ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE COMMERCIAL LIST

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF INTERTAN CANADA LTD. AND TOURMALET CORPORATION

FACTUM (MOTION RETURNABLE JANUARY 14, 2009)

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FACTUM

OVERVIEW

- 1. The DIP Lenders oppose the Monitor's motion which, if granted, would have the following significant ramifications:
 - (a) the Applicants will be in default of the DIP Facility;
 - (b) the DIP Lenders will have relied to their detriment on the Sixth Charge by making advance through the holiday season and by agreeing to subordinate their security to, *inter alia*, the \$19.3 million Directors' Charge; and
 - significant uncertainty will arise in respect of the protection afforded by Canadian orders to DIP lenders. Scarce availability may become even more scarce.

(a) The December 23 Hearing

2. On December 23, 2008, a case conference was held on short notice to address the terms of a draft Second Amendment to the U.S. DIP Facility. Information was incomplete, and the parties were uncertain as to the outcome of the U.S. Court's omnibus hearing on December 22 at which the document was to have been considered.

- 3. The draft document appeared on its face to purport to unilaterally amend the terms of the Initial Order, without the input of the Canadian Court. In these circumstances, the Court ordered that cross-border advances be restricted until the matter could be properly heard.
- 4. Shortly thereafter, the signed Second Amendment was made available, and it was evident that the suggestion in the draft that the parties could amend the Initial Order had been deleted in the final version. Moreover, the U.S. Court order approving the Second Amendment was made expressly on the proviso that it did not "amend or modify" the Initial Order and that the Initial Order was paramount with respect to the Applicants and their assets.¹

(b) The Monitor's Motion

5. At the December 23, 2008 hearing, there appeared to be a consensus that there needed to be a better dialogue between stakeholders. The Monitor and the Applicants agreed to communicate with stakeholders to "better understand the issues". Paragraph 7 of the Third Monitor's Report stated that:

In the meantime, the Applicants and the Monitor agreed to undertake further discussions with the U.S. Debtors and other relevant participants to attempt to better understand the issues and the impact on Canada.

- 6. However, as disclosed at Tab G of the Third Monitor's Report, the DIP Lenders proposed such a discussion with the Monitor. The Monitor demonstrated no interest in a dialogue and simply proceeded to serve its motion.²
- 7. The Monitor's Notice of Motion seeks to limit the DIP Lenders' recourse to the Sixth Charge provided in paragraph 44 of the Amended and Restated Initial Order. The DIP Lenders do not believe that the motion is constructive.
- 8. If the Monitor obtains the relief sought, the Applicants will be in default under the DIP Facility, and pursuant to the Amended and Restated Initial Order, the DIP Lenders will be

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A copy of the transcript from the US hearing is attached to the Compendium at tab 1.

See letter at the Compendium at tab 2. The first substantive discussion occurred after the motion was brought.

entitled to cease extending credit to InterTAN if there is "any variation or change to this Order which is materially adverse to the DIP Lenders without the Canadian Agent's consent".

- 9. The Monitor's Third Report is silent on the fact that its motion puts both the Canadian and U.S. DIP Facility at risk and thus imperils the efforts of both Courts to achieve a going concern sale.
- 10. The DIP Lenders cannot agree to the relief sought. By virtue of the commitments made in the Second Amendment, the DIP Lenders must oppose this motion.

(c) The DIP Lenders' Position

- 11. As this Court is aware, the DIP Facility was the subject of significant negotiation, and its appropriateness has been argued before this Court. The DIP Facility and the DIP Lenders' Charge were ultimately granted to preserve the estates as going concerns for the benefit of all creditors.
- 12. It was recognized by all that the Sixth Charge in particular was a significant right granted to the DIP Lenders and is expressly embodied in the Initial Order and the Amended and Restated Initial Order.
- 13. In reliance on its rights under the orders and specifically the Sixth Charge, the DIP Lenders advanced tens of millions of dollars in Canada and hundreds of millions of dollars in the U.S. The DIP Lenders also relied on the Sixth Charge in their dealings with the U.S. Debtors and the Unsecured Creditors Committee (the "UCC").
- 14. The Monitor now does not approve of the manner in which the Sixth Charge has been used in the DIP Lenders' negotiations and brings this motion as a result.
- 15. If the Monitor succeeds, the DIP Lenders (and any future DIP lender) will lose their Court ordered protection if they use their rights in a manner that is deemed by some stakeholders to be unfair. In other words, if the Monitor is right, an unstated condition should be read into DIP orders that any priority is subject to retroactive adjustment if the DIP lender's business decisions subsequently displease the Court.
- 16. It is the submission of the DIP Lenders that the Monitor's motion should be dismissed.

