad Hoc Bondholders to Sanjel. Under this proposal, Sanjel would be required to pay the USD \$11,250,000 interest payment. Provided that the interest payment was made, the bondholders would agree to a standstill agreement for the same period as may be agreed with the Syndicate. In return, the Ad Hoc Bondholders would lend back their pro rata share of that interest payment to Sanjel in return for secured notes ranking *pari passu* with the Bank Credit Facility, bearing interest at the same rate as the Bank Credit Facility plus 2%. The new notes would not be repaid until the Bank Credit Facility was repaid.

13 The Ad Hoc Bondholders indicated that they would consider acting as standby lenders to Sanjel for the remainder of the interest payment and would offer the other bondholders the option of lending back their pro-rata share to Sanjel on the same basis. If they agreed to be standby lenders, the Ad Hoc Bondholders would receive a commitment fee equal to 10% of their standby commitment, payable in new notes.

14 The proposal letter indicated that the Ad Hoc Bondholders were aware that Sanjel had been engaged in a process to address liquidity and leverage issues over the past few months, including attempting to raise equity to sell assets. In their view, Sanjel had exhausted those efforts, and the only remaining option was a deal negotiated with the bondholders. However, the Ad Hoc Bondholders would only embark on such a process if the December 19, 2015 interest payment was made.

15 Sanjel rejected the proposal on December 14, 2015. It is noteworthy that the Bank Credit Facility includes a negative covenant prohibiting Sanjel from granting a security interest over its assets. The Syndicate advised Sanjel that the Ad Hoc Bondholders' proposal to have their existing unsecured position elevated to rank *pari passu* with the Bank Credit Facility was unacceptable, and that it would not provide its consent.

16 On December 15, 2015, the Ad Hoc Bondholders advised counsel to the Syndicate that they wished to work towards a restructuring, which they envisaged would involve paying down a portion of the Syndicate's debt "in an amount to be mutually agreed on". They also suggested that Sanjel would implement a rights offering to holders of Bonds and then to existing equity, with a conversion of the Bonds into new debt and equity.

17 On or about December 15, 2015, the Ad Hoc Bondholders sent Sanjel a draft waiver and standstill agreement, which required the payment of part of the December 19 interest payment by December 23, 2015 and the payment of the fees and disbursements of Fried Frank and Moelis in return for arranging for a bondholder meeting to be called to consider a period of forbearance to March 31, 2016.

18 Fried Frank and Moelis executed Non-Disclosure Agreements ("NDAs") on December 24, 2015, but the Ad Hoc Bondholders did not, thus not restricting their right to trade the Bonds. Fried Frank and Moelis were granted access to a Sanjel virtual database ("VDR") on January 9, 2016.

19 By January, 2016, given the prolonged downturn in oil and gas prices, Sanjel's liquidity was limited. Events of default under the Bank Credit Facility that had occurred as of October 31, 2015 were exacerbated by a cross-default based on the non-payment of interest under the Bond Agreement. As of January 31, 2016, the Sanjel Group had total consolidated liabilities of approximately \$1.064 billion.

20 Sanjel was facing very significant negative cash flow projections over the next few months. As of early January, 2016, Sanjel's projected cash flows showed that its cash position would deteriorate by more than half as of the first week of April, 2016, and would be further reduced by anticipated forbearance payments.

21 In the circumstances, Sanjel agreed with the Syndicate to implement a Sales and Investment Solicitation Process ("SISP"). Sanjel states that it hoped that if a SISP was implemented, it might find a transaction that preserved the business as a going concern, which would maximize stakeholder value and preserve goodwill and jobs.

22 In mid-January, 2016, Sanjel engaged PWC as a proposed Monitor in the event it would become necessary to file under the CCAA.

23 The SISP was commenced on behalf of Sanjel by its financial advisors, PJT Partners Inc. ("PJT") and Credit Suisse Securities (CANADA), Inc. ("CS") on January 17, 2016. The advisors contacted prospective bidders, many of whom had already been identified through the BAML process of late 2015.

24 The process of soliciting non-bidding indications of interest ran from January 17, 2016 to February 22, 2016. On January 26, 2016, the advisers updated and opened a VDR available to anyone who had signed a NDA. A teaser letter was distributed and meetings and conference calls were held with bidders. A process letter was distributed on January 28, 2016. Nine indications of interest were submitted on or about February 22, 2016.

25 Before and during the SISP process, Sanjel was negotiating with both the Syndicate and the Ad Hoc Bondholders with respect to separate forbearance agreements, and with the Ad Hoc Bondholders with respect to NDAs to be signed by the Ad Hoc Bondholders. The Ad Hoc Bondholders complain that there was a delay of almost a month before Sanjel's counsel responded to a mark-up of a NDA provided by Fried Frank, but negotiations were stymied by the Ad Hoc Bondholders' insistence that the December interest payment be paid. Until this issue was settled, there was no reason to finalize the NDAs. In addition, it was not until January 29, 2016 that representatives of the Ad Hoc Bondholders advised Sanjel that they were prepared to be restricted from trading and therefore able to receive confidential information. During this period of time, the Ad Hoc Bondholders refused to meet with Sanjel management when they travelled to New York on January 20, 2016.

26 On February 1, 2016, counsel to Sanjel sent counsel to the Ad Hoc Bondholders a copy of the draft forbearance agreement between the Syndicate and Sanjel, which set out the key dates of the SISP, including the completion of definitive purchase and sales agreements by March 24, 2016. It would have been clear to the Ad Hoc Bondholders from this draft that Sanjel was proceeding

on a dual track basis, considering both a potential stand-alone restructuring of the company and a sales process.

27 The Ad Hoc Bondholders made a second proposal to Sanjel on February 2, 2016, very shortly after the NDAs were signed. This proposal involved the Syndicate recovering a portion of its loan from Sanjel's existing cash reserves and a rights offering backstopped by the Ad Hoc Bondholders. A portion of the Bonds would be converted into equity. The December interest payment would have to be paid. Sanjel's management team met with the Ad Hoc Bondholders and their advisors in New York on February 3, 2016 and Sanjel's team, the Syndicate and its advisors and the Ad Hoc Bondholders met on February 8, 2016.

28 Sanjel delivered an indicative restructuring term sheet to the Ad Hoc Bondholders on February 12, 2016, as required by the forbearance agreement that the parties were negotiating. The restructuring term sheet emphasized that a bondholder-led restructuring would require significant new money, a significant capital commitment and ongoing capital, with a significant pay-down of the Syndicate's debt.

29 Commencing on February 15, 2016, Sanjel allowed representatives of Alvarez and Marsal ("A&M"), advisors to the Ad Hoc Bondholders, to attend in Calgary and conduct due diligence.

30 On February 18, 2016, Sanjel uploaded to its VDR the final, unsigned versions of the Syndicate Amending and Forbearance Agreement and the Bondholders Forbearance Agreement.

31 Under the SISP, preliminary, non-binding indications of interest were delivered to the advisors and the company by February 22, 2016. Six such indications of interest were received, all of which were materially superior to the Ad Hoc Bondholders proposal of February 2, 2016. The Ad Hoc Bondholders have admitted that they were aware of the milestones under the SISP and the Bank Forbearance Agreement by mid-February, 2016, although it is clear that their advisors would have been aware of these milestones from February 1, 2016.

32 As part of finalizing the form of Bond Forbearance Agreement, counsel for Sanjel and for the Ad Hoc Bondholders had negotiated a form of summons that would be used to call a bondholder meeting to consider the agreement. The only item for consideration to be considered at the meeting was to be the Bond Forbearance Agreement. The plan was to have 2/3 of the bondholders approve and execute the Bond Forbearance Agreement, and then to hold a bondholders meeting.

33 Instead, on February 25, 2016, the Ad Hoc Bondholders caused the Trustee to issue a summons for a meeting on March 10, 2016 to consider and vote on a) whether to declare the Bonds in default, accelerate them and exercise remedies, including commencing involuntary bankruptcy proceedings against Sanjel under Chapter 11 of the *United States Bankruptcy Code*, including claims against the MacDonald family and MacBain Properties Ltd., which owns the business premises that are leased by the Sanjel Group or b) approve the Bond Forbearance Agreement.

34 On March 2, 2016, the Ad Hoc Bondholders submitted a restructuring proposal to Sanjel. This proposal provided no cash recovery to the Syndicate. Instead, a portion of the debt owed to the Syndicate would be converted to a new loan and the remainder extinguished, with the Syndicate receiving warrants in a reorganized company. There would be a Chapter 11 filing and the bondholders would provide a debtor-in-possession ("DIP") facility to rank *pari passu* with the Syndicate debt. Bondholders who contributed to the DIP would receive new 2<sup>nd</sup> lien notes for part of their previous notes, the remainder being extinguished. The DIP facility would be converted into 100% of the equity of the reorganized company. Sanjel would be required to appoint a Chief Restructuring Officer ("CRO") designated by the Ad Hoc Bondholders.

35 On March 4, 2016, in a follow-up letter to a telephone meeting on March 3, 2016, US counsel to the Syndicate wrote to Fried Frank requesting that the March 10 bondholders meeting be adjourned to March 31, 2016. Canadian counsel to Sanjel made the same request of the Trustee.

36 Also on March 4, 2016, a template Asset Purchase Agreement ("APA") for SISP bidders was posted on the VDRs, which disclosed a CCAA/Chapter 15 filing with PWC as designated Monitor. This template agreement was available to the Ad Hoc Bondholders and their advisors.

37 Counsel for the Ad Hoc Bondholders replied on March 5, 2016 that they would advise the Trustee to postpone the March 10 meeting subject to:

- a) a response to their March 2 proposal by March 10, 2016;
- b) full disclosure of company records for A&M's representative, "so that [that representative] is ready and best positioned to commence his duties as Chief Restructuring Officer for the Company".
- c) payment by March 7, 2016 of roughly USD \$2.2 million in fees and disbursements for the Ad Hoc Bondholders' legal and financial advisors.

38 After some negotiation, Sanjel agreed to these terms for an adjournment, other than with respect to a small deduction in fees and disbursements. Sanjel made it clear that it reserved all rights with respect to the appointment of a CRO and a filing under Chapter 11, which it would not agree to at that time. On March 8, 2016 the Trustee confirmed that the meeting would be postponed to March 31.

39 On March 9, 2016, second round bids under the SISP were received. Five bids were received, all of which were materially superior to the Ad Hoc Bondholders' March 2, 2016 proposal in terms of cash recovery for the Syndicate.

40 An information update conference for bondholders was scheduled to be held on March 11, 2016, at which Sanjel, the Trustee and the Ad Hoc Bondholders would provide an update to any bondholder that wished to call in. This was rescheduled by the Trustee to March 31, 2016.

41 On March 11, 2016, the Syndicate sent the counter-offer required by the postponement of meeting agreement to the Ad Hoc Bondholders. This counter-proposal made it clear that there would be a CCAA/Chapter 15 process, rather than a Chapter 11 process. While this counter-proposal is confidential, it is fair to say that the parties were far apart in their negotiations, particularly with respect to treatment of the Syndicate indebtedness.

42 Also on March 11, 2016, a representative of Sanjel met with A&M's representative and discussed Sanjel's intention to disclaim certain leases in the anticipated CCAA proceedings.

43 Following receipt of the second round bids, Sanjel and its advisors identified the top three bidders and began negotiations with them with the goal of finalizing due diligence and being in a position to execute final APAs on March 24, 2016, as indicated in the Bank Forbearance Agreement.

44 In the meantime, Sanjel continued meetings with the A&M representative, who asked for, and was provided with:

a) access to the newly created VDR for second stage bidders/investors in the SISP on March 12, 2016.

b) draft materials relating to the CCAA filing, including current drafts of cash flow projections and drafts of stakeholder communication regarding the CCAA, on March 21, 2016.

45 On March 20, 2016, the Ad Hoc Bondholders provided Sanjel and the Syndicate with a third restructuring proposal. This one provided for some paydown of the Syndicate's debt, but involved less than half of that recovery in new money, about the same amount in debt secured by accounts receivable and a substantial amount of bank debt rolled over into a new loan. It also provided for a DIP facility to rank *pari passu* with a new bank credit facility in the event of a liquidation and the conversion of some bondholder debt into secured notes.

46 On March 23, 2016, counsel for Sanjel requested that the Trustee postpone the bondholder meeting scheduled for March 31, 2016 to April 14, 2016. He also proposed to set up the requested informational update on March 31, 2016. On March 25, 2016, counsel for the Trustee consented to this request.

47 In the SISP, final bids were received from the three top bidders on March 24, 2016, with negotiations to continue on final APAs. On the same day, Sanjel and its advisors hosted a call with A&M and Moelis, during which they walked through a 13 week cash forecast.

48 On March 31, 2016 the Syndicate and the Ad Hoc Bondholders had discussions with respect to the Ad Hoc Bondholders' March 20 proposal. In previous correspondence, the Syndicate's counsel had questioned the adequacy of the proposed DIP financing in the proposal and noted Sanjel's significant cash needs following exit from an insolvency proceeding, as opposed to the proposal's assumption that there would be better cash flow. At the conclusion of the call, the Ad Hoc Bondholders indicated that they would provide further modelling with respect to their proposal.

49 On April 3, 2016, Sanjel entered into final APAs with the proposed purchasers, STEP and Liberty. On April 4, 2016, the Sanjel Group filed for CCAA protection. Counsel for Sanjel Group disclosed that the application was made without notice to the Ad Hoc Bondholders. He submitted that notice would imperil the CCAA proceedings as the bondholders may, with notice, have preempted the CCAA filing by an involuntary filing under Chapter 11. There is no requirement to give notice to unsecured creditors of a CCAA filing. There are circumstances, and this was one of them, where it is appropriate to seek an initial order on an ex parte basis:

This may be an appropriate — even necessary — step in order to prevent "creditors from moving to realize on their claims, essentially a 'stampede to the assets' once creditors learn of the debtor's financial distress": J.P. Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (2007), at p. 55 ("Rescue!"); see also *Algoma Steel Inc., Re* (2001), 25 C.B.R. (4th) 194 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 7

50 On April 11, 2016, the Ad Hoc Bondholders presented their fourth proposal for restructuring, not to Sanjel but to the Syndicate. This proposal increases the amount the bondholders would contribute to Sanjel for new equity, which would be used to repay a portion of the Syndicate's loan.

51 According to Fried Frank, the Syndicate's counsel responded on April 13, 2016 advising that while they appreciated the work done by the Ad Hoc Bondholders, the Syndicate preferred the sale route. The Syndicate proposed alternatives that it might consider involving a higher payout of the Syndicate's debt than offered by the April 11, 2016 proposal. The Ad Hoc Bondholders have not responded.

52 The Sanjel Group apply for an order approving the sales transactions generated through the SISP, being a sales agreement between Sanjel and STEP Energy Services Ltd., including an assignment of the sale of the debtor's cementing assets in favour of 1961531 Alberta Ltd., and a sales agreement between Sanjel and Liberty.

53 The Trustee applied for an order dismissing the application for approval of these transactions, allowing the Ad Hoc Bondholders to propose a plan of arrangement, lifting the stay to allow the Trustee to commence a Chapter 11 filing and directing a new Court-monitored SISP, among other applications

### III. Applicable Law

54 Section 36(3) of the CCAA sets out six non-exhaustive factors that must be considered in approving a sale by a CCAA debtor of assets outside the ordinary course of business. They are:

- (a) whether the process leading to the proposed sale was reasonable in the circumstances;
- (b) whether the Monitor approved the process leading to the proposed sale;
- (c) whether the Monitor filed with the court a report stating that in its opinion the sale would be more beneficial to creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy;
- (d) the extent to which the creditors were consulted;
- (e) the effects of the proposed sale on creditors and other interested parties; and
- (f) whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value.

55 In this case, the Monitor was not in place at the time of the process leading to the proposed sales, nor at the time the SISP was commenced. However, the Monitor has given an opinion on the process, which I will consider as part of my review.

56 Prior to the enactment of section 36, CCAA courts considered what are known as the Soundair principles in considering approval application, and they are still useful guidelines:

- a) Was there a sufficient effort made to get the price at issue? Did the debtor company act improvidently?
- b) Were the interests of all parties considered?
- c) Are there any questions about the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers were obtained?
- d) Was there unfairness in the working out of the process?

*Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.*, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) at para 20.

57 Gascon, J. (as he then was) suggested in *AbitibiBowater inc., Re*, 2010 QCCS 1742 (C.S. Que.) at paras 70-72 that a court should give due consideration to two further factors:

- a) the business judgment rule, in that a court will not lightly interfere with the exercise of the commercial and business judgment of the debtor company and the monitor in the context of an asset sale where the marketing and sale process was fair, reasonable, transparent and efficient; and

b) the weight to be given to the recommendation of the monitor.

58 As noted by Gascon, J., it is not desirable for a bidder to wait to the last minute, even up to a court approval stage, to submit its best offer. However, a court can consider such an offer, if it is evidence that the debtor company did not properly carry out its duty to obtain the best price for creditors.

#### IV. Analysis

59 The Trustee has raised a number of objections to the proposed sales, many of which relate to the factors and principles set out in section 36 of the CCAA, the Soundair principles and the AbitibiBowater factors:

A. The Trustee submits that the CCAA can only be used to liquidate the assets of a debtor company and distribute the proceeds where such use is uncontested or where there is clear evidence that the CCAA provides scope for greater recoveries than would be available on a bankruptcy.

60 Most of the cases relied upon by the Trustee with respect to this submission predate the 2009 enactment of section 36 of the CCAA. While prior to this change to the CCAA, there was some authority that questioned whether the CCAA should be used to carry out a liquidation of a debtors' assets, there was also authority that accepted this as a proper use of the statute.

61 An analysis of the pre-section 36 state of the law on this issue, and support for the latter view, is well summarized in *Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, [2009] O.J. No. 3169 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]). As noted by Morawetz, J. at para 28 of that decision, the CCAA is a flexible statute, particularly useful in complex insolvency cases in which the court is required to balance numerous constituents and myriad interests. This is such a case.

62 Section 36 now provides that a CCAA court may authorize the sale or disposition of assets outside the ordinary course of business if authorized to do so by court order. There is thus no jurisdictional impediment to the sale of assets where such sales meet the requisite tests, even in the absence of a plan of arrangement.

63 Morawetz, J in *Target Canada Co., Re*, 2015 ONSC 303 (Ont. S.C.J.) at paras 32 and 33, describes the change brought about by section 36:

Prior to the 2009 amendments to the CCAA, Canadian courts accepted that, in appropriate circumstances, debtor companies were entitled to seek the protection of the CCAA where the outcome was not going to be a going concern restructuring, but instead, a "liquidation" or wind-down of the debtor companies' assets or business.

The 2009 amendments did not expressly address whether the CCAA could be used generally to wind-down the business of a debtor company. However, I am satisfied that the enactment of section 36 of the CCAA, which establishes a process for a debtor company to sell assets outside the ordinary course of business while under CCAA protection, is consistent with the principle that the CCAA can be a vehicle to downsize or wind-down a debtor company's business.

See also *Re Brainhunter Inc.*, 2009 CarswellOnt 8207 at para 15.

64 Whether before or after the enactment of section 36, Canadian courts have approved en bloc sales of a debtor company, recognizing that such sales are consistent with the broad remedial purpose and flexibility of the CCAA.

65 What the provisions of the CCAA can provide in situations such as those facing the Sanjel Group is a court-supervised process of the execution of the sales, with provision for liquidity and the continuation of the business through the process provided by interim financing, a Key Employee Retention Plan that attempts to ensure that key employees are given an incentive to ensure a seamless transition, critical supplier relief that keeps operations functioning pending the closing of the sales and a process whereby a company with operations in Canada, the United States and internationally is able to invoke the aid of both Canadian and US courts during the process. It is true that the actual SISP process preceded the CCAA filing, and I will address that factor later in this decision.

66 As counsel to the Sanjel Group notes, this type of insolvency proceeding is well-suited to the current catastrophic downturn of the economy in Alberta, with companies at the limit of their liquidity. It allows a business to be kept together and sold as a going concern to the extent possible. There have been a number of recent similar filings in this jurisdiction: the filing in Southern Pacific and Quicksilver are examples.

67 The Monitor supports the sales, and is of the view, supported by investigation into the likely range of forced sale liquidation recoveries with financial advisors and others with industry knowledge, that a liquidation of assets would not generate a better result than the consideration contemplated by the proposed sales. The Monitor's investigations were hampered by the lack of recent sales of similar businesses, but I am satisfied by its thorough report that the Monitor's investigation of likely recoveries is the best estimate available. A CS estimate provided a different analysis, but I am satisfied by the evidence that it has little probative value.

68 In summary, this is not an inappropriate use of the CCAA arising from the nature of the proposed sales.

B. The Trustee submits that the proposed sales are the product of a defective SISP conducted outside of the CCAA.

69 It is true that the SISP, and the restructuring negotiations with the Ad Hoc Bondholders, took place prior to the filing under the CCAA, that this was a "pre-pack" filing.

70 A pre-filing SISP is not of itself abusive of the CCAA. Nothing in the statute precludes it. Of course, a pre-filing SISP must meet the principles and requirements of section 36 of the CCAA and must be considered against the Soundair principles. The Trustee submits that such a SISP should be subject to heightened scrutiny. It may well be correct that a pre-filing SISP will be subject to greater challenges from stakeholders, and that it may be more difficult for the debtor company to establish that it was conducted in a fair and effective manner, given the lack of supervision by the Court and the Monitor, who as a court officer has statutory duties.

71 Without prior court approval of the process, conducting a SISP outside of the CCAA means that both the procedure and the execution of the SISP are open to attack by aggrieved stakeholders and bitter bidders, as has been the case here. Any evidence or reasonable allegations of impropriety would have to be investigated carefully, whereas in a court-approved process, comfort can be obtained through the Monitor's review and the Court's approval of the process in advance. However, in the end, it is the specific details of the SISP as conducted that will be scrutinized.

72 Similar issues were considered in *Nelson Education Ltd., Re*, 2015 ONSC 5557 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paras 31-32, and in *Bloom Lake, g.p.l., Re*, 2015 QCCS 1920 (C.S. Que.) at para 21.

73 The Trustee submits that the SISP was defective in that its timelines were truncated and that it was destined not to generate offers that maximized value for all stakeholders. The Trustee filed an affidavit of a representative of Moelis indicating that it would be typical in a SISP to establish a deadline for non-binding offers one or two months following commencement of the process, while in this SISP, participants had only 12 to 25 days to evaluate the business and provide non-binding indications of interest. This opinion did not address the previous BAML process that identified likely purchasers and thus lengthened the review process for these parties who participated in the first process. The Trustee's advisor was also critical that the SISP provided only 16 days for final offers, suggesting that it is more typical to provide two months.

74 While likely correct for normal-course SISP's, this analysis does not take into account the high cash burn situation of these debtors, nor the deteriorating market. The Moelis opinion suggests that potential purchaser would have a heightened diligence requirement in the current unfavourable market conditions, requiring extra time for due diligence. However, despite the speed of the SISP, it appears to have generated a range of bids significantly above liquidation value. The

process was not limited to the SISP, but included the previous BAML process and the negotiations with the Ad Hoc Bondholders.

75 The evidence discloses a thorough and comprehensive canvassing of the relevant markets for the debtors and their assets despite the aggressive timelines. The BAML process identified some interested parties and Sanjel's financial advisors built on that process by re-engaging with 28 private equity firms that had already expressed interest in these unique assets as well as identifying new potential purchasers, reaching out to 85 potential buyers.

76 Of those 85 parties, 37 executed NDAs, 25 conducted due diligence and 17 met with the management team. Eight submitted non-binding indications of interest, five were invited to submit second-round bids and finally the top three were chosen for the continuation of negotiations to final agreements.

77 While some interested parties may have found the time limits challenging, a reasonable number were able to meet them and submit bids. I am satisfied from the evidence that, despite a challenging economic environment, the process was competitive and robust.

78 I also note the comments of the Monitor in its First Report dated April 12, 2016. While it was not directly involved in the SISP, the Monitor reports that the financial advisors advised the Monitor, that given the size and complexity of the Sanjel Group's operations and the time frames involved, all strategic and financial sponsors known to the advisors were contacted during the SISP and that it is unlikely that extending the SISP time frames in the current market would have resulted in materially better offers.

79 Based on this advice and the Monitor's observations since its involvement in the SISP from mid-February 2016, the Monitor is of the opinion that it is highly improbable that another post-filing sales process would yield offers materially in excess of those received.

80 Finally, I note that the Ad Hoc Bondholders' own March 20 proposal envisaged a pre-packaged CCAA proceedings. A sales process is only required to be reasonable, not perfect. I am satisfied that this SISP was run appropriately and reasonably, and that it adequately canvassed the relevant market for the Sanjel Group and its assets.

C. The Ad Hoc Bondholders submit that negotiations among them, the Sanjel Group and the Syndicate were a sham conducted by Sanjel to delay the Ad Hoc Bondholders from taking action under Chapter 11 while it finalized the APAs. The Trustee alleges that the SISP has been conducted and the CCAA filing occurred in an atmosphere tainted by manoeuvring for advantage, bad faith, deception, secrecy, artificial haste and excessive deference by the Sanjel Group to the Syndicate.

81 These are serious allegations, but they are not supported by the evidence.

82 As the somewhat lengthy history of negotiations establishes, the Ad Hoc Bondholders had almost three months to present and negotiate restructuring proposals, with access to confidential information afforded to their advisors from January 9, 2016, weeks before the SISP participants. They presented four proposals, the last one after final bids had been received in the SISP. Although the final proposal breached the timelines of the SISP process, and could potentially raise an issue with respect to the integrity of the SISP process, Sanjel, the Syndicate and the prospective purchasers are not pressing that argument, as they take the position that the final offer is inferior at any rate.

83 These proposals received responses from Sanjel and the Syndicate, and counter proposals were received. The evidence discloses that, in all proposals and counter proposals, the parties were far apart on a major issue: the extent to which the Syndicate's debt was to be paid down and how far it was willing to allow a portion to remain at risk.

84 The Ad Hoc Bondholders were aware of the SISP from its commencement, and aware of the timing of the process. Throughout the SISP, the financial advisors had regular contact with Moelis and Fried Frank and directly with the Ad Hoc Bondholders. Michael Genereux, the lead partner at PJT with respect to the SISP, has sworn that he believes the Ad Hoc Bondholders were aware of the SISP and that it was progressing at a rapid pace. He says that he urged the Ad Hoc Bondholders to accelerate the pace at which they were advancing their restructuring negotiations.

85 The Ad Hoc Bondholders were aware, or should have been aware, that the Sanjel Group intended a CCAA/Chapter 15 process from at the latest mid-March, 2016. Their representative from A&M was aware of the possibility of a CCAA filing from March 4, 2016. Reference to PWC as Monitor under the CCAA was available through the template APAs from March 4, 2016

86 The Trustee and the Ad Hoc Bondholders submit that the Ad Hoc Bondholders' April 11, 2016 proposal provides superior recovery to the proposed sales generated by the SISP, that it "implies" a purchase price significantly in excess of the values generated by the APAs. The proposal, which was made directly to the Syndicate, was rejected by the Syndicate. It provides less immediate recovery to the Syndicate, and leaves a substantial portion of the Syndicate debt outstanding in a difficult and highly uncertain economic environment. It fails to address previously-expressed concerns about the need for capital going forward. The implied value of the proposal appears to rest on assumptions about improved economic recovery that the Syndicate does not accept or share.

87 In addition, the proposal would require at least six months to execute and leaves a number of questions outstanding, not the least being whether a plan that raises some and not all unsecured debt to secured status would pass muster. The proposal was rejected by the Syndicate for reasonable and defensible justifications.

88 The Ad Hoc Bondholders describe their proposal as a "germ" of a viable plan. While a germ of a viable plan may be sufficient to justify the commencement of a CCAA proceeding, it is not comparable to the proposed sales generated by a reasonably-run and thorough SISP.

89 The Trustee also submits that the Court should not be deterred by the Syndicate's rejection of the proposal, insisting on its value and citing cases where a creditor's stated intention not to accept a plan did not prevent a CCAA filing from proceeding. This is a different situation: the Ad Hoc Bondholder's proposals are specific proposals with clear risks of timing and certainty. It is not up to this Court to second guess the Syndicate's rejection of such a plan, even if inclined to do so.

90 The Trustee submits that Sanjel did not act in good faith towards the Ad Hoc Bondholders in the period leading up to the filing. The Trustee notes that, contrary to the terms of the Bond Agreement, Sanjel failed to disclose to the bondholders that the Syndicate had issued a demand for payment acceleration and a notice of intention to enforce security pursuant to the terms of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (the "Demand Acceleration and NOI") on March 18, 2016. While this was a contractual breach, the Ad Hoc Bondholders were well aware that Sanjel was in breach of the Bank Credit Facility, and that the Syndicate was taking steps to enforce its rights in negotiations with Sanjel and the Ad Hoc Bondholders. The Syndicate, and the Ad Hoc Bondholders, were both careful to preserve their rights of enforcement in proposals and counter-proposals. In fact, the Syndicate did not exercise its right to set-off, and has allowed Sanjel to continue to have access to liquidity going into the CCAA process.

91 This failure by Sanjel to advise the Trustee, (and other unsecured creditors that had similar provisions in their contracts), of this further step by the Syndicate does not constitute a reason to refuse to approve that APAs.

92 The Trustee submits that Sanjel failed to make full and plain disclosure during the initial hearing because it failed to disclose that in 2015, 62 % of the Sanjel Group's revenue was generated in the United States. Sanjel made extensive disclosure of its corporate structure and the integration of its business in its initial filing, including the fact that the Sanjel Group's "nerve centre", management team and treasury and financial functions are largely based in Calgary. The factors disclosed were more than sufficient to establish jurisdiction for a CCAA filing. The US Court in the Chapter 15 filing found the Sanjel Group's COMI to be in Calgary. The single statistic of 2015 revenue would not have changed the outcome of the Initial Order.

93 The Trustee's most serious allegation, given its implications for the professional reputations of those involved, is that Sanjel and its counsel and the Syndicate and its counsel misled the Trustee and the Ad Hoc Bondholders in their requests for adjournment of the bondholders' meeting, that the correspondence relating to the requests for adjournment created an obligation to negotiate in good faith, and that Sanjel and the Syndicate failed to do so. The Trustee and the Ad Hoc Bondholders

allege that Sanjel and the Syndicate were negotiating with the Ad Hoc Bondholders only to gain time to finalize the APAs and file under the CCAA.

94 Again, this serious allegation is not supported by the evidence. The correspondence relating to the adjournment requests discloses no promises to hold off proceedings. The letter of request for the first adjournment for counsel to the Syndicate, while it refers to engaging with the Ad Hoc Bondholders with respect to the March 2, 2016 proposal, stipulates that in requesting the postponement of the meeting, counsel is not promising any course of action and reserves all rights.

95 The request from counsel to Sanjel refers to the dual track of negotiating a financial restructuring and/or sale of assets. It speaks of focusing on negotiations for the balance of the month, instead of "prospective enforcement action as proposed for consideration at the scheduled bondholders meeting," as was threatened by the notice of meeting. The Ad Hoc Bondholders were well-compensated financially for this adjournment.

96 The second request to adjourn the meeting to April 14, 2016 was similarly without any promise to forbear and the acceptance of the request by the Trustee did not impose any conditions nor give any reasons for the acceptance. The representatives of the Ad Hoc Bondholders are knowledgeable and sophisticated with respect to financing and insolvency matters. They cannot be said to have been misled by the language used in the adjournment requests.

97 The Trustee submits that the CCAA process to date has been engineered to effect a foreclosure in favour of the Syndicate "to the serious and material prejudice of the Bondholders" and other unsecured creditors.

98 The SISP did not disclose any possibility that, in the current economic climate, the disposition of the assets would generate even enough to cover the debt owed to the secured creditors. The proposals made by the Ad Hoc Bondholders did not offer nearly enough to pay out that debt.

99 The views of the Syndicate and its priority rights must be given due consideration: *Windsor Machine & Stamping Ltd., Re*, 2009 CarswellOnt 4471 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para 43.

100 Section 6 of the CCAA requires that any compromise of creditors' rights must be supported by a double majority of the affected creditors. The Syndicate (as the principal secured creditor group) and the Ad Hoc Bondholders (as unsecured creditors with other unsecured creditors) would form separate voting classes for the purposes of a vote on any plan of arrangement. Each class must have a double majority of creditors, representing both two-thirds in value and a majority of number, voting in support of the plan as a condition precedent to court approval. Thus, the Syndicate holds an effective "veto" over the approval of any plan proposed by the Ad Hoc Bondholders: *SemCanada Crude Co., Re*, 2009 ABQB 490 (Alta. Q.B.) at para 22.

101 A noted by the Syndicate, the Ad Hoc Bondholders proposals, including the April 11, 2016 proposal, pose substantial risk to the Syndicate, and it is under no obligation to support them. There is no evidence that the Syndicate is acting unreasonably or unfairly in asserting that it would exercise the statutory protection afforded to a secured creditor under the CCAA; in fact, the evidence is that the Syndicate was willing to consider a less than 100% payout in negotiations with the Ad Hoc Bondholders. There was however no, agreement as to the extent of the payout and the extent to which the Syndicate would agree to remain at risk.

102 The prejudice to the bondholders is that they were unable to persuade the secured creditors to compromise or put its financial interests at risk in order to provide the bondholders with some chance that an improved economic climate may save this enterprise. As noted, the Syndicate had doubts that the Ad Hoc Bondholder's proposals would even provide sufficient operating capital to keep the Sanjel Group operating for the months it would take to implement their proposals.

103 The prejudice, if any, to the Ad Hoc Bondholders is that they were not able to pre-empt the CCAA filing with a filing under Chapter 11 of the *United States Bankruptcy Code*, with an automatic stay that, according to US bankruptcy law, has worldwide effect. A subsequent CCAA filing could be considered a breach of the stay, and provoke a jurisdictional issue that would delay proceedings and prove expensive to the Syndicate, improving the Ad Hoc Bondholders' bargaining position.

104 While there is only hearsay opinion before me with respect to the advantages of a Chapter 11 filing, the Trustee suggests that under such a filing:

- (a) the Liberty and Step APAs would have been subject to market test and to higher and better offers;
- (b) Sanjel could confirm a plan without the consent of the Syndicate; and
- (c) parties in interest and estate fiduciaries could pursue claims and causes of action against Sanjel, the Syndicate, Sanjel's equity holders and MacBain.

105 Sanjel cites academic commentary that the cram-down provisions of Chapter 11 require strict compliance so as not to override the protections and elections available to secured creditors in opposition to a plan that they do not support. Specifically, if a class of creditors is impaired, the plan must be fair and equitable with respect to that class.

106 This is an issue for the US Courts. However, even if the Chapter 15 filing was replaced by a Chapter 11 filing, the current CCAA proceedings would not be terminated and any restructuring in the United States would necessarily have to be coordinated with these CCAA proceedings. Accordingly, the voting requirements for any plan of arrangement or the requirements for approval of a sale under the CCAA could not be avoided.

D. The Ad Hoc Bondholders were prejudiced in that they were not provided with information regarding the process and the bids received.

107 The Ad Hoc Bondholders had access to the same information afforded to bidders under the SISP and more. They were able to make proposals both before and after that process. Their financial advisors were afforded an opportunity for due diligence, and exercised it.

108 What they did not receive was disclosure of the details of the bids. There was a dispute about whether or not the Ad Hoc Bondholders could be considered "bidders". While they were not part of the SISP, they certainly had interests in conflict with the SISP bidders. Had the bids been disclosed to them, there would indeed have been concern over the integrity of the process, as such disclosure would allow them to tailor their proposals in such a way as to undermine the bids.

109 The Ad Hoc Bondholders were aware that they would not be given copies of the bids by mid-February, 2016 when the Bondholders Forbearance Agreement was settled, as it included a provision clarifying that they were not entitled to any pricing or bidder information from the SISP.

110 The Bond Forbearance Agreement also recognized that, while Sanjel would negotiate in good faith with the Ad Hoc Bondholders, nothing restricted its ability to enter into or conduct negotiations with respect to potential sales or other transactions. It was only on March 14, 2016 that the Ad Hoc Bondholders requested third party bid information.

111 The Ad Hoc Bondholders were not improperly denied access to information, and would not have been entitled to know details of the third party bids.

## **V. Conclusion**

112 I am satisfied by the evidence before me that the factors set out in section 36(3) of the CCAA and Soundair favour the approval of the proposed sales. Specifically:

(a) the process, while not conducted under the CCAA, was nevertheless reasonable in the circumstances, as established by the evidence. It was brief, but not unreasonably brief, given the previous BAML process, current economic climate and the deteriorating financial position of the Sanjel Group;

(b) while the Monitor was not directly involved and did not actively participate in the SISP process prior to February 24, 2016, the Monitor has reviewed the process and is of the opinion that the SISP was a robust process run fairly and reasonably, and that sufficient efforts were made to obtain the best price possible for the Sanjel Group's assets in that process. I agree with the Monitor's assessment from my review of the evidence.

It is the Monitor's view, based on (i) the advice of CS and PJT, (ii) the nature of the Sanjel Group's operations and assets, (iii) the market conditions over the past year, (iv) the proposals received in the context of the SISP and from the Ad Hoc Bondholders, (v) the current ongoing depressed condition of the market and (vi) the underlying value of the Sanjel Group's assets, it is highly improbable that another post-filing sales process would yield offers for the Canadian and U.S. operations materially in excess of the values contained in the STEP and Liberty APAs.

I accept the Monitor's opinion in that regard, and nothing in my review of the evidence and the submissions of interested parties causes me to doubt that opinion.

(c) The Monitor has provided an opinion that the proposed sales are more beneficial to creditors than a sale or disposition under bankruptcy.

(d) Creditors, other than trade creditors, were consulted and involved in the process.

(e) While the sales provide no return to any creditor other than the Syndicate, I am satisfied that all other viable or reasonable options were considered. While there is no guarantee of further employment arising from the sale, there is the prospect that since the business will continue to operate until the sale, there will be an opportunity for employment for Sanjel employees with the new enterprises, and an opportunity for suppliers to continue to supply them.

(f) I am satisfied from the evidence that the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair.

I therefore approve the sale approval and vesting orders sought by the Sanjel Group.

## **VI. Postscript**

113 On May 9, 2016, before these reasons were released, I received a copy of a letter dated May 5, 2016 from Fried Frank on behalf of the Ad Hoc Bondholders addressed to Canadian and US counsel for the Sanjel Group, the Monitor, the Syndicate and the prospective purchasers. In extravagant language, the Ad Hoc Bondholders state that they have become aware of information that the addressees are "duty bound" to bring to the attention of the Courts as officers of the Courts. That information is that Shane Hooker has been designated to lead the Canadian cementing operations when the STEP sale closes, according to a STEP press release. Evidently, Mr. Hooker is married to the daughter of Dan MacDonald, the chairman of Sanjel's board, and is the sister of Darin MacDonald, who was Chief Executive Officer of Sanjel and head of the restructuring committee.

114 The letter asserts the following:

- a) There are "substantial and material" connections between STEP and the MacDonald family. It appears that the basis for this statement is that Mr. Hooker is married to Mr. MacDonald's daughter and an employee and "executive in residence" of ARC Financial Corp., STEP's financial sponsor in the sale;
- b) Mr. Hooker is "an intimate beneficiary of all that is and all that belongs to the MacDonald family." In subsequent correspondence with the Monitor, it appears that the Ad Hoc Bondholders have no evidence to support this allegation;
- c) Mr. Hooker is "the loyal son-in-law and brother-in-law" of the MacDonald family. Again, the Ad Hoc Bondholders admit that they have no information to support this allegation;
- d) By reason of Mr. Hooker's relationship with the "MacDonald family", the proposed STEP transaction and the entirety of the SISP process "is tainted and worse". "(O)ur clients have every reason to believe the substance, of self-dealing and deception of the highest order";
- e) "Mr. Hooker's personal and professional ties to the MacDonald family raise the spectre that all at hand is and has been a thinly-veiled scheme between the Company and the Syndicate and their advisors to deliver, on the one hand, an adequate recovery to the Syndicate and, on the other hand, Sanjel's Canadian assets back into the hands of the MacDonald family thereby working a substantial forfeiture of value to the Bondholders and all other unsecured creditors of the Company".

115 The letter repeats previous allegations that the SISP was "driven by self-interest and self-dealing", "riddled with conflicts of interest," "inappropriate and flawed in every respect", "chilled, inadequate" and "not conducted in good faith and efforts were undertaken to mislead and misdirect the company's stakeholders". It alleges:

- a) "That none of this has been brought to the attention of the Courts and all parties in interest is reprehensible at best and has all indicia of fraudulent intent and purpose."
- b) "Be advised that with respect to each and all of you and each and all of your respective clients as well as with respect to STEP, Liberty and any and all funding sources and sponsors for each, our clients hereby reserve all of their rights and remedies with respect to any and all claims and causes of action of every kind and nature whatsoever whether such claims and causes of action are grounded in contract, tort, equity, statute and otherwise including, but not limited to, any and all breach of fiduciary duties, civil conspiracy, tortious interference and lender liability."
- c) "... the efforts to continue with malfeasance wrapped in the cloak of SISP and CCAA by each and all of you and your clients must stop now. As above, the Courts and others should

and must be informed, the failure to do so is and will be a misrepresentation and fraud on the Courts."

116 The letter comments that "(w)hen Justice Romaine is in receipt of the information, she will have reason and basis and we believe that Her Ladyship will be constrained, to vacate the order."

117 The Monitor took immediate action to investigate these serious allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, conspiracy and collusion, requesting urgent responses from counsel for Sanjel, the Syndicate, Mr. MacDonald, PJT and CS. Relevant witnesses were contacted and follow-up questions directed. The Monitor was also in contact with Fried Frank to determine the source of the allegations, and what investigation had been undertaken by Fried Frank or the Ad Hoc Bondholders to verify or support their allegations.

118 On Saturday, May 7, 2016, Fried Frank made the further allegation that potential bidders in the SISP were provided with forecasts that were far worse than actual results in order to facilitate the alleged fraud and conspiracy. The Monitor added this allegation to its investigation.

119 The Monitor was satisfied by its rapid but thorough investigations that:

a) Mr. Hooker and Mr. MacDonald have been estranged for the last two and a half-years, and have had no communication on any personal or business matters;

b) Mr. Hooker left Sanjel in March, 2014 and began working for ARC Financial in the fall of 2015 to assist ARC in an unrelated transaction. ARC is a large private investor focussed on energy, which provides financing through a number of funds financed by from third party investors. ARC is the primary financial stakeholder in the STEP acquisition. No one from the MacDonald family has an ownership position in ARC, nor are any of them investors in any ARC funds. Mr. Hooker has no involvement in ARC's fundraising efforts or fund deployment and he has no ownership interest in ARC;

c) Mr. MacDonald had no involvement in the negotiation of the STEP APA, other than attendance as a Sanjel representative at three meetings between November 2015 and January 2016, before the SISP was commenced;

d) Mr. Crilly as CFO of Sanjel (and later CRO) led the SISP process for Sanjel, while Mr. MacDonald concentrated on attempting to find a buyer for the whole company;

e) The senior Mr. MacDonald has not had an active role in Sanjel's management for years, was not involved in the SISP and does not own shares in STEP or ARC;

f) Mr. Hooker's involvement with the SISP and negotiations with STEP was limited to conducting on-site diligence on behalf of STEP;

g) Sanjel has no direct or indirect ownership interest or other financial interest in ARC, STEP, the newly formed company that will be purchasing the cementing assets or any other entity owned or controlled by ARC;

h) No consideration was provided to Mr. Hooker or either Mr. MacDonald in connection with the STEP APA;

i) In the opinion of many of those who provided responses, the relationship between Mr. Hooker and Mr. MacDonald had an adverse effect, if anything, on the merits of the STEP bid. The advisors and the Syndicate repeat their previous position that the STEP offer, in combination with the Liberty offer, was materially superior to any en bloc bid or combination of bids, and was supported on the basis of its economic merits.

120 This information was largely confirmed by a number of sources. The Monitor did not obtain sworn statements, nor conduct any kind of discovery process. It did not present the information in its Sixth Report to the Court as evidence, but as a report on its investigation to determine whether there was any probative value to the Ad Hoc Bondholders' allegations.

121 When the Monitor was unable to find any real evidence to support the allegations, other than the bare fact that Mr. Hooker is an employee of ARC and is married to Mr. MacDonald's sister, it asked the Ad Hoc Bondholders if they had any supporting evidence. The substance of counsel to the Ad Hoc Bondholders' response is that there is an appearance of inappropriate dealing (arising from the relationship), and that it was up to the Monitor to investigate this.

122 The Ad Hoc Bondholders instead provided the Monitor with a list of additional questions that they wish the Monitor to investigate through sworn statements subject to cross-examination. These questions appear designed to elicit some evidence that may support the Ad Hoc Bondholder's speculations.

123 The Monitor cannot be faulted for failing to obtain sworn evidence from relevant parties. The allegations were made after approval of the APAs in the context of tight timelines to the closing of the transactions and the risk of losing the recommended sales transactions. If the Monitor had discovered anything that would give any legitimacy to the allegations, or raise any doubt about the integrity of the SISF, it may have been appropriate to direct further investigation, including sworn evidence. However, mere speculation resting on a family relationship is insufficient to require the Monitor to undertake further expensive investigation or to conduct a fishing expedition. This is particularly the case as there is no real evidence that Mr. Hooker's prospective employment will benefit either Mr. MacDonald or Sanjel in any way, or Mr. Hooker himself, other than the offer of employment.

124 This is not a case where evidence that should be presented in affidavit form has been incorporated improperly into a Monitor's report. The Monitor decided, quite properly, that at this

stage of the process, a quick investigation to determine whether there was any real basis for the Ad Hoc Bondholders complaint was warranted. This investigation has satisfied the Monitor that, other than the fact that Mr. Hooker is indeed Mr. MacDonald's brother-in-law, there is no evidence of collusion between them, Mr. MacDonald was not involved in the STEP APA, Mr. Hooker was in no position to influence that STEP APA and no evidence that Mr. Hooker or the "MacDonald family" will profit in any way from the STEP APA, other than Mr. Hooker's offer of employment.

125 Given the lack of any indicia that there is any basis for the Ad Hoc Bondholders' speculations of fraud or conspiracy, there is no reason for this Court to require the Monitor to take further steps to investigate the allegations, which appear to be thinly veiled and reckless attempts to delay and obfuscate the process.

126 With respect to the allegations that potential bidders were provided with forecasts far worse than actual results in order to facilitate the alleged fraud and conspiracy, the Monitor has reviewed the forecasts and the variances from the forecasts provided during the SISP to actuals. The Monitor reports that these relate to collection of accounts receivable and payment of accounts payable. The actual collection of receivables was better than forecasted for the months of March and April. However, the Monitor understands that is a temporary timing variance based on earlier collection of receivables and does not represent a permanent improvement in Sanjel's actual cash position.

127 Thus, the Monitor is of the view that the allegations by the Ad Hoc Bondholders with respect to forecasts being far worse than actual results lack merit.

128 I accept the Monitor's advice on this issue.

129 With respect to disclosure, the Monitor was not aware of the connection between STEP and the company alleged in the Fried Frank letter. The Monitor has reported that it did not become aware of anything that would support or substantiate the allegations since its involvement in the SISP process after February 24, 2016.

130 The Ad Hoc Bondholders' allegations are in essence that the SISP was structured to achieve a preferential outcome for the MacDonald family through the familial connections between Mr. Hooker and the MacDonald family. If a sale of assets of a debtor company is to be made to a person related to the debtor, the Court may only approve the sale if it is satisfied that:

- (a) good faith efforts were made to sell or otherwise dispose of the assets to persons who are not related to the debtor company; and
- (b) the consideration to be received is superior to the consideration that would be received under any other offer made in accordance with the process leading to the proposed sale: CCAA section 36(4).

131 A related party pursuant to section 36(5) is defined to include certain categories of persons, and neither Mr. Hooker, his wife or either Mr. MacDonald fall into these categories.

132 There is no evidence or indication that any member of the "MacDonald family" will benefit from the STEP APA, other than Mr. Hooker's offer of employment. I am therefore satisfied that section 36(3) is not applicable to the STEP or the Liberty transactions and that no disclosure of any relationship was necessary before the APAs were approved.

133 Even if disclosure had been made, given the evidence before me with respect to the SISP process and the offers received, I would have been satisfied the requirements of section 36(3) were met.

134 In conclusion, the allegations of the Ad Hoc Bondholders do not change my decision with respect to approval of the APAs. I see no reason why the Monitor should continue its investigation.

135 The issue of who should bear the cost of the investigation into these allegations is reserved.  
*Debtors' application granted; trustee's application dismissed.*

# **TAB 5**

2015 ONSC 5557  
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Nelson Education Ltd., Re

2015 CarswellOnt 13576, 2015 ONSC 5557, 258 A.C.W.S. (3d) 465, 29 C.B.R. (6th) 140

**In the Matter of the Companies' Lenders  
Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended**

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Nelson  
Education Ltd. and Nelson Education Holdings Ltd., Applicants

Newbould J.

Heard: August 13, 27, 2015  
Judgment: September 8, 2015  
Docket: CV15-10961-00CL

Counsel: Benjamin Zarnett, Jessica Kimmel, Caroline Descours for Applicants  
Robert W. Staley, Kevin J. Zych, Sean Zweig for First Lien Agent and the First Lien Steering  
Committee  
John L. Finnigan, D.J. Miller, Kyla E.M. Mahar for Royal Bank of Canada  
Orestes Pasparskis for Monitor

**Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency  
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act  
XIX.5 Miscellaneous

**Headnote**

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Miscellaneous  
Education publishing company obtained protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act  
("CCAA") — Bank was one of 22 first lien lenders, second lien lender and agent for second lien  
lenders — Credit bid for sale of substantially all assets to newly incorporated entity owned by  
first ranked secured lenders, if approved, would result in second lien lenders receiving nothing  
on outstanding loans — Company brought motion for approval of sale; bank brought motion for  
order that amounts owing to it and portion of consent fee be paid by company prior to sale —  
Company's motion granted; bank's motion dismissed — Normally, sale process is undertaken after  
court approves proposed sale methodology with monitor participating in process and reporting to  
court — While none of this occurred, sale or investment sales process ("SISP") and credit bid sale  
transaction met requirements of CCAA — SISP was typical and consistent with processes that had

been approved by court in many CCAA proceedings — Results of SISP showed that no interested parties could offer price sufficient to repay amounts owing to first lien lenders — Intercreditor agreement governed, and led to conclusion that order in favour of bank as second lien agent was not appropriate as payment would reduce collateral subject to rights of first lien lenders in that collateral.

## **Table of Authorities**

### **Cases considered by *Newbould J.*:**

*ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.* (2008), 2008 ONCA 587, 2008 CarswellOnt 4811, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 123, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 296 D.L.R. (4th) 135, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 240 O.A.C. 245, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 92 O.R. (3d) 513 (Ont. C.A.) — followed *Brainhunter Inc., Re* (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 7627 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

*Cruden v. Bank of New York* (1992), 957 F.2d 961 (U.S. C.A. 2nd Cir.) — referred to *Nortel Networks Corp., Re* (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4467, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

*Nortel Networks Corp., Re* (2014), 2014 ONSC 6973, 2014 CarswellOnt 17291, 20 C.B.R. (6th) 171, 17 C.C.P.B. (2nd) 10 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

*Rainbow v. Swisher* (1988), 72 N.Y.2d 106, 531 N.Y.S. 775, 527 N.E.2d 258 (U.S. N.Y. Ct. App.) — referred to

*Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) — followed

### **Statutes considered:**

*Bankruptcy Code*, 11 U.S.C.

Generally — referred to

*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 11 — considered

s. 36(3) — considered

### ***Newbould J.*:**

1 The applicants Nelson Education Ltd. ("Nelson") and Nelson Education Holdings Ltd. sought and obtained protection under the CCAA on May 12, 2015. They now apply for approval of the sale of substantially all of the assets and business of Nelson to a newly incorporated entity to be owned indirectly by Nelson's first ranked secured lenders (the "first lien lenders") pursuant to a credit bid made by the first lien agent. Nelson also seeks ancillary orders relating to the sale. The

effect of the credit bid, if approved, is that the second lien lenders will receive nothing for their outstanding loans.

2 RBC is one of 22 first lien lenders, a second lien lender and agent for the second lien lenders. At the time of its motion to replace the Monitor, RBC did not accept that the proposed sale should be approved. RBC now takes no position on the sale approval motion other than to oppose certain ancillary relief sought by the applicants. RBC also has moved for an order that certain amounts said to be owing to it and their portion of a consent fee should be paid by Nelson prior to the completion of the sale. The applicants and the first lien lenders oppose the relief sought by RBC.

### **Nelson business**

3 Nelson is a Canadian education publishing company, providing learning solutions to universities, colleges, students, teachers, professors, libraries, government agencies, schools, professionals and corporations across the country.

4 The business and assets of Nelson were acquired by an OMERS entity and certain other funds from the Thomson Corporation in 2007 together with U.S. assets of Thomson for U.S. \$7.75 billion, of which US\$550 million was attributed to the Canadian business. The purchase was financed with first lien debt of approximately US\$311.5 million and second lien debt of approximately US\$171.3 million.

5 The maturity date under the first lien credit agreement was July 3, 2014 and the maturity date under the second lien credit agreement was July 3, 2015. Nelson has not paid the principal balances owing under either loan. It paid interest on the first lien credit up to the filing of this CCAA application. It has paid no interest on the second lien credit since April 2014. As of the filing date, Nelson was indebted in the aggregate principal amounts of approximately US\$269 million, plus accrued interest, costs and fees, under the first lien credit agreement and approximately US \$153 million, plus accrued interest, costs and fees, under the second lien credit agreement.

6 Because these loans are denominated in U.S. dollars, the recent decline in the Canadian dollar against the United States dollar has significantly increased the Canadian dollar balance of the loans. Nelson generates substantially all of its revenue in Canadian dollars and is not hedged against currency fluctuations. Based on an exchange rate of CAD/USD of 1.313, as of August 10, 2015, the Canadian dollar principal balances of the first and second lien loans are \$352,873,910 and \$201,176,237.

7 According to Mr. Greg Nordal, the CEO of Nelson, the business of Nelson has been affected by a general decline in the education markets over the past few years. Notwithstanding the industry decline over the past few years, Nelson has maintained strong EBITDA over each of the last several years.

## **Discussions leading to the sale to the first lien lenders**

8 In March 2013, Nelson engaged Alvarez & Marsal Canada Securities ULC ("A&M"), the Canadian corporate finance arm of Alvarez & Marsal to assist it in reviewing and considering potential strategic alternatives. RBC, the second lien agent also engaged a financial advisor in March 2013 and the first lien steering committee engaged a financial advisor in June 2013. RBC held approximately 85% of the second lien debt.

9 Commencing in April 2013, Nelson and its advisors entered into discussions with stakeholders including the RBC as second lien agent, the first lien steering committee and their advisors. Nelson sought to achieve as its primary objective a consensual transaction that would be supported by all of the first lien lenders and second lien lenders. These discussions took place until September 2014. No agreement with the first lien lenders and second lien lenders was reached.

10 In April 2014, Nelson and the second lien lenders agreed to two extensions of the cure period under the second lien credit agreement in respect of the second lien interest payment due on March 31, 2014, to May 30, 2014. In connection with these extensions, Nelson made a partial payment of US\$350,000 in respect of the March interest payment and paid certain professional fees of the second lien lenders. Nelson requested a further extension of the second lien cure period beyond May 30, 2014, but the second lien lenders did not agree. Thereafter, Nelson defaulted under the second lien credit agreement and failed to make further interest payments to the second lien lenders.

11 The first lien credit agreement matured on July 3, 2014. On July 7, 2014, Nelson proposed an amendment and extension of that agreement and solicited consent from its first lien lenders. RBC, as one of the first lien lenders was prepared to consent to the Nelson proposal, being a consent and support agreement, but no agreement was reached with the other first lien lenders and it did not proceed.

12 In September, 2014, Nelson proposed in a term sheet to the first lien lenders a transaction framework for a sale or restructuring of the business on the terms set out in a term sheet dated September 10, 2014 and sought their support. In connection with the first lien term sheet, Nelson entered into a first lien support agreement with first lien lenders representing approximately 88% of the principal amounts outstanding under the first lien credit agreement. The consenting first lien lenders comprised 21 of the 22 first lien lenders, the only first lien lender not consenting being RBC. Consent fees of approximately US\$12 million have been paid to the consenting first lien lenders.

13 The first lien term sheet provided that Nelson would conduct a comprehensive and open sale or investment sales process (SISP) to attempt to identify one or more potential purchasers of, or investors in, the Nelson business on terms that would provide for net sale or investment

proceeds sufficient to pay in full all obligations under the first lien credit agreement or that was otherwise acceptable to first lien lenders holding at least 66 2/3% of the outstanding obligations under the first lien credit agreement. If such a superior offer was not identified pursuant to the SISP, the first lien lenders would become the purchaser and purchase substantially all of the assets of Nelson in exchange for the conversion by all of the first lien lenders of all of the debt owing to them under the first lien credit agreement into a new first lien term facility and for common shares of the purchaser.

14 In September 2014, the company engaged A&M to assist with the SISP. By that time, A&M had been advising the Company for over 17 months and had gained an understanding of the Nelson Business and the educational publishing industry. The SISP was structured as a two-phase process.

15 Phase 1 involved (i) contacting 168 potential purchasers, including both financial and strategic parties located in Canada, the United States and Europe, and 11 potential lenders to ascertain their potential interest in a transaction, (ii) initial due diligence and (iii) receipt by Nelson of non-binding letters of interest ("LOIs"). The SISP provided that interested parties could propose a purchase of the whole or parts of the business or an investment in Nelson.

16 Seven potential purchasers submitted LOIs under phase 1, six of which were offers to purchase substantially all of the Nelson business and one of which was an offer to acquire only the K-12 business. Nelson reviewed the LOIs with the assistance of its advisors, and following consultation with the first lien steering committee and its advisors, invited five of the parties that submitted LOIs to phase 2 of the SISP. Phase 2 of the SISP involved additional due diligence, data room access and management presentations aimed at completion of binding documentation for a superior offer.

