

COURT FILE NUMBER           B301-163430

COURT                           COURT OF KING'S BENCH OF ALBERTA

JUDICIAL CENTRE           CALGARY

IN THE MATTER OF THE *BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY ACT*, RSC 1985, C B-3, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF THE NOTICE OF INTENTION TO MAKE A PROPOSAL OF CLEO ENERGY CORP.

APPLICANT                   CLEO ENERGY CORP.

DOCUMENT                   BOOK OF AUTHORITIES OF CLEO ENERGY CORP.

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File No.:       G10010664

**Attention:     Sam Gabor/ Tom Cumming**

## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

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1.	<a href="#"><u>Royal Bank of Canada v. Soundair Corp., 1991 CanLII 2727 (ON CA)</u></a>
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3.	<a href="#"><u>Re Komtech Inc., 2011 ONSC 3230</u></a>
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7.	<a href="#"><u>Pricewaterhousecoopers Inc. v 1905393 Alberta Ltd., 2019 ABCA 433</u></a>
8.	<a href="#"><u>Re Bloom Lake, 2015 QCCS 1920</u></a>
9.	<a href="#"><u>Re Heritage Flooring Ltd., 2004 NBQB 168</u></a>
10.	<a href="#"><u>Re Scotian Distribution Services Limited, 2020 NSSC 131</u></a>
11.	<a href="#"><u>Re T &amp; C Steel Ltd, 2022 SKKB 236</u></a>
12.	<a href="#"><u>Nautican v Dumont, 2020 PESC 15</u></a>
13.	<a href="#"><u>Baldwin Valley Investors Inc., Re, 1994 CarswellOnt 254</u></a>
14.	<a href="#"><u>Re Colossus Minerals, 2014 ONSC 514</u></a>
15.	<a href="#"><u>Sierra Club of Canada v Cafnada (Minister of Finance), 2002 SCC 41</u></a>
16.	<a href="#"><u>Sherman Estate v Donovan, 2021 SCC 25</u></a>
17.	<a href="#"><u>Orphan Well Association v Grant Thornton Ltd, 2019 SCC 5</u></a>
18.	<a href="#"><u>Alberta (Attorney General) v Moloney, 2015 SCC 51</u></a>



Tab

**1**

1991 CarswellOnt 205  
Ontario Court of Appeal

Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.

1991 CarswellOnt 205, [1991] O.J. No. 1137, 27 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1178,  
46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76

**ROYAL BANK OF CANADA (plaintiff/respondent) v. SOUNDAIR CORPORATION  
(respondent), CANADIAN PENSION CAPITAL LIMITED (appellant)  
and CANADIAN INSURERS' CAPITAL CORPORATION (appellant)**

Goodman, McKinlay and Galligan JJ.A.

Heard: June 11, 12, 13 and 14, 1991

Judgment: July 3, 1991

Docket: Doc. CA 318/91

Counsel: *J. B. Berkow* and *S. H. Goldman* , for appellants Canadian Pension Capital Limited and Canadian Insurers' Capital Corporation.

*J. T. Morin, Q.C.* , for Air Canada.

*L.A.J. Barnes* and *L.E. Ritchie* , for plaintiff/respondent Royal Bank of Canada.

*S.F. Dunphy* and *G.K. Ketcheson* , for Ernst & Young Inc., receiver of respondent Soundair Corporation.

*W.G. Horton* , for Ontario Express Limited.

*N.J. Spies* , for Frontier Air Limited.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

**Headnote**

Receivers --- Conduct and liability of receiver — General conduct of receiver

Court considering its position when approving sale recommended by receiver.

S Corp., which engaged in the air transport business, had a division known as AT. When S Corp. experienced financial difficulties, one of the secured creditors, who had an interest in the assets of AT, brought a motion for the appointment of a receiver. The receiver was ordered to operate AT and to sell it as a going concern. The receiver had two offers. It accepted the offer made by OEL and rejected an offer by 922 which contained an unacceptable condition. Subsequently, 922 obtained an order allowing it to make a second offer removing the condition. The secured creditors supported acceptance of the 922 offer. The court approved the sale to OEL and dismissed the motion to approve the 922 offer. An appeal was brought from this order.

**Held:**

The appeal was dismissed.

Per Galligan J.A.: When a court appoints a receiver to use its commercial expertise to sell an airline, it is inescapable that it intends to rely upon the receiver's expertise and not upon its own. The court should be reluctant to second-guess, with the benefit of hindsight, the considered business decisions made by its receiver.

The conduct of the receiver should be reviewed in the light of the specific mandate given to him by the court. The order appointing the receiver did not say how the receiver was to negotiate the sale. The order obviously intended, because of the unusual nature of the asset being sold, to leave the method of sale substantially to the discretion of the receiver.

To determine whether a receiver has acted providently, the conduct of the receiver should be examined in light of the information the receiver had when it agreed to accept an offer. On the date the receiver accepted the OEL offer, it had only two offers: that of OEL, which was acceptable, and that of 922, which contained an unacceptable condition. The decision made was a sound one in the circumstances. The receiver made a sufficient effort to obtain the best price, and did not act improvidently.

The court must exercise extreme caution before it interferes with the process adopted by a receiver to sell an unusual asset. It is important that prospective purchasers know that, if they are acting in good faith, bargain seriously with a receiver and enter into an agreement with it, a court will not lightly interfere with the commercial judgment of the receiver to sell the assets to them. Per McKinlay J.A. (concurring in the result): It is most important that the integrity of procedures followed by court-appointed receivers be protected in the interests of both commercial morality and the future confidence of business persons in their dealings with receivers. In all cases, the court should carefully scrutinize the procedure followed by the receiver. While the procedure carried out by the receiver in this case was appropriate, given the unfolding of events and the unique nature of the asset involved, it may not be a procedure that is likely to be appropriate in many receivership sales.

Per Goodman J.A. (dissenting): It was imprudent and unfair on the part of the receiver to ignore an offer from an interested party which offered approximately triple the cash down payment without giving a chance to the offeror to remove the conditions or other terms which made the offer unacceptable to the receiver. The offer accepted by the receiver was improvident and unfair insofar as two creditors were concerned.

Appeal from order approving sale of assets by receiver.

**Galligan J.A. :**

1 This is an appeal from the order of Rosenberg J. made on May 1, 1991. By that order, he approved the sale of Air Toronto to Ontario Express Limited and Frontier Air Limited, and he dismissed a motion to approve an offer to purchase Air Toronto by 922246 Ontario Limited.

2 It is necessary at the outset to give some background to the dispute. Soundair Corporation ("Soundair") is a corporation engaged in the air transport business. It has three divisions. One of them is Air Toronto. Air Toronto operates a scheduled airline from Toronto to a number of mid-sized cities in the United States of America. Its routes serve as feeders to several of Air Canada's routes. Pursuant to a connector agreement, Air Canada provides some services to Air Toronto and benefits from the feeder traffic provided by it. The operational relationship between Air Canada and Air Toronto is a close one.

3 In the latter part of 1989 and the early part of 1990, Soundair was in financial difficulty. Soundair has two secured creditors who have an interest in the assets of Air Toronto. The Royal Bank of Canada (the "Royal Bank") is owed at least \$65 million dollars. The appellants Canadian Pension Capital Limited and Canadian Insurers' Capital Corporation (collectively called "CCFL") are owed approximately \$9,500,000. Those creditors will have a deficiency expected to be in excess of \$50 million on the winding up of Soundair.

4 On April 26, 1990, upon the motion of the Royal Bank, O'Brien J. appointed Ernst & Young Inc. (the "receiver") as receiver of all of the assets, property and undertakings of Soundair. The order required the receiver to operate Air Toronto and sell it as a going concern. Because of the close relationship between Air Toronto and Air Canada, it was contemplated that the receiver would obtain the assistance of Air Canada to operate Air Toronto. The order authorized the receiver:

(b) to enter into contractual arrangements with Air Canada to retain a manager or operator, including Air Canada, to manage and operate Air Toronto under the supervision of Ernst & Young Inc. until the completion of the sale of Air Toronto to Air Canada or other person.

Also because of the close relationship, it was expected that Air Canada would purchase Air Toronto. To that end, the order of O'Brien J. authorized the Receiver:

(c) to negotiate and do all things necessary or desirable to complete a sale of Air Toronto to Air Canada and, if a sale to Air Canada cannot be completed, to negotiate and sell Air Toronto to another person, subject to terms and conditions approved by this Court.

5 Over a period of several weeks following that order, negotiations directed towards the sale of Air Toronto took place between the receiver and Air Canada. Air Canada had an agreement with the receiver that it would have exclusive negotiating rights during that period. I do not think it is necessary to review those negotiations, but I note that Air Canada had complete

access to all of the operations of Air Toronto and conducted due diligence examinations. It became thoroughly acquainted with every aspect of Air Toronto's operations.

6 Those negotiations came to an end when an offer made by Air Canada on June 19, 1990, was considered unsatisfactory by the receiver. The offer was not accepted and lapsed. Having regard to the tenor of Air Canada's negotiating stance and a letter sent by its solicitors on July 20, 1990, I think that the receiver was eminently reasonable when it decided that there was no realistic possibility of selling Air Toronto to Air Canada.

7 The receiver then looked elsewhere. Air Toronto's feeder business is very attractive, but it only has value to a national airline. The receiver concluded reasonably, therefore, that it was commercially necessary for one of Canada's two national airlines to be involved in any sale of Air Toronto. Realistically, there were only two possible purchasers, whether direct or indirect. They were Air Canada and Canadian Airlines International.

8 It was well known in the air transport industry that Air Toronto was for sale. During the months following the collapse of the negotiations with Air Canada, the receiver tried unsuccessfully to find viable purchasers. In late 1990, the receiver turned to Canadian Airlines International, the only realistic alternative. Negotiations began between them. Those negotiations led to a letter of intent dated February 11, 1990. On March 6, 1991, the receiver received an offer from Ontario Express Limited and Frontier Airlines Limited, who are subsidiaries of Canadian Airlines International. This offer is called the OEL offer.

9 In the meantime, Air Canada and CCFL were having discussions about making an offer for the purchase of Air Toronto. They formed 922246 Ontario Limited ("922") for the purpose of purchasing Air Toronto. On March 1, 1991, CCFL wrote to the receiver saying that it proposed to make an offer. On March 7, 1991, Air Canada and CCFL presented an offer to the receiver in the name of 922. For convenience, its offers are called the "922 offers."

10 The first 922 offer contained a condition which was unacceptable to the receiver. I will refer to that condition in more detail later. The receiver declined the 922 offer and on March 8, 1991, accepted the OEL offer. Subsequently, 922 obtained an order allowing it to make a second offer. It then submitted an offer which was virtually identical to that of March 7, 1991, except that the unacceptable condition had been removed.

11 The proceedings before Rosenberg J. then followed. He approved the sale to OEL and dismissed a motion for the acceptance of the 922 offer. Before Rosenberg J., and in this court, both CCFL and the Royal Bank supported the acceptance of the second 922 offer.

12 There are only two issues which must be resolved in this appeal. They are:

- (1) Did the receiver act properly when it entered into an agreement to sell Air Toronto to OEL?
- (2) What effect does the support of the 922 offer by the secured creditors have on the result?

13 I will deal with the two issues separately.

#### **1. Did the Receiver Act Properly in Agreeing to Sell to OEL?**

14 Before dealing with that issue, there are three general observations which I think I should make. The first is that the sale of an airline as a going concern is a very complex process. The best method of selling an airline at the best price is something far removed from the expertise of a court. When a court appoints a receiver to use its commercial expertise to sell an airline, it is inescapable that it intends to rely upon the receiver's expertise and not upon its own. Therefore, the court must place a great deal of confidence in the actions taken and in the opinions formed by the receiver. It should also assume that the receiver is acting properly unless the contrary is clearly shown. The second observation is that the court should be reluctant to second-guess, with the benefit of hindsight, the considered business decisions made by its receiver. The third observation which I wish to make is that the conduct of the receiver should be reviewed in the light of the specific mandate given to him by the court.

15 The order of O'Brien J. provided that if the receiver could not complete the sale to Air Canada that it was "to negotiate and sell Air Toronto to another person." The court did not say how the receiver was to negotiate the sale. It did not say it was to call for bids or conduct an auction. It told the receiver to negotiate and sell. It obviously intended, because of the unusual nature of the asset being sold, to leave the method of sale substantially in the discretion of the receiver. I think, therefore, that the court should not review minutely the process of the sale when, broadly speaking, it appears to the court to be a just process.

16 As did Rosenberg J., I adopt as correct the statement made by Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg* (1986), 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 320n, 22 C.P.C. (2d) 131, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526 (H.C.), at pp. 92-94 [O.R.], of the duties which a court must perform when deciding whether a receiver who has sold a property acted properly. When he set out the court's duties, he did not put them in any order of priority, nor do I. I summarize those duties as follows:

1. It should consider whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently.
2. It should consider the interests of all parties.
3. It should consider the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained.
4. It should consider whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

17 I intend to discuss the performance of those duties separately.

#### 1. Did the Receiver make a sufficient effort to get the best price and did it act providently?

18 Having regard to the fact that it was highly unlikely that a commercially viable sale could be made to anyone but the two national airlines, or to someone supported by either of them, it is my view that the receiver acted wisely and reasonably when it negotiated only with Air Canada and Canadian Airlines International. Furthermore, when Air Canada said that it would submit no further offers and gave the impression that it would not participate further in the receiver's efforts to sell, the only course reasonably open to the receiver was to negotiate with Canadian Airlines International. Realistically, there was nowhere else to go but to Canadian Airlines International. In doing so, it is my opinion that the receiver made sufficient efforts to sell the airline.


19 When the receiver got the OEL offer on March 6, 1991, it was over 10 months since it had been charged with the responsibility of selling Air Toronto. Until then, the receiver had not received one offer which it thought was acceptable. After substantial efforts to sell the airline over that period, I find it difficult to think that the receiver acted improvidently in accepting the only acceptable offer which it had.

20 On March 8, 1991, the date when the receiver accepted the OEL offer, it had only two offers, the OEL offer, which was acceptable, and the 922 offer, which contained an unacceptable condition. I cannot see how the receiver, assuming for the moment that the price was reasonable, could have done anything but accept the OEL offer.

21 When deciding whether a receiver had acted providently, the court should examine the conduct of the receiver in light of the information the receiver had when it agreed to accept an offer. In this case, the court should look at the receiver's conduct in the light of the information it had when it made its decision on March 8, 1991. The court should be very cautious before deciding that the receiver's conduct was improvident based upon information which has come to light after it made its decision. To do so, in my view, would derogate from the mandate to sell given to the receiver by the order of O'Brien J. I agree with and adopt what was said by Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, at p. 112 [O.R.]:

Its decision was made as a matter of business judgment *on the elements then available to it*. It is of the very essence of a receiver's function to make such judgments and in the making of them to act seriously and responsibly so as to be prepared to stand behind them.

If the court were to reject the recommendation of the Receiver in any but the most exceptional circumstances, it would materially diminish and weaken the role and function of the Receiver both in the perception of receivers and in the



Tab

**2**



Canada Federal Statutes  
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act  
Short Title

### KeyCite treatment

**Most Recently Cited in:** [Tiamat Resources Inc v. Procyon Resources Corp](#), 2021 ABQB 509, 2021 CarswellAlta 1615, 29 Alta. L.R. (7th) 239, 335 A.C.W.S. (3d) 245, 91 C.B.R. (6th) 259, [2021] A.W.L.D. 3771 | (Alta. Q.B., Jun 25, 2021)  
R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 1

## s 1. Short title

### Currency

#### 1.Short title

This Act may be cited as the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*.

#### Amendment History

1992, c. 27, s. 2

### Judicial Consideration (1)

#### Currency

Federal English Statutes reflect amendments current to September 25, 2024

Federal English Regulations Current to Gazette Vol. 158:24 (November 20, 2024)

Canada Federal Statutes  
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act  
Part III — Proposals (ss. 50-66.4)  
Division I — General Scheme for Proposals

#### KeyCite treatment

**Most Recently Cited in:** [Tool Shed Brewing Company Inc \(Re\)](#) , 2024 ABKB 234, 2024 CarswellAlta 1310, 2024 A.C.W.S. 1949, [2024] A.W.L.D. 2774, 13 C.B.R. (7th) 395 | (Alta. K.B., Apr 23, 2024)

R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 65.13

s 65.13

Currency

#### 65.13

##### **65.13(1) Restriction on disposition of assets**

An insolvent person in respect of whom a notice of intention is filed under [section 50.4](#) or a proposal is filed under [subsection 62\(1\)](#) may not sell or otherwise dispose of assets outside the ordinary course of business unless authorized to do so by a court. Despite any requirement for shareholder approval, including one under federal or provincial law, the court may authorize the sale or disposition even if shareholder approval was not obtained.

##### **65.13(2) Individuals**

In the case of an individual who is carrying on a business, the court may authorize the sale or disposition only if the assets were acquired for or used in relation to the business.

##### **65.13(3) Notice to secured creditors**

An insolvent person who applies to the court for an authorization shall give notice of the application to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the proposed sale or disposition.

##### **65.13(4) Factors to be considered**

In deciding whether to grant the authorization, the court is to consider, among other things,

- (a) whether the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition was reasonable in the circumstances;
- (b) whether the trustee approved the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition;
- (c) whether the trustee filed with the court a report stating that in their opinion the sale or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy;
- (d) the extent to which the creditors were consulted;
- (e) the effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties; and
- (f) whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value.

##### **65.13(5) Additional factors — related persons**

If the proposed sale or disposition is to a person who is related to the insolvent person, the court may, after considering the factors referred to in subsection (4), grant the authorization only if it is satisfied that

(a) good faith efforts were made to sell or otherwise dispose of the assets to persons who are not related to the insolvent person; and

(b) the consideration to be received is superior to the consideration that would be received under any other offer made in accordance with the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition.

#### **65.13(6)Related persons**

For the purpose of subsection (5), a person who is related to the insolvent person includes

(a) a director or officer of the insolvent person;

(b) a person who has or has had, directly or indirectly, control in fact of the insolvent person; and

(c) a person who is related to a person described in paragraph (a) or (b).

#### **65.13(7)Assets may be disposed of free and clear**

The court may authorize a sale or disposition free and clear of any security, charge or other restriction and, if it does, it shall also order that other assets of the insolvent person or the proceeds of the sale or disposition be subject to a security, charge or other restriction in favour of the creditor whose security, charge or other restriction is to be affected by the order.

#### **65.13(8)Restriction — employers**

The court may grant the authorization only if the court is satisfied that the insolvent person can and will make the payments that would have been required under paragraphs 60(1.3)(a) and (1.5)(a) if the court had approved the proposal.

#### **65.13(9)Restriction — intellectual property**

If, on the day on which a notice of intention is filed under [section 50.4](#) or a copy of the proposal is filed under [subsection 62\(1\)](#), the insolvent person is a party to an agreement that grants to another party a right to use intellectual property that is included in a sale or disposition authorized under subsection (7), that sale or disposition does not affect the other party's right to use the intellectual property — including the other party's right to enforce an exclusive use — during the term of the agreement, including any period for which the other party extends the agreement as of right, as long as the other party continues to perform its obligations under the agreement in relation to the use of the intellectual property.

#### **Amendment History**

2005, c. 47, s. 44; 2007, c. 36, s. 27; 2018, c. 27, s. 266

#### **Judicial Consideration (1)**

#### **Currency**

Federal English Statutes reflect amendments current to September 25, 2024

Federal English Regulations Current to Gazette Vol. 158:24 (November 20, 2024)

Canada Federal Statutes  
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act  
Part III — Proposals (ss. 50-66.4)  
Division I — General Scheme for Proposals

R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 50.4

s 50.4

Currency

**50.4**

**50.4(1) Notice of intention**

Before filing a copy of a proposal with a licensed trustee, an insolvent person may file a notice of intention, in the prescribed form, with the official receiver in the insolvent person's locality, stating

- (a) the insolvent person's intention to make a proposal,
- (b) the name and address of the licensed trustee who has consented, in writing, to act as the trustee under the proposal, and
- (c) the names of the creditors with claims amounting to two hundred and fifty dollars or more and the amounts of their claims as known or shown by the debtor's books,

and attaching thereto a copy of the consent referred to in paragraph (b).

**50.4(2) Certain things to be filed**

Within ten days after filing a notice of intention under subsection (1), the insolvent person shall file with the official receiver

- (a) a statement (in this section referred to as a "cash-flow statement") indicating the projected cash-flow of the insolvent person on at least a monthly basis, prepared by the insolvent person, reviewed for its reasonableness by the trustee under the notice of intention and signed by the trustee and the insolvent person;
- (b) a report on the reasonableness of the cash-flow statement, in the prescribed form, prepared and signed by the trustee; and
- (c) a report containing prescribed representations by the insolvent person regarding the preparation of the cash-flow statement, in the prescribed form, prepared and signed by the insolvent person.

**50.4(3) Creditors may obtain statement**

Subject to subsection (4), any creditor may obtain a copy of the cash-flow statement on request made to the trustee.

**50.4(4) Exception**

The court may order that a cash-flow statement or any part thereof not be released to some or all of the creditors pursuant to subsection (3) where it is satisfied that

- (a) such release would unduly prejudice the insolvent person; and
- (b) non-release would not unduly prejudice the creditor or creditors in question.

**50.4(5) Trustee protected**

If the trustee acts in good faith and takes reasonable care in reviewing the cash-flow statement, the trustee is not liable for loss or damage to any person resulting from that person's reliance on the cash-flow statement.

**50.4(6) Trustee to notify creditors**

Within five days after the filing of a notice of intention under subsection (1), the trustee named in the notice shall send to every known creditor, in the prescribed manner, a copy of the notice including all of the information referred to in paragraphs (1) (a) to (c).

**50.4(7) Trustee to monitor and report**

Subject to any direction of the court under [paragraph 47.1\(2\)\(a\)](#), the trustee under a notice of intention in respect of an insolvent person

(a) shall, for the purpose of monitoring the insolvent person's business and financial affairs, have access to and examine the insolvent person's property, including his premises, books, records and other financial documents, to the extent necessary to adequately assess the insolvent person's business and financial affairs, from the filing of the notice of intention until a proposal is filed or the insolvent person becomes bankrupt;

(b) shall file a report on the state of the insolvent person's business and financial affairs — containing the prescribed information, if any —

(i) with the official receiver without delay after ascertaining a material adverse change in the insolvent person's projected cash-flow or financial circumstances, and

(ii) with the court at or before the hearing by the court of any application under subsection (9) and at any other time that the court may order; and

(c) shall send a report about the material adverse change to the creditors without delay after ascertaining the change.

**50.4(8) Where assignment deemed to have been made**

Where an insolvent person fails to comply with subsection (2), or where the trustee fails to file a proposal with the official receiver under [subsection 62\(1\)](#) within a period of thirty days after the day the notice of intention was filed under subsection (1), or within any extension of that period granted under subsection (9),

(a) the insolvent person is, on the expiration of that period or that extension, as the case may be, deemed to have thereupon made an assignment;

(b) the trustee shall, without delay, file with the official receiver, in the prescribed form, a report of the deemed assignment;

(b.1) the official receiver shall issue a certificate of assignment, in the prescribed form, which has the same effect for the purposes of this Act as an assignment filed under [section 49](#); and

(c) the trustee shall, within five days after the day the certificate mentioned in paragraph (b.1) is issued, send notice of the meeting of creditors under [section 102](#), at which meeting the creditors may by ordinary resolution, notwithstanding [section 14](#), affirm the appointment of the trustee or appoint another licensed trustee in lieu of that trustee.

**50.4(9) Extension of time for filing proposal**

The insolvent person may, before the expiry of the 30-day period referred to in subsection (8) or of any extension granted under this subsection, apply to the court for an extension, or further extension, as the case may be, of that period, and the court, on notice to any interested persons that the court may direct, may grant the extensions, not exceeding 45 days for any individual extension and not exceeding in the aggregate five months after the expiry of the 30-day period referred to in subsection (8), if satisfied on each application that

(a) the insolvent person has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence;

(b) the insolvent person would likely be able to make a viable proposal if the extension being applied for were granted; and

(c) no creditor would be materially prejudiced if the extension being applied for were granted.

**50.4(10) Court may not extend time**

Subsection 187(11) does not apply in respect of time limitations imposed by subsection (9).

**50.4(11) Court may terminate period for making proposal**

The court may, on application by the trustee, the interim receiver, if any, appointed under [section 47.1](#), or a creditor, declare terminated, before its actual expiration, the thirty day period mentioned in subsection (8) or any extension thereof granted under subsection (9) if the court is satisfied that

- (a) the insolvent person has not acted, or is not acting, in good faith and with due diligence,
- (b) the insolvent person will not likely be able to make a viable proposal before the expiration of the period in question,
- (c) the insolvent person will not likely be able to make a proposal, before the expiration of the period in question, that will be accepted by the creditors, or
- (d) the creditors as a whole would be materially prejudiced were the application under this subsection rejected,

and where the court declares the period in question terminated, paragraphs (8)(a) to (c) thereupon apply as if that period had expired.

**Amendment History**


1992, c. 27, s. 19; 1997, c. 12, s. 32(1); 2005, c. 47, s. 35; 2007, c. 36, s. 17; 2017, c. 26, s. 6

**Judicial Consideration (2)**

**Currency**

Federal English Statutes reflect amendments current to June 19, 2024

Federal English Regulations Current to Gazette Vol. 158:12 (June 5, 2024)



Tab

**3**

2011 ONSC 3230  
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Komtech Inc., Re

2011 CarswellOnt 6577, 2011 ONSC 3230, 106 O.R. (3d) 654, 205 A.C.W.S. (3d) 24, 81 C.B.R. (5th) 256

**In the Matter of the Proposal of Komtech Inc. pursuant to the Law of the Province  
of Ontario, with a Head Office in the City of Kanata, in the Province of Ontario**

Paul Kane J.

Heard: April 27, 2011  
Judgment: July 8, 2011  
Docket: 33-1469781

Counsel: Keith A. MacLaren for Komtech Inc.  
John O'Toole, André Ducasse for Business Development Bank of Canada  
Karen Perron for Hubbell Canada LP

Subject: Insolvency; Estates and Trusts; Corporate and Commercial

**Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIV Administration of estate](#)

[XIV.4 Sale of assets](#)

**Headnote**

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Administration of estate — Sale of assets — Jurisdiction of court to approve sale  
Where no proposal — Company became insolvent — Company issued notice of intent to make proposal under [Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act](#) — Company sought auction for sale of assets — Company brought motion for approval of sale — Motion granted — Trustee and primary lenders of company approved of sale process — Proposed process was likely to see higher price than forced sale of assets — Company made reasonable efforts in search of alternate financing, equity partnership or purchaser of business — Company cooperated with trustee to identify and engage prospective purchasers — Position of creditors would not improve if motion dismissed — Sale could still be authorized under s. 65.13 of Act despite fact that proposal had not been filed, as court had jurisdiction to do so.