THE FACTS

(a) The DIP Lenders

- 17. On November 10, 2008, the Applicants filed for protection under the CCAA. At the time of filing, the Applicants required ongoing financing for their operations. A significant commitment was required in a short time frame to fund a complicated business with significant risk. For example, key assets of the Applicants, including the rights to their own trade names, were held by the U.S. Debtors.
- 18. Moreover, in November-December 2008: (a) the generally availability of credit and particularly DIP financing was scarce; and (b) there was significant uncertainty leading to the 2008 holiday season retailers.
- 19. The evidence was that the only lender prepared to make funds available to the Applicants were the DIP Lenders.
- 20. In agreeing to make the DIP Facility, the DIP Lenders also effectively conceded their right to realize upon the businesses and liquidate inventory in the run up to the busy holiday season.
- 21. To extend the facilities in these circumstances and as the global enterprise moved into insolvency protection, the DIP Lenders sought additional security in Canada and to cross-collateralize with the U.S. There can be no credible suggestion that the DIP Lenders ought to have continued to lend on terms negotiated pre-insolvency in the hay days of 2006.

(b) The Negotiation of Terms

- 22. There have been references to the terms of the DIP Lenders' provision of security as "non-negotiable". That is not accurate. In the First Report of the Proposed Monitor, it was acknowledged that the DIP Facility was the product of "very complex negotiations between InterTan and the Secured Lenders".
- 23. The product of this negotiation was a \$60 million dollar Canadian facility within the context of a global \$1.1 billion commitment. In Canada, the DIP Lenders agreed to a six tiered "waterfall" of priority claims, with notably:

- (a) a second ranking Director's Charge of \$19.3 million;
- (b) a third ranking DIP Lenders' Charge for direct advances (subject to a cap);
- (c) a fifth ranking Canadian Creditor Charge of \$25 million; and
- (d) a sixth ranking DIP Lenders' Charge for any monies owing on account of advances to the US Debtors.
- 24. The Applicants' evidence at the time of filing was that the \$25 million for the Canadian Creditor Charge was "determined by the Applicants, in consultation with their financial advisors, as an estimate of the unsecured trade debt that may be impacted by these proceedings while InterTAN (sic) a going concern restructuring, after taking into account set-offs and other adjustments."
- 25. Thus, the DIP Lenders <u>did</u> negotiate and struck what was believed to be a principled bargain based on estimates of the Applicants and FTI. In the result, the DIP Lenders agreed to a \$25 million prior charge for unsecured. That bargain was the subject of debate in Court, with the Monitor expressing its concerns, and was ultimately accepted by the Court and embodied in the Initial Order.
- Again as an accommodation, on December 5, 2008, the DIP Lenders consented to an alteration of the waterfall priorities that permitted the Canadian Creditors to avail themselves of any unused portion of the Directors' Charge, thus effectively increasing the pool subject to the charge to \$44.3 million. As well, the DIP Lenders consented to accommodations that favoured the landlords.
- 27. Again, on December 5, 2008, the DIP Lenders compromised their position. They renegotiated the deal for the benefit of the Canadian Creditors and to resolve the concerns in the First and Second Reports. It should be noted that by compromising on this issue in Canada for the benefit of the Canadian Creditors, the DIP Lenders arguably prejudiced the position of the U.S. unsecured creditors by agreeing to dilute the DIP Lenders' priority claim.

Wong Affidavit para. 98.

THE BENEFIT TO STAKEHOLDERS

- 28. The uncontroverted evidence was that in the absence of the DIP Facility, there would have been liquidations in both the US and Canada with enormous job loss, 1,200 dark retail outlets and supply chain disruption. The effects would clearly have been far ranging.
- 29. The DIP Facility preserved the prospect of a going concern sale, which is still being pursued both in Canada and the US. The cash flows show that the Applicants still require the DIP Facility.
- 30. Absent the DIP Facility, the Canadian unsecured creditor class would have swelled enormously with employee and landlord claims, as the Monitor noted at the time:

"a liquidation and wind-down of InterTan would also result in a number of claims that would not arise in a going concern scenario, such as employee and landlord claims, which would reduce the amount of the proceeds available for other unsecured creditors."