17 Three participants submitted non-binding offers by the deadline of December 19, 2014, two of which were for the purchase of substantially all of the Nelson business and one of which was for the acquisition of the K-12 business. All three offers remained subject to further due diligence and reflected values that were significantly below the value of the obligations under the first lien credit agreement.

18 On December 19, 2014, one of the participants advised A&M that it required additional time to complete and submit its offer, which additional time was granted. An offer was subsequently submitted but not ultimately advanced by the bidder.

19 Nelson, with the assistance of its advisors, maintained communications throughout its restructuring efforts with Cengage Learnings, the company that has the U.S. business that was sold by Thomson and which is a key business partner of Nelson. Cengage submitted an expression of interest for the higher education business that, even in combination with the offer received for the K-12 business, was substantially lower than the amount of the first lien debt. In February 2015, Cengage and Nelson terminated discussions about a potential sale transaction.

20 Ultimately, phase 2 of the SISP did not result in a transaction that would generate proceeds sufficient to repay the obligations under the first lien credit agreement in full or would otherwise be supported by the first lien lenders. Accordingly, with the assistance of A&M and its legal advisors, and in consultation with the first lien steering committee, Nelson determined that it should proceed with the sale transaction pursuant to the first lien support agreement.

### **Sale transaction**

21 The sale transaction is an asset purchase. It will enable the Nelson business to continue as a going concern. It includes:

- (a) the transfer of substantially all of Nelson's assets to a newly incorporated entity to be owned indirectly by the first lien lenders;
- (b) the assumption by the purchaser of substantially all of Nelson's trade payables, contractual obligations and employment obligations incurred in the ordinary course and as reflected in its balance sheet, excluding some obligations including the obligations under the second lien credit agreement and an intercompany promissory note of approximately \$102.3 million owing by Nelson to Nelson Education Holdings Ltd.;
- (c) an offer of employment by the purchaser to all of Nelson's employees; and
- (d) a release by the first lien lenders of all of the indebtedness owing under the first lien credit agreement in exchange for: (i) 100% of the common shares of a newly incorporated entity that will own 100% of the common shares of the purchaser, and (ii) the obligations under a new US\$200 million first lien term facility to be entered into by the Purchaser.

22 The relief sought by the applicants apart from the approval of the sale transaction involves ancillary relief, including authorizing the distribution from Nelson's cash on hand to the first lien lenders of outstanding fees and interest, effecting mutual releases of parties associated with the sale transaction, and deeming a shareholders' rights agreement to bind all shareholders of the purchaser. This ancillary relief is opposed by RBC.

### **Analysis**

#### ***(i) Sale approval***

23 RBC says it takes no position on the sale, although it opposes some of the terms and seeks an order paying the second lien lenders their pre-filing interest and expense claims. Whether RBC is entitled to raise the issues that it has requires a consideration of the intercreditor agreement of July 5, 2007 made between the agents for the first lien lenders and the second lien lenders.

24 Section 6.1(a) of the intercreditor agreement provides that the second lien lenders shall not object to or oppose a sale and of the collateral and shall be deemed to have consented to it if the first lien claimholders have consented to it. It provides:

The Second Lien Collateral Agent on behalf of the Second Lien Claimholders agrees that it will raise no objection or oppose a sale or other disposition of any Collateral free and clear of its Liens and other claims under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code (or any similar provision of any other Bankruptcy Law or any order of a court of competent jurisdiction) if the First Lien Claimholders have consented to such sale or disposition of such assets and the Second Lien Collateral Agent and each other Second Lien Claimholder will be deemed to have consented under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code (or any similar provision of any other Bankruptcy Law or any order of a court of competent jurisdiction) to any sale supported by the First Lien Claimholders and to have released their Liens in such assets.

(underlining added)

25 Section 6.11 of the intercreditor agreement contained a similar provision. RBC raises the point that for these two sections to be applicable, the first lien claimholders must have consented to the sale, and that the definition of first lien claimholders means that all of the first lien lenders must have consented to the sale. In this case, only 88% of the first lien lenders consented to the sale, the lone holdout being RBC. The definition in the intercreditor agreement of first lien claimholder is as follows:

**"First Lien Claimholders"** means, at any relevant time, the holders of First Lien Obligations at that time, including the First Lien Collateral Agent, the First Lien Lenders, any other "Secured Party" (as defined in the First Lien Credit Agreement) and the agents under the First Lien Loan Documents.

26 The intercreditor agreement is governed by the New York law and is to be construed and enforced in accordance with that law. The first lien agent filed an opinion of Allan L. Gropper, a former bankruptcy judge in the Southern District of New York and undoubtedly highly qualified to express proper expert opinions regarding the matters in issue. Mr. Gropper did not, however, discuss the principles of interpretation of a commercial contract under New York law, and in the absence of such evidence, I am to take the law of New York so far as contract interpretation is concerned as the same as our law. In any event, New York law regarding the interpretation of a contract would appear to be the same as our law. See *Cruden v. Bank of New York*, 957 F.2d 961 (U.S. C.A. 2nd Cir. 1992) and *Rainbow v. Swisher*, 72 N.Y.2d 106, 531 N.Y.S. 775, 527 N.E.2d 258 (U.S. N.Y. Ct. App. 1988). Mr. Gropper did opine that the sections in question are valid and enforceable in accordance with their terms.<sup>1</sup>

27 The intercreditor agreement, like a lot of complex commercial contracts, appears to have a hodgepodge of terms piled on, or added to, one another, with many definitions and exceptions to exceptions. That is what too often appears to happen when too many lawyers are involved in stirring the broth. It is clear that there are many definitions, including a reference to First Lien Lenders, which is defined to be the Lenders as defined in the First Lien Loan Documents, which is itself a defined term, meaning the First Lien Credit Agreement and the Loan Documents. The provisions of the first lien credit agreement make clear that the Lenders include all those who have lent under that agreement, including obviously RBC.

28 Under section 8.02(d) of the first lien credit agreement, more than 50% of the first lien lenders (the "Required Lenders") may direct the first lien agent to exercise on behalf of the first lien lenders all rights and remedies available to. In this case 88% of the first lien lenders, being all except RBC, directed the first lien agent to credit bid all of the first lien debt. This credit bid was thus made on behalf of all of the first lien lenders, including RBC.

29 While the definition of First Lien Claimholders is expansive and refers to both the First Lien Collateral Agent (the first lien agent) and the First Lien Lenders, suggesting a distinction between the two, once the Required Lenders have caused a credit bid to be made by the First Lien Collateral Agent, RBC in my view is taken to have supported the sale that is contemplated by the credit bid.

30 It follows that RBC is deemed under section 6.11 of the intercreditor agreement to have consented to the sale supported by the first lien claimholders. It is nevertheless required that I determine whether the sale and its terms should be approved. It is also important to note that no sale agreement has been signed and it awaits an order approving the form of Asset Purchase Agreement submitted by Nelson in its motion materials.

31 This is an unusual CCAA case. It involves the acquisition of the Nelson business by its senior secured creditors under a credit bid made after a SISP conducted before any CCAA process and without any prior court approval of the SISP terms. The result of the credit bid in this case will be the continuation of the Nelson business in the hands of the first lien lenders, a business that is generating a substantial EBITDA each year and which has been paying its unsecured creditors in the normal course, but with the extinguishment of the US \$153 million plus interest owed to the second lien lenders.

32 Liquidating CCAA proceedings without a plan of arrangement are now a part of the insolvency landscape in Canada, but it is usual that the sale process be undertaken after a court has blessed the proposed sale methodology with a monitor fully participating in the sale process and reporting to the court with its views on the process that was carried out<sup>2</sup>. None of this has occurred in this case. One issue therefore is whether the SISP carried out before credit bid sale

that has occurred involving an out of court process can be said to meet the *Soundair*<sup>3</sup> principles and that the credit bid sale meets the requirements of section 36(3) of the CCAA.

33 I have concluded that the SISP and the credit bid sale transaction in this case does meet those requirements, for the reasons that follow.

34 Alvarez & Marsal Canada Inc. was named the Monitor in the Initial Order over the objections of RBC, but shortly afterwards on the come-back motion by RBC, was replaced as Monitor by FTI Consulting Inc. The reasons for this change are contained in my endorsement of June 2, 2015. There was no suggestion of a lack of integrity or competence on the part of A&M or Alvarez & Marsal Canada Inc. In brief, the reason was that A&M had been retained by Nelson in 2013 as a financial advisor in connection with its debt situation, and in September 2014 had been retained to undertake the SISP process that has led to the sale transaction to the first lien lenders. I did not consider it right to put Alvarez & Marsal Canada Inc. in the position of providing independent advice to the Court on the SISP process that its affiliate had conducted, and that it would be fairer to all concerned that a different Monitor be appointed in light of the fact that the validity of the SISP process was going to be front and centre in the application of Nelson to have the sale agreement to the first lien lenders approved. Accordingly FTI was appointed to be the Monitor.

35 FTI did a thorough review of all relevant facts, including interviewing a large number of people involved. In its report to the Court the Monitor expressed the following views:

- (a) The design of the SISP was typical of such marketing processes and was consistent with processes that have been approved by the courts in many CCAA proceedings;
- (b) The SISP allowed interested parties adequate opportunity to conduct due diligence, both A&M and management appear to have been responsive to all requests from potentially interested parties and the timelines provided for in the SISP were reasonable in the circumstances;
- (c) The activities undertaken by A&M were consistent with the activities that any investment banker or sale advisor engaged to assist in the sale of a business would be expected to undertake;
- (d) The selection of A&M as investment banker would not have had a detrimental effect on the SISP or the value of offers;
- (e) Both key senior management and A&M were incentivised to achieve the best value available and there was no impediment to doing so;
- (f) The SISP was undertaken in a thorough and professional manner;

(g) The results of the SISP clearly demonstrate that none of the interested parties would, or would be likely to, offer a price for the Nelson business that would be sufficient to repay the amounts owing to the first lien lenders under the first lien credit agreement

(h) The SISP was a thorough market test and can be relied on to establish that there is no value beyond the first lien debt.

36 The Monitor expressed the further view that:

(a) There is no realistic prospect that Nelson could obtain a new source of financing sufficient to repay the first lien debt;

(b) An alternative debt restructuring that might create value for the second lien lenders is not a viable alternative at this time;

(c) There is no reasonable prospect of a new sale process generating a transaction at a value in excess of the first lien debt;

(d) It does not appear that there are significant operational improvements reasonably available that would materially improve profitability in the short-term such that the value of the Nelson business would increase to the extent necessary to repay the first lien debt and, accordingly, there is no apparent benefit from delaying the sale of the business.

37 *Soundair* established factors to be considered in an application to approve a sale in a receivership. These factors have widely been considered in such applications in a CCAA proceeding. They are:

(a) whether sufficient effort has been made to obtain the best price and that the receiver or debtor (as applicable) has not acted improvidently;

(b) whether the interests of all parties have been considered;

(c) the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers have been obtained; and

(d) whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

38 These factors are now largely mirrored in section 36(3) of the CCAA that requires a court to consider a number of factors, among other things, in deciding to authorize a sale of a debtor's assets. It is necessary to deal briefly with them.

(a) Whether the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition was reasonable in the circumstances. In this case, despite the fact that there was no prior court approval to the SISP, I accept the Monitor's view that the process was reasonable.

(b) Whether the monitor approved the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition. In this case there was no monitor at the time of the SISP. This factor is thus not strictly applicable as it assumes a sale process undertaken in a CCAA proceeding. However, the report of FTI blessing the SISP that took place is an important factor to consider.

(c) Whether the monitor filed with the court a report stating that in its opinion the sale or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy. The Monitor did not make such a statement in its report. However, there is no reason to think that a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy would be more beneficial to the creditors. The creditors negatively affected could not expect to fare better in a bankruptcy.

(d) The extent to which the creditors were consulted. The first lien steering committee was obviously consulted. Before the SISP, RBC, the second lien lenders' agent, was consulted and actively participated in the reconstruction discussions. I take it from the evidence that RBC did not actively participate in the SISP, a decision of its choosing, but was provided some updates.

(e) The effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties. The positive effect is that all ordinary course creditors, employees, suppliers and customers will be protected. The effect on the second lien lenders is to wipe out their security and any chance of their loans being repaid. However, apart from their being deemed to have consented to the sale, it is clear that the second lien lenders have no economic interest in the Nelson assets except as might be the case some years away if Nelson were able to improve its profitability to the point that the second lien lenders could be paid something towards the debt owed to them. RBC puts this time line as perhaps five years and it is clearly conjecture. The first lien lenders however are not obliged to wait in the hopes of some future result. As the senior secured creditor, they have priority over the interests of the second lien lenders.

There are some excluded liabilities and a small amount owing to former terminated employees that will not be paid. As to these the Monitor points out that there is no reasonable prospect of any alternative solution that would provide a recovery for those creditors, all of whom rank subordinate to the first lien lenders.

(f) Whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value. The Monitor is of the view that the results of the SISP indicate that the consideration is fair and reasonable in the circumstances and that the SISP can, and should, be relied on for the purposes of such a determination. There is no evidence to the contrary and I accept the view of the Monitor.

39 In the circumstances, taking into account the *Soundair* factors and the matters to be considered in section 36(3) of the CCAA, I am satisfied that the sale transaction should be approved. Whether the ancillary relief should be granted is a separate issue, to which I now turn.

*(ii) Ancillary claimed relief*

*(a) Vesting order*

40 The applicants seek a vesting order vesting all of Nelson's right, title and interest in and to the purchased assets in the purchaser, free and clear of all interests, liens, charges and encumbrances, other than the permitted encumbrances and assumed liabilities contemplated in the Asset Purchase Agreement. It is normal relief given in an asset sale under the CCAA and it is appropriate in this case.

*(b) Payment of amounts to first lien lenders*

41 As a condition to the completion of the transaction, Nelson is to pay all accrued and unpaid interest owing to the first lien lenders and all unpaid professional fees of the first lien agent and the first lien lenders outstanding under the first lien credit agreement. RBC does not oppose this relief.

42 If the cash is not paid out before the closing, it will be an asset of the purchaser as all cash on hand is being acquired by the purchaser. Thus the first lien lenders will have the cash. However, because the applicant is requesting a court ordered release by the first lien lenders of all obligations under the first lien credit agreement, the unpaid professional fees of the first lien agent and the first lien lenders that are outstanding under the first lien credit agreement would no longer be payable after the closing of the transaction. Presumably this is the reason for the payment of these prior to the closing.

43 These amounts are owed under the provisions of the first lien credit agreement and have priority over the interests of the second lien lenders under the intercreditor agreement. However, on June 2, 2015 it was ordered that pending further order, Nelson was prevented from paying any interest or other expenses to the first lien lenders unless the same payments owing to the second lien lenders. Nelson then chose not to make any payments to the first lien lenders. It is in effect now asking for an order nunc pro tunc permitting the payments to be made. I have some reluctance to make such an order, but in light of no opposition to it and that fact that it is clear from the report of the Monitor that there is no value in the collateral for the second lien lenders, the payment is approved.

*(c) Releases*

44 The applicants request an order that would include a broad release of the parties to the Asset Purchase Agreement as well as well as other persons including the first lien lenders.

45 The Asset Purchase Agreement has not been executed. In accordance with the draft approval and vesting order sought by the applicants, it is to be entered into upon the entry of the approval and vesting order. The release contained in the draft Asset Purchase Agreement in section 5.12 provides that the parties release each other from claims in connection with Nelson, the Nelson business, the Asset Purchase Agreement, the transaction, these proceedings, the first lien support agreement, the supplemental support agreement, the payment and settlement agreement, the first lien credit agreement and the other loan documents or the transactions contemplated by them. Released parties are not released from their other obligations or from claims of fraud. The release also does not deal with the second lien credit agreement or the second lien lenders.

46 The first lien term sheet made a part of the support agreement contained terms and conditions, but it stated that they would not be effective until definitive agreements were made by the applicable parties and until they became effective. One of the terms was that there would be a release "usual and customary for transactions of this nature", including a release by the first lien lenders in connection with "all matters related to the Existing First Lien Credit Agreement, the other Loan Documents and the transactions contemplated herein". RBC was not a party to the support agreement or the first lien term sheet.

47 The release in the Asset Purchase Agreement at section 5.12 provides that "each of the Parties on behalf of itself and its Affiliates does hereby forever release...". "Affiliates" is defined to include "any other Person that directly or indirectly...controls...such Person". The party that is the purchaser is a New Brunswick numbered company that will be owned indirectly by the first lien lenders. What instructions will or have been given by the first lien lenders to the numbered company to sign the Asset Purchase Agreement are not in the record, but I will assume that the First Lien Agent has or will authorize it and that RBC as a first lien lenders has not and will not authorize it.

48 Releases are a feature of approved plans of compromise and arrangement under the CCAA. The conditions for such a release have been laid down in *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.*, 2008 ONCA 587 (Ont. C.A.) at paras. 43 and 70. Third party releases are authorized under the CCAA if there is a reasonable connection between the third party claim being compromised in the plan and the restructuring achieved by the plan. In *Metcalfe*, Blair J.A. found compelling that the claims to be released were rationally related to the purpose of the plan and necessary for it and that the parties who were to have claims against them released were contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the plan<sup>4</sup>.

49 While there is no CCAA plan in this case, I see no reason not to consider the principles established in *Metcalfe* when considering a sale such as this under the CCAA, with any necessary modifications due to the fact that it is not a sale pursuant to a plan. The application of those

principles dictates in my view that the requested release by the first lien lenders should not be ordered.

50 The beneficiaries of the release by the first lien lenders are providing nothing to the first lien lenders in return for the release. The substance of the support agreement was that Nelson agreed to try to fetch as much as it could through a SISP but that if it could not get enough to satisfy the first lien lenders, it agreed to a credit bid by the first lien lenders. Neither Nelson nor the first lien agent or supplemental first lien agent or any other party gave up anything in return for a release from the first lien lenders. So far as RBC releasing a claim that it may have as a first lien lender against the other first lien lenders, nothing has been provided to RBC by the other first lien lenders in return for such a release. RBC as a first lien lender would be required to give up any claim it might have against the other parties to the release for any matters arising prior to or after the support agreement while receiving nothing in return for its release.

In the circumstances, I decline to approve the release by the first lien lenders requested by the applicants to be included in the approval and vesting order.

*(d) Stockholders and Registration Rights Agreement*

51 The applicants seek to have a Stockholders and Registration Rights Agreement declared effective and binding on all persons entitled to receive common shares of Purchaser Holdco in connection with the transaction as though such persons were signatories to the Stockholders and Registration Rights Agreement.

52 The Stockholders and Registration Rights Agreement is a contract among the purchaser's parent company, Purchaser Holdco, and the holders of Purchaser Holdco's common shares. After implementation of the transaction, the first lien lenders will be the holders of 100% of the shares of Purchaser Holdco. The Stockholders and Registration Rights Agreement was negotiated and agreed to by Purchaser Holdco and the First Lien Steering Committee (all first lien lenders except RBC). The First Lien Steering Committee would like RBC to be bound by the agreement. The evidence of this is in the affidavit of Mr. Nordal, the President and CEO of Nelson, who says that based on discussions with Mr. Chadwick, the First Lien Steering Committee requires that all of the first lien lenders to be bound to the terms of the Stockholders and Registration Rights Agreement. This is of course double hearsay as Mr. Chadwick acts for Nelson and not the First Lien Steering Committee.

The effect of what is being requested is that RBC as a shareholder of Purchaser Holdco would be bound to some shareholder agreement amongst the shareholders of Purchaser Holdco. While the

remaining 88% of the shareholders of Purchaser Holdco might want to bind RBC, I see nothing in the record that would justify such a confiscation of such shareholder rights. I agree with RBC that extending the Court's jurisdiction in these CCAA proceedings and exercising it to assist the purchaser's parent company with its corporate governance is not appropriate. The purchaser and its parent company either have the contractual right to bind all first lien lenders to terms as future shareholders, or they do not.

## **RBC Motion**

### ***(a) Second lenders' pre-filing interest and second lien agent's fees***

53 RBC seeks an order that directing Nelson to pay to RBC in its capacity as the second lien agent the second lien interest outstanding at the filing date of CDN\$1,316,181.73 and the second lien fees incurred prior to the filing date of US\$15,365,998.83.

54 Mr. Zarnett in argument conceded that these amounts are owed under the second lien credit agreement. There are further issues, however, being (i) whether they continue to be owed due to the intercreditor agreement (ii) whether RBC is entitled under the intercreditor agreement to request the payment and (iii) whether RBC is entitled to be paid these under the intercreditor agreement before the first lien lenders are paid in full.

55 There is a distinction between a lien subordination agreement and a payment subordination agreement. Lien subordination is limited to dealings with the collateral over which both groups of lenders hold security. It gives the senior lender a head start with respect to any enforcement actions in respect of the collateral and ensures a priority waterfall from the proceeds of enforcement over collateral. It entitles second lien lenders to receive and retain payments of interest, principal and other amounts in respect of a second lien obligation unless the receipt results from an enforcement step in respect of the collateral. By contrast, payment subordination means that subordinate lenders have also subordinated in favour of the senior lender their right to payment and have agreed to turn over all money received, whether or not derived from the proceeds of the common collateral<sup>5</sup>. The intercreditor agreement is a lien subordination agreement, as stated in section 8.2.

56 Nelson and the first lien agent say that RBC has no right to ask the Court to order any payments to it from the cash on hand prior to the closing of the transaction. They rely on the language of section 3.1(a)(1) that provides that until the discharge of the first lien obligations, the second lien collateral agent will not exercise any rights or remedies with respect to any collateral, institute any action or proceeding with respect to such remedies including any enforcement step under the second lien documents. RBC says it is not asking to enforce its security rights but merely asking that it be paid what it is owed and is permitted to receive under the intercreditor agreement, which does not subordinate payments but only liens. It points to section 3.1(c) that provides that:

(c) Notwithstanding the foregoing (i.e. section 3.1(a)(1)) the Second Lien Collateral Agent and any Second Lien Claimholder may (1)... and may take such other action as it deems in good faith to be necessary to protect its rights in an insolvency proceeding" and (4) may file any... motions... which assert rights... available to unsecured creditors... arising under any insolvency... proceeding.

57 My view of the intercreditor agreement language and what has occurred is that RBC has not taken enforcement steps with respect to collateral. It has asked that payments owing to it under the second lien credit agreement up to the date of filing be paid.

58 Payment of what the second lien lenders are entitled to under the second lien credit agreement is protected under the intercreditor agreement unless it is as the result of action taken by the second lien lenders to enforce their security. Section 3.1(f) of the intercreditor agreement provides as follows:

(f) Except as set forth in section 3.1(a) and section 4 to the extent applicable, nothing in this Agreement shall prohibit the receipt by the Second Lien Collateral Agent or any Second Lien Claimholders of the required payments of interest, principal and other amounts owed in respect of the Second Lien Obligations or receipt of payments permitted under the First Lien Loan Documents, including without limitation, under section 7.09(a) of the First Lien Credit Agreement, so long as such receipt is not the direct or indirect result of the exercise by the Second Lien Collateral Agent or any Second Lien Claimholders of rights or remedies as a secured creditor (including set off) or enforcement in contravention of this Agreement.  
... (underlining added).

59 Section 3.1(a) prohibits the second lien lenders from exercising any rights or remedies with respect to the collateral before the first liens have been discharged. Section 4 requires any collateral or proceeds thereof received by the first lien collateral agent from a sale of collateral to be first applied to the first lien obligations and requires any payments received by the second lien lenders from collateral in connection with the exercise of any right or remedy in contravention of the agreement must be paid over to the first lien collateral agent.

60 It do not agree with the first lien collateral agent that payment to RBC before the sale closes of amounts owing pre-filing under the second lien credit agreement would be in contravention of section 4.1. That section deals with cash from collateral being received by the first lien collateral agent in connection with a sale of collateral, and provides that it shall be applied to the first lien obligations until those obligations have been discharged. In this case, the cash on hand before any closing will not be received by the first lien collateral agent at all. It will be received after the closing by the purchaser.

61 The first lien collateral agent has made a credit bid on behalf of the first lien lenders. Pursuant to section 3.1(b), that credit bid is deemed to be an exercise of remedies with respect to the collateral held by the first lien lenders. Under the last paragraph of section 3.1(c), until the discharge of the first lien obligations has occurred, the sole right of the second lien collateral agent and the second lien claimholders with respect to the collateral is to hold a lien on the collateral pursuant to the second lien collateral documents and to receive a share of the proceeds thereof, if any, after the discharge of the first lien obligations has occurred. That provision is as follows:

Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, unless and until the discharge of the First Lien Obligations has occurred, except as expressly provided in Sections 3.1(a), 6.3(b) and this Section 3.1(c), the sole right of the Second Lien Collateral Agent and the Second Lien Claimholders with respect to the Collateral is to hold a Lien of the Collateral pursuant to the Second Lien Collateral Documents for the period and to the extent granted therein and to receive a share of the proceeds thereof, if any, after the Discharge of First Lien Obligations has occurred.

62 RBC points out that its rights under section 3.1(f) to receive payment of amounts owing to the second lien lenders is not subject to section 3.1(c) at all. It is not suggested by the first lien collateral agent that this is a drafting error, but it strikes me that it may be. The provision at the end of section 3.1(c) is inconsistent with section 3.1(f) as section 3.1(c) is not an exception to section 3.1(f).

63 Both the liens of the first lien lenders and the second lien lenders are over all of the assets of Nelson. Cash is one of those assets. Therefore if payment were now made to RBC from that cash, the cash would be paid to RBC from the collateral for amounts owing under the second lien credit agreement before the obligations to the first lien lenders were discharged. The obligations to the first lien lenders will be discharged when the sale to the purchaser takes place and the first lien obligations are cancelled.

64 There is yet another provision of the intercreditor agreement that must be considered. It appears to say that if a judgment is obtained in favour of a second lien lender after exercising rights as an unsecured creditor, the judgment is to be considered a judgment lien subject to the intercreditor agreement for all purposes. Section 3.1(e) provides:

(e) Except as otherwise specifically set forth in Sections 3.1(a) and (d), the Second Lien Collateral Agent and the Second Lien Claimholders may exercise rights and remedies as unsecured creditors against the Company or any other Grantor that has guaranteed or granted Liens to secure the Second Lien Obligations in accordance with the terms of the Second Lien Loan Documents and applicable law; provided that in the event that any Second Lien Claimholder becomes a judgment creditor in respect of Collateral as a result of its enforcement of its rights as an unsecured creditor with respect to the Second Lien Obligations,

**such judgment Lien** shall be subject to the terms of this Agreement for all purposes (including in relation to the First Lien Obligations) as the other Liens securing the Second Lien Obligations are subject to this Agreement. (Emphasis added).

65 What exactly is meant by a "judgment Lien" is not stated in the intercreditor agreement and is not a defined term. If an order is made in this CCAA proceeding that the pre-filing obligations to the second lien collateral agent are to be paid from the cash on hand that Nelson holds, is that a "judgment Lien" meaning that it cannot be exercised before the first lien obligations are discharged? In this case, as the first lien obligations will be discharged as part of the closing of the transaction, does that mean that once the order is made approving the sale and the transaction closes, the cash on hand will go to the purchaser and the judgment Lien will not be paid? It is not entirely clear. But the section gives some indication that a judgment held as a result of the second lien agent exercising rights as an unsecured creditor cannot be used to attach collateral contrary to the agreement if the first lien obligations have not been discharged.

66 I have been referred to a number of cases in which statements have been made as to the need for the priority of secured creditors to be recognized in CCAA proceedings, particularly when distributions have been ordered. While in this case we are not dealing with a distribution generally to creditors, the principles are well known and undisputed. However, in considering the priorities between the first and second lien holders in this case, the intercreditor agreement is what must govern, even with all of its warts.

67 In this case, the cash on hand held by Nelson is collateral, and subject to the rights of the first lien lenders in that collateral. An order made in favour of RBC as second lien agent would reduce that collateral. The overall tenor of the intercreditor agreement, including section 3.1(e), leads me to the conclusion that such an order in favour of RBC should not be made. I do say, however, that the issue is not at all free from doubt and that no credit should be given to those who drafted and settled the intercreditor agreement as it is far from a model of clarity. I decline to make the order sought by RBC.

68 I should note that RBC has made a claim that that Nelson and the first lien lenders who signed the First Lien Support Agreement acted in bad faith and disregarded the interests of the second lien lenders under the intercreditor agreement. RBC claims that the first lien lenders induced Nelson to breach the second lien credit agreement and that this breach resulted in damages to the second lien agent in the amounts of US\$15,365,998.83 on account of interest and CDN\$1,316,181.73 on account of fees. RBC says that these wrongs should be taken into account in considering whether the credit bid should be accepted and that the powers under section 11 of the CCAA should be exercised to order these amounts to be paid to RBC as second lien agent.

69 I decline to do so. No decision on this record could be possibly be made as to whether these wrongs took place. The claim for inducing breach of contract surfaced in the RBC factum filed

just two days before the hearing and it would be unfair to Nelson or the first lien lenders to have to respond without the chance to fully contest these issues. Moreover, even the release sought by the applicants would not prevent RBC or any second lien lender from bringing an action for wrongs committed. RBC is able to pursue relief for these alleged wrongs in a separate action.

*(b) Consent fee*

70 The first lien lenders who signed the First Lien Support Agreement were paid a consent fee. That agreement, and particularly the term sheet made a part of it, provided that those first lien lenders who signed the agreement would be paid a consent fee.

71 RBC contends that because the consent fee was calculated for each first lien lender that signed the First Lien Support Agreement on the amount of the loans that any consenting first lien lenders held under the first lien credit agreement, the consent fee was paid on account of the loans and thus because all first lien lenders were to be paid equally on their loans on a pro rata basis, RBC is entitled to be paid its share of the consent fees.

72 Section 2.14 of the first lien credit agreement provides in part, as follows:

If, other than as expressly provided elsewhere herein, **any Lender shall obtain on account of the Loans made by it**, or the participations in L/C Obligations and Swing Line Loans held by it, **any payment** (whether voluntary, involuntary, through the exercise of any right of setoff, or otherwise) **in excess of its ratable share** (or other share contemplated hereunder) thereof, such Lender shall immediately (a) notify the Administrative Agent of such fact, and (b) purchase from the other Lenders such participations in the Loans made by them and/or such subparticipations in the participations in L/C Obligations or Swing Line Loans held by them, as the case may be, as shall be necessary to cause such purchasing Lender to share the excess payment in respect of such Loans or such participations, as the case may be, pro rata with each of them ... [emphasis added].

73 RBC says that while the section refers to a first lien lender obtaining a payment "on account" of its loan, U.S. authorities under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code have held that the words "on account of" do not mean "in exchange for" but rather mean "because of." As the consent payments are calculated on the amount of the loan of any first lien lender who signed the term sheet, RBC says that they were made because of their loan and thus RBC is entitled to its share of the consent fees that were paid by virtue of section 2.14 of the first lien credit agreement.

74 I do not accept that argument. The consent fees were paid because the consenting first lien lenders signed the First Lien Support Agreement. The fact that their calculation depended on the amount of the loan made by each consenting first lien lender does not mean they were made because of the loan. RBC declined to sign the First Lien Support Agreement and is not entitled to a consent fee.

## Conclusion


75 An order is to go in accordance with these reasons. As there has been mixed success, there shall be no order as to costs.

*Company's motion granted; bank's motion dismissed.*

## Footnotes

- 1 I do not think that Mr. Gropper's views on what particular sections of the agreement meant is the proper subject of expert opinion on foreign law. Such an expert should confine his evidence to a statement of what the law is and how it applies generally and not express his opinion on the very facts in issue before the court. See my comments in *Nortel Networks Corp., Re* (2014), 20 C.B.R. (6th) 171 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) para. 103.
- 2 See *Nortel Networks Corp., Re* (2009), 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paras. 35-40 and *Brainhunter Inc., Re*, [2009] O.J. No. 5207 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paras. 12-13.
- 3 *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.).
- 4 This case does not involve a plan under the CCAA. One of the reasons for this may be that pursuant to section 6.9(b) of the intercreditor agreement, in the event the applicants commence any restructuring proceeding in Canada and put forward a plan, the applicants, the first lien lenders and the second lien lenders agreed that the first lien lenders and the second lien lenders should be classified together in one class. The second lien lenders agreed that they would only vote in favour of a plan if it satisfied one of two conditions, there was no contractual restriction on their ability to vote against a plan.
- 5 See 65 A.B.A. Bus Law. 809-883 (May 2010).

# TAB 6



Court File No. CV-09-8396-00CL

**ONTARIO  
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE  
COMMERCIAL LIST**

THE HONOURABLE )

WEDNESDAY, THE 8<sup>th</sup> DAY

)

MADAM JUSTICE PEPALL )

OF SEPTEMBER, 2010

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS  
ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR  
ARRANGEMENT OF CANWEST GLOBAL  
COMMUNICATIONS CORP. AND THE OTHER APPLICANTS  
LISTED ON SCHEDULE "A"

Applicants

**ORDER  
(Approval and Vesting Order)**

**THIS MOTION**, made by Canwest Global Communications Corp. and the other Applicants listed on Schedule "A" hereto (collectively, the "Applicants") and the Partnerships listed on Schedule "B" hereto (the "Partnerships" and, together with the Applicants, the "CMI Entities"), for an order (the "Approval and Vesting Order"), *inter alia*, (i) approving the sale transaction (the "Transaction") contemplated by an Offer to Purchase by and between Ruth Zelcer (the "Purchaser") and 5313997 Manitoba Inc. (the "Vendor"), dated July 28, 2010, as amended by letter agreements dated August 5 and 6, 2010 (collectively, the "Offer to Purchase") and appended to the affidavit of John E. Maguire sworn September 1, 2010 (the "Maguire Affidavit"), and (ii) vesting in the Purchaser the rights, title and interest in the Condominium and the Included Goods and Chattels (both as defined in the Maguire Affidavit, and collectively the "Purchased Assets") of Canwest Media Inc. ("CMI"), the beneficial owner of the Purchased Assets, was heard this day at 330 University Avenue, Toronto, Ontario.

**ON READING** the Notice of Motion of the CMI Entities, the Maguire Affidavit and the Exhibits thereto, the Eighteenth Report of FTI Consulting Canada Inc. in its capacity as Court-appointed monitor of the CMI Entities (the "Monitor"), and on hearing from counsel for the CMI Entities, the Monitor, Shaw Communications Inc., the *ad hoc* committee of holders of 8% senior subordinated notes issued by CMI, CIBC Asset-Based Lending Inc. and such other counsel as were present, no one else appearing although duly served as appears from the affidavit of service, filed.

**SERVICE**

1. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the time for service of the Notice of Motion and the Motion Record is hereby abridged so that this Motion is properly returnable today and any further service of the Notice of Motion and the Motion Record is hereby dispensed with.

**DEFINED TERMS**

2. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that all capitalized terms used herein and not otherwise defined herein shall have the meaning ascribed thereto in the Maguire Affidavit.

**APPROVAL OF THE OFFER TO PURCHASE**

3. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that the Transaction is hereby approved. The execution of the Offer to Purchase by the Vendor is hereby authorized and approved, with such amendments as the Vendor and the Purchaser, with the consent of the Monitor, may deem necessary. CMI and the Vendor are hereby authorized and directed to take such additional steps and execute such additional documents as may be necessary or desirable for the completion of the Transaction and for the conveyance of the Purchased Assets to the Purchaser.

**PROCEEDS OF SALE**

4. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that counsel for CMI will hold the proceeds from the sale of the Purchased Assets in trust until such time as such proceeds are payable to the Monitor in accordance with the terms of the Plan Emergence Agreement or further Order of this Court.

**VESTING OF ASSETS**

5. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that upon the delivery of a Monitor's certificate to the Purchaser substantially in the form attached as Schedule "C" hereto (the "Monitor's Certificate"), all of CMI's right, title and interest in and to the Purchased Assets shall vest absolutely in the Purchaser and the Purchaser shall be the absolute owner of CMI's right, title and interest in and to the Purchased Assets, free and clear of and from any and all security interests (whether contractual, statutory, or otherwise), hypothecs, mortgages, trusts or deemed trusts (whether contractual, statutory, or otherwise), liens, executions, levies, charges, or other financial or monetary claims, whether or not they have attached or been perfected, registered or filed and whether secured, unsecured or otherwise including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing: (i) any encumbrances or charges created by the Initial Order of the Honourable Justice Pepall dated October 6, 2009 or any other Order made in these proceedings; and (ii) all charges, security interests, liens or claims evidenced by registrations pursuant to the *Personal Property Security Act* (Ontario), the *Personal Property Security Act* (Manitoba), or any other personal or movable property registry system, (all of which are collectively referred to as the "Encumbrances", which term shall not include the permitted encumbrances, easements and restrictive covenants listed on Schedule "D") and, for greater certainty, this Court orders that all of the Encumbrances affecting or relating to CMI's right, title and interest in and to the Purchased Assets are hereby expunged and discharged as against the Purchased Assets.

6. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DIRECTS** the Monitor to file with the Court a copy of the Monitor's Certificate, as soon as reasonably practicable after delivery thereof to the Purchaser.

7. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, notwithstanding:

- (a) the pendency of these proceedings;
- (b) any applications for a bankruptcy order now or hereafter issued pursuant to the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Canada) in respect of any of the CMI Entities and any bankruptcy order issued pursuant to any such applications; and
- (c) any assignment in bankruptcy made in respect of any of the CMI Entities;



**Schedule "A"**

**Applicants**

1. Canwest Global Communications Corp.
2. Canwest Media Inc.
3. MBS Productions Inc.
4. Yellow Card Productions Inc.
5. Canwest Global Broadcasting Inc./Radiodiffusion Canwest Global Inc.
6. Canwest Television GP Inc.
7. Fox Sports World Canada Holdco Inc.
8. Global Centre Inc.
9. Multisound Publishers Ltd.
10. Canwest International Communications Inc.
11. Canwest Irish Holdings (Barbados) Inc.
12. Western Communications Inc.
13. Canwest Finance Inc./Financiere Canwest Inc.
14. National Post Holdings Ltd.
15. Canwest International Management Inc.
16. Canwest International Distribution Limited
17. Canwest MediaWorks Turkish Holdings (Netherlands)
18. CGS International Holdings (Netherlands)
19. CGS Debenture Holding (Netherlands)
20. CGS Shareholding (Netherlands)
21. CGS NZ Radio Shareholding (Netherlands)
22. 4501063 Canada Inc.
23. 4501071 Canada Inc.
24. 30109, LLC
25. CanWest MediaWorks (US) Holdings Corp.

**Schedule "B"**

**Partnerships**

1. Canwest Television Limited Partnership
2. Fox Sports World Canada Partnership
3. The National Post Company/La Publication National Post

**SCHEDULE "C" – Form of Monitor's Certificate**

Court File No. CV-09-8396-00CL

**ONTARIO  
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE  
COMMERCIAL LIST**

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS  
ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR  
ARRANGEMENT OF CANWEST GLOBAL  
COMMUNICATIONS CORP. AND THE OTHER APPLICANTS  
LISTED ON SCHEDULE "A"

Applicants

**MONITOR'S CERTIFICATE**

**RECITALS**

- A. Pursuant to an Order of the Honourable Madam Justice Pepall of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (the "Court") dated October 6, 2009, FTI Consulting Canada Inc. was appointed as the monitor (the "Monitor") of the Applicants listed on Schedule "A" and the Partnerships listed on Schedule "B" in respect of these CCAA Proceedings (collectively, the "CMI Entities").
- B. Pursuant to an Order of the Court dated September 9, 2010, (the "Approval and Vesting Order") the Court, *inter alia*, approved the offer to purchase by and between 5313997 Manitoba Inc. (the "Vendor") and Ruth Zelcer (the "Purchaser"), dated July 28, 2010, and as amended by letter agreements dated August 5 and 6, 2010 (collectively, the "Offer to Purchase"), and provided for, among other things, the vesting in the Purchaser of Canwest Media Inc.'s right, title and interest in the Purchased Assets, which vesting is to be effective with respect to the Purchased Assets upon the delivery by the Monitor to the Purchaser of this certificate.
- C. Unless otherwise indicated herein, terms with initial capitals have the meanings set out in the Approval and Vesting Order.

**THE MONITOR CERTIFIES** the following:

1. The Monitor has received written confirmation from the Purchaser that it paid to the Vendor's counsel and the Monitor has received written confirmation from the Vendor that it has received from the Purchaser all amounts payable on the Possession Date (as defined in the Offer to Purchase) in accordance with the terms of the Offer to Purchase.
2. The Monitor has received written confirmation from the Vendor and the Purchaser that, other than the delivery of this certificate, the conditions to Closing as set out in sections 22-25 of the Offer to Purchase have been satisfied or waived by the Vendor and the Purchaser.
3. This Certificate was delivered by the Monitor at \_\_\_ [TIME] on \_\_\_ [DATE].

**FTI Consulting Canada Inc., in its capacity as  
Court-appointed Monitor of the CMI Entities,  
and not in its personal capacity**

Per:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Name:

Title:

**SCHEDULE "D" - PERMITTED ENCUMBRANCES**

1. Instrument 87-19549 being a caveat in favour of Manitoba Telephone System registered March 2, 1987.

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C., 1985, c.C-36,  
AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF CANWEST  
GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS CORP., AND THE OTHER APPLICANTS LISTED ON  
SCHEDULE "A"

Court File No: CV-09-8396-00CL

APPLICANTS

**ONTARIO  
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE  
COMMERCIAL LIST**

Proceeding commenced at Toronto

**ORDER**

**(Approval and Vesting)**

**OSLER, HOSKIN & HARCOURT LLP**

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Lawyers for the Applicants

F. 1114233


**TAB 7**

**ONTARIO**  
**SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE**  
**(COMMERCIAL LIST)**

THE HONOURABLE MR.  
JUSTICE HAINEY

)  
)  
)

FRIDAY, THE 23<sup>rd</sup>  
DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2018



IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS*  
*ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, C. c-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR  
ARRANGEMENT OF GREAT SLAVE HELICOPTERS LTD.

APPLICANT

**APPROVAL AND VESTING ORDER**

**THIS MOTION**, made by Great Slave Helicopters Ltd. (the "**Applicant**") for an order approving the sale transaction (the "**Transaction**") contemplated by an asset purchase agreement (the "**Sale Agreement**") between the Applicant and Great Slave Helicopters 2018 Ltd. (formerly 11088211 Canada Corp.) (the "**Purchaser**") dated November 8, 2018, and appended to the Second Report of KSV Kofman Inc. ("**KSV**"), in its capacity as Monitor ("**Monitor**") dated November 16, 2018 (the "**Second Report**"), and vesting in the Purchaser the Applicant's right, title and interest in and to the Assets (as defined in the Sale Agreement), was heard this day at 330 University Avenue, Toronto, Ontario.

**ON READING** the Notice of Motion of the Applicant, the affidavit of Al Martin sworn November 15, 2018, and the Exhibits thereto, the Second Report and the Responding Motion of Gwich'in Development Corporation ("**GDC**"), and on hearing the submissions of counsel for the Applicant, the Monitor, the Purchaser, Clairvest Group Inc., GDC and Sahtu Helicopters, and no one appearing for any other person on the service list, although properly served as appears from the affidavit of service of Katie Parent sworn November 19, 2018, filed:

1. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the time for service of the Notice of Motion, the Motion Record and Second Report is hereby abridged and validated so that this Motion is properly returnable today and hereby dispenses with further service thereof.

2. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that the Transaction is hereby approved, and the execution of the Sale Agreement by the Applicant is hereby authorized and approved, with such minor amendments as the Applicant and the Purchaser, with the consent of the Monitor, may agree upon pursuant to the Sale Agreement. The Applicant, with the consent of the Monitor, is hereby authorized and directed to take such additional steps and execute such additional documents as may be necessary or desirable for the completion of the Transaction and for the conveyance of the Assets to the Purchaser.

3. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that, subject to paragraphs 8 and 9, upon the delivery of a Monitor's certificate to the Purchaser substantially in the form attached as Schedule "A" hereto (the "**Monitor's Certificate**"), all of the Applicant's right, title and interest in and to the Assets shall vest absolutely in the Purchaser, free and clear of and from any and all security interests (whether contractual, statutory, or otherwise), hypothecs, mortgages, trusts or deemed trusts (whether contractual, statutory, or otherwise), liens, executions, levies, charges, or other financial or monetary claims, whether or not they have attached or been perfected, registered or filed and whether secured, unsecured or otherwise (collectively, the "**Claims**") including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing: (i) any encumbrances or charges created by the Amended and Restated Initial Order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Hainey dated September 4, 2018 (the "**Initial Order**"); (ii) all charges, security interests or claims evidenced by registrations pursuant to the *Personal Property Security Act* (Ontario) or any other personal or movable property registry system in any provinces or territories in Canada, including, without limitation, under the Civil Code of Quebec; and (iii) any liabilities or obligations of the Applicant other than the Assumed Obligations (as defined in the Sale Agreement) (all of which are collectively referred to as the "**Encumbrances**", which term shall not include the Assumed Obligations or the Permitted Encumbrances (each as defined in the Sale Agreement)). This Court orders that all of the Encumbrances affecting or relating to the Assets are hereby expunged and discharged as against the Assets.

4. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, upon proof of payment of the Purchase Price (as defined in the Sale Agreement), that the Northwest Territories Land Titles Office cancel the existing certificates of title covering the properties described on Schedule "B" hereto (the "**NWT Real Properties**"), and to issue new certificates of title covering the NWT Real Properties in the name of the Purchaser free of the Encumbrances listed on Schedule "B" hereto and any subsequent encumbrances.

5. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that all counterparties to any Contract (as defined in the Sale Agreement) to which the Applicant is a party or beneficiary, are prohibited from exercising any right or remedy under such Contract, including, without limitation, any rights of termination, that arise as a result of, or otherwise relate to, the Transaction, the insolvency of the Applicant, the commencement of the Applicant's proceedings under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (Canada) (the "**CCAA**") or any relief granted in such proceedings.

6. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, for the purposes of determining the nature and priority of Claims, the net proceeds from the sale of the Assets shall stand in the place and stead of the Assets, and that from and after the delivery of the Monitor's Certificate all Claims and Encumbrances shall attach to the net proceeds from the sale of the Assets with the same priority as they had with respect to the Assets immediately prior to the sale, as if the Assets had not been sold and remained in the possession or control of the person having that possession or control immediately prior to the sale.

7. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DIRECTS** the Monitor to file with the Court a copy of the Monitor's Certificate, forthwith after delivery thereof.

8. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, notwithstanding any other provisions in this Order or the Sale Agreement,

(a) "**Assets**" as used in this paragraph 8 shall mean the Assets (as defined in the Sale Agreement) other than the Sahtu ROFR Assets;

(b) "**Sahtu ROFR Assets**" shall mean (i) the Applicant's interest in the Sahtu Helicopters joint venture (as described on Schedule 5 of the Sale Agreement), (ii) the management agreement between the Applicant and Sahtu Helicopters dated July 1, 2004, the goods and services agreement between the Applicant, Husky Oil and Sahtu

Helicopters dated June 1, 2017, the helicopter lease agreement between the Applicant and Sahtu Helicopters dated May 1, 2017 and the shareholder agreement between the Applicant, Sahtu Helicopters and 994461 N.W.T. Ltd. (as assigned to Fort Norman Metis Development Corporation ("**Fort Norman**")) (the "**Sahtu Shareholder Agreement**"), and (iii) all other right, title or interest held by the Applicant in respect of the Sahtu Helicopters joint venture;

(c) the Applicant shall comply with the provisions of section 8 of the Sahtu Shareholder Agreement (the "**Sahtu ROFR Provisions**") in respect of the Sahtu ROFR Assets by providing notice to Fort Norman of the Purchaser's offer (the "**Sahtu Offer**") to purchase the Sahtu ROFR Assets in accordance with the Sahtu ROFR Provisions;

(d) if:

(i) Fort Norman delivers a notice to the Applicant and the Monitor of its intention to accept the Sahtu Offer within the period for acceptance set out in the Sahtu ROFR Provisions, then (effective on the date the Monitor receives such notice) the Sahtu ROFR Assets shall for all purposes be considered to not form part of the Assets conveyed to the Purchaser under the Sale Agreement, and the sale of Sahtu ROFR Assets to Fort Norman (or its designee) on the terms set out in the Sahtu Offer shall be deemed to be approved hereby and shall close in accordance with the Sahtu ROFR Provisions, and upon the filing of a Monitor's Sahtu ROFR Certificate (in the form attached as Schedule "C" hereto) (the "**Monitor's Sahtu ROFR Certificate**") the Sahtu ROFR Assets shall vest absolutely in Fort Norman, free and clear of and from any and all Encumbrances; or

 (ii) Fort Norman delivers a notice to the Applicant and the Monitor of its intention not to accept the Sahtu Offer <sup>or fails to deliver any notice</sup> within the period for acceptance set out in the Sahtu ROFR Provisions, then (effective on the date the Monitor receives such notice) the sale of Sahtu ROFR Assets to Purchaser contemplated under the Sale Agreement shall be deemed to be approved hereby and conveyed to and vested in the Purchaser pursuant to paragraph 3 hereof upon the filing of a Monitor's Sahtu ROFR Certificate.

9. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, notwithstanding any other provisions in this Order or the Sale Agreement,

(a) "**Assets**" as used in this paragraph 9 shall mean the Assets (as defined in the Sale Agreement) other than the Gwich'in ROFR Assets;

- (b) **“Gwich’in ROFR Assets”** shall mean (i) the Applicant’s interest in the Gwich’in Helicopters joint venture (as described on Schedule 5 of the Sale Agreement), including 49 common shares in Gwich’in Helicopters Limited, (ii) the Applicant’s interest in (a) the Restated Management Agreement made effective as of January 1, 2016 between the Applicant and Gwich’in Helicopters Limited, and (b) the Amended and Restated Unanimous Shareholder Agreement made effective as of January 1, 2016 between the Applicant, GDC and Gwich’in Helicopter Limited (the **“Gwich’in Shareholder Agreement”**); (iii) the leased Hangar at Inuvik Airport (as described on Schedule 6 of the Sale Agreement, and comprised of a Head Lease between Commissioner of Northwest Territories and Gwich’in Helicopters Limited for parcel of land comprised of Lots 3-73 and 3-75 at the Inuvik Mike Zubko Airport) including the leasehold interest in the building (hangar) on lands, the fixtures and the improvements, and the tools on the leased location; and (iv) all other right, title or interest held by the Applicant in respect of the Gwich’in Helicopters joint venture;
- (c) the Applicant shall comply with the provisions of section 8 of the Gwich’in Shareholder Agreement (as amended by agreement with the Monitor) (the **“Gwich’in ROFR Provisions”**) in respect of the Gwich’in ROFR Assets by providing notice to GDC of the Purchaser’s offer (the **“Gwich’in Offer”**) to purchase the Gwich’in ROFR Assets in accordance with the Gwich’in ROFR Provisions;
- (d) if:
- (i) GDC delivers a notice to the Applicant and the Monitor of its intention to accept the Gwich’in Offer within the period for acceptance set out in the Gwich’in ROFR Provisions, then (effective on the date the Monitor receives such notice) the Gwich’in ROFR Assets shall for all purposes be considered to not form part of the Assets conveyed to the Purchaser under the Sale Agreement, and the sale of Gwich’in ROFR Assets to GDC (or its designee) on the terms set out in the Gwich’in Offer shall be deemed to be approved hereby and shall close in accordance with the Gwich’in ROFR Provisions, and upon the filing of a Monitor’s Gwich’in ROFR Certificate (in the form attached as Schedule “D” hereto) (the **“Monitor’s Gwich’in ROFR**

**Certificate**) the Gwich'in ROFR Assets shall vest absolutely in GDC, free and clear of and from any and all Encumbrances; or

(ii)

GDC delivers a notice to the Applicant and the Monitor of its intention not to accept the Gwich'in Offer <sup>or fails to deliver any notice</sup> within the period for acceptance set out in the Gwich'in ROFR Provisions, then (effective on the date the Monitor receives such notice) the sale of Gwich'in ROFR Assets to Purchaser contemplated under the Sale Agreement shall be deemed to be approved hereby and conveyed to and vested in the Purchaser pursuant to paragraph 3 hereof upon the filing of a Monitor's Gwich'in ROFR Certificate.

10. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, pursuant to clause 7(3)(c) of the *Canada Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act*, the Applicant is authorized and permitted to disclose and transfer to the Purchaser all human resources and payroll information in the Applicant's records pertaining to the Applicant's past and current employees. The Purchaser shall maintain and protect the privacy of such information and shall be entitled to use the personal information provided to it in a manner which is in all material respects identical to the prior use of such information by the Applicant.

11. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, notwithstanding:

- (a) the pendency of these proceedings;
- (b) any applications for a bankruptcy order now or hereafter issued pursuant to the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Canada) in respect of the Applicant and any bankruptcy order issued pursuant to any such applications; and
- (c) any assignment in bankruptcy made in respect of the Applicant;

the vesting of the Assets in the Purchaser pursuant to this Order shall be binding on any trustee in bankruptcy that may be appointed in respect of the Applicant and shall not be void or voidable by creditors of the Applicant, nor shall it constitute nor be deemed to be a fraudulent preference, assignment, fraudulent conveyance, transfer at undervalue, or other reviewable transaction under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Canada) or any other applicable federal or provincial legislation, nor shall it constitute oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct pursuant to any applicable federal or provincial legislation.



**Schedule "A" - Form of Monitor's Certificate**

Court File No.: CV-18-604434-00CL

**ONTARIO  
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE  
(COMMERCIAL LIST)**

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS  
ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, C. c-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR  
ARRANGEMENT OF GREAT SLAVE HELICOPTERS LTD.

APPLICANT

**MONITOR'S CERTIFICATE**

**RECITALS**

A. Pursuant to an Order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Hainey of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) (the "**Court**") dated September 4, 2018, KSV Kofman Inc. was appointed as the monitor (the "**Monitor**") of Great Slave Helicopters Ltd. (the "**Applicant**").

B. Pursuant to an Order of the Court dated ●, 2018, the Court approved the agreement of purchase and sale made as of November 8, 2018 (the "**Sale Agreement**") between the Applicant and Great Slave Helicopters 2018 Ltd. (formerly 11088211 Canada Corp.) (the "**Purchaser**") and provided for the vesting in the Purchaser of the Applicant's right, title and interest in and to the Assets, which vesting is to be effective with respect to the Assets upon the delivery by the Monitor to the Purchaser of a certificate confirming: (i) the payment by the Purchaser of the Purchase Price for the Assets; (ii) that the conditions to Closing as set out in Article 6 of the Sale Agreement have been satisfied or waived by the Applicant and the Purchaser; and (iii) the Transaction has been completed to the satisfaction of the Monitor.

C. Unless otherwise indicated herein, terms with initial capitals have the meanings set out in the Sale Agreement.

**THE MONITOR CERTIFIES** the following:

1. The Purchaser has paid and the Monitor has received the Purchase Price for the Assets payable on the Closing Date pursuant to the Sale Agreement;
2. The conditions to Closing as set out in Article 6 of the Sale Agreement have been satisfied or waived by the Applicant and the Purchaser; and
3. The Transaction has been completed to the satisfaction of the Monitor.
4. This Certificate was delivered by the Monitor at [TIME] on [DATE].

**KSV KOFMAN INC., in its capacity as Monitor  
of Great Slave Helicopters Ltd., and not in its  
personal capacity**

Per: \_\_\_\_\_

Name:

Title:

Schedule "B"

NORTHWEST TERRITORIES REAL PROPERTY

Location/Address	Legal Description	Claims to be Expunged/Deleted
Fort Simpson Airport Hangar, Fort Simpson, NT	Lot 411, Plan 1859, Fort Simpson	Mortgage 185,163 registered April 8, 2014 in favour of Clairvest GP Manageco Inc.
15 Bromley Drive, Yellowknife, NT	Lot 8, Block 508, Plan 1080, Yellowknife	Mortgage 185,168 registered April 8, 2014 in favour of Clairvest GP Manageco Inc.
6009 Finlayson Drive N, Yellowknife, NT	Lot 21, Block 526, Plan 1977, Yellowknife	Mortgage 185,168 registered April 8, 2014 in favour of Clairvest GP Manageco Inc.

**Schedule "C" - Form of Monitor's Sahtu ROFR Certificate**

Court File No.: CV-18-604434-00CL

**ONTARIO  
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE  
(COMMERCIAL LIST)**

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS  
ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, C. c-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR  
ARRANGEMENT OF GREAT SLAVE HELICOPTERS LTD.

APPLICANT

**MONITOR'S SAHTU ROFR CERTIFICATE**

**RECITALS**

A. Pursuant to an Order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Hainey of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) (the "**Court**") dated September 4, 2018, KSV Kofman Inc. was appointed as the monitor (the "**Monitor**") of Great Slave Helicopters Ltd. (the "**Applicant**").

B. Pursuant to an Order (the "**Approval and Vesting Order**") of the Court dated ●, 2018, the Court approved the sale of the Sahtu ROFR Assets to either (i) the Purchaser, pursuant to an agreement of purchase and sale made as of November 8, 2018 or (ii) Fort Norman pursuant to the exercise of a right of first refusal to purchase the Sahtu ROFR Assets under the Sahtu Shareholder Agreement, and provided for the vesting in the Purchaser or Fort Norman, as the case may be, of the Applicant's right, title and interest in and to the Sahtu ROFR Assets, which vesting is to be effective with respect to the Sahtu ROFR Assets upon the delivery by the Monitor to the Purchaser and Fort Norman of a certificate confirming: (x) the payment by the Purchaser or Fort Norman of the purchase price for the Sahtu ROFR Assets; and (y) the transaction for sale of the Sahtu ROFR Assets has been completed to the satisfaction of the Monitor.

C. Unless otherwise indicated herein, terms with initial capitals have the meanings set out in the Approval and Vesting Order.

THE MONITOR CERTIFIES the following:

1. [Purchaser or Fort Norman] has paid and the Monitor has received the purchase price for the Sahtu ROFR Assets set out in the Sahtu Offer; and
2. The transaction for the sale of the Sahtu ROFR Assets has been completed to the satisfaction of the Monitor.
3. This Certificate was delivered by the Monitor at [TIME] on [DATE].