**Table of Authorities**

**Cases considered by *Paul Kane J.*:**

*Brainhunter Inc., Re* (2009), 62 C.B.R. (5th) 41, 2009 CarswellOnt 8207 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered  
*Hypnotic Clubs Inc., Re* (2010), 68 C.B.R. (5th) 267, 2010 CarswellOnt 3463, 2010 ONSC 2987 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered  
*Nortel Networks Corp., Re* (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4467, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

**Statutes considered:**

*Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

s. 14.06(7) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 15(1)] — referred to

s. 50.4 [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 19] — referred to

s. 50.4(1) [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 19] — pursuant to



21 Parliament enacted s. 65.13 of the *BIA* at the same time as enacting s. 36 of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("*CCAA*"). Both amendments were enacted in 2005.

22 The wording of s. 65.13 under the *BIA* and s. 36 under the *CCAA*, are remarkably similar.

23 Section 65.13(1) of the *BIA* prohibits the sale and disposition of assets outside the ordinary course of business in respect of an insolvent person which has filed an NOI under s. 50.4, unless authorized by the court to do so.

24 *Hypnotic Clubs Inc., Re* (2010), 68 C.B.R. (5th) 267 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) involved an NOI by the debtor under the *BIA* and a motion for approval of a sale of assets to a related third party under s. 65.13. The trustee was this Proposal Trustee. The Court refused to approve that asset purchase agreement as it was not satisfied that good faith efforts had been made to sell the debtor's assets to unrelated parties. In coming to that conclusion, the court at paras. 36 and 37 states:

36 Given these circumstances, and taking into account the underlying policy of the *BIA* of letting creditors vote as they choose in respect of accepting or rejecting a proposal, in my view, the factor of required good faith efforts stipulated by s. 65.13(5)(a) has not been met.

37 It is obvious that a deemed assignment into bankruptcy by s. 50.1(8), consequential to no proposal having being made, will quite probably result in Ms. Telios and the other unsecured creditors not recovering anything at all. However, that is a consequence that should be determined by the unsecured creditors through a vote upon a proposal without a prior disposition of Hypnotic's assets through the proposed Revised APA.

25 Under s. 65.13, the court's jurisdiction to authorize the sale of assets outside of the ordinary course of business is not expressed as limited to cases where the debtor is capable of presenting a Proposal to its creditors. The ability to present a Proposal is not one of the listed factors to be considered on a motion under s. 65.13(4). Parliament could have, but did not include language in s. 65.13 requiring the presentation of or the ability to present a Proposal and the vote thereon by creditors, as a condition to the exercise of the court's jurisdiction to authorize a sale of assets.

26 A comparable issue under the *CCAA* with wording remarkably similar to s. 65.13 of the *BIA* has concluded that the court has jurisdiction to authorize the sale of business assets absent a formal plan of compromising arrangement under s. 36 of the *CCAA*.

27 Section 36 of the *CCAA* reads as follows:

#### **Restriction on disposition of business assets**

36. (1) A debtor company in respect of which an order has been made under this Act may not sell or otherwise dispose of assets outside the ordinary course of business unless authorized to do so by a court. Despite any requirement for shareholder approval, including one under federal or provincial law, the court may authorize the sale or disposition even if shareholder approval was not obtained.

#### **Notice to creditors**

(2) A company that applies to the court for an authorization is to give notice of the application to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the proposed sale or disposition.

#### **Factors to be considered**

(3) In deciding whether to grant the authorization, the court is to consider, among other things,

(a) whether the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition was reasonable in the circumstances;

(b) whether the monitor approved the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition;

- (c) whether the monitor filed with the court a report stating that in their opinion the sale or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy;
- (d) the extent to which the creditors were consulted;
- (e) the effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties; and
- (f) whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value.

**Additional factors — related persons**

(4) If the proposed sale or disposition is to a person who is related to the company, the court may, after considering the factors referred to in subsection (3), grant the authorization only if it is satisfied that

- (a) good faith efforts were made to sell or otherwise dispose of the assets to persons who are not related to the company; and
- (b) the consideration to be received is superior to the consideration that would be received under any other offer made in accordance with the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition.

**Related persons**

(5) For the purpose of subsection (4), a person who is related to the company includes

- (a) a director or officer of the company;
- (b) a person who has or has had, directly or indirectly, control in fact of the company; and
- (c) a person who is related to a person described in paragraph (a) or (b).

**Assets may be disposed of free and clear**

(6) The court may authorize a sale or disposition free and clear of any security, charge or other restriction and, if it does, it shall also order that other assets of the company or the proceeds of the sale or disposition be subject to a security, charge or other restriction in favour of the creditor whose security, charge or other restriction is to be affected by the order.


**Restriction — employers**

(7) The court may grant the authorization only if the court is satisfied that the company can and will make the payments that would have been required under [paragraphs 6\(4\)\(a\) and \(5\)\(a\)](#) if the court had sanctioned the compromise or arrangement.

28 In *Nortel Networks Corp., Re* (2009), 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), the court found jurisdiction under the [CCAA](#) absent a plan of an arrangement which was described as "skeletal in nature". That court held that an important consideration, in addition to whether the business continues under the debtor stewardship or under a new equity structure, is whether the business can be continued as a going concern in the form of a sale by the debtor.

29 Following the amendments creating [s. 36 of the CCAA](#), the Court in *Brainhunter Inc., Re* (2009), 62 C.B.R. (5th) 41 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), determined that [s. 36 of the CCAA](#) expressly permits the sale of substantially all of the debtor's assets even in the absence of the presentation and vote upon a plan of arrangement.

30 [Section 65.13 of the BIA](#) and [s. 36 of the CCAA](#) were introduced in 2005 in "An Act to establish the [Wage Earner Protection Program Act](#), to amend the [Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act](#) and the [Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act](#) and to make consequential amendments to other Acts" (Bill C-55).



Tab

**4**

2022 ONSC 653

Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Harte Gold Corp. (Re)

2022 CarswellOnt 1698, 2022 ONSC 653, 343 A.C.W.S. (3d) 284, 97 C.B.R. (6th) 202

**THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985,  
c. C-36, AS AMENDED (Applicant) and A PLAN OF COMPROMISE  
OR ARRANGEMENT OF HARTE GOLD CORP. (Applicant)**

Penny J.

Heard: January 28, 2022

Judgment: February 4, 2022

Docket: CV-21-00673304-00CL

Counsel: Guy P. Martel, Danny Duy Vu, Lee Nicholson, William Rodler Dumais, for Applicant

Joseph Pasquariello, Chris Armstrong, Andrew Harmes, for Court appointed Monitor

Leanne M. Williams, for Board of Directors of the Applicant

Marc Wasserman, Kathryn Esaw, Dave Rosenblat, Justin Kanji, for 1000025833 Ontario Inc.

Stuart Brotman, Daniel Richer, for BNP Paribas

Sean Collins, Walker W. MacLeod, Natasha Rambaran, for Appian Capital Advisory LLP, 2729992 Ontario Corp., ANR Investments B.V. and AHG (Jersey) Limited

David Bish, for OMF Fund II SO Ltd., Orion Resource Partners (USA) LP and their affiliates

Orlando M. Rosa, Gordon P. Acton, for Netmizaaggamig Nishnaabeg First Nation (Pic Mobert First Nation)

Timothy Jones, for Attorney General of Ontario

Subject: Civil Practice and Procedure; Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

**Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act](#)

[XIX.2 Initial application](#)

[XIX.2.a Grant and length of stay](#)

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act](#)

[XIX.2 Initial application](#)

[XIX.2.d Miscellaneous](#)

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act](#)

[XIX.4 Liquidation or sale of assets](#)

**Headnote**

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — General principles — Jurisdiction — Court

Company operated gold mine — Company encountered growing liquidity problem — Company developed plan to attract new capital through potential sale — No binding offers were received — Further sale and investment solicitation process led to two competing proposals from its primary secured creditors — One of creditors had winning bid and proposed purchase was structured as reverse vesting order — Company brought motion for orders approving creditor transaction, including reverse vesting order structure, extending stay and expanding monitor's powers — Motion granted — [Section 11 of Companies Creditors Arrangement Act](#) clearly provided court with jurisdiction to issue reverse vesting order, provided discretion available under s. 11 of Act was exercised in accordance with objects and purposes of Act — Reverse vesting order should continue to be

*Business Corporations Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16

Generally — referred to

s. 168 — referred to

s. 168(1)(g) — referred to

s. 186(1) "reorganization" — referred to

s. 186(2) — referred to

*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 5.1(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 122] — referred to

s. 6(2) — referred to

s. 6(8) — referred to

s. 11 — pursuant to

s. 11.02 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — referred to

s. 11.3 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — referred to

s. 11.3(4) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — referred to

s. 22(1) — referred to

s. 23(1)(k) — referred to

s. 36 — referred to

s. 36(1) — referred to

s. 36(3) — referred to

MOTION by company for approval of sale of company's mining enterprise to strategic purchaser, including reverse vesting order structure of transaction, and for order extending stay and expanding monitor's powers.

***Penny J.:***

1 This is a motion by Harte Gold for an approval and reverse vesting order involving the sale of Harte Gold's mining enterprise to a strategic purchaser (that is, an entity in the gold mining business) and for an order extending the stay and expanding the Monitor's powers to include new entities to be created for the purposes of implementing Harte Gold's proposed restructuring. There was no opposition to the relief sought. All those who appeared at the hearing supported approval of the transaction.

2 Following the conclusion of oral submissions on Friday, January 28, 2022, I issued the orders sought with written reasons to follow. These are the reasons.

**Background**

3 Harte Gold is a public company incorporated under the *Business Corporations Act (Ontario)*. Prior to January 17, 2022, its shares publicly traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange, Frankfurt Stock Exchange and over-the-counter. Harte Gold operates a gold mine located in northern Ontario within the Sault Ste. Marie Mining Division and approximately 30 km north of the town

18 Section 11 of the CCAA confers jurisdiction on the Court in the broadest of terms: "the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances".

19 Section 36(1) of the CCAA provides:

A debtor company in respect of which an order has been made under this Act may not sell or otherwise dispose of assets outside the ordinary course of business unless authorized to do so by a court. Despite any requirement for shareholder approval, including one under federal or provincial law, the court may authorize the sale or disposition even if shareholder approval was not obtained.

20 Section 36(3) of the CCAA provides a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered on a motion to approve a sale. These include:

- (a) whether the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition was reasonable in the circumstances;
- (b) whether the monitor approved the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition;
- (c) whether the monitor filed with the court a report stating that in their opinion the sale or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy;
- (d) the extent to which the creditors were consulted;
- (e) the effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties; and
- (f) whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value.

21 The s. 36(3) criteria largely correspond to the principles articulated in *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp* 1991 CanLII 2727(ONCA) for the approval of the sale of assets in an insolvency scenario:

- (a) whether sufficient effort has been made to obtain the best price and that the debtor has not acted improvidently;
- (b) the interests of all parties;
- (c) the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers have been obtained; and
- (d) whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process:


see *Target Canada Co. (Re)*, 2015 ONSC 1487, at paras. 14-17.

22 The purchase transaction for which approval is being sought in this case does not provide for a sale of assets but, rather, provides for a "reverse vesting order" under which the purchaser will become the sole shareholder of Harte Gold and certain excluded assets, excluded contracts and excluded liabilities will be vested out to new companies incorporated for that purpose.

23 In determining whether the transaction should be approved and the RVO granted, it is appropriate to consider:

- (a) the statutory basis for a reverse vesting order and whether a reverse vesting order is appropriate in the circumstances; and,
- (b) the factors outlined in s. 36(3) of the CCAA, making provision or adjustment, as appropriate, for the unique aspects of a reverse vesting transaction.

### ***The Statutory Basis (Jurisdiction) for a Reverse Vesting Order***



Tab

**5**

**KeyCite treatment**

**Most Negative Treatment:** Recently added (treatment not yet designated)

**Most Recent Recently added (treatment not yet designated):** [Arrangement relatif à Chrono Aviation inc.](#) | 2024 QCCA 1710, 2024 CarswellQue 15598, EYB 2024-560472 | (C.A. Que, Dec 19, 2024)  
2022 ONSC 6354

Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Just Energy Group Inc. et. al. v. Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. et. al.

2022 CarswellOnt 16700, 2022 ONSC 6354, 2022 A.C.W.S. 5355, 6 C.B.R. (7th) 386

**IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS  
ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED**

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF JUST ENERGY GROUP INC., JUST ENERGY CORP., ONTARIO ENERGY COMMODITIES INC., UNIVERSALE ENERGY CORPORATION, JUST ENERGY FINANCE CANADA ULC, HUDSON ENERGY CANADA CORP., JUST MANAGEMENT CORP., JUST ENERGY FINANCE HOLDING INC., 11929747 CANADA INC., 12175592 CANADA INC., JE SERVICES HOLDCO I INC., JE SERVICES HOLDCO II INC., 8704104 CANADA INC., JUST ENERGY ADVANCED SOLUTIONS CORP., JUST ENERGY (U.S.) CORP., JUST ENERGY ILLINOIS CORP., JUST ENERGY INDIANA CORP., JUST ENERGY MASSACHUSETTS CORP., JUST ENERGY NEW YORK CORP., JUST ENERGY TEXAS I CORP., JUST ENERGY, LLC, JUST ENERGY PENNSYLVANIA CORP., JUST ENERGY MICHIGAN CORP., JUST ENERGY SOLUTIONS INC., HUDSON ENERGY SERVICES LLC, HUDSON ENERGY CORP., INTERACTIVE ENERGY GROUP LLC, HUDSON PARENT HOLDINGS LLC, DRAG MARKETING LLC JUST ENERGY ADVANCED SOLUTIONS LLC, FULCRUM RETAIL ENERGY LLC, FULCRUM RETAIL HOLDINGS LLC, TARA ENERGY, LLC, JUST ENERGY MARKETING CORP., JUST ENERGY CONNECTICUT CORP., JUST ENERGY LIMITED, JUST SOLAR HOLDINGS CORP. and JUST ENERGY (FINANCE) HUNGARY ZRT. (Applicants) and MORGAN STANLEY CAPITAL GROUP INC. (Respondents)

McEwen J.

Heard: November 2, 2022

Judgment: November 14, 2022

Docket: CV-21-00658423-00CL

Counsel: Jeremy Dacks, Marc Wasserman, for Just Energy Group

Tim Pinos, Ryan Jacobs, Alan Merskey, for LVS III SPE XV LP, TOCU XVII LLC, HVS XVI LLC, OC II LVS XIV LP, OC III LFE I LP and CBHT Energy I LLC

David H. Botter, Sarah Link Schultz, for LVS III SPE XV LP, TOCU XVII LLC, HVS XVI LLC, OC II LVS XIV LP, OC III LFE I LP and CBHT Energy I LLC

Heather L. Meredith, James D. Gage, for Agent and the Credit Facility Lenders

Howard A. Gorman, Ryan E. Manns, for Shell Energy North American (Canada) Inc. and Shell Energy North America (U.S.)

Danielle Glatt, for U.S. Counsel for Fira Donin and Inna Golovan, in their capacity as proposed class representatives in Donin et al. v. Just Energy Group Inc. et al. and Counsel to U.S. Counsel for Trevor Jordet, in his capacity as proposed class representative in Jordet v. Just Energy Solutions Inc.

David Rosenfeld, James Harnum, for Haidar Omarali in his capacity as Representative Plaintiff in Omarali v. Just Energy

Robert Kennedy, for BP Energy Company and certain of its affiliates

Jessica MacKinnon, for Macquarie Energy LLC and Macquarie Energy Canada Ltd.

Bevan Brooksbank, for Chubb Insurance Co. of Canada

Alexandra McCawley, for Counsel to Fortis BC Energy Inc.



s. 173 — referred to

s. 176(1)(b) — referred to

s. 191(1) "reorganization" — referred to

s. 191(1) "reorganization" (c) — referred to

s. 191(2) — referred to

*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — considered

s. 11 — referred to

s. 36 — referred to

s. 36(3) — referred to

s. 36(4) — referred to

*Wage Earner Protection Program Act*, S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 1

Generally — referred to

APPLICATION by group of energy companies for approval of reverse vesting order and transaction in bankruptcy proceedings.

**McEwen J.:**

1 The Applicants (collectively the "Just Energy Entities") bring a motion seeking approval of a going-concern sale transaction (the "Transaction") for their business. They seek to implement the Transaction through a proposed draft reverse vesting order (the "RVO") and other related relief.

2 The Just Energy Entities provided the court with two draft orders in furtherance of their position. The first is the RVO for the Transaction. The second is an order (the "Monitor's Order") giving FTI Consulting Canada Inc. (the "Monitor") enhanced powers to implement the RVO and other related relief, including a stay extension, approval of the Monitor's reports and fees and a sealing order.

3 I granted the two orders with reasons to follow. I am now providing those reasons.

**BACKGROUND**

4 Just Energy Group Inc. ("Just Energy") and its subsidiaries collectively form the Just Energy Entities. Just Energy is primarily a holding company that operates subsidiaries in Canada and the U.S.

5 Just Energy is incorporated under the *Canada Business Corporations Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44 ("*CBCA*") . It maintains dual headquarters in Ontario and Texas. Just Energy's shares are listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange and the New York Stock Exchange.

6 The Just Energy Entities are a retail energy provider. Their principal line of business consists of purchasing retail energy and natural gas commodities from large energy suppliers and reselling them to residential and commercial customers. The Just Energy Entities service over 950,000 residential and commercial customers across Canada and the U.S. and employ over 1,000 employees.

29 The jurisdiction to approve a transaction through a reverse vesting order is found in [s. 11 of the CCAA](#). Section 11 gives this court broad powers to make orders that it sees fit, subject to the restrictions set out in the statute. There is no provision in the [CCAA](#) that prohibits a reverse vesting order structure: see [Quest University \(Re\)](#), 2020 BCSC 1883, at para. 157.

30 Some courts have also held that [s. 36 of the CCAA](#) confers jurisdiction. Section 36 contemplates court approval for the sale of a debtor company's assets out of the ordinary course of business: see [Black Rock Metals Inc.](#); [Quest University \(Re\)](#), at para. 40.

31 In any event, it is settled law that courts have jurisdiction to approve a transaction involving a reverse vesting order. Moreover, courts agree that the factors set out in [s. 36\(3\) of the CCAA](#) should also be considered on a motion to approve a sale, including one involving a reverse vesting order. Section 36(3) stipulates that the court is to consider, among other things,

- (a) whether the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition was reasonable in the circumstances;
- (b) whether the monitor approved the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition;
- (c) whether the monitor filed with the court a report stating that in their opinion the sale or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy;
- (d) the extent to which the creditors were consulted;
- (e) the effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties; and
- (f) whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value.

32 In [Harte Gold Corp. \(Re\)](#), 2022 ONSC 653, Penny J. held that the s. 36(3) criteria largely correspond to the principles articulated in [Royal Bank of Canada v. Soundair Corp.](#), (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A) for the approval of the sale of assets in an insolvency. They are as follows:

- whether sufficient effort has been made to obtain the best price and that the debtor has not acted improvidently;
- the interests of all parties;
- the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers have been obtained; and
- whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

33 Reverse vesting orders are relatively new structures. I agree that reverse vesting orders should not be the "norm" and that a court should carefully consider whether a reverse vesting order is warranted in the circumstances: see [Harte Gold Corp. \(Re\)](#), at para. 38; [Black Rock Metals Inc.](#), at para. 99. That said, reverse vesting orders have been deemed appropriate in a number of cases: see [Quest University \(Re\)](#), at para. 168, [Harte Gold Corp. \(Re\)](#), at para. 77 and [Black Rock Metals Inc.](#), at para. 114.

34 The aforementioned cases approved reverse vesting orders in circumstances where:

- The debtor operated in a highly-regulated environment in which its existing permits, licenses or other rights were difficult or impossible to reassign to a purchaser.
- The debtor is a party to certain key agreements that would be similarly difficult or impossible to assign to a purchaser.
- Where maintaining the existing legal entities would preserve certain tax attributes that would otherwise be lost in a traditional vesting order transaction.

35 Given the supporting jurisprudence, I will now discuss why the RVO should be granted and why the Transaction should be approved.

*The RVO should be granted*

36 The Just Energy Entities' business, as noted, is highly regulated and depends almost entirely on a substantial number of licenses, authorizations and permits in multiple jurisdictions in Canada and the U.S.

37 As set out in the affidavit of Mr. Michael Carter, the Chief Financial Officer to the Just Energy Entities (at para. 57), the value of the Just Energy Entities' business arises predominantly from the gross margin in their customer contracts. The business is wholly dependent on the Just Energy Entities holding several non-transferable licenses and authorizations that permit their operation in Canada and the U.S. and in their agreements with over 100 public utilities, which allow the Just Energy Entities to provide natural gas and electricity in certain markets to their customers.

38 Currently the Just Energy Entities hold at least:

- Seventeen separate licenses and authorizations in five provinces in Canada which allows them to market natural gas and electricity in the applicable provincial markets, eight of which are non-transferrable and non-assignable, with the remaining nine only assignable with leave of the regulator.
- Five separate import and export orders issued by the Canadian Energy Regulator ("CER"), all of which are non-transferrable and non-assignable.
- Three separate registrations with the Alberta Electricity System Operator (the "AESO") in Alberta and with the Independent Electricity System Operator ("IESO") in Ontario, all of which are either non-transferrable or only assignable with leave.
- Six licenses in Nevada and New Jersey to allow them to market natural gas and/or electricity in the applicable states, all of which are non-transferrable.
- Twenty-five licenses in Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Virginia to allow them to market natural gas and/or electricity in the applicable states, all of which may only be transferred with the prior authorization of the applicable regulator in each jurisdiction.
- Eighteen electricity and/or natural gas provider licenses or authorizations in California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, and New York, where no process for transferring the licenses or authorizations is prescribed in the applicable statutes.
- Five retail electricity provider certifications in Texas which may only be transferred with the authorization of the Public Utility Commission of Texas ("PUCT").
- Three separate export authorizations issued by the Department of Energy ("DOE") in the U.S., all of which may only be transferred with the prior authorization of the DOE's assistant secretary.
- Seven separate market-based authorizations issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") in the U.S. which may only be transferred with the prior authorization of FERC.

39 As further deposed by Mr. Carter, all the provincial, state, market participation, export and import orders, licenses and authorizations held by the Just Energy Entities are either non-transferrable, capable of transfer only with the approval of the applicable regulator, or provide for no clear regulatory process for the transfer of such authorizations.

40 On Mr. Carter's analysis, the RVO would not hamper the existing licenses, authorizations, orders and agreements. As such, he deposes that the RVO structure is the only feasible structure for the Transaction (at para. 59). Any other structure would risk exposing most of the 89 licenses upon which the Just Energy Entities' business is founded. Mr. Carter also deposes (at para. 75) that if a traditional vesting order was granted, the Purchaser would be required to participate in a separate regulatory process in five Canadian provinces, 15 U.S. states and with federal agencies in both Canada and the U.S. to try and obtain transfers of

the 89 licenses, authorizations and certifications or the issuance of new licenses, authorizations and certifications. This risk and uncertainty would affect the value of a sale to any other purchaser. For this reason, the benefit of the RVO is clear: it preserves the necessary approvals to conduct business.

41 Additionally, Mr. Carter (at para. 60) deposes that the Just Energy Entities are party to a myriad of hedging transactions. This includes hedge transactions with commodity suppliers to minimize commodity and volume risk, foreign exchange hedge transactions and hedges for renewal energy credits, many of which are fundamental to the Just Energy Entities' ability to effectively operate their business and non-transferrable. Moreover, any U.S. tax attributes resident in the Just Energy Entities would generally be unable to be utilized in the go-forward business where the Transaction structure has a traditional asset sale vesting order.

42 No stakeholder disputes Mr. Carter's evidence. More specifically, no stakeholder disputes the importance of maintaining the 89 current licenses, authorizations and certifications listed above. And, no stakeholder disputes the fact that under a traditional asset sale and approval and vesting order structure, a purchaser would have to apply to the various agencies and regulators for transfers of the aforementioned licenses, etc.

43 I agree with the Just Energy Entities, who are supported by the Monitor. Given the above, the RVO sought is the only way to achieve the preservation of the licenses, authorizations and certifications necessary for the ongoing business operations of the Just Energy Entities. This includes transferring the excluded assets into the two Residual Cos., one in Canada and one in the U.S. as is typically the case in reverse vesting orders.

44 The fact that the Just Energy Entities has been operating for approximately 19 months since the [CCAA](#) filing is critical. As noted by Penny J. in [Harte Gold Corp. \(Re\)](#) , at para. 72, time is not on the side of a debtor company facing financial challenges. I agree.

45 For all the reasons above, I am satisfied that the RVO is appropriate.

46 I now turn to the s. 36(3) factors.

***The Transaction is fair and reasonable***

***The process leading to the proposed sale was reasonable***

47 The Transaction was developed by the Just Energy Entities in consultation with the Monitor and its financial advisor, Mr. Mark Caiger, the Managing Director, Mergers & Acquisitions at BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc., as well as the Purchaser and other secured lenders. As noted, the SISP was approved by this court and thereafter conducted as per the provisions of the SISP Approval Order. As set out in Mr. Carter's affidavit, the SISP was undertaken in accordance with the SISP Approval Order in two stages.

48 The overview of the SISP structure is well described in Mr. Caiger's October 19, 2022 affidavit. Amongst other things, in the first stage, the Just Energy Entities and Mr. Caiger prepared a list of potential bidders, established a data room and published a press release announcing the SISP. Mr. Caiger contacted 41 potential bidders, non-disclosure agreements were negotiated and four NOIs were received.

49 The process then moved into the second stage. The Just Energy Entities prepared a form of transaction agreement that included a form of approval and RVO for completion by bidders as part of receiving submissions of a qualified bid. Three of the four second stage participants eventually indicated that they were not going to proceed. The remaining party did not submit a bid. It advised the Monitor that it saw no value beyond the stalking-horse bid.

50 The Transaction before this court is therefore the only going-concern Transaction available to the Just Energy Entities. I am satisfied in the circumstances that the market was thoroughly canvassed and, as noted, in addition to the SISP, the business of the Just Energy Entities has been marketed broadly and extensively for approximately three years. The U.S. Class Actions previously indicated that they may advance their own restructuring plan for consideration and voting by the Just Energy Entities

creditors. During this process, they were allowed full participation but ultimately did not file a NOI or further engage in the SISP process.

*The Monitor has approved the process*

51 As noted, the Monitor approved the process that lead to the Transaction. The Monitor concluded that the RVO is the only efficient means to ensure that all the licenses, authorizations and agreements remain in place. The Monitor is also of the view that any potential prejudice to the individual creditors is far outweighed by the overall benefit of the Transaction. Importantly, the Monitor also believes that the RVO represents the only viable alternative to implement the Transaction for the benefit of the Just Energy Entities' stakeholders.