- 31. Thus, the provision of the DIP financing provided potential benefits to various stakeholders, including in particular the Canadian Creditors.
- 32. As in any case, there was an assessment of the costs and benefits of the DIP Facility. The Court agreed with the analysis of the Applicants and FTI and granted the order.

(a) The DIP Charge

- 33. The Initial Order established the DIP Lenders' Charge and dictated its parameters.
- 34. In reliance on the DIP Lenders' Charge in the Initial Order, and subsequently as amended in the Amended and Restated Initial Order, the DIP Lenders made tens of millions of dollars in advances to the Applicants and hundreds of millions of dollars to the US Debtors.
- 35. The DIP Lenders funded the Companies through the holiday season and has the going concern sales that continue to be pursued in both Canada and the US.

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First Report of the Proposed Monitor, page 16.

36. The DIP Lenders relied on their rights in the Amended and Restated Initial Order both in making advances and also in their dealings with stakeholders within the Chapter 11 proceedings.

(b) The UCC's Position and the Second Amendment

- 37. It was understood that pursuant to the U.S. bankruptcy process, the U.S. DIP order would not be finalized, and creditors were free to raise objections, until the return date of the first omnibus hearing. In these circumstances, it ought to have been clear that there could be alterations to the DIP facility.
- 38. As noted in the Monitor's Third Report, the UCC objected to the terms of the DIP Lender's facility in the US. The UCC, like the Monitor, had concerns about the fact that the scope of security was broader than the pre-filing security. Other objections were also raised.
- 39. The issues were to come to a head at the omnibus hearing on December 22, 2008. Had the UCC successfully opposed the US DIP facility, there would have been an immediate liquidation in the US and, as a result of cross-defaults, likely in Canada as well.
- 40. Thus, again, finding a consensual resolution with the UCC was important for all stakeholders.
- 41. The resolution reached was embodied in the Second Amendment. In Canada, the DIP Lender's compromise took the form of a \$44.3 million Canadian Creditors' Charge. In the US, it involved:
 - (a) the DIP Lenders forgoing additional post-petition security on furniture, fixtures and equipment; and
 - (b) the DIP Lenders agreeing to share 50% of the proceeds of the Sixth Charge received, to the extent received, with the US Debtors' estates.
- 42. In return, the DIP Lenders avoided the risk of a liquidation (and thus liquidation recoveries) and also obtained an expedited sales process as a term of the Second Amendment. Again, both of these terms benefit the Canadian process: (a) a possible Canadian liquidation was avoided; and (b) the chances of preserving the going concern was maximized with an immediate process.

- 43. In particular, the UCC and the U.S. Debtors agreed to bring forward the sales process by several months.
- 44. It is acknowledged by the DIP Lenders that under certain scenarios, the business deal outlined in the Second Amendment could adversely affect Canadian unsecured creditors. This is no different from the fact that the Directors' Charge and Canadian Creditors' Charge may prove to work to the disadvantage of the US unsecured creditors.⁵
- 45. The DIP Lenders' interests as stakeholder straddles both insolvency proceedings, and they recognize that any decision it makes in one forum may affect the other. Nonetheless, it must act (within its rights) to the best of its business judgment.
- 46. The fact is that the DIP Lenders understood that they had certain rights under the Amended and Restated Initial Order and relied on those rights.
- 47. The Monitor suggests in the Third Report that the DIP Lenders "bartered away... the Sixth Charge... as a form of value or currency in negotiations with the UCC."
- 48. While the language is colourful, the Monitor is correct. The DIP Lenders compromised with the UCC (as it did with the Applicants with the "waterfall"). The DIP Lenders made a business decision to compromise certain rights they had. They did so cognisant that a failure to make a deal with UCC could have disastrous consequences, cognisant that they had also made similar compromises in Canada and cognisant that as a *quid pro quo* they had secured an expedited sales process from the UCC and the U.S. Debtors.
- 49. The DIP Lenders believed that they could rely on this Court's order. They believed that they had the benefit of the Sixth Charge and acted accordingly.

ARGUMENT

50. The effect of the Monitor's motion would be pernicious. First, it would effectively allow the DIP Lenders' Charge to be reconsidered after advances in reliance of the Charge had been made. The "comeback clause" cannot replace the principle of *res judicata*.