KSV KOFMAN INC., in its capacity  
as Monitor of Great Slave  
Helicopters Ltd., and not in its  
personal capacity

Per: Name: Title:

GOODMANS\6878350

**Schedule "D" - Form of Monitor's Gwich'in ROFR Certificate**

Court File No.: CV-18-604434-00CL

**ONTARIO  
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE  
(COMMERCIAL LIST)**

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS  
ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, C. c-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR  
ARRANGEMENT OF GREAT SLAVE HELICOPTERS LTD.

APPLICANT

**MONITOR'S GWICH'IN ROFR CERTIFICATE**

**RECITALS**

A. Pursuant to an Order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Hailey of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) (the "**Court**") dated September 4, 2018, KSV Kofman Inc. was appointed as the monitor (the "**Monitor**") of Great Slave Helicopters Ltd. (the "**Applicant**").

B. Pursuant to an Order (the "**Approval and Vesting Order**") of the Court dated ●, 2018, the Court approved the sale of the Gwich'in ROFR Assets to either (i) the Purchaser, pursuant to an agreement of purchase and sale made as of November 8, 2018 or (ii) GDC pursuant to the exercise of a right of first refusal to purchase the Gwich'in ROFR Assets under the Gwich'in Shareholder Agreement, and provided for the vesting in the Purchaser or GDC, as the case may be, of the Applicant's right, title and interest in and to the Gwich'in ROFR Assets, which vesting is to be effective with respect to the Gwich'in ROFR Assets upon the delivery by the Monitor to the Purchaser and GDC of a certificate confirming: (x) the payment by the Purchaser or GDC of the purchase price for the Gwich'in ROFR Assets; and (y) the transaction for sale of the Gwich'in ROFR Assets has been completed to the satisfaction of the Monitor.

C. Unless otherwise indicated herein, terms with initial capitals have the meanings set out in the Approval and Vesting Order.

**THE MONITOR CERTIFIES** the following:

1. [Purchaser or GDC] has paid and the Monitor has received the purchase price for the Gwich'in ROFR Assets set out in the Gwich'in Offer; and
2. The transaction for the sale of the Gwich'in ROFR Assets has been completed to the satisfaction of the Monitor.
3. This Certificate was delivered by the Monitor at [TIME] on [DATE].

KSV KOFMAN INC., in its capacity  
as Monitor of Great Slave  
Helicopters Ltd., and not in its  
personal capacity

Per: Name: Title:

**IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985,  
c. C-36, AS AMENDED**

Court File No. CV-18-604434-00CL

**AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF GREAT  
SLAVE HELICOPTERS LTD.**

**ONTARIO  
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE  
(Commercial List)**

Proceeding commenced at Toronto

**APPROVAL AND VESTING ORDER**

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Lawyers for the Applicant

**TAB 8**

**ONTARIO**  
**SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE**  
**COMMERCIAL LIST**

THE HONOURABLE ) THURSDAY, THE 2<sup>ND</sup>  
 )  
REGIONAL SENIOR JUSTICE ) DAY OF JUNE, 2016  
 )  
MORAWETZ )



IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF TARGET CANADA CO., TARGET CANADA HEALTH CO., TARGET CANADA MOBILE GP CO., TARGET CANADA PHARMACY (BC) CORP., TARGET CANADA PHARMACY (ONTARIO) CORP., TARGET CANADA PHARMACY CORP., TARGET CANADA PHARMACY (SK) CORP., and TARGET CANADA PROPERTY LLC (collectively the "**Applicants**")

**APPROVAL AND VESTING ORDER**  
**(Share Sale Agreement)**

THIS MOTION, made by the Applicants, pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. c-36, as amended (the "**CCAA**") for an order approving the share sale (the "**Transaction**") contemplated by a Share Sale Agreement among Target Canada Co. ("**TCC**"), as Vendor, and 2519114 Ontario Inc., as Purchaser (the "**Purchaser**"), dated May 18, 2016 (the "**Share Sale Agreement**") and certain related relief, was heard this day at 330 University Avenue, Toronto, Ontario.

ON READING the Notice of Motion of the Applicants and the Twenty-Eighth Report of Alvarez & Marsal Canada Inc., in its capacity as Monitor (the "**Monitor**"), filed, and on hearing the submissions of respective counsel for the Applicants and the Partnerships listed on Schedule

“A” hereto, the Monitor, and such other counsel as were present, no one else appearing although duly served as appears from the Affidavit of Service of Robert Carson sworn May 27, 2016, filed:

### **SERVICE AND DEFINITIONS**

1. THIS COURT ORDERS that the time for service of the Notice of Motion and the Motion Record herein is hereby abridged and validated so that this Motion is properly returnable today and hereby dispenses with further service thereof.

2. THIS COURT ORDERS that any capitalized term used and not defined herein shall have the meaning ascribed thereto in the Amended and Restated Initial Order in these proceedings dated January 15, 2015 (the “**Initial Order**”), or in the Share Sale Agreement, as applicable.

### **APPROVAL OF THE SHARE SALE AGREEMENT**

3. THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES that the Transaction is hereby approved and ratified and that the execution of the Share Sale Agreement by TCC is hereby approved and ratified with such minor amendments as TCC (with the consent of the Monitor) and the Purchaser may agree to in writing. TCC is hereby authorized and directed to take such additional steps and execute such additional documents as may be necessary or desirable for the completion of the Transaction and for the conveyance of the Shares to the Purchaser and the Monitor shall be authorized to take such additional steps in furtherance of its responsibilities under the Share Sale Agreement.

4. THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES that upon the delivery of a Monitor’s certificate to the Purchaser substantially in the form attached as Schedule “B” hereto (the “**Monitor’s Certificate**”), all of TCC’s right, title and interest in and to the Shares shall vest absolutely in the Purchaser free and clear of and from any and all security interests (whether contractual, statutory, or otherwise), hypothecs, mortgages, trusts or deemed trusts (whether contractual, statutory, or otherwise), liens, executions, levies, charges, Claims (as defined in the Share Sale Agreement), or other financial or monetary claims, whether or not they have attached or been perfected, registered or filed and whether secured, unsecured or otherwise (collectively, the “**Claims**”), including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing:

- (a) the Administration Charge, the KERP Charge, the Directors' Charge, the Financial Advisor Subordinated Charge, the DIP Lender's Charge, and the Agent's Charge and Security Interest (as defined in the Approval Order – Agency Agreement dated February 4, 2015) (collectively, the “**CCAA Charges**”); and
- (b) all charges, security interests or claims evidenced by registrations pursuant to the *Personal Property Security Act* (Ontario) or any other personal property registry system;

(all of which are collectively referred to as the “**Encumbrances**”)

and, for greater certainty, this Court orders that all of the Claims and Encumbrances affecting or relating to the Shares are hereby expunged and discharged as against the Shares.

5. THIS COURT ORDERS that for the purposes of determining the nature and priority of Claims, the net proceeds received from the sale of the Shares shall stand in the place and stead of the Shares and that from and after the delivery of the Monitor's Certificate all Claims and Encumbrances shall attach to the net proceeds from the sale of the Shares with the same priority as they had with respect to the Shares immediately prior to the Closing of the Transaction, as if the Transaction had not been completed.

6. THIS COURT ORDERS AND DIRECTS the Monitor to file with the Court a copy of the Monitor's Certificate, forthwith after delivery thereof.

7. THIS COURT ORDERS that, in accordance with Section 9.4 of the Share Sale Agreement, the corporate name of Target Canada Pharmacy (Ontario) Corp. shall be changed forthwith upon closing to a name that does not include “Target”.

#### GENERAL PROVISIONS

8. THIS COURT ORDERS that, notwithstanding:

- (a) the pendency of these proceedings;



**SCHEDULE "A"**  
**PARTNERSHIPS**

Target Canada Pharmacy Franchising LP

Target Canada Mobile LP

Target Canada Property LP

**SCHEDULE "B"**

Court File No. CV-15-10832-00CL

**ONTARIO**

**SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE**

**COMMERCIAL LIST**

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF TARGET CANADA CO., TARGET CANADA HEALTH CO., TARGET CANADA MOBILE GP CO., TARGET CANADA PHARMACY (BC) CORP., TARGET CANADA PHARMACY (ONTARIO) CORP., TARGET CANADA PHARMACY CORP., TARGET CANADA PHARMACY (SK) CORP., and TARGET CANADA PROPERTY LLC (collectively the "Applicants")

**MONITOR'S CERTIFICATE**

**RECITALS:**

A. All undefined terms in this Monitor's Certificate have the meanings ascribed to them in the Order of the Court dated June 2, 2016 (the "Approval and Vesting Order") approving the Share Sale Agreement entered into among Target Canada Co. ("TCC") and 2519114 Ontario Inc. (the "Purchaser") dated May 18, 2016 (the "Share Sale Agreement"), a copy of which is attached as Appendix B to the Twenty-Eighth Report of the Monitor.

B. The Approval and Vesting Order approved the Share Sale Agreement and provided for the vesting in the Purchaser of TCC's right, title and interest in and to the Shares, which vesting is to be effective with respect to the Shares upon the delivery by the Monitor to the Purchaser and TCC of a certificate confirming (i) the conditions to Closing as set out in Articles 7, 8 and 9 of the Share Sale Agreement have been satisfied or waived by the Purchaser and TCC, as applicable; and (ii) the Transaction has been completed to the satisfaction of the Monitor.

THE MONITOR CERTIFIES the following:

1. The conditions to Closing as set out in Articles 7, 8 and 9 of the Share Sale Agreement have been satisfied or waived by the Purchaser and TCC, as applicable; and
2. The Transaction has been completed to the satisfaction of the Monitor.

This Certificate was delivered by the Monitor at \_\_\_\_\_ [TIME] on \_\_\_\_\_ [DATE].

**ALVAREZ & MARSAL CANADA INC.**, in its capacity as Court-appointed Monitor of Target Canada Co., *et al.* and not in its personal or corporate capacity

Per: \_\_\_\_\_

Name:

Title:

**IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED  
AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF TARGET CANADA CO., et al.**

Applicants

Court File No. CV-15-10832-00CL

**ONTARIO  
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE  
(COMMERCIAL LIST)**

PROCEEDING COMMENCED AT  
TORONTO

**APPROVAL AND VESTING ORDER  
(Share Sale Agreement)**

**OSLER, HOSKIN & HARCOURT LLP**  
Box 50, 1 First Canadian Place  
Toronto, Canada M5X 1B8

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
Lawyers for the Applicants

Matter No: 1159785

# **TAB 9**

ONTARIO  
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE  
COMMERCIAL LIST

THE HONOURABLE MR. )  
 )  
JUSTICE DUNPHY ) FRIDAY, THE 7<sup>TH</sup>  
 ) DAY OF DECEMBER, 2018



IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C.  
1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF  
ARALEZ PHARMACEUTICALS INC. AND  
ARALEZ PHARMACEUTICALS CANADA INC.

Applicants

APPROVAL AND VESTING ORDER

THIS MOTION, made by Aralez Pharmaceuticals Inc. ("API") and Aralez Pharmaceuticals Canada Inc. ("Aralez Canada" and, together with API, the "Applicants"), pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended (the "CCAA"), for an Order, among other things, (i) approving the sale transaction (the "Transaction") contemplated by a share purchase agreement (the "Share Purchase Agreement") among API, as vendor, Aralez Canada, as the corporation, and Nuvo Pharmaceuticals Inc., as the purchaser (the "Purchaser") dated September 18, 2018 (as amended by the First Amending Agreement to the Share Purchase Agreement and Disclosure Letter dated December 6, 2018), (ii) vesting in the Purchaser all of API's right, title and interest in and to the Purchased Shares, and (iii) granting the other relief set out herein, was heard this day at 330 University Avenue, Toronto, Ontario.

ON READING the Motion Record of the Applicants filed in respect of this motion and the Report, and on hearing the submissions of counsel for the Applicants, Richter Advisory

Group Inc. ("Richter") in its capacity as Monitor of the Applicants (the "Monitor"), Deerfield, and the Purchaser, no one appearing for any other person on the service list, although properly served as appears from the affidavit of service filed:

#### SERVICE

1. THIS COURT ORDERS that the time and method of service and notice of this Motion is hereby abridged and validated and that this Motion is properly returnable today without further service or notice thereof.

#### DEFINED TERMS

2. THIS COURT ORDERS that capitalized terms used and not defined herein shall have the meanings given to them in the Share Purchase Agreement.

#### APPROVAL OF THE TRANSACTION

3. THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES that the Transaction is hereby approved and the execution by the Applicants of the Share Purchase Agreement and the entering into of the Transaction is hereby authorized, ratified and approved, with such minor amendments to the Share Purchase Agreement as the Applicants and the Purchaser may agree to with the consent of the Monitor. The Applicants are hereby authorized and directed to perform their obligations under the Share Purchase Agreement and any ancillary documents related thereto and to take all such additional steps and actions and to execute such additional documents as may be required by the Share Purchase Agreement or are necessary or desirable for completion of the Transaction and for the conveyance of the Purchased Shares to the Purchaser.

#### VESTING OF THE PURCHASED SHARES

4. THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES that upon the delivery of a Monitor's certificate to the Purchaser substantially in the form attached as Schedule A hereto (the "Monitor's Certificate"), all of API's right, title and interest in and to the Purchased Shares shall vest absolutely in the Purchaser, free and clear of and from any and all security interests (whether contractual, statutory, or otherwise), hypothecs, mortgages, trusts or deemed trusts (whether contractual, statutory, or otherwise), liens, executions, levies, charges, or other

financial or monetary claims, whether or not they have attached or been perfected, registered or filed and whether secured, unsecured or otherwise (collectively, the "Claims") including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing: (i) any encumbrances or charges created by the Initial Order dated August 10, 2018 (as amended and restated, the "Initial Order"); (ii) any encumbrances or charges created by the Order (Re Bidding Procedures Approval) dated October 10, 2018; (iii) any encumbrances or charges created by the Order (Re KEIP Approval and Related Charge) dated November 28, 2018; and (iv) all charges, security interests or claims evidenced by registrations pursuant to the *Personal Property Security Act* (Ontario) or any other personal property registry system (all of which are collectively referred to as the "Encumbrances") and, for greater certainty, this Court orders that all of the Encumbrances affecting or relating to the Purchased Shares are hereby expunged and discharged as against the Purchased Shares.

5. THIS COURT ORDERS that for purposes of determining the nature and priority of Claims, the net proceeds from the sale of the Purchased Shares shall stand in the place and stead of the Purchased Shares, and that from and after the delivery of the Monitor's Certificate all Claims and Encumbrances (including those created by the Initial Order) shall attach to the net proceeds from the sale of the Purchased Shares with the same priority as they had with respect to the Purchased Shares immediately prior to the sale, as if the Purchased Shares had not been sold and remained in the possession or control of the person having that possession or control immediately prior to the sale.

6. THIS COURT ORDERS AND DIRECTS the Monitor to file with the Court a copy of the Monitor's Certificate, forthwith after delivery thereof.

7. THIS COURT ORDERS that, pursuant to clause 7(3)(c) of the Canada *Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act*, the Monitor and Applicants are authorized and permitted to disclose and transfer to the Purchaser all human resources and payroll information in the Applicants' records pertaining to Aralez Canada's past and current employees. The Purchaser shall maintain and protect the privacy of such information and shall be entitled to use the personal information provided to it in a manner which is in all material respects identical to the prior use of such information by the Applicants.

8. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, notwithstanding:

- (a) the pendency of these proceedings;
- (b) any assignment in bankruptcy or any application for a bankruptcy order now or hereafter issued pursuant to the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (the "BIA") and any order issued pursuant to any such application;
- (c) any application for a receivership order; or
- (d) any provisions of any federal or provincial legislation,

the vesting of the Purchased Shares in the Purchaser pursuant to this Order shall be binding on any trustee in bankruptcy that may be appointed in respect of the Applicants and shall not be void or voidable by creditors of the Applicants, nor shall it constitute nor be deemed to be a fraudulent preference, assignment, fraudulent conveyance, transfer at undervalue, or other reviewable transaction under the BIA or any other applicable federal or provincial legislation, nor shall it constitute oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct pursuant to any applicable federal or provincial legislation.

9. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that except as set forth in paragraph 3 of Section 6.4 of the Disclosure Letter, the Bezalip APA (as defined below) or as may otherwise be agreed in writing among API, Aralez Canada, the Purchaser and any purchaser of the U.S. rights to the Bezalip product (the "Bezalip Assets"), including Intercept Pharmaceuticals Inc. as the purchaser of the Bezalip Assets under the Asset Purchase Agreement dated December 6, 2018 among API, Aralez Canada and Intercept Pharmaceuticals Inc. (the "Bezalip Purchaser" and the "Bezalip APA"), the Share Purchase Agreement shall not impair or adversely affect the Bezalip Assets, Aralez Canada's ability to transfer the Bezalip Assets to the Bezalip Purchaser under the Bezalip APA or the Bezalip Purchaser's rights and benefits under the Bezalip APA.

#### **APPROVAL OF THE PRE-CLOSING REORGANIZATION**

10. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that the Pre-Closing Reorganization is hereby approved and the Applicants are authorized and empowered to take the necessary or desirable steps, transactions, set-offs, distributions, repayments, transfers and other actions to


consummate the Pre-Closing Reorganization as set out in Schedule "B" to this Order (collectively, the "Pre-Closing Reorganization Steps").

11. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicants are hereby authorized and empowered, but not directed, without further notice to or action, order, or approval of this Court or any other person, to issue, execute, deliver, file, and record any document, and to take any action necessary or appropriate to consummate the Pre-Closing Reorganization and Pre-Closing Reorganization Steps and all transactions and agreements related thereto in accordance with their terms, without the need for any further notice to, or action, order or approval of this Court, or other act or action under applicable laws. This Order shall constitute all approvals and consents required, if any, by the laws, rules and regulations of all provinces and any other governmental authority with respect to the implementation or consummation of the Pre-Closing Reorganization and the Pre-Closing Reorganization Steps.

**GENERAL**

12. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicants, the Monitor, the Purchaser and Deerfield may apply to the Court as necessary to seek further orders and directions to give effect to this Order.

13. **THIS COURT HEREBY REQUESTS** the aid and recognition of any court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body having jurisdiction in Canada or in the United States to give effect to this Order and to assist the Monitor and its agents in carrying out the terms of this Order. All courts, tribunals, regulatory and administrative bodies are hereby respectfully requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to the Monitor, as an officer of this Court, as may be necessary or desirable to give effect to this Order or to assist the Monitor and its agents in carrying out the terms of this Order.



S.F. Dunphy J.

ENTERED AT / INSCRIT À TORONTO  
ON / BOOK NO:  
LE / DANS LE REGISTRE NO:

DEC 10 2018

PER / PAR:



SCHEDULE A  
FORM OF MONITOR'S CERTIFICATE

Court File No. CV-18-603054-00CL

ONTARIO  
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE  
COMMERCIAL LIST

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C.  
1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF  
ARALEZ PHARMACEUTICALS INC. AND  
ARALEZ PHARMACEUTICALS CANADA INC.

Applicants

MONITOR'S CERTIFICATE

RECITALS

- A. The Applicants obtained protection under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (the "CCAA") pursuant to an Initial Order of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) (the "Court") dated August 10, 2018 (as amended and restated, the "Initial Order").
- B. Richter Advisory Group Inc. (in such capacity, the "Monitor") was appointed as the Monitor of the Applicants in the CCAA proceedings pursuant to the Initial Order.
- C. Pursuant to the Approval and Vesting Order of the Court granted ●, 2018 (the "Approval and Vesting Order"), the Court approved the share purchase agreement dated ● 2018 (as amended by the First Amending Agreement to the Share Purchase Agreement and Disclosure Letter dated December 6, 2018) (the "Share Purchase Agreement") among Aralez Pharmaceuticals Inc. ("API"), as vendor, Aralez Pharmaceuticals Canada Inc. ("Aralez Canada"), as the corporation, and Nuvo Pharmaceuticals Inc., as the purchaser (the "Purchaser") providing for, among other things, the sale of all the shares in the capital of Aralez Canada to the Purchaser (the "Purchased Shares"), which vesting is to be effective upon the delivery by the Monitor to the Purchaser of this Monitor's Certificate.

D. Unless otherwise indicated or defined herein, capitalized terms used in this Monitor's Certificate shall have the meanings given to them in the Approval and Vesting Order.

THE MONITOR CONFIRMS the following:

1. The Monitor has received written confirmation, in form and substance satisfactory to the Monitor, from the Purchaser and API that:

- (a) all conditions to Closing set forth in the Share Purchase Agreement have been satisfied or waived;
- (b) the Purchaser has paid the Purchase Price;
- (c) the Purchase Price has been delivered in accordance with the Share Purchase Agreement; and
- (d) the Transaction has been completed to the satisfaction of the Purchaser and API, respectively.

DATED at Toronto, Ontario this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2018.

**RICHTER ADVISORY GROUP INC., solely in its capacity as Monitor of the Applicants and not in its personal capacity**

Per: \_\_\_\_\_  
Name:  
Title:

**SCHEDULE "B"**  
**PRE-CLOSING REORGANIZATION STEPS**

*Section 6.4 of the Share Purchase Agreement (as amended and revised)*

**Pre-Closing Reorganization**

- (1) Evidence shall be provided by the Vendor to the Purchaser of (A) the termination of (i) the Management and Support Services Agreement, and (ii) the Non-Exclusive Distributor Agreement dated April 1, 2016 between Aralez Pharmaceuticals Trading DAC and the Corporation and, in each case, all parties thereto shall have executed a full and unconditional release of all rights and obligations thereunder and (B) the assignment of the Product Development and Profit Share Agreement, as contemplated by #3 below.
- (2) Tribute Pharmaceuticals International Inc. (Barbados) shall be dissolved, or the shares in its capital stock transferred, such that it shall no longer be a subsidiary of the Corporation.
- (3) The U.S. rights of the Corporation to the Bezafibrate product shall be transferred by the Corporation to, subject to approval by the CCAA Court, Intercept Pharmaceuticals, Inc. in consideration for a cash purchase price (the portion of such cash purchase price actually received by the Corporation on the closing of the transaction is referred to herein as the "Bezafibrate Cash Proceeds") pursuant to the asset purchase agreement between the Corporation and Intercept Pharmaceuticals Inc. dated as of December 6, 2018 (the "Intercept APA"), which asset purchase agreement shall not be amended in a manner that would adversely impact the pre-closing reorganization without the prior written consent of Purchaser, acting reasonably; provided, however, that if such transaction does not close on or prior to the date that is two (2) Business Days prior to the Closing Date, the U.S. rights of the Corporation to the Bezafibrate product shall be transferred by the Corporation to the Vendor by way of dividend in kind (and the Vendor shall pay HST to the Corporation in respect of the transferred assets); provided that such transfer by the Corporation to the Vendor shall not occur prior to December 28, 2018; and provided further that in either case, the Corporation or the Vendor, as the case may be, shall ensure that, except for the Corporation's express obligations under the Intercept APA, which in the case of a transfer to by the Corporation to the Vendor, are only those obligations that survive such transfer as expressly specified in Section 9.6 (Assignment) of the Intercept APA, the Corporation does not have any further liability related thereto or under the Product Development and Profit Share Agreement whether (i) through the Claims Procedure Order and/or the CCAA Termination Order, (ii) a full and unconditional release in favour of the Corporation by the counterparty to the relevant contract(s) in respect of such U.S. rights and obligations, (iii) by the provision of an indemnity in favour of the Corporation by a credit worthy third party with respect thereto, or (iv) by such other commercially reasonable means (including disclaiming such relevant contract(s) if necessary), in each case, acceptable to the Purchaser, acting reasonably. For greater certainty, any failure to satisfy this Step 3 as contemplated shall be deemed to be a material and non-curable breach under the Agreement.

Steps 4-11 below (as amended, modified, or supplemented with the written consent of each of the Vendor and the Purchaser) shall be completed in the order set forth below and in a manner that does not give rise to a material Tax liability of the Corporation or a material reduction in the Tax attributes of the Corporation or any of its Assets.

- (4) 2017 Loan Agreement. The loan agreement dated April 3, 2017 between the Corporation, as lender, and the Vendor, as borrower, (the "2017 Loan Agreement") in the principal amount of CDN\$6,015,200 shall be amended to reflect the additional principal amount of approximately CDN\$8,000,000 owing by the Vendor to the Corporation thereunder, such that following such amendment the total amount owing by the Vendor to the Corporation thereunder shall be approximately CDN\$14,015,200.
- (5) 2016 Loan Facility Agreement. The loan facility agreement dated March 29, 2016, among Aralez Luxembourg Finance, as lender, and Aralez Pharmaceuticals Trading DAC, Tribute Pharmaceuticals Canada Inc., Aralez Pharmaceuticals Inc. and Aralez Pharmaceuticals Management Inc., as borrowers, as amended by an amendment to the loan facility agreement effective as of March 29, 2016 (the "2016 Loan Facility Agreement"), under which there is and shall be no amount owing by any of the borrowers, shall be amended to (i) remove the Corporation as a party thereto and (ii) fully, finally, unconditionally and irrevocably release the Corporation and all of its Assets from any and all liabilities and obligations thereunder, such that following such amendment there shall be no debts, liabilities or obligations owing by the Corporation to any Person thereunder.
- (6) Deerfield Guarantee. The Corporation shall be fully, finally, unconditionally and irrevocably released of any and all of the liabilities and obligations of the Corporation to Deerfield under the facility agreement dated as of June 8, 2015, as amended and restated on October 29, 2015 and as further amended and restated on December 7, 2015, under which the Corporation has and shall have liabilities and obligations only as guarantor and not as borrower, and which guarantee of the Corporation has not been and shall not have been called upon, such that following such release there shall be no debts, liabilities or obligations owing by the Corporation to any Person thereunder.
- (7) DIP Indebtedness. The Vendor shall assume any and all of the debts, liabilities and obligations of the Corporation to Deerfield Management Company, LP or any Affiliate thereof (collectively, "Deerfield") under the DIP Agreement or any of the Definitive Documents (as defined in the Initial Order) (collectively, the "DIP Indebtedness") in consideration for the issuance of a demand promissory note (the "DIP Note") having a principal amount equal to the aggregate amount of the DIP Indebtedness, such that following such assumption there shall be no debts, liabilities or obligations owing by the Corporation to any Person under the DIP Agreement or any of the Definitive Documents.
- (8) DIP Note. The Corporation shall repay the DIP Note using all or a portion of the Bezafibrate Cash Proceeds. If the amount of the Bezafibrate Cash Proceeds is less than the principal amount of the DIP Note the Corporation shall issue common shares to the

Vendor having an aggregate fair market value equal to the principal amount of the DIP Note less the Bezafibrate Cash Proceeds. Such payment(s) shall be in full and final payment and satisfaction of the amount owing by the Corporation to the Vendor under the DIP Note, such that following such cash payment and issuance, if applicable, no amount shall be owing by the Corporation to the Vendor under the DIP Note.

- (9) Intercompany Indebtedness. The Vendor shall assume any and all of the debts, liabilities and obligations owing by the Corporation to any Affiliate of the Vendor (including the amount owing by the Corporation to Aralez Pharmaceuticals Trading DAC ("Trading DAC") pursuant to a promissory note in the principal amount of USD\$2,260,000 effective as of August 8, 2018 issued by the Corporation for and in favour of Trading DAC) (collectively, the "Intercompany Indebtedness") in consideration for the issuance by the Corporation to the Vendor of a demand promissory note (the "Assumption Note") having a principal amount equal to the aggregate amount of the Intercompany Indebtedness, such that following such assumption there shall be no debts, liabilities or obligations owing by the Corporation to any Affiliate of the Vendor.
- (10) Assumption Note and Other Liabilities To Vendor. The Corporation shall repay the Assumption Note and any and all other debts, liabilities and obligations owing by the Corporation to the Vendor using all or a portion of the Bezafibrate Cash Proceeds that remain following the repayment of the DIP Note in step 8 hereof. If the remaining amount of the Bezafibrate Cash Proceeds is less than the sum of the principal amount of the Assumption Note and the aggregate amount of any and all other debts, liabilities and obligations owing by the Corporation to the Vendor, the Corporation shall issue common shares to the Vendor having an aggregate fair market value equal to the sum of the principal amount of the Assumption Note and the aggregate amount of any and all other debts, liabilities and obligations owing by the Corporation to the Vendor less the Bezafibrate Cash Proceeds paid to the Vendor pursuant to this step 10. Such payment(s) shall be in full and final payment and satisfaction of the amounts owing by the Corporation to the Vendor under the Assumption Note and under such other debts, liabilities and obligations, such that following such payment and issuance, if applicable, no amount shall be owing by the Corporation to the Vendor.
- (11) Intercompany Receivables. The Corporation shall forgive, settle and extinguish in full without repayment in respect thereof all amounts owing by the Vendor or any Affiliate thereof to the Corporation (including the amount owing by the Vendor to the Corporation under the 2017 Loan Agreement).
- (12) Bezafibrate Cash Proceeds. If any portion of the Bezafibrate Cash Proceeds remain following the payments in Steps 8 and 10 hereof, such amounts (together with any other cash of the Corporation) shall be distributed to the Vendor as a cash dividend.

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c.  
C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF ARALEZ  
PHARMACEUTICALS INC. AND ARALEZ PHARMACEUTICALS CANADA INC.

Applicants

Court File No. CV-18-603054-00CL

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ONTARIO  
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE (COMMERCIAL  
LIST)  
Proceeding commenced at Toronto

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APPROVAL AND VESTING ORDER

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STIKEMAN ELLIOTT LLP  
Barristers & Solicitors  
5300 Commerce Court West  
199 Bay Street  
Toronto, Canada M5L 1B9

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Lawyers for the Applicants

**TAB 10**

**Most Negative Treatment:** Check subsequent history and related treatments.

2017 ONCA 1014  
Ontario Court of Appeal

Ernst & Young Inc. v. Essar Global Fund Limited

2017 CarswellOnt 20162, 2017 ONCA 1014, 139 O.R. (3d) 1, 286 A.C.W.S.  
(3d) 658, 420 D.L.R. (4th) 23, 54 C.B.R. (6th) 173, 76 B.L.R. (5th) 171

**Ernst & Young Inc. in its capacity as Monitor of all of the following: Essar Steel Algoma Inc., Essar Tech Algoma Inc., Algoma Holdings B.V., Essar Steel Algoma (Alberta) ULC, Cannelton Iron Ore Company and Essar Steel Algoma Inc. USA (Plaintiff / Respondent) and Essar Global Fund Limited, Essar Power Canada Ltd., New Trinity Coal, Inc., Essar Ports Algoma Holding Inc., Algoma Port Holding Company Inc., Port of Algoma Inc., Essar Steel Limited and Essar Steel Algoma Inc. (Defendants / Appellants / Respondent)**

R.A. Blair, S.E. Pepall, K. van Rensburg JJ.A.

Heard: August 15-17, 2017  
Judgment: December 21, 2017  
Docket: CA C63581/C63588

Proceedings: affirming *Ernst & Young Inc. v. Essar Global Fund Ltd.* (2017), 137 O.R. (3d) 438, 46 C.B.R. (6th) 107, 66 B.L.R. (5th) 189, 2017 CarswellOnt 4049, 2017 ONSC 1366, Newbould J. (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); additional reasons at *Ernst & Young Inc. v. Essar Global Fund Ltd et al* (2017), 50 C.B.R. (6th) 148, 2017 ONSC 4017, 2017 CarswellOnt 12508, Newbould J. (Ont. S.C.J.); and refusing leave to appeal *Ernst & Young Inc. v. Essar Global Fund Ltd et al* (2017), 50 C.B.R. (6th) 148, 2017 ONSC 4017, 2017 CarswellOnt 12508, Newbould J. (Ont. S.C.J.); additional reasons to *Ernst & Young Inc. v. Essar Global Fund Ltd.* (2017), 137 O.R. (3d) 438, 46 C.B.R. (6th) 107, 66 B.L.R. (5th) 189, 2017 CarswellOnt 4049, 2017 ONSC 1366, Newbould J. (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])

Counsel: Patricia D.S. Jackson, Andrew D. Gray, Jeremy Opolsky, Alexandra Shelley, Davida Shiff, for Appellants, Essar Global Fund Limited, New Trinity Coal, Inc., Essar Ports Algoma Holding Inc., Essar Ports Canada Holding Inc., Algoma Port Holding Company Inc., Port of Algoma Inc., and Essar Steel Limited

Clifton P. Prophet, Nicholas Kluge, Delna Contractor, for Respondent, Ernst & Young Inc. in its capacity as Monitor of Essar Steel Algoma Inc. et al.

Eliot N. Kolers, Patrick Corney, for Respondent, Essar Steel Algoma Inc.  
Peter H. Griffin, Monique Jilesen, Kim Nusbaum, for Appellants, GIP Primus, L.P. and  
Brightwood Loan Services LLC

**Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency

XVII Practice and procedure in courts

XVII.8 Costs

XVII.8.d Award of costs

XVII.8.d.i General principles

Bankruptcy and insolvency

XVII Practice and procedure in courts

XVII.9 Miscellaneous

Business associations

III Specific matters of corporate organization

III.3 Shareholders

III.3.e Shareholders' remedies

III.3.e.i Derivative actions

III.3.e.i.A At common law

III.3.e.i.A.5 Miscellaneous

Business associations

III Specific matters of corporate organization

III.3 Shareholders

III.3.e Shareholders' remedies

III.3.e.ii Relief from oppression

III.3.e.ii.B Standing to apply

III.3.e.ii.B.4 Miscellaneous

Business associations

III Specific matters of corporate organization

III.3 Shareholders

III.3.e Shareholders' remedies

III.3.e.ii Relief from oppression

III.3.e.ii.C Oppressive conduct

III.3.e.ii.C.3 Corporate governance

Business associations

III Specific matters of corporate organization

III.3 Shareholders

III.3.e Shareholders' remedies

III.3.e.ii Relief from oppression

III.3.e.ii.C Oppressive conduct

III.3.e.ii.C.5 Miscellaneous

## Headnote

Business associations --- Specific matters of corporate organization — Shareholders — Shareholders' remedies — Relief from oppression — Standing to apply — Miscellaneous

E Global acquired A Ltd. through its subsidiaries in 2007 — A Ltd. owned steel production operations and, in late 2013, was faced with liquidity crisis — Its investments were managed by E Capital — In 2016, order was granted authorizing Monitor appointed under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) to commence and continue proceedings under s. 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA) for oppression against A Ltd.'s parent, E Global and other companies owned directly or indirectly by E Global (collectively E Group) — Action arose in context of recapitalization of A Ltd. and transaction between A Ltd. and Port of Algoma Inc. (Portco), two companies indirectly owned by E Global, in which A Ltd.'s port facilities in Sault Ste. Marie were conveyed to Portco (Port Transaction) — Trial judge found Port Transaction and other conduct of E Global to be oppressive and granted remedy designed to address that oppression — E Global and some members of E Group, together with GIP, who were arm's length lenders who loaned Portco US\$150 million to effect transaction appealed on several grounds, including that Monitor lacked standing to bring oppression claim — Appeal dismissed — Monitor could be complainant under CBCA and should have been made one, however, it would only occur on rare occasions at CCAA supervising judge's discretion — CCAA supervising judge was justified in providing authorization as prima facie case was established; Monitor had reviewed and reported to court on related party transactions; oppression action served to remove insurmountable obstacle to restructuring and Monitor could efficiently advance oppression claim representing stakeholders who were not organized as group and who were similarly affected by alleged oppressive conduct.

Business associations --- Specific matters of corporate organization — Shareholders — Shareholders' remedies — Relief from oppression — Oppressive conduct — Miscellaneous

E Global acquired A Ltd. through its subsidiaries in 2007 — A Ltd. owned steel production operations and, in late 2013, was faced with liquidity crisis — Its investments were managed by E Capital — In 2016, order was granted authorizing Monitor appointed under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act to commence and continue proceedings under s. 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act for oppression against A Ltd.'s parent, E Global and other companies owned directly or indirectly by E Global (collectively E Group) — Action arose in context of recapitalization of A Ltd. and transaction between A Ltd. and Port of Algoma Inc. (Portco) two companies indirectly owned by E Global, in which A Ltd.'s port facilities in Sault Ste. Marie were conveyed to Portco (Port Transaction) — Trial judge found Port Transaction and other conduct of E Global to be oppressive and granted remedy designed to address that oppression — E Global and some members of E Group, together with GIP, who were arm's length lenders who loaned Portco US\$150 million to effect transaction appealed on basis trial judge erred in tailoring remedy — Appeal dismissed — Trial judge had broad latitude to fashion oppression remedy based on facts before him — Trial judge properly identified need to avoid overly broad remedy and varying transaction as he did was one such way — Trial judge's remedy removed Portco's control rights and after GIP was paid, restored Port to the ownership of A Ltd. — Remedy was responsive to

oppressive conduct unlike award of damages — Further, remedy granted preserved security GIP had bargained for and therefore GIP did not suffer any prejudice as result of remedy — Regarding issue of set-off, trial judge's subsequent ruling was full answer to GIP's submissions and ensured that GIP would not suffer any prejudice as result of remedy granted in response to E Global's oppressive conduct.

Business associations --- Specific matters of corporate organization — Shareholders — Shareholders' remedies — Derivative actions — At common law — Miscellaneous

E Global acquired A Ltd. through its subsidiaries in 2007 — A Ltd. owned steel production operations and, in late 2013, was faced with liquidity crisis — Its investments were managed by E Capital — In 2016, order was granted authorizing Monitor appointed under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act to commence and continue proceedings under s. 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act for oppression against A Ltd.'s parent, E Global and other companies owned directly or indirectly by E Global — Action arose in context of recapitalization of A Ltd. and transaction between A Ltd. and Port of Algoma Inc. (Portco), two companies indirectly owned by E Global, in which A Ltd.'s port facilities in Sault Ste. Marie were conveyed to Portco (Port Transaction) — Trial judge found Port Transaction and other conduct of E Global to be oppressive and granted remedy designed to address that oppression — E Global, along with some companies directly or indirectly owned by E Global, together with GIP, who were arm's length lenders who loaned Portco US\$150 million to effect transaction appealed on several grounds including alleged harm was to A Ltd. and appropriate redress was derivative action — Appeal dismissed — Court affirmed principles that derivative action and oppression remedy were not mutually exclusive and that there may be circumstances giving rise overlapping derivative actions and oppression remedies where harm was done both to corporation and to stakeholders in their separate stakeholder capacities — Question was whether impugned conduct was "oppressive" and, if so, whether stakeholder suffered harm in its capacity as stakeholder as result of that conduct.

Business associations --- Specific matters of corporate organization — Shareholders — Shareholders' remedies — Relief from oppression — Oppressive conduct — Corporate governance

Business judgment rule — E Global acquired A Ltd. through its subsidiaries in 2007 — A Ltd. owned steel production operations and, in late 2013, was faced with liquidity crisis — Its investments were managed by E Capital — In 2016, order was granted authorizing Monitor appointed under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act to commence and continue proceedings under s. 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act for oppression against A Ltd.'s parent, E Global and other companies owned directly or indirectly by E Global (collectively E Group) — Action arose in context of recapitalization of A Ltd. and transaction between A Ltd. and Port of Algoma Inc. (Portco), two companies indirectly owned by E Global, in which A Ltd.'s port facilities in Sault Ste. Marie were conveyed to Portco (Port Transaction) — Trial judge found Port Transaction and other conduct of E Global to be oppressive and granted remedy designed to address that oppression — E Global and some members of E Group, together with GIP, who were arm's length lenders who loaned Portco US\$150 million to effect transaction appealed —

Appeal dismissed — There was evidence of subjective expectations before trial judge, who also drew reasonable inferences from evidence and circumstances that existed at A Ltd. that supported expectations Monitor relied upon — Trial judge did not err in his analysis of wrongful conduct and harm as there was recognition that stakeholders were neither party to nor involved in amended plan of arrangement proceedings — Trial judge made his finding of wrongful conduct on totality of E Global's conduct regarding recapitalization and Port Transaction — Trial judge had not misunderstood E Global's contribution to recapitalization — Causal connection between E Global's Equity Commitment and Port Transaction was factual matter and trial judge's factual finding was supported by evidence — Trial judge also correctly described business judgment rule however appellate court added rule shielded business decisions from court intervention only where they were made prudently and in good faith, and rule's protection was available only to extent that Board of Directors' actions actually evidenced their business.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Practice and procedure in courts — Costs — Award of costs — General principles

A Ltd. owned steel production operations and, in late 2013, was faced with liquidity crisis — Its investments were managed by E Capital — In 2016, order was granted authorizing Monitor appointed under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act to commence and continue proceedings under s. 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act for oppression against A Ltd.'s parent, E Global and other companies owned directly or indirectly by E Global — GIP, who were arm's length lenders, sought costs against monitor on partial indemnity scale of \$750,156.18 on basis that relief sought by monitor at various times in one form or another would have affected GIP security — Monitor acknowledged that if only position taken by GIP was scope of relief, they were entitled to costs but GIP took broader attack, including whether monitor had standing to bring action, contending they had veto provision in was commercially reasonable and fair value of transaction was established, none of which was established — GIP appealed oppression decision and requested appellate court order that it was error to find that monitor was proper complainant or to find oppression of A Ltd. and thus it was contended that GIP could not say it was wholly successful — Court was not privy to GIP's strategy in filing its appeal and issues had been decided at first instance but may be appealed — In circumstances, success was divided between monitor and GIP and no order was made to costs — GIP applied for leave to appeal costs award — Application dismissed — There was no basis on which to interfere with costs award of trial judge as there was no error in principle in trial judge's exercise of discretion.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Practice and procedure in courts — Miscellaneous

**Held:**

**Table of Authorities**

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*Brant Investments Ltd. v. KeepRite Inc.* (1991), 1 B.L.R. (2d) 225, 3 O.R. (3d) 289, 45 O.A.C. 320, 80 D.L.R. (4th) 161, 1991 CarswellOnt 133 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

*CW Shareholdings Inc. v. WIC Western International Communications Ltd.* (1998), 160 D.L.R. (4th) 131, 1998 CarswellOnt 1891, 38 B.L.R. (2d) 196, 39 O.R. (3d) 755, 61 O.T.C. 81 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

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*Fedel v. Tan* (2010), 2010 ONCA 473, 2010 CarswellOnt 4658, 83 C.C.E.L. (3d) 60, 70 B.L.R. (4th) 157, 101 O.R. (3d) 481, 264 O.A.C. 144 (Ont. C.A.) — followed

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*Ivaco Inc., Re* (2006), 2006 CarswellOnt 6292, 56 C.C.P.B. 1, 2006 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8218 (headnote only), 25 C.B.R. (5th) 176, 83 O.R. (3d) 108, 275 D.L.R. (4th) 132, 26 B.L.R. (4th) 43 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

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*Sengmueller v. Sengmueller* (1994), 17 O.R. (3d) 208, 69 O.A.C. 312, 111 D.L.R. (4th) 19, 25 C.P.C. (3d) 61, 2 R.F.L. (4th) 232, 1994 CarswellOnt 375 (Ont. C.A.) — followed

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Generally — referred to

s. 13 — considered

*Canada Business Corporations Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44

Generally — referred to

s. 192 — considered

s. 238 — considered

s. 238 "complainant" (d) — considered

s. 239 — considered

s. 241 — considered

s. 241(1) — considered

s. 241(2) — considered

s. 241(3) — considered

*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 11 — considered

s. 11.7(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 23 — considered

s. 23(1)(c) — considered

s. 23(1)(k) — considered

***S.E. Pepall J.A.:***

1 This appeal concerns a successful oppression action brought pursuant to s. 241 of the *Canada Business Corporations Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44 (the "*CBCA*"). It involves the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (the "*CCAA*") restructuring proceedings of the respondent, Essar Steel Algoma Inc. ("Algoma")<sup>1</sup>, one of Canada's largest integrated steel mills and the respondent, Ernst & Young Inc., the court-appointed Monitor.

2 The supervising *CCAA* judge authorized the Monitor to commence an action for oppression against Algoma's parent, the appellant Essar Global Fund Limited ("Essar Global"), and the remaining appellants, other companies owned directly or indirectly by Essar Global (the "Essar Group"). The action arose in the context of a recapitalization of Algoma and a transaction between Algoma and Port of Algoma Inc. ("Portco"), two companies indirectly owned by Essar Global, in which Algoma's port facilities in Sault Ste. Marie (the "Port") were conveyed to Portco.

3 Portco is a single purpose company established by Essar Global. As Portco's name suggests, it currently controls the Sault Ste. Marie Port. Portco obtained control in November 2014 in a transaction between Algoma, Portco, and Essar Global (the "Port Transaction"). The Port Transaction effectively provided Portco with the ability to veto any change in control of Algoma's business. The interveners below and appellants on appeal, GIP Primus, L.P. and Brightwood Loan Services LLC (collectively "GIP"), are arm's length lenders who loaned Portco US\$150 million to effect the transaction.

4 The trial judge found the Port Transaction and other conduct of Essar Global to be oppressive and granted a remedy that was designed to address that oppression. Essar Global and some of the members of the Essar Group, together with GIP, appeal from that judgment. The appellants advance a number of arguments, many of them factual, in support of their appeal. The appellants' two principal legal submissions are first, that the Monitor lacked standing to bring an oppression claim and second, that the alleged harm was to Algoma and that therefore the appropriate redress was a derivative action.

5 For the reasons that follow, I would dismiss the appeal.

## **A. FACTS**

### ***(1) Algoma's Operations***

6 The City of Sault Ste. Marie sits on the shore of St. Mary's River, a waterway that links Lake Superior to Lake Huron at the heart of the Great Lakes, close to the Canada/U.S. border. The steel production operations that are owned by Algoma have been the primary employer and economic engine of the City since construction of the steel mill in 1901. Not surprisingly, the City's Port, which is situated next to Algoma's buildings and facilities, is integral to the steel operations. Indeed, Algoma is the Port's primary customer and its employees have traditionally run the Port operations. Raw materials used to produce steel are shipped to the Port and the steel that is produced is shipped to market from the Port. The relationship is one of mutual dependence.

7 Unfortunately, Algoma was in and out of *CCAA* protection proceedings both in 1991 and in 2001. In late 2013, Algoma faced another liquidity crisis and restructured under the *CBCA* in 2014. The recent *CCAA* filing occurred on November 9, 2015.

### ***(2) The Essar Group***

8 Essar Global is a Cayman Islands limited liability company and the ultimate parent of the respondent Algoma, which it acquired through its subsidiaries in 2007. Essar Global is also the parent of the appellants Portco, Essar Power Canada Ltd., New Trinity Coal Inc., Essar Ports Algoma Holding Inc., Algoma Port Holding Company Inc., and Essar Steel Limited. Its

investments are managed by Essar Capital Limited ("Essar Capital"), which is based in London, England. These companies are part of the Essar Group, a multinational conglomerate that was founded in India by two brothers, Sashi and Ravi Ruia. Members of the Ruia family are the beneficial owners of the Essar Group.

### *(3) Algoma's Recapitalization*

9 In late 2013, Algoma was facing a liquidity crisis. Algoma anticipated being unable to meet a coupon payment due to unsecured bondholders in June 2014, and its US\$346 million term loan was to mature in September 2014. Although Essar Global had been injecting substantial funds into Algoma, it was hesitant to advance further cash to Algoma. Algoma decided to consider mechanisms to restructure and reduce its debt and therefore embarked on a recapitalization project.

10 At the time of the discussions relating to the recapitalization, Algoma's Board of Directors consisted of five appointees affiliated with the Ruia family or the Essar Group, and three independent directors. In early January 2014, the Board of Directors placed responsibility for Algoma's recapitalization efforts in the hands of Essar Global and Essar Capital employees. Algoma personnel had no day-to-day control over the recapitalization project.

11 Although the three independent directors had begun expressing concerns about their roles on the Board as early as the fall of 2013, in the face of Algoma's serious financial challenges, their concerns became more acute. Specifically, they were concerned that their requests for timely, full disclosure of information and full participation in the strategic decisions of the Board had not been properly taken into account by the other Board members. On January 19, 2014, the three sent a memo to the Board proposing the establishment of an independent committee to work with outside financial advisors to evaluate options and alternatives for Algoma's recapitalization. The Board held a meeting on February 11, 2014, and rejected this proposal by a vote of four to three, the three being the independent directors. In response, one of the three independent directors resigned. The other two initially remained on the Board.

12 On February 17, 2014, one of the remaining independent directors, Thomas Dodds, wrote to Prashant Ruia seeking a meeting. Prashant Ruia was then the vice-chair of Algoma's Board, the son of one of the founders of Essar Group, and a director of Essar Capital. Mr. Dodds wrote:

If your expectation of [the Algoma] Board is to simply be a formality and our role as independent directors is to essentially "rubberstamp" shareholder and management decisions, we are not prepared to continue serving as directors.

As you know, Directors and particularly independent directors have a legal, fiduciary responsibility to all the stakeholders of the Company starting with the Company first, followed by the shareholders, employees, community and others. This Director responsibility may on occasion conflict with the objectives of the shareholder who may, understandably, be

more interested in matters of import to themselves. Most of the time there will be no conflict between the responsibilities of the Directors, objectives of the shareholder and that of the Company stakeholders as broadly defined. However, there are other occasions when they do.

What we as independent directors have experienced in the last few Board meetings is a complete disregard for any discussion or wholesome debate on alternatives to re-financing or contingency planning at [Algoma].

...

In addition when we ask questions, or propose alternatives, we are asked to wait a while for additional information and told that everything will work out.

We cannot discharge our responsibilities under such an environment.

13 The two remaining independent directors resigned on February 21 and May 5, 2014, respectively. In his resignation letter, Mr. Dodds explained his rationale, stating:

I lacked confidence that I was receiving information and engaged in decision-making in the same manner as those Board members who are directly affiliated with the company or its parent.

14 The trial judge found, at para. 15 of his reasons, that the four directors who voted against the independent committee were "Essar-affiliated directors", that it was clear that the Ruia family did not want an independent committee, and that the Essar-affiliated directors voted accordingly.

15 The trial judge also found that the recapitalization and the Port Transaction were run by Joe Seifert, Chief Investment Officer of Essar Capital. The trial judge rejected the contention that Mr. Seifert was merely an advisor to the Board that independently made all of the critical decisions. Rather, Essar Global and Essar Capital, led by Mr. Seifert, directed and made decisions relating to the recapitalization and the Port Transaction. As the trial judge noted at para. 49, the evidence was "overwhelming" that Essar Global and Essar Capital were "calling the shots".

#### ***(4) Restructuring Support Agreement***

16 Essar Global engaged Barclays Capital, an investment bank, to pursue alternative financing structures for Algoma on behalf of Essar Global. Barclays introduced GIP to Mr. Seifert of Essar Capital. In May 2014, representatives of Essar Global, GIP, and Barclays met to discuss Algoma's infrastructure assets and potential asset disposition transactions. They discussed the possibility of a transaction in which Algoma might sell its Port assets to a new corporate entity to generate cash proceeds, but not for the purpose of recapitalizing Algoma. Rather, the proceeds would flow upstream to Essar Global. In light of Algoma's prior insolvencies, GIP thought it important that a separate corporate entity distinct from Algoma be established to hold the Port assets. By the end

of June 2014, Algoma had an exclusivity agreement with GIP regarding GIP's loan to finance the Port Transaction.

17 Soon after entering into the exclusivity agreement with GIP, on July 24, 2014, Algoma entered into a Restructuring Support Agreement (the "RSA") with Essar Global and an *ad hoc* committee of Algoma's unsecured noteholders. The RSA set out the principal terms of a restructuring. It provided for a reduction of Algoma's debt through the exchange of the unsecured notes in return for the payment of a percentage of their original principal amount and the issuance of new notes. The note restructuring would be implemented through a court-approved *CBCA* Plan of Arrangement. As a condition of the RSA and pursuant to an Equity Commitment Letter dated July 23, 2014, Essar Global agreed to acquire equity in Algoma for cash in the minimum amount of US\$250 million and subject to a maximum of US\$300 million. The trial judge found that Essar Global never intended to honour this obligation.

18 The Equity Commitment Letter provided a remedy in the event of a breach. The Plan of Arrangement contained a release of any claim arising out of the Equity Commitment Letter in favour of Essar Global, the noteholders, and the other corporations participating in the Arrangement.

19 It was a condition of the proposed Plan of Arrangement that Essar Global would comply with its RSA obligation to provide the aforementioned cash equity infusion. However, as early as March 28, 2014, representatives of the Ruia family had made it clear that they did not have US\$250 million for equity. Efforts were made to reduce Essar Global's contribution. In late July 2014, one of the Ruia representatives wrote that ideally the equity contribution would be kept to US\$150 to US\$160 million.

20 Nonetheless, an application for approval of the Plan of Arrangement was made to the court. The recapitalization contemplated by the RSA was approved as an arrangement under s. 192 of the *CBCA* on September 15, 2014.

21 Beginning in October 2014, roadshow presentations were made to market the securities being offered through the recapitalization. However the transaction marketed did not accord with the transaction contemplated by the RSA. First, the roadshow presentation described an Essar Global cash equity contribution in Algoma of less than US\$100 million, not the US\$250 to US\$300 million described in the RSA. Second, the presentation provided for the cash to be generated from the sale of the Port by Algoma. The RSA did not allow for such a sale absent the noteholders' consent. No such consent had been obtained. In addition, the proceeds of any sale were to be used to reduce Algoma's debt.

22 The roadshow was unsuccessful and investors failed to subscribe for the securities marketed. The lead bookrunner attributed this failure to the perception among investors that the transaction

described in the roadshow presentation contemplated an insufficient contribution of equity into Algoma by Essar Global.

23 And so it was that Algoma was left without the cash to repay or refinance its debt.

24 Ultimately, the RSA was amended on November 6, 2014, such that Essar Global contributed US\$150 million rather than the cash contribution of between US\$250 and US\$300 million originally contemplated by the Equity Commitment Letter. The amended RSA went on to provide that upon fulfillment of this revised contribution, Essar Global was deemed to have satisfied all of its obligations under the Equity Commitment Letter. The releases contained in the original filing were repeated in the amended Plan of Arrangement.

25 As subsequently discussed, in light of the amended RSA, an amended Plan of Arrangement was approved on November 10, 2014.

#### ***(5) Port Transaction***

26 The Port Transaction closed on November 14, 2014. In summary, Algoma sold to Portco the Port assets consisting of the Port buildings, the plant, and machinery, but not the land. Algoma leased the realty to Portco for a term of 50 years. Portco agreed to provide Port cargo handling services in return for a monthly payment from Algoma to Portco. Algoma agreed to provide to Portco the services necessary to operate the Port in return for a monthly payment from Portco that would be less than the monthly payment paid by Algoma to Portco for cargo handling services.

27 Turning to the details of the Port Transaction, Algoma and Portco entered into a Master Sale and Purchase Agreement ("MSPA"). Under the MSPA:

(i) Algoma conveyed to Portco all of the fixed assets owned and used by Algoma in relation to the Port, and agreed to lease the realty to Portco;

(ii) Portco agreed to pay Algoma US\$171.5 million to be satisfied by:

- a cash payment by Portco of US\$151.66 million; and
- the issuance of an unsecured promissory note in the amount of US\$19.84 million payable in full on November 13, 2015.

28 To fund these obligations, Portco obtained a US\$150 million term loan from GIP. GIP Primus, L.P. lent US\$125 million, while Brightwood Loan Services LLC lent US\$25 million. This term loan was secured by all of Portco's current and future real and personal property and supported by two guarantees in favour of GIP: one from Essar Global, and another from Algoma Port Holding Company Inc., Portco's direct parent.

29 Pursuant to the MSPA, Algoma and Portco executed five additional documents: a promissory note, a lease, a Shared Services Agreement, an Assignment of Material Contracts Agreement, and a Cargo Handling Agreement.

*(i) Promissory Note*

30 The promissory note was for US\$19.84 million payable by Portco to Algoma. Portco immediately assigned its obligations under the promissory note to Essar Global. Essar Global therefore became the obligor under the note and Algoma released Portco from its obligation. As of the date of the trial, the promissory note remained unpaid. At para. 27 of a subsequent decision released on June 26, 2017, the trial judge granted a declaration that any amounts owing to Algoma under the promissory note given by Portco to Algoma have been set-off against amounts owing by Algoma to Portco under the Cargo Handling Agreement: [*Essar Steel Algoma Inc. et al Re*] 2017 ONSC 3930, 53 C.B.R. (6th) 321 (Ont. S.C.J.). The decision allows for set-off against Portco, but preserves GIP's right to repayment.

*(ii) Lease*

31 Under the lease, Portco leased from Algoma the Port lands, roads, and outdoor storage space for a 50-year term. Portco prepaid Algoma the rent for the entire 50-year period. The present value of this leasehold interest was stated to be US\$154.8 million. Algoma maintained responsibility for all maintenance, repairs, insurance, and property taxes.

*(iii) Shared Services Agreement*

32 Under the Shared Services Agreement, Algoma was to be responsible for providing all the services necessary for Portco to fulfill its obligations under the Cargo Handling Agreement. These services were to be provided by Algoma employees, not Portco employees. Portco agreed to pay Algoma US\$11 million annually subject to escalation at the rate of 3 percent per annum beginning in 2016.

*(iv) Assignment of Material Contracts*

33 Under the Assignment of Material Contracts Agreement, Algoma provided a covenant in favour of GIP, which precluded Algoma from selling or assigning any material contract relating to the Port, including the Cargo Handling Agreement except by way of security granted to its other third party lender.

*(v) Cargo Handling Agreement*

34 Under the Cargo Handling Agreement, Portco agreed to provide Algoma with cargo handling services for an initial 20-year term with automatic renewal for successive three-year periods unless

either party gave written notice of termination to the other. Algoma agreed to pay Portco based on tonnage with a minimum monthly assured volume of US\$3 million. In other words, Algoma was obliged to pay a minimum of US\$36 million annually to Portco for 20 years subject to an escalation in price of 1 percent per annum commencing in 2016. Therefore, while Algoma was entitled to US\$11 million annually under the Shared Services Agreement, it had to pay Portco at least US\$36 million annually under the Cargo Handling Agreement, such that Portco would receive an annual revenue stream from Algoma of US\$25 million. This amount was intended to service GIP's term loan at US\$25 million a year. However, GIP's loan had a term of eight years, and therefore Portco would have the full benefit of the US\$25 million for at least 12 years of the initial 20-year term of the Cargo Handling Agreement, and potentially for 42 years if the Agreement was not terminated.