**The Transaction is more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition in bankruptcy**

52 The Monitor assisted the Just Energy Entities in preparing a liquidation analysis when the Just Energy Entities were pursuing approval of the Plan of Compromise and Arrangement. The analysis has been updated. The Monitor and the Just Energy Entities concluded, on the basis of the updated liquidation analysis, that not only would a liquidation produce no recovery for unsecured creditors, but it would result in a shortfall to secured creditors. This, of course, would be less beneficial than closing the Transaction.

*The creditors were consulted*

53 As noted in this endorsement, extensive consultation was undertaken both with the secured creditors, the U.S. Class Actions, the Omarali Class Action and the Mass Tort Claims. There is no suggestion in the record that any creditors were ignored or overlooked.

*The effect of the Transaction on creditors and other interested parties*

54 I am of the belief that the RVO is the only viable option for a going-concern exit from the [CCAA](#) proceedings.

55 No other offers have been obtained, not only during the SISP but also in the past three years when the Just Energy Entities' business was being broadly and extensively marketed. No other plan or proposal has been put forward.

56 The Transaction, in my view, provides a number of positive benefits, including:

- preserving the going-concern value of the business for the benefit of stakeholders;
- maintaining the Just Energy Entities' relationships with the majority of its commodity suppliers, vendors, trade creditors and other counter-parties;
- providing for the continued operation of the Just Energy Entities across Canada and the U.S.;
- continuing to supply uninterrupted energy to the Just Energies Entities approximately 950,000 customers;
- preserving the ongoing employment of most of the more than 1,000 employees of the Just Energy Entities;
- maintaining the aforementioned regulatory and licensing relationships across Canada and the U.S.;
- satisfying or assuming in full all secured claims and priority payables;
- preserving U.S. tax attributes and tax pools; and
- permitting the Just Energy Entities to exit these proceedings with a significantly deleveraged balance sheet and a U.S. \$250 million new credit facility bringing an end to the [CCAA](#) proceedings aside from the limited matters related to the Residual Cos.

57 As discussed, the Transaction does not provide any recovery for unsecured creditors or shareholders. I accept the submissions of the Just Energy Entities, however, that this is not a result of the RVO structure. Rather, this reflects the fact that the Just Energy Entities' value, as tested through the market through the SISP and through previous marketing attempts over three years, is not high enough to generate value for the unsecured creditors and shareholders. This was also the situation in *Black Rock Metals Inc.* (see paras. 109, 120). I agree with the comments in *Black Rock Metals Inc.* wherein Chief Justice Paquette stated that the unsecured creditors and shareholders are therefore not in a worse position with the reverse vesting order than they would have been under a traditional asset sale. Either way, they have no economic interest because the purchase price would not generate any value for the unsecured creditors and shareholders.

58 There is no other viable option being presented to this court. Further, it bears noting that the shareholders' interests amount to claims in equity. As noted in *Harte Gold Corp. (Re)*, at para. 64, shareholders have no economic interest in an insolvent enterprise and therefore they are not entitled to a vote in any plan. The portion of the order requested relating to the cancellation of the existing shares is, therefore, justified in the circumstances.

59 The consideration to be received for the assets is fair and reasonable. The Just Energy Entities' business was extensively marketed both prior to and during the *CCAA*. There have been no offers, except that put forth by the Purchaser. Therefore, I accept that the consideration is fair and reasonable.

60 While it is unfortunate that there is no recovery for unsecured creditors or shareholders, this is a function of the market. In this regard, it is noteworthy that PIMCO holds over U.S. \$250 million in unsecured debt that it will not recover.

61 There is also evidence above that the purchaser is paying more than the Just Energy Entities would be worth in a bankruptcy. Furthermore, the Monitor is satisfied that the consideration is fair in the circumstances.

#### *Other considerations*

62 Based on the foregoing analysis of the s. 36(3) provisions, I am also satisfied that the criteria set out above in *Soundair* have been met: there has been a sufficient effort to obtain the best price; the debtor has not acted improvidently; the interests of the parties have been properly considered; the process has been carried out with efficacy and integrity; and there is no unfairness in the circumstances.


63 The Transaction will provide for a fair and reasonable resolution of the Just Energy Entities' insolvency and obtain the best value for its assets. In sum, employment is preserved for most employees and energy will continued to be provided for approximately 950,000 customers.

#### *Related relief*

64 With respect to the shareholdings in the Just Energy Entities, it is reasonable to cancel the existing shares and issue new common shares to the Purchaser via JEUS. Similar approaches have been used in other reverse vesting order transactions: see *Black Rock Metals Inc.*, at para. 122; *Harte Gold Corp. (Re)*, at paras. 59-64. Since the existing shareholders have no economic interest in the company, there is no entitlement to recovery unless all creditors are paid in full: *Canwest Global Communications Corp. (Re)*, 2010 ONSC 4209, 70 C.B.R. (5th) 1.

65 The *CBCA* provides that the share conditions of a *CBCA* corporation under *CCAA* protection can be changed by articles of reorganization. Section 191(1) of the *CBCA* recognizes that a "reorganization" includes a court order made under any Act of Parliament that affects the rights among the corporation, its shareholders and other creditors (see s. 191(1)(c)). This includes the *CCAA*: see *Canwest*, at para. 34; *Black Rock Metals Inc.*, at para. 122; *Harte Gold Corp. (Re)*, at para. 61 (dealing with the equivalent provision of Ontario's *Business Corporations Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16. (*OBCA*)).

66 Pursuant to ss. 173, 176(1)(b) and 191(2) of the *CBCA*, courts have accepted that, under a *CCAA* proceeding, they can approve the cancellation of outstanding shares as part of a corporate reorganization that gives effect to a *CCAA* restructuring



Tab

6



2021 ABCA 144  
Alberta Court of Appeal

1705221 Alberta Ltd v. Three M Mortgages Inc

2021 CarswellAlta 968, 2021 ABCA 144, [2021] A.W.L.D. 4108, 336 A.C.W.S. (3d) 283

**1705221 Alberta Ltd (Appellant / Plaintiff) and Three M Mortgages Inc and Avatex Land Corporation (Respondents / Plaintiffs) and Todd Oeming, Todd Oeming as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Albert Oeming and the Estate of Albert Oeming (Defendants) and BDO Canada Limited (Interested Party) and Shelby Fehr (Interested Party)**

Three M Mortgages Inc and Avatex Land Corporation (Respondents / Plaintiffs) and Todd Oeming, Todd Oeming as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Albert Oeming and the Estate of Albert Oeming (Appellants / Defendants) and BDO Canada Limited (Interested Party) and Shelby Fehr (Interested Party)

Jack Watson J.A., Dawn Pentelchuk J.A., and Kevin Feehan J.A.

Heard: April 1, 2021

Judgment: April 21, 2021

Docket: Edmonton Appeal 2003-0076AC, 2003-0077AC

Proceedings: additional reasons at [1705221 Alberta Ltd v. Three M Mortgages Inc \(2021\)](#), [2021 ABCA 192](#), [2021 CarswellAlta 1232](#), Dawn Pentelchuk J.A., Jack Watson J.A., Kevin Feehan J.A. (Alta. C.A.)

Counsel: D.R. Bieganeck, Q.C., for Appellant, 1705221 Alberta Ltd

K.A. Rowan, Q.C., for Respondents, Three M Mortgages Inc and Avatex Land Corporation

K.G. Heintz, for Respondents, Todd Oeming, Todd Oeming as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Albert Oeming, and the Estate of Albert Oeming

M.J. McCabe, Q.C., for Interested Party, BDO Canada Limited

B.G. Doherty, for Interested Party, Shelby Fehr

Subject: Civil Practice and Procedure; Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

**Related Abridgment Classifications**

Debtors and creditors

[VII](#) Receivers

[VII.6](#) Conduct and liability of receiver

[VII.6.a](#) General conduct of receiver

**Headnote**

Debtors and creditors --- Receivers --- Conduct and liability of receiver --- General conduct of receiver

Loan was granted by plaintiff creditors to investment corporation, OI Ltd, which was secured by mortgage on lands owned by OI Ltd and guaranteed by defendant guarantors --- Creditors foreclosed on OI Ltd's land and obtained deficiency judgment and judgment on guarantors --- Guarantors' assets included shares in third party corporation, which owned lands at issue, and receiver was appointed for third party corporation --- Receiver was authorized to list lands for sale and received two offers from prospective purchaser at price slightly below what receiver advised it would have accepted and also received offer from SF --- Receiver filed application for court approval of SF's offer and invited prospective purchaser to submit improved offer to purchase --- Chambers judge approved sale to SF --- Guarantors and prospective purchaser brought appeals seeking to set aside order approving sale of lands to SF --- Appeals dismissed --- Receiver demonstrated reasonable efforts to market lands and did not act improvidently and receiver's acceptance of SF's offer was reasonable in circumstances and unassailable --- SF's offer was significantly better than prospective purchaser's second offer and clearly reasonable given that it exceeded appraised



value of lands — Integrity of sale process was not compromised — Having concluded that both sale process and SF offer were fair and reasonable, there was no reason for chambers judge to compare prospective purchaser's third offer to offer accepted, nor to enter into new bid process.

#### Table of Authorities

##### Cases considered:

*Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg* (1986), 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 22 C.P.C. (2d) 131, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526, 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 320 (note), 1986 CarswellOnt 235 (Ont. H.C.) — followed

*Jaycap Financial Ltd v. Snowdon Block Inc* (2019), 2019 ABCA 47, 2019 CarswellAlta 160, 68 C.B.R. (6th) 7 (Alta. C.A.) — followed

*Pricewaterhousecoopers Inc v. 1905393 Alberta Ltd* (2019), 2019 ABCA 433, 2019 CarswellAlta 2418, 74 C.B.R. (6th) 14, 98 Alta. L.R. (6th) 1 (Alta. C.A.) — followed

*Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) — followed

*Skyepharma PLC v. Hyal Pharmaceutical Corp.* (2000), 2000 CarswellOnt 466, 47 O.R. (3d) 234, 130 O.A.C. 273, 15 C.B.R. (4th) 298 (Ont. C.A.) — followed

##### Statutes considered:

*Business Corporations Act*, R.S.A. 2000, c. B-9

Generally — referred to

*Civil Enforcement Act*, R.S.A. 2000, c. C-15

Generally — referred to

*Judicature Act*, R.S.A. 2000, c. J-2

Generally — referred to

APPEALS by guarantors and prospective purchaser seeking to set aside order approving sale of lands to SF.

#### Per curiam:

#### Overview

1 These appeals involve challenges to a sale approval and vesting order granted by a chambers judge in the course of receivership proceedings. The appellant guarantors, Todd Oeming, Todd Oeming as Personal Representative of the Estate of Albert Oeming and the Estate of Albert Oeming (collectively, Oeming) seek to set aside the order approving the sale of lands to Shelby Fehr, as does an unsuccessful prospective purchaser, the appellant 1705221 Alberta Ltd (170).

2 These appeals engage consideration of whether the Receiver, BDO Canada Limited, satisfied the well-known test for court approval outlined in *Royal Bank of Canada v Soundair Corp* (1991), 83 DLR (4th) 76, 4 OR (3d) 1 (CA) [*Soundair*]. The arguments of both appellants coalesce around the suggestion that the sale process lacked the necessary hallmarks of fairness, integrity and reasonableness.

3 The chambers judge applied the correct test in deciding whether to approve the sale recommended by the Receiver; therefore, for either appeal to succeed, one or both appellants must demonstrate that the chambers judge erred in the exercise of his discretion in approving the sale. This attracts a high degree of deference. Since the chambers judge did not misdirect himself on the law, this Court will only interfere if his decision was so clearly wrong that it amounts to an injustice or where the chambers judge gave no or insufficient weight to relevant considerations: *Jaycap Financial Ltd v Snowdon Block Inc* 2019 ABCA 47 at para 20.

4 We have concluded that neither Oeming nor 170 has demonstrated any error that would warrant setting aside the order. For the reasons that follow, the appeals are dismissed.

#### Background

16 On February 28, 2020, after reviewing the affidavit evidence and hearing full submissions, the chambers judge made the following findings:

- 170's February 3, 2020 offer was never accepted;
- There was no consensus between 170 and the Receiver regarding the structure of the purchase price; this was being negotiated;
- There was no evidence 170's offer was shopped around beyond the normal course;
- 170, through its realtor, was aware of other potential purchasers;
- 170's suspicion something untoward had happened was not grounded in the evidence.

17 The chambers judge concluded that allowing 170's offer to be considered "would be manifestly unfair and lend uncertainty to the process of sales under receiverships, which would be untenable in the commercial community and would erode trust in that community and its confidence in the court-supervised receivership process". The sale to Fehr was approved.

18 The chambers judge later granted a stay of the order pending appeal.

### The Soundair Test

19 Court approval of the sale requires the Receiver to satisfy the well-known test in *Soundair*. As this Court summarized in *Pricewaterhousecoopers Inc v 1905393 Alberta Ltd* 2019 ABCA 433 at para 10 [*Pricewaterhousecoopers*], the test requires satisfaction of four factors:

- i. Whether the Receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently;
- ii. Whether the interests of all parties have been considered, not just the interests of the creditors of the debtor;
- iii. The efficacy and integrity of the sale process by which offers are obtained; and
- iv. Whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.


20 Although the grounds of appeal of 170 and Oeming differ, they all lead to the central question of whether the Receiver satisfied the *Soundair* requirements. 170 seeks to set aside the order and asks that a bid process involving 170 and Fehr be allowed, on the condition that neither party be allowed to submit an offer for less than their last and highest offer. Oeming asks that the order be set aside and that they be provided additional time to refinance or alternatively, that the lands be re-marketed for a minimum of six to nine months.

21 We will address each of the four *Soundair* factors in turn, from the perspective of both 170 and Oeming.

#### *i. Sufficient Efforts to Sell*

22 A court approving a sale recommended by a receiver is not engaged in a perfunctory, rubberstamp exercise. But neither should a court reject a receiver's recommendation on sale absent exceptional circumstances: *Soundair* at paras 21, 58. A receiver plays the lead role in receivership proceedings. They are officers of the court; their advice should therefore be given significant weight. To otherwise approach the proceedings would weaken the receiver's central purpose and function and erode confidence in those who deal with them: *Crown Trust Co v Rosenberg*(1986), 39 DLR (4th) 526, 60 OR (2d) 87 (ONSC) at p 551.

23 Oeming argues that the chambers judge erred in relying on the Receiver's appraisal of the lands which was not appended to an affidavit and therefore constituted inadmissible hearsay. Oeming further alleges that the Receiver acted improvidently in listing the lands for sale at \$1,950,000, an amount they insist is significantly below property value. They point to their appraisal



Tab

**7**

2019 ABCA 433  
Alberta Court of Appeal

Pricewaterhousecoopers Inc v. 1905393 Alberta Ltd

2019 CarswellAlta 2418, 2019 ABCA 433, [2019] A.W.L.D. 4519,  
312 A.C.W.S. (3d) 237, 74 C.B.R. (6th) 14, 98 Alta. L.R. (6th) 1

**Pricewaterhousecoopers Inc. in its capacity as Receiver of 1905393 Alberta Ltd.  
(Respondent / Cross-Appellants / Applicant) and 1905393 Alberta Ltd., David  
Podollan and Steller One Holdings Ltd. (Appellants / Cross-Respondents /  
Respondents) and Servus Credit Union Ltd., Ducor Properties Ltd., Northern  
Electric Ltd. and Fancy Doors & Mouldings Ltd. (Respondents / Interested Parties)**

Thomas W. Wakeling, Dawn Pentelechuk, Jolaine Antonio JJ.A.

Heard: September 3, 2019

Judgment: November 14, 2019

Docket: Edmonton Appeal 1903-0134-AC

Counsel: D.M. Nowak, J.M. Lee, Q.C., for Respondent, Pricewaterhousecoopers Inc. in its capacity as receiver of 1905393 Alberta Ltd.

D.R. Peskett, C.M. Young, for Appellants

C.P. Russell, Q.C., R.T. Trainer, for Respondent, Servus Credit Union Ltd.

S.A. Wanke, for Respondent, Ducor Properties Ltd.

S.T. Fitzgerald, for Respondent, Northern Electric Ltd.

H.S. Kandola, for Respondent, Fancy Doors & Mouldings Ltd.

Subject: Civil Practice and Procedure; Insolvency

**Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XVII Practice and procedure in courts](#)

[XVII.4 Appeals](#)

[XVII.4.b Miscellaneous](#)

**Headnote**

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Practice and procedure in courts — Appeals — Miscellaneous

Appellants appeal Approval and Vesting Order which approved sale proposed in Asset Purchase Agreement between Receiver, PWC, and respondent, D Ltd. — Appeal dismissed — Chambers judge was keenly alive to abbreviated marketing period and appraised values of hotels — Nevertheless, having regard to unique nature of property, incomplete construction of development hotel, difficulties with prospective purchasers in branding hotels in area outside of major centre and area which was in midst of economic downturn, she concluded that receiver acted in commercially reasonable manner and obtained best price possible in circumstances — Even with abbreviated period for submission of offers, chambers judge reasonably concluded that receiver undertook extensive marketing campaign, engaged commercial realtor and construction consultant, and consulted and dialogued with owner throughout process, which process appellants took no issue with, until offers were received.

**Table of Authorities**

**Cases considered:**

*Bank of Montreal v. River Rentals Group Ltd.* (2010), 2010 ABCA 16, 2010 CarswellAlta 57, 18 Alta. L.R. (5th) 201, 470 W.A.C. 333, 469 A.R. 333, 63 C.B.R. (5th) 26 (Alta. C.A.) — considered

*Northstone Power Corp. v. R.J.K. Power Systems Ltd.* (2002), 2002 ABCA 201, 2002 CarswellAlta 1111, 36 C.B.R. (4th) 272, 317 A.R. 192, 284 W.A.C. 192 (Alta. C.A.) — referred to

*Romspen Mortgage Corp. v. Lantzville Foothills Estates Inc.* (2013), 2013 BCSC 2222, 2013 CarswellBC 3640, 12 C.B.R. (6th) 282 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

*Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) — followed

*Salima Investments Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal* (1985), 41 Alta. L.R. (2d) 58, 21 D.L.R. (4th) 473, 65 A.R. 372, 59 C.B.R. (N.S.) 242, 1985 CarswellAlta 332 (Alta. C.A.) — referred to

*Skyepharm PLC v. Hyal Pharmaceutical Corp.* (1999), 1999 CarswellOnt 3641, 12 C.B.R. (4th) 87, [2000] B.P.I.R. 531, 96 O.T.C. 172 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

*Skyepharm PLC v. Hyal Pharmaceutical Corp.* (2000), 2000 CarswellOnt 466, 47 O.R. (3d) 234, 130 O.A.C. 273, 15 C.B.R. (4th) 298 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

*1905393 Alberta Ltd v. Servus Credit Union Ltd* (2019), 2019 ABCA 269, 2019 CarswellAlta 1342, 72 C.B.R. (6th) 20 (Alta. C.A.) — referred to

#### Statutes considered:

*Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

s. 193 — considered

s. 193(a) — considered

s. 193(a)-193(d) — referred to

s. 193(c) — considered

s. 193(e) — considered

APPEAL by appellants from Approval and Vesting Order which approved sale proposed in Asset Purchase Agreement between receiver, PWC, and respondent, D Ltd.

#### *Per curiam:*

1 The appellants appeal an Approval and Vesting Order granted on May 21, 2019 which approved a sale proposed in the May 3, 2019 Asset Purchase Agreement between the Receiver, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, and the respondent, Ducor Properties Ltd ("Ducor"). The assets consist primarily of lands and buildings in Grande Prairie, Alberta described as a partially constructed 169 room full service hotel not currently open for business (the "Development Hotel") and a 63 room extended stay hotel ("Extended Stay Hotel") currently operating on the same parcel of land (collectively the "Hotels"). The Hotels are owned by the appellant, 1905393 Alberta Ltd. ("190") whose shareholder is the appellant, Stellar One Holdings Ltd, and whose president and sole director is the appellant, David Podollan.

2 The respondent, Servus Credit Union Ltd ("Servus"), is 190's largest secured creditor. Servus provided financing to 190 for construction of the Hotels. On May 16, 2018, Servus issued a demand for payment of its outstanding debt. As of June 29, 2018, 190 owed Servus approximately \$23.9 million. That debt remains outstanding and, in fact, continues to increase because of interest, property taxes and ongoing carrying costs for the Hotels incurred by the Receiver.

3 On July 20, 2018, the Receiver was appointed over all of 190's current and future assets, undertakings and properties. The appellants opposed the Receiver's appointment primarily on the basis that 190 was seeking to re-finance the Hotels. That re-financing has never materialized.

4 As a result, the Receiver sought in October 2018 to liquidate the Hotels. In typical fashion, the Receiver obtained an appraisal of the Hotels, as did the respondents. After consulting with three national real estate brokers, the Receiver engaged the services of Colliers International ("Colliers"), which recommended a structured sales process with no listing price and a fixed bid submission date. While the sales process contemplated an exposure period of approximately six weeks between market launch and offer submission deadline, Colliers had contacted over 1,290 prospective purchasers and agents using a variety of mediums in the months prior to market launch, exposing the Hotels to national hotel groups and individuals in the industry, and

conducted site visits and answered inquiries posed by prospective buyers. Prospective purchasers provided feedback to Colliers but that included concerns about the quality of construction on the Development Hotel.

5 The Receiver also engaged the services of an independent construction consultant, Entuitive Corporation, to provide an estimate of the cost to complete construction on the Development Hotel and to assist in decision-making on whether to complete the Development Hotel. In addition, the Receiver contacted a major international hotel franchise brand to obtain input on prospective franchisees' views of the design and fixturing of the Development Hotel. The ability to brand the Hotels is a significant factor affecting their marketability. Moreover, some of the feedback confirmed that energy exploration and development in Grande Prairie is down, resulting in downward pressure on hotel-room demand.

6 Parties that requested further information in response to the listing were asked to execute a confidentiality agreement whereupon they were granted access to a "data-room" containing information on the Hotels and offering related documents and photos. Colliers provided confidential information regarding 190's assets to 27 interested parties.

7 The deadline for offer submission yielded only four offers, each of which was far below the appraised value of the Hotels. Three of the four offers were extremely close in respect of their stated price; the fourth offer was significantly lower than the others. As a result, the Receiver went back to the three prospective purchasers that had similar offers and asked them to re-submit better offers. None, however, varied their respective purchase prices in a meaningful manner when invited to do so. The Receiver ultimately accepted and obtained approval for Ducor's offer to purchase which, as the appellants correctly point out, is substantially less than the appraised value of the Hotels.

8 The primary thrust of the appellants' argument is that an abbreviated sale process resulted in an offer which is unreasonably low having regard to the appraisals. They argue that the Receiver was improvident in accepting such an offer and the chambers judge erred by approving it. Approving the sale, they argue, would eliminate the substantial equity in the property evidenced by the appraised value and that the "massive prejudice" caused to them as a result materially outweighs any further time and cost associated with requiring the Receiver to re-market the Hotels with a longer exposure time. Mr. Podollan joins in this argument as he is potentially liable for any shortfall under personal guarantees to Servus for all amounts owed to Servus by 190. The other respondents, Fancy Doors & Mouldings Ltd and Northern Electric Ltd, similarly echo the appellants' arguments as the shortfall may deprive them both from collecting on their builders' liens which, collectively, total approximately \$340,000.

9 The appellants obtained both a stay of the Approval and Vesting Order and leave to appeal pursuant to s 193 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, RSC 1985, c B-3: *1905393 Alberta Ltd v. Servus Credit Union Ltd*, [2019] A.J. No. 895, 2019 ABCA 269 (Alta. C.A.). The issues around which leave was granted generally coalesce around two questions. First, whether the chambers judge applied the correct test in deciding whether to approve of the Receiver recommended sale; and second, whether the chambers judge erred in her application of the legal test to the facts in deciding whether to approve the sale and, in particular, erred in her exercise of discretion by failing to consider or provide sufficient weight to a relevant factor. The standard of review is correctness on the first question and palpable and overriding error on the second: *Northstone Power Corp. v. R.J.K. Power Systems Ltd.*, 2002 ABCA 201 (Alta. C.A.) at para 4, (2002), 317 A.R. 192 (Alta. C.A.).

10 As regards the first question, the parties agree that Court approval requires the Receiver to satisfy the well-known test in *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.*, [1991] O.J. No. 1137 (Ont. C.A.) at para 16, (1991), 46 O.A.C. 321 (Ont. C.A.) ("*Soundair*"). That test requires the Court to consider four factors: (i) whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently; (ii) whether the interests of all parties have been considered, not just the interests of the creditors of the debtor; (iii) the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained; and (iv) whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

11 The appellants suggest that *Soundair* has been modified by our Court in *Bank of Montreal v. River Rentals Group Ltd.*, 2010 ABCA 16 (Alta. C.A.) at para 13, (2010), 469 A.R. 333 (Alta. C.A.), to require an additional four factors in assessing whether a receiver has complied with its duties: (a) whether the offer accepted is so low in relation to the appraised value as to be unrealistic; (b) whether the circumstances indicate that insufficient time was allowed for the making of bids; (c) whether inadequate notice of sale by bid was given; and (d) whether it can be said that the proposed sale is not in the best interests of



either the creditor or the owner. The appellants argue that, although the chambers judge considered the *Soundair* factors, she erred by failing to consider the additional *River Rentals* factors and, in so doing, in effect applied the "wrong law".

12 We disagree. The chambers judge expressly referred to the *River Rentals* case. *River Rentals*, it must be recalled, simply identified a subset of factors that a Court might also consider when considering the first prong of the *Soundair* test as to whether a receiver failed to get the best price and has not acted providently. Moreover, the type of factors that might be considered is by no means a closed category and there may be other relevant factors that might lead a court to refuse to approve a sale: *Salima Investments Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal* (1985), 65 A.R. 372 (Alta. C.A.) at paras 12-13. At its core, *River Rentals* highlights the need for a Court to balance several factors in determining whether a receiver complied with its duties and to confirm a sale. It did not purport to modify the *Soundair* test, establish a hierarchy of factors, nor limit the types of things that a Court might consider. The chambers judge applied the correct test. This ground of appeal is dismissed.

13 At its core, then, the appellants challenge how the chambers judge applied and weighed the relevant factors in this case. The appellants suggest that the failure to obtain a price at or close to the appraised value of the Hotels is an overriding factor that trumps all the others in assessing whether the Receiver acted improvidently. That is not the test. A reviewing Court's function is not to consider whether a Receiver has failed to get the best price. Rather, a Receiver's duty is to act in a commercially reasonable manner in the circumstances with a view to obtaining the best price having regard to the competing interests of the interested parties: *Skyepharm PLC v. Hyal Pharmaceutical Corp.* (1999), 12 C.B.R. (4th) 87 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para 4, [1999] O.J. No. 4300 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), aff'd on appeal (2000), 15 C.B.R. (4th) 298 (Ont. C.A.).

14 Nor is it the Court's function to substitute its view of how a marketing process should proceed. The appellants suggest that if the Hotels were re-marketed with an exposure period closer to that which the appraisals were based on, then a better offer might be obtained. Again, that is not the test. The Receiver's decision to enter into an agreement for sale must be assessed under the circumstances then existing. The chambers judge was aware that the Receiver considered the risk of not accepting the approved offer to be significant. There was no assurance that a longer marketing period would generate a better offer and, in the interim, the Receiver was incurring significant carrying costs. To ignore these circumstances would improperly call into question a receiver's expertise and authority in the receivership process and thereby compromise the integrity of a sales process and would undermine the commercial certainty upon which court-supervised insolvency sales are based: *Soundair* at para 43. In such a case, chaos in the commercial world would result and "receivers and purchasers would never be sure they had a binding agreement": *Soundair* at para 22.

15 The fact that three of the four offers came in so close together in terms of amount, with the fourth one being even lower, is significant. Absent evidence of impropriety or collusion in the preparation of those confidential offers — of which there is absolutely none — the fact that those offers were all substantially lower than the appraised value speaks loudly to the existing hotel market in Grande Prairie. Moreover, the appellants have not brought any fresh evidence application to admit cogent evidence that a better offer might materialize if the Hotels were re-marketed. Indeed, the appellants have indicated that they do not rely on what the leave judge described as a "fairly continuous flow of material", the scent of which was to suggest that there were better offers waiting in the wings but were prevented from bidding because of the Receiver's abbreviated marketing process. Clearly the impression meant to be created by that late flow of material was an important factor in the leave judge's decision to grant a stay and leave to appeal: 2019 ABCA 269 (Alta. C.A.) at para 13.

16 Nor, as stated previously, have the appellants been able to re-finance the Hotels notwithstanding their assessment that there is still substantial equity in the Hotels based on the appraisals. At a certain point, however, it is the market that sets the value of property and appraisals simply become "relegated to not much more than well-meant but inaccurate predictions": *Romspen Mortgage Corp. v. Lantzville Foothills Estates Inc.*, 2013 BCSC 2222 (B.C. S.C.) at para 20.

17 The chambers judge was keenly alive to the abbreviated marketing period and the appraised values of the Hotels. Nevertheless, having regard to the unique nature of the property, the incomplete construction of the Development Hotel, the difficulties with prospective purchasers in branding the Hotels in an area outside of a major centre and an area which is in the midst of an economic downturn, she concluded that the Receiver acted in a commercially reasonable manner and obtained the best price possible in the circumstances. Even with an abbreviated period for submission of offers, the chambers

judge reasonably concluded that the Receiver undertook an extensive marketing campaign, engaged a commercial realtor and construction consultant, and consulted and dialogued with the owner throughout the process, which process the appellants took no issue with, until the offers were received.


18 We see no reviewable error. This ground of appeal is also dismissed.

19 Finally, leave to appeal was also granted on whether s 193 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, and specifically s 193(a) or (c) of the Act, creates a leave to appeal as of right in these circumstances or whether leave to appeal is required pursuant to s 193(e). As the appeal was also authorized under s 193(e), we find it unnecessary to address whether this case meets the criteria for leave as of right in s 193(a)-(d) of the Act.

*Appeal dismissed.*

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Tab

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2015 QCCS 1920  
Cour supérieure du Québec

Bloom Lake, g.p.l., Re

2015 CarswellQue 4072, 2015 QCCS 1920, 27 C.B.R. (6th) 1, J.E. 2015-830, EYB 2015-251727

**In the matter of the companies' creditors arrangement act, r.s.c. 1985, c. C-36, as amended:  
Bloom lake General Partner Limited, Quinto Mining Corporation, 8568391 Canada  
Limited and Cliffs Québec Iron mining ULC, Petitioners, and The bloom lake iron ore  
mine limited partnership and Bloom lake railway company limited, Mises en cause, and  
FTI Consulting Canada Inc., Monitor, and 9201955 Canada inc., Mise en cause, and  
Eabametoong first nation, Ginoogaming first nation, Constance Lake first nation and Long  
Lake # 58 first nation, Aroland first nation and Marten Falls first nation, Objectors, and  
8901341 Canada inc. and Canadian Development And Marketing Corporation, Interveners**

Hamilton J.C.S.

Heard: 24 april 2015

Judgment: 27 april 2015

Docket: C.S. Qué. Montréal 500-11-048114-157

Counsel: Me Bernard Boucher, Me Sébastien Guy, Me Steven J. Weisz for Bloom Lake General Partner Limited, Quinto Mining Corporation, 8568391 Canada Limited, Cliffs Quebec Iron Mining ULC, The Bloom Lake Iron Ore Mine Limited Partnership, Bloom Lake Railway Company Limited

Me Sylvain Rigaud, Me Chrystal Ashby for FTI Consulting Canada Inc.

Me Jean-Yves Simard, Me Sean Zweig for 9201955 Canada Inc.

Me Stéphane Hébert, Me Maurice Fleming for Eabametoong First Nation Ginoogaming First Nation, Constance Lake First Nation and Long Lake # 58 First Nation, Aroland First Nation, Marten Falls First Nation

Me Sandra Abitan, Me Éric Préfontaine, Me Julien Morissette for 8901341 Canada inc. Canadian Development and Marketing Corporation

Subject: Civil Practice and Procedure; Insolvency; Public

#### **Related Abridgment Classifications**

Aboriginal and Indigenous law

[XII Miscellaneous](#)

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act](#)

[XIX.3 Arrangements](#)

[XIX.3.c Miscellaneous](#)

Civil practice and procedure

[III Parties](#)

[III.4 Standing](#)

#### **Headnote**

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Miscellaneous

Sellers, who were parent company and affiliates of petitioners, sought to sell interests in chromite mining projects in Ring of Fire mining district — Sellers executed initial Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) with N, which made provision for "superior proposal" mechanism allowing sellers to accept unsolicited, superior offer from third party — Petitioners commenced motion for issuance of approval and vesting order with respect to initial SPA — C made unsolicited, superior offer — Sellers developed supplemental bid process giving C and N chance to submit their best and final offers — Sellers ultimately accepted N's higher

25 [Section 36 of the CCAA](#) provides in part as follows:

36. (1) A debtor company in respect of which an order has been made under this Act may not sell or otherwise dispose of assets outside the ordinary course of business unless authorized to do so by a court. Despite any requirement for shareholder approval, including one under federal or provincial law, the court may authorize the sale or disposition even if shareholder approval was not obtained.

...

(3) In deciding whether to grant the authorization, the court is to consider, among other things,

- (a) whether the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition was reasonable in the circumstances;
  - (b) whether the monitor approved the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition;
  - (c) whether the monitor filed with the court a report stating that in their opinion the sale or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy;
  - (d) the extent to which the creditors were consulted;
  - (e) the effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties; and
  - (f) whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value.
- (6) The court may authorize a sale or disposition free and clear of any security, charge or other restriction and, if it does, it shall also order that other assets of the company or the proceeds of the sale or disposition be subject to a security, charge or other restriction in favour of the creditor whose security, charge or other restriction is to be affected by the order.

...

26 The criteria in [Section 36\(3\) of the CCAA](#) have been held not to be cumulative or exhaustive. The Court must look at the proposed transaction as a whole and decide whether it is appropriate, fair and reasonable:

[48] The elements which can be found in [Section 36 CCAA](#) are, first of all, not limitative and secondly they need not to be all fulfilled in order to grant or not grant an order under this section.

[49] The Court has to look at the transaction as a whole and essentially decide whether or not the sale is appropriate, fair and reasonable. In other words, the Court could grant the process for reasons others than those mentioned in [Section 36 CCAA](#) or refuse to grant it for reasons which are not mentioned in [Section 36 CCAA](#).<sup>16</sup>

27 Further, in the context of one of the asset sales in *AbitibiBowater*, Mr. Justice Gascon, then of this Court, adopted the following list of relevant factors:

[36] The Court has jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets in the course of [CCAA](#) proceedings, notably when such a sale of assets is in the best interest of the stakeholders generally.

[37] In determining whether to authorize a sale of assets under the [CCAA](#), the Court should consider, amongst others, the following key factors:

- have sufficient efforts to get the best price been made and have the parties acted providently;
- the efficacy and integrity of the process followed;

- the interests of the parties; and
- whether any unfairness resulted from the working out process.

[38] These principles were enunciated in *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* They are equally applicable in a CCAA sale situation.<sup>17</sup>

28 The Court must give due consideration to two further elements in assessing whether the sale should be approved under Section 36 CCAA:

1. the business judgment rule:

[70] That being so, it is not for this Court to second-guess the commercial and business judgment properly exercised by the Petitioners and the Monitor.

[71] A court will not lightly interfere with the exercise of this commercial and business judgment in the context of an asset sale where the marketing and sale process was fair, reasonable, transparent and efficient. This is certainly not a case where it should.<sup>18</sup>

2. the weight to be given to the recommendation of the Monitor:

The recommendation of the Monitor, a court-appointed officer experienced in the insolvency field, carries great weight with the Court in any approval process. Absent some compelling, exceptional factor to the contrary, a Court should accept an applicant's proposed sale process where it is recommended by the Monitor and supported by the stakeholders.<sup>19</sup>

29 Debtors often ask the Court to authorize the sale process in advance. This has the advantage of ensuring that the process is clear and of reducing the likelihood of a subsequent challenge. In the present matter, the Petitioners did seek the Court's authorization with respect to a sale process for their other assets, but they did not seek the Court's authorization with respect to the sale process for the Ring of Fire interests because that sale process was already well under way before the CCAA filing. There is no legal requirement that the sale process be approved in advance, but it creates the potential for the process being challenged after the fact, as in this case.

30 The Court will therefore review the sale process in light of these factors.

(1) *From October 2014 to the execution of the Noront letter of intent on February 13, 2015*


31 The sale process began in earnest in October 2014 when Cliffs engaged Moelis.

32 Moelis identified a group of eighteen potential buyers and strategic partners, with the assistance of CQIM and Cliffs. The group included traders, resource buyers, financial sector participants, local strategic partners, and market participants, as well as parties who had previously expressed an interest in the Ring of Fire.

33 Moelis began contacting the potential interested parties to solicit interest in purchasing the Ring of Fire project. It sent a form of non-disclosure agreement to fifteen parties. Fourteen executed the agreement and were given access to certain confidential information.

34 Negotiations ensued with seven of the interested parties, and six were given access to the data room that was established in November 2014.

35 By January 21, 2015, non-binding letters of intent were received from Noront and from a third party. There were also two verbal expressions of interest, but neither resulted in a letter of intent.



Tab

9

2004 NBBR 168, 2004 NBQB 168  
New Brunswick Court of Queen's Bench

Plancher Heritage Ltée / Heritage Flooring Ltd., Re

2004 CarswellNB 358, 2004 NBBR 168, 2004 NBQB 168, [2004]  
N.B.J. No. 286, 279 N.B.R. (2d) 1, 3 C.B.R. (5th) 60, 732 A.P.R. 1

## In the Matter of The Proposal of Plancher Heritage Ltée / Heritage Flooring Ltd.

Glennie J.

Judgment: July 20, 2004  
Docket: 10543, Estate No. 51-114608

Counsel: G. Patrick Gorman, Q.C. for Heritage Flooring Ltd.  
Stephen J. Hutchinson, Jeffrey R. Parker, Lee C. Bell-Smith for Royal Bank of Canada

Subject: Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure

### Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

VI Proposal

VI.6 Miscellaneous

### Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Proposal — General principles

Test for whether insolvent company would be able to make viable proposal, if granted extension of stay, is whether it would likely, as opposed to certainly, be able to present viable proposal — Test is not whether or not specific creditor would be prepared to support proposal — Purpose of stay provisions under [Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act](#) is to preserve and protect status quo at moment when insolvent party files Notice of Intention to Make Proposal — Intention of stay provisions is to allow insolvent party to continue its business in accordance with its existing authorized credit agreements — Secured creditor cannot unilaterally amend loan or credit agreement relating to secured revolving line of credit by capping available line of credit.

### Table of Authorities

#### Cases considered by *Glennie J.*:

*Baldwin Valley Investors Inc., Re* (1994), 23 C.B.R. (3d) 219, 1994 CarswellOnt 253 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

*Bell ExpressVu Ltd. Partnership v. Rex* (2002), 2002 SCC 42, 2002 CarswellBC 851, 2002 CarswellBC 852, 100 B.C.L.R. (3d) 1, [2002] 5 W.W.R. 1, 212 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 287 N.R. 248, 18 C.P.R. (4th) 289, 166 B.C.A.C. 1, 271 W.A.C. 1, 93 C.R.R. (2d) 189, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 (S.C.C.) — referred to

*Com/Mit Hitech Services Inc., Re* (1997), 1997 CarswellOnt 2753, 47 C.B.R. (3d) 182 (Ont. Bkcty.) — considered  
*Cumberland Trading Inc., Re* (1994), 23 C.B.R. (3d) 225, 1994 CarswellOnt 255 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

*Gene Moses Construction Ltd., Re* (1999), 1999 CarswellBC 149, 9 C.B.R. (4th) 275 (B.C. Master) — considered

*National Bank of Canada v. Dutch Industries Ltd.* (1996), 149 Sask. R. 317, 45 C.B.R. (3d) 103, 1996 CarswellSask 631 (Sask. Q.B.) — referred to

*Scotia Rainbow Inc. v. Bank of Montreal* (2000), 2000 CarswellNS 216, 18 C.B.R. (4th) 114, (sub nom. *Scotia Rainbow Inc. (Bankrupt) v. Bank of Montreal*) 186 N.S.R. (2d) 153, (sub nom. *Scotia Rainbow Inc. (Bankrupt) v. Bank of Montreal*) 581 A.P.R. 153 (N.S. S.C.) — referred to

#### Statutes considered:

*Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

s. 50(1.5) [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 18(1)] — considered

s. 50.4(1) [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 19] — referred to

s. 50.4(8) [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 19] — referred to

s. 50.4(11) [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 19] — referred to

s. 50.4(11)(b) [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 19] — referred to

s. 50.4(11)(c) [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 19] — referred to

s. 65.1(1) [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 30] — considered

s. 65.1(4) [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 30] — considered

s. 65.1(4)(b) [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 30] — considered

s. 69 — referred to

ss. 69-69.3(1) — referred to

ss. 69-69.31 — referred to

s. 69(1) — referred to

s. 69(1)(a) — referred to

s. 69.4 [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 36(1)] — considered

s. 244 — referred to

MOTION by insolvent company for extension of stay under s.69 of *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* and for order that bank return to it all funds taken from its operating accounts.

**Glennie J.:**

1 On February 11, 2004, Plancher Heritage Ltee / Heritage Flooring Ltd. ("Heritage") filed a Notice of Intention To Make A Proposal (the "Notice of Intention") pursuant to [Subsection 50.4\(1\) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act](#) (the "BIA"). A.C. Poirier & Associates Inc. (the "Trustee") consented to act as Trustee under the proposal. [Section 69 of the BIA](#) grants a stay (the "Stay") of all creditor actions and remedies against the insolvent person, which stay in this case was to expire on March 12, 2004. On March 12, 2004, I extended the Stay in this matter to Thursday, March 25, 2004 and advised that I would file written reasons for the granting of such an extension. These are those reasons.

2 There is also another issue, namely whether Heritage's banker, Royal Bank of Canada (the "Bank") operated contrary to the stay by sweeping Heritage's operating account and capping its available line of credit or whether the Bank is authorized to do so by virtue of [Section 65.1\(4\)\(b\) of the BIA](#).

**Background**

3 Heritage manufactured hardwood flooring at its plant in Kedgwick, New Brunswick. It had annual gross sales in the range of five to six million dollars.

4 On January 30, 2001, Heritage accepted an offer from the Bank's Asset Based Finance Division to establish a revolving credit facility in favour of Heritage with a credit limit of two million dollars subject to the limitation that the aggregate amount

22 On February 25, 2004, Heritage filed a motion seeking an extension of the stay and also an order that the Bank return to it all funds taken from its operating accounts since February 11, 2004 and that the Stay be extended to April 12, 2004.

23 The Bank opposed Heritage's motion and subsequently filed its own motion seeking an order declaring the 30-day period for filing a proposal terminated pursuant to [Sections 50.4\(11\)\(b\) and \(c\) of the BIA](#) or, in the alternative a declaration that Sections 69 to 69.3(1) of the BIA no longer operate in respect of the Bank pursuant to [Section 69.4 of the BIA](#) and, in the further alternative, an order determining the classes of secured creditors pursuant to [Subsection 50\(1.5\) of the BIA](#) and in so doing determine that the Bank does not fall within the same class of secured creditors as Business Development Bank of Canada and Farm Credit Corporation.

24 Counsel for the Bank argued that Heritage would not likely be able to make a viable proposal before the expiration of the 30-day period that will be accepted by the creditors of Heritage and that the Bank is likely to be materially prejudiced by the continued operations of [Sections 69 - 69.31 of the BIA](#).

25 The Bank argued that its level of security decreased significantly after the filing by Heritage of the Notice of Intention. The Bank says that in the nine days following the filing, its level of security decreased in the approximate amount of \$140,000.00. Five days later, on February 25, 2004, the Bank says its position had been eroded by a further amount of approximately \$38,000.00.

26 Immediately prior to the filing of the Notice of Intention, Heritage was entitled to draw upon its credit facility at the Bank in the amount of \$1,283,444.74. Subsequently, Heritage made significant deposits to its Canadian dollar operating account and its U.S. dollar operating account. On the date of filing of the Notice of Intention, the Bank capped Heritage's credit facility at the then current outstanding balance of \$1,283,444.74.

27 Subsequent to the filing of its Notice of Intention, Heritage made deposits to its Canadian account and its U.S. account totalling \$209,944.03. Subsequent to the deposits being made by Heritage, the Bank transferred the deposited funds to the blocked account and swept the funds in what the Bank says was in accordance "*with the existing contractual arrangements with Heritage*." The balance outstanding under the credit facilities was thus reduced to \$1,080,589.38. The Trustee advised counsel for the Bank that the Bank's action offended the Stay in place as a result of the filing of the Notice of Intention. He went on to state, "*the actions of the bank could have a damaging affect on the debtor's ability to restructure*." The Trustee notified counsel for the Bank that Heritage had confirmed to him that the Bank had seized \$205,445.01 from Heritage's account and the Trustee requested the immediate return of the funds.

28 The Bank argued that if it had not reduced the amount of the loan balance through the sweep of the account in the usual process. The Bank says it would, as of March 1, 2004, have been in a margin deficit of \$179,984.88 in the 14 days since the filing of the Notice of Intention due to a decrease of the level of the Bank's security from \$1,283,529.43, as of the date of filing of the Notice, to \$1,103,544.55 as of the February 25, 2004 upload. The Bank argued that a decrease of approximately \$180,000.00 in the level of its security over a period of 14 days amounted to material prejudice and that the stay should not be allowed to continued.

29 The Trustee takes the position that the Bank's action in sweeping the account was in contravention of the Stay and that the Bank should be ordered to replace the funds and be restrained from taking any further action in this regard without further order of this Court. The Trustee also asserts that the Bank has not been materially prejudiced.

### **The Application For An Extension Of Time**

30 [Subsection 50.4\(9\) of the BIA](#) provides:

69.(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3) and [sections 69.4 and 69.5](#), on the filing of a notice of intention under [section 50.4](#) by an insolvent person,



(a) no creditor has any remedy against the insolvent person or the insolvent person's property, or shall commence or continue any action, execution or other proceedings, for the recovery of a claim provable in bankruptcy.

31 I am satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that as of March 12, 2004 Heritage met the following criteria to grant an extension: a) It had acted, and continued to act, in good faith and with due diligence; b) It would likely be able to make a viable proposal if the extension were to be granted; and, c) no creditor of Heritage would be materially prejudiced if the extension were to be granted.

32 The test for whether Heritage would likely be able to make a viable proposal, if granted the extension, is whether it would likely, as opposed to certainly, be able to present a viable proposal. The test is not whether or not a specific creditor would be prepared to support the proposal. In *Baldwin Valley Investors Inc.* (1994), 23 C.B.R. (3d) 219 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), Justice Farley was of the opinion that "viable" means "reasonable on its face" to a reasonable creditor and that "likely" did not require certainty but meant "might well happen", "probable" or "to be reasonably expected." See also *Scotia Rainbow Inc. v. Bank of Montreal* (2000), 18 C.B.R. (4th) 114 (N.S. S.C.).

33 In support of its motion, the Bank relied on [Section 50.4\(11\)\(c\) of the BIA](#) and argued that Heritage would not be able to make a proposal before the expiration of the 30-day period that would be accepted by the majority of its creditors. It relied upon *Cumberland Trading Inc., Re*, [1994] O.J. No. 132 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) in support of its argument. In *Cumberland Trading Inc.*, Skyview International Finance Corporation represented 95 percent of the value of the claims of secured creditors of Cumberland and 67 percent of all creditors' claims. Skyview therefore had a veto power on any vote on a proposal and it asserted that there was no proposal which Cumberland could make that it would approve. Justice Farley allowed Skyview's motion and declared terminated the 30-day period in which to file a proposal.

34 Similarly, in *Com/Mit Hitech Services Inc., Re*, [1997] O.J. No. 3360 (Ont. Bkcty.), Toronto Dominion Bank ("TD Bank") was owed more than 90 percent of the debtor's total indebtedness and brought a motion pursuant to [Section 50.4\(11\) of the BIA](#) requesting a declaration that the 30-day period provided in [Section 50.4\(8\)](#) be terminated. Justice Farley allowed TD Bank's application, recognizing that TD Bank was the overwhelming creditor and thus was in a veto position with respect to any proposal.


35 However, in the present case, the Trustee has advised that the Bank would be outside the terms of any proposal and would in fact be paid out. As well, Gilbert LeBlanc testified that Group Savoie, which has expressed an interest in acquiring all of the outstanding shares of Heritage, understands that the Bank would have to be paid out. Accordingly, the Bank's argument that it is in a position to veto any proposal put forth by Heritage must fail since the Trustee has advised that the Bank will not be in a position to veto any proposal since it will be outside the terms of any proposal and would not be included in any class of creditors of Heritage.

36 In granting an extension of the stay, I relied on the fact that Groupe Savoie Inc. expressed a desire to negotiate with the shareholders of Heritage for the purpose of structuring a transaction whereby it would acquire all of the outstanding shares of Heritage. It was anticipated that negotiations would take place from March 15th to March 17, 2004 "with a formal letter of intent to be provided no later than Monday, March 22, 2004 and open for acceptance by the shareholders of the Company until 5:00 p.m. on Tuesday, March 23, 2004." Groupe Savoie is an arms length corporation with substantial assets.

37 At the time of the hearing of Heritage's motion, I was satisfied that Heritage established on a balance of probabilities that an extension was justified. Accordingly, I allowed Heritage's application for an extension of the Stay to March 25, 2004.

### The Availability of Credit

38 The next issue to be addressed is whether the Bank acted contrary to the Stay provisions of [Section 69 of the BIA](#) by sweeping Heritage's operating account and capping its operating facility subsequent to the date Heritage filed its Notice Of Intention. Heritage argues that by so doing the Bank in effect executed a remedy contrary to [Section 69.\(1\) of the BIA](#).



Tab

10

2020 NSSC 131

Nova Scotia Supreme Court

Scotian Distribution Services Limited (Re)

2020 CarswellNS 256, 2020 NSSC 131, 318 A.C.W.S. (3d) 12, 78 C.B.R. (6th) 258

## **In the Matter of: The Proposal of Scotian Distribution Services Limited**

Reg. Raffi A. Balmanoukian

Heard: March 27, 2020

Judgment: April 6, 2020

Docket: 43999, Estate No. 51-2624515

Counsel: Tim Hill, Q.C., for Applicant

Subject: Civil Practice and Procedure; Insolvency

### **Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[VI Proposal](#)

[VI.5 Practice and procedure](#)

### **Headnote**

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Proposal — Time period to file — Extension of time

Provincial court adopted essential services model in response to Covid-19 pandemic — Only matters deemed urgent or essential by presiding jurist would be heard and they would be heard by method of least direct personal interaction — Debtor had brought application for extension of time to file proposal, pursuant to [s. 50.4\(9\) of Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act](#) — Application granted — Time to file proposal was extended — Matter was heard by teleconference — Urgent or essential threshold was met — Limitation period in s. 50.4(8) of Act was nigh — Lack of extension would result in deemed assignment in bankruptcy — Deemed assignment would at least potentially have impacts that ran beyond solely individual interests of corporate debtor — Evidence of current status of process established good faith requirement — Debtor had employees and contracts and its operations included transportation which were important and perhaps essential on both micro and macroeconomic basis — No creditor objected and there was no evidence that extension would cause material prejudice to any creditor — Debtor had to demonstrate that it was likely to be able to make viable proposal with extension in place but in current context benefit of any doubt should be accorded to debtor — In current environment, creditor would be well advised to consider viability and desirability of proposal [Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s 50.4\(9\)](#).

### **Table of Authorities**

#### **Statutes considered:**

*Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

s. 50.4(8) [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 19] — referred to

s. 50.4(9) [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 19] — considered

s. 50.4(9)(a) [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 19] — considered

s. 50.4(9)(b) [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 19] — considered

s. 50.4(9)(c) [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 19] — considered

APPLICATION by debtor for extension of time to file proposal.

**Reg. Raffi A. Balmanoukian:**

1 The word "Bankrupt" is derived from the Italian "*banca rotta*." In times of yore, an insolvent merchant's place of business would be trashed by irate creditors; the result was a "broken bench."

2 In Nova Scotia, the Bench will not break.

3 During the Great Plague of 1665-6, the Court in London moved from Westminster to Oxford (as did Parliament). But yet, they persisted.

4 In 2020, we are blessed with far greater modalities of communication and administration. As circumstances direct they are being, and will be brought, to bear in the interests of delivering both justice and access to justice.

5 As I write, and with a hat tip to Mr. Yeats, mere anarchy is loosed upon the world.

6 It is not business as usual. Virtually nothing is.

7 On March 19, 2020, the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia adopted an "essential services" model in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. This has meant that only matters deemed urgent or essential by the presiding jurist will be heard until further notice; and those, by the method of least direct personal interaction that is consistent with the delivery and administration of justice. This can, in appropriate instances, include written, virtual, electronic, telephone, video, or other modalities, and adaptations of procedures surrounding filing of affidavit and other material.

8 On March 20, 2020, I issued a memorandum to all Trustees in Nova Scotia reflecting this as it applies to this Court, and underscoring the "urgent or essential" standard. It can be obtained from the Deputy Registrar whose contact coordinates, in turn, are posted on the Court website (courts.ns.ca).