35 Section 15.2 of the Cargo Handling Agreement also contained a change of control clause that stated that the "Agreement may not be assigned by either Party without the prior written consent of the other Party." This provision became particularly contentious because it effectively gave Portco — and therefore Portco's parent, Essar Global — a veto over any party acquiring Algoma in the CCAA proceedings.

36 Although inclusion of the change of control provision in the Cargo Handling Agreement was driven by GIP, the trial judge found that it was effectively for the benefit of Essar Global, as it gave Portco a veto. Furthermore, the trial judge noted at para. 117 that Essar Global had in fact relied on s. 15.2 to its benefit, by holding out its change of control rights to dissuade competing bidders for Algoma in the restructuring process while Essar Global continued to express its own interest as a prospective bidder.

37 In discussing the financial ramifications of the Shared Services Agreement and the Cargo Handling Agreement, the trial judge observed at para. 26 of his reasons:

When the costs of operating the Port (shared services) are netted from the cargo handling charges, the result is that Algoma will pay approximately \$25 million per year to Portco, which is the amount required by Portco to service the Term Loan each year. That amount of \$25 million for 20 years comes to \$500 million, far more than the amount needed to repay the \$150 million GIP loan.

38 Duff & Phelps assessed the fair value of the Portco Transaction as ranging between US\$150.9 million and US\$174.2 million with a midpoint of US\$161.7 million. However, this assessment failed to take into account the change of control provision in the Cargo Handling Agreement. Deloitte LLP reviewed Duff & Phelps' assessment and concluded it was reasonable.<sup>2</sup>

#### ***(6) Final Recapitalization***

39 Ultimately the recapitalization of Algoma consisted of the following transactions:

- (a) Algoma issued US\$375 million in senior secured notes pursuant to an offering memorandum;
- (b) Algoma entered into a new US\$50 million senior secured asset-based revolving credit facility and a new US\$375 million term loan;
- (c) Algoma's unsecured noteholders were paid a portion of their principal and were issued new junior secured notes;
- (d) Algoma completed the Port Transaction;
- (e) Essar Global contributed US\$150 million in cash in exchange for common equity, and also contributed US\$150 million in debt forgiveness; and
- (f) All other Algoma lenders were repaid in full.

40 In addition, GIP entered into a secured term loan for US\$150 million with Portco, secured by a GSA over all of Portco's assets. It also received guarantees — one from Essar Global and one from Algoma Port Holding Company Inc. — guaranteeing Portco's liabilities. In November 2014, the transactions in furtherance of Algoma's recapitalization, including the Port Transaction, were approved unanimously by Algoma's Board of Directors after receiving advice and on the recommendation of Algoma's management. By this time, the Board consisted of four directors: Mr. Kishore Mirchandani, who became a director on June 23, 2014; Mr. Naresh Kothari, who became a director on August 24, 2014; the Board's chair, Mr. Jatinder Mehra of Essar Global; and Algoma's CEO, Mr. Kalyan Ghosh. Mr. Ghosh, and Mr. Rajat Marwah, Algoma's CFO, both testified that they supported the Port Transaction not because it was ideal, but because there was no other option given Essar Global's failure to capitalize Algoma as it had committed to do.

41 As mentioned, the approved Plan of Arrangement that included the original RSA had to be amended in light of the revised equity contribution. A *CBCA* Plan of Arrangement incorporating the recapitalization and authorizing the amendment of the September 2014 approval order was granted by Morawetz J. on November 10, 2014.

42 Based on the materials before this court, it would appear that the Port Transaction was not mentioned or brought to Morawetz J.'s attention. In this regard, the trial judge found that there was no reference to the Port Transaction in the affidavits filed in support of the amendment to the Plan of Arrangement. The Port Transaction is not mentioned in that order or in any endorsement.

43 The outcome of the Port Transaction was that all Port assets were transferred from Algoma to Portco, the Port lands were leased to Portco for 50 years, and Portco obtained change of control rights. Portco paid Algoma US\$151,660,501.50 in cash, provided the US\$19,840,000 promissory note, and was obliged to pay Algoma US\$11 million per annum under the Shared

Services Agreement. In turn, Algoma was obliged to pay Portco US\$36 million per annum for an initial term of 20 years under the Cargo Handling Agreement, subject to renewal, netting Portco US\$25 million per annum as against the Shared Services Agreement payments. Meanwhile, under the revised RSA, Essar Global contributed cash of US\$150 million to Algoma rather than the original cash commitment of US\$250 to US\$300 million.

### ***(7) Insolvency Protection Proceedings***

44 On November 9, 2015, Newbould J. granted an order placing Algoma, Essar Tech Algoma Inc., Algoma Holdings B.V., Essar Steel Algoma (Alberta) ULC, Cannelton Iron Ore Company, and Essar Steel Algoma Inc. USA (the "CCAA Applicants") under CCAA protection. As mentioned, he appointed Ernst & Young Inc. as the Monitor. The order contained various paragraphs addressing the rights and obligations of the Monitor, including a direction to perform such duties as were required by the Court. On November 20, 2015, Morawetz J. granted an Amended and Restated Initial Order that, among other things, directed the Monitor to review and report to the Court on any related party transactions (expressly including the Port Transaction).

45 During the CCAA proceedings, on February 10, 2016, a sales and investment solicitation process ("SISP") for Algoma's business and property was approved by the Court. Essar North America, a subsidiary of Essar Global, submitted a bid but was disqualified in April 2016 under the terms of the SISP because it failed to provide sufficient evidence of financial ability to purchase. In May and July of 2016, Essar Global persisted in its efforts to be the purchaser of the CCAA Applicants. On May 10, 2016, counsel to Portco, who was also counsel to Essar Global, wrote to counsel for Algoma to highlight matters of particular concern in connection with the CCAA process. The letter stated that any prospective bidder was to be told of the consent or veto right:

Portco and [Algoma] are party to a Cargo Handling Agreement pursuant to which [Algoma] has committed to long-term use of the port. Portco, has, of course, a keen interest in any successor to [Algoma] as counterparty to that agreement and would like it to be clear to prospective bidders that, pursuant to the terms of the Cargo Handling Agreement, Portco has a consent right in the event of any assignment by [Algoma] of the agreement or a change of control of [Algoma].

Again please confirm that this has been made clear to prospective bidders.

46 On June 20, 2016, the Monitor filed its Thirteenth Report, which described the Portco Transaction and indicated that there may be grounds for further review of that transaction. The Monitor noted that the renegotiated equity commitment resulted in Essar Global contributing the sum of US\$150 million in equity rather than US\$250 to US\$300 million, and that the Portco Transaction transferred control of one of Algoma's most critical assets, the Port, to Essar Global. The Monitor stated that it remained "particularly concerned about the effect on the completion of a restructuring transaction of the restrictions on assignment in the Portco Transaction documents."

47 On September 26, 2016, Deutsche Bank AG, who led the Debtor-in-Possession ("DIP") Lenders of Algoma and also represented the interests of potential bidders in the *CCAA* process, applied for an order empowering the Monitor to commence certain proceedings and make certain investigations.<sup>3</sup> On September 26, 2016, Newbould J. granted an order authorizing the Monitor to commence and continue proceedings under s. 241 of the *CBCA* in relation to related party transactions, including but not limited to the Port Transaction.

48 The action proceeded on an accelerated timetable due to the progress of the *CCAA* restructuring.<sup>4</sup> On October 20, 2016, the Monitor commenced proceedings claiming oppression pursuant to s. 241 of the *CBCA* against Essar Global and others in the Essar Group including Portco. It pleaded that by reason of its role as a court officer directed to commence the oppression proceedings and to oversee the interests of all stakeholders of Algoma, it was a complainant within the meaning of ss. 238 and 241 of the *CBCA*.

49 It alleged that since June 2007, the Essar Group had exercised *de facto* control over Algoma and had engaged in a course of conduct that consistently preferred the interests of the Essar Group and in particular, Essar Global, to those of Algoma and its stakeholders. This included the transfer to the Essar Group of long-term control over, and a valuable equity interest in, Algoma's Port facilities, an irreplaceable and core strategic asset of Algoma. The value of control over the Port to Algoma and its stakeholders was immeasurable, since Algoma's business could not function without access to the Port.

50 The Monitor pointed out that the Essar Group obtained its control and equity interest in the Port through a cash contribution of less than US\$4.7 million. It pleaded that the US\$150 million raised as part of the Port Transaction came from third party lenders, namely GIP, and was money raised against the security and value of the Port facilities, an asset of Algoma, as well as a promissory note that remained unpaid, and a guarantee from Essar Global. The Monitor also stressed that the control obtained by the Essar Group was not only over the Port facilities, but extended to any sale of the Algoma business such that Essar Global had an indirect veto on transactions involving Algoma's enterprise. Essar Global also obtained a right to substantial payments under the Cargo Handling Agreement.

51 The oppression occasioned was exacerbated by the fact that the borrowed monies raised through the transaction were a substitution for monies Essar Global had promised to contribute as equity in Algoma.

52 The Monitor also argued that s. 15.2 of the Cargo Handling Agreement itself constituted oppression, because it was for the long-term benefit of Essar Global and not in the interests of Algoma's non-shareholder stakeholders. The Monitor took the position that the provision gave Portco and Essar Global a veto over any party acquiring Algoma in the *CCAA* process, thus

negatively affecting the sales process. The Monitor also argued that the change of control provision was not necessary for the protection of GIP because it had its own change of control rights under its credit agreement.

53 In addition, the Monitor pleaded that the oppression and prejudice to creditors was continuing as Essar Global and other related companies had insisted that bidders for Algoma's business under the SISP, which was approved by the court on February 11, 2016, be advised of Portco's consent rights under the change of control clause in the Cargo Handling Agreement.

54 Essar Global and the remaining defendants filed their defence rejecting the Monitor's allegations, describing the action as "an improper and ill-conceived leverage tactic". They asserted that the litigation was an attempt to attack the Port Transaction for the benefit of other bidders under the sales process, including the DIP Lenders. They pleaded that the Monitor had no standing, the claim was improperly pleaded, an oppression remedy seeking to unwind or claim damages in respect of the Port Transaction was unavailable at law, and in any event there was no oppression, prejudice, or unfairness.

55 Portco's lenders, GIP, were granted intervener status as parties on December 22, 2016. They noted that they were *bona fide*, arm's length, and independent commercial parties and no cause of action or wrongful conduct was asserted by the Monitor against them. Nonetheless, the Monitor was seeking remedies that eviscerated the security held by them. They asserted that the Monitor did not have standing and could not establish any oppressive conduct in any event. Moreover, the structure of the Port Transaction was transparent to all of Algoma's stakeholders. Lastly, even if the court granted a remedy to the Monitor, it had no jurisdiction to prejudice the interests of GIP. The Monitor subsequently amended its statement of claim to modify the language on the relief claimed relating to the indebtedness and security interests in favour of GIP.

56 Various procedural motions were brought. Others who are not before this court intervened: Deutsche Bank AG; the Ad Hoc Committee of Algoma's Noteholders; Algoma Retirees; and two locals from the union United Steelworkers, Locals 2724 and 2251. The Essar Group and GIP brought motions to strike on the basis that the Monitor lacked standing and later also sought an order for particulars. On December 1, 2016, Newbould J. ordered that the standing motions be dealt with at the trial scheduled for January 30, 2017. On January 5, 2017, he urged the Monitor to give as many particulars as it could regarding the relief it might seek.

57 On January 30, 2017, Essar Capital served a motion for an order re-opening the SISP and to make information available to Essar Global to allow it to consider submitting a bid. Newbould J. dismissed the request. At para. 114 of his reasons, the trial judge found that Essar Global was still interested in purchasing the assets of Algoma.

58 The action proceeded to a five-day trial before Newbould J. commencing on January 31, 2017.

## B. TRIAL JUDGMENT

59 The trial judge organized his reasons for decision under six principal headings: the Monitor's standing; who directed the recapitalization and the Port Transaction; reasonable expectations and were they violated; the business judgment rule; and the appropriate remedy. I will summarize his conclusions on each issue.

### (1) Monitor's Standing

60 As mentioned, both Essar Global and GIP challenged the Monitor's standing as a complainant under the oppression provisions of the *CBCA*. They also argued that only persons directly damaged by the oppressive conduct could bring the action and that this action was in substance a derivative claim by Algoma. The trial judge rejected these arguments.

61 He found that the stakeholders harmed were Algoma's trade creditors, pensioners, retirees, and employees. At para. 32, he noted that Algoma owed CDN\$911.9 million as of the date of the Port Transaction to a group of creditors including trade creditors, pensioners, retirees, and the City of St. Sault Marie.

62 The trial judge acknowledged at para. 34 that normally a monitor, who is a court officer, is to be neutral and not take sides. However, there are exceptions. Under s. 23(1)(k) of the *CCAA*, a monitor must carry out any function in relation to the debtor that the court may direct. At para. 35, the trial judge also pointed to the *CCAA* proceedings of Nortel Networks Corp. as a precedent: *Nortel Networks Corp., Re* (October 3, 2012), Doc. Toronto 09-CL-7950 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]). In those proceedings, a monitor was authorized to act as a litigant after all of Nortel's directors and senior executives had resigned.

63 Moreover, the trial judge observed that determining whether someone is a complainant under s. 238 of the *CBCA* is a discretionary decision. In *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Olympia & York Realty Corp.* (2003), 68 O.R. (3d) 544 (Ont. C.A.), this court confirmed that a trustee in bankruptcy acting on behalf of the creditors of a bankrupt estate could be a complainant within the meaning of s. 238. In so doing, the court noted the need for flexibility to ensure that the remedial purpose of the oppression provisions is achieved. The trial judge saw no reason why the principle of collective action — which posits that it is more efficient for creditors to pursue their claims in a bankruptcy collectively with a trustee acting as their representative rather than individually — should not be followed in the present *CCAA* proceeding. At para. 37, he concluded that the Monitor had taken the action as an adjunct to its role in facilitating a restructuring and was therefore a proper complainant.

64 To respond to Essar Global and GIP's arguments that the claim was properly a derivative action and that no person had been personally harmed beyond Algoma, at para. 40 the trial judge

relied on *Rea v. Wildeboer*, 2015 ONCA 373, 126 O.R. (3d) 178 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 27. There, Blair J.A. commented that the derivative action and the oppression remedy are not mutually exclusive. Although on the facts of *Wildeboer*, Blair J.A. had struck out a statement of claim pleading the oppression remedy, the trial judge distinguished *Wildeboer* on the basis that the relief sought was for the benefit of the corporation and there was no allegation that individualized personal interests were affected by the alleged wrongful conduct.

### ***(2) Essar Global Directed the Recapitalization and the Portco Transaction***

65 The trial judge observed that in some respects, it did not matter who made the decisions regarding the recapitalization and the Port Transaction — if the conduct was oppressive, relief could be granted. Nonetheless, he found at para. 49, that the evidence was "overwhelming" that Essar Global and Essar Capital were "calling the shots."

66 At para. 52, he accepted the evidence of Mr. Ghosh and Mr. Marwah that they did not negotiate the economic terms of the refinancing or the Port Transaction. Nor was either involved in the renegotiation of the RSA.

67 The trial judge relied on other evidence, including Algoma's annual Business Plan dated February 3, 2014, to support his factual findings. He also considered evidence of the witnesses. He found at paras. 56-57 that some of the witnesses had been evasive, including: Rewant Ruia, the Ruia family's lead in the Essar Group's North American operations; Mr. Seifert,; and Rajiv Saxena, the Executive Director of Essar Steel India Ltd.

68 After reviewing the evidence, the trial judge noted at para. 58 that he was satisfied that Mr. Seifert, who represented the Essar Group's interests, had primary responsibility for pursuing the recapitalization negotiations and Algoma's refinancing via the Port Transaction. He concluded at para. 60:

I am satisfied that representatives of Essar Global including Essar Capital carried out the Recapitalization and Portco Transaction negotiations and made the critical decisions. Algoma management were handed the economic terms of the Recapitalization and Port Transaction and implemented them from an operational perspective. Algoma management did not negotiate the terms. Their role was to support the negotiations with regard to non-economic, primarily operational, issues.

### ***(3) Reasonable Expectations and their Violation***

69 The trial judge identified the two-step process to determine whether a violation of reasonable expectations has occurred under s. 241 of the *CBCA*, which is described at para. 68 of *BCE Inc., Re*, 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560 (S.C.C.): (i) does the evidence support the reasonable expectation asserted by the complainant; and (ii) does the evidence establish that the reasonable

expectation was violated by conduct that is oppressive, unfairly prejudicial, or unfairly disregards a relevant interest?

70 He described the reasonable expectations asserted by the Monitor as relating to the loss by Algoma of a critical asset and the change of control clause in the Cargo Handling Agreement. He stated at para. 64:

The Monitor contends that the reasonable expectations of the creditors of Algoma, including the trade creditors, employees, pensioners and retirees, were that Algoma would not deal with its core assets like the Port in such a way as it would lose long-term control and value over those assets to a related party on terms that permitted the related party to veto or thwart Algoma's ability to do significant transactions or restructure, as was done in this case.

71 At para. 67, the trial judge did not accept that the expectations of creditors such as the employees, pensioners, and retirees were governed only by their agreements with Algoma. Furthermore, the evidence, including the inferences drawn from the circumstances that existed at Algoma in 2014, supported the expectations relied upon by the Monitor. He noted at para. 73 that stakeholders have a reasonable expectation of fair treatment and this was particularly so in Sault Ste. Marie, where Algoma is of critical importance to the local economy and relied upon greatly by trade creditors and employees.

72 He concluded at para. 75 that:

[T]he reasonable expectations of the trade creditors, the employees, pensioners and retirees of Algoma were that Algoma would not deal with a critical asset like the Port in such a way as to lose long-term control over such a strategic asset to a related party on terms that permitted the related party to veto and control Algoma's ability to do significant transactions or restructure and which gave unwarranted value to the third party.

73 The trial judge held that the reasonable expectations of the trade creditors, employees, pensioners, and retirees were violated in two principal ways: first, the Port Transaction itself; and second, the change of control veto provided to Portco, and thus Essar Global, in the Port Transaction.

74 The Port Transaction was caused by Essar Global's breach of both the RSA and the Equity Commitment Letter. Because the lease of the land from Algoma to Portco was for 50 years and Essar Global was in a position to terminate the Cargo Handling Agreement after 20 years, Algoma would be at Essar Global's mercy for the duration of these agreements. The trial judge found at para. 78 that the transfer of the Port assets to Portco was driven by GIP's desire for a "bankruptcy remote" special purpose vehicle. GIP was aware of Algoma's previous insolvencies and would only lend to a new entity that held the Port assets and that was separate from Algoma.

75 The Port Transaction and the GIP secured loan to Portco would not have been necessary had Essar Global lived up to its obligations under the RSA and the Equity Commitment Letter under which Essar Global had pledged a cash investment of US\$250 to US\$300 million. The trial judge found at para. 82 that Essar Global had no intention of living up to its promises and had acted in bad faith in this regard. The content of the roadshow presentations reflected the discordance with the RSA. The alternative transaction in the roadshow presentations contemplated cash being contributed to the recapitalization through the sale of the Port. That these presentations failed was partially attributable, as the trial judge found at para. 82, to Essar Global's insufficient contribution of cash equity into Algoma.

76 The trial judge concluded that Essar Global's decision not to fund Algoma according to the terms of the Equity Commitment Letter made it necessary to carry out the Port Transaction. GIP's loan of US\$150 million reduced the amount of cash equity Essar Global promised to advance to Algoma. Essar Global's failure to inject cash equity into Algoma as agreed was the root cause of the Port Transaction and the transfer of control. This was, as the trial judge concluded at para. 89, an exercise in bad faith. Had an independent committee of Algoma's Board of Directors been struck, Essar may have been held to its bargain rather than looking to third party financing from GIP under the Port Transaction structure. The Board's failure to examine alternatives to effect Algoma's recapitalization indicated a lack of regard for the interests of Algoma's stakeholders.

77 Additionally, the long-term value given to Essar Global by the Port Transaction was itself oppressive (although in stating this, the trial judge noted that the Monitor did not pursue its claim that the Port assets were transferred to Portco at an undervalue).

78 As for the release in the amended RSA, the trial judge observed that it was a release of any claim arising out of the Equity Commitment Letter. The trial judge found at para. 100 that the Monitor was not making a claim under that Letter, nor was it asking that Essar Global provide the equity it had promised in that commitment. Rather, Essar Global's failure to live up to its commitment was part of the factual circumstances to be taken into account in considering whether Algoma's stakeholders were treated fairly under the Port Transaction.

79 The trial judge also observed that when the court approved the amended Plan of Arrangement under the amended RSA, it did not have knowledge of the Port Transaction. There was no reference to the Port Transaction in the affidavits filed in support of the amendment to the Plan of Arrangement; there was no finding relating to the release of Essar Global; the trade creditors, the employees, pensioners and retirees were not parties to the motion approving the amended RSA; and the order was obtained without opposition.

80 Ultimately he concluded that the Port Transaction was itself unfairly prejudicial to, and unfairly disregarded, the interests of Algoma's trade creditors, employees, pensioners, and retirees.

#### ***(4) Change of Control Provision***

81 The trial judge determined at para. 104 that the change of control provision gave effective control to Portco (*i.e.* Essar Global) over who may acquire the Algoma business. Any buyer of Algoma or its business would need to be assigned the Cargo Handling Agreement so that it could operate the steel mill. Therefore the veto under this clause was effectively a veto over any change of control of the Algoma business.

82 Although the evidence indicated that the change of control provision was included for GIP's protection, the trial judge found that this end could have been achieved in other ways. For example, as the trial judge pointed out at para. 110, the parties could have included a provision in the Assignment of Material Contracts Agreement that prevented a change of control of Algoma without GIP's explicit consent. Such an alternative might have been considered had there been a committee of independent directors with advisors independent of Essar Global. But, as the trial judge concluded at para. 111, the reality was that there was no pushback on the change of control provision that was implemented, and which gave Portco/Essar Global a veto.

83 The trial judge concluded at para. 113 that the change of control provision was of considerable value to Essar Global. Furthermore, as mentioned, the trial judge stated at para. 117 that Essar Global had in fact relied on s. 15.2 to its benefit by holding out its change of control rights to dissuade competing bidders for Algoma in the restructuring process while Essar Global continued to express its own interest as a prospective bidder.

84 The May 10, 2016 letter from Portco's counsel, which sought confirmation from Algoma's counsel that prospective bidders would be advised of Portco's rights, exemplified this. In the letter, Essar Global effectively held out its consent to any change of control right to dissuade competing bidders for Algoma in the restructuring process while it continued to express its own interest as a prospective bidder. The trial judge observed at para 115 that: "[I]t is clear that the dictate of Portco through its solicitors that prospective purchasers should be made aware of the change of control provision was successful".

85 The trial judge also observed that the evidence established that Portco's right to refuse assignment of the Cargo Handling Agreement was a material impediment to restructuring Algoma as Algoma could not survive without access to the Port. He concluded that the change of control provision in favour of Portco in the Cargo Handling Agreement was unfairly prejudicial to, and unfairly disregarded, the interests of Algoma's trade creditors, employees, pensioners, and retirees.

#### ***(5) The Business Judgment Rule***

86 The trial judge also determined that the business judgment rule, which accords deference to a business decision of a Board of Directors so long as the decision lies within a range of reasonable

alternatives, did not provide a defence to Essar Global. The Board had not followed advice that it insist Essar Global comply with its commitments under the RSA and the Equity Commitment Letter. As the trial judge stated at para. 123, the result of this was the Port Transaction, which was:

[A]n exercise in self-dealing in that Algoma's critical Port asset was transferred out of Algoma to a wholly owned subsidiary of Essar Global with a change of control provision that benefitted Essar Global at a time that a future insolvency was a possibility.

87 Moreover, there was no evidence that the Board even considered whether protection to GIP could be provided in the absence of the change of control provision in favour of Portco and hence Essar Global. This failure was unreasonable.

### **(6) Remedy**

88 The trial judge stated at para. 136 that if there were no less obtrusive way to remedy the oppression, he would have ordered that Portco's shares be transferred to Algoma. However, mindful that a remedy for oppression should be approached with a scalpel, he instead relied on s. 241(3) of the *CBCA* to order a variation of the Port Transaction. He accordingly deleted s. 15.2 of the Cargo Handling Agreement and inserted a provision in the Assignment of Material Contracts Agreement, which provided that, if GIP becomes the equity owner of Portco, its consent would be required for a change of control of Algoma. He rejected the suggestion that either GIP or Essar Global were taken by surprise by this relief.

89 He also addressed the imbalance created by the 50-year term of the lease between Algoma and Portco as against the 20-year term of the Cargo Handling Agreement (with automatic renewal for successive three year periods, barring either party's termination). As the Port was critical to Algoma's operation and survival, Algoma's ability under the Cargo Handling Agreement to refuse an extension after 20 years was illusory and, in reality, the renewal provision was one-sided in favour of Essar Global.

90 He concluded at para. 144 that the payments under the Cargo Handling Agreement were an unreasonable benefit in favour of Essar Global. If the Agreement lasted only the initial 20-year term, Portco/Essar Global would receive US\$300 million after GIP's loan was paid off. If the Agreement was not terminated before the end of its 50 year life, Portco/Essar Global would receive an additional US\$750 million for the last 30 years.

91 Accordingly, the trial judge ordered that the lease, the Cargo Handling Agreement, and the Shared Services Agreement be amended to provide Algoma with the option to terminate any of these three agreements once GIP's loan matured and was paid. If Portco elected not to renew after 20 years, or any of the three-year extensions, those three agreements would terminate, and Algoma would then owe Portco US\$4.2 million plus interest.

92 The trial judge decided at para. 147 that the appropriate place for Portco to assert its claims for a declaration that the US\$19.8 million promissory note had been paid as a result of set-off and for amounts owing under the Cargo Handling Agreement was in the ongoing *CCAA* proceedings.

**(7) Costs**

93 Lastly, following the release of the judgment, Essar Global agreed to pay costs of CDN\$1.17 million to the Monitor. The trial judge then ordered Essar Global to pay Algoma CDN\$1.5 million in costs and ordered that no costs be payable by the Monitor or by or to GIP.

**C. ISSUES**

94 There are eight issues to be addressed:

1. Did the Monitor lack standing to be a complainant under s. 238 of the *CBCA*?
2. Could the claim of the Monitor only be brought as a derivative action under s. 239 of the *CBCA* rather than an oppression action under s. 241 of the *CBCA*?
3. Did the trial judge err in his analysis of reasonable expectations?
4. Did the trial judge err in his analysis of wrongful conduct and harm?
5. Did the trial judge err in tailoring a remedy?
6. Was there procedural unfairness?
7. Should the fresh evidence be admitted?
8. Should leave to appeal costs be granted to GIP and the costs award varied?

**D. ANALYSIS**

**(1) Standing of the Monitor**

95 Essar Global submits that the Monitor is not a proper complainant given the conflict between it and the stakeholders it represents. The trial judge failed to consider whether the Monitor could avoid conflicts.

96 GIP supports the position of Essar Global. It states that the trial judge erred in assuming that the court's broad jurisdiction under the *CCAA* could be combined with the equally broad jurisdiction under the *CBCA* to create a super remedy that would interfere with the contractual rights of non-offending third parties. A trustee in bankruptcy is a representative of the creditors of the bankrupt. A monitor owes duties to all stakeholders, not just creditors. Its duty to Essar Global

as sole shareholder of Algoma cannot be reconciled with the Monitor's oppression claim against it. Also, Algoma can be directed to make the Cargo Handling Agreement payments to GIP directly and therefore the Monitor owed a fiduciary duty to GIP.

97 In addressing this issue, I will first discuss the evolution of the role of a monitor. I will then discuss who can be a complainant under the *CBCA* oppression provisions. Lastly, I will consider whether in the particular circumstances of this case, the trial judge was correct in concluding that the Monitor could have standing to bring an oppression action.

(a) *The Purpose of CCAA Restructurings*

98 As has been repeatedly described, the *CCAA* was originally enacted in 1933 to respond to the ravages of the Great Depression and to allow large corporations with outstanding bonds and debentures to restructure their debt in a court-supervised process through plans of arrangement or compromise negotiated with their creditors.

99 As outlined by Deschamps J. in *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re*, 2010 SCC 60, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter *Century Services*], the *CCAA* fell into disuse after amendments in 1953 that limited its application to companies issuing bonds. Courts breathed new life into the statute in the early 1980s in response to an economic recession, and the *CCAA* became the primary vehicle through which major restructurings were attempted. Amendments to the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 (the "*BIA*"), introduced in 1992, allowed insolvent debtors to make proposals to creditors under that statute, and were expected to supplant the *CCAA*. However, the *CCAA* continues to be employed as the vehicle of choice to restructure large corporations, particularly where flexibility is needed in the restructuring process: Roderick J. Wood, *Bankruptcy & Insolvency Law*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2015), at pp. 336-337; and *Century Services*, at para. 13.

100 The corporate restructuring process at the heart of the *CCAA* "provide[s] a constructive solution for all stakeholders when a company has become insolvent": *Indalex Ltd., Re*, 2013 SCC 6, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 271 (S.C.C.), at para. 205. There are a number of justifications for why such a process is desirable. The traditional justification for *CCAA*-enabled restructurings, as explained by Duff C.J. shortly after the statute's enactment, was to rescue financially-distressed corporations without forcing them to first declare bankruptcy: *Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada)*, [1934] S.C.R. 659 (S.C.C.), at p. 661.

101 The restructuring process can also allow creditors to obtain a higher recovery than may otherwise be available to them through bankruptcy or other liquidation proceedings, by preserving the corporate entity or the value of its business as a going concern: Wood, at pp. 338-339. Additionally, restructuring proceedings can provide an opportunity to evaluate the root of a corporation's financial difficulties, and develop strategies to achieve a turnaround, whether

the best option be a full restructuring, or a liquidation of the corporation within the restructuring regime: Wood, at p. 340.

102 The benefits of the restructuring process are not limited to creditors. Even early commentary lauded restructurings as promoting the public interest by salvaging corporations that supply goods or services important to the economy, and that employ large numbers of people: see Stanley E. Edwards, "Reorganizations Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act" (1947), 25 Can. Bar Rev. 587, at p. 593. This view remains applicable today, with restructurings "justified in terms of rehabilitating companies that are key elements in a complex web of interdependent economic relationships in order to avoid the negative consequences of liquidation": *Century Services*, at para. 18.

103 To summarize, by enabling the restructuring process, the *CCAA* can achieve multiple objectives. It permits corporations to rehabilitate and maintain viability despite liquidity issues. It allows for the development of business strategies to preserve going-concern value. It seeks to maximize creditor recovery. It can serve to preserve employment and trade relationships, protecting non-creditor shareholders and the communities within which the corporation operates: see Janis P. Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2013), at pp. 13-17. The flexibility inherent in the restructuring process permits a broad balancing of these objectives and the multiple stakeholder interests engaged when a corporation faces insolvency.

104 It is against this background that the role of a monitor must be considered.

*(b) The Role of the Monitor*

105 Originally, the *CCAA* was a very slim statute and made no mention of a monitor. Born of the court's inherent jurisdiction, the term "monitor" was first used in *Northland Properties Ltd., Re* (1988), 29 B.C.L.R. (2d) 257 (B.C. S.C.). In that case, an interim receiver was appointed whose role was described at p. 277 as that of a monitor or watchdog. As a watchdog, the monitor could "observe the conduct of management and the operation of the business while a plan was being formulated": A.J.F. Kent and W. Rostom, "The Auditor as Monitor in *CCAA* Proceedings: What is the Debate?" (2008), online: Mondaq [www.mondaq.com](http://www.mondaq.com). The monitor was thus a court-appointed officer.

106 The 1997 amendments to the *CCAA* gave legislative recognition to the role of the monitor and made the appointment mandatory. The 2007 amendments to the *CCAA* expanded the description of the monitor's role and responsibilities. In essence, its minimum powers are set out in the Act and they may be augmented through the exercise of discretion by the court, typically the *CCAA* supervising judge. This framework is reflected in s. 23 of the *CCAA*, which enumerates certain duties and functions of a monitor. Paragraph 23(1)(k) directs that a monitor shall carry out "any other functions in relation to the company that the court may direct." Its express duties under

s. 23(1)(c) include making, or causing to be made, any appraisal or investigation that the monitor "considers necessary to determine with reasonable accuracy the state of the company's business and financial affairs and the cause of its financial difficulties or insolvency". It is then to file a report on its findings.

107 Not surprisingly, as with the *CCAA* itself, the role of the monitor has evolved over time. As stated by David Mann and Neil Narfason in their article entitled "The Changing Role of the Monitor" (2008) 24 *Bank. & Fin. L. Rev.* 131, at p. 132:

Born out of invention, the role has developed from one of passive observer to one of active participant. The monitor has enhanced communication, mediated disputes, provided input into plans of reorganization, and provided expert advice in complex affairs. As the business community has become more sophisticated and global, so too has the monitor — taking on larger mandates, often times involving complex, cross-border restructurings.

108 Examples of the use of expanded powers for a monitor are found in *Philip's Manufacturing Ltd., Re* (1992), 67 B.C.L.R. (2d) 385 (B.C. C.A.), where the British Columbia Court of Appeal ordered a monitor to report on the causes of financial problems of the company and report on improper payments made to management, shareholders and directors, and in *Woodward's Ltd., Re* (1993), 77 B.C.L.R. (2d) 332 (B.C. S.C.), where Tysoe J. (as he then was) held that a monitor was to review all transactions and conveyances for fraud, preferences, or other reviewable features and act in a similar manner to a trustee in bankruptcy.

109 Under s. 11.7(1) of the *CCAA*, a monitor must be a licensed trustee in bankruptcy, and as such, under s. 13 of the *BIA*, is subject to the supervision of the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy. The monitor is to be the eyes and the ears of the court and sometimes, as is the case here, the nose. The monitor is to be independent and impartial, must treat all parties reasonably and fairly, and is to conduct itself in a manner consistent with the objectives of the *CCAA* and its restructuring purpose. In the course of a *CCAA* proceeding, a monitor frequently takes positions; indeed it is required by statute to do so. See for example s. 23 of the *CCAA* that describes certain duties of a monitor.

110 Of necessity, the positions taken will favour certain stakeholders over others depending on the context. Again, as stated by Messrs. Kent and Rostom:

Quite fairly, monitors state that creditors and the Court currently expect them to express opinions and make recommendations. . . . [T]he expanded role of the monitor forces the monitor more and more into the fray. Monitors have become less the detached observer and expert witness contemplated by the Court decisions, and more of an active participant or party in the proceedings.

*(c) A Monitor as Complainant in an Oppression Action*

111 Turning to the issue of a monitor and an oppression action, there is some difference in academic opinion on the suitability of the oppression remedy in insolvency proceedings. Professor Stephanie Ben-Ishai has argued that the remedy should be unavailable for use once the debtor has entered a court-supervised reorganization under the *BIA* or the *CCAA*.<sup>5</sup> Professor Janis Sarra has countered that the oppression remedy continues to be an important corporate law remedy that should be available in such proceedings.<sup>6</sup> I do not understand the appellants to be taking the former position; rather they simply argue that the Monitor has no standing.

112 Section 238 of the *CBCA* defines a complainant as:

- (a) a registered holder or beneficial owner, and a former registered holder or beneficial owner, of a security of a corporation or any of its affiliates,
- (b) a director or an officer or a former director or officer of a corporation or any of its affiliates,
- (c) the Director, or
- (d) any other person who, in the discretion of a court, is a proper person to make an application under this Part.

For the purposes of this analysis, s. 238(d) is the relevant subsection.

113 Section 241 of the *CBCA* describes the oppression remedy:

- (1) A complainant may apply to a court for an order under this section.
- (2) If, on an application under subsection (1), the court is satisfied that in respect of a corporation or any of its affiliates
  - (a) any act or omission of the corporation or any of its affiliates effects a result,
  - (b) the business or affairs of the corporation or any of its affiliates are or have been carried on or conducted in a manner, or
  - (c) the powers of the directors of the corporation or any of its affiliates are or have been exercised in a manner

that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the interests of any security holder, creditor, director or officer, the court may make an order to rectify the matters complained of.

114 The question here is whether the trial judge erred in concluding that the Monitor had standing to be a complainant. There are two elements to this analysis: can a monitor be a complainant under

the *CBCA*; and should the Monitor have been a complainant in this case? I would answer both questions affirmatively.

115 As is clear from s. 238(d) of the *CBCA*, a court exercises its discretion in determining who may be a complainant, and this discretion is broad. There has been much jurisprudence on who qualifies as a complainant. In *Olympia & York*, a trustee in bankruptcy, acting on behalf of the creditors of the bankrupt estate, was entitled to be a complainant in an oppression action involving an oppressive agreement between the debtor and a non-arm's length party. As this court said in that case at para. 45:

. . . the trustee is neither automatically barred from being a complainant nor automatically entitled to that status. It is for the judge at first instance to determine in the exercise of his or her discretion whether in the circumstances of the particular case, the trustee is a proper person to be a complainant.

116 Admittedly, a monitor differs from a trustee in bankruptcy in that the latter represents the interests of the creditors whereas the monitor has a broader mandate. However, like a trustee in bankruptcy, a monitor is neither automatically barred from being a complainant nor automatically entitled to that status.

117 Section 241 speaks of *a* proper person, not *the* proper person, therefore allowing for discretion to be exercised in the face of more than one proper person. The appellants did not direct us to any authority saying that a monitor could not be a complainant. Paragraph 23(1)(k) of the *CCAA* expressly provides that a monitor shall carry out any functions in relation to the company that the court may direct. Moreover, s. 23(1)(c) directs a monitor to conduct any investigation that the monitor considers necessary to determine the state of the company's business and financial affairs. It does not strain credulity that this responsibility will frequently place a monitor at odds with the shareholders or other stakeholders.

118 Additionally, there is nothing in the *CCAA* itself to suggest that a monitor cannot be authorized to act as a complainant. Indeed, the broad language of s. 11 of the *CCAA*, which permits a supervising court to "make any order it considers appropriate in the circumstances", is permissive of such orders. As this court and the Supreme Court have made clear, the broad language of s. 11 "should not be read as being restricted by the availability of more specific orders": *U.S. Steel Canada Inc., Re*, 2016 ONCA 662, 39 C.B.R. (6th) 173 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 79, citing *Century Services*, at para. 70. Courts can, and sometimes should, make "creative orders" in the context of *CCAA* proceedings: *U.S. Steel*, at paras. 80, 86-87.

119 Generally speaking, the monitor plays a neutral role in a *CCAA* proceeding. To the extent it takes positions, typically those positions should be in support of a restructuring purpose. As stated by this court in *Ivaco Inc., Re* (2006), 83 O.R. (3d) 108 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 49-53, a monitor is

not necessarily a fiduciary; it only becomes one if the court specifically assigns it a responsibility to which fiduciary duties attach.

120 However, in exceptional circumstances, it may be appropriate for a monitor to serve as a complainant. In my view, this is one such case.

121 Here, in para. 37(c) of the Amended and Restated Initial *CCAA* Order dated November 20, 2015, the Monitor was directed to investigate whether there were potential related party transactions that should be reviewed. It then reported back to the supervising *CCAA* judge that there were, and on that basis the *CCAA* judge authorized the Monitor to commence proceedings under s. 241 of the *CBCA*. The Monitor proceeded with the oppression action in the interests of the restructuring consistent with the objectives of the *CCAA*. The trial judge ultimately found that aspects of the Port Transaction, such as the change of control clause in the Cargo Handling Agreement that gave Essar Global control over who can be a buyer of the Algoma business, were oppressive and also harmful to the restructuring process. The Monitor took the action as an "adjunct to its role in facilitating a restructuring".

122 Moreover, it cannot be said that the Monitor was a fiduciary. Indeed, the appellants did not say this in their pleadings, opening submissions, or closing submissions before the trial judge. The remedy granted by the trial judge was directed at the oppression and removed an insurmountable barrier to a successful restructuring. In addition, it was brought in the face of Essar Global demonstrating a continuous desire to acquire Algoma and, as evident from the letter sent by its counsel, a desire to discourage others from doing so.

123 It will be a rare occasion that a monitor will be authorized to be a complainant. Factors a *CCAA* supervising judge should consider when exercising discretion as to whether a monitor should be authorized to be a complainant include whether:

- (i) there is a *prima facie* case that merits an oppression action or application;
- (ii) the proposed action or application itself has a restructuring purpose, that is to say, materially advances or removes an impediment to a restructuring; and
- (iii) any other stakeholder is better placed to be a complainant.

These factors are not exhaustive, and none of them is necessarily dispositive; they are simply factors to consider.

124 In the circumstances that presented themselves here, the *CCAA* supervising judge was justified in providing authorization. A *prima facie* case had been established; the Monitor had reviewed and reported to the court on related party transactions; the oppression action served to remove an insurmountable obstacle to the restructuring; and the Monitor could efficiently advance an oppression claim, representing a conglomeration of stakeholders, namely the pensioners,

retirees, employees, and trade creditors, who were not organized as a group and who were all similarly affected by the alleged oppressive conduct.

125 Quite apart from meeting the aforementioned criteria, I would also observe that as the presiding judge in the *CCAA* proceeding and the trial judge, Newbould J. had insight into the dynamics of the restructuring and was well positioned to supervise all parties including the Monitor to ensure that no unfairness or unwarranted impartiality occurred.

126 Lastly, I do accept the appellants' position that the *Nortel* proceedings relied upon by the trial judge in support of his conclusion were quite different from this case. In *Nortel*, the monitor's powers were expanded by an order authorizing the Monitor to exercise any powers properly exercisable by a Board of Directors of Nortel or its subsidiaries. But this expansion was a response to the resignations of the Boards of Nortel and its subsidiaries, not, as here, a response to the results of investigations the Monitor had been directed to pursue. That said, the case does illustrate the need to avoid rigid definition of a monitor's role and responsibilities.

127 In conclusion, I would not give effect to the appellants' submission that the trial judge erred in granting the Monitor standing to pursue an action for oppression.

## ***(2) Derivative or Oppression Action***

128 In addition to attacking the standing of the Monitor to bring the action, the appellants also submit that the Monitor was precluded from bringing the action in the form of an oppression remedy proceeding pursuant to s. 241 of the *CBCA*. In their view, the action could only have been brought as a derivative action pursuant to s. 239 of that *Act*. They say the claim asserted is a corporate claim belonging to Algoma, if anyone, and the stakeholders, on whose behalf the Monitor asserts the claim, were not harmed directly or personally but only derivatively through harm done to Algoma. I disagree.

129 In support of their submission, the appellants rely heavily on the decision of this Court in *Wildeboer*. This case is not *Wildeboer*, however.

130 In *Wildeboer*, "insiders" who controlled the corporation had misappropriated many millions of dollars from the corporation. The *sole claim* advanced by the complainant minority shareholder by way of oppression remedy was for the return of the misappropriated funds *to the corporation*. There was *no claim* asserted by the complainant, of any kind, *for a personal remedy qua shareholder*. As the court noted at para. 45, "[t]he substantive remedy claimed is the disgorgement of all the ill-gotten gains back to Martinrea [the corporation in question]."

131 The *Wildeboer* decision must be read in that context. It does not stand for the proposition that in all cases where there has been a wrong done to the corporation, the action must be brought as a derivative action. Consistent with a number of other authorities, this court expressly re-affirmed the

principles that the derivative action and the oppression remedy are not mutually exclusive and that there may be circumstances giving rise to overlapping derivative actions and oppression remedies where harm is done both to the corporation and to stakeholders in their separate stakeholder capacities. This is clear from para. 26:

I accept that the derivative action and the oppression remedy are not mutually exclusive. Cases like *Malata* [*Malata Group (HK) Ltd. v. Jung*, 2008 ONCA 111, 89 O.R. (3d) 36] and *Jabalee* [*Jabalee v. Abalmark Inc.*, [1996] O.J. No. 2609 (C.A.)] make it clear that there are circumstances where the factual underpinning will give rise to both types of redress and in which a complainant will nonetheless be entitled to proceed by way of oppression. Other examples include: *Ontario (Securities Commission) v. McLaughlin*, [1987] O.J. No. 1247 (Ont. H.C.); *Deluce Holdings Inc. v. Air Canada* (1992), 12 O.R. (3d) 131 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); *Covington Fund Inc. v. White*, [2000] O.J. No. 4589 (Ont. S.C.J.), aff'd [2001] O.J. No. 3918 (Ont. Div. Ct.); *Waxman v. Waxman*, [2004] O.J. No. 1765 (C.A.), at para. 526, leave to appeal refused, (2005), [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 291 (S.C.C.).

132 Or, as Armstrong J.A. put it in *Malata Group (HK) Ltd. v. Jung* [2008 CarswellOnt 699 (Ont. C.A.)], at para. 30:

[T]here is not a bright line distinction between the claims that may be advanced under the derivative action section of the Act and those that may be advanced under the oppression remedy provisions.

133 In short, there will be circumstances in which a stakeholder suffers harm in the stakeholder's capacity as stakeholder, from the same wrongful conduct that causes harm to the corporation. In my opinion — unlike in *Wildeboer*, where the harm alleged was solely harm to the corporation — this case falls into the overlapping category.

134 For the purposes of this analysis, it is the nature of the claim put forward by the claimants, on whose behalf the Monitor was pursuing the oppression remedy, that must be examined. As the trial judge noted at para. 31, the Monitor initially cast quite widely the net of stakeholders affected by the Port Transaction and on whose behalf it was claiming a remedy. By the time of the hearing, however, the net's reach had been narrowed to Algoma's trade creditors, employees, pensioners, and retirees.

135 In oppression remedy parlance, the nub of the exercise lies in determining whether the claimant has identified a "reasonable expectation" and shown that it has been violated by wrongful conduct that is "oppressive" (in the broad sense contemplated by the *Act*) of the interests of the claimant: see *BCE*. The Monitor asserted at the hearing, and the trial judge found at para. 75:

[T]hat the reasonable expectations of the trade creditors, the employees, pensioners and retirees of Algoma were that Algoma would not deal with a critical asset like the Port in such

a way as to lose long-term control over such a strategic asset to a related party on terms that permitted the related party to veto and control Algoma's ability to do significant transactions or restructure and which gave unwarranted value to the third party.

136 It was alleged, and the trial judge found, that these reasonable expectations had been violated both by aspects of the Port Transaction itself, and by the change of control veto provided to Portco, and thus Essar Global, in the Port Transaction.

137 The appellants argue that the reasonable expectations asserted relate only to harm done to Algoma. The trial judge disagreed, as do I. As he concluded at para. 37:

Aspects of the Port Transaction, such as the change of control clause in the Cargo Handling Agreement that gives the parent control over who can be a buyer of the Algoma business, are harmful to a restructuring process and negatively impact creditors. [Emphasis added]

138 On this basis, at para. 40, the trial judge distinguished *Wildeboer* because the Monitor was asserting "that the personal interests of the creditors ha[d] been affected."

139 The appellants place considerable emphasis on certain language contained in *Wildeboer* to the effect that, in circumstances where there may be overlapping derivative and oppression claims, the wrong must both harm the corporation and must also affect the claimant's "individualized personal interests". They interpret these comments as mandating not only that each claimant must suffer an identifiable individual harm but also that this harm must be different from other individualized personal harms suffered by others in their same class.

140 For example, the appellants rely on certain aspects of the following comments by this court at paras. 29, 32-33 of *Wildeboer*:

On my reading of the authorities, in the cases where an oppression claim has been permitted to proceed even though the wrongs asserted were wrongs to the corporation, those same wrongful acts have, for the most part, also directly affected the complainant in a manner that was different from the indirect effect of the conduct on similarly placed complainants.

...

The appellants are not asserting that their personal interests as shareholders have been adversely affected in any way other than the type of harm that has been suffered by all shareholders as a collectivity. Mr. Rea — the only director plaintiff — does not plead that the Improper Transactions have impacted his interest *qua* director.

Since the creation of the oppression remedy, courts have taken a broad and flexible approach to its application, in keeping with the broad and flexible form of relief it is intended to provide. However, the appellants' open-ended approach to the oppression remedy in circumstances

where the facts support a derivative action on behalf of the corporation misses a significant point: the impugned conduct must harm the complainant personally, not just the body corporate, *i.e.*, the collectivity of shareholders as a whole.

141 While pertinent to the *Wildeboer* context, some of the foregoing language, when read in isolation and out of context, may be misconceived when it comes to a more general application. However, I do not read *Wildeboer* as precluding an oppression remedy in respect of individuals forming a homogenous group of stakeholders — for example, trade creditors, employees, retirees, or pensioners — simply because each of them, separately, may have suffered the same type of individualized harm.

142 Instead, I read the reference at para. 29 to the complainant being directly affected "in a manner that was different from the indirect effect of the conduct on similarly placed complainants" to be another way of capturing the notion expressed in paras. 32-33 that the individualized harm is to be distinct from conduct harming only "the body corporate, *i.e.*, the collectivity of shareholders as a whole."

143 Were the appellants correct in their submissions, as counsel for the Monitor points out, this court would not have upheld an oppression remedy on behalf of *all* shareholders of a company that had suffered harm as a result of a non-market executive compensation contract: see *UPM-Kymmene Corp. v. UPM-Kymmene Miramichi Inc.* (2002), 214 D.L.R. (4th) 496 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), *aff'd* (2004), 42 B.L.R. (3d) 34 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 153. Nor would it have upheld an oppression remedy claim on behalf of *a class* of shareholders who were harmed as a result of the existence of a transfer pricing regime that was disadvantageous to the company, as it did in *Ford Motor Co. of Canada v. Ontario (Municipal Employees Retirement Board)* (2006), 79 O.R. (3d) 81 (Ont. C.A.). *Wildeboer* contains no suggestion that these authorities are no longer good law; nor would it have done.

144 The same may be said, in my view, about a group of creditors who have suffered similar harm from a corporate wrong that affects both their interests as creditors and the interests of the corporation. While the oppression remedy is not available as redress for a simple contractual breach (such as the failure to pay a debt), it has long been held to be available, in appropriate circumstances, to creditors whose interests "have been compromised by unlawful and internal corporate manoeuvres against which the creditor cannot effectively protect itself": *J.S.M. Corp. (Ontario) Ltd. v. Brick Furniture Warehouse Ltd.*, 2008 ONCA 183, 41 B.L.R. (4th) 51 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 66. See also: *Fedel v. Tan*, 2010 ONCA 473, 101 O.R. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 56.

145 The question is whether the impugned conduct is "oppressive" (in the broad sense contemplated by the *CBCA*) and, if so, whether the stakeholder has suffered harm in its capacity as a stakeholder as a result of that conduct.

146 Moreover, the circumstances that presented themselves emphasize the need for flexibility in the availability of the oppression remedy. The court and the Monitor were faced with *prima facie* evidence of oppression including bad faith and self-dealing. There was *prima facie* evidence of personal harm to the pensioners, employees, retirees, and trade creditors. While leave of the court is required for a derivative action, in substance, in the context of a *CCAA* proceeding, court supervision is present, thereby neutralizing the need for the derivative action procedural safeguard of leave.

147 I would also note that GIP argues that the decision not to bring this action by way of derivative action may have been a strategic decision made because Algoma was contractually prohibited from seeking to set aside or vary the contracts arising from the Port Transaction, including the Cargo Handling Agreement and the lease. If anything, this argument supports the conclusion that it was appropriate for this action to be brought as an oppression claim.

148 In conclusion, at law, the Monitor was at liberty to bring an action for oppression. I will now turn to the issue of reasonable expectations.

### ***(3) Reasonable Expectations***

149 Essar Global and GIP submit that the trial judge erred in his analysis of reasonable expectations. They argue that there was no evidence of any subjectively held expectations, that the trial judge did not consider whether the expectations were objectively reasonable, and that he failed to consider factors identified in *BCE*.

150 The Monitor and Algoma respond by saying that the existence of reasonable expectations is a question of fact that can be proved by direct evidence or by the drawing of reasonable inferences. In this case, the trial judge properly considered the evidence that was before him to conclude that the pensioners, employees, retirees, and trade creditors held expectations that had been violated and that those expectations were objectively reasonable.

151 In his analysis, the trial judge correctly identified the two prongs of the oppression inquiry identified by the Supreme Court at para. 68 of *BCE*: (i) does the evidence support the reasonable expectation asserted by a claimant; and (ii) does the evidence establish that the reasonable expectation was violated by conduct falling within the terms "oppression", "unfair prejudice", or "unfair disregard" of a relevant interest?

152 In identifying these two prongs, at paras. 58-59, the Supreme Court made two preliminary observations:

First, oppression is an equitable remedy. It seeks to ensure fairness — what is "just and equitable". It gives a court broad, equitable jurisdiction to enforce not just what is legal but

what is fair. . . . It follows that courts considering claims for oppression should look at business realities, not merely narrow legalities.

Second, like many equitable remedies, oppression is fact-specific. What is just and equitable is judged by the reasonable expectations of the stakeholders in the context and in regard to the relationships at play. Conduct that may be oppressive in one situation may not be in another. [Citations omitted.]

153 As also stated in *BCE* at para. 71:

Actual unlawfulness is not required to invoke s. 241; the provision applies "where the impugned conduct is wrongful, even if it is not actually unlawful." The remedy is focused on concepts of fairness and equity rather than on legal rights. In determining whether there is a reasonable expectation or interest to be considered, the court looks beyond legality to what is fair, given all the interests at play.

154 Evidence of an expectation "may take many forms depending on the facts of the case": *BCE*, at para. 70. The "actual expectation of a particular stakeholder is not conclusive": *BCE*, at para. 62. Furthermore, a stakeholder's reasonable expectation of fair treatment "may be readily inferred", because fundamentally all stakeholders are entitled to expect fair treatment: *BCE*, at paras. 64, 70. Once the expectation at issue is identified, the focus of the inquiry is on whether it has been established that the particular expectation was reasonably held: *BCE*, at para. 70.

155 The Monitor particularized the reasonable expectations in issue. It stated that the stakeholders had reasonable expectations that the Essar Group would not cause Algoma to engage in transactions for their benefit to the detriment of Algoma and its stakeholders, cause Algoma to transfer long-term control over an irreplaceable and core strategic asset of Algoma (*i.e.* the Port) to the Essar Group, and, among other things, provide the Essar Group with a veto. The source and content of the expectations were stated by the Monitor to include commercial practice, the nature of Algoma, and past practice. These particulars would all feed an expectation of fair treatment.

156 Based on the reasonable expectations particularized by the Monitor, as already noted, the trial judge found at para. 75 that:

[T]he reasonable expectations of the trade creditors, the employees, pensioners and retirees of Algoma were that Algoma would not deal with a critical asset like the Port in such a way as to lose long-term control over such a strategic asset to a related party on terms that permitted the related party to veto and control Algoma's ability to do significant transactions or restructure and which gave unwarranted value to the third party.

157 There was evidence of subjective expectations before the trial judge. For example, at para. 65 of his reasons, the trial judge considered the evidence of subjective expectations of two trade

creditors explaining that they were unaware of the Port Transaction and would not have expected an outcome in which Algoma no longer had full control over the Port facility.

158 The trial judge also drew reasonable inferences from the evidence and circumstances that existed at Algoma in 2014 in support of the expectations relied upon by the Monitor, as he was entitled to do: see *Ford Motor*, at para. 65. In that regard, he noted that Algoma had gone through a number of insolvencies and restructurings since the early 1990s. Given the cyclical nature of the steel business, it was reasonable for the stakeholders to expect a restructuring in the future. The reasonableness of this restructuring-related expectation was confirmed by GIP's insistence on a "bankruptcy remote" structure for its loan "given the fluctuating prices of steel and Algoma's history of insolvencies", as GIP said in its factum.

159 Based on the evidence of subjective expectations and the reasonable inferences the trial judge drew from the record, it cannot be said that there was no evidence supporting the trial judge's conclusion that a future restructuring was not reasonably foreseeable.

160 The trial judge also concluded that it was objectively reasonable for the stakeholders to expect, as he noted at para. 73, that Algoma would not lose its ability to restructure absent the consent of Essar Global — particularly in Sault Ste. Marie, where Algoma is the major industry on which trade creditors and employees rely. Put differently, it would not be reasonable to expect that the shareholder would have the right to veto any restructuring in a *CCAA* proceeding in which it was not an applicant and have the right to prefer its own interests over those of others such as the retirees, pensioners, trade creditors, and employees. Contrary to the assertions of the appellants, the trial judge expressly considered those issues.

161 Similarly, Essar Global submits that the foreseeability of another insolvency was contradicted by Mr. Marwah's affidavit evidence on the application for approval of the Plan of Arrangement, where he deposed that he believed that Algoma would be solvent. I would not give effect to this argument, as the trial judge's conclusion on the foreseeability of the insolvency is a factual finding, based on his review of the record as a whole. Essar Global has not demonstrated that this finding is subject to any palpable and overriding error.

162 The appellants' complaint that the trial judge failed to consider any of the factors identified in *BCE* is also misplaced. In that decision, the Supreme Court stated at para. 62:

As denoted by "reasonable", the concept of reasonable expectations is objective and contextual. . . . In the context of whether it would be "just and equitable" to grant a remedy, the question is whether the expectation is reasonable having regard to the facts of the specific case, the relationships at issue, and the entire context, including the fact that there may be conflicting claims and expectations.

163 Essar Global's argument that the trial judge did not turn his mind to the *BCE* factors ignores the trial judge's explicit reasons on this point. At para. 68 of his decision, the trial judge referred to the factors identified by the Supreme Court as "useful" in determining whether an expectation was reasonable. These factors include: i) general commercial practice; ii) the nature of the corporation; iii) the relationship between the parties; iv) past practice; v) steps the claimant could have taken to protect itself; vi) representations and agreements; and vii) the fair resolution of conflicting interests between corporate stakeholders.

164 The trial judge correctly noted that, due to the fact-specific nature of the inquiry into reasonable expectations, not all listed factors must be satisfied in any particular case. I agree with his conclusion. The *BCE* factors are "not hard and fast rules", but are merely intended to "guide the court in its contextual analysis": Dennis H. Peterson and Matthew J. Cumming, *Shareholder Remedies in Canada*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2017), at j§17.47.