9 "Essential" means such matters that must be filed, with or without a scheduled hearing, to preserve the rights of the parties - such as those which face a legislative limitation period. "Urgent" means matters that simply cannot wait, in the opinion of the presiding jurist.

10 Both the Chief Justice of Nova Scotia, the Honourable Chief Justice Michael J. Wood, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, the Honourable Chief Justice Deborah K. Smith, have been clear that this does not mean that Courts, being an essential branch of government and the guardian of the rule of law, cease to function. It means that they operate during this global emergency - and its local manifestation - on an essential services basis.

11 Accordingly, scheduled matters are deemed to be adjourned *sine die* unless brought to my attention in accordance with the memorandum noted above and I (or a presiding Justice) deem the standard to be met.

12 Against that backdrop, evolving in real time, I faced the present application. It is a motion for an extension of time to file a proposal, pursuant to [Section 50.4\(9\) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c. B-3](#), as amended (the "BIA"). That section reads:

(9) The insolvent person may, before the expiry of the 30-day period referred to in subsection (8) or of any extension granted under this subsection, apply to the court for an extension, or further extension, as the case may be, of that period, and the court, on notice to any interested persons that the court may direct, may grant the extensions, not exceeding 45 days for any individual extension and not exceeding in the aggregate five months after the expiry of the 30-day period referred to in subsection (8), if satisfied on each application that

(a) the insolvent person has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence;

(b) the insolvent person would likely be able to make a viable proposal if the extension being applied for were granted;  
and

(c) no creditor would be materially prejudiced if the extension being applied for were granted. [emphasis added]

13 The present motion had been scheduled for March 27, 2020. The applicant's Notice of Intention had been filed on February 28, 2020, meaning that its expiration, 30 days thereafter, was at the end of March, 2020 (BIA s. 50.4(8)). The scheduled motion was therefore at the very end of this timeline, and the lack of an extension would result in a deemed assignment in bankruptcy (BIA s. 50.4(8)).

14 The applicant sought to have the matter heard by teleconference. After a review of the file material, I agreed. The Deputy Registrar, with my gratitude, arranged for recording facilities; this is still an open Court of record. Affected entities are still entitled to notice, and they are still entitled to be heard. As well, our open court principle remains and is at least as important as ever.

15 To that end, the applicant was directed to provide affected entities, including creditors, with particulars of the conference call, including time and call-in particulars. That was done, and a creditor (who did not object to the application) did indeed avail itself of this facility.

16 I note that the affidavit of service, and other material, was filed electronically. That is perfectly in order in accordance with the current directives in effect at present.

17 I have granted the order based on the following factors:

18 First, I am satisfied that the 'urgent or essential' threshold was met. The limitation period in BIA 50.4(8) was nigh. The deemed assignment would be automatic. As I will recount below, such an assignment would at least potentially have impacts that run beyond solely the individual interests of the corporate debtor.

19 Section 50.4(9) requires the Court to be satisfied that the applicant meets a three part test each time it is asked for an extension: that it has and continues to act with due diligence; that there is a likely prospect of a viable proposal; *and* that no creditor would be materially prejudiced by the extension. The burden is on the applicant each time, to meet each test.

20 The applicant's affidavit evidence is that the applicant continues in operation and is diligently pursuing the proposal process; the evidence of the current status of the process (ie the engagement of MNP Ltd., review of operations, and review of assets and liabilities) satisfies me, at present, of the good faith requirement.

21 It has employees and contracts. Its operations include transportation operations, which at least for the basis of the current application are important and perhaps essential on both a micro and macroeconomic basis. While "bigger picture" ramifications outside the particular debtor and creditors are not part of the Section 50.4(9) test, I believe I can take them into account when assessing and placing appropriate weight on the benefit/detriment elements which are the overall thrust of that tripartite standard.

22 No creditor objected, and there is no evidence that the extension would cause material prejudice to any creditor. Although this burden, too, is on the applicant, I can take judicial notice that proposals, if performed, generally result in a greater net recovery to creditors overall; while there is some indication that the applicant will seek to resile from certain obligations, the test is whether the *extension* would be prejudicial, not whether the proposal *itself* would be.

23 This would be the applicant's first extension under 50.4(9), which allows for a series of extensions of up to 45 days each, to a maximum of five months.

24 To say that virtually all economic prospects in the near to medium term are moving targets is a considerable understatement. The applicant must still demonstrate that it is "likely [to] be able to make a viable proposal" with the extension in place, but in the current context I consider this to be a threshold in which the benefit of any doubt should be accorded to the applicant. This does not relieve the burden of proof on the applicant of establishing that likelihood to a civil standard; it does, however, indicate that at least on a first extension, it will not likely be a difficult standard to meet.

25 I can take further judicial notice that especially in the current environment, a bankruptcy of an operating enterprise would almost inevitably be nasty, brutish, and anything but short. Creditors would be well advised to consider the viability and desirability of a proposal through that lens.

26 This Court will, no doubt, face a considerable additional case load as the economic fallout of the current human disaster works its way through what is and remains a robust legal process. An applicant should have every reasonable opportunity to avail itself of a restructuring rather than a bankruptcy, assuming it otherwise meets the requirements of [BIA 50.4\(9\)](#).

### **Conclusion**


27 The application is granted, and I have issued the order allowing the time to file a proposal to be extended to and including May 11, 2020.

*Application granted.*

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**End of Document**

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Tab

**11**

2022 SKKB 236

Saskatchewan Court of King's Bench

T & C Steel Ltd., Re

2022 CarswellSask 534, 2022 SKKB 236

**IN THE MATTER OF THE NOTICE OF INTENTION TO MAKE A PROPOSAL  
UNDER SECTION 50.4 OF THE BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY ACT, RSC 1985,  
C B-3, AS AMENDED, OF T & C STEEL LTD. AND T & C REINFORCING LTD.**

T & C STEEL LTD. and T & C REINFORCING LTD. (Applicants)

IN THE MATTER OF THE NOTICE OF INTENTION TO MAKE A PROPOSAL  
UNDER SECTION 50.4 OF THE BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY ACT,  
RSC 1985, C B-3, AS AMENDED, OF UNDER THE SUN GROWERIES INC.

UNDER THE SUN GROWERIES INC. (Applicant)

Scherman J.

Judgment: October 28, 2022

Docket: BKY-RG-00228-2022

Counsel: Travis K. Kusch, David J. Smith, for Applicants

Kelsey J. Meyer, Andrew Basi, for Proposal Trustee

Subject: Insolvency

**Headnote**

Bankruptcy and insolvency

**Table of Authorities**

**Cases considered by Scherman J.:**

*Cantrail Coach Lines Ltd., Re* (2005), 2005 BCSC 351, 2005 CarswellBC 581, 10 C.B.R. (5th) 164 (B.C. S.C.) — considered

*Enirgi Group Corp. v. Andover Mining Corp.* (2013), 2013 BCSC 1833, 2013 CarswellBC 3026, 6 C.B.R. (6th) 32 (B.C. S.C.) — considered

*Scotian Distribution Services Limited (Re)* (2020), 2020 NSSC 131, 2020 CarswellNS 256, 78 C.B.R. (6th) 258 (N.S. S.C.) — considered

**Statutes considered:**

*Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

s. 50.4(9) [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 19] — pursuant to

**Scherman J.:**

1 Each of T & C Steel Ltd. [TCS], T & C Reinforcing Ltd. [TCR] and Under the Sun Groweries Inc. [UTSG] had given Notices of Intention to Make a Proposal [NOI] to their unsecured creditors. On the filing thereof, Grant Thornton was named as the Proposal Trustee for each. The applications did not include proposals to their secured creditors.

2 On September 13, 2022, Gabrielson J. made an order consolidating the proceedings in BKY-RG-00228-2022 and BKY-RG-00229-2022 respecting TCS and TCR into the court file BKY-RG-00228-2022 and granted, pursuant to s. 50.4(9) of the



*Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, RSC 1985, c B-3 [BIA], a first extension of the time for those applicants to file their proposal to 11:59 p.m. on October 28, 2022, along with ordering other interim measures. He also made a similar extension order in respect of UTSG.

3 Each of the applicants now asks the court to order an extension of the time to file their respective proposals to creditors to December 9, 2022.

### Applicable Legislation and Authorities

4 Section 50.4(9) of the BIA states as follows:

#### Extension of time for filing proposal

**50.4 (9)** The insolvent person may, before the expiry of the 30-day period referred to in subsection (8) or of any extension granted under this subsection, apply to the court for an extension, or further extension, as the case may be, of that period, and the court, on notice to any interested persons that the court may direct, may grant the extensions, not exceeding 45 days for any individual extension and not exceeding in the aggregate five months after the expiry of the 30-day period referred to in subsection (8), if satisfied on each application that

(a) the insolvent person has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence;

(b) the insolvent person would likely be able to make a viable proposal if the extension being applied for were granted; and

(c) no creditor would be materially prejudiced if the extension being applied for were granted.

5 In light of this provision, before granting the requested extension, I have to be satisfied that:

a. The respective applicants are acting in good faith and with due diligence;

b. They are likely able to make a viable proposal to their respective creditors if the extensions are granted; and

c. No creditor would be materially prejudiced if the respective extensions are granted.

6 In *Cantrail Coach Lines Ltd. (Re)* 2005 BCSC 351, 10 CBR (5th) 164 [Cantrail], the British Columbia Supreme Court said the following in respect of this section:

[11] I am satisfied on reading the case law provided by counsel that in considering this type of application an objective standard must be applied. In other words, what would a reasonable person or creditor do in the circumstances. The case of *Re: N.T.W. Management Group Ltd.* [1993] O.J. No. 621, a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice, is authority for the proposition that the intent of the Act and these specific sections is rehabilitation, and that matters considered under these sections are to be judged on a rehabilitation basis rather than on a liquidation basis.

[12] I am also satisfied that it would be important in considering the various applications before me to take a broad approach and look at a number of interested and potentially affected parties, including employees, unsecured creditors, as well as the secured creditor that is present before the Court.

7 In *Enirgi Group Corp. v Andover Mining Corp.* 2013 BCSC 1833, 6 CBR (6th) 32 [Enirgi Group], the Court said:

[66] Turning to s. 50.4(9)(b), a viable proposal is one that would be reasonable on its face to a reasonable creditor; "this ignores the possible idiosyncrasies of any specific creditor": *Cumberland* [[1994] OJ No 132 (Ont Ct J)] at para. 4. It follows that Enirgi's views about any proposal are not necessarily determinative. The proposal need not be a certainty and "likely" means "such as might well happen." (*Baldwin* [[1994] OJ No 271 (Ont Ct J)], paras. 3-4). And Enirgi's statement that it has lost faith in *Andover* is not determinative under s. 50.4(9): *Baldwin* at para. 3; *Cantrail* at paras. 13-18).

8 Then more recently the Nova Scotia Supreme Court said the following in *Scotian Distribution Services Limited (Re) 2020 NSSC 131* [*Scotian Distribution*]:

[24] To say that virtually all economic prospects in the near to medium term are moving targets is a considerable understatement. The applicant must still demonstrate that it is "likely [to] be able to make a viable proposal" with the extension in place, but in the current context I consider this to be a threshold in which the benefit of any doubt should be accorded to the applicant. This does not relieve the burden of proof on the applicant of establishing that likelihood to a civil standard; it does, however, indicate that at least on a first extension, it will not likely be a difficult standard to meet.

[25] I can take further judicial notice that especially in the current environment, a bankruptcy of an operating enterprise would almost inevitably be nasty, brutish, and anything but short. Creditors would be well advised to consider the viability and desirability of a proposal through that lens.

### The Position of Interested Parties

9 Counsel for the applicants says that the affidavits of Chad Joinson, the sole director and shareholder of each of the applicants, provides evidence that they are acting in good faith, with due diligence and that no creditor would be materially prejudiced. He adds that given there is no evidence presented by any interested party disputing this evidence, these requirements are satisfied. Thus, counsel says the remaining issue is whether I am satisfied the applicants are likely able to make a viable proposal to their respective creditors if the extensions are granted.

10 The only interested parties appearing were the Royal Bank of Canada [Royal Bank] through their legal counsel Mr. Olfert and David Smith for Canada Revenue Agency [CRA]. The Court was advised that the Royal Bank takes no position in respect of the applications. This is understandable since no compromise of the debts to it are proposed.

11 David Smith advised the Court that the CRA does not take issues with the good faith or diligence of the applicants, nor was he able to say that the ongoing obligations of the applicants to the CRA (there being no current indebtedness) are prejudiced. However, he takes the position that the extensions sought should not be granted, because he argues that on the basis of the information available to the Court, I should not be satisfied the applicants are likely able to make a viable proposal to their respective creditors.

### My Analysis and Conclusions

12 The affidavits of Chad Joinson make no express statement that the applicants are likely able to make a viable proposal to their respective creditors. The furthest he goes is to state: "It is my honest belief that a viable proposal will be made in this matter". He provides no factual basis for his stated honest belief, nor does he speak to whether the financial information and projections the applicants were providing to the Proposal Trustee were accurate and truthful. This is significant because the Proposal Trustee relied on the financial information and projections provided for its reports to the Court.

13 The best information that I have in respect of the prospects for a viable proposal are contained in the Proposal Trustee's Second Report in respect of the applications. Their reports are not evidence, but proposal trustees have a status akin to officers of the court in *BIA* proceedings. The Second Report respecting TCS and TCR contains the following statements:

7. To date, nothing has come to the Proposal Trustee's attention that would cause it to question the reasonableness of the information and explanations provided to it by the Companies and their management. The Proposal Trustee has requested that management bring to its attention any significant matters which were not addressed in the course of the Proposal Trustee's specific inquiries. Accordingly, this Report is based on the information (financial or otherwise) made available to the Proposal Trustee by the Companies.

.....

25. The Proposal Trustee's review of the Second Cash Flow Statement consisted of inquiries, analytical procedures and discussions related to information supplied to the Proposal Trustee by management of T&C. Since hypothetical

assumptions need not be supported, the Proposal Trustee's procedures with respect to such assumptions were limited to evaluating whether they were consistent with the purpose of the Second Cash Flow Statement. The Proposal Trustee has also reviewed the support provided by management for the probable assumptions and the preparation and presentation of the Second Cash Flow Statement. Based on the Proposal Trustee's review, nothing has come to its attention that causes it to believe that, in all material respects:

- (a) the Probable and Hypothetical Assumptions are not consistent with the purpose of the Second Cash Flow Statement;
- (b) as at the date of the Second Cash Flow Statement, the Probable and Hypothetical Assumptions developed by management were not suitably supported and consistent with the Companies' plans or do not provide a reasonable basis for the Second Cash Flow Statement, given the Probable and Hypothetical Assumptions; or
- (c) the Second Cash Flow Statement does not reflect the Probable and Hypothetical Assumptions.

.....

28. The Proposal Trustee believes that granting an extension of time to file a proposal and the continuation of these Proceedings is in the best interest of stakeholders, and preferable to a liquidation in a bankruptcy and/or receivership.

14 The Second Report in respect of UTSG contains the same statements but paragraphs 25 and 28 quoted above are found at paragraphs 27 and 30 of this Report.

15 Each Second Report has attached, as Appendix 2, a Report on the Actual Cash Flow over the Period September 3 to October 14, 2022, and, as Appendix 3, a Cash Flow Forecast for the period October 15 to January 13, 2022 [*sic*] (presumably 2023 was intended).

16 By way of summary, these appendices provide the following information:

a. Re the consolidated operations of TCS and TCR:

- i. Its cash flow over the period September 3 to October 14 was a negative \$125,699 and was some \$273,000 less than the projected cash flows the applicants had previously provided; and
- ii. Its projected cash flow from operations October 15 to January 13 is stated to be \$251,684 before professional costs and \$138,684 after the professional costs associated with the proposal.

b. Re UTSG:

- i. Its cash flow from operations over the period September 3 to October 14 was \$207,064, some \$195,000 less than the projected cash flow the applicants had previously provided; and
- ii. Its projected cash flow from operations October 15 to January 13 is \$22,094 before professional costs and a negative \$90,406 after the professional costs associated with the proposal.

17 Thus, the applicants had failed by some significant measure to achieve their projected cash flows for the period to October 14 with somewhat mixed projections going forward. This information leaves me with serious reservations as to whether the applicants are viable businesses.

18 In their Second Reports, Grant Thornton, in carefully limiting and curiously phrased statements, say that having reviewed the support provided by management for the probable assumptions and the preparation and presentation of the Second Cash Statements:

25. ... Based on the Proposal Trustee's review, nothing has come to its attention that causes it to believe that, in all material respects:

(a) the Probable and Hypothetical Assumptions are not consistent with the purpose of the Second Cash Flow Statement;

(b) as at the date of the Second Cash Flow Statement, the Probable and Hypothetical Assumptions developed by management were not suitably supported and consistent with the Companies' plans or do not provide a reasonable basis for the Second Cash Flow Statement, given the Probable and Hypothetical Assumptions; or

(c) the Second Cash Flow Statement does not reflect the Probable and Hypothetical Assumptions.

19 The Proposal Trustee then end their Second Reports with the following conclusion:

28. The Proposal Trustee believes that granting an extension of time to file a proposal and the continuation of these proceedings is in the best interests of the stakeholders, and preferable to a liquidation in a bankruptcy and/or receivership.

and recommend the Court approve the stay extensions sought.

20 I find the evidentiary and informational basis provided to the Court in support of the extension application to barely meet the test of a likelihood of being able to make a viable proposal. As stated in *Scotian Distribution*, on a first extension, the test "will likely not be a difficult standard to meet". But this is not a first extension.

21 It is only by giving regard to:


- a. the statement in *Enirgi Group* to the effect that "'likely' means 'such as might well happen'";
- b. the direction in *Cantrail* quoted above to the effect that is important for the Court to take a broad approach and look at a number of interested and potentially affected parties, including employees and unsecured creditor;
- c. recognizing that Grant Thornton is, in providing to the Court their reports, effectively an officer of the court in respect of the conclusions and recommendations they provide, notwithstanding my concerns about the limitations inherent in their reports; and
- d. my opinion that the creditors should, where a reasonable possibility of acceptance of a proposal exists, be given the opportunity to decide, since they are the ones who will be primarily affected;

that I am able to conclude that I am satisfied that the applicants "would likely be able to make a viable proposal" if given additional time. I recognize that creditors might view what I might perceive as unviable as to them being viable and acceptable.

22 Accordingly, I am granting the extensions sought and direct that orders shall issue in the form of the draft orders filed on October 21, 2022, on each of the files.

23 In granting the requested second extensions, I wish to make it clear that should the applicants fail to complete their proposals within the time limits set forth in the orders I have made and come to the Court seeking a further extension, they should expect the Court will be requiring better and focused evidence and information on the likelihood of a viable proposal, given the problematic cash flow projections in turn based on unknown "probable and hypothetical assumptions".

24 Because of the attention I have given to these matters and the concerns expressed herein, and in the interests of judicial efficiency, I will remain seized of any future application for a further extension of time.



Tab

12

2020 PESC 15

Prince Edward Island Supreme Court

Nautican v. Dumont

2020 CarswellPEI 30, 2020 PESC 15, 319 A.C.W.S. (3d) 18, 79 C.B.R. (6th) 243

**IN THE MATTER OF: a Notice of Intention to Make a Proposal filed  
by NAUTICAN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT LTD. Pursuant to  
Section 50.4 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3**

IN THE MATTER OF: a Notice of Intention to Make a Proposal filed by CARELI MARINE CORPORATION  
LIMITED pursuant to Section 50.4 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

IN THE MATTER OF: a Motion by NAUTICAN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT LTD.  
and by CARELI MARINE CORPORATION LIMITED for Orders pursuant to Sections 50.4(9),  
64.2(1), 64.2(2), 50.6(1) and 50.6(3) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

James W. Gormley J.

Heard: October 31, 2019

Judgment: May 8, 2020

Docket: S1-GS-28836

Counsel: Michael G. Drake, Sean Corcoran, for Nautican Research and Development Ltd. and Careli Marine Corporation Ltd.  
David W. Hooley, Q.C., Melanie McKenna, for David Dumont and Outboard Engineering Group LLC

Subject: Insolvency

**Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[VI](#) Proposal

[VI.5](#) Practice and procedure

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[VII](#) Consolidation orders and orderly payment of debts

**Headnote**

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Consolidation orders and orderly payment of debts

Creditor brought action against debtor corporations — Debtor corporations entered proceedings under [Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act](#), and trustee was appointed — Debtors brought application for consolidation of bankruptcy proceedings and other relief — Application granted in part — Consolidation of bankruptcy proceedings ordered — Consolidation would avoid multiplicity of proceedings thereby providing most just, expeditious and least expensive determination of issues — Debtors were closely aligned, as one was holding company that held all issued shares in other and had no employees, no bank account, and no active business activities — Managing director for both debtors was same and both companies shared same major secured creditor — No prejudice in granting consolidation — Creditor agreed to consolidation.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Proposal — Time period to file — Extension of time

Creditor brought action against debtor corporations — Debtor corporations entered proceedings under [Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act](#), and trustee was appointed — Debtors brought application for consolidation of bankruptcy proceedings and other relief — Application granted in part — Consolidation of bankruptcy proceedings ordered — Extension of time to file proposal granted — Not shown that debtors were acting in bad faith and it was not shown that funds were being diverted to other entity — There was evidence that viable proposal could be filed — No prejudice to creditor from extension — Tangible assets were subject to seizure order, and intangible assets would be diminished if bankruptcy declared — Administrative charge

iii) since the stay commenced, they are addressing current lease requirements, assessing current employee levels and reviewing client contracts. They have also reduced operating costs and worked with PWC to assess options and formulate viable proposals to creditors.

14 I also note that the proposal trustee states that the debtors have been acting in good faith and have prepared projected statements of cash flow, which have been provided to their creditors.

15 Outbound and Mr. Dumont have raised their concerns of the "possibility" that Nautican may have or is attempting to divert contracts to its US subsidiary to avoid its creditors. Mr. Dumont also has a "feeling" that he was not receiving the same good faith bargaining from Nautican and Careli that he was offering. Although the creditors have concerns, which may or may not be based in fact, they have not produced sufficient evidence to overcome the evidence provided by Nautican and Careli that their activities have been demonstrative of acting in a good faith manner and with due diligence with respect to the preparation of a viable proposal. I find Nautican and Careli have met the first prong of the three part test.

#### Sub-issue B - Will Nautican and Careli likely be able to make a viable proposal if the extension is granted?

16 I refer again to *Convergix Inc., Re* wherein Glennie J. states as follows:

[40] The test for whether insolvent persons would likely be able to make a viable proposal if granted an extension is whether the insolvent person would likely (as opposed to certainly) be able to present a proposal that seems reasonable on its face to a reasonable creditor. The test is not whether or not a specific creditor would be prepared to support the proposal. In *Re Baldwin Valley Investors Inc.* (1994), 23 C.B.R. (3d) 219 (Ont. G.D.), Justice Farley was of the opinion that "viable" means reasonable on its face to a reasonable creditor and that "likely" does not require certainty but means "might well happen" and "probable" "to be reasonably expected". See also *Scotia Rainbow Inc. v. Bank of Montreal* (2000), 18 C.B.R. (4<sup>th</sup>) 114 (N.S.S.C.).

17 Clearly, this creates an objective standard for the court to consider, which is not tied to a specific creditor and particularly in this case, the creditor opposing the request for an extension.

18 The test requires me to consider what a reasonable creditor might expect to happen or what might reasonably be expected to occur. This test requires a dispassionate evaluation, not the position of an advocate of a specific creditor. Nautican and Careli are seeking 45 days to allow the process a chance at success. They have retained consultants, one of which has expressed his opinion that the debtors will likely be able to make a viable proposal if the extension is granted. Nautican and Careli have made efforts in the first 30 days of the stay. This is not a situation of inactivity by the debtors. Although the evidence is not overwhelming on this aspect of the test, it is sufficient to meet the legislative requirement on a balance of probabilities.


19 Although it is clear that Nautican, Careli and Outbound have been involved in lengthy, contentious negotiations and that Outbound believes no viable proposal will be made during the term of the extension, the test is not a subjective one and I find that the evidentiary record provided by Nautican and Careli is sufficient to meet this aspect of the test.

#### Sub-issue C - If the extension is granted, will any creditors be materially prejudiced?

20 It is clear from the affidavit of Dumont that the major creditors of Nautican and the major creditor of Careli vehemently oppose the motion and argue their position will be materially prejudiced if I order an extension.

21 I note the decision of *H & H Fisheries Ltd., Re*, 2005 NSSC 346 (N.S. S.C.) wherein Goodfellow J. stated as follows:

[37] This section of the *Act* contemplates some prejudice to creditors and I am of the view that the prejudice must be of a degree that raises significant concern to a level that it would be unreasonable for a creditor or creditors to accept. Overall, I am satisfied that HHFL has met the requirement of establishing on the balance of probabilities that the granting of an extension will not materially prejudice any of the creditors and in particular BNS.



Tab

13



1994 CarswellOnt 254

Ontario Court of Justice (General Division [Commercial List]), In Bankruptcy

Baldwin Valley Investors Inc., Re

1994 CarswellOnt 254, 23 C.B.R. (3d) 219 at 223

## **Re proposal of BALDWIN VALLEY INVESTORS INC. and of VARION INCORPORATED**

Registrar Ferron

Judgment: February 3, 1994

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

### **Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[VI Proposal](#)

[VI.2 Time period to file](#)

[VI.2.a Extension of time](#)

### ***Registrar Ferron:***

1 Baldwin and Varion are described as corporate components of "an entity known as Georgian Equity Corporation which is part of the Georgian group".

2 Baldwin is indebted to the Royal Bank of Canada for about \$5,000,000 which constitutes 92% of the Baldwin's total indebtedness while Varion is indebted to the bank for about \$1,000,000 which constitutes about 99% of its total indebtedness. Aside from indebtedness to related companies the unsecured debts of both companies are negligible.

3 Royal Bank's indebtedness is secured by Demand Debentures and General Security Agreements which blanket the assets of both companies.

4 Baldwin's only asset is a multi-tenanted building which is now about 50% leased; Varion's only asset is vacant land.

5 In or about November 1993, both Baldwin and Varion defaulted in their obligations to the bank and on November 12, 1993, the Royal Bank demanded payment of its debt from both companies and concurrently served notices of intention to enforce its security. Both companies responded by filing, on November 19, a notice of intention to file proposals.

6 There has been one extension to file a proposal granted to each company on unopposed applications which were made on December 16, 1993. No proposal has yet been filed and the secured creditor opposes this second application for a further extension.

7 The statutory burden on an applicant under s. 50.4(9) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* is fourfold. It must be shown that the applicant has, and is acting in good faith, and with diligence adequate in the circumstances. An applicant must also satisfy the court that if an extension or further extension is ordered it would as a consequence likely be able to make a viable proposal and that such an extension will not materially prejudice the creditors of the applicant.