165 Nonetheless, the trial judge did consider a number of the *BCE* factors based on the facts before him. For instance, at para. 68, he concluded that Algoma's prior sale of a non-critical asset, relating to factor iv), past practice, was not helpful in determining reasonable expectations. This was because the sale of a non-critical asset differs from the sale of a critical asset, as in the Port Transaction. Also under the rubric of past practices, he considered Algoma's prior insolvencies and restructuring proceedings. He concluded that while it was reasonable for stakeholders to expect that significant corporate changes might be necessary for Algoma in the future, it was not reasonable for them to expect that Algoma would lose its ability to restructure without the prior agreement of its parent, Essar Global.

166 As the trial judge's reasons reveal, he specifically considered the *BCE* factors and made findings on the objective reasonableness of the expectations at issue. I endorse the comments of the Monitor found at para. 80 of its factum:

In this case, Justice Newbould found that the employees, retirees, and trade creditors all had a reasonable expectation that Essar Group would not engineer a transaction that deprived Algoma of a key strategic asset, rendering it incapable of restructuring or engaging in significant transactions without the approval of Essar Global, for minimal cash consideration in circumstances where there had been no consideration of alternative transactions. This was entirely supported by the entirety of the record adduced at trial.

167 This was essentially a factual exercise. There was conflicting evidence before the trial judge. However it was for the trial judge to weigh the evidence and make factual findings. That is what he did. Based on the record before him, those factual findings were available to him. He considered both subjective expectations and whether the expectations were objectively reasonable. I see no reason to interfere.

168 I therefore reject the appellants' submissions on reasonable expectations.

***(4) Wrongful Conduct and Harm***

169 Essar Global also takes issue with the trial judge's conclusion that Essar Global's conduct was wrongful and harmful.

170 First, Essar Global submits that the trial judge inappropriately relied on the Equity Commitment Letter. It argues that the court approved the amended Plan of Arrangement that released Essar Global from any claim relating to the Equity Commitment Letter, and that reliance on a released obligation in connection with the wrongful conduct requirement of oppression was an impermissible collateral attack on the approval order.

171 I disagree. I can state no more clearly than the trial judge did at para. 100 of his reasons:

The Monitor is not making a claim under the Equity Commitment Letter or asking that Essar Global provide the equity it agreed to provide in that commitment. Nor is the Monitor asking that the release be set aside. The Monitor contends, and I agree, that the failure of Essar Global to fund as agreed in the RSA and Equity Commitment Letter is a part of the factual circumstances to be taken into account in considering whether the affected stakeholders who were not party to the agreements were treated fairly by the Port Transaction.

172 An amended Plan of Arrangement became necessary when Essar Global did not provide the promised equity contribution, the roadshow presentations were unsuccessful, and the Port Transaction was the only available means to generate sufficient cash for Algoma.

173 I also note that the trial judge recognized that the trade creditors, the employees, pensioners and retirees were not parties to nor did they play any role in the amended Plan of Arrangement proceedings. Although the release was in both the original RSA and the amended RSA, it would appear that there was no express reference to the Port Transaction being part of the Plan of Arrangement, nor was there any mention of it in any endorsement or the order approving the amended Plan of Arrangement.

174 In addition, the trial judge did not make his finding of wrongful conduct based on Essar Global's breach of the Equity Commitment Letter. Rather, he found that the totality of Essar Global's conduct regarding the Recapitalization and Port Transaction satisfied the wrongful conduct requirement.

175 Taken in context, the trial judge made no error in his treatment of the release in favour of Essar Global.

176 Second, Essar Global submits that the trial judge made factual errors relating to Essar Global's cash contributions. In particular, it submits that he erred in concluding that the cash Essar Global did advance in the recapitalization, namely US\$150 million rather than the US\$250 to US \$300 million that was originally promised, was generated by the Port Transaction when it was not. They also complain that he erred in granting an oppression remedy when the Equity Commitment Letter provided for a limited remedy in the event of a breach.

177 The reasons of the trial judge on Essar Global's cash contribution are admittedly somewhat confusing. In para. 20 of his reasons, he states that Essar Global's revised cash contribution under the amended RSA was "to be funded largely not by Essar Global but by a loan from third party lenders to Portco of \$150 million." Reading that paragraph in isolation might lend credence to the appellants' submission. That said, having regard to the record before him and reading the reasons as a whole, I am not persuaded that the trial judge misunderstood Essar Global's contribution to the recapitalization.

178 The relevant contributions made to Algoma in November 2014 consisted of:

- US\$150 million in cash from Essar Global under the amended RSA;
- US\$150 million in debt reduction in the form of loan forgiveness for certain loans owed by Algoma to members of the Essar Group under the amended RSA; and
- US\$150 million in cash generated from the Port Transaction.

179 Essar Global only provided Algoma with US\$150 million in cash equity, not the US \$250 to 300 million in cash equity it had originally promised. The debt forgiveness would not assist Algoma in addressing its impending liquidity issues in the same way a cash injection would. Additionally, as the trial judge noted at para. 88, the US\$150 million in debt reduction related to loans at the bottom of Algoma's capital structure, and therefore this reduction was of "questionable value" to Algoma at the time.

180 Algoma, the Monitor and Essar Global all provided the trial judge with written submissions describing the cash equity contribution as consisting of US\$150 million in cash from Essar Global and US\$150 million in cash from the Port Transaction. The contributions were also repeatedly referenced in the record. For example, the affidavit of Mr. Seifert — which the trial judge considered in great detail — clearly sets out Essar Global's cash contribution to Algoma and the US \$150 million in cash paid by Portco to Algoma under the Port Transaction as separate transactions. Similarly, these contributions are described as separate transactions in the affidavits of Messrs. Marwah and Ghosh.

181 The trial judge's reasons establish that he understood that there were two separate cash payments made to Algoma — one made by Essar Global in satisfaction of its commitments under

the amended RSA and one made by Portco under the Port Transaction. He also understood that these cash payments were made in addition to Essar Global's forgiveness of US\$150 million debt owed to it by Algoma.

182 Specifically, at para. 85, the trial judge noted that in October 2014, after the original RSA had been executed, Essar Global contemplated reducing the amount of its cash contribution promised under the RSA and the Equity Commitment Letter. The roadshow presentation prepared regarding Algoma's capitalization showed that Essar Global proposed to contribute less than US \$100 million of *cash* rather than the US\$250-\$300 million required. He obviously understood that there was to be a cash component to Essar Global's contribution separate and apart from the proceeds of the Port Transaction.

183 In addition, at para. 88, the trial judge noted that the Port Transaction "*reduced* the amount of cash equity previously promised by Essar Global to be advanced to Algoma" (emphasis added). This shows that the trial judge understood that the proceeds from the Port Transaction were not *replacing* Essar Global's promised cash contribution. The trial judge recognized that the cash equity contribution of US\$150 million and the debt reduction of US\$150 million were insufficient to successfully refinance Algoma, and using the Port Transaction proceeds was the only way to generate the additional US\$150 million in cash necessary. The trial judge highlighted at para. 96 that Algoma's CEO, Mr. Ghosh, had indicated that "he had had to agree to the Port Transaction" as it was the "only way" to refinance Algoma, since Essar Global's contribution was only "bringing in \$150 million".

184 Even if the appellants were correct in this regard, which I do not accept, on their analysis, they themselves admit that Essar Global's contribution was short by US\$50 million.

185 No matter the correct figure, Essar Global's conduct created a situation where Algoma had no choice but to accept the Port Transaction. There was no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's understanding of the recapitalization requirements.

186 In any event, the reduction in Essar Global's cash contribution was only one aspect of Essar Global's overall conduct considered by the trial judge. He did not conclude that the cash equity reduction was itself the oppressive act. Accordingly, again, any factual error regarding Essar Global's actual cash contribution was not a palpable and overriding error.

187 As mentioned, Essar Global also asserts that the remedy for breach contained in the Equity Commitment Letter precluded any oppression remedy. No one was suing for breach of the Equity Commitment Letter. Rather, it formed part of the context that included a failure to explore alternatives, the Port Transaction itself, control rights that were proffered as a disincentive to other bidders and that erased any possibility of a successful restructuring, all in disregard of the expectations of the pensioners, employees, retirees, and trade creditors.

188 Third, although not identified as a ground of appeal nor advanced as such in their factum, in oral argument, the appellants submitted that the alleged breach of the Equity Commitment Letter did not cause Algoma to enter the Port Transaction.

189 Essar Global contends that the trial judge made factual errors in finding a causal connection between Essar Global's equity commitment and the Port Transaction. It argues that the Port Transaction was a key component of the recapitalization before the execution of the Equity Commitment Letter.

190 At trial, the trial judge rejected Essar Global's argument, finding at para. 87 that the Port Transaction was contemplated as a possible transaction when first introduced in May 2014, but that the transaction was not a certainty. He accurately noted that the first Plan of Arrangement that was approved by the Court required Essar Global to comply with its cash funding commitment of US \$250 to US\$300 million pursuant to the Equity Commitment Letter and that the Port Transaction was not a part of that plan. He found that the Port Transaction had to be carried out because of Essar Global's decision not to fund Algoma according to the terms of the Equity Commitment Letter.

191 The causal connection between Essar Global's equity commitment and the Port Transaction is a factual matter and the trial judge's factual finding was supported by the evidence.

192 Furthermore, the Port Transaction that was floated in May 2014 was an entirely different transaction, in which the proceeds of sale would flow upstream to Essar Global and would not be used to recapitalize Algoma. Moreover, the RSA prohibited a related party transaction without noteholder consent, and the proceeds of any sale in excess of US\$2 million had to be used to reduce Algoma's debt.

193 I am not persuaded that the trial judge made any palpable and overriding error in his finding.

194 Fourth, Essar Global submits that the trial judge erred in disregarding the business judgment rule, which should have applied to prevent judicial second-guessing of the Board's decisions.

195 The trial judge correctly described the business judgment rule relying on para. 40 of *BCE*:

In considering what is in the best interests of the corporation, directors may look to the interests of, *inter alia*, shareholders, employees, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment to inform their decisions. Courts should give appropriate deference to the business judgment of directors who take into account these ancillary interests, as reflected by the business judgment rule. The "business judgment rule" accords deference to a business decision, so long as it lies within a range of reasonable alternatives . . . It reflects the reality that directors, who are mandated under s. 102(1) of the *CBCA* to manage the corporation's business and affairs, are often better suited to determine what is in the best interests of the

corporation. This applies to decisions on stakeholders' interests, as much as other directorial decisions.

196 Two additional points should be made with respect to the business judgment rule. First, the rule shields business decisions from court intervention only where they are made prudently and in good faith: *CW Shareholdings Inc. v. WIC Western International Communications Ltd.* (1998), 160 D.L.R. (4th) 131 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), at pp. 150-151.

197 Second, the rule's protection is available only to the extent that the Board of Directors' actions actually evidence their business judgment: *UPM-Kymmene*, at para. 153.

198 In deciding that the rule afforded no defence to Essar Global, the trial judge, at para. 123, relied on the fact that the Board did not follow "advice to go after Essar Global on its cash equity commitment". The trial judge went on to note that had Algoma's Board formed an independent committee in February 2014, events may have evolved differently, and the Board may have accepted the advice to hold Essar Global to its commitment.

199 Essar Global takes issue with this conclusion by asserting that the trial judge should not have characterized Algoma's Board as lacking independence because of its decision not to strike an independent committee. Essar Global points out that there was no evidence that Mr. Ghosh — who cast the deciding vote in that decision — was not free to vote as he chose.

200 Essar Global's argument ignores the trial judge's key finding that the four directors who voted against the independent committee in February 2014, including Mr. Ghosh, were not independent. The trial judge noted at para. 15 that he could "not overlook" that Mr. Ghosh had been with Essar Steel India, adding that Algoma's CFO, Mr. Marwah, had described these four directors as "Essar-affiliated directors". On this basis, it was open for the trial judge to find that the Essar-affiliated directors were not free from the influence of Essar Global and the Ruia family, particularly when considered alongside his extensive comments at paras. 43-60 finding that the critical decisions regarding Algoma's recapitalization and the Port Transaction were made not by Algoma's Board, but by Essar Global and Essar Capital as led by Mr. Seifert.

201 Specifically, the trial judge made findings of fact at paras. 51-53 regarding the limited role played by Algoma's Board and management. He accepted the evidence of Messrs. Ghosh and Marwah that they did not negotiate the economic terms of the debt refinancing or the Port Transaction. He also accepted the evidence of Mr. Ghosh that the Transaction was approved because there was no realistic alternative to generate sufficient cash to complete the recapitalization. He rejected the contradictory evidence of Mr. Seifert because the evidence of Messrs. Ghosh and Marwah was consistent with the documentary evidence. In my view, the trial judge was entitled to weigh the evidence as he did and make these findings of fact that were not infected by any palpable and overriding error.

202 Essar Global maintained before the trial judge, as they do before this court, that the Algoma Board's decisions were nonetheless shielded from court intervention because the Board had the benefit of sophisticated advisors throughout the recapitalization process. And yet, the only evidence tendered of any such advice was advice that the Board elected not to follow.

203 At para. 122, the trial judge described this advice, which was provided at least in part by Ray Schrock, described by the appellants as Algoma's lawyer. Mr. Schrock told the Board that unsecured noteholders would not react well to the Port Transaction and were likely to seek a higher infusion of cash from Essar Global, as promised in the Equity Commitment Letter. Mr. Schrock said that the Board should insist that Algoma press Essar Global to fulfill its equity commitments. There was no evidence that steps were taken in this regard and the trial judge found that this advice was not followed.

204 Additionally, the circumstances surrounding the resignation of the independent directors from Algoma's Board lend support to the trial judge's conclusion that reliance on the business judgment rule was unavailable. Mr. Dodds' letter stated that his decision to resign was driven by his conclusion that as an independent director, he lacked confidence that he was "receiving information and engaged in decision-making in the same manner as those Board members who are directly affiliated with the company and/or its parent". It was open to the trial judge to reach the conclusions he did. In these circumstances, the business judgment rule was of little assistance.

205 Essar Global also submits that the trial judge should not have gone on to censure the activities of the Board in November 2014 (when the Board approved the transactions) by relying on the Board's February 2014 decision regarding the independent committee.

206 The trial judge did not censure the decisions of the Algoma Board solely based on the February 2014 meeting. The February meeting, and the events surrounding it, are part of a larger context that included the November 2014 meeting, all of which the trial judge considered, and all of which demonstrated that the Board's decisions regarding the recapitalization were not made prudently or in good faith, as found by the trial judge, and thereby failed to attract the application of the business judgment rule.

207 Specifically, the trial judge found at para. 123 that, if the Board had acquiesced to forming an independent committee, or listened to the truly independent directors before they resigned in frustration, subsequent steps taken in pursuit of the recapitalization transaction "may have been taken differently". He then went on to say that:

What happened in the Port Transaction was an exercise in self-dealing in that Algoma's critical Port asset was transferred out of Algoma to a wholly owned subsidiary of Essar Global with a change of control provision that benefited Essar Global at a time that a future insolvency was a possibility.

208 Additionally, the trial judge found that the Board had accepted the inclusion of the contentious change of control provision in the Cargo Handling Agreement without considering alternatives. If the provision was truly for the benefit of GIP, it could have been accomplished in another way, without providing Essar Global with an effective veto over a change of control of Algoma.

209 All this evidence speaks to the Board's lack of business judgment and good faith, the failure to consider reasonable alternatives, and the Algoma Board's limited role in directing the recapitalization. There is no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the Board was precluded from relying on the business judgment rule. His decision was amply supported by the record.

210 Essar Global makes an additional point relating to the business judgment rule: that, in any event, no independent committee was required under corporate law.

211 It is a contrivance for Essar Global to impugn the trial judge's conclusion regarding the business judgment rule on the basis that an independent committee was not required. Although it is true that an independent committee was not legally or technically required, the Board's decision not to strike one, in the circumstances surrounding the November 2014 restructuring transactions, speaks volumes. The decision not to strike an independent committee must be considered alongside the evidence I have already reviewed: the Board's lack of independence, the Board's failure to follow its advisors' advice, the Board's failure to consider alternatives, and the Board's acquiescence to recapitalization transactions that primarily benefited the interests of Essar Global over those of Algoma. Again, the totality of the evidence supports the Board's lack of good faith, and renders the business judgment rule inapplicable.

212 There is one final argument Essar Global raises in invoking the business judgment rule. It claims that it was procedurally offensive for the trial judge to criticize the directors for not following Mr. Schrock's advice because evidence of the advice was not before him. It adds that, had the directors relied on legal advice from Mr. Schrock in the legal proceedings, privilege had not been waived.

213 Here, the minutes of the Board meeting held in November 2014 describe Mr. Schrock as "informing the Board [that] the [unsecured noteholders] would not react well to the proposed changes and that they were likely to push [Essar Global] for a higher infusion of cash/equity into [Algoma] as set forth in the Commitment [L]etter". Mr. Schrock also commented that the proposed Port Transaction "was likely to cause concern by the [unsecured noteholders]". Accordingly, Mr. Schrock advised the Board to "insist that [Algoma] should press all parties to fully satisfy their . . . obligations regarding the equity contributions".

214 To the extent that Mr. Schrock's comments amounted to legal advice, I would first note that his advice was only one piece of the evidentiary puzzle in the broader factual context. Even if Mr. Schrock's advice, and the Board's failure to implement it, are disregarded, the record still amply supports the trial judge's conclusions on this issue.

215 I would also add that Essar Global's claim that the evidence of Mr. Schrock's advice was not before the trial judge is incorrect. The Board minutes were included in the record as an exhibit to an affidavit tendered by Essar Global. Finally, as for Essar Global's argument that privilege had not been waived, any privilege that may have attached to Mr. Schrock's advice belonged to Algoma and not Essar Global.

216 Fifth, Essar Global submits that the involvement of Algoma's management and Board in the Port Transaction sanitizes that transaction, because the trial judge concluded that Messrs. Ghosh and Marwah acted in good faith thinking they were doing the best for Algoma in the circumstances. Essar Global also claims that the trial judge erred by holding otherwise because the Monitor failed to attack the Board's process in its pleading. I do not accept these arguments.

217 Despite Essar Global's argument, this court has established that good faith corporate conduct does not preclude a finding of oppression: *Brant Investments Ltd. v. KeepRite Inc.* (1991), 3 O.R. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.).

218 Moreover, Essar Global's argument on this point ignores the trial judge's findings that Algoma's Board and management played a limited role in the Port Transaction. It also ignores evidence that indicates that Messrs. Ghosh and Marwah's support was only given because there was no alternative to address Algoma's financial straits. This factual background demonstrates why it was open for the trial judge to conclude that the Port Transaction was oppressive, despite the good faith of Messrs. Ghosh and Marwah.

219 On the pleadings issue, I note that the Monitor pleaded that the Port Transaction was the result of Essar Global's "*de facto* control" of Algoma. In response, Essar Global pleaded that the Port Transaction was in the best interests of Algoma, based on the approval of the transaction by Algoma's Board and senior management, who were acting on an informed basis and with the benefit of financial advice. Given the way in which Essar Global framed its defence in its pleadings, it cannot now say that issues related to the Board's process were not properly before the trial judge.

220 Turning to the appellants' last argument relating to wrongful conduct and harm, they submitted that the trial judge identified two potential harms caused by Essar Global, neither of which is actionable in the oppression action: the undervalue of the Port Transaction to Algoma and the impairment of Algoma's ongoing restructuring.

221 In my view, it is inaccurate to characterize the trial judge's findings and analysis as concluding that harm flowed to stakeholders because the Port Transaction did not provide sufficient value to Algoma.

222 Specifically, he did not find that the US\$171.5 million in consideration paid by Portco to Algoma constituted undervalue. Indeed his remedy that GIP be repaid in full suggests the contrary. Rather, he found that Essar Global received an unreasonable benefit from the Port Transaction.

223 Moreover, it was an exercise in self-dealing. As the trial judge stated at para. 144:

For the balance of the first 20 years under the Cargo Handling Agreement after the GIP loan matures, if that agreement survives only to that date, Algoma will pay a further 12 years at \$25 million, or \$300 million, to Portco which will benefit Essar Global after the balance of the GIP loan is paid off. If the Cargo Handling Agreement is not terminated before the end of its life of 50 years, that will be another 30 years at \$25 million, or \$750 million, paid to Portco/ Essar Global. Taken with the small amount paid by Essar Global, the \$4.2 million in cash (and the \$19.8 million note that it has refused to pay), it means that Essar Global will obtain an extremely large amount of cash from Algoma for little money. I realize that if Algoma became solvent and able to pay its debts, it would be able to pay a dividend to Essar Global (or the appropriate subsidiary) so long as Essar Global remained its shareholder. Whether and when Algoma could become solvent with its pension deficits that have existed for some time and be in a position to pay dividends to its shareholder is a significant unknown. But the payments under the Cargo Handling Agreement do not require any solvency test and are in the financial circumstances Algoma finds itself in, a clear contractual benefit for little money. It is an unreasonable benefit that was prejudicial to, and unfairly disregarded, the interests of the creditors on whose behalf this action has been brought by the Monitor.

224 The trial judge also concluded that the mismatched terms of the Cargo Handling Agreement (20 years renewable) and the 50-year lease offered Essar Global an additional benefit. In that regard, he was not bound to accept the evidence of the appellants' expert. He reasoned, at para. 142, that the Port was critical to Algoma's functioning, and therefore that Algoma would not be in a position to terminate the Cargo Handling Agreement for the duration of the lease:

The other concerns are with respect to the obligations in the Cargo Handling Agreement. I have a concern with the imbalance in the term of the lease to Portco for 50 years against the term of the Cargo Handling Agreement for 20 years with automatic renewal for successive three year periods unless either party gives written notice of termination to the other party. If Essar Global thought that it wanted an increased payment after 20 years, it could refuse to continue the Cargo Handling Agreement and put Algoma at its complete mercy. If the market did not support an increased payment, or indicated that the payments from Algoma to Portco should be less in the future, Algoma would still be at the mercy of Essar Global. As the Port

facilities are critical to the operation and survival of Algoma, it would be foolhardy indeed for Algoma to refuse to extend the Cargo Handling Agreement. The language in the Cargo Handling Agreement that Algoma can refuse to extend it after 20 years is illusory and not realistic. In reality, it is a provision that is one-sided in favour of Essar Global.

225 The change of control provision or veto was also an exercise in "self-dealing". The consent provision unnecessarily tied Algoma's strategic options to Essar Global. The trial judge properly found that the insertion of control rights in the Cargo Handling Agreement served no practical purpose to GIP and the same rights could have been provided for in the Assignment of Material Contracts.

226 As the trial judge concluded at para. 138:

In my view, and I so order, the appropriate relief for the oppression involving the change of control clause in the Cargo Handling Agreement is to delete section 15.2 from that agreement and to insert a provision in the Assignment of Material Contracts agreement that if GIP becomes the equity owner of Portco, Algoma or its parent cannot agree to or undertake a change of control of Algoma without the consent of GIP.

227 There was evidence from Messrs. Ghosh and Marwah that supported the trial judge's conclusion that harm had flowed from the presence of the change of control provision and the ensuing letter from counsel. They were not cross-examined and no competing evidence was tendered by the appellants. It was also open to the trial judge to interpret the letter sent by Portco's counsel to Algoma's counsel as a veto threat to potential bidders while Essar Global continued to be interested in being a bidder. I would not give effect to this argument.

228 On the issue of the impairment of Algoma's ongoing restructuring, the appellants argue that no harm could have flowed from this, as the restructuring was not, in fact, impaired. Specifically, they argue that the only evidence of impairment consisted of statements in the affidavits of Messrs. Ghosh and Marwah that potential bidders for Algoma were concerned about the change of control clause. I would reject this argument as well. Again, I note that the appellants chose not to cross-examine on these affidavits, nor did they object to their admission into evidence. They cannot now, after the fact, impugn the trial judge's reliance on these statements.

229 Additionally, the appellants argue that it was premature for the trial judge to conclude that the control clause impaired the restructuring, because Portco/Essar Global was never asked to consent to a new transaction or to new owners. However, at para. 117, the trial judge noted that the change of control rights had to be considered alongside Essar Global's holding itself out as a prospective buyer in any bidding process for Algoma. That Essar Global has never been asked to consent to a new transaction was immaterial, as it remained in Essar Global's "interest to dissuade other buyers in order for it to achieve the lowest possible purchase price". In coming to this conclusion the trial

judge pointed to the letter from counsel for Portco/Essar Global on May 12, 2016, which "sp[oke] volumes" by "clearly invit[ing] any bidder to understand that Essar Global has control rights."

230 I see no error in the trial judge's conclusion.

### **(5) The Remedy**

231 Turning then to the issue of the remedy. Essar Global submits that the trial judge erred in striking out the control clause in the Cargo Handling Agreement and in granting Algoma the option of terminating the Port agreements upon repayment of the GIP loan. They argue that he was only permitted to rectify the harm that was suffered. Deleting the provision was an overly broad remedy that was unconnected to the reasonable expectations of the stakeholders and instead, he should have considered a nominal damages award.

232 GIP supports the submissions of Essar Global. It argues that the remedy awarded was not sought by any party, no evidence had been called in respect of that remedy, and no submissions were made. The practical effect of granting Algoma a termination right is that GIP does not have the security for which it bargained and it was prejudiced, despite its lack of involvement in the oppression found against Essar Global. GIP also argues that the Monitor and Algoma are seeking to set-off amounts owed by Essar Capital to Algoma against amounts owed to GIP, which results in additional prejudice.

233 I would not give effect to these submissions. First, trial judges have a broad latitude to fashion oppression remedies based on the facts before them. Once a claim in oppression has been made out, a court may "grant any remedy it thinks fit": *Pente Investment Management Ltd. v. Schneider Corp.* (1998), 42 O.R. (3d) 177 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 4. The focus is on equitable relief, and deference is owed to the remedy granted: *Fedel*, at para. 100.

234 Second, the trial judge properly identified the need to avoid an overly broad remedy, stating at para. 136 that there were "less obtrusive ways" of remedying the oppression than ordering shares of Portco be transferred to Algoma (the remedy the Monitor had originally requested). Varying the transaction as he did was one such way. The trial judge's remedy removes Portco's control rights (the main obstacle to a successful restructuring) and, after GIP is paid, restores the Port to the ownership of Algoma. If GIP becomes the equity owner of Portco, its consent will be required to any change of control. Unlike a damages award, the remedy was responsive to the oppressive conduct. It served to vindicate the expectations of the stakeholders that Algoma would retain long-term control of the Port and that Essar Global would not have a veto over its restructuring efforts.

235 Third, the remedy granted preserves the security GIP had bargained for and therefore GIP has not suffered any prejudice as a result of the remedy. The trial judge's remedy, as described at para. 145, ensures that GIP is to be paid in full. Until "payment in cash of all amounts owing to GIP" is made, the Port remains in Portco's hands and the contractual remedies held by GIP to

enforce its security remain in place. Moreover, Essar Global guaranteed Portco's liabilities to GIP under GIP's loan in the Port Transaction, which further demonstrates GIP's lack of prejudice. As GIP's own affiant indicated, this guarantee provides GIP with "an extra layer of protection in the event the debtor is unable to repay the loan".

236 Finally, regarding the issue of set-off, I note that the arguments made by GIP in support of this ground were made prior to Newbould J.'s subsequent ruling dealing with this issue. In that decision, he held that Algoma had set-off amounts owed under the promissory note against Essar Global, but he preserved GIP's right to repayment. This decision is a full answer to GIP's arguments on this point, and ensures that GIP will not suffer any prejudice as a result of the remedy granted in response to Essar Global's oppressive conduct.

#### ***(6) Was There Procedural Unfairness?***

237 Essar Global submits that the trial judge erred in basing his decision and relief on bases that were not pleaded. GIP supports the position of Essar Global, with particular focus on the remedy that was ultimately imposed.

238 As mentioned, the trial judge was the supervising *CCAA* judge and deeply acquainted with the facts of the restructuring. Of necessity, and on agreement of all parties to the oppression action, the timelines for pleadings, productions, and examinations were truncated. Additionally, no party objected at trial that the process had been procedurally unfair. Given the context and the complexity of the dispute, the pleadings were not as clear as they might have been in a less abbreviated schedule. That said, on a review of the record, I am not persuaded that there was any procedural unfairness with respect to the claims or that the appellants did not know the case they had to meet.

239 The focus of at least GIP's complaint lies in the remedy. The appellants are correct that the precise remedy awarded by the trial judge was not pleaded. A trial judge must fashion a remedy that best responds to the oppressive conduct and that is not overly broad. While it is desirable for a party seeking oppression relief to provide particulars of the remedy, a trial judge is not bound by those particulars. Because the discretionary powers under the oppression remedy must be exercised to *rectify* the oppressive conduct complained of (see: *Nanef v. Con-Crete Holdings Ltd.* (1995), 23 O.R. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 27), it follows that the remedy will, by necessity, be linked to the oppressive conduct that was pleaded. Therefore a party against whom a specifically-tailored oppression remedy is ordered cannot fairly complain that the remedy caught them by surprise. This conclusion is consistent with *Fedel*, where this court upheld oppression remedies imposed by the trial judge where the relief granted had not been specifically pleaded or sought in argument.

240 Moreover, absent error, a trial judge's decision on remedy is entitled to deference. As I have discussed, there is an absence of error. Furthermore, in this case, there is no prejudice to GIP.

Its position is preserved by the remedy granted by the trial judge. At the same time, the remedy is responsive to Essar Global's oppressive conduct.

241 That said, the trial judge did consider whether Essar Global and GIP could fairly argue that they were taken by surprise by his remedy. At para. 141, he rejected this position, holding that the issue of the change of control clause was pleaded by the Monitor, and affidavit material filed by both Essar Global and GIP provided evidence on the provision's significance. At para. 146, he concluded that issues relating to the relief he ordered were "fully canvassed in the evidence and argument", and that the remedy he ordered in fact was less intrusive than the remedy originally pled by the Monitor. And although he did not think an amendment was necessary, he nonetheless ordered that the Monitor would be granted leave to amend its claim to support the relief he granted.

242 I would not give effect to this ground of appeal.

### ***(7) Fresh Evidence***

243 Essar Global seeks to introduce fresh evidence on appeal that addresses the independence of Algoma's Board of Directors. It takes the position that the trial judge's rejection of the independence of two directors, Messrs. Kothari and Mirchandani, played a significant role in his decision. It adds that the lack of independent directors was not pleaded by the Monitor and so Essar Global had no reason to adduce this evidence earlier.

244 Messrs. Mirchandani and Kothari joined Algoma's Board in June and August 2014, respectively, after the three independent directors resigned. They were therefore on the Board when the Port Transaction was approved in November 2014.

245 Whether "a proper case" exists to allow fresh evidence is determined by applying the test outlined in *R. v. Palmer* (1979), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 759 (S.C.C.), or the slightly modified test from *Sengmueller v. Sengmueller* (1994), 17 O.R. (3d) 208 (Ont. C.A.).

246 As this court has noted, the two tests are quite similar: see *Korea Data Systems Co. v. Chiang*, 2009 ONCA 3, 93 O.R. (3d) 483 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 77. Under the *Palmer* test, the party seeking to admit fresh evidence must demonstrate that the evidence could not, by due diligence, have been adduced at trial; that the evidence is relevant in that it bears on a decisive issue in the trial; that the evidence is credible; and that the evidence, if believed, could be expected to affect the result.

247 Under the *Sengmueller* test, the moving party must demonstrate that the evidence could not have been obtained by the exercise of reasonable diligence prior to trial; that the evidence is credible; and that the evidence, if admitted, would likely be conclusive of an issue on appeal.

248 Essar Global has failed to meet either the *Palmer* or the *Sengmueller* test for two main reasons.

249 In both its original and its amended statement of claim, the Monitor alleged that representatives of Essar Global were members of Algoma's Board and exercised *de facto* control over Algoma, such that they made decisions for the benefit of Essar Global while unfairly disregarding the interests of Algoma's stakeholders. Essar Global cannot claim to have been caught by surprise by the issue of the Board's independence being in play. The fresh evidence could have been obtained with reasonable diligence prior to trial.

250 In any event, the evidence would not have affected the result at trial, and is not conclusive of any issue on appeal. The fresh evidence Essar Global asks to proffer consists of the affidavit of Mr. Mirchandani, which states that he and Mr. Kothari were determined to be independent Board members as a result of a conflict of interest policy and by virtue of the questionnaires they each completed.

251 However, there was evidence before the trial judge essentially to this effect, including Algoma's October 2014 offering memorandum, which stated that the Board included two independent directors. Indeed, the trial judge commented on this evidence in footnote 7 of his reasons, and rejected it in concluding that Messrs. Mirchandani and Kothari were not truly independent of Essar Global.

252 Additionally, and as I have already discussed elsewhere in these reasons, the remainder of the record strongly supported the Board's lack of independence. Even if the trial judge had Mr. Mirchandani's affidavit before him, it would not have made a difference.

253 I would therefore dismiss the motion for fresh evidence.

### **(8) Costs**

254 GIP claimed costs of CDN\$750,156.18 against the Monitor payable on a partial indemnity scale. It claimed it was entirely successful because it successfully resisted relief sought by the Monitor that would have prejudiced GIP. The trial judge exercised his discretion and observed that success between the Monitor and GIP was divided. He also relied on GIP's appeal as a basis to conclude success was divided. He therefore did not order any costs in favour of or against GIP.

255 GIP seeks leave to appeal the trial judge's costs award. Before this court, GIP in essence renews the arguments made before the trial judge. The awarding of costs is highly discretionary and leave is granted sparingly. I see no error in principle in the trial judge's exercise of discretion nor was the award plainly wrong: *Hamilton v. Open Window Bakery Ltd.* (2003), 2004 SCC 9, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 303 (S.C.C.), at para. 27.

256 At trial, GIP was unsuccessful in challenging both the Monitor's claim of standing and its claim that the Port Transaction was oppressive. It also seems incongruous for GIP to suggest that it was entirely successful in defeating the Monitor's claims, while it appeals the trial decision.

257 I see no basis on which to interfere with the costs award of the trial judge and would refuse leave to appeal costs.

## **E. DISPOSITION**

258 For these reasons, I would dismiss the appeal, the motion for fresh evidence and the motion for leave to appeal costs.

259 As agreed, I would order that the Monitor and Algoma are entitled to costs of the appeal fixed in the amounts of CDN\$100,000 and CDN\$60,000 respectively, inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes on a partial indemnity scale. At the oral hearing, the parties had not agreed on whether the award should be payable on a joint and several basis and requested more time to consider the matter. On September 15, 2017, counsel wrote advising that they had still not agreed on this issue. GIP requested the opportunity to make additional costs submissions on this issue at the appropriate time. Under the circumstances, I would permit GIP to make brief written submissions on this issue by January 10, 2018. Essar Global shall have until January 17, 2018 to file its submissions. The Monitor and Algoma shall have until January 24, 2018 to respond.

***R.A. Blair J.A.:***

I agree.

***K. van Rensburg J.A.:***

I agree.

*Appeal dismissed; application dismissed.*

## Footnotes

- 1 Algoma was named in the proceeding below as a defendant, but supports the position taken by the respondent, Ernst & Young Inc. It is therefore a respondent on this appeal.
- 2 In early 2015, Essar Consulting obtained two additional valuations of the Port assets, one in February from Royal Bank of Canada and one in April from ICICI Securities. The RBC valuation, which was an exhibit to the affidavit of Joseph Seifert, was between US \$165 and US\$200 million. The ICICI valuation, which was an exhibit to the affidavit of Anshumali Dwivedi, was US\$349 million.
- 3 Although Deutsche Bank intervened in the proceedings below, it was not involved in this appeal.
- 4 Before this court, no submissions on urgency were advanced.

- 5 Stephanie Ben-Ishai and Catherine Nowak, "The Threat of the Oppression Remedy to Reorganizing Insolvent Corporations" in Janis P. Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law, 2008* (Toronto: Carswell, 2009) 429, at pp. 430-431 and 436.
- 6 Janis Sarra, "Creating Appropriate Incentives, A Place for the Oppression Remedy in Insolvency Proceedings" in Janis P. Sarra ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law, 2009* (Toronto: Carswell, 2010) 99, at p. 99.

# **TAB 11**

ONTARIO  
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE  
COMMERCIAL LIST

THE HONOURABLE MR. ) MONDAY, THE 26<sup>TH</sup>  
JUSTICE NEWBOULD ) DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2016

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT,  
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT  
OF ESSAR STEEL ALGOMA INC., ESSAR TECH ALGOMA INC.,  
ALGOMA HOLDINGS B.V., ESSAR STEEL ALGOMA (ALBERTA) ULC,  
CANNELTON IRON ORE COMPANY AND ESSAR STEEL ALGOMA INC. USA

Applicants

ORDER

THIS MOTION, made by the DIP Lenders (defined below) for an order authorizing, directing and empowering Ernst & Young Inc. in its capacity as Monitor pursuant to the Amended and Restated Initial Order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Morawetz dated November 9, 2015 (the "Amended and Restated Initial Order") and not in its personal capacity (the "Monitor") to commence certain proceedings and make certain investigations, was heard this day at 330 University Avenue, Toronto, Ontario.

ON READING the affidavit of John McKenna sworn August 9, 2016, the Thirteenth Report of the Monitor dated June 20, 2016 (the "Thirteenth Report"), the Sixteenth Report of the Monitor dated September 9, 2016 (the "Sixteenth Report"), the affidavit of Anshumali Dwivedi, sworn September 19, 2016 and on hearing the submissions of counsel for the Applicants, the Monitor, Port of Algoma Inc. and

those other parties present, no one appearing for any other person on the service list, although duly served as appears from the affidavit of service, filed:

1. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor is authorized, empowered and directed to commence and continue proceedings (the "**Related Party Proceedings**") under the provisions of section 241 of the *Canada Business Corporations Act* ("**CBCA**") in relation to the transactions and matters described in the Thirteenth Report and the Sixteenth Report (the "**Related Party Transactions**"), including without limitation the transactions involving the conveyance of Algoma's port facility assets (the "**Port Transaction**") to Port of Algoma Inc.

2. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that all issues regarding the merits of the Related Party Proceedings may be raised in the course of those proceedings, including but not limited to: (i) the sufficiency of the pleadings; (ii) whether the plaintiff or applicant is a proper complainant pursuant to section 238 of the CBCA; (iii) whether the proper parties are named in the Related Party Proceedings; and (iv) whether the Related Party Proceedings meet the elements of section 241 of the CBCA. The granting of this Order permitting the Monitor to commence the Related Party Proceedings does not constitute a determination of any such issue.

3. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor is directed to bring any and all Related Party Proceedings on the Commercial List by a date not later than October 21, 2016.

4. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the stays of proceedings provided for under the Amended and Restated Initial Order, as they apply to the Applicants, Port of Algoma Inc. and Essar Power Corporation Limited, are hereby lifted to allow the Monitor to commence and continue the Related Party Proceedings and any defendants or

respondents named in the Related Party Proceedings to respond to the Related Party Proceedings, provided however, that the stay of proceedings shall be lifted with respect to no other claim.

5. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that in addition to the powers provided to the Monitor pursuant to the Amended and Restated Initial Order and the obligations imposed upon those with information and records pertaining to the Applicants, all persons having notice of this Order shall cooperate fully with the Monitor in relation to its investigation of the Related Party Transactions, and provided further that such persons shall incur no liability merely by reason of the cooperation referred to in this paragraph. All procedural and discovery related issues shall be determined by the case management judge of the Related Party Proceedings.

6. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that in relation to all matters connected with the Related Party Proceedings, the Monitor shall have all of the rights, powers and protections provided for pursuant to the Amended and Restated Initial Order.


7. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor shall continue to have the benefit of the protections provided for under paragraph 41 of the Amended and Restated Initial Order in the exercise of its powers under this Order, including, without limitation, the commencement and continuation of the Related Party Proceedings.

8. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the foregoing does not preclude the Court from awarding legal costs associated with the Related Party Proceedings in favour of a party to the Related Party Proceedings and in the event that such costs are awarded against the Monitor, the Monitor shall, have a claim for indemnity against the Property to satisfy any such costs award ("**Monitor's Cost Indemnity Claim**") and such indemnity claim shall be secured by the Administrative Charge created in accordance with the Amended and Restated Initial Order, as amended by this Order.

9. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Amended and Restated Initial Order shall be amended as necessary so as to provide that the maximum aggregate amount of the Administrative Charge (as defined therein) is equal the sum of \$5 million plus the amount of the Monitor's Cost Indemnity Claim.

**GENERAL**

10. **THIS COURT HEREBY REQUESTS** the aid and recognition of any court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body having jurisdiction in Canada or in the United States or any other jurisdiction to give effect to this Order and to assist the Applicants, the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order, including the U.S. Bankruptcy Court. All courts, tribunals, regulatory and administrative bodies are hereby respectfully requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to the Applicants and the Monitor, as an officer of this Court, as may be necessary or desirable to give effect to this Order or to assist the Applicants and the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order.



ENTERED AT / INSCRIT À TORONTO  
ON / BOOK NO:  
LE / DANS LE REGISTRE NO:

SEP 26 2016

PER / PAR: 

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS  
AMENDED

Court File No. CV15-000011169-00CL

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT  
OF ESSAR STEEL ALGOMA INC., ET AL

ONTARIO  
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE  
(COMMERCIAL LIST)

Proceeding commenced at Toronto

ORDER

OSLER, HOSKIN & HARCOURT LLP  
P.O. Box 50, 1 First Canadian Place  
Toronto, ON M5X 1B8

**JOHN MACDONALD**  
Tel: 416-862-5962  
LSUC No. 25884R

**MARC WASSERMAN**  
Tel: 416-862-4908  
Fax: 416-862-6666


Lawyers for Deutsche Bank AG in its various  
capacities, the DIP Lenders and Term Lenders  
**Lawyers for the Applicants**

**TAB 12**

ONTARIO  
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE  
COMMERCIAL LIST

THE HONOURABLE MR. ) MONDAY, THE 3RD  
JUSTICE HAINEY ) DAY OF DECEMBER, 2018

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS  
ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED



AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR  
ARRANGEMENT OF SEARS CANADA INC., 9370-2751  
QUÉBEC INC., 191020 CANADA INC., THE CUT INC., SEARS  
CONTACT SERVICES INC., INITIUM LOGISTICS SERVICES  
INC., INITIUM COMMERCE LABS INC., INITIUM TRADING AND  
SOURCING CORP., SEARS FLOOR COVERING CENTRES  
INC., 173470 CANADA INC., 2497089 ONTARIO INC., 6988741  
CANADA INC., 10011711 CANADA INC., 1592580 ONTARIO  
LIMITED, 955041 ALBERTA LTD., 4201531 CANADA INC.,  
168886 CANADA INC., AND 3339611 CANADA INC.

APPLICANTS

GOVERNANCE PROTOCOL AND STAY EXTENSION ORDER

THIS MOTION, made by FTI Consulting Canada Inc., in its capacity as monitor (the "Monitor"), pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended (the "CCAA"), for an order approving the governance protocol for the Applicants and SearsConnect (collectively, the "Sears Canada Entities") attached as Schedule "A" to this Order (the "Governance Protocol") and certain other relief, was heard this day at 330 University Avenue, Toronto, Ontario.

ON READING the Notice of Motion of the Monitor and the Twenty-Eighth Report of the Monitor (the "Twenty-Eighth Report"), filed, and on hearing the submissions of respective counsel for the Monitor, the Sears Canada Entities, and such other counsel as were present, no

one else appearing although duly served as appears from the Affidavit of Service of Catherine Ma sworn November 28, 2018, filed:

#### **SERVICE AND DEFINITIONS**

1. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the time for service of the Notice of Motion, the Twenty-Eighth Report, and the Motion Record herein is hereby abridged and validated so that this Motion is properly returnable today and hereby dispenses with further service thereof.
2. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that each capitalized term used and not defined herein shall have the meaning ascribed to such term in the Amended and Restated Initial Order dated June 22, 2017 (the "Initial Order") in these proceedings and in the Twenty-Eight Report.

#### **GOVERNANCE PROTOCOL**

3. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Governance Protocol is hereby approved and that the Monitor is authorized to take all steps necessary to implement such protocol.
4. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, the Sears Canada Entities, their advisors and their current and former officers, directors, agents and representatives shall fully co-operate with the Monitor and any directions it may provide pursuant to this Order or the Governance Protocol, and shall provide the Monitor with such assistance as the Monitor may request from time to time to enable the Monitor to carry out and discharge its powers as set out in this Order, the Governance Protocol or any other Order of this Court.
5. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, without limiting the provisions of the Initial Order, the Monitor shall not take possession of the Property or Business and not be deemed to have taken possession of the Property or Business, or any part thereof.
6. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor shall be entitled to exercise any and all of the powers of the Sears Canada Entities set out herein, in the Governance Protocol and in any

other Order in these proceedings. Nothing in this Order shall derogate from the powers of the Monitor as provided for in the CCAA, the Initial Order or any other Order in these proceedings.

7. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor be and is hereby authorized and empowered, but not obligated, without any personal liability therefor, in the name of and on behalf of the Sears Canada Entities, to:

- (a) take control of the existing bank accounts of the Sears Canada Entities listed in Schedule "B" attached hereto (the "**Bank Accounts**") and the funds credited thereto or deposited therein including, but not limited to, transferring any funds received into these bank accounts to accounts held in the name of the Monitor; provided that the Monitor shall endeavor to cause Sears Canada to perform the obligations of the Sears Canada Entities with respect to such Bank Accounts, including the payment of any fees or expenses arising in the ordinary course from the use of the accounts. Provided always that nothing in this Order or anything done by the Monitor in furtherance of its duties as Monitor shall create any obligation or liability on the part of the Monitor in respect of any amounts owing by the Sears Canada Entities on account of payment of such fees or expenses; and
- (b) the financial institutions maintaining such Bank Accounts shall not be under any obligation whatsoever to inquire into the propriety, validity or legality of any transfer, payment, collection or other action taken in accordance with the instructions of the Monitor or as to the use or application of funds transferred, paid, collected or otherwise dealt with in accordance with such instructions and such financial institutions shall be authorized to act in accordance with and in reliance upon such instructions without any liability in respect thereof to any person. For greater certainty and except to the extent that any of the terms of the documentation applicable to the Cash Management System (as defined in the Initial Order) are inconsistent with the authorities granted to the Monitor pursuant to this sub-paragraph 7(b) (dealing with Monitor control and access to bank accounts), nothing in this Order shall or shall be deemed to derogate from, limit, restrict or otherwise affect the protections granted pursuant to paragraph 5 of the Initial Order in favour of any bank providing Cash Management Services to the Sears Canada Entities.

## PROTECTIONS OF THE MONITOR

8. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, without limiting the provisions of the Initial Order, all employees of the Sears Canada Entities shall remain employees of the Sears Canada Entities until such time as the employment of such employees is terminated. Nothing in this Order or the Governance Protocol shall cause the Monitor to be liable for any employee-related liabilities or duties, including, without limitation, wages, severance pay, termination pay, vacation pay and pension or benefit amounts.

9. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that nothing in this Order or the Governance Protocol and nothing done by the Monitor in carrying out its duties under the Governance Protocol or hereunder shall result in, or be deemed to result in, the Monitor being an employer, successor employer, responsible person, operator, officer, director, employee receiver, trustee, assignee, liquidator, administrator, legal representative, receiver-manager or agent of the Sears Canada Entities or in possession or control of the Property or any part thereof, in each case, within the meaning of any statute, regulation or rule of law, or equity, for any purpose whatsoever. Without limiting the foregoing, the Monitor shall not, as a result of this Order or the Governance Protocol, or anything done pursuant to its powers pursuant to this Order or the Governance Protocol, be deemed to occupy or to take control, care, charge, possession or management of any of the Property that might be environmentally contaminated, might be a pollutant or a contaminant, or might cause or contribute to a spill, discharge, release or deposit of a substance contrary to any federal, provincial or other law respecting the protection, conservation, enhancement, remediation or rehabilitation of the environment or relating to the disposal of waste or other contamination including, without limitation, the *Canadian Environmental Protection Act*, the *Environmental Protection Act (Ontario)*, the *Occupational Health and Safety Act (Ontario)* and each of the respective regulations thereunder; provided however, if the Monitor is nevertheless found to be in possession of any Property, then the Monitor shall be deemed to be a person who has been lawfully appointed to take, or has lawfully taken, possession or control of such

Property for the purposes of section 14.06(1.1)(c) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Canada) (the "BIA") and shall be entitled to the benefits and protections in relation to the Sears Canada Entities and such Property as provided by section 14.06(2) of the BIA to a "trustee" in relation to an insolvent person and its property.

10. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, in addition to the rights and protections afforded to the Monitor under the CCAA, as an officer of this Court, or under the Initial Order, the Monitor shall not incur any liability or obligation as a result of carrying out the provisions of this Order or the Governance Protocol, save for gross negligence or wilful misconduct on its part, and the Monitor shall not have any liability with respect to any losses, claims, damages or liabilities, of any nature or kind, to any Person from and after the date of this Order, except to the extent such losses, claims, damages or liabilities result from the gross negligence or wilful misconduct on its part.

11. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any distribution or payment made to creditors of the Sears Canada Entities will be deemed to have been made by the Sears Canada Entities, or any one of them, as applicable.

12. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any Authorized Representative (as such term is defined in the Governance Protocol) acting upon the direction or delegation of the Monitor shall incur no liability or obligation as a result of carrying out the provisions of the Order or the Governance Protocol, save for gross negligence or wilful misconduct on their part, and any Authorized Representative shall not have any liability with respect to any losses, claims, damages or liabilities, of any nature or kind, to any Person from and after the date of this Order, except to the extent such losses, claims, damages or liabilities result from the gross negligence or wilful misconduct on their part.

13. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, without limiting any other provision of this Order, the Sears Canada Entities shall, jointly and severally, indemnify the Monitor and any Authorized

Representative against any and all costs, expenses, obligations and liabilities that it or any of them may incur as result of carrying out the provisions of this Order or the Governance Protocol (in the case of an Authorized Representative, at the direction or delegation of the Monitor), except to the extent that liability was incurred as a result of the gross negligence or willful misconduct on the part of the Monitor or such Authorized Representative, as the case may be.

14. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor shall continue to have the benefit of all of the indemnities, charges, protections and priorities as set out in the Initial Order and any other Order of this Court and all such indemnities, charges, protections and priorities shall apply and extend to the Monitor in the carrying out of the provisions of this Order and the Governance Protocol and shall also apply and extend to any Authorized Representative acting upon the direction or delegation of the Monitor. For the avoidance of doubt, no Authorized Representative shall be deemed to be a director of any of the Sears Canada Entities, or any entity affiliated with any of the Sears Canada Entities, under applicable law by reason of having been designated as an Authorized Representative pursuant to this Order or the Governance Protocol and/or having acted in such capacity at the direction or delegation of the Monitor.

**EXTENSION OF THE STAY PERIOD AND DEADLINE TO ISSUE NOTICES OF REVISION OR DISALLOWANCE**

15. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Stay Period (as such term is defined in the Amended and Restated Initial Order dated June 22, 2017 made in these proceedings) is hereby extended from December 18, 2018 until and including May 2, 2019. Further, the Application Period for the Employee Hardship Fund (as such terms, respectively, are defined in the Employee Hardship Fund Term Sheet, approved by the Court on August 18, 2017) shall also be extended from ~~December 18, 2018 until and including May 2, 2019.~~

16. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the deadline for the Monitor to issue Notices of Revision or Disallowance in respect of D&O Claims and claims filed by the Directors and Officers based

upon claimed indemnity obligations of the Applicants to such Directors and Officers, in each case pursuant to the Claims Procedure Orders, shall be extended until and including March 1, 2019.

#### **SEALING**

17. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that Schedule "B" to this Order shall be and is hereby sealed, kept confidential and shall not form part of the public record pending further Order of this Court.


#### **GENERAL**

18. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, except as may be necessary to give effect to this Order and the Governance Protocol, the Initial Order remains in full force and effect and in the event of a conflict between the terms of this Order and those in the Initial Order, the provisions of this Order shall govern.

19. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that this Order shall have full force and effect in all provinces and territories in Canada.

20. **THIS COURT HEREBY REQUESTS** the aid and recognition of any court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body, having jurisdiction in Canada or in the United States of America, to give effect to this Order and to assist the Sears Canada Entities, the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order and the Governance Protocol. All courts, tribunals, regulatory and administrative bodies are hereby respectfully requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to the Sears Canada Entities and to the Monitor, as an officer of this Court, as may be necessary or desirable to give effect to this Order and the Governance Protocol, to grant representative status to the Monitor in any foreign proceeding, or to assist the Sears Canada Entities and the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order and the Governance Protocol. Without limiting the foregoing, in regard to any Governance Action (as such term is defined in the Governance

Protocol) taken on behalf of any of the Sears Canada Entities by the Monitor, all applicable regulatory or governmental units or agencies are hereby directed to accept any such certificates or other documents filed by the Monitor and to take all such steps necessary or appropriate to allow and effect the Governance Action in question.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Hainey J.", is written over a horizontal line.

ENTERED AT / INSCRIT À TORONTO  
ON / BOOK NO:  
LE / DANS LE REGISTRE NO:

DEC 04 2018

PER / PAR: UM

**SCHEDULE A**  
**Governance Protocol**

Sears Canada Inc. Governance Protocol

All capitalized terms used herein and not otherwise defined have the meanings given to them in the Amended and Restated Initial Order dated June 22, 2017.

**WHEREAS** substantially all of the Property and assets of the Sears Canada Entities have been sold or otherwise disposed of or are the subject of a binding transaction agreement, with the exception of two remaining real property assets and other non-material assets (the "**Remaining Property**").

**WHEREAS** the Business previously carried on by the Sears Canada Entities has ceased operations.

**WHEREAS** the Applicants currently employ not more than ten individuals.

**WHEREAS** the remaining material steps to be taken in connection with these proceedings are: (i) completing the review, determination and adjudication of certain claims made against any of the Sears Canada Entities pursuant to the Claims Procedure Orders (as defined below) or otherwise (the "**Claims Resolution Process**"); (ii) monetizing the remaining real estate assets (the "**Real Estate Process**"); (iii) distributing the proceeds through a Plan if possible (the "**Distribution Process**"); and (iv) implementing a framework to proceed with certain litigation claims for the benefit of the Sears Canada Entities and their creditors (the "**Litigation Process**" and together with (i), (ii) and (iii), the "**Remaining Matters**").

**WHEREAS** no ordinary course business operations remain to be supervised and no material commercial transactions outside of the Real Estate Process remain to be implemented.

As a result of the foregoing, the following parties will oversee the Remaining Matters:

- i. the **Claims Resolution Process** has been, and will continue to be, administered by the Monitor in accordance with the Claims Procedure Order granted on December 8, 2017 and the Employee and Retiree Claims Procedure Order granted on February 22, 2018 (collectively, the "**Claims Procedure Orders**");
- ii. the **Real Estate Process** will be overseen by the Monitor. A group of stakeholders of the Sears Canada Entities has been consulted in this process and will continue to be consulted in accordance with past practice;
- iii. the **Distribution Process**, including all matters related to a Plan, including, without limitation, drafting of the Plan, and bringing of any motion to the Court in respect thereto, will be supervised and administered by the Monitor for the benefit of all creditors whose distributions will be determined in accordance with their legal entitlements or any negotiated resolutions resulting from the Claims Resolution Process; and
- iv. the **Litigation Process**, if approved by the Court, will be administered and supervised in accordance with the Order or Orders of the Court by the Court-appointed Litigation Trustee in connection with those claims it pursues on behalf of Sears Canada Inc., and by the Monitor in connection with those claims that the Monitor is empowered by statute to pursue.

In support of the foregoing, the Monitor will, to the exclusion of any other Person, and without the need for approval of the remaining directors of Sears Canada Inc. (the "**Remaining Directors**") or the remaining directors of the other Applicants:

(a) oversee the remaining wind-down of the Sears Canada Entities, including without limitation:

1. directing the Sears Canada Entities to preserve, protect and maintain control of the Remaining Property, or any parts thereof;

2. receiving, collecting and taking possession of all monies and accounts now owed or hereafter owing to any of the Sears Canada Entities; and
3. directing the Sears Canada Entities to file, or file on behalf of the Sears Canada Entities, any tax returns and directing the Sears Canada Entities to claim, or claim on behalf of the Sears Canada Entities, any and all rebates, refunds, and other amounts of tax (including sales taxes, capital taxes and income taxes) paid or payable by the Sears Canada Entities,

in each case on the basis that the Monitor shall incur no liability or obligation to any Person with respect to the foregoing matters.

(b) cause the Sears Canada Entities to perform such functions as the Monitor considers necessary or desirable in order to facilitate or assist the Sears Canada Entities in dealing with the Remaining Matters including the Remaining Property or operations, wind-down or other activities, including, without limitation:

1. entering into any agreements or disclaiming any agreements;
2. retaining or terminating employees or contractors, including preparing and filing the Sears Canada Entities' employee-related remittances, T4 statements and records of employment for the Sears Canada Entities' former employees based solely upon information provided by the Sears Canada Entities and on the basis that the Monitor shall incur no liability or obligation to any Person with respect to such returns, remittances, statements, records or other documentation;
3. in the event of dissolution and winding up of any of the Sears Canada Entities, executing, acknowledging and filing all necessary or appropriate certificates or other documents with the appropriate governmental agency or unit on behalf of any such Sears Canada Entity and taking any other action necessary or appropriate to effect such dissolution and wind-up of each such Sears Canada Entity and withdrawing such Sears Canada Entity from qualification in any jurisdiction it is qualified to do business, including without limitation, executing and filing certificates of dissolution and paying of any associated filing fees and the filing of any tax returns deemed necessary or appropriate (and paying the related taxes) on behalf of such entity on the basis that the Monitor shall incur no liability or obligation to any Person with respect to such matters;

(c) cause the Sears Canada Entities to administer the Remaining Property of the Sears Canada Entities as the Monitor considers necessary or desirable for the purposes of completing any transaction involving any Remaining Property or for purposes of facilitating distributions to creditors of the Sears Canada Entities, whether by way of a Plan or otherwise;

(d) cause the Sears Canada Entities to engage assistants or advisors as the Monitor deems necessary to carry out the Remaining Matters and to provide instructions and directions to any current advisors of the Sears Canada Entities;

(e) have authority to sign such agreements, instruments and other documents on behalf of each of the Sears Canada Entities as the Monitor deems appropriate, whether in the Monitor's name or in the name of and on behalf of any one of the Sears Canada Entities (including, without limitation, financial statements, tax returns and tax filings);

~~(f) as appropriate, delegate to any employee of the Sears Canada Entities (an "Authorized Representative") the authority to sign such agreements, instruments, notices, directions, settlements, regulatory and tax filings, certificates, authorizations and other documents on behalf of each of the Sears Canada Entities as the Monitor may direct;~~

(g) be authorized but not obligated to take any and all corporate actions and actions regarding the governance of the Sears Canada Entities (the "Governance Action"), including without limitation, authorizing and effecting:

1. amendments or updates to bylaws;
2. amendments to certificates of incorporation;
3. merger or consolidation with any entity;
4. changes to the jurisdiction of incorporation or formation; and
5. dissolution and winding up of any of the Sears Canada Entities;

provided, in each case, that such actions do not have an adverse effect on any creditors of the Applicants, and any Governance Action so taken by the Monitor is hereby authorized without requiring any further action or approval by the applicable entity or the Remaining Directors, former or existing shareholders or officers.

(h) where appropriate or necessary to conduct the administration of the estate, consult with and provide regular updates to stakeholders of the Sears Canada Entities and their advisors and report to the Court at such times and intervals as the Monitor may deem appropriate with respect to matters relating to its exercise of the enhanced powers provided herein and other matters as may be relevant to the CCAA proceedings; and

(i) be entitled to exercise any and all of the rights and powers of the Sears Canada Entities set out herein and in any other Order in the CCAA proceedings and to perform such other duties or to take any steps reasonably incidental to the exercise of the powers and obligations conferred upon the Monitor herein.

The Remaining Directors are not removed from their positions as a result of this protocol. Bennett Jones LLP will continue to advise its current clients that were directors of Sears Canada Inc. on June 22, 2017 in dealing with D&O insurers and matters relating to the CCAA proceedings. Following the approval of this protocol by the Court, the Remaining Directors (and the remaining directors of the other Applicants) will have no liability, obligation or responsibility with respect to the Remaining Matters or any other matter over which the Monitor or any other person exercises control in accordance with this protocol. For greater certainty, this specifically does not relate to any liability, obligation or responsibility of the Remaining Directors (and the remaining directors of the other Applicants) that arose prior to the Court approval of the Order related to these Governance Protocols. The payment of legal fees of counsel to the Remaining Directors shall be subject to the approval of the Monitor as to scope and reasonability.

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT,  
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

Court File No.: CV-17-11846-00CL

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF  
SEARS CANADA INC., et al.

**ONTARIO  
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE  
(COMMERCIAL LIST)**

Proceeding commenced at TORONTO

**GOVERNANCE PROTOCOL AND STAY EXTENSION  
ORDER**

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Lawyers to the Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc.

**TAB 13**

2009 CarswellOnt 9378  
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Nortel Networks Corp., Re

2009 CarswellOnt 9378

**In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement  
of Nortel Networks Corporation, Nortel Networks  
Limited, Nortel Networks Global Corporation,  
Nortel Networks International Corporation  
and Nortel Networks Technology Corporation**

Morawetz J.

Judgment: August 14, 2009  
Docket: Toronto 09-CL-7950

Counsel: Derrick Tay, Mario Forte, Jennifer Stam, for Applicants

**Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency

XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

XIX.5 Miscellaneous

**Headnote**

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Miscellaneous

**Table of Authorities**

**Statutes considered:**

*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

***Morawetz J.:***

- 1 The motion was not opposed.
- 2 Counsel to the Applicant submits that a natural transition point has been reached and that going forward it is appropriate and necessary for the Monitor to take on an enhanced role in Nortel's CCAA proceedings.
- 3 The reasons giving rise to this submission are set out in the affidavit of Mr. Davies sworn Aug. 11/09 and they are also referenced in the 19th Report of the Monitor.

4 Having reviewed the record and having heard submissions, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant the requested relief to expand the powers and rule of the Monitor in the form requested. In doing so, it is noted that Ernst & Young Inc. has indicated its willingness and consent to the proposed expansion of the powers and duties of the Monitor as reflected in the draft order.

5 In seeking this order, the Applicants have noted that "given the decisions that have been made and the direction that the restructuring has taken, Nortel has reached a natural transition point for certain matters". In light of these circumstances and in furtherance of expanding the powers of the Monitor, the Monitor advises that it will consult on a timely basis (with regard to the circumstances) with the Applicants' major creditor constituencies (in each case as appropriate in light of their respected potential interests with regard to the specific issue) in exercising powers in relation to matters of material substance and that it will provide timely (with regard to the circumstances) delivery of relevant information reasonably requested by such appropriate creditor constituent, subject to the terms of the Initial Order, as amended.

6 I also note that a further hearing has been scheduled to deal with this matter.

7 Paragraph 11 of this Order is to be considered as a true come back clause to address any matters arising out of this Order.

8 An order has been signed in the form presented to give effect to the foregoing.

**TAB 14**



Court File No.: 09-CL-7950

**ONTARIO  
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE  
COMMERCIAL LIST**

THE HONOURABLE MR. ) FRIDAY, THE 14<sup>th</sup>  
 )  
JUSTICE MORAWETZ ) DAY OF AUGUST, 2009

**IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*,  
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED**

**AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF  
NORTEL NETWORKS CORPORATION, NORTEL NETWORKS LIMITED,  
NORTEL NETWORKS GLOBAL CORPORATION, NORTEL NETWORKS  
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION AND NORTEL NETWORKS TECHNOLOGY  
CORPORATION**

**APPLICATION UNDER THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*,  
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED**

**ORDER**

THIS MOTION, made by Nortel Networks Corporation ("NNC"), Nortel Networks Limited ("NNL"), Nortel Networks Technology Corporation, Nortel Networks Global Corporation and Nortel Networks International Corporation (collectively, the "Applicants") for the relief set out in the Applicants' Notice of Motion dated August 11, 2009 was heard this day at 330 University Avenue, Toronto, Ontario.

ON READING the affidavit of Gordon A. Davies sworn August 11, 2009 (the "Davies Affidavit") and the Nineteenth report of Ernst & Young Inc. in its capacity as monitor (the "Monitor") dated August 11, 2009 (the "Nineteenth Report") and on hearing the submissions of counsel for the Applicant, the Monitor and those other parties present, no one appearing for any

other person on the service list, although properly served as appears from the affidavit of Katie Legree sworn August 11, 2009, filed:

1. THIS COURT ORDERS that the time for the service of the Notice of Motion, the Nineteenth Report and the Motion Record is hereby abridged so that this Motion is properly returnable today and hereby dispenses with further service thereof.

2. THIS COURT ORDERS that capitalized terms used herein and not otherwise defined shall have the meaning given to them in the Initial Order granted by this Court on January 14, 2009 (as the same has been amended and amended and restated and as the same may be amended or amended and restated further from time to time, the "Initial Order").

3. THIS COURT ORDERS that in addition to the powers and duties set out in the Initial Order but without altering in any way the powers, abilities, limitations and obligations of the Applicants within or as a result of these proceedings, the Monitor be and is hereby authorized and empowered to:

- (a) cause the Applicants, or any one or more of them, to exercise rights under paragraph 11 of the Initial Order;
- (b) cause the Applicants to perform such other functions or duties as the Monitor considers necessary or desirable in order to facilitate or assist the Applicants in dealing with the Property or their operations, restructuring, wind-down, liquidation or other activities;
- (c) conduct, supervise and direct one or more Court-approved sales processes for the Property or the business and any procedure regarding the allocation and/or distribution of proceeds of any sales;
- (d) cause the Applicants to administer the Property and operations of the Applicants as the Monitor considers necessary or desirable for the purposes of completing any transaction for the sale of the business or any part of it or for purposes of facilitating a Plan or Plans for all or part of the business;

- (e) administer the Applicants' claims process pursuant to the Claims Procedure Order dated July 30, 2009 (the "Claims Procedure Order") and any other claims bar and/or claims resolution process, or protocol as may be approved by Order of this Court within these proceedings;
- (f) propose or cause the Applicants or any one or more of them to propose one or more Plans in respect of the Applicants or any one or more of them;
- (g) engage assistants or advisors or cause the Applicants to engage assistants or advisors as the Monitor deems necessary or desirable to carry out the terms of the Initial Order or any other Order made in these proceedings or for the purposes of the Plan and such persons shall be deemed to be "Assistants" under the Initial Order;
- (h) apply to this Court for any orders necessary or advisable to carry out its powers and obligations under this Order or any other Order granted by this Court including for advice and directions with respect to any matter;
- (i) meet and coordinate with the chief restructuring officer of the Applicants or any person holding any similar position;
- (j) meet and consult with the board of directors of the Applicants as it deems necessary or appropriate;
- (k) meet with and direct management of the Applicants with respect to any of the foregoing including, without limitation, operational and restructuring matters; and
- (l) coordinate with the individual appointed as the principal officer (or such similar title) of Nortel Networks Inc. or any successor or assign of such entity with respect to operational and restructuring matters, provided that the Monitor shall have no supervisory authority or control over such individuals;

provided, however, that the Monitor shall comply with all applicable law and shall not have any authority or power to elect or to cause the election or removal of directors of

any of the Applicants or any of their subsidiaries or to take any action to restrict or to transfer to the Monitor any of their powers, duties or obligations.

4. THIS COURT ORDERS that, other than with respect to the Retainers, the Monitor shall not receive or hold any property or funds of the Applicants, including without limitation, any proceeds of dispositions of Property or other cash or cash equivalents.

5. THIS COURT ORDERS that nothing in this Order shall diminish or vary the obligations of the Applicants, or the Monitor when directing the Applicants, where required, either contractually or by Order of the Court, to consult with, obtain the consent of or provide notice to the official committee of unsecured creditors of Nortel Networks Inc., the ad hoc bondholders committee and/or the Joint Administrators (as defined in the Davies Affidavit), prior to taking any action for which consent or notice is required including pursuant to and in accordance with the Orders previously made in these proceedings and in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Amended Cross-Border Protocol dated July 6, 2009 (the "Cross-Border Protocol"), the Interim Funding and Settlement Agreement dated as of June 9, 2009 (the "IFSA") and the Interim GSPA (as the same has been amended and extended from time to time) and provided further that nothing in this Order shall diminish or vary the Applicants' obligations under the Cross-Border Protocol, the IFSA or the Interim GSPA (or any Orders in respect of the Cross-Border Protocol, the IFSA or the Interim GSPA).

6. THIS COURT ORDERS that, without limiting the provisions of the Initial Order, the Applicants shall remain in possession and control of the Property and the Business and that the Monitor shall not take possession of the Property and/or the Business or any part thereof.

7. THIS COURT ORDERS that, without limiting the provisions of the Initial Order, all employees of the Applicants shall remain employees of the Applicants until such time as the Applicants may terminate the employment of such employees. Nothing in this Order shall, in and of itself, cause the Monitor to be liable for any employee-related liabilities or duties, including, without limitation, wages, severance pay, termination pay, vacation pay and pension or benefit amounts.

8. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Monitor shall continue to have the benefit of all of the protections and priorities as set out in the Initial Order and any such protections and priorities

shall apply to the Monitor in fulfilling its duties under this Order or carrying out the provisions of this Order.

9. THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES that nothing in this Order shall constitute or be deemed to constitute the Monitor as a receiver, assignee, liquidator, administrator, receiver-manager, agent of the creditors or legal representative of any of the Applicants within the meaning of any relevant legislation and that any distribution ultimately made to creditors of the Applicants by the Monitor will be deemed to have been made by the Applicants themselves.

10. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Applicants and their advisors shall cooperate fully with the Monitor and any directions it may provide pursuant to this Order and shall provide the Monitor with such assistance as the Monitor may request from time to time to enable the Monitor to carry out its duties and powers as set out in the Initial Order, this Order or any other Order of this Court under the CCAA or applicable law generally.

11. THIS COURT ORDERS that a further hearing shall be held on September 15, 2009 or such alternate date as this Court may fix, at which time this Order may be varied. Materials for such further hearing shall be served upon the Service List for this proceeding by no later than ten days prior to the date scheduled for the further hearing save and except in the case of the Monitor and the Applicants, which shall serve their materials (either in response or otherwise), if any, by no later than four days prior to the date scheduled for the further hearing.



ENTERED AT / INSCRIT A TORONTO  
ON / BOOK NO:  
LE / DANS LE REGISTRE NO.:

AUG 14 2009

PER / PAR: Joanne Nicoara  
Registrar, Superior Court of Justice

IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF NORTEL  
NETWORKS CORPORATION, NORTEL NETWORKS LIMITED, NORTEL NETWORKS  
GLOBAL CORPORATION, NORTEL NETWORKS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION AND  
NORTEL NETWORKS TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION

Court File No: 09-CL-7950

**ONTARIO  
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE  
COMMERCIAL LIST**

Proceeding commenced at Toronto

**ORDER**

**OGILVY RENAULT LLP**

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Lawyers for the Applicants

**TAB 15**


**ONTARIO  
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE  
COMMERCIAL LIST**

THE HONOURABLE MR. ) WEDNESDAY, THE 3<sup>rd</sup>  
 )  
JUSTICE MORAWETZ ) DAY OF OCTOBER, 2012

**IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*,  
R.S.C.1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED**

**AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF  
NORTEL NETWORKS CORPORATION, NORTEL NETWORKS LIMITED,  
NORTEL NETWORKS GLOBAL CORPORATION, NORTEL NETWORKS  
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION AND NORTEL NETWORKS TECHNOLOGY  
CORPORATION**

**APPLICATION UNDER THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*,  
R.S.C.1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED**



**ORDER  
(Monitor's Expansion of Power Order # 2)**

THIS MOTION, made by Ernst & Young Inc. in its capacity as monitor in the within proceedings (the "Monitor") for the relief set out in the Monitor's Notice of Motion dated September 26, 2012 was heard this day at 330 University Avenue, Toronto, Ontario.

ON READING the Eighty-Eighth Report of the Monitor ("Eighty-Eighth Report") and on hearing the submissions of counsel for Nortel Networks Corporation, Nortel Networks Limited, Nortel Networks Technology Corporation, Nortel Networks Global Corporation and Nortel Networks International Corporation (collectively, the "Applicants") and counsel for the Monitor and those other parties present, no one appearing for any other person on the service list, although properly served as appears from the affidavit of Christopher G. Armstrong sworn September 27, 2012, filed:

1. THIS COURT ORDERS that the time for the service of the Notice of Motion, the Eighty-Eighth Report and the Motion Record is hereby abridged so that this Motion is properly returnable today and hereby dispenses with further service thereof.

2. THIS COURT ORDERS that capitalized terms used herein and not otherwise defined shall have the meaning given to them in the Initial Order granted by this Court on January 14, 2009 (as the same has been amended and amended and restated and as the same may be amended or amended and restated further from time to time, the "Initial Order").

3. THIS COURT ORDERS that, without limiting the provisions of previous Orders granted in these proceedings, including the Initial Order and the Order granted by this Court on August 14, 2009, which, among other things, expanded the powers of the Monitor (the "Monitor Expansion of Powers Order") and in addition to all powers of the Monitor, the Monitor be and is hereby authorized and empowered, but not obligated, to exercise any powers which may be properly exercised by a board of directors of any of the Applicants.

4. THIS COURT ORDERS that, in furtherance of and without in any way limiting the powers set out in the Initial Order, those set out in the Monitor Expansion of Powers Order or any other Order of this Court, those set out herein or under the CCAA or applicable law generally, the Monitor is authorized and directed to take the following actions:

a) cause the Applicants to retain the services of Allan Bifield and Anna Ventresca as employees of>NNL under the supervision and direction of the Monitor on the same terms in respect of their 2012 remuneration as currently in place and thereafter on terms as agreed with the Monitor; and

b) designate each of Allan Bifield and Anna Ventresca, and/or such other person or persons as the Monitor shall determine from time to time as evidenced by the filing of a Monitor's Certificate with this Court as an authorized representative of each of the Applicants (each, in such capacity, an "Authorized Representative") whose sole responsibility shall be to act, on behalf of the Applicants, solely as the Monitor may direct in the exercise of its rights, powers and authorities granted by the Initial Order, the Monitor Expansion of Powers Order, and any other Order of this Court, and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, each of the Authorized Representatives shall

have sole authority to sign such agreements, instruments and other documents on behalf of each of the Applicants as the Monitor may direct, but no authority to direct the management and policies of the Applicants or any entity affiliated with any of the Applicants by reason of having been designated as an Authorized Representative pursuant to this Order.

5. THIS COURT ORDERS that, other than with respect to the Retainers, the Monitor shall not receive or hold any property or funds of the Applicants, including without limitation, any proceeds of dispositions of Property or other cash or cash equivalents.

6. THIS COURT ORDERS that, without limiting the provisions of the Initial Order, the Applicants shall remain in possession and control of the Property and the Business and that the Monitor shall not take possession of the Property and/or the Business or any part thereof.

7. THIS COURT ORDERS that, without limiting the provisions of the Initial Order, all employees of the Applicants shall remain employees of the Applicants until such time as the Applicants may terminate the employment of such employees. Nothing in this Order shall, in and of itself, cause the Monitor to be liable for any employee-related liabilities or duties, including, without limitation, wages, severance pay, termination pay, vacation pay and pension or benefit amounts.

8. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Monitor shall continue to have the benefit of all of the indemnities, charges, protections and priorities as set out in the Initial Order, the Monitor Expansion of Powers Order and any other Order of this Court and all such indemnities, charges, protections and priorities shall apply and extend to the Monitor in the fulfilment of its duties or the carrying out of the provisions of this Order and shall extend to any Authorized Representative acting upon the direction of the Monitor. For the avoidance of doubt, no Authorized Representative shall be deemed to be an officer or director of any of the Applicants, or of any entity affiliated with any of the Applicants, under applicable law by reason of having been designated as an Authorized Representative pursuant to this Order and/or having acted in such capacity at the direction of the Monitor.

9. THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES that nothing in this Order shall constitute or be deemed to constitute the Monitor as a receiver, assignee, liquidator, administrator, receiver

manager, agent of the creditors or legal representative of any of the Applicants within the meaning of any relevant legislation and that any distribution ultimately made to creditors of the Applicants by the Monitor will be deemed to have been made by the Applicants themselves.

10. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Applicants and their advisors shall cooperate fully with the Monitor and any directions it may provide pursuant to this Order and shall provide the Monitor with such assistance as the Monitor may request from time to time to enable the Monitor to carry out its duties and powers as set out in the Initial Order, the Monitor Expansion of Powers Order, this Order or any other Order of this Court under the CCAA or applicable law generally.

11. THIS COURT ORDERS that references to “directors” and “officers” in paragraphs 20, 21, 21A and 22 of the Initial Order are understood to mean directors and officers, respectively, that served in such capacity at any time on or after January 14, 2009 and that the reference to “counsel to directors” in paragraph 30 of the Initial Order is understood to mean Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP as counsel to certain former directors and officers.

12. THIS COURT ORDERS that, except as may be necessary to give effect to this Order, the Initial Order and the Monitor Expansion of Powers Order remain in full force and effect and in the event of a conflict between the terms of this Order and those of the Initial Order or the Monitor Expansion of Powers Order, the provisions of this Order shall govern.

13. THIS COURT ORDERS that Confidential Appendix “B” to the Eighty- Eighth Report be and is hereby sealed pending further Order of the Court.

14. THIS COURT HEREBY REQUESTS the aid and recognition of any court or administrative body in any province of Canada, the Federal Court of Canada, any administrative tribunal or other court constituted pursuant to the Parliament of Canada or any of its provinces or territories and any federal or state court or administrative body in the United States of America or any other foreign courts to act in aid of and to be complementary to this Court in carrying out the terms of this Order.

  
\_\_\_\_\_

IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF NORTEL  
NETWORKS CORPORATION, NORTEL NETWORKS LIMITED, NORTEL NETWORKS  
GLOBAL CORPORATION, NORTEL NETWORKS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION  
AND NORTEL NETWORKS TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION

Court File No: 09-CL-7950

**ONTARIO  
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE  
COMMERCIAL LIST**

Proceeding commenced at Toronto

**ORDER  
(Monitor's Expansion of Power  
Order # 2)**

**Goodmans LLP**  
Barristers & Solicitors  
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Joseph Pasquariello (LSUC# 38390C)  
Christopher G. Armstrong (LSUC# 55148B)

Tel: 416.979.2211  
Fax: 416.979.1234

**Lawyers for the Monitor, Ernst & Young  
Inc.**

**TAB 16**

**Most Negative Treatment:** Distinguished

**Most Recent Distinguished:** Arrangement de MPECO Construction inc. | 2019 QCCS 297, 2019 CarswellQue 730, EYB 2019-306949, 67 C.B.R. (6th) 87 | (Que. Bkcty., Feb 4, 2019)

2010 SCC 60  
Supreme Court of Canada

Ted Leroy Trucking [Century Services] Ltd., Re

2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 CarswellBC 3420, 2010 SCC 60, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, [2010] S.C.J. No. 60, [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 533, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 534, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 196 A.C.W.S. (3d) 27, 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 409 N.R. 201, 503 W.A.C. 1, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, J.E. 2011-5

**Century Services Inc. (Appellant) and Attorney  
General of Canada on behalf of Her Majesty  
The Queen in Right of Canada (Respondent)**

Deschamps J., McLachlin C.J.C., Binnie, LeBel,  
Fish, Abella, Charron, Rothstein, Cromwell JJ.

Heard: May 11, 2010  
Judgment: December 16, 2010  
Docket: 33239

Proceedings: reversing *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re* (2009), 2009 CarswellBC 1195, 2009 G.T.C. 2020 (Eng.), 2009 BCCA 205, 270 B.C.A.C. 167, 454 W.A.C. 167, [2009] 12 W.W.R. 684, 98 B.C.L.R. (4th) 242, [2009] G.S.T.C. 79 (B.C. C.A.); reversing *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re* (2008), 2008 CarswellBC 2895, 2008 BCSC 1805, [2008] G.S.T.C. 221, 2009 G.T.C. 2011 (Eng.) (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers])

Counsel: Mary I.A. Buttery, Owen J. James, Matthew J.G. Curtis for Appellant  
Gordon Bourgard, David Jacyk, Michael J. Lema for Respondent

**Related Abridgment Classifications**

Tax

I General principles

I.5 Priority of tax claims in bankruptcy proceedings

Tax

III Goods and Services Tax

### III.14 Collection and remittance

#### III.14.b GST held in trust

##### **Headnote**

Tax --- Goods and Services Tax — Collection and remittance — GST held in trust

Debtor owed Crown under Excise Tax Act (ETA) for unremitted GST — Debtor sought relief under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) — Under order of BC Supreme Court, amount of GST debt was placed in trust account and remaining proceeds of sale of assets paid to major secured creditor — Debtor's application for partial lifting of stay of proceedings to assign itself into bankruptcy was granted, while Crown's application for payment of tax debt was dismissed — Crown's appeal to BC Court of Appeal was allowed — Creditor appealed to Supreme Court of Canada — Appeal allowed — Analysis of ETA and CCAA yielded conclusion that CCAA provides that statutory deemed trusts do not apply, and that Parliament did not intend to restore Crown's deemed trust priority in GST claims under CCAA when it amended ETA in 2000 — Parliament had moved away from asserting priority for Crown claims under both CCAA and Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), and neither statute provided for preferred treatment of GST claims — Giving Crown priority over GST claims during CCAA proceedings but not in bankruptcy would reduce use of more flexible and responsive CCAA regime — Parliament likely inadvertently succumbed to drafting anomaly — Section 222(3) of ETA could not be seen as having impliedly repealed s. 18.3 of CCAA by its subsequent passage, given recent amendments to CCAA — Court had discretion under CCAA to construct bridge to liquidation under BIA, and partially lift stay of proceedings to allow entry into liquidation — No "gap" should exist when moving from CCAA to BIA — Court order segregating funds did not have certainty that Crown rather than creditor would be beneficiary sufficient to support express trust — Amount held in respect of GST debt was not subject to deemed trust, priority or express trust in favour of Crown — Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15, ss. 222(1), (1.1).

Tax --- General principles — Priority of tax claims in bankruptcy proceedings

Debtor owed Crown under Excise Tax Act (ETA) for unremitted GST — Debtor sought relief under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) — Under order of BC Supreme Court, amount of GST debt was placed in trust account and remaining proceeds of sale of assets paid to major secured creditor — Debtor's application for partial lifting of stay of proceedings to assign itself into bankruptcy was granted, while Crown's application for payment of tax debt was dismissed — Crown's appeal to BC Court of Appeal was allowed — Creditor appealed to Supreme Court of Canada — Appeal allowed — Analysis of ETA and CCAA yielded conclusion that CCAA provides that statutory deemed trusts do not apply, and that Parliament did not intend to restore Crown's deemed trust priority in GST claims under CCAA when it amended ETA in 2000 — Parliament had moved away from asserting priority for Crown claims under both CCAA and Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), and neither statute provided for preferred treatment of GST claims — Giving Crown priority over GST claims during CCAA proceedings but not in bankruptcy would reduce use of more flexible and responsive CCAA regime — Parliament likely inadvertently succumbed to drafting anomaly — Section 222(3) of ETA could not be seen as having impliedly

repealed s. 18.3 of CCAA by its subsequent passage, given recent amendments to CCAA — Court had discretion under CCAA to construct bridge to liquidation under BIA, and partially lift stay of proceedings to allow entry into liquidation — No "gap" should exist when moving from CCAA to BIA — Court order segregating funds did not have certainty that Crown rather than creditor would be beneficiary sufficient to support express trust — Amount held in respect of GST debt was not subject to deemed trust, priority or express trust in favour of Crown.

Taxation --- Taxe sur les produits et services — Perception et versement — Montant de TPS détenu en fiducie

Débitrice devait à la Couronne des montants de TPS qu'elle n'avait pas remis, en vertu de la Loi sur la taxe d'accise (LTA) — Débitrice a entamé des procédures judiciaires en vertu de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies (LACC) — En vertu d'une ordonnance du tribunal, le montant de la créance fiscale a été déposé dans un compte en fiducie et la balance du produit de la vente des actifs a servi à payer le créancier garanti principal — Demande de la débitrice visant à obtenir la levée partielle de la suspension de procédures afin qu'elle puisse faire cession de ses biens a été accordée, alors que la demande de la Couronne visant à obtenir le paiement des montants de TPS non remis a été rejetée — Appel interjeté par la Couronne a été accueilli — Créancier a formé un pourvoi — Pourvoi accueilli — Analyse de la LTA et de la LACC conduisait à la conclusion que le législateur ne saurait avoir eu l'intention de redonner la priorité, dans le cadre de la LACC, à la fiducie réputée de la Couronne à l'égard de ses créances relatives à la TPS quand il a modifié la LTA, en 2000 — Législateur avait mis un terme à la priorité accordée aux créances de la Couronne sous les régimes de la LACC et de la Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité (LFI), et ni l'une ni l'autre de ces lois ne prévoyaient que les créances relatives à la TPS bénéficiaient d'un traitement préférentiel — Fait de faire primer la priorité de la Couronne sur les créances découlant de la TPS dans le cadre de procédures fondées sur la LACC mais pas en cas de faillite aurait pour effet de restreindre le recours à la possibilité de se restructurer sous le régime plus souple et mieux adapté de la LACC — Il semblait probable que le législateur avait par inadvertance commis une anomalie rédactionnelle — On ne pourrait pas considérer l'art. 222(3) de la LTA comme ayant implicitement abrogé l'art. 18.3 de la LACC, compte tenu des modifications récemment apportées à la LACC — Sous le régime de la LACC, le tribunal avait discrétion pour établir une passerelle vers une liquidation opérée sous le régime de la LFI et de lever la suspension partielle des procédures afin de permettre à la débitrice de procéder à la transition au régime de liquidation — Il n'y avait aucune certitude, en vertu de l'ordonnance du tribunal, que la Couronne était le bénéficiaire véritable de la fiducie ni de fondement pour donner naissance à une fiducie expresse — Montant perçu au titre de la TPS ne faisait l'objet d'aucune fiducie présumée, priorité ou fiducie expresse en faveur de la Couronne.

Taxation --- Principes généraux — Priorité des créances fiscales dans le cadre de procédures en faillite

Débitrice devait à la Couronne des montants de TPS qu'elle n'avait pas remis, en vertu de la Loi sur la taxe d'accise (LTA) — Débitrice a entamé des procédures judiciaires en vertu de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies (LACC) — En vertu d'une ordonnance du

tribunal, le montant de la créance fiscale a été déposé dans un compte en fiducie et la balance du produit de la vente des actifs a servi à payer le créancier garanti principal — Demande de la débitrice visant à obtenir la levée partielle de la suspension de procédures afin qu'elle puisse faire cession de ses biens a été accordée, alors que la demande de la Couronne visant à obtenir le paiement des montants de TPS non remis a été rejetée — Appel interjeté par la Couronne a été accueilli — Créancier a formé un pourvoi — Pourvoi accueilli — Analyse de la LTA et de la LACC conduisait à la conclusion que le législateur ne saurait avoir eu l'intention de redonner la priorité, dans le cadre de la LACC, à la fiducie réputée de la Couronne à l'égard de ses créances relatives à la TPS quand il a modifié la LTA, en 2000 — Législateur avait mis un terme à la priorité accordée aux créances de la Couronne sous les régimes de la LACC et de la Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité (LFI), et ni l'une ni l'autre de ces lois ne prévoyait que les créances relatives à la TPS bénéficiaient d'un traitement préférentiel — Fait de faire primer la priorité de la Couronne sur les créances découlant de la TPS dans le cadre de procédures fondées sur la LACC mais pas en cas de faillite aurait pour effet de restreindre le recours à la possibilité de se restructurer sous le régime plus souple et mieux adapté de la LACC — Il semblait probable que le législateur avait par inadvertance commis une anomalie rédactionnelle — On ne pourrait pas considérer l'art. 222(3) de la LTA comme ayant implicitement abrogé l'art. 18.3 de la LACC, compte tenu des modifications récemment apportées à la LACC — Sous le régime de la LACC, le tribunal avait discrétion pour établir une passerelle vers une liquidation opérée sous le régime de la LFI et de lever la suspension partielle des procédures afin de permettre à la débitrice de procéder à la transition au régime de liquidation — Il n'y avait aucune certitude, en vertu de l'ordonnance du tribunal, que la Couronne était le bénéficiaire véritable de la fiducie ni de fondement pour donner naissance à une fiducie expresse — Montant perçu au titre de la TPS ne faisait l'objet d'aucune fiducie présumée, priorité ou fiducie expresse en faveur de la Couronne.

The debtor company owed the Crown under the Excise Tax Act (ETA) for GST that was not remitted. The debtor commenced proceedings under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA). Under an order by the B.C. Supreme Court, the amount of the tax debt was placed in a trust account, and the remaining proceeds from the sale of the debtor's assets were paid to the major secured creditor. The debtor's application for a partial lifting of the stay of proceedings in order to assign itself into bankruptcy was granted, while the Crown's application for the immediate payment of the unremitted GST was dismissed.

The Crown's appeal to the B.C. Court of Appeal was allowed. The Court of Appeal found that the lower court was bound by the ETA to give the Crown priority once bankruptcy was inevitable. The Court of Appeal ruled that there was a deemed trust under s. 222 of the ETA or that an express trust was created in the Crown's favour by the court order segregating the GST funds in the trust account.

The creditor appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

**Held:** The appeal was allowed.

Per Deschamps J. (McLachlin C.J.C., Binnie, LeBel, Charron, Rothstein, Cromwell JJ. concurring): A purposive and contextual analysis of the ETA and CCAA yielded the conclusion

that Parliament could not have intended to restore the Crown's deemed trust priority in GST claims under the CCAA when it amended the ETA in 2000. Parliament had moved away from asserting priority for Crown claims in insolvency law under both the CCAA and Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA). Unlike for source deductions, there was no express statutory basis in the CCAA or BIA for concluding that GST claims enjoyed any preferential treatment. The internal logic of the CCAA also militated against upholding a deemed trust for GST claims.

Giving the Crown priority over GST claims during CCAA proceedings but not in bankruptcy would, in practice, deprive companies of the option to restructure under the more flexible and responsive CCAA regime. It seemed likely that Parliament had inadvertently succumbed to a drafting anomaly, which could be resolved by giving precedence to s. 18.3 of the CCAA. Section 222(3) of the ETA could no longer be seen as having impliedly repealed s. 18.3 of the CCAA by being passed subsequently to the CCAA, given the recent amendments to the CCAA. The legislative context supported the conclusion that s. 222(3) of the ETA was not intended to narrow the scope of s. 18.3 of the CCAA.

The breadth of the court's discretion under the CCAA was sufficient to construct a bridge to liquidation under the BIA, so there was authority under the CCAA to partially lift the stay of proceedings to allow the debtor's entry into liquidation. There should be no gap between the CCAA and BIA proceedings that would invite a race to the courthouse to assert priorities.

The court order did not have the certainty that the Crown would actually be the beneficiary of the funds sufficient to support an express trust, as the funds were segregated until the dispute between the creditor and the Crown could be resolved. The amount collected in respect of GST but not yet remitted to the Receiver General of Canada was not subject to a deemed trust, priority or express trust in favour of the Crown.

Per Fish J. (concurring): Parliament had declined to amend the provisions at issue after detailed consideration of the insolvency regime, so the apparent conflict between s. 18.3 of the CCAA and s. 222 of the ETA should not be treated as a drafting anomaly. In the insolvency context, a deemed trust would exist only when two complementary elements co-existed: first, a statutory provision creating the trust; and second, a CCAA or BIA provision confirming its effective operation. Parliament had created the Crown's deemed trust in the Income Tax Act, Canada Pension Plan and Employment Insurance Act and then confirmed in clear and unmistakable terms its continued operation under both the CCAA and the BIA regimes. In contrast, the ETA created a deemed trust in favour of the Crown, purportedly notwithstanding any contrary legislation, but Parliament did not expressly provide for its continued operation in either the BIA or the CCAA. The absence of this confirmation reflected Parliament's intention to allow the deemed trust to lapse with the commencement of insolvency proceedings. Parliament's evident intent was to render GST deemed trusts inoperative upon the institution of insolvency proceedings, and so s. 222 of the ETA mentioned the BIA so as to exclude it from its ambit, rather than include it as the other statutes did. As none of these statutes mentioned the CCAA expressly, the specific reference to the BIA had no bearing on the interaction with the CCAA. It was the confirmatory provisions in

the insolvency statutes that would determine whether a given deemed trust would subsist during insolvency proceedings.

Per Abella J. (dissenting): The appellate court properly found that s. 222(3) of the ETA gave priority during CCAA proceedings to the Crown's deemed trust in unremitted GST. The failure to exempt the CCAA from the operation of this provision was a reflection of clear legislative intent. Despite the requests of various constituencies and case law confirming that the ETA took precedence over the CCAA, there was no responsive legislative revision and the BIA remained the only exempted statute. There was no policy justification for interfering, through interpretation, with this clarity of legislative intention and, in any event, the application of other principles of interpretation reinforced this conclusion. Contrary to the majority's view, the "later in time" principle did not favour the precedence of the CCAA, as the CCAA was merely re-enacted without significant substantive changes. According to the Interpretation Act, in such circumstances, s. 222(3) of the ETA remained the later provision. The chambers judge was required to respect the priority regime set out in s. 222(3) of the ETA and so did not have the authority to deny the Crown's request for payment of the GST funds during the CCAA proceedings.

La compagnie débitrice devait à la Couronne des montants de TPS qu'elle n'avait pas remis, en vertu de la Loi sur la taxe d'accise (LTA). La débitrice a entamé des procédures judiciaires en vertu de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies (LACC). En vertu d'une ordonnance du tribunal, le montant de la créance fiscale a été déposé dans un compte en fiducie et la balance du produit de la vente des actifs de la débitrice a servi à payer le créancier garanti principal. La demande de la débitrice visant à obtenir la levée partielle de la suspension de procédures afin qu'elle puisse faire cession de ses biens a été accordée, alors que la demande de la Couronne visant à obtenir le paiement immédiat des montants de TPS non remis a été rejetée.

L'appel interjeté par la Couronne a été accueilli. La Cour d'appel a conclu que le tribunal se devait, en vertu de la LTA, de donner priorité à la Couronne une fois la faillite inévitable. La Cour d'appel a estimé que l'art. 222 de la LTA établissait une fiducie présumée ou bien que l'ordonnance du tribunal à l'effet que les montants de TPS soient détenus dans un compte en fiducie créait une fiducie expresse en faveur de la Couronne.

Le créancier a formé un pourvoi.

**Arrêt:** Le pourvoi a été accueilli.

Deschamps, J. (McLachlin, J.C.C., Binnie, LeBel, Charron, Rothstein, Cromwell, JJ., souscrivant à son opinion) : Une analyse téléologique et contextuelle de la LTA et de la LACC conduisait à la conclusion que le législateur ne saurait avoir eu l'intention de redonner la priorité, dans le cadre de la LACC, à la fiducie réputée de la Couronne à l'égard de ses créances relatives à la TPS quand il a modifié la LTA, en 2000. Le législateur avait mis un terme à la priorité accordée aux créances de la Couronne dans le cadre du droit de l'insolvabilité, sous le régime de la LACC et celui de la Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité (LFI). Contrairement aux retenues à la source, aucune disposition législative expresse ne permettait de conclure que les créances relatives à la TPS bénéficiaient d'un traitement préférentiel sous le régime de la LACC ou celui de la LFI. La logique interne de

la LACC allait également à l'encontre du maintien de la fiducie réputée à l'égard des créances découlant de la TPS.

Le fait de faire primer la priorité de la Couronne sur les créances découlant de la TPS dans le cadre de procédures fondées sur la LACC mais pas en cas de faillite aurait pour effet, dans les faits, de priver les compagnies de la possibilité de se restructurer sous le régime plus souple et mieux adapté de la LACC. Il semblait probable que le législateur avait par inadvertance commis une anomalie rédactionnelle, laquelle pouvait être corrigée en donnant préséance à l'art. 18.3 de la LACC. On ne pouvait plus considérer l'art. 222(3) de la LTA comme ayant implicitement abrogé l'art. 18.3 de la LACC parce qu'il avait été adopté après la LACC, compte tenu des modifications récemment apportées à la LACC. Le contexte législatif étayait la conclusion suivant laquelle l'art. 222(3) de la LTA n'avait pas pour but de restreindre la portée de l'art. 18.3 de la LACC.

L'ampleur du pouvoir discrétionnaire conféré au tribunal par la LACC était suffisant pour établir une passerelle vers une liquidation opérée sous le régime de la LFI, de sorte qu'il avait, en vertu de la LACC, le pouvoir de lever la suspension partielle des procédures afin de permettre à la débitrice de procéder à la transition au régime de liquidation. Il n'y avait aucune certitude, en vertu de l'ordonnance du tribunal, que la Couronne était le bénéficiaire véritable de la fiducie ni de fondement pour donner naissance à une fiducie expresse, puisque les fonds étaient détenus à part jusqu'à ce que le litige entre le créancier et la Couronne soit résolu. Le montant perçu au titre de la TPS mais non encore versé au receveur général du Canada ne faisait l'objet d'aucune fiducie présumée, priorité ou fiducie expresse en faveur de la Couronne.

Fish, J. (souscrivant aux motifs des juges majoritaires) : Le législateur a refusé de modifier les dispositions en question suivant un examen approfondi du régime d'insolvabilité, de sorte qu'on ne devrait pas qualifier l'apparente contradiction entre l'art. 18.3 de la LACC et l'art. 222 de la LTA d'anomalie rédactionnelle. Dans un contexte d'insolvabilité, on ne pourrait conclure à l'existence d'une fiducie présumée que lorsque deux éléments complémentaires étaient réunis : en premier lieu, une disposition législative qui crée la fiducie et, en second lieu, une disposition de la LACC ou de la LFI qui confirme l'existence de la fiducie. Le législateur a établi une fiducie présumée en faveur de la Couronne dans la Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu, le Régime de pensions du Canada et la Loi sur l'assurance-emploi puis, il a confirmé en termes clairs et explicites sa volonté de voir cette fiducie présumée produire ses effets sous le régime de la LACC et de la LFI. Dans le cas de la LTA, il a établi une fiducie présumée en faveur de la Couronne, sciemment et sans égard pour toute législation à l'effet contraire, mais n'a pas expressément prévu le maintien en vigueur de celle-ci sous le régime de la LFI ou celui de la LACC. L'absence d'une telle confirmation témoignait de l'intention du législateur de laisser la fiducie présumée devenir caduque au moment de l'introduction de la procédure d'insolvabilité. L'intention du législateur était manifestement de rendre inopérantes les fiducies présumées visant la TPS dès l'introduction d'une procédure d'insolvabilité et, par conséquent, l'art. 222 de la LTA mentionnait la LFI de manière à l'exclure de son champ d'application, et non de l'y inclure, comme le faisaient les autres lois. Puisqu'aucune de ces lois ne mentionnait spécifiquement la LACC, la mention explicite de la LFI n'avait aucune incidence sur l'interaction avec la LACC. C'était les dispositions confirmatoires que l'on trouvait

dans les lois sur l'insolvabilité qui déterminaient si une fiducie présumée continuerait d'exister durant une procédure d'insolvabilité.

Abella, J. (dissidente) : La Cour d'appel a conclu à bon droit que l'art. 222(3) de la LTA donnait préséance à la fiducie présumée qui est établie en faveur de la Couronne à l'égard de la TPS non versée. Le fait que la LACC n'ait pas été soustraite à l'application de cette disposition témoignait d'une intention claire du législateur. Malgré les demandes répétées de divers groupes et la jurisprudence ayant confirmé que la LTA l'emportait sur la LACC, le législateur n'est pas intervenu et la LFI est demeurée la seule loi soustraite à l'application de cette disposition. Il n'y avait pas de considération de politique générale qui justifierait d'aller à l'encontre, par voie d'interprétation législative, de l'intention aussi clairement exprimée par le législateur et, de toutes manières, cette conclusion était renforcée par l'application d'autres principes d'interprétation. Contrairement à l'opinion des juges majoritaires, le principe de la préséance de la « loi postérieure » ne militait pas en faveur de la préséance de la LACC, celle-ci ayant été simplement adoptée à nouveau sans que l'on ne lui ait apporté de modifications importantes. En vertu de la Loi d'interprétation, dans ces circonstances, l'art. 222(3) de la LTA demeurait la disposition postérieure. Le juge siégeant en son cabinet était tenu de respecter le régime de priorités établi à l'art. 222(3) de la LTA, et il ne pouvait pas refuser la demande présentée par la Couronne en vue de se faire payer la TPS dans le cadre de la procédure introduite en vertu de la LACC.

#### **Table of Authorities**

##### **Cases considered by *Deschamps J.*:**

*Air Canada, Re* (2003), 42 C.B.R. (4th) 173, 2003 CarswellOnt 2464 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

*Air Canada, Re* (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 4967 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to  
*Alternative granite & marbre inc., Re* (2009), (sub nom. *Dep. Min. Rev. Quebec v. Caisse populaire Desjardins de Montmagny*) 2009 G.T.C. 2036 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Quebec (Revenue) v. Caisse populaire Desjardins de Montmagny*) [2009] 3 S.C.R. 286, 312 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2009] G.S.T.C. 154, (sub nom. *9083-4185 Québec Inc. (Bankrupt), Re*) 394 N.R. 368, 60 C.B.R. (5th) 1, 2009 SCC 49, 2009 CarswellQue 10706, 2009 CarswellQue 10707 (S.C.C.) — referred to

*ATB Financier v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.* (2008), 2008 ONCA 587, 2008 CarswellOnt 4811, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 240 O.A.C. 245, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 296 D.L.R. (4th) 135, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 92 O.R. (3d) 513, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 123 (Ont. C.A.) — considered  
*Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* (2000), [2000] 10 W.W.R. 269, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 1, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 9, 9 B.L.R. (3d) 41, 2000 CarswellAlta 662, 2000 ABQB 442, 265 A.R. 201 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

*Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix Rouge, Re* (2000), 2000 CarswellOnt 3269, 19 C.B.R. (4th) 158 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

*Doré c. Verdun (Municipalité)* (1997), (sub nom. *Doré v. Verdun (City)*) [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862, (sub nom. *Doré v. Verdun (Ville)*) 215 N.R. 81, (sub nom. *Doré v. Verdun (City)*) 150 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 1997 CarswellQue 159, 1997 CarswellQue 850 (S.C.C.) — distinguished

*Dylex Ltd., Re* (1995), 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106, 1995 CarswellOnt 54 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

*First Vancouver Finance v. Minister of National Revenue* (2002), [2002] 3 C.T.C. 285, (sub nom. *Minister of National Revenue v. First Vancouver Finance*) 2002 D.T.C. 6998 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Minister of National Revenue v. First Vancouver Finance*) 2002 D.T.C. 7007 (Fr.), 288 N.R. 347, 212 D.L.R. (4th) 615, [2002] G.S.T.C. 23, [2003] 1 W.W.R. 1, 45 C.B.R. (4th) 213, 2002 SCC 49, 2002 CarswellSask 317, 2002 CarswellSask 318, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 720 (S.C.C.) — considered

*Gauntlet Energy Corp., Re* (2003), 30 Alta. L.R. (4th) 192, 2003 ABQB 894, 2003 CarswellAlta 1735, [2003] G.S.T.C. 193, 49 C.B.R. (4th) 213, [2004] 10 W.W.R. 180, 352 A.R. 28 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

*Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* (1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84, 1990 CarswellBC 394, 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311, (sub nom. *Chef Ready Foods Ltd. v. Hongkong Bank of Canada*) [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136 (B.C. C.A.) — referred to

*Ivaco Inc., Re* (2006), 2006 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8218, 25 C.B.R. (5th) 176, 83 O.R. (3d) 108, 275 D.L.R. (4th) 132, 2006 CarswellOnt 6292, 56 C.C.P.B. 1, 26 B.L.R. (4th) 43 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

*Komunik Corp., Re* (2010), 2010 CarswellQue 686, 2010 QCCA 183 (C.A. Que.) — referred to

*Komunik Corp., Re* (2009), 2009 QCCS 6332, 2009 CarswellQue 13962 (C.S. Que.) — referred to

*Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (1990), 1990 CarswellOnt 139, 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) 1 O.R. (3d) 289, (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) 41 O.A.C. 282 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

*Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp., Re* (2005), 2005 G.T.C. 1327 (Eng.), 6 C.B.R. (5th) 293, 2005 D.T.C. 5233 (Eng.), 2005 CarswellOnt 8, [2005] G.S.T.C. 1, 193 O.A.C. 95, 73 O.R. (3d) 737 (Ont. C.A.) — not followed

*Pacific National Lease Holding Corp., Re* (1992), 72 B.C.L.R. (2d) 368, 19 B.C.A.C. 134, 34 W.A.C. 134, 15 C.B.R. (3d) 265, 1992 CarswellBC 524 (B.C. C.A. [In Chambers]) — referred to

*Philip's Manufacturing Ltd., Re* (1992), 9 C.B.R. (3d) 25, 67 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84, 4 B.L.R. (2d) 142, 1992 CarswellBC 542 (B.C. C.A.) — referred to

*Quebec (Deputy Minister of Revenue) c. Rainville* (1979), (sub nom. *Bourgeault, Re*) 33 C.B.R. (N.S.) 301, (sub nom. *Bourgeault's Estate v. Quebec (Deputy Minister of Revenue)*) 30 N.R. 24, (sub nom. *Bourgeault, Re*) 105 D.L.R. (3d) 270, 1979 CarswellQue 165, 1979 CarswellQue 266, (sub nom. *Quebec (Deputy Minister of Revenue) v. Bourgeault (Trustee of)*) [1980] 1 S.C.R. 35 (S.C.C.) — referred to

*Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada)* (1934), [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75, 1934 CarswellNat 1, 16 C.B.R. 1, [1934] S.C.R. 659 (S.C.C.) — referred to  
*Royal Bank v. Sparrow Electric Corp.* (1997), 193 A.R. 321, 135 W.A.C. 321, [1997] 2 W.W.R. 457, 208 N.R. 161, 12 P.P.S.A.C. (2d) 68, 1997 CarswellAlta 112, 1997 CarswellAlta 113, 46 Alta. L.R. (3d) 87, (sub nom. *R. v. Royal Bank*) 97 D.T.C. 5089, 143 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 44 C.B.R. (3d) 1, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 411 (S.C.C.) — considered  
*Skeena Cellulose Inc., Re* (2003), 2003 CarswellBC 1399, 2003 BCCA 344, 184 B.C.A.C. 54, 302 W.A.C. 54, 43 C.B.R. (4th) 187, 13 B.C.L.R. (4th) 236 (B.C. C.A.) — referred to  
*Skydome Corp., Re* (1998), 16 C.B.R. (4th) 118, 1998 CarswellOnt 5922 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to  
*Solid Resources Ltd., Re* (2002), [2003] G.S.T.C. 21, 2002 CarswellAlta 1699, 40 C.B.R. (4th) 219 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to  
*Stelco Inc., Re* (2005), 253 D.L.R. (4th) 109, 75 O.R. (3d) 5, 2 B.L.R. (4th) 238, 9 C.B.R. (5th) 135, 2005 CarswellOnt 1188, 196 O.A.C. 142 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to  
*United Used Auto & Truck Parts Ltd., Re* (1999), 12 C.B.R. (4th) 144, 1999 CarswellBC 2673 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) — referred to  
*United Used Auto & Truck Parts Ltd., Re* (2000), 2000 BCCA 146, 135 B.C.A.C. 96, 221 W.A.C. 96, 2000 CarswellBC 414, 73 B.C.L.R. (3d) 236, 16 C.B.R. (4th) 141, [2000] 5 W.W.R. 178 (B.C. C.A.) — referred to

**Cases considered by *Fish J.*:**

*Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp., Re* (2005), 2005 G.T.C. 1327 (Eng.), 6 C.B.R. (5th) 293, 2005 D.T.C. 5233 (Eng.), 2005 CarswellOnt 8, [2005] G.S.T.C. 1, 193 O.A.C. 95, 73 O.R. (3d) 737 (Ont. C.A.) — not followed

**Cases considered by *Abella J.* (dissenting):**

*Canada (Attorney General) v. Canada (Public Service Staff Relations Board)* (1977), [1977] 2 F.C. 663, 14 N.R. 257, 74 D.L.R. (3d) 307, 1977 CarswellNat 62, 1977 CarswellNat 62F (Fed. C.A.) — referred to

*Doré c. Verdun (Municipalité)* (1997), (sub nom. *Doré v. Verdun (City)*) [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862, (sub nom. *Doré v. Verdun (Ville)*) 215 N.R. 81, (sub nom. *Doré v. Verdun (City)*) 150 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 1997 CarswellQue 159, 1997 CarswellQue 850 (S.C.C.) — referred to

*Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp., Re* (2005), 2005 G.T.C. 1327 (Eng.), 6 C.B.R. (5th) 293, 2005 D.T.C. 5233 (Eng.), 2005 CarswellOnt 8, [2005] G.S.T.C. 1, 193 O.A.C. 95, 73 O.R. (3d) 737 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

*R. v. Tele-Mobile Co.* (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 1588, 2008 CarswellOnt 1589, 2008 SCC 12, (sub nom. *Tele-Mobile Co. v. Ontario*) 372 N.R. 157, 55 C.R. (6th) 1, (sub nom. *Ontario v. Tele-Mobile Co.*) 229 C.C.C. (3d) 417, (sub nom. *Tele-Mobile Co. v. Ontario*) 235 O.A.C. 369, (sub nom. *Tele-Mobile Co. v. Ontario*) [2008] 1 S.C.R. 305, (sub nom. *R. v. Tele-Mobile Company (Telus Mobility)*) 92 O.R. (3d) 478 (note), (sub nom. *Ontario v. Tele-Mobile Co.*) 291 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.) — considered

**Statutes considered by *Deschamps J.*:**

*Bank Act*, S.C. 1991, c. 46

Generally — referred to

*Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

s. 67(2) — referred to

s. 67(3) — referred to

s. 81.1 [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 38(1)] — considered

s. 81.2 [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 38(1)] — considered

s. 86(1) — considered

s. 86(3) — referred to

*Bankruptcy Act and to amend the Income Tax Act in consequence thereof, Act to amend the*, S.C. 1992, c. 27

Generally — referred to

s. 39 — referred to

*Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and the Income Tax Act, Act to amend the*, S.C. 1997, c. 12

s. 73 — referred to

s. 125 — referred to

s. 126 — referred to

*Canada Pension Plan*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8

Generally — referred to

s. 23(3) — referred to

s. 23(4) — referred to

*Cités et villes, Loi sur les*, L.R.Q., c. C-19

en général — referred to

*Code civil du Québec*, L.Q. 1991, c. 64

en général — referred to

art. 2930 — referred to

*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, Act to Amend*, S.C. 1952-53, c. 3

Generally — referred to

*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, 1933*, S.C. 1932-33, c. 36

Generally — referred to  
*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 11 — considered

s. 11(1) — considered

s. 11(3) — referred to

s. 11(4) — referred to

s. 11(6) — referred to

s. 11.02 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — referred to

s. 11.09 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.4 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — referred to

s. 18.3 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

s. 18.3(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

s. 18.3(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

s. 18.4 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — referred to

s. 18.4(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

s. 18.4(3) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

s. 20 — considered

s. 21 — considered

s. 37 — considered

s. 37(1) — referred to

*Employment Insurance Act*, S.C. 1996, c. 23

Generally — referred to

s. 86(2) — referred to

s. 86(2.1) [en. 1998, c. 19, s. 266(1)] — referred to

*Excise Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15

Generally — referred to

s. 222(1) [en. 1990, c. 45, s. 12(1)] — referred to

s. 222(3) [en. 1990, c. 45, s. 12(1)] — considered

*Fairness for the Self-Employed Act*, S.C. 2009, c. 33

Generally — referred to

*Income Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.)

s. 227(4) — referred to

s. 227(4.1) [en. 1998, c. 19, s. 226(1)] — referred to

*Interpretation Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21

s. 44(f) — considered

*Personal Property Security Act*, S.A. 1988, c. P-4.05

Generally — referred to

*Sales Tax and Excise Tax Amendments Act, 1999*, S.C. 2000, c. 30

Generally — referred to

*Wage Earner Protection Program Act*, S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 1

Generally — referred to

s. 69 — referred to

s. 128 — referred to

s. 131 — referred to

**Statutes considered *Fish J.*:**

*Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

s. 67(2) — considered

s. 67(3) — considered

*Canada Pension Plan*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8

Generally — referred to

s. 23 — considered

*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 11 — considered

s. 18.3(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

s. 18.3(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

s. 37(1) — considered

*Employment Insurance Act*, S.C. 1996, c. 23

Generally — referred to

s. 86(2) — referred to

s. 86(2.1) [en. 1998, c. 19, s. 266(1)] — referred to

*Excise Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15

Generally — referred to

s. 222 [en. 1990, c. 45, s. 12(1)] — considered

s. 222(1) [en. 1990, c. 45, s. 12(1)] — considered

s. 222(3) [en. 1990, c. 45, s. 12(1)] — considered

s. 222(3)(a) [en. 1990, c. 45, s. 12(1)] — considered

*Income Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.)

Generally — referred to

s. 227(4) — considered

s. 227(4.1) [en. 1998, c. 19, s. 226(1)] — considered

s. 227(4.1)(a) [en. 1998, c. 19, s. 226(1)] — considered

**Statutes considered *Abella J.* (dissenting):**

*Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 11 — considered

s. 11(1) — considered

s. 11(3) — considered

s. 18.3(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

s. 37(1) — considered

*Excise Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15

Generally — referred to

s. 222 [en. 1990, c. 45, s. 12(1)] — considered

s. 222(3) [en. 1990, c. 45, s. 12(1)] — considered

*Interpretation Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21

s. 2(1)"enactment" — considered

s. 44(f) — considered

*Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. W-11

Generally — referred to

### ***Deschamps J.:***

1 For the first time this Court is called upon to directly interpret the provisions of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("*CCAA*"). In that respect, two questions are raised. The first requires reconciliation of provisions of the *CCAA* and the *Excise Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 ("*ETA*"), which lower courts have held to be in conflict with one another. The second concerns the scope of a court's discretion when supervising reorganization. The relevant statutory provisions are reproduced in the Appendix. On the first question, having considered the evolution of Crown priorities in the context of insolvency and the wording of the various statutes creating Crown priorities, I conclude that it is the *CCAA* and not the *ETA* that provides the rule. On the second question, I conclude that the broad discretionary jurisdiction conferred on the supervising judge must be interpreted having regard to the remedial nature of the *CCAA* and insolvency legislation generally. Consequently, the court had the discretion to partially lift a stay of proceedings to allow the debtor to make an assignment under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 ("*BIA*"). I would allow the appeal.

#### **1. Facts and Decisions of the Courts Below**

2 Ted LeRoy Trucking Ltd. ("*LeRoy Trucking*") commenced proceedings under the *CCAA* in the Supreme Court of British Columbia on December 13, 2007, obtaining a stay of proceedings with a view to reorganizing its financial affairs. LeRoy Trucking sold certain redundant assets as authorized by the order.

3 Amongst the debts owed by LeRoy Trucking was an amount for Goods and Services Tax ("*GST*") collected but unremitted to the Crown. The *ETA* creates a deemed trust in favour of the Crown for amounts collected in respect of GST. The deemed trust extends to any property or proceeds held by the person collecting GST and any property of that person held by a secured creditor, requiring that property to be paid to the Crown in priority to all security interests. The *ETA* provides that the deemed trust operates despite any other enactment of Canada except the *BIA*. However, the *CCAA* also provides that subject to certain exceptions, none of which mentions

GST, deemed trusts in favour of the Crown do not operate under the *CCAA*. Accordingly, under the *CCAA* the Crown ranks as an unsecured creditor in respect of GST. Nonetheless, at the time LeRoy Trucking commenced *CCAA* proceedings the leading line of jurisprudence held that the *ETA* took precedence over the *CCAA* such that the Crown enjoyed priority for GST claims under the *CCAA*, even though it would have lost that same priority under the *BIA*. The *CCAA* underwent substantial amendments in 2005 in which some of the provisions at issue in this appeal were renumbered and reformulated (S.C. 2005, c. 47). However, these amendments only came into force on September 18, 2009. I will refer to the amended provisions only where relevant.