8 The bottom line of these applications is that the secured creditor has made it quite clear that it, as counsel expressed it, has lost all confidence in the debtors and now only wants to enforce its security.

9 Since the bank's debt is about 92% of the total indebtedness of Baldwin and almost 100% of that of Varion, as a practical matter, a viable proposal, that is, a proposal which is capable of implementation is not possible.

10 Both applicants were undoubtedly formed to hold one asset, the commercial building in the case of Baldwin and vacant land in the case of Varion. These applicants carry on no business in the ordinary sense and have no employees. Baldwin is managed by "a related company". Their major, and for all practical purposes only creditor, is a secured creditor and as a matter of fact the applicants have no business to reorganize or to restructure.

11 The cash flow of Baldwin is negative and Varion has no cash flow at all so that the company, in order to make a viable proposal must, pay out the bank either by prospective financing or by equity financing. It has no revenue otherwise on which to found a proposal.

12 In practical terms these options are not available and one must conclude that the applications are merely an attempt to fend off the secured creditor and to protect their only asset rather than to put forth a viable proposal.

13 The applicants accordingly have not met the standard of good faith.


14 There is no equity in the Baldwin asset and to extend the period in which to file a proposal is to permit the insolvent person to speculate. A debtor may not in good faith speculate on an investment asset at the expense of the secured creditor and thereby throw the entire risk of loss on that creditor.

15 I do not accept the argument that the representatives of the Royal Bank entered into an agreement concerning the preparation of the appraisal of the Baldwin property and that the secured creditor having obtained an independent appraisal is acting in bad faith and I find it disingenuous to base the application on the argument that a proposal cannot be formulated until an appraisal is obtained. The applicant was in no way precluded from obtaining an independent appraisal and it does not require the concurrence of the secured creditor to do so. It is the court which must be satisfied and not the secured creditor.

16 In addition, the letter of December 8th sent by W.B. Clunie to the Royal Bank of Canada is not indicative of an agreement. The letter merely suggests that Baldwin Valley Investors Incorporated, "is prepared to allow the bank to conduct an independent assessment including an inspection of the premises to determine its viability, provided the work is completed by a mutually acceptable party at a mutually acceptable fee".

17 Presumably the bank did not accept that offer and has in fact obtained an independent appraisal which is before the court. A perusal of that appraisal, allowing for the fluctuation and value which depends upon the purpose of the appraisal and, in addition, allowing for a generous margin of error the gulf between the value of the Baldwin property and the bank's indebtedness serious and clearly indicates that there is no equity in that property.

18 In the circumstances the applicants have not met the statutory burden and the applications for extension must be refused.  
*Applications dismissed.*



Tab

14

**KeyCite treatment**

**Most Negative Treatment:** Check subsequent history and related treatments.

2014 ONSC 514

Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Colossus Minerals Inc., Re

2014 CarswellOnt 1517, 2014 ONSC 514, 14 C.B.R. (6th) 261, 237 A.C.W.S. (3d) 584

**In the Matter of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, As Amended**

In the Matter of the Notice of Intention of Colossus Minerals Inc., of the City of Toronto in the Province of Ontario

H.J. Wilton-Siegel J.

Heard: January 16, 2014

Judgment: February 7, 2014

Docket: CV-14-10401-00CL

Counsel: S. Brotman, D. Chochla for Applicant, Colossus Minerals Inc.

L. Rogers, A. Shalviri for DIP Agent, Sandstorm Gold Inc.

H. Chaiton for Proposal Trustee

S. Zweig for Ad Hoc Group of Noteholders and Certain Lenders

Subject: Insolvency

**Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XX](#) Miscellaneous

**Headnote**

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Miscellaneous

Applicant filed notice of intention to make proposal under [s. 50.4\(1\) of Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act \(Can.\) \(BIA\)](#) on January 13, 2014 — Main asset of applicant was 75 percent interest in gold and platinum project in Brazil, which was held by subsidiary — Project was nearly complete — However, there was serious water control issue that urgently required additional de-watering facilities to preserve applicant's interest in project — As none of applicant's mining interests, including project, were producing, it had no revenue and had been accumulating losses — Applicant sought orders granting various relief under [BIA](#) — Application granted — Court granted approval of debtor-in-possession loan (DIP Loan) and DIP charge dated January 13, 2014 with S Inc. and certain holders of applicant's outstanding gold-linked notes in amount up to \$4 million, subject to first-ranking charge on applicant's property, being DIP charge — Court also approved first-priority administration charge in maximum amount of \$300,000 to secure fees and disbursements of proposal trustee and counsel — Proposed services were essential both to successful proceeding under [BIA](#) as well as for conduct of sale and investor solicitation process — Court approved indemnity and priority charge to indemnify applicant's directors and officers for obligations and liabilities they may incur in such capacities from and after filing of notice of intention to make proposal — Remaining directors and officers would not continue without indemnification — Court also approved sale and investor solicitation process and engagement letter with D Ltd. for purpose of identifying financing and/or merger and acquisition opportunities available to applicant — Time to file proposal under [BIA](#) was extended.

**Table of Authorities**

**Statutes considered:**

*Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

s. 50.4(1) [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 19] — considered

s. 50.4(8) [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 19] — considered

s. 50.4(9) [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 19] — referred to

s. 50.6(1) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 36] — considered

s. 50.6(5) [en. 2007, c. 36, s. 18] — considered

s. 64.1 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 42] — considered

s. 64.2 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 42] — considered

s. 65.13 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 44] — referred to

s. 65.13(1) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 44] — considered

s. 65.13(4) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 44] — considered

*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

APPLICATION by debtor for various orders under *Bankruptcy and insolvency*.

***H.J. Wilton-Siegel J.:***

1 The applicant, Colossus Minerals Inc. (the "applicant" or "Colossus"), seeks an order granting various relief under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 (the "BIA"). The principal secured creditors of Colossus were served and no objections were received regarding the relief sought. In view of the liquidity position of Colossus, the applicant was heard on an urgent basis and an order was issued on January 16, 2014 granting the relief sought. This endorsement sets out the Court's reasons for granting the order.

**Background**

2 The applicant filed a notice of intention to make a proposal under s. 50.4(1) of the BIA on January 13, 2014. Duff & Phelps Canada Restructuring Inc. (the "Proposal Trustee") has been named the Proposal Trustee in these proceedings. The Proposal Trustee has filed its first report dated January 14, 2014 addressing this application, among other things. The main asset of Colossus is a 75% interest in a gold and platinum project in Brazil (the "Project"), which is held by a subsidiary. The Project is nearly complete. However, there is a serious water control issue that urgently requires additional de-watering facilities to preserve the applicant's interest in the Project. As none of the applicant's mining interests, including the Project, are producing, it has no revenue and has been accumulating losses. To date, the applicant has been unable to obtain the financing necessary to fund its cash flow requirements through to the commencement of production and it has exhausted its liquidity.

**DIP Loan and DIP Charge**

3 The applicant seeks approval of a Debtor-in-Possession Loan (the "DIP Loan") and DIP Charge dated January 13, 2014 with Sandstorm Gold Inc. ("Sandstorm") and certain holders of the applicant's outstanding gold-linked notes (the "Notes") in an amount up to \$4 million, subject to a first-ranking charge on the property of Colossus, being the DIP Charge. The Court has the authority under section 50.6(1) of the BIA to authorize the DIP Loan and DIP Charge, subject to a consideration of the factors under section 50.6(5). In this regard, the following matters are relevant.

32 Dundee has considerable industry experience as well as familiarity with Colossus, based on its involvement with the company prior to the filing of the Notice of Intention.

33 As mentioned, the SISP is necessary to permit an assessment of the best option for stakeholders.

34 In addition, the success fee is necessary to incentivize Dundee but is reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with success fees in similar circumstances.

35 Importantly, the success fee is only payable in the event of a successful outcome of the SISP.

36 Lastly, the Proposal Trustee supports the Engagement Letter, including the success fee arrangement.

#### **Extension of the Stay**

37 The applicant seeks an extension for the time to file a proposal under the BIA from the thirty-day period provided for in s. 50.4(8). The applicant seeks an extension to March 7, 2014 to permit it to pursue the SISP and assess whether a sale or a proposal under the BIA would be most beneficial to the applicant's stakeholders.

38 The Court has authority to grant such relief under section 50.4(9) of the BIA. I am satisfied that such relief is appropriate in the present circumstances for the following reasons.

39 First, the applicant is acting in good faith and with due diligence, with a view to maximizing value for the stakeholders, in seeking authorization for the SISP.


40 Second, the applicant requires additional time to determine whether it could make a viable proposal to stakeholders. The extension of the stay will increase the likelihood of a feasible sale transaction or a proposal.

41 Third, there is no material prejudice likely to result to creditors from the extension of the stay itself. Any adverse effect flowing from the DIP Loan and DIP Charge has been addressed above.

42 Fourth, the applicant's cash flows indicate that it will be able to meet its financial obligations, including care and maintenance of the Project, during the extended period with the inclusion of the proceeds of the DIP Loan.

43 Lastly, the Proposal Trustee supports the requested relief.

*Application granted.*



Tab

**15**

## KeyCite treatment

**Most Negative Treatment:** Distinguished

**Most Recent Distinguished:** [Party A v. The Law Society of British Columbia](#) | 2021 BCCA 130, 2021 CarswellBC 872, 48 B.C.L.R. (6th) 238, 83 Admin. L.R. (6th) 250, [2021] 9 W.W.R. 379, 329 A.C.W.S. (3d) 457, 458 D.L.R. (4th) 77 | (B.C. C.A., Mar 29, 2021)

2002 SCC 41, 2002 CSC 41

Supreme Court of Canada

Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)

2002 CarswellNat 823, 2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CSC 41, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, [2002] S.C.J. No. 42, 113 A.C.W.S. (3d) 36, 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), 287 N.R. 203, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, J.E. 2002-803, REJB 2002-30902

## Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Appellant v. Sierra Club of Canada, Respondent and The Minister of Finance of Canada, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, the Minister of International Trade of Canada and the Attorney General of Canada, Respondents

McLachlin C.J.C., Gonthier, Iacobucci, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour, LeBel JJ.

Heard: November 6, 2001

Judgment: April 26, 2002

Docket: 28020

Proceedings: reversing (2000), [2000 CarswellNat 970](#), (sub nom. [Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada](#)) 187 D.L.R. (4th) 231, 256 N.R. 1, 24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, [2000] 4 F.C. 426, 182 F.T.R. 284 (note), [2000 CarswellNat 3271](#), [2000] F.C.J. No. 732 (Fed. C.A.); affirming (1999), [1999 CarswellNat 2187](#), [2000] 2 F.C. 400, [1999 CarswellNat 3038](#), 179 F.T.R. 283, [1999] F.C.J. No. 1633 (Fed. T.D.)

Counsel: *J. Brett Ledger* and *Peter Chapin*, for appellant

*Timothy J. Howard* and *Franklin S. Gertler*, for respondent Sierra Club of Canada

*Graham Garton, Q.C.*, and *J. Sanderson Graham*, for respondents Minister of Finance of Canada, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, Minister of International Trade of Canada, and Attorney General of Canada

Subject: Intellectual Property; Property; Civil Practice and Procedure; Evidence; Environmental

## Related Abridgment Classifications

Civil practice and procedure

### XII Discovery

#### XII.2 Discovery of documents

##### XII.2.h Privileged document

##### XII.2.h.xiii Miscellaneous

Civil practice and procedure

### XII Discovery

#### XII.4 Examination for discovery

##### XII.4.h Range of examination

##### XII.4.h.ix Privilege

##### XII.4.h.ix.F Miscellaneous

Evidence

### XIV Privilege

#### XIV.8 Public interest immunity



*R. v. Keegstra*, 1 C.R. (4th) 129, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 77 Alta. L.R. (2d) 193, 117 N.R. 1, [1991] 2 W.W.R. 1, 114 A.R. 81, 61 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 3 C.R.R. (2d) 193, 1990 CarswellAlta 192, 1990 CarswellAlta 661 (S.C.C.) — followed  
*R. v. Mentuck*, 2001 SCC 76, 2001 CarswellMan 535, 2001 CarswellMan 536, 158 C.C.C. (3d) 449, 205 D.L.R. (4th) 512, 47 C.R. (5th) 63, 277 N.R. 160, [2002] 2 W.W.R. 409 (S.C.C.) — followed  
*R. v. Oakes*, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200, 65 N.R. 87, 14 O.A.C. 335, 24 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 50 C.R. (3d) 1, 19 C.R.R. 308, 53 O.R. (2d) 719, 1986 CarswellOnt 95, 1986 CarswellOnt 1001 (S.C.C.) — referred to

**Statutes considered:**

*Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11

Generally — referred to

s. 1 — referred to

s. 2(b) — referred to

s. 11(d) — referred to

*Canadian Environmental Assessment Act*, S.C. 1992, c. 37

Generally — considered

s. 5(1)(b) — referred to

s. 8 — referred to

s. 54 — referred to

s. 54(2)(b) — referred to

*Criminal Code*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46

s. 486(1) — referred to

**Rules considered:**

*Federal Court Rules*, 1998, SOR/98-106

R. 151 — considered

R. 312 — referred to

APPEAL from judgment reported at 2000 CarswellNat 970, 2000 CarswellNat 3271, [2000] F.C.J. No. 732, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 187 D.L.R. (4th) 231, 256 N.R. 1, 24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, [2000] 4 F.C. 426, 182 F.T.R. 284 (note) (Fed. C.A.), dismissing appeal from judgment reported at 1999 CarswellNat 2187, [2000] 2 F.C. 400, 1999 CarswellNat 3038, 179 F.T.R. 283 (Fed. T.D.), granting application in part.

POURVOI à l'encontre de l'arrêt publié à 2000 CarswellNat 970, 2000 CarswellNat 3271, [2000] F.C.J. No. 732, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 187 D.L.R. (4th) 231, 256 N.R. 1, 24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, [2000] 4 F.C. 426, 182 F.T.R. 284 (note) (C.A. Féd.), qui a rejeté le pourvoi à l'encontre du jugement publié à 1999 CarswellNat 2187, [2000] 2 F.C. 400, 1999 CarswellNat 3038, 179 F.T.R. 283 (C.F. (1<sup>re</sup> inst.)), qui avait accueilli en partie la demande.

**The judgment of the court was delivered by *Iacobucci J.*:**

**I. Introduction**

1 In our country, courts are the institutions generally chosen to resolve legal disputes as best they can through the application of legal principles to the facts of the case involved. One of the underlying principles of the judicial process is public openness, both in the proceedings of the dispute, and in the material that is relevant to its resolution. However, some material can be made the subject of a confidentiality order. This appeal raises the important issues of when, and under what circumstances, a confidentiality order should be granted.

34 Robertson J.A. also considered the public interest in the need to ensure that site-plans for nuclear installations were not, for example, posted on a web-site. He concluded that a confidentiality order would not undermine the two primary objectives underlying the principle of open justice: truth and the rule of law. As such, he would have allowed the appeal and dismissed the cross-appeal.

## V. Issues

35

A. What is the proper analytical approach to be applied to the exercise of judicial discretion where a litigant seeks a confidentiality order under [R. 151 of the Federal Court Rules, 1998](#)?

B. Should the confidentiality order be granted in this case?

## VI. Analysis

### A. The Analytical Approach to the Granting of a Confidentiality Order

#### (1) *The General Framework: Herein the Dagenais Principles*

36 The link between openness in judicial proceedings and freedom of expression has been firmly established by this Court. In *Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General)*, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter *New Brunswick*], at para. 23, La Forest J. expressed the relationship as follows:

The principle of open courts is inextricably tied to the rights guaranteed by [s. 2\(b\)](#). Openness permits public access to information about the courts, which in turn permits the public to discuss and put forward opinions and criticisms of court practices and proceedings. While the freedom to express ideas and opinions about the operation of the courts is clearly within the ambit of the freedom guaranteed by [s. 2\(b\)](#), so too is the right of members of the public to obtain information about the courts in the first place.

Under the order sought, public access and public scrutiny of the Confidential Documents would be restricted; this would clearly infringe the public's freedom of expression guarantee.

37 A discussion of the general approach to be taken in the exercise of judicial discretion to grant a confidentiality order should begin with the principles set out by this Court in *Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.*, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 (S.C.C.). Although that case dealt with the common law jurisdiction of the court to order a publication ban in the criminal law context, there are strong similarities between publication bans and confidentiality orders in the context of judicial proceedings. In both cases a restriction on freedom of expression is sought in order to preserve or promote an interest engaged by those proceedings. As such, the fundamental question for a court to consider in an application for a publication ban or a confidentiality order is whether, in the circumstances, the right to freedom of expression should be compromised.

38 Although in each case freedom of expression will be engaged in a different context, the *Dagenais* framework utilizes overarching *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* principles in order to balance freedom of expression with other rights and interests, and thus can be adapted and applied to various circumstances. As a result, the analytical approach to the exercise of discretion under [R. 151](#) should echo the underlying principles laid out in *Dagenais*, *supra*, although it must be tailored to the specific rights and interests engaged in this case.

39 *Dagenais*, *supra*, dealt with an application by four accused persons under the court's common law jurisdiction requesting an order prohibiting the broadcast of a television programme dealing with the physical and sexual abuse of young boys at religious institutions. The applicants argued that because the factual circumstances of the programme were very similar to the facts at issue in their trials, the ban was necessary to preserve the accuseds' right to a fair trial.

40 Lamer C.J. found that the common law discretion to order a publication ban must be exercised within the boundaries set by the principles of [the Charter](#). Since publication bans necessarily curtail the freedom of expression of third parties, he adapted the pre-*Charter* common law rule such that it balanced the right to freedom of expression with the right to a fair trial of the accused in a way which reflected the substance of the test from *R. v. Oakes*, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.). At p. 878 of *Dagenais*, Lamer C.J. set out his reformulated test:

A publication ban should only be ordered when:

- (a) Such a ban is *necessary* in order to prevent a real and substantial risk to the fairness of the trial, because reasonably available alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and
- (b) The salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects to the free expression of those affected by the ban. [Emphasis in original.]

41 In *New Brunswick*, *supra*, this Court modified the *Dagenais* test in the context of the related issue of how the discretionary power under s. 486(1) of the *Criminal Code* to exclude the public from a trial should be exercised. That case dealt with an appeal from the trial judge's order excluding the public from the portion of a sentencing proceeding for sexual assault and sexual interference dealing with the specific acts committed by the accused on the basis that it would avoid "undue hardship" to both the victims and the accused.

42 La Forest J. found that s. 486(1) was a restriction on the s. 2(b) right to freedom of expression in that it provided a "discretionary bar on public and media access to the courts": *New Brunswick*, *supra*, at para. 33; however, he found this infringement to be justified under s. 1 provided that the discretion was exercised in accordance with [the Charter](#). Thus, the approach taken by La Forest J. at para. 69 to the exercise of discretion under s. 486(1) of the *Criminal Code*, closely mirrors the *Dagenais* common law test:

- (a) the judge must consider the available options and consider whether there are any other reasonable and effective alternatives available;
- (b) the judge must consider whether the order is limited as much as possible; and
- (c) the judge must weigh the importance of the objectives of the particular order and its probable effects against the importance of openness and the particular expression that will be limited in order to ensure that the positive and negative effects of the order are proportionate.

In applying this test to the facts of the case, La Forest J. found that the evidence of the potential undue hardship consisted mainly in the Crown's submission that the evidence was of a "delicate nature" and that this was insufficient to override the infringement on freedom of expression.

43 This Court has recently revisited the granting of a publication ban under the court's common law jurisdiction in *R. v. Mentuck*, 2001 SCC 76 (S.C.C.), and its companion case *R. v. E. (O.N.)*, 2001 SCC 77 (S.C.C.). In *Mentuck*, the Crown moved for a publication ban to protect the identity of undercover police officers and operational methods employed by the officers in their investigation of the accused. The accused opposed the motion as an infringement of his right to a fair and public hearing under s. 11(d) of the *Charter*. The order was also opposed by two intervening newspapers as an infringement of their right to freedom of expression.

44 The Court noted that, while *Dagenais* dealt with the balancing of freedom of expression on the one hand, and the right to a fair trial of the accused on the other, in the case before it, both the right of the accused to a fair and public hearing, and freedom of expression weighed in favour of denying the publication ban. These rights were balanced against interests relating to the proper administration of justice, in particular, protecting the safety of police officers and preserving the efficacy of undercover police operations.

45 In spite of this distinction, the Court noted that underlying the approach taken in both *Dagenais* and *New Brunswick* was the goal of ensuring that the judicial discretion to order publication bans is subject to no lower a standard of compliance with the *Charter* than legislative enactment. This goal is furthered by incorporating the essence of s. 1 of the *Charter* and the *Oakes* test into the publication ban test. Since this same goal applied in the case before it, the Court adopted a similar approach to that taken in *Dagenais*, but broadened the *Dagenais* test (which dealt specifically with the right of an accused to a fair trial) such that it could guide the exercise of judicial discretion where a publication ban is requested in order to preserve *any* important aspect of the proper administration of justice. At para. 32, the Court reformulated the test as follows:

A publication ban should only be ordered when:

- (a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and
- (b) the salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects on the rights and interests of the parties and the public, including the effects on the right to free expression, the right of the accused to a fair and public trial, and the efficacy of the administration of justice.

46 The Court emphasized that under the first branch of the test, three important elements were subsumed under the "necessity" branch. First, the risk in question must be a serious risk well-grounded in the evidence. Second, the phrase "proper administration of justice" must be carefully interpreted so as not to allow the concealment of an excessive amount of information. Third, the test requires the judge ordering the ban to consider not only whether reasonable alternatives are available, but also to restrict the ban as far as possible without sacrificing the prevention of the risk.

47 At para. 31, the Court also made the important observation that the proper administration of justice will not necessarily involve *Charter* rights, and that the ability to invoke the *Charter* is not a necessary condition for a publication ban to be granted:

The [common law publication ban] rule can accommodate orders that must occasionally be made in the interests of the administration of justice, which encompass more than fair trial rights. As the test is intended to "reflect . . . the substance of the *Oakes* test", *we cannot require that Charter rights be the only legitimate objective of such orders any more than we require that government action or legislation in violation of the Charter be justified exclusively by the pursuit of another Charter right.* [Emphasis added.]

The Court also anticipated that, in appropriate circumstances, the *Dagenais* framework could be expanded even further in order to address requests for publication bans where interests other than the administration of justice were involved.

48 *Mentuck* is illustrative of the flexibility of the *Dagenais* approach. Since its basic purpose is to ensure that the judicial discretion to deny public access to the courts is exercised in accordance with *Charter* principles, in my view, the *Dagenais* model can and should be adapted to the situation in the case at bar where the central issue is whether judicial discretion should be exercised so as to exclude confidential information from a public proceeding. As in *Dagenais*, *New Brunswick* and *Mentuck*, granting the confidentiality order will have a negative effect on the *Charter* right to freedom of expression, as well as the principle of open and accessible court proceedings, and, as in those cases, courts must ensure that the discretion to grant the order is exercised in accordance with *Charter* principles. However, in order to adapt the test to the context of this case, it is first necessary to determine the particular rights and interests engaged by this application.

## **(2) The Rights and Interests of the Parties**

49 The immediate purpose for AECL's confidentiality request relates to its commercial interests. The information in question is the property of the Chinese authorities. If the appellant were to disclose the Confidential Documents, it would be in breach of its contractual obligations and suffer a risk of harm to its competitive position. This is clear from the findings of fact of the motions judge that AECL was bound by its commercial interests and its customer's property rights not to disclose the information (para. 27), and that such disclosure could harm the appellant's commercial interests (para. 23).

50 Aside from this direct commercial interest, if the confidentiality order is denied, then in order to protect its commercial interests, the appellant will have to withhold the documents. This raises the important matter of the litigation context in which the order is sought. As both the motions judge and the Federal Court of Appeal found that the information contained in the Confidential Documents was relevant to defences available under the CEAA, the inability to present this information hinders the appellant's capacity to make full answer and defence or, expressed more generally, the appellant's right, as a civil litigant, to present its case. In that sense, preventing the appellant from disclosing these documents on a confidential basis infringes its right to a fair trial. Although in the context of a civil proceeding this does not engage a *Charter* right, the right to a fair trial generally can be viewed as a fundamental principle of justice: *M. (A.) v. Ryan*, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157 (S.C.C.), at para. 84, *per* L'Heureux-Dubé J. (dissenting, but not on that point). Although this fair trial right is directly relevant to the appellant, there is also a general public interest in protecting the right to a fair trial. Indeed, as a general proposition, all disputes in the courts should be decided under a fair trial standard. The legitimacy of the judicial process alone demands as much. Similarly, courts have an interest in having all relevant evidence before them in order to ensure that justice is done.

51 Thus, the interests which would be promoted by a confidentiality order are the preservation of commercial and contractual relations, as well as the right of civil litigants to a fair trial. Related to the latter are the public and judicial interests in seeking the truth and achieving a just result in civil proceedings.

52 In opposition to the confidentiality order lies the fundamental principle of open and accessible court proceedings. This principle is inextricably tied to freedom of expression enshrined in s. 2(b) of the *Charter*: *New Brunswick*, *supra*, at para. 23. The importance of public and media access to the courts cannot be understated, as this access is the method by which the judicial process is scrutinized and criticized. Because it is essential to the administration of justice that justice is done and is *seen* to be done, such public scrutiny is fundamental. The open court principle has been described as "the very soul of justice," guaranteeing that justice is administered in a non-arbitrary manner: *New Brunswick*, *supra*, at para. 22.

### (3) Adapting the Dagenais Test to the Rights and Interests of the Parties

53 Applying the rights and interests engaged in this case to the analytical framework of *Dagenais* and subsequent cases discussed above, the test for whether a confidentiality order ought to be granted in a case such as this one should be framed as follows:

A confidentiality order under R. 151 should only be granted when:

(a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and

(b) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

54 As in *Mentuck*, *supra*, I would add that three important elements are subsumed under the first branch of this test. First, the risk in question must be real and substantial, in that the risk is well-grounded in the evidence and poses a serious threat to the commercial interest in question.

55 In addition, the phrase "important commercial interest" is in need of some clarification. In order to qualify as an "important commercial interest," the interest in question cannot merely be specific to the party requesting the order; the interest must be one which can be expressed in terms of a public interest in confidentiality. For example, a private company could not argue simply that the existence of a particular contract should not be made public because to do so would cause the company to lose business, thus harming its commercial interests. However, if, as in this case, exposure of information would cause a breach of a confidentiality agreement, then the commercial interest affected can be characterized more broadly as the general commercial interest of preserving confidential information. Simply put, if there is no general principle at stake, there can be no "important commercial interest" for the purposes of this test. Or, in the words of Binnie J. in *Re N. (F.)*, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 880, 2000 SCC 35



(S.C.C.), at para. 10, the open court rule only yields" where the *public* interest in confidentiality outweighs the public interest in openness" (emphasis added).