4 On April 29, 2008, Brenner C.J.S.C., in the context of the *CCAA* proceedings, approved a payment not exceeding \$5 million, the proceeds of redundant asset sales, to Century Services, the debtor's major secured creditor. LeRoy Trucking proposed to hold back an amount equal to the GST monies collected but unremitted to the Crown and place it in the Monitor's trust account until the outcome of the reorganization was known. In order to maintain the *status quo* while the success of the reorganization was uncertain, Brenner C.J.S.C. agreed to the proposal and ordered that an amount of \$305,202.30 be held by the Monitor in its trust account.

5 On September 3, 2008, having concluded that reorganization was not possible, LeRoy Trucking sought leave to make an assignment in bankruptcy under the *BIA*. The Crown sought an order that the GST monies held by the Monitor be paid to the Receiver General of Canada. Brenner C.J.S.C. dismissed the latter application. Reasoning that the purpose of segregating the funds with the Monitor was "to facilitate an ultimate payment of the GST monies which were owed pre-filing, but only if a viable plan emerged", the failure of such a reorganization, followed by an assignment in bankruptcy, meant the Crown would lose priority under the *BIA* (2008 BCSC 1805, [2008] G.S.T.C. 221 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers])).

6 The Crown's appeal was allowed by the British Columbia Court of Appeal (2009 BCCA 205, [2009] G.S.T.C. 79, 270 B.C.A.C. 167 (B.C. C.A.)). Tysoe J.A. for a unanimous court found two independent bases for allowing the Crown's appeal.

7 First, the court's authority under s. 11 of the *CCAA* was held not to extend to staying the Crown's application for immediate payment of the GST funds subject to the deemed trust after it was clear that reorganization efforts had failed and that bankruptcy was inevitable. As restructuring was no longer a possibility, staying the Crown's claim to the GST funds no longer served a purpose under the *CCAA* and the court was bound under the priority scheme provided by the *ETA* to allow payment to the Crown. In so holding, Tysoe J.A. adopted the reasoning in *Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp. (Re)*, [2005] G.S.T.C. 1, 73 O.R. (3d) 737 (Ont. C.A.), which found that the *ETA* deemed trust for GST established Crown priority over secured creditors under the *CCAA*.

8 Second, Tysoe J.A. concluded that by ordering the GST funds segregated in the Monitor's trust account on April 29, 2008, the judge had created an express trust in favour of the Crown from

which the monies in question could not be diverted for any other purposes. The Court of Appeal therefore ordered that the money held by the Monitor in trust be paid to the Receiver General.

## 2. Issues

9 This appeal raises three broad issues which are addressed in turn:

(1) Did s. 222(3) of the *ETA* displace s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* and give priority to the Crown's *ETA* deemed trust during *CCAA* proceedings as held in *Ottawa Senators*?

(2) Did the court exceed its *CCAA* authority by lifting the stay to allow the debtor to make an assignment in bankruptcy?

(3) Did the court's order of April 29, 2008 requiring segregation of the Crown's GST claim in the Monitor's trust account create an express trust in favour of the Crown in respect of those funds?

## 3. Analysis

10 The first issue concerns Crown priorities in the context of insolvency. As will be seen, the *ETA* provides for a deemed trust in favour of the Crown in respect of GST owed by a debtor "[d]espite ... any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*)" (s. 222(3)), while the *CCAA* stated at the relevant time that "notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be [so] regarded" (s. 18.3(1)). It is difficult to imagine two statutory provisions more apparently in conflict. However, as is often the case, the apparent conflict can be resolved through interpretation.

11 In order to properly interpret the provisions, it is necessary to examine the history of the *CCAA*, its function amidst the body of insolvency legislation enacted by Parliament, and the principles that have been recognized in the jurisprudence. It will be seen that Crown priorities in the insolvency context have been significantly pared down. The resolution of the second issue is also rooted in the context of the *CCAA*, but its purpose and the manner in which it has been interpreted in the case law are also key. After examining the first two issues in this case, I will address Tysse J.A.'s conclusion that an express trust in favour of the Crown was created by the court's order of April 29, 2008.

### 3.1 Purpose and Scope of Insolvency Law

12 Insolvency is the factual situation that arises when a debtor is unable to pay creditors (see generally, R. J. Wood, *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law* (2009), at p. 16). Certain legal proceedings become available upon insolvency, which typically allow a debtor to obtain a court order staying its creditors' enforcement actions and attempt to obtain a binding compromise with creditors to

adjust the payment conditions to something more realistic. Alternatively, the debtor's assets may be liquidated and debts paid from the proceeds according to statutory priority rules. The former is usually referred to as reorganization or restructuring while the latter is termed liquidation.

13 Canadian commercial insolvency law is not codified in one exhaustive statute. Instead, Parliament has enacted multiple insolvency statutes, the main one being the *BIA*. The *BIA* offers a self-contained legal regime providing for both reorganization and liquidation. Although bankruptcy legislation has a long history, the *BIA* itself is a fairly recent statute — it was enacted in 1992. It is characterized by a rules-based approach to proceedings. The *BIA* is available to insolvent debtors owing \$1000 or more, regardless of whether they are natural or legal persons. It contains mechanisms for debtors to make proposals to their creditors for the adjustment of debts. If a proposal fails, the *BIA* contains a bridge to bankruptcy whereby the debtor's assets are liquidated and the proceeds paid to creditors in accordance with the statutory scheme of distribution.

14 Access to the *CCAA* is more restrictive. A debtor must be a company with liabilities in excess of \$5 million. Unlike the *BIA*, the *CCAA* contains no provisions for liquidation of a debtor's assets if reorganization fails. There are three ways of exiting *CCAA* proceedings. The best outcome is achieved when the stay of proceedings provides the debtor with some breathing space during which solvency is restored and the *CCAA* process terminates without reorganization being needed. The second most desirable outcome occurs when the debtor's compromise or arrangement is accepted by its creditors and the reorganized company emerges from the *CCAA* proceedings as a going concern. Lastly, if the compromise or arrangement fails, either the company or its creditors usually seek to have the debtor's assets liquidated under the applicable provisions of the *BIA* or to place the debtor into receivership. As discussed in greater detail below, the key difference between the reorganization regimes under the *BIA* and the *CCAA* is that the latter offers a more flexible mechanism with greater judicial discretion, making it more responsive to complex reorganizations.

15 As I will discuss at greater length below, the purpose of the *CCAA* — Canada's first reorganization statute — is to permit the debtor to continue to carry on business and, where possible, avoid the social and economic costs of liquidating its assets. Proposals to creditors under the *BIA* serve the same remedial purpose, though this is achieved through a rules-based mechanism that offers less flexibility. Where reorganization is impossible, the *BIA* may be employed to provide an orderly mechanism for the distribution of a debtor's assets to satisfy creditor claims according to predetermined priority rules.

16 Prior to the enactment of the *CCAA* in 1933 (S.C. 1932-33, c. 36), practice under existing commercial insolvency legislation tended heavily towards the liquidation of a debtor company (J. Sarra, *Creditor Rights and the Public Interest: Restructuring Insolvent Corporations* (2003), at p. 12). The battering visited upon Canadian businesses by the Great Depression and the absence of an effective mechanism for reaching a compromise between debtors and creditors to avoid liquidation required a legislative response. The *CCAA* was innovative as it allowed the insolvent debtor

to attempt reorganization under judicial supervision outside the existing insolvency legislation which, once engaged, almost invariably resulted in liquidation (*Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada)*, [1934] S.C.R. 659 (S.C.C.), at pp. 660-61; Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, at pp. 12-13).

17 Parliament understood when adopting the *CCAA* that liquidation of an insolvent company was harmful for most of those it affected — notably creditors and employees — and that a workout which allowed the company to survive was optimal (Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, at pp. 13-15).

18 Early commentary and jurisprudence also endorsed the *CCAA's* remedial objectives. It recognized that companies retain more value as going concerns while underscoring that intangible losses, such as the evaporation of the companies' goodwill, result from liquidation (S. E. Edwards, "Reorganizations Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act" (1947), 25 *Can. Bar Rev.* 587, at p. 592). Reorganization serves the public interest by facilitating the survival of companies supplying goods or services crucial to the health of the economy or saving large numbers of jobs (*ibid.*, at p. 593). Insolvency could be so widely felt as to impact stakeholders other than creditors and employees. Variants of these views resonate today, with reorganization justified in terms of rehabilitating companies that are key elements in a complex web of interdependent economic relationships in order to avoid the negative consequences of liquidation.

19 The *CCAA* fell into disuse during the next several decades, likely because amendments to the Act in 1953 restricted its use to companies issuing bonds (S.C. 1952-53, c. 3). During the economic downturn of the early 1980s, insolvency lawyers and courts adapting to the resulting wave of insolvencies resurrected the statute and deployed it in response to new economic challenges. Participants in insolvency proceedings grew to recognize and appreciate the statute's distinguishing feature: a grant of broad and flexible authority to the supervising court to make the orders necessary to facilitate the reorganization of the debtor and achieve the *CCAA's* objectives. The manner in which courts have used *CCAA* jurisdiction in increasingly creative and flexible ways is explored in greater detail below.

20 Efforts to evolve insolvency law were not restricted to the courts during this period. In 1970, a government-commissioned panel produced an extensive study recommending sweeping reform but Parliament failed to act (see *Bankruptcy and Insolvency: Report of the Study Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency Legislation* (1970)). Another panel of experts produced more limited recommendations in 1986 which eventually resulted in enactment of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* of 1992 (S.C. 1992, c. 27) (see *Proposed Bankruptcy Act Amendments: Report of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency* (1986)). Broader provisions for reorganizing insolvent debtors were then included in Canada's bankruptcy statute. Although the 1970 and 1986 reports made no specific recommendations with respect to the *CCAA*, the House of Commons committee studying the *BIA's* predecessor bill, C-22, seemed to accept expert testimony that the *BIA's* new reorganization scheme would shortly supplant the *CCAA*, which could then be

repealed, with commercial insolvency and bankruptcy being governed by a single statute (*Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Consumer and Corporate Affairs and Government Operations*, Issue No. 15, October 3, 1991, at pp. 15:15-15:16).

21 In retrospect, this conclusion by the House of Commons committee was out of step with reality. It overlooked the renewed vitality the *CCAA* enjoyed in contemporary practice and the advantage that a flexible judicially supervised reorganization process presented in the face of increasingly complex reorganizations, when compared to the stricter rules-based scheme contained in the *BIA*. The "flexibility of the *CCAA* [was seen as] a great benefit, allowing for creative and effective decisions" (Industry Canada, Marketplace Framework Policy Branch, *Report on the Operation and Administration of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (2002), at p. 41). Over the past three decades, resurrection of the *CCAA* has thus been the mainspring of a process through which, one author concludes, "the legal setting for Canadian insolvency restructuring has evolved from a rather blunt instrument to one of the most sophisticated systems in the developed world" (R. B. Jones, "The Evolution of Canadian Restructuring: Challenges for the Rule of Law", in J. P. Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2005* (2006), 481, at p. 481).

22 While insolvency proceedings may be governed by different statutory schemes, they share some commonalities. The most prominent of these is the single proceeding model. The nature and purpose of the single proceeding model are described by Professor Wood in *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law*:

They all provide a collective proceeding that supersedes the usual civil process available to creditors to enforce their claims. The creditors' remedies are collectivized in order to prevent the free-for-all that would otherwise prevail if creditors were permitted to exercise their remedies. In the absence of a collective process, each creditor is armed with the knowledge that if they do not strike hard and swift to seize the debtor's assets, they will be beat out by other creditors. [pp. 2-3]

The single proceeding model avoids the inefficiency and chaos that would attend insolvency if each creditor initiated proceedings to recover its debt. Grouping all possible actions against the debtor into a single proceeding controlled in a single forum facilitates negotiation with creditors because it places them all on an equal footing, rather than exposing them to the risk that a more aggressive creditor will realize its claims against the debtor's limited assets while the other creditors attempt a compromise. With a view to achieving that purpose, both the *CCAA* and the *BIA* allow a court to order all actions against a debtor to be stayed while a compromise is sought.

23 Another point of convergence of the *CCAA* and the *BIA* relates to priorities. Because the *CCAA* is silent about what happens if reorganization fails, the *BIA* scheme of liquidation and distribution necessarily supplies the backdrop for what will happen if a *CCAA* reorganization is

ultimately unsuccessful. In addition, one of the important features of legislative reform of both statutes since the enactment of the *BIA* in 1992 has been a cutback in Crown priorities (S.C. 1992, c. 27, s. 39; S.C. 1997, c. 12, ss. 73 and 125; S.C. 2000, c. 30, s. 148; S.C. 2005, c. 47, ss. 69 and 131; S.C. 2009, c. 33, ss. 25 and 29; see also *Alternative granite & marbre inc., Re*, 2009 SCC 49, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 286, [2009] G.S.T.C. 154 (S.C.C.); *Quebec (Deputy Minister of Revenue) c. Rainville* (1979), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 35 (S.C.C.); *Proposed Bankruptcy Act Amendments: Report of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency* (1986)).

24 With parallel *CCAA* and *BIA* restructuring schemes now an accepted feature of the insolvency law landscape, the contemporary thrust of legislative reform has been towards harmonizing aspects of insolvency law common to the two statutory schemes to the extent possible and encouraging reorganization over liquidation (see *An Act to establish the Wage Earner Protection Program Act, to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts*, S.C. 2005, c. 47; *Gauntlet Energy Corp., Re*, 2003 ABQB 894, [2003] G.S.T.C. 193, 30 Alta. L.R. (4th) 192 (Alta. Q.B.), at para. 19).

25 Mindful of the historical background of the *CCAA* and *BIA*, I now turn to the first question at issue.

### **3.2 GST Deemed Trust Under the CCAA**

26 The Court of Appeal proceeded on the basis that the *ETA* precluded the court from staying the Crown's enforcement of the GST deemed trust when partially lifting the stay to allow the debtor to enter bankruptcy. In so doing, it adopted the reasoning in a line of cases culminating in *Ottawa Senators*, which held that an *ETA* deemed trust remains enforceable during *CCAA* reorganization despite language in the *CCAA* that suggests otherwise.

27 The Crown relies heavily on the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in *Ottawa Senators* and argues that the later in time provision of the *ETA* creating the GST deemed trust trumps the provision of the *CCAA* purporting to nullify most statutory deemed trusts. The Court of Appeal in this case accepted this reasoning but not all provincial courts follow it (see, e.g., *Komunik Corp., Re*, 2009 QCCS 6332 (C.S. Que.), leave to appeal granted, 2010 QCCA 183 (C.A. Que.)). Century Services relied, in its written submissions to this Court, on the argument that the court had authority under the *CCAA* to continue the stay against the Crown's claim for unremitted GST. In oral argument, the question of whether *Ottawa Senators* was correctly decided nonetheless arose. After the hearing, the parties were asked to make further written submissions on this point. As appears evident from the reasons of my colleague Abella J., this issue has become prominent before this Court. In those circumstances, this Court needs to determine the correctness of the reasoning in *Ottawa Senators*.

28 The policy backdrop to this question involves the Crown's priority as a creditor in insolvency situations which, as I mentioned above, has evolved considerably. Prior to the 1990s, Crown claims

largely enjoyed priority in insolvency. This was widely seen as unsatisfactory as shown by both the 1970 and 1986 insolvency reform proposals, which recommended that Crown claims receive no preferential treatment. A closely related matter was whether the *CCAA* was binding at all upon the Crown. Amendments to the *CCAA* in 1997 confirmed that it did indeed bind the Crown (see *CCAA*, s. 21, as am. by S.C. 1997, c. 12, s. 126).

29 Claims of priority by the state in insolvency situations receive different treatment across jurisdictions worldwide. For example, in Germany and Australia, the state is given no priority at all, while the state enjoys wide priority in the United States and France (see B. K. Morgan, "Should the Sovereign be Paid First? A Comparative International Analysis of the Priority for Tax Claims in Bankruptcy" (2000), 74 *Am. Bank. L.J.* 461, at p. 500). Canada adopted a middle course through legislative reform of Crown priority initiated in 1992. The Crown retained priority for source deductions of income tax, Employment Insurance ("EI") and Canada Pension Plan ("CPP") premiums, but ranks as an ordinary unsecured creditor for most other claims.

30 Parliament has frequently enacted statutory mechanisms to secure Crown claims and permit their enforcement. The two most common are statutory deemed trusts and powers to garnish funds third parties owe the debtor (see F. L. Lamer, *Priority of Crown Claims in Insolvency* (loose-leaf), at § 2).

31 With respect to GST collected, Parliament has enacted a deemed trust. The *ETA* states that every person who collects an amount on account of GST is deemed to hold that amount in trust for the Crown (s. 222(1)). The deemed trust extends to other property of the person collecting the tax equal in value to the amount deemed to be in trust if that amount has not been remitted in accordance with the *ETA*. The deemed trust also extends to property held by a secured creditor that, but for the security interest, would be property of the person collecting the tax (s. 222(3)).

32 Parliament has created similar deemed trusts using almost identical language in respect of source deductions of income tax, EI premiums and CPP premiums (see s. 227(4) of the *Income Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) ("*ITA*"), ss. 86(2) and (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act*, S.C. 1996, c. 23, and ss. 23(3) and (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8). I will refer to income tax, EI and CPP deductions as "source deductions".

33 In *Royal Bank v. Sparrow Electric Corp.*, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 411 (S.C.C.), this Court addressed a priority dispute between a deemed trust for source deductions under the *ITA* and security interests taken under both the *Bank Act*, S.C. 1991, c. 46, and the *Alberta Personal Property Security Act*, S.A. 1988, c. P-4.05 ("*PPSA*"). As then worded, an *ITA* deemed trust over the debtor's property equivalent to the amount owing in respect of income tax became effective at the time of liquidation, receivership, or assignment in bankruptcy. *Sparrow Electric* held that the *ITA* deemed trust could not prevail over the security interests because, being fixed charges, the latter attached as soon as the debtor acquired rights in the property such that the *ITA* deemed trust had no property on which

to attach when it subsequently arose. Later, in *First Vancouver Finance v. Minister of National Revenue*, 2002 SCC 49, [2002] G.S.T.C. 23, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 720 (S.C.C.), this Court observed that Parliament had legislated to strengthen the statutory deemed trust in the *ITA* by deeming it to operate from the moment the deductions were not paid to the Crown as required by the *ITA*, and by granting the Crown priority over all security interests (paras. 27-29) (the "*Sparrow Electric* amendment").

34 The amended text of s. 227(4.1) of the *ITA* and concordant source deductions deemed trusts in the *Canada Pension Plan* and the *Employment Insurance Act* state that the deemed trust operates notwithstanding any other enactment of Canada, except ss. 81.1 and 81.2 of the *BIA*. The *ETA* deemed trust at issue in this case is similarly worded, but it excepts the *BIA* in its entirety. The provision reads as follows:

**222.** (3) Despite any other provision of this Act (except subsection (4)), any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*), any enactment of a province or any other law, if at any time an amount deemed by subsection (1) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn in the manner and at the time provided under this Part, property of the person and property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust, is deemed ....

35 The Crown submits that the *Sparrow Electric* amendment, added by Parliament to the *ETA* in 2000, was intended to preserve the Crown's priority over collected GST under the *CCAA* while subordinating the Crown to the status of an unsecured creditor in respect of GST only under the *BIA*. This is because the *ETA* provides that the GST deemed trust is effective "despite" any other enactment except the *BIA*.

36 The language used in the *ETA* for the GST deemed trust creates an apparent conflict with the *CCAA*, which provides that subject to certain exceptions, property deemed by statute to be held in trust for the Crown shall not be so regarded.

37 Through a 1997 amendment to the *CCAA* (S.C. 1997, c. 12, s. 125), Parliament appears to have, subject to specific exceptions, nullified deemed trusts in favour of the Crown once reorganization proceedings are commenced under the Act. The relevant provision reads:

**18.3** (1) Subject to subsection (2), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

This nullification of deemed trusts was continued in further amendments to the *CCAA* (S.C. 2005, c. 47), where s. 18.3(1) was renumbered and reformulated as s. 37(1):

37. (1) Subject to subsection (2), despite any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as being held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

38 An analogous provision exists in the *BIA*, which, subject to the same specific exceptions, nullifies statutory deemed trusts and makes property of the bankrupt that would otherwise be subject to a deemed trust part of the debtor's estate and available to creditors (S.C. 1992, c. 27, s. 39; S.C. 1997, c. 12, s. 73; *BIA*, s. 67(2)). It is noteworthy that in both the *CCAA* and the *BIA*, the exceptions concern source deductions (*CCAA*, s. 18.3(2); *BIA*, s. 67(3)). The relevant provision of the *CCAA* reads:

18.3 (2) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act*....

Thus, the Crown's deemed trust and corresponding priority in source deductions remain effective both in reorganization and in bankruptcy.

39 Meanwhile, in both s. 18.4(1) of the *CCAA* and s. 86(1) of the *BIA*, other Crown claims are treated as unsecured. These provisions, establishing the Crown's status as an unsecured creditor, explicitly exempt statutory deemed trusts in source deductions (*CCAA*, s. 18.4(3); *BIA*, s. 86(3)). The *CCAA* provision reads as follows:

18.4 (3) Subsection (1) [Crown ranking as unsecured creditor] does not affect the operation of

- (a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*,
- (b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution ....

Therefore, not only does the *CCAA* provide that Crown claims do not enjoy priority over the claims of other creditors (s. 18.3(1)), but the exceptions to this rule (i.e., that Crown priority is maintained for source deductions) are repeatedly stated in the statute.

40 The apparent conflict in this case is whether the rule in the *CCAA* first enacted as s. 18.3 in 1997, which provides that subject to certain explicit exceptions, statutory deemed trusts are ineffective under the *CCAA*, is overridden by the one in the *ETA* enacted in 2000 stating that GST deemed trusts operate despite any enactment of Canada except the *BIA*. With respect for my colleague Fish J., I do not think the apparent conflict can be resolved by denying it and creating a rule requiring both a statutory provision enacting the deemed trust, and a second statutory provision

confirming it. Such a rule is unknown to the law. Courts must recognize conflicts, apparent or real, and resolve them when possible.

41 A line of jurisprudence across Canada has resolved the apparent conflict in favour of the *ETA*, thereby maintaining GST deemed trusts under the *CCAA*. *Ottawa Senators*, the leading case, decided the matter by invoking the doctrine of implied repeal to hold that the later in time provision of the *ETA* should take precedence over the *CCAA* (see also *Solid Resources Ltd., Re* (2002), 40 C.B.R. (4th) 219, [2003] G.S.T.C. 21 (Alta. Q.B.); *Gauntlet*

42 The Ontario Court of Appeal in *Ottawa Senators* rested its conclusion on two considerations. First, it was persuaded that by explicitly mentioning the *BIA* in *ETA* s. 222(3), but not the *CCAA*, Parliament made a deliberate choice. In the words of MacPherson J.A.:

The *BIA* and the *CCAA* are closely related federal statutes. I cannot conceive that Parliament would specifically identify the *BIA* as an exception, but accidentally fail to consider the *CCAA* as a possible second exception. In my view, the omission of the *CCAA* from s. 222(3) of the *ETA* was almost certainly a considered omission. [para. 43]

43 Second, the Ontario Court of Appeal compared the conflict between the *ETA* and the *CCAA* to that before this Court in *Doré c. Verdun (Municipalité)*, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862 (S.C.C.), and found them to be "identical" (para. 46). It therefore considered *Doré* binding (para. 49). In *Doré*, a limitations provision in the more general and recently enacted *Civil Code of Québec*, S.Q. 1991, c. 64 ("*C.C.Q.*"), was held to have repealed a more specific provision of the earlier Quebec *Cities and Towns Act*, R.S.Q., c. C-19, with which it conflicted. By analogy, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the later in time and more general provision, s. 222(3) of the *ETA*, impliedly repealed the more specific and earlier in time provision, s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* (paras. 47-49).

44 Viewing this issue in its entire context, several considerations lead me to conclude that neither the reasoning nor the result in *Ottawa Senators* can stand. While a conflict may exist at the level of the statutes' wording, a purposive and contextual analysis to determine Parliament's true intent yields the conclusion that Parliament could not have intended to restore the Crown's deemed trust priority in GST claims under the *CCAA* when it amended the *ETA* in 2000 with the *Sparrow Electric* amendment.

45 I begin by recalling that Parliament has shown its willingness to move away from asserting priority for Crown claims in insolvency law. Section 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* (subject to the s. 18.3(2) exceptions) provides that the Crown's deemed trusts have no effect under the *CCAA*. Where Parliament has sought to protect certain Crown claims through statutory deemed trusts and intended that these deemed trusts continue in insolvency, it has legislated so explicitly and elaborately. For example, s. 18.3(2) of the *CCAA* and s. 67(3) of the *BIA* expressly provide that deemed trusts for source deductions remain effective in insolvency. Parliament has, therefore, clearly carved out exceptions from the general rule that deemed trusts are ineffective in insolvency.

The *CCAA* and *BIA* are in harmony, preserving deemed trusts and asserting Crown priority only in respect of source deductions. Meanwhile, there is no express statutory basis for concluding that GST claims enjoy a preferred treatment under the *CCAA* or the *BIA*. Unlike source deductions, which are clearly and expressly dealt with under both these insolvency statutes, no such clear and express language exists in those Acts carving out an exception for GST claims.

46 The internal logic of the *CCAA* also militates against upholding the *ETA* deemed trust for GST. The *CCAA* imposes limits on a suspension by the court of the Crown's rights in respect of source deductions but does not mention the *ETA* (s. 11.4). Since source deductions deemed trusts are granted explicit protection under the *CCAA*, it would be inconsistent to afford a better protection to the *ETA* deemed trust absent explicit language in the *CCAA*. Thus, the logic of the *CCAA* appears to subject the *ETA* deemed trust to the waiver by Parliament of its priority (s. 18.4).

47 Moreover, a strange asymmetry would arise if the interpretation giving the *ETA* priority over the *CCAA* urged by the Crown is adopted here: the Crown would retain priority over GST claims during *CCAA* proceedings but not in bankruptcy. As courts have reflected, this can only encourage statute shopping by secured creditors in cases such as this one where the debtor's assets cannot satisfy both the secured creditors' and the Crown's claims (*Gauntlet*, at para. 21). If creditors' claims were better protected by liquidation under the *BIA*, creditors' incentives would lie overwhelmingly with avoiding proceedings under the *CCAA* and not risking a failed reorganization. Giving a key player in any insolvency such skewed incentives against reorganizing under the *CCAA* can only undermine that statute's remedial objectives and risk inviting the very social ills that it was enacted to avert.

48 Arguably, the effect of *Ottawa Senators* is mitigated if restructuring is attempted under the *BIA* instead of the *CCAA*, but it is not cured. If *Ottawa Senators* were to be followed, Crown priority over GST would differ depending on whether restructuring took place under the *CCAA* or the *BIA*. The anomaly of this result is made manifest by the fact that it would deprive companies of the option to restructure under the more flexible and responsive *CCAA* regime, which has been the statute of choice for complex reorganizations.

49 Evidence that Parliament intended different treatments for GST claims in reorganization and bankruptcy is scant, if it exists at all. Section 222(3) of the *ETA* was enacted as part of a wide-ranging budget implementation bill in 2000. The summary accompanying that bill does not indicate that Parliament intended to elevate Crown priority over GST claims under the *CCAA* to the same or a higher level than source deductions claims. Indeed, the summary for deemed trusts states only that amendments to existing provisions are aimed at "ensuring that employment insurance premiums and Canada Pension Plan contributions that are required to be remitted by an employer are fully recoverable by the Crown in the case of the bankruptcy of the employer" (Summary to S.C. 2000, c. 30, at p. 4a). The wording of GST deemed trusts resembles that of statutory deemed trusts for source deductions and incorporates the same overriding language and reference to the

*BIA*. However, as noted above, Parliament's express intent is that only source deductions deemed trusts remain operative. An exception for the *BIA* in the statutory language establishing the source deductions deemed trusts accomplishes very little, because the explicit language of the *BIA* itself (and the *CCAA*) carves out these source deductions deemed trusts and maintains their effect. It is however noteworthy that no equivalent language maintaining GST deemed trusts exists under either the *BIA* or the *CCAA*.

50 It seems more likely that by adopting the same language for creating GST deemed trusts in the *ETA* as it did for deemed trusts for source deductions, and by overlooking the inclusion of an exception for the *CCAA* alongside the *BIA* in s. 222(3) of the *ETA*, Parliament may have inadvertently succumbed to a drafting anomaly. Because of a statutory lacuna in the *ETA*, the GST deemed trust could be seen as remaining effective in the *CCAA*, while ceasing to have any effect under the *BIA*, thus creating an apparent conflict with the wording of the *CCAA*. However, it should be seen for what it is: a facial conflict only, capable of resolution by looking at the broader approach taken to Crown priorities and by giving precedence to the statutory language of s. 18.3 of the *CCAA* in a manner that does not produce an anomalous outcome.

51 Section 222(3) of the *ETA* evinces no explicit intention of Parliament to repeal *CCAA* s. 18.3. It merely creates an apparent conflict that must be resolved by statutory interpretation. Parliament's intent when it enacted *ETA* s. 222(3) was therefore far from unambiguous. Had it sought to give the Crown a priority for GST claims, it could have done so explicitly as it did for source deductions. Instead, one is left to infer from the language of *ETA* s. 222(3) that the GST deemed trust was intended to be effective under the *CCAA*.

52 I am not persuaded that the reasoning in *Doré* requires the application of the doctrine of implied repeal in the circumstances of this case. The main issue in *Doré* concerned the impact of the adoption of the *C.C.Q.* on the administrative law rules with respect to municipalities. While Gonthier J. concluded in that case that the limitation provision in art. 2930 *C.C.Q.* had repealed by implication a limitation provision in the *Cities and Towns Act*, he did so on the basis of more than a textual analysis. The conclusion in *Doré* was reached after thorough contextual analysis of both pieces of legislation, including an extensive review of the relevant legislative history (paras. 31-41). Consequently, the circumstances before this Court in *Doré* are far from "identical" to those in the present case, in terms of text, context and legislative history. Accordingly, *Doré* cannot be said to require the automatic application of the rule of repeal by implication.

53 A noteworthy indicator of Parliament's overall intent is the fact that in subsequent amendments it has not displaced the rule set out in the *CCAA*. Indeed, as indicated above, the recent amendments to the *CCAA* in 2005 resulted in the rule previously found in s. 18.3 being renumbered and reformulated as s. 37. Thus, to the extent the interpretation allowing the GST deemed trust to remain effective under the *CCAA* depends on *ETA* s. 222(3) having impliedly repealed *CCAA* s. 18.3(1) because it is later in time, we have come full circle. Parliament has renumbered and

reformulated the provision of the *CCAA* stating that, subject to exceptions for source deductions, deemed trusts do not survive the *CCAA* proceedings and thus the *CCAA* is now the later in time statute. This confirms that Parliament's intent with respect to GST deemed trusts is to be found in the *CCAA*.

54 I do not agree with my colleague Abella J. that s. 44(f) of the *Interpretation Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, can be used to interpret the 2005 amendments as having no effect. The new statute can hardly be said to be a mere re-enactment of the former statute. Indeed, the *CCAA* underwent a substantial review in 2005. Notably, acting consistently with its goal of treating both the *BIA* and the *CCAA* as sharing the same approach to insolvency, Parliament made parallel amendments to both statutes with respect to corporate proposals. In addition, new provisions were introduced regarding the treatment of contracts, collective agreements, interim financing and governance agreements. The appointment and role of the Monitor was also clarified. Noteworthy are the limits imposed by *CCAA* s. 11.09 on the court's discretion to make an order staying the Crown's source deductions deemed trusts, which were formerly found in s. 11.4. No mention whatsoever is made of GST deemed trusts (see Summary to S.C. 2005, c. 47). The review went as far as looking at the very expression used to describe the statutory override of deemed trusts. The comments cited by my colleague only emphasize the clear intent of Parliament to maintain its policy that only source deductions deemed trusts survive in *CCAA* proceedings.

55 In the case at bar, the legislative context informs the determination of Parliament's legislative intent and supports the conclusion that *ETA* s. 222(3) was not intended to narrow the scope of the *CCAA*'s override provision. Viewed in its entire context, the conflict between the *ETA* and the *CCAA* is more apparent than real. I would therefore not follow the reasoning in *Ottawa Senators* and affirm that *CCAA* s. 18.3 remained effective.

56 My conclusion is reinforced by the purpose of the *CCAA* as part of Canadian remedial insolvency legislation. As this aspect is particularly relevant to the second issue, I will now discuss how courts have interpreted the scope of their discretionary powers in supervising a *CCAA* reorganization and how Parliament has largely endorsed this interpretation. Indeed, the interpretation courts have given to the *CCAA* helps in understanding how the *CCAA* grew to occupy such a prominent role in Canadian insolvency law.

### **3.3 Discretionary Power of a Court Supervising a *CCAA* Reorganization**

57 Courts frequently observe that "[t]he *CCAA* is skeletal in nature" and does not "contain a comprehensive code that lays out all that is permitted or barred" (*ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.*, 2008 ONCA 587, 92 O.R. (3d) 513 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 44, *per* Blair J.A.). Accordingly, "[t]he history of *CCAA* law has been an evolution of judicial interpretation" (*Dylex Ltd., Re* (1995), 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List])), at para. 10, *per* Farley J.).

58 *CCAA* decisions are often based on discretionary grants of jurisdiction. The incremental exercise of judicial discretion in commercial courts under conditions one practitioner aptly describes as "the hothouse of real-time litigation" has been the primary method by which the *CCAA* has been adapted and has evolved to meet contemporary business and social needs (see Jones, at p. 484).

59 Judicial discretion must of course be exercised in furtherance of the *CCAA's* purposes. The remedial purpose I referred to in the historical overview of the Act is recognized over and over again in the jurisprudence. To cite one early example:

The legislation is remedial in the purest sense in that it provides a means whereby the devastating social and economic effects of bankruptcy or creditor initiated termination of ongoing business operations can be avoided while a court-supervised attempt to reorganize the financial affairs of the debtor company is made.

(*Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (1990), 41 O.A.C. 282 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 57, *per* Doherty J.A., dissenting)

60 Judicial decision making under the *CCAA* takes many forms. A court must first of all provide the conditions under which the debtor can attempt to reorganize. This can be achieved by staying enforcement actions by creditors to allow the debtor's business to continue, preserving the *status quo* while the debtor plans the compromise or arrangement to be presented to creditors, and supervising the process and advancing it to the point where it can be determined whether it will succeed (see, e.g., *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* (1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84 (B.C. C.A.), at pp. 88-89; *Pacific National Lease Holding Corp., Re* (1992), 19 B.C.A.C. 134 (B.C. C.A. [In Chambers]), at para. 27). In doing so, the court must often be cognizant of the various interests at stake in the reorganization, which can extend beyond those of the debtor and creditors to include employees, directors, shareholders, and even other parties doing business with the insolvent company (see, e.g., *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*, 2000 ABQB 442, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 9 (Alta. Q.B.), at para. 144, *per* Paperny J. (as she then was); *Air Canada, Re* (2003), 42 C.B.R. (4th) 173 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), at para. 3; *Air Canada, Re* [2003 CarswellOnt 4967 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])], 2003 CanLII 49366, at para. 13, *per* Farley J.; Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, at pp. 181-92 and 217-26). In addition, courts must recognize that on occasion the broader public interest will be engaged by aspects of the reorganization and may be a factor against which the decision of whether to allow a particular action will be weighed (see, e.g., *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix Rouge, Re* (2000), 19 C.B.R. (4th) 158 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 2, *per* Blair J. (as he then was); Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, at pp. 195-214).

61 When large companies encounter difficulty, reorganizations become increasingly complex. *CCAA* courts have been called upon to innovate accordingly in exercising their jurisdiction beyond merely staying proceedings against the debtor to allow breathing room for reorganization. They

have been asked to sanction measures for which there is no explicit authority in the *CCAA*. Without exhaustively cataloguing the various measures taken under the authority of the *CCAA*, it is useful to refer briefly to a few examples to illustrate the flexibility the statute affords supervising courts.

62 Perhaps the most creative use of *CCAA* authority has been the increasing willingness of courts to authorize post-filing security for debtor in possession financing or super-priority charges on the debtor's assets when necessary for the continuation of the debtor's business during the reorganization (see, e.g., *Skydome Corp., Re* (1998), 16 C.B.R. (4th) 118 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); *United Used Auto & Truck Parts Ltd., Re*, 2000 BCCA 146, 135 B.C.A.C. 96 (B.C. C.A.), aff'g (1999), 12 C.B.R. (4th) 144 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]); and generally, J. P. Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (2007), at pp. 93-115). The *CCAA* has also been used to release claims against third parties as part of approving a comprehensive plan of arrangement and compromise, even over the objections of some dissenting creditors (see Metcalfe & Mansfield). As well, the appointment of a Monitor to oversee the reorganization was originally a measure taken pursuant to the *CCAA*'s supervisory authority; Parliament responded, making the mechanism mandatory by legislative amendment.

63 Judicial innovation during *CCAA* proceedings has not been without controversy. At least two questions it raises are directly relevant to the case at bar: (1) what are the sources of a court's authority during *CCAA* proceedings? (2) what are the limits of this authority?

64 The first question concerns the boundary between a court's statutory authority under the *CCAA* and a court's residual authority under its inherent and equitable jurisdiction when supervising a reorganization. In authorizing measures during *CCAA* proceedings, courts have on occasion purported to rely upon their equitable jurisdiction to advance the purposes of the Act or their inherent jurisdiction to fill gaps in the statute. Recent appellate decisions have counselled against purporting to rely on inherent jurisdiction, holding that the better view is that courts are in most cases simply construing the authority supplied by the *CCAA* itself (see, e.g., *Skeena Cellulose Inc., Re*, 2003 BCCA 344, 13 B.C.L.R. (4th) 236 (B.C. C.A.), at paras. 45-47, *per* Newbury J.A.; *Stelco Inc. (Re)* (2005), 75 O.R. (3d) 5 (Ont. C.A.), paras. 31-33, *per* Blair J.A.).

65 I agree with Justice Georgina R. Jackson and Professor Janis Sarra that the most appropriate approach is a hierarchical one in which courts rely first on an interpretation of the provisions of the *CCAA* text before turning to inherent or equitable jurisdiction to anchor measures taken in a *CCAA* proceeding (see G. R. Jackson and J. Sarra, "Selecting the Judicial Tool to get the Job Done: An Examination of Statutory Interpretation, Discretionary Power and Inherent Jurisdiction in Insolvency Matters", in J. P. Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2007* (2008), 41, at p. 42). The authors conclude that when given an appropriately purposive and liberal interpretation, the *CCAA* will be sufficient in most instances to ground measures necessary to achieve its objectives (p. 94).

66 Having examined the pertinent parts of the *CCAA* and the recent history of the legislation, I accept that in most instances the issuance of an order during *CCAA* proceedings should be considered an exercise in statutory interpretation. Particularly noteworthy in this regard is the expansive interpretation the language of the statute at issue is capable of supporting.

67 The initial grant of authority under the *CCAA* empowered a court "where an application is made under this Act in respect of a company ... on the application of any person interested in the matter ..., subject to this Act, [to] make an order under this section" (*CCAA*, s. 11(1)). The plain language of the statute was very broad.

68 In this regard, though not strictly applicable to the case at bar, I note that Parliament has in recent amendments changed the wording contained in s. 11(1), making explicit the discretionary authority of the court under the *CCAA*. Thus in s. 11 of the *CCAA* as currently enacted, a court may, "subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, ... make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances" (S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 128). Parliament appears to have endorsed the broad reading of *CCAA* authority developed by the jurisprudence.

69 The *CCAA* also explicitly provides for certain orders. Both an order made on an initial application and an order on subsequent applications may stay, restrain, or prohibit existing or new proceedings against the debtor. The burden is on the applicant to satisfy the court that the order is appropriate in the circumstances and that the applicant has been acting in good faith and with due diligence (*CCAA*, ss. 11(3), (4) and (6)).

70 The general language of the *CCAA* should not be read as being restricted by the availability of more specific orders. However, the requirements of appropriateness, good faith, and due diligence are baseline considerations that a court should always bear in mind when exercising *CCAA* authority. Appropriateness under the *CCAA* is assessed by inquiring whether the order sought advances the policy objectives underlying the *CCAA*. The question is whether the order will usefully further efforts to achieve the remedial purpose of the *CCAA* — avoiding the social and economic losses resulting from liquidation of an insolvent company. I would add that appropriateness extends not only to the purpose of the order, but also to the means it employs. Courts should be mindful that chances for successful reorganizations are enhanced where participants achieve common ground and all stakeholders are treated as advantageously and fairly as the circumstances permit.

71 It is well-established that efforts to reorganize under the *CCAA* can be terminated and the stay of proceedings against the debtor lifted if the reorganization is "doomed to failure" (see *Chef Ready*, at p. 88; *Philip's Manufacturing Ltd., Re* (1992), 9 C.B.R. (3d) 25 (B.C. C.A.), at paras. 6-7). However, when an order is sought that does realistically advance the *CCAA*'s purposes, the ability to make it is within the discretion of a *CCAA* court.

72 The preceding discussion assists in determining whether the court had authority under the *CCAA* to continue the stay of proceedings against the Crown once it was apparent that reorganization would fail and bankruptcy was the inevitable next step.

73 In the Court of Appeal, Tysoe J.A. held that no authority existed under the *CCAA* to continue staying the Crown's enforcement of the GST deemed trust once efforts at reorganization had come to an end. The appellant submits that in so holding, Tysoe J.A. failed to consider the underlying purpose of the *CCAA* and give the statute an appropriately purposive and liberal interpretation under which the order was permissible. The Crown submits that Tysoe J.A. correctly held that the mandatory language of the *ETA* gave the court no option but to permit enforcement of the GST deemed trust when lifting the *CCAA* stay to permit the debtor to make an assignment under the *BIA*. Whether the *ETA* has a mandatory effect in the context of a *CCAA* proceeding has already been discussed. I will now address the question of whether the order was authorized by the *CCAA*.

74 It is beyond dispute that the *CCAA* imposes no explicit temporal limitations upon proceedings commenced under the Act that would prohibit ordering a continuation of the stay of the Crown's GST claims while lifting the general stay of proceedings temporarily to allow the debtor to make an assignment in bankruptcy.

75 The question remains whether the order advanced the underlying purpose of the *CCAA*. The Court of Appeal held that it did not because the reorganization efforts had come to an end and the *CCAA* was accordingly spent. I disagree.

76 There is no doubt that had reorganization been commenced under the *BIA* instead of the *CCAA*, the Crown's deemed trust priority for the GST funds would have been lost. Similarly, the Crown does not dispute that under the scheme of distribution in bankruptcy under the *BIA*, the deemed trust for GST ceases to have effect. Thus, after reorganization under the *CCAA* failed, creditors would have had a strong incentive to seek immediate bankruptcy and distribution of the debtor's assets under the *BIA*. In order to conclude that the discretion does not extend to partially lifting the stay in order to allow for an assignment in bankruptcy, one would have to assume a gap between the *CCAA* and the *BIA* proceedings. Brenner C.J.S.C.'s order staying Crown enforcement of the GST claim ensured that creditors would not be disadvantaged by the attempted reorganization under the *CCAA*. The effect of his order was to blunt any impulse of creditors to interfere in an orderly liquidation. His order was thus in furtherance of the *CCAA*'s objectives to the extent that it allowed a bridge between the *CCAA* and *BIA* proceedings. This interpretation of the tribunal's discretionary power is buttressed by s. 20 of the *CCAA*. That section provides that the *CCAA* "may be applied together with the provisions of any Act of Parliament... that authorizes or makes provision for the sanction of compromises or arrangements between a company and its shareholders or any class of them", such as the *BIA*. Section 20 clearly indicates the intention of Parliament for the *CCAA* to operate *in tandem* with other insolvency legislation, such as the *BIA*.

77 The *CCAA* creates conditions for preserving the *status quo* while attempts are made to find common ground amongst stakeholders for a reorganization that is fair to all. Because the alternative to reorganization is often bankruptcy, participants will measure the impact of a reorganization against the position they would enjoy in liquidation. In the case at bar, the order fostered a harmonious transition between reorganization and liquidation while meeting the objective of a single collective proceeding that is common to both statutes.

78 Tysoe J.A. therefore erred in my view by treating the *CCAA* and the *BIA* as distinct regimes subject to a temporal gap between the two, rather than as forming part of an integrated body of insolvency law. Parliament's decision to maintain two statutory schemes for reorganization, the *BIA* and the *CCAA*, reflects the reality that reorganizations of differing complexity require different legal mechanisms. By contrast, only one statutory scheme has been found to be needed to liquidate a bankrupt debtor's estate. The transition from the *CCAA* to the *BIA* may require the partial lifting of a stay of proceedings under the *CCAA* to allow commencement of the *BIA* proceedings. However, as Laskin J.A. for the Ontario Court of Appeal noted in a similar competition between secured creditors and the Ontario Superintendent of Financial Services seeking to enforce a deemed trust, "[t]he two statutes are related" and no "gap" exists between the two statutes which would allow the enforcement of property interests at the conclusion of *CCAA* proceedings that would be lost in bankruptcy *Ivaco Inc. (Re)* (2006), 83 O.R. (3d) 108 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 62-63).

79 The Crown's priority in claims pursuant to source deductions deemed trusts does not undermine this conclusion. Source deductions deemed trusts survive under both the *CCAA* and the *BIA*. Accordingly, creditors' incentives to prefer one Act over another will not be affected. While a court has a broad discretion to stay source deductions deemed trusts in the *CCAA* context, this discretion is nevertheless subject to specific limitations applicable only to source deductions deemed trusts (*CCAA*, s. 11.4). Thus, if *CCAA* reorganization fails (e.g., either the creditors or the court refuse a proposed reorganization), the Crown can immediately assert its claim in unremitted source deductions. But this should not be understood to affect a seamless transition into bankruptcy or create any "gap" between the *CCAA* and the *BIA* for the simple reason that, regardless of what statute the reorganization had been commenced under, creditors' claims in both instances would have been subject to the priority of the Crown's source deductions deemed trust.

80 Source deductions deemed trusts aside, the comprehensive and exhaustive mechanism under the *BIA* must control the distribution of the debtor's assets once liquidation is inevitable. Indeed, an orderly transition to liquidation is mandatory under the *BIA* where a proposal is rejected by creditors. The *CCAA* is silent on the transition into liquidation but the breadth of the court's discretion under the Act is sufficient to construct a bridge to liquidation under the *BIA*. The court must do so in a manner that does not subvert the scheme of distribution under the *BIA*. Transition to liquidation requires partially lifting the *CCAA* stay to commence proceedings under the *BIA*.

This necessary partial lifting of the stay should not trigger a race to the courthouse in an effort to obtain priority unavailable under the *BIA*.

81 I therefore conclude that Brenner C.J.S.C. had the authority under the *CCAA* to lift the stay to allow entry into liquidation.

### ***3.4 Express Trust***

82 The last issue in this case is whether Brenner C.J.S.C. created an express trust in favour of the Crown when he ordered on April 29, 2008, that proceeds from the sale of LeRoy Trucking's assets equal to the amount of unremitted GST be held back in the Monitor's trust account until the results of the reorganization were known. Tysoe J.A. in the Court of Appeal concluded as an alternative ground for allowing the Crown's appeal that it was the beneficiary of an express trust. I disagree.

83 Creation of an express trust requires the presence of three certainties: intention, subject matter, and object. Express or "true trusts" arise from the acts and intentions of the settlor and are distinguishable from other trusts arising by operation of law (see D. W. M. Waters, M. R. Gillen and L. D. Smith, eds., *Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada* (3rd ed. 2005), at pp. 28-29 especially fn. 42).

84 Here, there is no certainty to the object (i.e. the beneficiary) inferrable from the court's order of April 29, 2008, sufficient to support an express trust.

85 At the time of the order, there was a dispute between Century Services and the Crown over part of the proceeds from the sale of the debtor's assets. The court's solution was to accept LeRoy Trucking's proposal to segregate those monies until that dispute could be resolved. Thus there was no certainty that the Crown would actually be the beneficiary, or object, of the trust.

86 The fact that the location chosen to segregate those monies was the Monitor's trust account has no independent effect such that it would overcome the lack of a clear beneficiary. In any event, under the interpretation of *CCAA* s. 18.3(1) established above, no such priority dispute would even arise because the Crown's deemed trust priority over GST claims would be lost under the *CCAA* and the Crown would rank as an unsecured creditor for this amount. However, Brenner C.J.S.C. may well have been proceeding on the basis that, in accordance with *Ottawa Senators*, the Crown's GST claim would remain effective if reorganization was successful, which would not be the case if transition to the liquidation process of the *BIA* was allowed. An amount equivalent to that claim would accordingly be set aside pending the outcome of reorganization.

87 Thus, uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the *CCAA* restructuring eliminates the existence of any certainty to permanently vest in the Crown a beneficial interest in the funds. That much is clear from the oral reasons of Brenner C.J.S.C. on April 29, 2008, when he said: "Given the fact that [*CCAA* proceedings] are known to fail and filings in bankruptcy result, it seems to me that maintaining the status quo in the case at bar supports the proposal to have the monitor hold these

funds in trust." Exactly who might take the money in the final result was therefore evidently in doubt. Brenner C.J.S.C.'s subsequent order of September 3, 2008, denying the Crown's application to enforce the trust once it was clear that bankruptcy was inevitable, confirms the absence of a clear beneficiary required to ground an express trust.

#### **4. Conclusion**

88 I conclude that Brenner C.J.S.C. had the discretion under the *CCAA* to continue the stay of the Crown's claim for enforcement of the GST deemed trust while otherwise lifting it to permit LeRoy Trucking to make an assignment in bankruptcy. My conclusion that s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* nullified the GST deemed trust while proceedings under that Act were pending confirms that the discretionary jurisdiction under s. 11 utilized by the court was not limited by the Crown's asserted GST priority, because there is no such priority under the *CCAA*.

89 For these reasons, I would allow the appeal and declare that the \$305,202.30 collected by LeRoy Trucking in respect of GST but not yet remitted to the Receiver General of Canada is not subject to deemed trust or priority in favour of the Crown. Nor is this amount subject to an express trust. Costs are awarded for this appeal and the appeal in the court below.

#### ***Fish J. (concurring):***

#### **I**

90 I am in general agreement with the reasons of Justice Deschamps and would dispose of the appeal as she suggests.

91 More particularly, I share my colleague's interpretation of the scope of the judge's discretion under s. 11 of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("*CCAA*"). And I share my colleague's conclusion that Brenner C.J.S.C. did not create an express trust in favour of the Crown when he segregated GST funds into the Monitor's trust account (2008 BCSC 1805, [2008] G.S.T.C. 221 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers])).

92 I nonetheless feel bound to add brief reasons of my own regarding the interaction between the *CCAA* and the *Excise Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 ("*ETA*").

93 In upholding deemed trusts created by the *ETA* notwithstanding insolvency proceedings, *Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp. (Re)* (2005), 73 O.R. (3d) 737, [2005] G.S.T.C. 1 (Ont. C.A.), and its progeny have been unduly protective of Crown interests which Parliament itself has chosen to subordinate to competing prioritized claims. In my respectful view, a clearly marked departure from that jurisprudential approach is warranted in this case.

94 Justice Deschamps develops important historical and policy reasons in support of this position and I have nothing to add in that regard. I do wish, however, to explain why a comparative analysis of related statutory provisions adds support to our shared conclusion.

95 Parliament has in recent years given detailed consideration to the Canadian insolvency scheme. It has declined to amend the provisions at issue in this case. Ours is not to wonder why, but rather to treat Parliament's preservation of the relevant provisions as a deliberate exercise of the legislative discretion that is Parliament's alone. With respect, I reject any suggestion that we should instead characterize the apparent conflict between s. 18.3(1) (now s. 37(1)) of the *CCAA* and s. 222 of the *ETA* as a drafting anomaly or statutory lacuna properly subject to judicial correction or repair.

## II

96 In the context of the Canadian insolvency regime, a deemed trust will be found to exist only where two complementary elements co-exist: first, a statutory provision *creating* the trust; and second, a *CCAA* or *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 ("*BIA*") provision *confirming* — or explicitly preserving — its effective operation.

97 This interpretation is reflected in three federal statutes. Each contains a deemed trust provision framed in terms strikingly similar to the wording of s. 222 of the *ETA*.

98 The first is the *Income Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) ("*ITA*") where s. 227(4) *creates* a deemed trust:

**227 (4) Trust for moneys deducted** — Every person who deducts or withholds an amount under this Act is deemed, notwithstanding any security interest (as defined in subsection 224(1.3)) in the amount so deducted or withheld, to hold the amount separate and apart from the property of the person and from property held by any secured creditor (as defined in subsection 224(1.3)) of that person that but for the security interest would be property of the person, in trust for Her Majesty and for payment to Her Majesty in the manner and at the time provided under this Act. [Here and below, the emphasis is of course my own.]

99 In the next subsection, Parliament has taken care to make clear that this trust is unaffected by federal or provincial legislation to the contrary:

**(4.1) Extension of trust** — Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (except sections 81.1 and 81.2 of that Act), any other enactment of Canada, any enactment of a province or any other law, where at any time an amount deemed by subsection 227(4) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not paid to Her Majesty in

the manner and at the time provided under this Act, property of the person ... equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust is deemed

(a) to be held, from the time the amount was deducted or withheld by the person, separate and apart from the property of the person, in trust for Her Majesty whether or not the property is subject to such a security interest, ...

...

... and the proceeds of such property shall be paid to the Receiver General in priority to all such security interests.

100 The continued operation of this deemed trust is expressly *confirmed* in s. 18.3 of the *CCAA*:

**18.3** (1) Subject to subsection (2), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as being held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act*...

101 The operation of the *ITA* deemed trust is also confirmed in s. 67 of the *BIA*:

**67** (2) Subject to subsection (3), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a bankrupt shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty for the purpose of paragraph (1)(a) unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

(3) Subsection (2) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act*...

102 Thus, Parliament has first *created* and then *confirmed the continued operation* of the Crown's *ITA* deemed trust under *both* the *CCAA* and the *BIA* regimes.

103 The second federal statute for which this scheme holds true is the *Canada Pension Plan*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8 ("*CPP*"). At s. 23, Parliament creates a deemed trust in favour of the Crown and specifies that it exists despite all contrary provisions in any other Canadian statute. Finally, and in almost identical terms, the *Employment Insurance Act*, S.C. 1996, c. 23 ("*EIA*"), creates a deemed trust in favour of the Crown: see ss. 86(2) and (2.1).

104 As we have seen, the survival of the deemed trusts created under these provisions of the *ITA*, the *CPP* and the *EIA* is confirmed in s. 18.3(2) the *CCAA* and in s. 67(3) the *BIA*. In all three cases, Parliament's intent to enforce the Crown's deemed trust through insolvency proceedings is expressed in clear and unmistakable terms.

105 The same is not true with regard to the deemed trust created under the *ETA*. Although Parliament creates a deemed trust in favour of the Crown to hold unremitted GST monies, and although it purports to maintain this trust notwithstanding any contrary federal or provincial legislation, it does not *confirm* the trust — or expressly provide for its continued operation — in either the *BIA* or the *CCAA*. The second of the two mandatory elements I have mentioned is thus absent reflecting Parliament's intention to allow the deemed trust to lapse with the commencement of insolvency proceedings.

106 The language of the relevant *ETA* provisions is identical in substance to that of the *ITA*, *CPP*, and *EIA* provisions:

**222. (1) [Deemed] Trust for amounts collected** — Subject to subsection (1.1), every person who collects an amount as or on account of tax under Division II is deemed, for all purposes and despite any security interest in the amount, to hold the amount in trust for Her Majesty in right of Canada, separate and apart from the property of the person and from property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, until the amount is remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn under subsection (2).

...

**(3) Extension of trust** — Despite any other provision of this Act (except subsection (4)), any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*), any enactment of a province or any other law, if at any time an amount deemed by subsection (1) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn in the manner and at the time provided under this Part, property of the person and property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust, is deemed

(a) to be held, from the time the amount was collected by the person, in trust for Her Majesty, separate and apart from the property of the person, whether or not the property is subject to a security interest, ...

...

... and the proceeds of the property shall be paid to the Receiver General in priority to all security interests.

107 Yet no provision of the *CCAA* provides for the continuation of this deemed trust after the *CCAA* is brought into play.

108 In short, Parliament has imposed *two* explicit conditions, or "building blocks", for survival under the *CCAA* of deemed trusts created by the *ITA*, *CPP*, and *EIA*. Had Parliament intended to likewise preserve under the *CCAA* deemed trusts created by the *ETA*, it would have included in the *CCAA* the sort of confirmatory provision that explicitly preserves other deemed trusts.

109 With respect, unlike Tysoe J.A., I do not find it "inconceivable that Parliament would specifically identify the *BIA* as an exception when enacting the current version of s. 222(3) of the *ETA* without considering the *CCAA* as a possible second exception" (2009 BCCA 205, 98 B.C.L.R. (4th) 242, [2009] G.S.T.C. 79 (B.C. C.A.), at para. 37). *All* of the deemed trust provisions excerpted above make explicit reference to the *BIA*. Section 222 of the *ETA* does not break the pattern. Given the near-identical wording of the four deemed trust provisions, it would have been surprising indeed had Parliament not addressed the *BIA* at all in the *ETA*.

110 Parliament's evident intent was to render GST deemed trusts inoperative upon the institution of insolvency proceedings. Accordingly, s. 222 mentions the *BIA* so as to *exclude* it from its ambit — rather than to *include* it, as do the *ITA*, the *CPP*, and the *EIA*.

111 Conversely, I note that *none* of these statutes mentions the *CCAA* expressly. Their specific reference to the *BIA* has no bearing on their interaction with the *CCAA*. Again, it is the confirmatory provisions *in the insolvency statutes* that determine whether a given deemed trust will subsist during insolvency proceedings.

112 Finally, I believe that chambers judges should not segregate GST monies into the Monitor's trust account during *CCAA* proceedings, as was done in this case. The result of Justice Deschamps's reasoning is that GST claims become unsecured under the *CCAA*. Parliament has deliberately chosen to nullify certain Crown super-priorities during insolvency; this is one such instance.