56 In addition to the above requirement, courts must be cautious in determining what constitutes an "important commercial interest." It must be remembered that a confidentiality order involves an infringement on freedom of expression. Although the balancing of the commercial interest with freedom of expression takes place under the second branch of the test, courts must be alive to the fundamental importance of the open court rule. See generally Muldoon J. in *Eli Lilly & Co. v. Novopharm Ltd.* (1994), 56 C.P.R. (3d) 437 (Fed. T.D.), at p. 439.

57 Finally, the phrase "reasonably alternative measures" requires the judge to consider not only whether reasonable alternatives to a confidentiality order are available, but also to restrict the order as much as is reasonably possible while preserving the commercial interest in question.

## **B. Application of the Test to this Appeal**

### **(1) Necessity**


58 At this stage, it must be determined whether disclosure of the Confidential Documents would impose a serious risk on an important commercial interest of the appellant, and whether there are reasonable alternatives, either to the order itself or to its terms.

59 The commercial interest at stake here relates to the objective of preserving contractual obligations of confidentiality. The appellant argues that it will suffer irreparable harm to its commercial interests if the confidential documents are disclosed. In my view, the preservation of confidential information constitutes a sufficiently important commercial interest to pass the first branch of the test as long as certain criteria relating to the information are met.

60 Pelletier J. noted that the order sought in this case was similar in nature to an application for a protective order which arises in the context of patent litigation. Such an order requires the applicant to demonstrate that the information in question has been treated at all relevant times as confidential and that on a balance of probabilities its proprietary, commercial and scientific interests could reasonably be harmed by the disclosure of the information: *AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health & Welfare)* (1998), 83 C.P.R. (3d) 428 (Fed. T.D.), at p. 434. To this I would add the requirement proposed by Robertson J.A. that the information in question must be of a "confidential nature" in that it has been "accumulated with a reasonable expectation of it being kept confidential" (para. 14) as opposed to "facts which a litigant would like to keep confidential by having the courtroom doors closed" (para. 14).

61 Pelletier J. found as a fact that the *AB Hassle* test had been satisfied in that the information had clearly been treated as confidential both by the appellant and by the Chinese authorities, and that, on a balance of probabilities, disclosure of the information could harm the appellant's commercial interests (para. 23). As well, Robertson J.A. found that the information in question was clearly of a confidential nature as it was commercial information, consistently treated and regarded as confidential, that would be of interest to AECL's competitors (para. 16). Thus, the order is sought to prevent a serious risk to an important commercial interest.

62 The first branch of the test also requires the consideration of alternative measures to the confidentiality order, as well as an examination of the scope of the order to ensure that it is not overly broad. Both courts below found that the information contained in the Confidential Documents was relevant to potential defences available to the appellant under the *CEAA* and this finding was not appealed at this Court. Further, I agree with the Court of Appeal's assertion (para. 99) that, given the importance of the documents to the right to make full answer and defence, the appellant is, practically speaking, compelled to produce the documents. Given that the information is necessary to the appellant's case, it remains only to determine whether there are reasonably alternative means by which the necessary information can be adduced without disclosing the confidential information.



Tab

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**KeyCite treatment**

**Most Negative Treatment:** Distinguished

**Most Recent Distinguished:** [T.Z. v. P.V.R.](#) | 2022 SKQB 129, 2022 CarswellSask 256 | (Sask. Q.B., May 17, 2022)

2021 SCC 25, 2021 CSC 25

Supreme Court of Canada

Sherman Estate v. Donovan

2021 CarswellOnt 8340, 2021 CarswellOnt 8339, 2021 SCC 25, 2021 CSC 25, [2021] 2

S.C.R. 75, [2021] 2 R.C.S. 75, [2021] S.C.J. No. 25, 331 A.C.W.S. (3d) 489, 458 D.L.R.

(4th) 361, 66 C.P.C. (8th) 1, 67 E.T.R. (4th) 163, 72 C.R. (7th) 223, EYB 2021-391973

**Estate of Bernard Sherman and Trustees of the Estate and Estate of Honey Sherman and Trustees of the Estate (Appellants) and Kevin Donovan and Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. (Respondents) and Attorney General of Ontario, Attorney General of British Columbia, Canadian Civil Liberties Association, Income Security Advocacy Centre, Ad IDEM/Canadian Media Lawyers Association, Postmedia Network Inc., CTV, a Division of Bell Media Inc., Global News, a division of Corus Television Limited Partnership, The Globe and Mail Inc., Citytv, a division of Rogers Media Inc., British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, HIV & AIDS Legal Clinic Ontario, HIV Legal Network and Mental Health Legal Committee (Intervenors)**

Wagner C.J.C., Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Brown, Rowe, Martin, Kasirer JJ.

Heard: October 6, 2020

Judgment: June 11, 2021

Docket: 38695

Proceedings: affirming *Donovan v. Sherman Estate* (2019), 56 C.P.C. (8th) 82, 47 E.T.R. (4th) 1, 2019 CarswellOnt 6867, 2019 ONCA 376, C.W. Hourigan J.A., Doherty J.A., Paul Rouleau J.A. (Ont. C.A.); reversing *Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Sherman Estate* (2018), 41 E.T.R. (4th) 126, 2018 CarswellOnt 13017, 2018 ONSC 4706, 28 C.P.C. (8th) 102, 417 C.R.R. (2d) 321, S.F. Dunphy J. (Ont. S.C.J.)

Counsel: Chantelle Cseh, Timothy Youdan, for Appellants

Iris Fischer, Skye A. Sepp, for Respondents

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Jacqueline Hughes, for Intervener, Attorney General of British Columbia

Ryder Gilliland, for Intervener, Canadian Civil Liberties Association

Ewa Krajewska, for Intervener, Income Security Advocacy Centre

Robert S. Anderson, Q.C., for Intervenors, Ad IDEM/Canadian Media Lawyers Association, Postmedia Network Inc., CTV, a Division of Bell Media Inc., Global News, a division of Corus Television Limited Partnership, The Globe and Mail Inc. and Citytv, a division of Rogers Media Inc.

Adam Goldenberg, for Intervener, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association

Khalid Janmohamed, for Intervenors, HIV & AIDS Legal Clinic Ontario, the HIV Legal Network and the Mental Health Legal Committee

Subject: Civil Practice and Procedure; Criminal; Estates and Trusts

**Related Abridgment Classifications**

Civil practice and procedure

[XXIII Practice on appeal](#)

[XXIII.13 Powers and duties of appellate court](#)



## I. Overview

1 This Court has been resolute in recognizing that the open court principle is protected by the constitutionally-entrenched right of freedom of expression and, as such, it represents a central feature of a liberal democracy. As a general rule, the public can attend hearings and consult court files and the press — the eyes and ears of the public — is left free to inquire and comment on the workings of the courts, all of which helps make the justice system fair and accountable.

2 Accordingly, there is a strong presumption in favour of open courts. It is understood that this allows for public scrutiny which can be the source of inconvenience and even embarrassment to those who feel that their engagement in the justice system brings intrusion into their private lives. But this discomfort is not, as a general matter, enough to overturn the strong presumption that the public can attend hearings and that court files can be consulted and reported upon by the free press.

3 Notwithstanding this presumption, exceptional circumstances do arise where competing interests justify a restriction on the open court principle. Where a discretionary court order limiting constitutionally-protected openness is sought — for example, a sealing order, a publication ban, an order excluding the public from a hearing, or a redaction order — the applicant must demonstrate, as a threshold requirement, that openness presents a serious risk to a competing interest of public importance. That this requirement is considered a high bar serves to maintain the strong presumption of open courts. Moreover, the protection of open courts does not stop there. The applicant must still show that the order is necessary to prevent the risk and that, as a matter of proportionality, the benefits of that order restricting openness outweigh its negative effects.

4 This appeal turns on whether concerns advanced by persons seeking an exception to the ordinarily open court file in probate proceedings — the concerns for privacy of the affected individuals and their physical safety — amount to important public interests that are at such serious risk that the files should be sealed. The parties to this appeal agree that physical safety is an important public interest that could justify a sealing order but disagree as to whether that interest would be at serious risk, in the circumstances of this case, should the files be unsealed. They further disagree whether privacy is in itself an important interest that could justify a sealing order. The appellants say that privacy is a public interest of sufficient import that can justify limits on openness, especially in light of the threats individuals face as technology facilitates widespread dissemination of personally sensitive information. They argue that the Court of Appeal was mistaken to say that personal concerns for privacy, without more, lack the public interest component that is properly the subject-matter of a sealing order.

5 This Court has, in different settings, consistently championed privacy as a fundamental consideration in a free society. Pointing to cases decided in other contexts, the appellants contend that privacy should be recognized here as a public interest that, on the facts of this case, substantiates their plea for orders sealing the probate files. The respondents resist, recalling that privacy has generally been seen as a poor justification for an exception to openness. After all, they say, virtually every court proceeding entails some disquiet for the lives of those concerned and these intrusions on privacy must be tolerated because open courts are essential to a healthy democracy.

6 This appeal offers, then, an occasion to decide whether privacy can amount to a public interest in the open court jurisprudence and, if so, whether openness puts privacy at serious risk here so as to justify the kind of orders sought by the appellants.

7 For the reasons that follow, I propose to recognize an aspect of privacy as an important public interest for the purposes of the relevant test from *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*, 2002 SCC 41, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522. Proceedings in open court can lead to the dissemination of highly sensitive personal information that would result not just in discomfort or embarrassment, but in an affront to the affected person's dignity. Where this narrower dimension of privacy, rooted in what I see as the public interest in protecting human dignity, is shown to be at serious risk, an exception to the open court principle may be justified.

8 In this case, and with this interest in mind, it cannot be said that the risk to privacy is sufficiently serious to overcome the strong presumption of openness. The same is true of the risk to physical safety here. The Court of Appeal was right in the circumstances to set aside the sealing orders and I would therefore dismiss the appeal.

### A. The Test for Discretionary Limits on Court Openness

37 Court proceedings are presumptively open to the public (*MacIntyre*, at p. 189; *A.B. v. Bragg Communications Inc.* 2012 SCC 46, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 567, at para. 11).

38 The test for discretionary limits on presumptive court openness has been expressed as a two-step inquiry involving the necessity and proportionality of the proposed order (*Sierra Club*, at para. 53). Upon examination, however, this test rests upon three core prerequisites that a person seeking such a limit must show. Recasting the test around these three prerequisites, without altering its essence, helps to clarify the burden on an applicant seeking an exception to the open court principle. In order to succeed, the person asking a court to exercise discretion in a way that limits the open court presumption must establish that:

(1) court openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest;

(2) the order sought is necessary to prevent this serious risk to the identified interest because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent this risk; and,

(3) as a matter of proportionality, the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effects.

Only where all three of these prerequisites have been met can a discretionary limit on openness — for example, a sealing order, a publication ban, an order excluding the public from a hearing, or a redaction order — properly be ordered. This test applies to all discretionary limits on court openness, subject only to valid legislative enactments (*Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario* 2005 SCC 41, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 188, at paras. 7 and 22).

39 The discretion is structured and controlled in this way to protect the open court principle, which is understood to be constitutionalized under the right to freedom of expression at s. 2(b) of the Charter (*New Brunswick*, at para. 23). Sustained by freedom of expression, the open court principle is one of the foundations of a free press given that access to courts is fundamental to newsgathering. This Court has often highlighted the importance of open judicial proceedings to maintaining the independence and impartiality of the courts, public confidence and understanding of their work and ultimately the legitimacy of the process (see, e.g., *Vancouver Sun*, at paras. 23-26). In *New Brunswick*, La Forest J. explained the presumption in favour of court openness had become "one of the hallmarks of a democratic society" (citing *Re Southam Inc. and The Queen (No.1)*, (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 113 (C.A.), at p. 119), that "acts as a guarantee that justice is administered in a non-arbitrary manner, according to the rule of law ... thereby fostering public confidence in the integrity of the court system and understanding of the administration of justice" (para. 22). The centrality of this principle to the court system underlies the strong presumption — albeit one that is rebuttable — in favour of court openness (para. 40; *Mentuck*, at para. 39).

40 The test ensures that discretionary orders are subject to no lower standard than a legislative enactment limiting court openness would be (*Mentuck*, at para. 27; *Sierra Club*, at para. 45). To that end, this Court developed a scheme of analysis by analogy to the *Oakes* test, which courts use to understand whether a legislative limit on a right guaranteed under the Charter is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society (*Sierra Club*, at para. 40, citing *R. v. Oakes*, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; see also *Dagenais*, at p. 878; *Vancouver Sun*, at para. 30).

41 The recognized scope of what interests might justify a discretionary exception to open courts has broadened over time. In *Dagenais*, Lamer C.J. spoke of a requisite risk to the "fairness of the trial" (p. 878). In *Mentuck*, Iacobucci J. extended this to a risk affecting the "proper administration of justice" (para. 32). Finally, in *Sierra Club*, Iacobucci J., again writing for a unanimous Court, restated the test to capture any serious risk to an "important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation" (para. 53). He simultaneously clarified that the important interest must be expressed as a public interest. For example, on the facts of that case, a harm to a particular business interest would not have been sufficient, but the "general commercial interest of preserving confidential information" was an important interest because of its public character (para. 55). This is consistent with the fact that this test was developed in reference to the *Oakes* jurisprudence that focuses on the "pressing and substantial" objective of legislation of general application (*Oakes*, at pp. 138-39; see also *Mentuck*, at para. 31). The term "important interest" therefore captures a broad array of public objectives.

42 While there is no closed list of important public interests for the purposes of this test, I share Iacobucci J.'s sense, explained in *Sierra Club*, that courts must be "cautious" and "alive to the fundamental importance of the open court rule" even at the earliest stage when they are identifying important public interests (para. 56). Determining what is an important public interest can be done in the abstract at the level of general principles that extend beyond the parties to the particular dispute (para. 55). By contrast, whether that interest is at "serious risk" is a fact-based finding that, for the judge considering the appropriateness of an order, is necessarily made in context. In this sense, the identification of, on the one hand, an important interest and, on the other, the seriousness of the risk to that interest are, theoretically at least, separate and qualitatively distinct operations. An order may therefore be refused simply because a valid important public interest is not at serious risk on the facts of a given case or, conversely, that the identified interests, regardless of whether they are at serious risk, do not have the requisite important public character as a matter of general principle.


43 The test laid out in *Sierra Club* continues to be an appropriate guide for judicial discretion in cases like this one. The breadth of the category of "important interest" transcends the interests of the parties to the dispute and provides significant flexibility to address harm to fundamental values in our society that unqualified openness could cause (see, e.g., P. M. Perell and J. W. Morden, *The Law of Civil Procedure in Ontario* (4th ed. 2020), at para. 3.185; J. Bailey and J. Burkell, "Revisiting the Open Court Principle in an Era of Online Publication: Questioning Presumptive Public Access to Parties' and Witnesses' Personal Information" (2016), 48 *Ottawa L. Rev.* 143, at pp. 154-55). At the same time, however, the requirement that a serious risk to an important interest be demonstrated imposes a meaningful threshold necessary to maintain the presumption of openness. Were it merely a matter of weighing the benefits of the limit on court openness against its negative effects, decision-makers confronted with concrete impacts on the individuals appearing before them may struggle to put adequate weight on the less immediate negative effects on the open court principle. Such balancing could be evasive of effective appellate review. To my mind, the structure provided by *Dagenais*, *Mentuck*, and *Sierra Club* remains appropriate and should be affirmed.

44 Finally, I recall that the open court principle is engaged by all judicial proceedings, whatever their nature (*MacIntyre* at pp. 185-86; *Vancouver Sun*, at para. 31). To the extent the Trustees suggested, in their arguments about the negative effects of the sealing orders, that probate in Ontario does not engage the open court principle or that the openness of these proceedings has no public value, I disagree. The certificates the Trustees sought from the court are issued under the seal of that court, thereby bearing the imprimatur of the court's authority. The court's decision, even if rendered in a non-contentious setting, will have an impact on third parties, for example by establishing the testamentary paper that constitutes a valid will (see *Otis v. Otis*, (2004), 7 E.T.R. (3d) 221 (Ont. S.C.), at paras. 23-24). Contrary to what the Trustees argue, the matters in a probate file are not quintessentially private or fundamentally administrative. Obtaining a certificate of appointment of estate trustee in Ontario is a court proceeding and the fundamental rationale for openness — discouraging mischief and ensuring confidence in the administration of justice through transparency — applies to probate proceedings and thus to the transfer of property under court authority and other matters affected by that court action.

45 It is true that other non-probate estate planning mechanisms may allow for the transfer of wealth outside the ordinary avenues of testate or intestate succession — that is the case, for instance, for certain insurance and pension benefits, and for certain property held in co-ownership. But this does not change the necessarily open court character of probate proceedings. That non-probate transfers keep certain information related to the administration of an estate out of public view does not mean that the Trustees here, by seeking certificates from the court, somehow do not engage this principle. The Trustees seek the benefits that flow from the public judicial probate process: transparency ensures that the probate court's authority is administered fairly and efficiently (*Vancouver Sun*, at para. 25; *New Brunswick*, at para. 22). The strong presumption in favour of openness plainly applies to probate proceedings and the Trustees must satisfy the test for discretionary limits on court openness.

## **B. The Public Importance of Privacy**

46 As mentioned, I disagree with the Trustees that an unbounded interest in privacy qualifies as an important public interest under the test for discretionary limits on court openness. Yet in some of its manifestations, privacy does have social importance beyond the person most immediately concerned. On that basis, it cannot be excluded as an interest that could justify, in the right circumstances, a limit to court openness. Indeed, the public importance of privacy has been recognized by this Court in



Tab

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## KeyCite treatment

**Most Negative Treatment:** Distinguished

**Most Recent Distinguished:** [Abbey Resources Corp. v. Saskatchewan Assessment Management Agency](#) | 2021 SKQB 100, 2021 CarswellSask 230, 332 A.C.W.S. (3d) 623 | (Sask. Q.B., Apr 7, 2021)  
2019 SCC 5, 2019 CSC 5  
Supreme Court of Canada

Orphan Well Association v. Grant Thornton Ltd.

2019 CarswellAlta 141, 2019 CarswellAlta 142, 2019 CSC 5, 2019 SCC 5, [2019] 1 S.C.R. 150, [2019] 1 R.C.S. 150, [2019] 3 W.W.R. 1, [2019] A.W.L.D. 879, [2019] A.W.L.D. 880, [2019] A.W.L.D. 881, [2019] A.W.L.D. 941, [2019] A.W.L.D. 942, [2019] S.C.J. No. 5, 22 C.E.L.R. (4th) 121, 301 A.C.W.S. (3d) 183, 430 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 66 C.B.R. (6th) 1, 81 Alta. L.R. (6th) 1, 9 P.P.S.A.C. (4th) 293

**Orphan Well Association and Alberta Energy Regulator (Appellants) and Grant Thornton Limited and ATB Financial (formerly known as Alberta Treasury Branches) (Respondents) and Attorney General of Ontario, Attorney General of British Columbia, Attorney General of Saskatchewan, Attorney General of Alberta, Ecojustice Canada Society, Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, Greenpeace Canada, Action Surface Rights Association, Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals and Canadian Bankers' Association (Interveners)**

Wagner C.J.C., Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Gascon, Côté, Brown JJ.

Heard: February 15, 2018

Judgment: January 31, 2019

Docket: 37627

Proceedings: reversing *Orphan Well Assn. v. Grant Thornton Ltd.* (2017), 8 C.E.L.R. (4th) 1, [2017] 6 W.W.R. 301, 50 Alta. L.R. (6th) 1, 47 C.B.R. (6th) 171, 2017 CarswellAlta 695, 2017 ABCA 124, Frans Slatter J.A., Frederica Schutz J.A., Sheilah Martin J.A. (Alta. C.A.); affirming *Grant Thornton Ltd. v. Alberta Energy Regulator* (2016), 33 Alta. L.R. (6th) 221, 37 C.B.R. (6th) 88, [2016] 11 W.W.R. 716, 2016 CarswellAlta 994, 2016 ABQB 278, Neil Wittmann C.J.Q.B. (Alta. Q.B.)

Counsel: Ken Lenz, Q.C., Patricia Johnston, Q.C., Keely R. Cameron, Brad Gilmour, Michael W. Selnes, for Appellants  
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Richard James Fyfe, for Intervener, Attorney General of Saskatchewan

Robert Normey, Vivienne Ball, for Intervener, Attorney General of Alberta

Adrian Scotchmer, for Intervener, Ecojustice Canada Society

Lewis Manning, Toby Kruger, for Intervener, Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers

Nader R. Hasan, Lindsay Board, for Intervener, Greenpeace Canada

Christine Laing, Shaun Fluker, for Intervener, Action Surface Rights Association

Caireen E. Hanert, Adam Maerov, for Intervener, Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals

Howard A. Gorman, Q.C., D. Aaron Stephenson, for Intervener, Canadian Bankers' Association

Subject: Civil Practice and Procedure; Environmental; Estates and Trusts; Insolvency; Natural Resources

## Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

Canadian courts characterize a mineral lease that allows a company to exploit oil and gas resources as a *profit à prendre*. It is not disputed that a *profit à prendre* is a form of real property interest held by the company (*Berkheiser v. Berkheiser*, [1957] S.C.R. 387 (S.C.C.)).

**Termes et locutions cités:**

**exploitant**

[Un] « exploitant » [est] la personne qui a droit à une substance minérale ou le droit de la travailler (*Surface Rights Act*, R.S.A. 2000, c. S-24, al. 1(h) et art. 15).

**installation**

L'« installation » est définie au sens large et englobe tous les bâtiments, structures, installations et matériaux qui sont liés ou associés à la récupération, à la mise en valeur, à la production, à la manutention, au traitement ou à l'élimination de ressources pétrolières et gazières ([*Oil and Gas Conservation Act*, R.S.A. 2000, c. O-6], art. 1(1)(w)).

**orphelins**

[L]es « orphelins » [sont] les biens pétroliers et gaziers ainsi que leurs sites délaissés sans que les processus en question n'aient été correctement effectués par les sociétés liquidées à la fin de leur procédure d'insolvabilité.

**profit à prendre**

Les tribunaux canadiens qualifient le bail d'exploitation minière permettant à une société d'exploiter des ressources pétrolières et gazières de profit à prendre. Il n'est pas contesté qu'un profit à prendre constitue une forme d'intérêt détenue par la société sur un bien réel (*Berkheiser c. Berkheiser*, [1957] R.C.S. 387).

APPEAL from judgment reported at *Orphan Well Assn. v. Grant Thornton Ltd.* (2017), 2017 ABCA 124, 2017 CarswellAlta 695, 8 C.E.L.R. (4th) 1, [2017] 6 W.W.R. 301, 50 Alta. L.R. (6th) 1, 47 C.B.R. (6th) 171 (Alta. C.A.), dismissing appeal from judgment dismissing application for declaration that trustee-in-bankruptcy's disclaimer of licensed wells was void and granting cross-application for approval of sales process that excluded renounced wells.

POURVOI formé à l'encontre d'une décision publiée à *Orphan Well Assn. v. Grant Thornton Ltd.* (2017), 2017 ABCA 124, 2017 CarswellAlta 695, 8 C.E.L.R. (4th) 1, [2017] 6 W.W.R. 301, 50 Alta. L.R. (6th) 1, 47 C.B.R. (6th) 171 (Alta. C.A.), ayant rejeté un appel interjeté à l'encontre d'un jugement ayant rejeté une demande visant à faire déclarer que la renonciation du syndic de faillite à des puits autorisés était nulle et ayant accueilli une demande reconventionnelle visant à obtenir l'approbation d'un processus de vente qui excluait les puits ayant fait l'objet d'une renonciation.

**Wagner C.J.C. (Abella, Karakatsanis, Gascon, Brown JJ. concurring):**

**I. Introduction**

1 The oil and gas industry is a lucrative and important component of Alberta's and Canada's economy. The industry also carries with it certain unavoidable environmental costs and consequences. To address them, Alberta has established a comprehensive cradle-to-grave licensing regime that is binding on companies active in the industry. A company will not be granted the licences that it needs to extract, process or transport oil and gas in Alberta unless it assumes end-of-life responsibilities for plugging and capping oil wells to prevent leaks, dismantling surface structures and restoring the surface to its previous condition. These obligations are known as "reclamation" and "abandonment" (*Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act*, R.S.A. 2000, c. E-12 ("EPEA"), s. 1(ddd), and *Oil and Gas Conservation Act*, R.S.A. 2000, c. O-6 ("OGCA"), s. 1(1)(a)).

2 The question in this appeal is what happens to these obligations when a company is bankrupt and a trustee in bankruptcy is charged with distributing its assets among various creditors according to the rules in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*,



[R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 \("BIA"\)](#). Redwater Energy Corporation ("Redwater") is the bankrupt company at the centre of this appeal. Its principal assets are 127 oil and gas assets — wells, pipelines and facilities — and their corresponding licences. A few of Redwater's licensed wells are still producing and profitable. The majority of the wells are spent and burdened with abandonment and reclamation liabilities that exceed their value.

3 The Alberta Energy Regulator ("Regulator") and the Orphan Well Association ("OWA") are the appellants in this Court. (For simplicity, I will refer to the Regulator when discussing the appellants' position, unless otherwise noted.) The Regulator administers Alberta's licensing regime and enforces the abandonment and reclamation obligations of licensees. The Regulator has delegated to the OWA, an independent non-profit entity, the authority to abandon and reclaim "orphans", which are oil and gas assets and their sites left behind in an improperly abandoned or unreclaimed state by defunct companies at the close of their insolvency proceedings. The Regulator says that, one way or another, the remaining value of the Redwater estate must be applied to meet the abandonment and reclamation obligations associated with its licensed assets.

4 Redwater's trustee in bankruptcy, Grant Thornton Limited ("GTL"), and Redwater's primary secured creditor, Alberta Treasury Branches ("ATB"), oppose the appeal. (For simplicity, I will refer to GTL when discussing the respondents' position, unless otherwise noted.) GTL argues that, since it has disclaimed Redwater's unproductive oil and gas assets, [s. 14.06\(4\) of the BIA](#) empowers it to walk away from those assets and the environmental liabilities associated with them and to deal solely with Redwater's producing oil and gas assets. Alternatively, GTL argues that, under the priority scheme in the [BIA](#), the claims of Redwater's secured creditors must be satisfied ahead of Redwater's environmental liabilities. Relying on the doctrine of paramountcy, GTL says that Alberta's environmental legislation regulating the oil and gas industry is constitutionally inoperative to the extent that it authorizes the Regulator to interfere with this arrangement.

5 The chambers judge ([2016 ABQB 278](#), [37 C.B.R. \(6th\) 88](#) (Alta. Q.B.)) and a majority of the Court of Appeal ([2017 ABCA 124](#), [47 C.B.R. \(6th\) 171](#) (Alta. C.A.)) agreed with GTL. The Regulator's proposed use of its statutory powers to enforce Redwater's compliance with abandonment and reclamation obligations during bankruptcy was held to conflict with the [BIA](#) in two ways: (1) it imposed on GTL the obligations of a licensee in relation to the Redwater assets disclaimed by GTL, contrary to [s. 14.06\(4\) of the BIA](#); and (2) it upended the priority scheme for the distribution of a bankrupt's assets established by the [BIA](#) by requiring that the "provable claims" of the Regulator, an unsecured creditor, be paid ahead of the claims of Redwater's secured creditors.

6 Martin J.A., as she then was, dissented. She would have allowed the Regulator's appeal on the basis that there was no conflict between Alberta's environmental legislation and the [BIA](#). Martin J.A. was of the view that: (1) [s. 14.06 of the BIA](#) did not operate to relieve GTL of Redwater's obligations with respect to its licensed assets; and (2) the Regulator was not asserting any provable claims, so the priority scheme in the [BIA](#) was not upended.

7 For the reasons that follow, I would allow the appeal. Although my analysis differs from hers in some respects, I agree with Martin J.A. that the Regulator's use of its statutory powers does not create a conflict with the [BIA](#) so as to trigger the doctrine of federal paramountcy. [Section 14.06\(4\)](#) is concerned with the personal liability of trustees, and does not empower a trustee to walk away from the environmental liabilities of the estate it is administering. The Regulator is not asserting any claims provable in the bankruptcy, and the priority scheme in the [BIA](#) is not upended. Thus, no conflict is caused by GTL's status as a licensee under Alberta legislation. Alberta's regulatory regime can coexist with and apply alongside the [BIA](#).

## II. Background

### A. Alberta's Regulatory Regime

8 The resolution of the constitutional questions and the ultimate outcome of this appeal depend on a proper understanding of the complex regulatory regime which governs Alberta's oil and gas industry. I will therefore describe that regime in considerable detail.

following bankruptcy did not determine or reorder priorities among creditors, but rather value[d] accurately the assets available for distribution" (para. 240).

### III. Analysis

#### A. The Doctrine of Paramountcy

63 As I have explained, Alberta legislation grants the Regulator wide-ranging powers to ensure that companies that have been granted licences to operate in the Alberta oil and gas industry will safely and properly abandon oil wells, facilities and pipelines at the end of their productive lives and will reclaim their sites. GTL seeks to avoid being subject to two of those powers: the power to order Redwater to abandon the Renounced Assets and the power to refuse to allow a transfer of the licences for the Retained Assets due to unmet LMR requirements. There is no doubt that these are valid regulatory powers granted to the Regulator by valid Alberta legislation. GTL seeks to avoid their application during bankruptcy by virtue of the doctrine of federal paramountcy, which dictates that the Alberta legislation empowering the Regulator to use the powers in dispute in this appeal will be inoperative to the extent that its use of these powers during bankruptcy conflicts with the *BIA*.

64 The issues in this appeal arise from what has been termed the "untidy intersection" of provincial environmental legislation and federal insolvency legislation (*Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, 2012 ONSC 1213, 88 C.B.R. (5th) 111 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), at para. 8). Paramountcy issues frequently arise in the insolvency context. Given the procedural nature of the *BIA*, the bankruptcy regime relies heavily on the continued operation of provincial laws. However, s. 72(1) of the *BIA* confirms that, where there is a genuine conflict between provincial laws concerning property and civil rights and federal bankruptcy legislation, the *BIA* prevails (see *Moloney*, at para. 40). In other words, bankruptcy is carved out from property and civil rights but remains conceptually part of it. Valid provincial legislation of general application continues to apply in bankruptcy until Parliament legislates pursuant to its exclusive jurisdiction in relation to bankruptcy and insolvency. At that point, the provincial law becomes inoperative to the extent of the conflict (see *Husky Oil Operations Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue*, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 453 (S.C.C.), at para. 3).

65 Over time, two distinct forms of conflict have been recognized. The first is *operational conflict*, which arises where compliance with both a valid federal law and a valid provincial law is impossible. Operational conflict arises "where one enactment says 'yes' and the other says 'no', such that 'compliance with one is defiance of the other'" (*Saskatchewan (Attorney General) v. Lemare Lake Logging Ltd.*, 2015 SCC 53, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 419 (S.C.C.), at para. 18, quoting *Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon*, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161 (S.C.C.), at p. 191). The second is *frustration of purpose*, which occurs where the operation of a valid provincial law is incompatible with a federal legislative purpose. The effect of a provincial law may frustrate the purpose of the federal law, even though it does "not entail a direct violation of the federal law's provisions" (*Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta*, 2007 SCC 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.), at para. 73). The party relying on frustration of purpose "must first establish the purpose of the relevant federal statute, and then prove that the provincial legislation is incompatible with this purpose" (*Lemare*, at para. 26, quoting *Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canadian Owners and Pilots Association*, 2010 SCC 39, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 536 (S.C.C.), at para. 66).

66 Under both branches of paramountcy, the burden of proof rests on the party alleging the conflict. This burden is not an easy one to satisfy, as the doctrine of paramountcy is to be applied with restraint. Conflict must be defined narrowly so that each level of government may act as freely as possible within its respective sphere of constitutional authority. "[H]armonious interpretations of federal and provincial legislation should be favoured over an interpretation that results in incompatibility ... [i]n the absence of 'very clear' statutory language to the contrary" (*Lemare*, at paras. 21 and 27). "It is presumed that Parliament intends its laws to co-exist with provincial laws" (*Moloney*, at para. 27). As this Court found in *Lemare*, at paras. 22-23, the application of the doctrine of paramountcy should also give due weight to the principle of co-operative federalism. This principle allows for interplay and overlap between federal and provincial legislation. While co-operative federalism does not impose limits on the otherwise valid exercise of legislative power, it does mean that courts should avoid an expansive interpretation of the purpose of federal legislation which will bring it into conflict with provincial legislation.



67 The case law has established that the *BIA* as a whole is intended to further "two purposes: the equitable distribution of the bankrupt's assets among his or her creditors and the bankrupt's financial rehabilitation" (*Moloney*, at para. 32, citing *Husky Oil*, at para. 7). Here, the bankrupt is a corporation that will never emerge from bankruptcy. Accordingly, only the former purpose is relevant. As I will discuss below, the chambers judge also spoke of the purposes of s. 14.06 as distinct from the broader purposes of the *BIA*. This Court has discussed the purpose of specific provisions of the *BIA* in previous cases — see, for example, *Lemare*, at para. 45.

68 GTL has proposed two conflicts between the Alberta legislation establishing the disputed powers of the Regulator during bankruptcy and the *BIA*, either of which, it says, would have provided a sufficient basis for the order granted by the chambers judge.

69 The first conflict proposed by GTL results from the inclusion of trustees in the definition of "licensee" in the *OGCA* and the *Pipeline Act*. GTL says that s. 14.06(4) releases it from all environmental liability associated with the Renounced Assets after a valid "disclaimer" is made. But as a "licensee", it can be required by the Regulator to satisfy all of Redwater's statutory obligations and liabilities, which disregards the "disclaimer" of the Renounced Assets. GTL further notes the possibility that it may be held personally liable as a "licensee". In response, the Regulator says that s. 14.06(4) is concerned primarily with protecting trustees from personal liability in relation to environmental orders, and does not affect the ongoing responsibilities of the bankrupt estate. Thus, as long as a trustee is protected from personal liability, no conflict arises from its status as a "licensee" or from the fact that the bankrupt estate remains responsible under provincial law for the ongoing environmental obligations associated with "disclaimed" assets.

70 The second conflict proposed by GTL is that, even if s. 14.06(4) is only concerned with a trustee's personal liability, the Regulator's use of its statutory powers effectively reorders the priorities in bankruptcy established by the *BIA*. Such reordering is said to be caused by the fact that the Regulator requires the expenditure of estate assets to comply with the Abandonment Orders and to discharge or secure the environmental liabilities associated with the Renounced Assets before it will approve a transfer of the licences for the Retained Assets (in keeping with the LMR requirements). These end-of-life obligations are said by GTL to be unsecured claims held by the Regulator, which cannot, under the *BIA*, be satisfied in preference over the claims of Redwater's secured creditors. In response, the Regulator says that, on the proper application of the *Abitibi* test, these environmental regulatory obligations are not provable claims in bankruptcy. Accordingly, says the Regulator, the provincial laws requiring the Redwater estate to satisfy these obligations prior to the distribution of its assets to secured creditors do not conflict with the priority scheme in the *BIA*.


71 I will consider each alleged conflict in turn.

### ***B. Is There a Conflict Between the Alberta Regulatory Scheme and Section 14.06 of the BIA?***

72 As a statutory scheme, s. 14.06 of the *BIA* raises numerous interpretive issues. As noted by Martin J.A., the only matter concerning s. 14.06 on which all the parties to this litigation can agree is that it "is not a model of clarity" (C.A. reasons, at para. 201). Given the confusion caused by attempts to interpret s. 14.06 as a coherent scheme during this litigation, Parliament may very well wish to re-examine s. 14.06 during its next review of the *BIA*.

73 At its core, this appeal raises the issue of whether there is a conflict between specific Alberta legislation and the *BIA*. GTL submits that there is such a conflict. It argues that, because it "disclaimed" the Renounced Assets under s. 14.06(4) of the *BIA*, it should cease to have any responsibilities, obligations or liability with respect to them. And yet, it notes, as a "licensee" under the *OGCA* and the *Pipeline Act*, it remains responsible for abandoning the Renounced Assets. Furthermore, those assets continue to be included in the calculation of Redwater's LMR. GTL suggests an additional conflict with s. 14.06(2) of the *BIA* based on its possible exposure, as a "licensee", to personal liability for the costs of abandoning the Renounced Assets.

74 I have concluded that there is no conflict. Various arguments were advanced during this appeal concerning the disparate elements of the s. 14.06 scheme. However, the provision upon which GTL in fact relies in arguing that it is entitled to avoid its responsibilities as a "licensee" under the Alberta legislation is s. 14.06(4). As I have noted, GTL and the Regulator propose



Tab

18

## KeyCite treatment

**Most Negative Treatment:** Check subsequent history and related treatments.

2015 SCC 51, 2015 CSC 51

Supreme Court of Canada

Alberta (Attorney General) v. Moloney

2015 CarswellAlta 2092, 2015 CarswellAlta 2091, 2015 SCC 51, 2015 CSC 51, 2015 J.E. 1777,  
[2015] 12 W.W.R. 1, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 327, [2015] A.W.L.D. 4293, [2015] A.W.L.D. 4294, [2015]  
A.W.L.D. 4341, 22 Alta. L.R. (6th) 287, 259 A.C.W.S. (3d) 20, 29 C.B.R. (6th) 173, 391 D.L.R.  
(4th) 189, 476 N.R. 318, 606 A.R. 123, 652 W.A.C. 123, 85 M.V.R. (6th) 37, J.E. 2015-1777

## **Attorney General of Alberta, Appellant and Joseph William Moloney, Respondent and Attorney General of Ontario, Attorney General of Quebec, Attorney General of British Columbia, Attorney General for Saskatchewan and Superintendent of Bankruptcy, Interveners**

McLachlin C.J.C., Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Wagner, Gascon, Côté JJ.

Heard: January 15, 2015

Judgment: November 13, 2015

Docket: 35820

Proceedings: affirming *Moloney v. Alberta (Administrator, Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act)* (2014), 64 M.V.R. (6th) 82, 569 A.R. 177, 370 D.L.R. (4th) 267, 9 C.B.R. (6th) 278, 91 Alta. L.R. (5th) 221, [2014] 4 W.W.R. 272, 2014 CarswellAlta 225, 2014 ABCA 68, Frans Slatter J.A., Jack Watson J.A., Ronald Berger J.A. (Alta. C.A.); affirming *Moloney v. Alberta (Administrator, Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act)* (2012), 550 A.R. 257, 39 M.V.R. (6th) 21, 2012 ABQB 644, 2012 CarswellAlta 1757, [2012] A.J. No. 1094, 73 Alta. L.R. (5th) 44, A.B. Moen J. (Alta. Q.B.)

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Thomson Irvine for Intervener, Attorney General, for Saskatchewan

Peter Southey, Michael Lema for Intervener, Superintendent of Bankruptcy

Subject: Constitutional; Insolvency; Public

### **Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency

**I** Bankruptcy and insolvency jurisdiction

**I.1** Constitutional jurisdiction of federal government and provinces

Bankruptcy and insolvency

**XV** Discharge of bankrupt

**XV.6** Effect of discharge

**XV.6.b** Miscellaneous

Motor vehicles

**II** Constitutional issues

**II.1** Conflict with federal legislation

**II.1.g** Licence suspension

In many aspects, the BIA [*Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3] is a complete code governing bankruptcy. It sets out which claims are treated as provable claims and which assets are distributed to creditors, and how. It then sets out which claims are released on discharge and which claims survive bankruptcy.

### driving

Driving is unlike other activities. For many, it is necessary to function meaningfully in society

### paramountcy

In keeping with co-operative federalism, the doctrine of paramountcy is applied with restraint. It is presumed that Parliament intends its laws to co-exist with provincial laws.

#### Termes et locutions cités:

### conduite d'un véhicule

La conduite d'un véhicule se distingue d'autres activités. Pour bon nombre de personnes, elle est nécessaire pour fonctionner normalement dans la société

### loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité

La LFI [*Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité*, L.R.C. 1985, c. B-3] constitue à maints égards un code complet en matière de faillite. Elle précise les réclamations qui sont considérées comme des réclamations prouvables et les biens qui sont distribués aux créanciers, et la façon dont ils le sont. Elle énonce ensuite les réclamations dont le failli est libéré par une ordonnance de libération et les réclamations qui subsistent après la faillite

### prépondérance

Conformément à la théorie du fédéralisme coopératif, la doctrine de la prépondérance est appliquée avec retenue. On présume que le Parlement a voulu que ses lois coexistent avec les lois provinciales.

APPEAL by Attorney General from judgment reported at *Moloney v. Alberta (Administrator, Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act)* (2014), 2014 ABCA 68, 2014 CarswellAlta 225, 9 C.B.R. (6th) 278, [2014] 4 W.W.R. 272, 91 Alta. L.R. (5th) 221, 370 D.L.R. (4th) 267, 64 M.V.R. (6th) 82, 569 A.R. 177 (Alta. C.A.), dismissing appeal from judgment granting application for judicial review of suspension of driver's licence.

POURVOI formé par le procureur général à l'encontre d'un jugement publié à *Moloney v. Alberta (Administrator, Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act)* (2014), 2014 ABCA 68, 2014 CarswellAlta 225, 9 C.B.R. (6th) 278, [2014] 4 W.W.R. 272, 91 Alta. L.R. (5th) 221, 370 D.L.R. (4th) 267, 64 M.V.R. (6th) 82, 569 A.R. 177 (Alta. C.A.), ayant rejeté un appel interjeté à l'encontre d'un jugement ayant accordé une demande de contrôle judiciaire d'une décision ayant suspendu un permis de conduire.

**Gascon J. (Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Wagner JJ. concurring):**

### I. Overview

1 In Canada, the federal and provincial levels of government must enact laws within the limits of their respective spheres of jurisdiction. The *Constitution Act, 1867* defines which matters fall within the exclusive legislative authority of each level. Still, even when acting within its own sphere, one level of government will sometimes affect matters within the other's sphere of jurisdiction. The resulting legislative overlap may, on occasion, lead to a conflict between otherwise valid federal and provincial laws. In this appeal, the Court must decide whether such a conflict exists, and if so, resolve it.

2 The alleged conflict in this case concerns, on the one hand, the federal *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 ("*BIA*"), and on the other hand, Alberta's *Traffic Safety Act*, R.S.A. 2000, c. T-6 ("*TSA*"). It stems from a car accident caused

by the respondent while he was uninsured, contrary to s. 54 of the *TSA*. The province of Alberta compensated the individual injured in the accident and sought to recover the amount of the compensation from the respondent. The latter, however, made an assignment in bankruptcy and was eventually discharged. The *BIA* governs bankruptcy and provides that, upon discharge, the respondent is released from all debts that are claims provable in bankruptcy. The *TSA* governs the activity of driving, including vehicle permits and driver's licences, and allows the province to suspend the respondent's licence and permits until he pays the amount of the compensation.

3 As a result of his bankruptcy and subsequent discharge, the respondent did not pay the amount of the compensation in full; because of this failure to pay, Alberta suspended his vehicle permits and driver's licence. The respondent contested this suspension, arguing that the *TSA* conflicted with the *BIA*, in that it frustrated the purposes of bankruptcy. The province replied that there was no conflict since the *TSA* was regulatory in nature and did not purport to enforce a discharged debt. The Court of Queen's Bench and the Court of Appeal found that there was a conflict between the federal and provincial laws. Relying on the doctrine of federal paramountcy, they declared the impugned provision of the *TSA* to be inoperative to the extent of the conflict. I agree with the outcome reached by the lower courts, and I would dismiss the appeal.

## II. Facts

4 The car accident caused by the respondent occurred in 1989. In 1996, the individual injured in the accident obtained judgment against the respondent in the amount of \$194,875. The Administrator appointed under the *Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. M-22 ("MVACA")*, indemnified the injured party for the amount of the judgment debt and was assigned the debt in accordance with the *MVACA*. Initially, the respondent made arrangements with the Administrator to pay the debt in instalments. Some years later, however, in January 2008, he made an assignment in bankruptcy. He listed the Administrator's claim in his Statement of Affairs. It is not disputed that the judgment debt assigned to the Administrator was a claim provable in bankruptcy. It was, by far, the respondent's most substantial debt and, in fact, the reason for his financial difficulties. At the time of the assignment, the outstanding amount due to the Administrator stood at \$195,823.

5 In June 2011, the respondent obtained an absolute discharge, which no one opposed. In October of the same year, he received a letter from the Director, Driver Fitness and Monitoring, notifying him that, by application of s. 102(1) of the *TSA*, his operator's licence and vehicle registration privileges would be suspended until payment of the outstanding amount of the judgment debt. Later, in November, his lawyer received another letter, this time from Motor Vehicle Accident Recoveries, advising the respondent that he "remains indebted for the judgment debt obtained against him ... 'until the judgment is satisfied or discharged, otherwise than by a discharge in bankruptcy'" (A.R., at p. 49). The letter proposed that new payment arrangements be made, failing which the suspension of his driving privileges would continue.

6 Given this situation, in March 2012, the respondent sought an order from the Court of Queen's Bench to stay the suspension of his driving privileges. He claimed that he had been discharged in bankruptcy and that s. 178 of the *BIA* precluded the Administrator from enforcing the judgment debt.

## III. Judicial History

### *A. Alberta Court of Queen's Bench, 2012 ABQB 64473 Alta. L.R. (5th) 44 (Alta. Q.B.)*

7 Moen J. first found that, as a result of the discharge, there was no longer a liability on the basis of which the judgment could be enforced (para. 21). In her view, the question at issue was whether the discharge precluded the province from suspending the respondent's driving privileges because of the unpaid judgment debt. This entailed looking at the operation of the *TSA* and the *BIA* and determining whether the relevant provisions were in conflict, making the doctrine of paramountcy applicable. According to Moen J., an "operational conflict" could arise in two situations, namely where (1) "compliance with both acts is rendered inconsistent or impossible by directly conflicting with an express provision of the *BIA*" or (2) "the *TSA* has the intent and/or effect of interfering with the provisions of the *BIA* or its fundamental objectives" (para. 30).

8 Moen J. emphasized the rehabilitative purpose of the *BIA* (para. 31). She described the purpose of the *TSA* as being the "protection of public safety via the regulation of traffic and motor vehicles" (para. 33), and the purpose of s. 102 of the *TSA*

[Emphasis added.]

(*Husky Oil*, at para. 39)

Assessing the effect of the provincial law requires looking at the substance of the law, rather than its form. The province cannot do indirectly what it is precluded from doing directly: *Husky Oil*, at para. 39.

29 In sum, if the operation of the provincial law has the effect of making it impossible to comply with the federal law, or if it is technically possible to comply with both laws, but the operation of the provincial law still has the effect of frustrating Parliament's purpose, there is a conflict. Such a conflict results in the provincial law being inoperative, but only to the extent of the conflict with the federal law: *Western Bank*, at para. 69; *Rothmans*, at para. 11; *Mangat*, at para. 74. In practice, this means that the provincial law remains valid, but will be read down so as to not conflict with the federal law, though only for as long as the conflict exists: *Husky Oil*, at para. 81; E. Colvin, "Constitutional Law — Paramouncy — Duplication and Express Contradiction — Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon" (1983), 17 *U.B.C.L. Rev.* 347, at p. 348.

30 I now turn to the application of the doctrine to the facts of this appeal.

## **B. Application**

### *(1) The Legislative Schemes at Issue*

31 The first step of the analysis is to ensure that the impugned federal and provincial provisions are independently valid. Early in the proceedings, the parties recognized the validity of the relevant provisions of the *BIA* and the *TSA*. Before this Court, they again conceded the validity of both laws. The only question is whether their concurrent operation results in a conflict. This requires analyzing the legislative schemes at issue at the outset so as to reach a proper understanding of the provisions that are alleged to be in conflict.

#### **(a) The Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act**

32 Parliament enacted the *BIA* pursuant to its jurisdiction over matters of bankruptcy and insolvency under s. 91(21) of the *Constitution Act, 1867*. The *BIA*, notably through the specific provisions discussed below, furthers two purposes: the equitable distribution of the bankrupt's assets among his or her creditors and the bankrupt's financial rehabilitation (*Husky Oil*, at para. 7).

33 The first purpose of bankruptcy, the equitable distribution of assets, is achieved through a single proceeding model. Under this model, creditors of the bankrupt wishing to enforce a claim provable in bankruptcy must participate in one collective proceeding. This ensures that the assets of the bankrupt are distributed fairly amongst the creditors. As a general rule, all creditors rank equally and share rateably in the bankrupt's assets: s. 141 of the *BIA*; *Husky Oil*, at para. 9. In *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re*, 2010 SCC 60, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379 (S.C.C.), at para. 22, the majority of the Court, per Deschamps J., explained the underlying rationale for this model:

The single proceeding model avoids the inefficiency and chaos that would attend insolvency if each creditor initiated proceedings to recover its debt. Grouping all possible actions against the debtor into a single proceeding controlled in a single forum facilitates negotiation with creditors because it places them all on an equal footing, rather than exposing them to the risk that a more aggressive creditor will realize its claims against the debtor's limited assets while the other creditors attempt a compromise.

Avoiding inefficiencies and chaos, and favouring an orderly collective process, maximizes global recovery for all creditors: *Husky Oil*, at para. 7; R. J. Wood, *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law* (2009), at p. 3.

34 For this model to be viable, creditors must not be allowed to enforce their provable claims individually, that is, outside the collective proceeding. Section 69.3 of the *BIA* thus provides for an automatic stay of proceedings, which is effective as of the first day of bankruptcy:



**69.3** (1) Subject to subsections (1.1) and (2) and sections 69.4 and 69.5, on the bankruptcy of any debtor, no creditor has any remedy against the debtor or the debtor's property, or shall commence or continue any action, execution or other proceedings, for the recovery of a claim provable in bankruptcy.

(See *R. v. Fitzgibbon*, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1005(S.C.C.), at pp. 1015-16.)

35 Yet there are exceptions to the principle of equitable distribution. Section 136 of the *BIA* provides that some creditors will be paid in priority. These creditors are referred to as "preferred creditors". There are also creditors that are paid only after all ordinary creditors have been satisfied: ss. 137(1), 139 and 140.1 of the *BIA*. Furthermore, the automatic stay of proceedings does not prevent secured creditors from realizing their security interest: s. 69.3(2) of the *BIA*; *Husky Oil*, at para. 9. A court may also grant leave permitting a creditor to begin separate proceedings and enforce a claim: s. 69.4 of the *BIA*. These exceptions reflect the policy choices made by Parliament in furthering this purpose of bankruptcy.

36 The second purpose of the *BIA*, the financial rehabilitation of the debtor, is achieved through the discharge of the debtor's outstanding debts at the end of the bankruptcy: *Husky Oil*, at para. 7. Section 178(2) of the *BIA* provides:

(2) Subject to subsection (1), an order of discharge releases the bankrupt from all claims provable in bankruptcy.

From the perspective of the creditors, the discharge means they are unable to enforce their provable claims: *Schreyer v. Schreyer*, 2011 SCC 35, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 605(S.C.C.), at para. 21. This, in effect, gives the insolvent person a "fresh start", in that he or she is "freed from the burdens of pre-existing indebtedness": Wood, at p. 273; see also *Industrial Acceptance Corp. v. Lalonde*, [1952] 2 S.C.R. 109(S.C.C.), at p. 120. This fresh start is not only designed for the well-being of the bankrupt debtor and his or her family; rehabilitation helps the discharged bankrupt to reintegrate into economic life so he or she can become a productive member of society: Wood, at pp. 274-75; L. W. Houlden, G. B. Morawetz and J. Sarra, *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law of Canada* (4th ed. rev. (loose-leaf), at p. 6-283. In many cases of consumer bankruptcy, the debtor has very few or no assets to distribute to his or her creditors. In those cases, rehabilitation becomes the primary objective of bankruptcy: Wood, at p. 37.

37 Although it is an important purpose of the *BIA*, financial rehabilitation also has its limits. Section 178(1) of the *BIA* lists debts that are not released by discharge and that survive bankruptcy. Furthermore, s. 172 provides that an order of discharge may be denied, suspended, or granted subject to conditions. These provisions demonstrate Parliament's attempt to balance financial rehabilitation with other policy objectives, such as confidence in the credit system, that require certain debts to survive bankruptcy: Wood, at pp. 273 and 289.

38 Discharge is the main rehabilitative tool contained in the *BIA*, but it is not the only one. As Professor Wood, at p. 273, observes:

The bankruptcy discharge is one of the primary mechanisms through which bankruptcy law attempts to provide for the economic rehabilitation of the debtor. However, it is not the only means by which bankruptcy law seeks to meet this objective. The exclusion of exempt property from distribution to creditors, the surplus income provisions, and mandatory credit counselling also are directed towards this goal.

39 Another means of rehabilitation is the automatic stay of proceedings contained in s. 69.3 of the *BIA*. The stay not only ensures that creditors are redirected into the collective proceeding described above, it also ensures that creditors are precluded from seizing property that is exempt from distribution to creditors. This is an important part of the bankrupt's financial rehabilitation:

The rehabilitation of the bankrupt is not the result only of his discharge. It begins when he is put into bankruptcy with measures designed to give him the minimum needed for subsistence.

(*Vachon v. Canada (Employment & Immigration Commission)*, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 417(S.C.C.), at p. 430.)