### III

113 For these reasons, like Justice Deschamps, I would allow the appeal with costs in this Court and in the courts below and order that the \$305,202.30 collected by LeRoy Trucking in respect of GST but not yet remitted to the Receiver General of Canada be subject to no deemed trust or priority in favour of the Crown.

#### ***Abella J. (dissenting):***

114 The central issue in this appeal is whether s. 222 of the *Excise Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 ("*EIA*"), and specifically s. 222(3), gives priority during *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("*CCAA*"), proceedings to the Crown's deemed trust in unremitted GST. I

agree with Tysoe J.A. that it does. It follows, in my respectful view, that a court's discretion under s. 11 of the *CCAA* is circumscribed accordingly.

115 Section 11<sup>1</sup> of the *CCAA* stated:

**11.** (1) Notwithstanding anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up Act*, where an application is made under this Act in respect of a company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make an order under this section.

To decide the scope of the court's discretion under s. 11, it is necessary to first determine the priority issue. Section 222(3), the provision of the *ETA* at issue in this case, states:

**222 (3) Extension of trust** — Despite any other provision of this Act (except subsection (4)), any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*), any enactment of a province or any other law, if at any time an amount deemed by subsection (1) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn in the manner and at the time provided under this Part, property of the person and property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust, is deemed

(a) to be held, from the time the amount was collected by the person, in trust for Her Majesty, separate and apart from the property of the person, whether or not the property is subject to a security interest, and

(b) to form no part of the estate or property of the person from the time the amount was collected, whether or not the property has in fact been kept separate and apart from the estate or property of the person and whether or not the property is subject to a security interest

and is property beneficially owned by Her Majesty in right of Canada despite any security interest in the property or in the proceeds thereof and the proceeds of the property shall be paid to the Receiver General in priority to all security interests.

116 Century Services argued that the *CCAA's* general override provision, s. 18.3(1), prevailed, and that the deeming provisions in s. 222 of the *ETA* were, accordingly, inapplicable during *CCAA* proceedings. Section 18.3(1) states:

**18.3 (1)** ... [N]otwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

117 As MacPherson J.A. correctly observed in *Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp. (Re)* (2005), 73 O.R. (3d) 737, [2005] G.S.T.C. 1 (Ont. C.A.), s. 222(3) of the *ETA* is in "clear conflict" with s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* (para. 31). Resolving the conflict between the two provisions is, essentially, what seems to me to be a relatively uncomplicated exercise in statutory interpretation: does the language reflect a clear legislative intention? In my view it does. The deemed trust provision, s. 222(3) of the *ETA*, has unambiguous language stating that it operates notwithstanding any law except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 ("*BIA*").

118 By expressly excluding only one statute from its legislative grasp, and by unequivocally stating that it applies despite any other law anywhere in Canada *except* the *BIA*, s. 222(3) has defined its boundaries in the clearest possible terms. I am in complete agreement with the following comments of MacPherson J.A. in *Ottawa Senators*:

The legislative intent of s. 222(3) of the *ETA* is clear. If there is a conflict with "any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*)", s. 222(3) prevails. In these words Parliament did two things: it decided that s. 222(3) should trump all other federal laws and, importantly, it addressed the topic of exceptions to its trumping decision and identified a single exception, the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* .... The *BIA* and the *CCAA* are closely related federal statutes. I cannot conceive that Parliament would specifically identify the *BIA* as an exception, but accidentally fail to consider the *CCAA* as a possible second exception. In my view, the omission of the *CCAA* from s. 222(3) of the *ETA* was almost certainly a considered omission. [para. 43]

119 MacPherson J.A.'s view that the failure to exempt the *CCAA* from the operation of the *ETA* is a reflection of a clear legislative intention, is borne out by how the *CCAA* was subsequently changed after s. 18.3(1) was enacted in 1997. In 2000, when s. 222(3) of the *ETA* came into force, amendments were also introduced to the *CCAA*. Section 18.3(1) was not amended.

120 The failure to amend s. 18.3(1) is notable because its effect was to protect the legislative *status quo*, notwithstanding repeated requests from various constituencies that s. 18.3(1) be amended to make the priorities in the *CCAA* consistent with those in the *BIA*. In 2002, for example, when Industry Canada conducted a review of the *BIA* and the *CCAA*, the Insolvency Institute of Canada and the Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals recommended that the priority regime under the *BIA* be extended to the *CCAA* (Joint Task Force on Business Insolvency Law Reform, *Report* (March 15, 2002), Sch. B, proposal 71, at pp. 37-38). The same recommendations were made by the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce in its 2003 report, *Debtors and Creditors Sharing the Burden: A Review of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*; by the Legislative Review Task Force (Commercial) of the Insolvency Institute of Canada and the Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals in its 2005 *Report on the*

*Commercial Provisions of Bill C-55*; and in 2007 by the Insolvency Institute of Canada in a submission to the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce commenting on reforms then under consideration.

121 Yet the *BIA* remains the only exempted statute under s. 222(3) of the *ETA*. Even after the 2005 decision in *Ottawa Senators* which confirmed that the *ETA* took precedence over the *CCAA*, there was no responsive legislative revision. I see this lack of response as relevant in this case, as it was in *R. v. Tele-Mobile Co.*, 2008 SCC 12, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 305 (S.C.C.), where this Court stated:

While it cannot be said that legislative silence is necessarily determinative of legislative intention, in this case the silence is Parliament's answer to the consistent urging of Telus and other affected businesses and organizations that there be express language in the legislation to ensure that businesses can be reimbursed for the reasonable costs of complying with evidence-gathering orders. I see the legislative history as reflecting Parliament's intention that compensation not be paid for compliance with production orders. [para. 42]

122 All this leads to a clear inference of a deliberate legislative choice to protect the deemed trust in s. 222(3) from the reach of s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA*.

123 Nor do I see any "policy" justification for interfering, through interpretation, with this clarity of legislative intention. I can do no better by way of explaining why I think the policy argument cannot succeed in this case, than to repeat the words of Tysoe J.A. who said:

I do not dispute that there are valid policy reasons for encouraging insolvent companies to attempt to restructure their affairs so that their business can continue with as little disruption to employees and other stakeholders as possible. It is appropriate for the courts to take such policy considerations into account, but only if it is in connection with a matter that has not been considered by Parliament. Here, Parliament must be taken to have weighed policy considerations when it enacted the amendments to the *CCAA* and *ETA* described above. As Mr. Justice MacPherson observed at para. 43 of *Ottawa Senators*, it is inconceivable that Parliament would specifically identify the *BIA* as an exception when enacting the current version of s. 222(3) of the *ETA* without considering the *CCAA* as a possible second exception. I also make the observation that the 1992 set of amendments to the *BIA* enabled proposals to be binding on secured creditors and, while there is more flexibility under the *CCAA*, it is possible for an insolvent company to attempt to restructure under the auspices of the *BIA*. [para. 37]

124 Despite my view that the clarity of the language in s. 222(3) is dispositive, it is also my view that even the application of other principles of interpretation reinforces this conclusion. In their submissions, the parties raised the following as being particularly relevant: the Crown relied on the principle that the statute which is "later in time" prevails; and Century Services based its argument

on the principle that the general provision gives way to the specific (*generalia specialibus non derogant*).

125 The "later in time" principle gives priority to a more recent statute, based on the theory that the legislature is presumed to be aware of the content of existing legislation. If a new enactment is inconsistent with a prior one, therefore, the legislature is presumed to have intended to derogate from the earlier provisions (Ruth Sullivan, *Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes* (5th ed. 2008), at pp. 346-47; Pierre-André Côté, *The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada* (3rd ed. 2000), at p. 358).

126 The exception to this presumptive displacement of pre-existing inconsistent legislation, is the *generalia specialibus non derogant* principle that "[a] more recent, general provision will not be construed as affecting an earlier, special provision" (Côté, at p. 359). Like a Russian Doll, there is also an exception within this exception, namely, that an earlier, specific provision may in fact be "overruled" by a subsequent general statute if the legislature indicates, through its language, an intention that the general provision prevails (*Doré c. Verdun (Municipalité)*, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862 (S.C.C.)).

127 The primary purpose of these interpretive principles is to assist in the performance of the task of determining the intention of the legislature. This was confirmed by MacPherson J.A. in *Ottawa Senators*, at para. 42:

[T]he overarching rule of statutory interpretation is that statutory provisions should be interpreted to give effect to the intention of the legislature in enacting the law. This primary rule takes precedence over all maxims or canons or aids relating to statutory interpretation, including the maxim that the specific prevails over the general (*generalia specialibus non derogant*). As expressed by Hudson J. in *Canada v. Williams*, [1944] S.C.R. 226, ... at p. 239 ...:

The maxim *generalia specialibus non derogant* is relied on as a rule which should dispose of the question, but the maxim is not a rule of law but a rule of construction and bows to the intention of the legislature, if such intention can reasonably be gathered from all of the relevant legislation.

(See also Côté, at p. 358, and Pierre-Andre Côté, with the collaboration of S. Beaulac and M. Devinat, *Interprétation des lois* (4th ed. 2009), at para. 1335.)

128 I accept the Crown's argument that the "later in time" principle is conclusive in this case. Since s. 222(3) of the *ETA* was enacted in 2000 and s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* was introduced in 1997, s. 222(3) is, on its face, the later provision. This chronological victory can be displaced, as Century Services argues, if it is shown that the more recent provision, s. 222(3) of the *ETA*, is a general one, in which case the earlier, specific provision, s. 18.3(1), prevails (*generalia specialibus non*

*derogant*). But, as previously explained, the prior specific provision does not take precedence if the subsequent general provision appears to "overrule" it. This, it seems to me, is precisely what s. 222(3) achieves through the use of language stating that it prevails despite any law of Canada, of a province, or "any other law" *other than the BIA*. Section 18.3(1) of the *CCAA*, is thereby rendered inoperative for purposes of s. 222(3).

129 It is true that when the *CCAA* was amended in 2005,<sup>2</sup> s. 18.3(1) was re-enacted as s. 37(1) (S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 131). Deschamps J. suggests that this makes s. 37(1) the new, "later in time" provision. With respect, her observation is refuted by the operation of s. 44(f) of the *Interpretation Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, which expressly deals with the (non) effect of re-enacting, without significant substantive changes, a repealed provision (see *Canada (Attorney General) v. Canada (Public Service Staff Relations Board)*, [1977] 2 F.C. 663 (Fed. C.A.), dealing with the predecessor provision to s. 44(f)). It directs that new enactments not be construed as "new law" unless they differ in substance from the repealed provision:

44. Where an enactment, in this section called the "former enactment", is repealed and another enactment, in this section called the "new enactment", is substituted therefor,

...

(f) except to the extent that the provisions of the new enactment are not in substance the same as those of the former enactment, the new enactment shall not be held to operate as new law, but shall be construed and have effect as a consolidation and as declaratory of the law as contained in the former enactment;

Section 2 of the *Interpretation Act* defines an enactment as "an Act or regulation or *any portion of an Act or regulation*".

130 Section 37(1) of the current *CCAA* is almost identical to s. 18.3(1). These provisions are set out for ease of comparison, with the differences between them underlined:

37.(1) Subject to subsection (2), despite any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as being held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

18.3 (1) Subject to subsection (2), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

131 The application of s. 44(f) of the *Interpretation Act* simply confirms the government's clearly expressed intent, found in Industry Canada's clause-by-clause review of Bill C-55, where

s. 37(1) was identified as "a technical amendment to reorder the provisions of this Act". During second reading, the Hon. Bill Rompkey, then the Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate, confirmed that s. 37(1) represented only a technical change:

On a technical note relating to the treatment of deemed trusts for taxes, the bill [*sic*] makes no changes to the underlying policy intent, despite the fact that in the case of a restructuring under the CCAA, sections of the act [*sic*] were repealed and substituted with renumbered versions due to the extensive reworking of the CCAA.

(*Debates of the Senate*, vol. 142, 1st Sess., 38th Parl., November 23, 2005, at p. 2147)

132 Had the substance of s. 18.3(1) altered in any material way when it was replaced by s. 37(1), I would share Deschamps J.'s view that it should be considered a new provision. But since s. 18.3(1) and s. 37(1) are the same in substance, the transformation of s. 18.3(1) into s. 37(1) has no effect on the interpretive queue, and s. 222(3) of the *ETA* remains the "later in time" provision (Sullivan, at p. 347).

133 This means that the deemed trust provision in s. 222(3) of the *ETA* takes precedence over s. 18.3(1) during *CCAA* proceedings. The question then is how that priority affects the discretion of a court under s. 11 of the *CCAA*.

134 While s. 11 gives a court discretion to make orders notwithstanding the *BIA* and the *Winding-up Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. W-11, that discretion is not liberated from the operation of any other federal statute. Any exercise of discretion is therefore circumscribed by whatever limits are imposed by statutes *other* than the *BIA* and the *Winding-up Act*. That includes the *ETA*. The chambers judge in this case was, therefore, required to respect the priority regime set out in s. 222(3) of the *ETA*. Neither s. 18.3(1) nor s. 11 of the *CCAA* gave him the authority to ignore it. He could not, as a result, deny the Crown's request for payment of the GST funds during the *CCAA* proceedings.

135 Given this conclusion, it is unnecessary to consider whether there was an express trust.

136 I would dismiss the appeal.

*Appeal allowed.*

*Pourvoi accueilli.*

## Appendix

***Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (as at December 13, 2007)**

**11. (1) Powers of court** — Notwithstanding anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up Act*, where an application is made under this Act in respect of a company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make an order under this section.

...

**(3) Initial application court orders** — A court may, on an initial application in respect of a company, make an order on such terms as it may impose, effective for such period as the court deems necessary not exceeding thirty days,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in subsection (i);

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and

(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of or proceeding with any other action, suit or proceeding against the company.

**(4) Other than initial application court orders** — A court may, on an application in respect of a company other than an initial application, make an order on such terms as it may impose,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, for such period as the court deems necessary, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in subsection (1);

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and

(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of or proceeding with any other action, suit or proceeding against the company.

...

**(6) Burden of proof on application** — The court shall not make an order under subsection (3) or (4) unless

(a) the applicant satisfies the court that circumstances exist that make such an order appropriate; and

(b) in the case of an order under subsection (4), the applicant also satisfies the court that the applicant has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence.

**11.4 (1) Her Majesty affected** — An order made under section 11 may provide that

(a) Her Majesty in right of Canada may not exercise rights under subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* or any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's

premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, in respect of the company if the company is a tax debtor under that subsection or provision, for such period as the court considers appropriate but ending not later than

- (i) the expiration of the order,
  - (ii) the refusal of a proposed compromise by the creditors or the court,
  - (iii) six months following the court sanction of a compromise or arrangement,
  - (iv) the default by the company on any term of a compromise or arrangement, or
  - (v) the performance of a compromise or arrangement in respect of the company;
- and\

(b) Her Majesty in right of a province may not exercise rights under any provision of provincial legislation in respect of the company where the company is a debtor under that legislation and the provision has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

- (i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or
- (ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

for such period as the court considers appropriate but ending not later than the occurrence or time referred to in whichever of subparagraphs (a)(i) to (v) may apply.

**(2) When order ceases to be in effect** — An order referred to in subsection (1) ceases to be in effect if

- (a) the company defaults on payment of any amount that becomes due to Her Majesty after the order is made and could be subject to a demand under
  - (i) subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*,
  - (ii) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or

an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(iii) under any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

(A) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(B) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection; or

(b) any other creditor is or becomes entitled to realize a security on any property that could be claimed by Her Majesty in exercising rights under

(i) subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(ii) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(iii) any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

(A) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(B) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection.

**(3) Operation of similar legislation** — An order made under section 11, other than an order referred to in subsection (1) of this section, does not affect the operation of

(a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(c) any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

and for the purpose of paragraph (c), the provision of provincial legislation is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(i), or as subsection 23(2) of the *Canada Pension Plan* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(ii), and in respect of any related interest, penalties or other amounts.

**18.3 (1) Deemed trusts** — Subject to subsection (2), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

**(2) Exceptions** — Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act* (each of which is in this subsection referred to as a "federal provision") nor in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under any law of a province that creates a deemed trust the sole

purpose of which is to ensure remittance to Her Majesty in right of the province of amounts deducted or withheld under a law of the province where

(a) that law of the province imposes a tax similar in nature to the tax imposed under the *Income Tax Act* and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as the amounts referred to in subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, or

(b) the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan*, that law of the province establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as amounts referred to in subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan*,

and for the purpose of this subsection, any provision of a law of a province that creates a deemed trust is, notwithstanding any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as the corresponding federal provision.

**18.4 (1) Status of Crown claims** — In relation to a proceeding under this Act, all claims, including secured claims, of Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province or any body under an enactment respecting workers' compensation, in this section and in section 18.5 called a "workers' compensation body", rank as unsecured claims.

...

**(3) Operation of similar legislation** — Subsection (1) does not affect the operation of

(a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(c) any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

and for the purpose of paragraph (c), the provision of provincial legislation is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(i), or as subsection 23(2) of the *Canada Pension Plan* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(ii), and in respect of any related interest, penalties or other amounts.

...

**20. [Act to be applied conjointly with other Acts]** — The provisions of this Act may be applied together with the provisions of any Act of Parliament or of the legislature of any province, that authorizes or makes provision for the sanction of compromises or arrangements between a company and its shareholders or any class of them.

*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C.*

**1985, c. C-36 (as at September 18, 2009)**

**11. General power of court** — Despite anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, if an application is made under this Act in respect of a debtor company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

...

**11.02 (1) Stays, etc. — initial application** — A court may, on an initial application in respect of a debtor company, make an order on any terms that it may impose, effective for the period that the court considers necessary, which period may not be more than 30 days,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*;

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and

(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of any action, suit or proceeding against the company.

**(2) Stays, etc. — other than initial application** — A court may, on an application in respect of a debtor company other than an initial application, make an order, on any terms that it may impose,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, for any period that the court considers necessary, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in paragraph (1)(a);

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and

(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of any action, suit or proceeding against the company.

**(3) Burden of proof on application** — The court shall not make the order unless

(a) the applicant satisfies the court that circumstances exist that make the order appropriate; and

(b) in the case of an order under subsection (2), the applicant also satisfies the court that the applicant has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence.

...

**11.09 (1) Stay — Her Majesty** — An order made under section 11.02 may provide that

(a) Her Majesty in right of Canada may not exercise rights under subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* or any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, in respect of the company if the company is a tax debtor under that subsection or provision, for the period that the court considers appropriate but ending not later than

(i) the expiry of the order,

(ii) the refusal of a proposed compromise by the creditors or the court,

(iii) six months following the court sanction of a compromise or an arrangement,

(iv) the default by the company on any term of a compromise or an arrangement, or

(v) the performance of a compromise or an arrangement in respect of the company; and

(b) Her Majesty in right of a province may not exercise rights under any provision of provincial legislation in respect of the company if the company is a debtor under that legislation and the provision has a purpose similar to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, and the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

for the period that the court considers appropriate but ending not later than the occurrence or time referred to in whichever of subparagraphs (a)(i) to (v) that may apply.

**(2) When order ceases to be in effect** — The portions of an order made under section 11.02 that affect the exercise of rights of Her Majesty referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b) cease to be in effect if

(a) the company defaults on the payment of any amount that becomes due to Her Majesty after the order is made and could be subject to a demand under

(i) subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(ii) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(iii) any provision of provincial legislation that has a purpose similar to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, and the sum

(A) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(B) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension

plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection; or

(b) any other creditor is or becomes entitled to realize a security on any property that could be claimed by Her Majesty in exercising rights under

(i) subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(ii) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(iii) any provision of provincial legislation that has a purpose similar to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, and the sum

(A) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(B) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection.

**(3) Operation of similar legislation** — An order made under section 11.02, other than the portions of that order that affect the exercise of rights of Her Majesty referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), does not affect the operation of

(a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(c) any provision of provincial legislation that has a purpose similar to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that

it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, and the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

and for the purpose of paragraph (c), the provision of provincial legislation is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(i), or as subsection 23(2) of the *Canada Pension Plan* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(ii), and in respect of any related interest, penalties or other amounts.

**37. (1) Deemed trusts** — Subject to subsection (2), despite any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as being held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

**(2) Exceptions** — Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act* (each of which is in this subsection referred to as a "federal provision"), nor does it apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under any law of a province that creates a deemed trust the sole purpose of which is to ensure remittance to Her Majesty in right of the province of amounts deducted or withheld under a law of the province if

(a) that law of the province imposes a tax similar in nature to the tax imposed under the *Income Tax Act* and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as the amounts referred to in subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, or

(b) the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan*, that law of the province establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as amounts referred to in subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan*,

and for the purpose of this subsection, any provision of a law of a province that creates a deemed trust is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as the corresponding federal provision.

*Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 (as at December 13, 2007)*

**222. (1) [Deemed] Trust for amounts collected** — Subject to subsection (1.1), every person who collects an amount as or on account of tax under Division II is deemed, for all purposes and despite any security interest in the amount, to hold the amount in trust for Her Majesty in right of Canada, separate and apart from the property of the person and from property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, until the amount is remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn under subsection (2).

**(1.1) Amounts collected before bankruptcy** — Subsection (1) does not apply, at or after the time a person becomes a bankrupt (within the meaning of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*), to any amounts that, before that time, were collected or became collectible by the person as or on account of tax under Division II.

...

**(3) Extension of trust** — Despite any other provision of this Act (except subsection (4)), any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*), any enactment of a province or any other law, if at any time an amount deemed by subsection (1) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn in the manner and at the time provided under this Part, property of the person and property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust, is deemed

(a) to be held, from the time the amount was collected by the person, in trust for Her Majesty, separate and apart from the property of the person, whether or not the property is subject to a security interest, and

(b) to form no part of the estate or property of the person from the time the amount was collected, whether or not the property has in fact been kept separate and apart from the estate or property of the person and whether or not the property is subject to a security interest

and is property beneficially owned by Her Majesty in right of Canada despite any security interest in the property or in the proceeds thereof and the proceeds of the property shall be paid to the Receiver General in priority to all security interests.

*Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 (as at December 13, 2007)*

**67. (1) Property of bankrupt** — The property of a bankrupt divisible among his creditors shall not comprise

- (a) property held by the bankrupt in trust for any other person,
- (b) any property that as against the bankrupt is exempt from execution or seizure under any laws applicable in the province within which the property is situated and within which the bankrupt resides, or
- (b.1) such goods and services tax credit payments and prescribed payments relating to the essential needs of an individual as are made in prescribed circumstances and are not property referred to in paragraph (a) or (b),

but it shall comprise

- (c) all property wherever situated of the bankrupt at the date of his bankruptcy or that may be acquired by or devolve on him before his discharge, and
- (d) such powers in or over or in respect of the property as might have been exercised by the bankrupt for his own benefit.

**(2) Deemed trusts** — Subject to subsection (3), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a bankrupt shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty for the purpose of paragraph (1)(a) unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

**(3) Exceptions** — Subsection (2) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act* (each of which is in this subsection referred to as a "federal provision") nor in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under any law of a province that creates a deemed trust the sole purpose of which is to ensure remittance to Her Majesty in right of the province of amounts deducted or withheld under a law of the province where

- (a) that law of the province imposes a tax similar in nature to the tax imposed under the *Income Tax Act* and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as the amounts referred to in subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, or
- (b) the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan*, that law of the province establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection and the amounts deducted or

withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as amounts referred to in subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan*,

and for the purpose of this subsection, any provision of a law of a province that creates a deemed trust is, notwithstanding any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as the corresponding federal provision.

**86. (1) Status of Crown claims** — In relation to a bankruptcy or proposal, all provable claims, including secured claims, of Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province or of any body under an Act respecting workers' compensation, in this section and in section 87 called a "workers' compensation body", rank as unsecured claims.

...

**(3) Exceptions** — Subsection (1) does not affect the operation of

(a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*;

(b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts; or

(c) any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

and for the purpose of paragraph (c), the provision of provincial legislation is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(i), or as subsection 23(2) of the *Canada Pension Plan*

in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(ii), and in respect of any related interest, penalties or other amounts.

## Footnotes

- 1 Section 11 was amended, effective September 18, 2009, and now states:  
11. Despite anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, if an application is made under this Act in respect of a debtor company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.
- 2 The amendments did not come into force until September 18, 2009.

**TAB 17**

**Most Negative Treatment:** Recently added (treatment not yet designated)

**Most Recent Recently added (treatment not yet designated):** Lydian International Limited (Re) | 2019 ONSC 7473, 2019 CarswellOnt 21645 | (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List], Dec 23, 2019)

2015 ONSC 303  
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Target Canada Co., Re

2015 CarswellOnt 620, 2015 ONSC 303, [2015] O.J.  
No. 247, 22 C.B.R. (6th) 323, 248 A.C.W.S. (3d) 753

**In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors  
Arrangement Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36, as Amended**

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Target Canada Co., Target Canada Health Co., Target Canada Mobile GP Co., Target Canada Pharmacy (BC) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (Ontario) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (SK) Corp., and Target Canada Property LLC.

Morawetz R.S.J.

Heard: January 15, 2015

Judgment: January 16, 2015

Docket: CV-15-10832-00CL

Counsel: Tracy Sandler, Jeremy Dacks for Applicants, Target Canada Co., Target Canada Health Co., Target Canada Mobile GP Co., Target Canada Pharmacy (BC) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (Ontario) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (SK) Corp., and Target Canada Property LLC

Jay Swartz for Target Corporation

Alan Mark, Melaney Wagner, Jesse Mighton for Proposed Monitor, Alvarez and Marsal Canada ULC ("Alvarez")

Terry O'Sullivan for Honourable J. Ground, Trustee of the Proposed Employee Trust

Susan Philpott for Proposed Employee Representative Counsel, for Employees of the Applicants

**Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency

XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

XIX.2 Initial application

XIX.2.e Proceedings subject to stay

## XIX.2.e.vi Miscellaneous

Bankruptcy and insolvency

XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

XIX.2 Initial application

XIX.2.h Miscellaneous

### **Headnote**

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Proceedings subject to stay — Miscellaneous

Applicant group of companies were involved in Canadian operations of U.S. retailer T Co. — Canadian operations suffered significant loss in every quarter — T Co. decided to stop funding Canadian operations — Applicants sought to wind down Canadian operations and applied for relief under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) — Application granted — Initial order granted — Stay of proceedings granted — Stay extended to certain limited partnerships, which were related to or carried on operations integral to applicants' business — Stay of proceedings extended to rights of third party tenants against landlords that arose out of insolvency — Stay extended to T Co. and its U.S. subsidiaries in relation to claims derivative of claims against Canadian operations.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Miscellaneous

Applicant group of companies were involved in Canadian operations of U.S. retailer T Co. — Canadian operations suffered significant loss in every quarter — T Co. decided to stop funding Canadian operations — Applicants sought to wind down Canadian operations and applied for relief under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) — Application granted — Initial order granted — Stay of proceedings granted — It was appropriate to grant broad relief to ensure status quo was maintained — Applicants were all insolvent — Although there was no prospect restructured "going concern" solution would result, use of CCAA protection was appropriate in circumstances — Creation of employee trust to cover payments to employees was approved — Key employee retention program (KERP) and charge as security for KERP payments were approved — Appointment of Employee Representative Counsel was approved — DIP Lenders' Charge and DIP Facility were approved — Administration charge and Directors' and Officers' charge approved.

### **Table of Authorities**

#### **Cases considered by *Morawetz R.S.J.*:**

*Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re* (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 6184, 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

*Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re* (2010), 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115, 2010 CarswellOnt 212, 2010 ONSC 222 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

*Grant Forest Products Inc., Re* (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4699, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 128 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

*Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

*Nortel Networks Corp., Re* (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 1330 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

*Nortel Networks Corp., Re* (2009), 53 C.B.R. (5th) 196, 75 C.C.P.B. 206, 2009 CarswellOnt 3028 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

*Priszm Income Fund, Re* (2011), 2011 ONSC 2061, 2011 CarswellOnt 2258, 75 C.B.R. (5th) 213 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered

*Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)* (2002), 287 N.R. 203, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, 2002 CSC 41 (S.C.C.) — followed  
*Stelco Inc., Re* (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299, [2004] O.T.C. 284, 2004 CarswellOnt 1211 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

*Stelco Inc., Re* (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 2936 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

*Stelco Inc., Re* (2004), 338 N.R. 196 (note), 2004 CarswellOnt 5200, 2004 CarswellOnt 5201 (S.C.C.) — referred to

*T. Eaton Co., Re* (1997), 1997 CarswellOnt 1914, 46 C.B.R. (3d) 293 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — considered

*Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re* (2010), (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. Canada (A.G.)*) [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada*) 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada*) 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re*) 503 W.A.C. 1, (sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re*) 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 2010 SCC 60, 2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 CarswellBC 3420, 409 N.R. 201, (sub nom. *Ted LeRoy Trucking Ltd., Re*) 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383 (S.C.C.) — considered

*U.S. Steel Canada Inc., Re* (2014), 2014 ONSC 6145, 2014 CarswellOnt 16465 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered

#### **Statutes considered:**

*Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

s. 2 "insolvent person" — considered

*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 11 — considered

s. 11.02 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.02(1) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.2 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.2(4) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.7(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.51 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 36 — considered

**Rules considered:**

*Rules of Civil Procedure*, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194

Generally — referred to

**Words and phrases considered:**

**insolvent**

"Insolvent" is not expressly defined in the [*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (CCAA)]. However, for the purposes of the CCAA, a debtor is insolvent if it meets the definition of an "insolvent person" in section 2 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* . . . or if it is "insolvent" as described in *Stelco Inc. (Re)*, [2004] O.J. No. 1257, [Stelco], leave to appeal refused, [2004] O.J. No. 1903, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 336, where Farley, J. found that "insolvency" includes a corporation "reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within [a] reasonable proximity of time as compared with the time reasonably required to implement a restructuring".

***Morawetz R.S.J.:***

1 Target Canada Co. ("TCC") and the other applicants listed above (the "Applicants") seek relief under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36, as amended (the "CCAA"). While the limited partnerships listed in Schedule "A" to the draft Order (the "Partnerships") are not applicants in this proceeding, the Applicants seek to have a stay of proceedings and other benefits of an initial order under the CCAA extended to the Partnerships, which are related to or carry on operations that are integral to the business of the Applicants.

2 TCC is a large Canadian retailer. It is the Canadian operating subsidiary of Target Corporation, one of the largest retailers in the United States. The other Applicants are either corporations or partners of the Partnerships formed to carry on specific aspects of TCC's Canadian retail business (such as the Canadian pharmacy operations) or finance leasehold improvements in leased Canadian stores operated by TCC. The Applicants, therefore, do not represent the entire Target enterprise; the Applicants consist solely of entities that are integral to the Canadian retail operations. Together, they are referred as the "Target Canada Entities".

3 In early 2011, Target Corporation determined to expand its retail operations into Canada, undertaking a significant investment (in the form of both debt and equity) in TCC and certain of its affiliates in order to permit TCC to establish and operate Canadian retail stores. As of today, TCC operates 133 stores, with at least one store in every province of Canada. All but three of these stores are leased.

4 Due to a number of factors, the expansion into Canada has proven to be substantially less successful than expected. Canadian operations have shown significant losses in every quarter since stores opened. Projections demonstrate little or no prospect of improvement within a reasonable time.

5 After exploring multiple solutions over a number of months and engaging in extensive consultations with its professional advisors, Target Corporation concluded that, in the interest of all of its stakeholders, the responsible course of action is to cease funding the Canadian operations.

6 Without ongoing investment from Target Corporation, TCC and the other Target Canada Entities cannot continue to operate and are clearly insolvent. Due to the magnitude and complexity of the operations of the Target Canada Entities, the Applicants are seeking a stay of proceedings under the CCAA in order to accomplish a fair, orderly and controlled wind-down of their operations. The Target Canada Entities have indicated that they intend to treat all of their stakeholders as fairly and equitably as the circumstances allow, particularly the approximately 17,600 employees of the Target Canada Entities.

7 The Applicants are of the view that an orderly wind-down under Court supervision, with the benefit of inherent jurisdiction of the CCAA, and the oversight of the proposed monitor, provides a framework in which the Target Canada Entities can, among other things:

- a) Pursue initiatives such as the sale of real estate portfolios and the sale of inventory;
- b) Develop and implement support mechanisms for employees as vulnerable stakeholders affected by the wind-down, particularly (i) an employee trust (the "Employee Trust") funded by Target Corporation; (ii) an employee representative counsel to safeguard employee interests; and (iii) a key employee retention plan (the "KERP") to provide essential employees who agree to continue their employment and to contribute their services and expertise to the Target Canada Entities during the orderly wind-down;
- c) Create a level playing field to ensure that all affected stakeholders are treated as fairly and equitably as the circumstances allow; and
- d) Avoid the significant maneuvering among creditors and other stakeholders that could be detrimental to all stakeholders, in the absence of a court-supervised proceeding.

8 The Applicants are of the view that these factors are entirely consistent with the well-established purpose of a CCAA stay: to give a debtor the "breathing room" required to restructure with a view to maximizing recoveries, whether the restructuring takes place as a going concern or as an orderly liquidation or wind-down.

9 TCC is an indirect, wholly-owned subsidiary of Target Corporation and is the operating company through which the Canadian retail operations are carried out. TCC is a Nova Scotia unlimited liability company. It is directly owned by Nicollet Enterprise 1 S. à r.l. ("NE1"), an entity organized under the laws of Luxembourg. Target Corporation (which is incorporated under the laws of the State of Minnesota) owns NE1 through several other entities.

10 TCC operates from a corporate headquarters in Mississauga, Ontario. As of January 12, 2015, TCC employed approximately 17,600 people, almost all of whom work in Canada. TCC's employees are not represented by a union, and there is no registered pension plan for employees.

11 The other Target Canada Entities are all either: (i) direct or indirect subsidiaries of TCC with responsibilities for specific aspects of the Canadian retail operation; or (ii) affiliates of TCC that have been involved in the financing of certain leasehold improvements.

12 A typical TCC store has a footprint in the range of 80,000 to 125,000 total retail square feet and is located in a shopping mall or large strip mall. TCC is usually the anchor tenant. Each TCC store typically contains an in-store Target brand pharmacy, Target Mobile kiosk and a Starbucks café. Each store typically employs approximately 100 - 150 people, described as "Team Members" and "Team Leaders", with a total of approximately 16,700 employed at the "store level" of TCC's retail operations.

13 TCC owns three distribution centres (two in Ontario and one in Alberta) to support its retail operations. These centres are operated by a third party service provider. TCC also leases a variety of warehouse and office spaces.

14 In every quarter since TCC opened its first store, TCC has faced lower than expected sales and greater than expected losses. As reported in Target Corporation's Consolidated Financial Statements, the Canadian segment of the Target business has suffered a significant loss in every quarter since TCC opened stores in Canada.

15 TCC is completely operationally funded by its ultimate parent, Target Corporation, and related entities. It is projected that TCC's cumulative pre-tax losses from the date of its entry into the Canadian market to the end of the 2014 fiscal year (ending January 31, 2015) will be more than \$2.5 billion. In his affidavit, Mr. Mark Wong, General Counsel and Secretary of TCC, states that this is more than triple the loss originally expected for this period. Further, if TCC's operations are

not wound down, it is projected that they would remain unprofitable for at least 5 years and would require significant and continued funding from Target Corporation during that period.

16 TCC attributes its failure to achieve expected profitability to a number of principal factors, including: issues of scale; supply chain difficulties; pricing and product mix issues; and the absence of a Canadian online retail presence.

17 Following a detailed review of TCC's operations, the Board of Directors of Target Corporation decided that it is in the best interests of the business of Target Corporation and its subsidiaries to discontinue Canadian operations.

18 Based on the stand-alone financial statements prepared for TCC as of November 1, 2014 (which consolidated financial results of TCC and its subsidiaries), TCC had total assets of approximately \$5.408 billion and total liabilities of approximately \$5.118 billion. Mr. Wong states that this does not reflect a significant impairment charge that will likely be incurred at fiscal year end due to TCC's financial situation.

19 Mr. Wong states that TCC's operational funding is provided by Target Corporation. As of November 1, 2014, NE1 (TCC's direct parent) had provided equity capital to TCC in the amount of approximately \$2.5 billion. As a result of continuing and significant losses in TCC's operations, NE1 has been required to make an additional equity investment of \$62 million since November 1, 2014.

20 NE1 has also lent funds to TCC under a Loan Facility with a maximum amount of \$4 billion. TCC owed NE1 approximately \$3.1 billion under this Facility as of January 2, 2015. The Loan Facility is unsecured. On January 14, 2015, NE1 agreed to subordinate all amounts owing by TCC to NE1 under this Loan Facility to payment in full of proven claims against TCC.

21 As at November 1, 2014, Target Canada Property LLC ("TCC Propco") had assets of approximately \$1.632 billion and total liabilities of approximately \$1.643 billion. Mr. Wong states that this does not reflect a significant impairment charge that will likely be incurred at fiscal year end due to TCC Propco's financial situation. TCC Propco has also borrowed approximately \$1.5 billion from Target Canada Property LP and TCC Propco also owes U.S. \$89 million to Target Corporation under a Demand Promissory Note.

22 TCC has subleased almost all the retail store leases to TCC Propco, which then made real estate improvements and sub-sub leased the properties back to TCC. Under this arrangement, upon termination of any of these sub-leases, a "make whole" payment becomes owing from TCC to TCC Propco.

23 Mr. Wong states that without further funding and financial support from Target Corporation, the Target Canada Entities are unable to meet their liabilities as they become due, including TCC's

next payroll (due January 16, 2015). The Target Canada Entities, therefore state that they are insolvent.

24 Mr. Wong also states that given the size and complexity of TCC's operations and the numerous stakeholders involved in the business, including employees, suppliers, landlords, franchisees and others, the Target Canada Entities have determined that a controlled wind-down of their operations and liquidation under the protection of the CCAA, under Court supervision and with the assistance of the proposed monitor, is the only practical method available to ensure a fair and orderly process for all stakeholders. Further, Mr. Wong states that TCC and Target Corporation seek to benefit from the framework and the flexibility provided by the CCAA in effecting a controlled and orderly wind-down of the Canadian operations, in a manner that treats stakeholders as fairly and as equitably as the circumstances allow.

25 On this initial hearing, the issues are as follows:

- a) Does this court have jurisdiction to grant the CCAA relief requested?
  - a) Should the stay be extended to the Partnerships?
  - b) Should the stay be extended to "Co-tenants" and rights of third party tenants?
  - c) Should the stay extend to Target Corporation and its U.S. subsidiaries in relation to claims that are derivative of claims against the Target Canada Entities?
  - d) Should the Court approve protections for employees?
  - e) Is it appropriate to allow payment of certain pre-filing amounts?
  - f) Does this court have the jurisdiction to authorize pre-filing claims to "critical" suppliers;
  - g) Should the court should exercise its discretion to authorize the Applicants to seek proposals from liquidators and approve the financial advisor and real estate advisor engagement?
  - h) Should the court exercise its discretion to approve the Court-ordered charges?

26 "Insolvent" is not expressly defined in the CCAA. However, for the purposes of the CCAA, a debtor is insolvent if it meets the definition of an "insolvent person" in section 2 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C., 1985, c. B-3 ("BIA") or if it is "insolvent" as described in *Stelco Inc., Re*, [2004] O.J. No. 1257 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), [*Stelco*], leave to appeal refused, [2004] O.J. No. 1903 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 336 (S.C.C.), where Farley, J. found that "insolvency" includes a corporation "reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within [a] reasonable proximity of time as compared with the time reasonably required to

implement a restructuring" (at para 26). The decision of Farley, J. in *Stelco* was followed in *Priszm Income Fund, Re*, [2011] O.J. No. 1491 (Ont. S.C.J.), 2011 and *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*, [2009] O.J. No. 4286 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) [*Canwest*].

27 Having reviewed the record and hearing submissions, I am satisfied that the Target Canada Entities are all insolvent and are debtor companies to which the CCAA applies, either by reference to the definition of "insolvent person" under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (the "BIA") or under the test developed by Farley J. in *Stelco*.

28 I also accept the submission of counsel to the Applicants that without the continued financial support of Target Corporation, the Target Canada Entities face too many legal and business impediments and too much uncertainty to wind-down their operations without the "breathing space" afforded by a stay of proceedings or other available relief under the CCAA.

29 I am also satisfied that this Court has jurisdiction over the proceeding. Section 9(1) of the CCAA provides that an application may be made to the court that has jurisdiction in (a) the province in which the head office or chief place of business of the company in Canada is situated; or (b) any province in which the company's assets are situated, if there is no place of business in Canada.

30 In this case, the head office and corporate headquarters of TCC is located in Mississauga, Ontario, where approximately 800 employees work. Moreover, the chief place of business of the Target Canada Entities is Ontario. A number of office locations are in Ontario; 2 of TCC's 3 primary distribution centres are located in Ontario; 55 of the TCC retail stores operate in Ontario; and almost half the employees that support TCC's operations work in Ontario.

31 The Target Canada Entities state that the purpose for seeking the proposed initial order in these proceedings is to effect a fair, controlled and orderly wind-down of their Canadian retail business with a view to developing a plan of compromise or arrangement to present to their creditors as part of these proceedings. I accept the submissions of counsel to the Applicants that although there is no prospect that a restructured "going concern" solution involving the Target Canada Entities will result, the use of the protections and flexibility afforded by the CCAA is entirely appropriate in these circumstances. In arriving at this conclusion, I have noted the comments of the Supreme Court of Canada in *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re*, 2010 SCC 60 (S.C.C.) ("*Century Services*") that "courts frequently observe that the CCAA is skeletal in nature", and does not "contain a comprehensive code that lays out all that is permitted or barred". The flexibility of the CCAA, particularly in the context of large and complex restructurings, allows for innovation and creativity, in contrast to the more "rules-based" approach of the BIA.

32 Prior to the 2009 amendments to the CCAA, Canadian courts accepted that, in appropriate circumstances, debtor companies were entitled to seek the protection of the CCAA where the

outcome was not going to be a going concern restructuring, but instead, a "liquidation" or wind-down of the debtor companies' assets or business.

33 The 2009 amendments did not expressly address whether the CCAA could be used generally to wind-down the business of a debtor company. However, I am satisfied that the enactment of section 36 of the CCAA, which establishes a process for a debtor company to sell assets outside the ordinary course of business while under CCAA protection, is consistent with the principle that the CCAA can be a vehicle to downsize or wind-down a debtor company's business.

34 In this case, the sheer magnitude and complexity of the Target Canada Entities business, including the number of stakeholders whose interests are affected, are, in my view, suited to the flexible framework and scope for innovation offered by this "skeletal" legislation.

35 The required audited financial statements are contained in the record.

36 The required cash flow statements are contained in the record.

37 Pursuant to s. 11.02 of the CCAA, the court may make an order staying proceedings, restraining further proceedings, or prohibiting the commencement of proceedings, "on any terms that it may impose" and "effective for the period that the court considers necessary" provided the stay is no longer than 30 days. The Target Canada Entities, in this case, seek a stay of proceedings up to and including February 13, 2015.

38 Certain of the corporate Target Canada Entities (TCC, TCC Health and TCC Mobile) act as general or limited partners in the partnerships. The Applicants submit that it is appropriate to extend the stay of proceedings to the Partnerships on the basis that each performs key functions in relation to the Target Canada Entities' businesses.

39 The Applicants also seek to extend the stay to Target Canada Property LP which was formerly the sub-leasee/sub-sub lessor under the sub-sub lease back arrangement entered into by TCC to finance the leasehold improvements in its leased stores. The Applicants contend that the extension of the stay to Target Canada Property LP is necessary in order to safeguard it against any residual claims that may be asserted against it as a result of TCC Propco's insolvency and filing under the CCAA.

40 I am satisfied that it is appropriate that an initial order extending the protection of a CCAA stay of proceedings under section 11.02(1) of the CCAA should be granted.

41 Pursuant to section 11.7(1) of the CCAA, Alvarez & Marsal Inc. is appointed as Monitor.

42 It is well established that the court has the jurisdiction to extend the protection of the stay of proceedings to Partnerships in order to ensure that the purposes of the CCAA can be achieved (see: *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]));

*Prizm Income Fund, Re*, 2011 ONSC 2061 (Ont. S.C.J.); *Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re*, 2010 ONSC 222 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) ("*Canwest Publishing*") and *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*, 2009 CarswellOnt 6184 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) ("*Canwest Global*").

43 In these circumstances, I am also satisfied that it is appropriate to extend the stay to the Partnerships as requested.

44 The Applicants also seek landlord protection in relation to third party tenants. Many retail leases of non-anchored tenants provide that tenants have certain rights against their landlords if the anchor tenant in a particular shopping mall or centre becomes insolvent or ceases operations. In order to alleviate the prejudice to TCC's landlords if any such non-anchored tenants attempt to exercise these rights, the Applicants request an extension of the stay of proceedings (the "Co-Tenancy Stay") to all rights of these third party tenants against the landlords that arise out of the insolvency of the Target Canada Entities or as a result of any steps taken by the Target Canada Entities pursuant to the Initial Order.

45 The Applicants contend that the authority to grant the Co-Tenancy Stay derives from the broad jurisdiction under sections 11 and 11.02(1) of the CCAA to make an initial order on any terms that the court may impose. Counsel references *T. Eaton Co., Re*, 1997 CarswellOnt 1914 (Ont. Gen. Div.) as a precedent where a stay of proceedings of the same nature as the Co-Tenancy Stay was granted by the court in Eaton's second CCAA proceeding. The Court noted that, if tenants were permitted to exercise these "co-tenancy" rights during the stay, the claims of the landlord against the debtor company would greatly increase, with a potentially detrimental impact on the restructuring efforts of the debtor company.

46 In these proceedings, the Target Canada Entities propose, as part of the orderly wind-down of their businesses, to engage a financial advisor and a real estate advisor with a view to implementing a sales process for some or all of its real estate portfolio. The Applicants submit that it is premature to determine whether this process will be successful, whether any leases will be conveyed to third party purchasers for value and whether the Target Canada Entities can successfully develop and implement a plan that their stakeholders, including their landlords, will accept. The Applicants further contend that while this process is being resolved and the orderly wind-down is underway, the Co-Tenancy Stay is required to postpone the contractual rights of these tenants for a finite period. The Applicants contend that any prejudice to the third party tenants' clients is significantly outweighed by the benefits of the Co-Tenancy Stay to all of the stakeholders of the Target Canada Entities during the wind-down period.

47 The Applicants therefore submit that it is both necessary and appropriate to grant the Co-Tenancy Stay in these circumstances.

48 I am satisfied the Court has the jurisdiction to grant such a stay. In my view, it is appropriate to preserve the status quo at this time. To the extent that the affected parties wish to challenge the broad nature of this stay, the same can be addressed at the "comeback hearing".

49 The Applicants also request that the benefit of the stay of proceedings be extended (subject to certain exceptions related to the cash management system) to Target Corporation and its U.S. subsidiaries in relation to claims against these entities that are derivative of the primary liability of the Target Canada Entities.

50 I am satisfied that the Court has the jurisdiction to grant such a stay. In my view, it is appropriate to preserve the status quo at this time and the stay is granted, again, subject to the proviso that affected parties can challenge the broad nature of the stay at a comeback hearing directed to this issue.

51 With respect to the protection of employees, it is noted that TCC employs approximately 17,600 individuals.

52 Mr. Wong contends that TCC and Target Corporation have always considered their employees to be integral to the Target brand and business. However, the orderly wind-down of the Target Canada Entities' business means that the vast majority of TCC employees will receive a notice immediately after the CCAA filing that their employment is to be terminated as part of the wind-down process.

53 In order to provide a measure of financial security during the orderly wind-down and to diminish financial hardship that TCC employees may suffer, Target Corporation has agreed to fund an Employee Trust to a maximum of \$70 million.

54 The Applicants seek court approval of the Employee Trust which provides for payment to eligible employees of certain amounts, such as the balance of working notice following termination. Counsel contends that the Employee Trust was developed in consultation with the proposed monitor, who is the administrator of the trust, and is supported by the proposed Representative Counsel. The proposed trustee is The Honourable J. Ground. The Employee Trust is exclusively funded by Target Corporation and the costs associated with administering the Employee Trust will be borne by the Employee Trust, not the estate of Target Canada Entities. Target Corporation has agreed not to seek to recover from the Target Canada Entities estates any amounts paid out to employee beneficiaries under the Employee Trust.

55 In my view, it is questionable as to whether court authorization is required to implement the provisions of the Employee Trust. It is the third party, Target Corporation, that is funding the expenses for the Employee Trust and not one of the debtor Applicants. However, I do recognize that the implementation of the Employee Trust is intertwined with this proceeding and is beneficial

to the employees of the Applicants. To the extent that Target Corporation requires a court order authorizing the implementation of the employee trust, the same is granted.

56 The Applicants seek the approval of a KERP and the granting of a court ordered charge up to the aggregate amount of \$6.5 million as security for payments under the KERP. It is proposed that the KERP Charge will rank after the Administration Charge but before the Directors' Charge.

57 The approval of a KERP and related KERP Charge is in the discretion of the Court. KERPs have been approved in numerous CCAA proceedings, including *Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, 2009 CarswellOnt 1330 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) [*Nortel Networks (KERP)*], and *Grant Forest Products Inc., Re*, 2009 CarswellOnt 4699 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]). In *U.S. Steel Canada Inc., Re*, 2014 ONSC 6145 (Ont. S.C.J.), I recently approved the KERP for employees whose continued services were critical to the stability of the business and for the implementation of the marketing process and whose services could not easily be replaced due, in part, to the significant integration between the debtor company and its U.S. parent.

58 In this case, the KERP was developed by the Target Canada Entities in consultation with the proposed monitor. The proposed KERP and KERP Charge benefits between 21 and 26 key management employees and approximately 520 store-level management employees.

59 Having reviewed the record, I am of the view that it is appropriate to approve the KERP and the KERP Charge. In arriving at this conclusion, I have taken into account the submissions of counsel to the Applicants as to the importance of having stability among the key employees in the liquidation process that lies ahead.

60 The Applicants also request the Court to appoint Koskie Minsky LLP as employee representative counsel (the "Employee Representative Counsel"), with Ms. Susan Philpott acting as senior counsel. The Applicants contend that the Employee Representative Counsel will ensure that employee interests are adequately protected throughout the proceeding, including by assisting with the Employee Trust. The Applicants contend that at this stage of the proceeding, the employees have a common interest in the CCAA proceedings and there appears to be no material conflict existing between individual or groups of employees. Moreover, employees will be entitled to opt out, if desired.

61 I am satisfied that section 11 of the CCAA and the *Rules of Civil Procedure* confer broad jurisdiction on the court to appoint Representative Counsel for vulnerable stakeholder groups such as employee or investors (see *Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, 2009 CarswellOnt 3028 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) (*Nortel Networks Representative Counsel*)). In my view, it is appropriate to approve the appointment of Employee Representative Counsel and to provide for the payment of fees for such counsel by the Applicants. In arriving at this conclusion, I have taken into account:

- (i) the vulnerability and resources of the groups sought to be represented;

- (ii) the social benefit to be derived from the representation of the groups;
- (iii) the avoidance of multiplicity of legal retainers; and
- (iv) the balance of convenience and whether it is fair and just to creditors of the estate.

62 The Applicants also seek authorization, if necessary, and with the consent of the Monitor, to make payments for pre-filing amounts owing and arrears to certain critical third parties that provide services integral to TCC's ability to operate during and implement its controlled and orderly wind-down process.

63 Although the objective of the CCAA is to maintain the status quo while an insolvent company attempts to negotiate a plan of arrangement with its creditors, the courts have expressly acknowledged that preservation of the status quo does not necessarily entail the preservation of the relative pre-stay debt status of each creditor.

64 The Target Canada Entities seek authorization to pay pre-filing amounts to certain specific categories of suppliers, if necessary and with the consent of the Monitor. These include:

- a) Logistics and supply chain providers;
- b) Providers of credit, debt and gift card processing related services; and
- c) Other suppliers up to a maximum aggregate amount of \$10 million, if, in the opinion of the Target Canada Entities, the supplier is critical to the orderly wind-down of the business.

65 In my view, having reviewed the record, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant this requested relief in respect of critical suppliers.

66 In order to maximize recovery for all stakeholders, TCC indicates that it intends to liquidate its inventory and attempt to sell the real estate portfolio, either en bloc, in groups, or on an individual property basis. The Applicants therefore seek authorization to solicit proposals from liquidators with a view to entering into an agreement for the liquidation of the Target Canada Entities inventory in a liquidation process.

67 TCC's liquidity position continues to deteriorate. According to Mr. Wong, TCC and its subsidiaries have an immediate need for funding in order to satisfy obligations that are coming due, including payroll obligations that are due on January 16, 2015. Mr. Wong states that Target Corporation and its subsidiaries are no longer willing to provide continued funding to TCC and its subsidiaries outside of a CCAA proceeding. Target Corporation (the "DIP Lender") has agreed to provide TCC and its subsidiaries (collectively, the "Borrower") with an interim financing facility (the "DIP Facility") on terms advantageous to the Applicants in the form of a revolving credit

facility in an amount up to U.S. \$175 million. Counsel points out that no fees are payable under the DIP Facility and interest is to be charged at what they consider to be the favourable rate of 5%. Mr. Wong also states that it is anticipated that the amount of the DIP Facility will be sufficient to accommodate the anticipated liquidity requirements of the Borrower during the orderly wind-down process.

68 The DIP Facility is to be secured by a security interest on all of the real and personal property owned, leased or hereafter acquired by the Borrower. The Applicants request a court-ordered charge on the property of the Borrower to secure the amount actually borrowed under the DIP Facility (the "DIP Lenders Charge"). The DIP Lenders Charge will rank in priority to all unsecured claims, but subordinate to the Administration Charge, the KERP Charge and the Directors' Charge.

69 The authority to grant an interim financing charge is set out at section 11.2 of the CCAA. Section 11.2(4) sets out certain factors to be considered by the court in deciding whether to grant the DIP Financing Charge.

70 The Target Canada Entities did not seek alternative DIP Financing proposals based on their belief that the DIP Facility was being offered on more favourable terms than any other potentially available third party financing. The Target Canada Entities are of the view that the DIP Facility is in the best interests of the Target Canada Entities and their stakeholders. I accept this submission and grant the relief as requested.

71 Accordingly, the DIP Lenders' Charge is granted in the amount up to U.S. \$175 million and the DIP Facility is approved.

72 Section 11 of the CCAA provides the court with the authority to allow the debtor company to enter into arrangements to facilitate a restructuring under the CCAA. The Target Canada Entities wish to retain Lazard and Northwest to assist them during the CCAA proceeding. Both the Target Canada Entities and the Monitor believe that the quantum and nature of the remuneration to be paid to Lazard and Northwest is fair and reasonable. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to approve the engagement of Lazard and Northwest.

73 With respect to the Administration Charge, the Applicants are requesting that the Monitor, along with its counsel, counsel to the Target Canada Entities, independent counsel to the Directors, the Employee Representative Counsel, Lazard and Northwest be protected by a court ordered charge and all the property of the Target Canada Entities up to a maximum amount of \$6.75 million as security for their respective fees and disbursements (the "Administration Charge"). Certain fees that may be payable to Lazard are proposed to be protected by a Financial Advisor Subordinated Charge.

74 In *Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re*, 2010 ONSC 222 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), Pepall J. (as she then was) provided a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered in approving an administration charge, including:

- a. The size and complexity of the business being restructured;
- b. The proposed role of the beneficiaries of the charge;
- c. Whether there is an unwarranted duplication of roles;
- d. Whether the quantum of the proposed Charge appears to be fair and reasonable;
- e. The position of the secured creditors likely to be affected by the Charge; and
- f. The position of the Monitor.

75 Having reviewed the record, I am satisfied, that it is appropriate to approve the Administration Charge and the Financial Advisor Subordinated Charge.

76 The Applicants seek a Directors' and Officers' charge in the amount of up to \$64 million. The Directors Charge is proposed to be secured by the property of the Target Canada Entities and to rank behind the Administration Charge and the KERP Charge, but ahead of the DIP Lenders' Charge.

77 Pursuant to section 11.51 of the CCAA, the court has specific authority to grant a "super priority" charge to the directors and officers of a company as security for the indemnity provided by the company in respect of certain obligations.

78 I accept the submissions of counsel to the Applicants that the requested Directors' Charge is reasonable given the nature of the Target Canada Entities retail business, the number of employees in Canada and the corresponding potential exposure of the directors and officers to personal liability. Accordingly, the Directors' Charge is granted.

79 In the result, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant the Initial Order in these proceedings.

80 The stay of proceedings is in effect until February 13, 2015.

81 A comeback hearing is to be scheduled on or prior to February 13, 2015. I recognize that there are many aspects of the Initial Order that go beyond the usual first day provisions. I have determined that it is appropriate to grant this broad relief at this time so as to ensure that the status quo is maintained.

82 The comeback hearing is to be a "true" comeback hearing. In moving to set aside or vary any provisions of this order, moving parties do not have to overcome any onus of demonstrating that the order should be set aside or varied.

83 Finally, a copy of Lazard's engagement letter (the "Lazard Engagement Letter") is attached as Confidential Appendix "A" to the Monitor's pre-filing report. The Applicants request that the Lazard Engagement Letter be sealed, as the fee structure contemplated in the Lazard Engagement Letter could potentially influence the structure of bids received in the sales process.

84 Having considered the principles set out in *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)* (2002), 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.), I am satisfied that it is appropriate in the circumstances to seal Confidential Appendix "A" to the Monitor's pre-filing report.

85 The Initial Order has been signed in the form presented.

*Application granted.*

**IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES CREDITORS' ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED AND  
AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF CLOVER LEAF HOLDINGS  
COMPANY, CONNORS BROS. CLOVER LEAF SEAFOODS COMPANY, K.C.R. FISHERIES LTD., 6162410 CANADA  
LIMITED, CONNORS BROS. HOLDINGS COMPANY and CONNORS BROS. SEAFOODS COMPANY**

Court File No.: CV-19-631523-00CL

**ONTARIO  
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE  
(COMMERCIAL LIST)**

Proceedings commenced in Toronto

**APPLICANTS' BOOK OF AUTHORITIES**

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