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Nothing in the Second Amendment adversely impacts on the Canadian Creditors' Charge.

- 51. It is a challenging environment. The DIP Lenders have acted properly throughout. They have sought to resolve issues, avoid conflict where possible and to compromise reasonably. It has been, like every complex insolvency, a fluid process requiring flexibility. However, that flexibility cannot extend to re-opening and re-arguing issues already resolved by the Court.
- 52. Second, if the Monitor succeeds, it will mean that unbeknownst to anyone, there were unstated conditions to the rights afforded by the Court to the DIP Lenders.
- 53. In other words, the Sixth Charge contained unwritten conditions such that the DIP Lenders' rights are subject to how they purport to exercise them. If the DIP Lenders conduct their business or make compromises that stakeholders do not approve of or that displease the Court, then their rights can be limited *ex ante*.
- 54. If the Monitor is correct, a DIP lender's rights are exceedingly frail. If a DIP lender takes an action (even what is believed to be a reasonable business decision), that action can be subsequently second guessed, and if found wanting, can result in a retroactive limitation on that DIP Lender's rights.
- By relying on the Court ordered charge, the DIP Lenders now retroactively face the prospect that (a) a form of "marshalling" may be imposed; (b) there will be a carve out for U.S. furniture, fixtures & equipment, and (c) there will be ongoing uncertainty as the "status quo" is frozen until further order of the Court.
- 56. This cannot be the right outcome. It must be that once the DIP Lenders were granted the Sixth Charge, they could assign it, sell it or negotiate with it.
- 57. In our submission, the DIP Lenders' decision to share the benefit of the Sixth Charge to protect the continuation of the going concern and to expedite the sale should not be open to criticism. As Justice Spence has observed:

So what remains is a request that the Court, in the exercise of its discretion under s. 11, should make an order that would be contrary to the reasonable expectations of the Applicant and the DIP Lender based on the steps already taken and the orders already granted under the CCAA in this proceeding. That would be unfair

and it would not contribute to the fair application of the CCAA in this case or as a precedent for others.⁶

58. Finally, to the extent monies are paid out under the Sixth Charge, there should be no prejudice to the Canadian Creditors since they will continue to have a right of subrogation.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

January 13, 2009

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⁶ Collins & Aikman Automotive Canada Inc. (Re) [2007], O.J. No. 4186, at para. 108.

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT OF INTERTAN CANADA LTD. AND TOURMALET CORPORATION ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

Court File No: 08-CL-7841

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE (COMMERCIAL LIST)

Proceeding commenced at Toronto

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COMPENDIUM (for the Motion Returnable January 14, 2009)

January 14, 2009

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ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE COMMERCIAL LIST

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF INTERTAN CANADA LTD. AND TOURMALET CORPORATION

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ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT OF INTERTAN CANADA LTD. AND TOURMALET CORPORATION

Court File No: 08-CL-7841

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

Proceeding commenced at Toronto

COMPENDIUM (for the Motion returnable January 14, 200'

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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA RICHMOND DIVISION

_____X

In re: : Chapter 11

CIRCUIT CITY STORES, INC., : Case No. 08-35653

et al.,

Debtors.: Jointly Administered

X

December 22, 2008

Richmond, Virginia

Transcript of motions in the above when heard before the Honorable Kevin R. Huennekens, Judge.

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THE CLERK: In the matter of Circuit City

Stores, Incorporated, Case Number 08-35653.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. FOLEY: Good morning, Your Honor. Doug Foley with McGuire Woods on behalf of the debtors. With me today, co-counsel at the table, is Greg Galardi and Ian Fredericks from the law firm of Skadden Arps. Also here today from the company, Your Honor, is the general counsel, Reggie, sitting in the front row.

Your Honor, we filed an amended agenda yesterday, as we're trying to see if we can resolve as many of these matters as we can. What we would propose to do, Your Honor, is to go through the first few items -- which I believe most of which are either uncontested or can be adjourned by agreement -- and then spend most of the time on the second half of the agenda this morning.

Your Honor, the first item on the agenda actually should come off. It's a resolution of the outstanding issues with respect to Adequate Assurance with respect to utilities. I don't believe there's anybody here that needs to address that motion. So that one should come off the docket.

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1 THE COURT: All right.

MR. FOLEY: Your Honor, the next item is our claims trading motion with respect to sell-down procedures and equity and trading of claims. Your Honor, we're still working through final objections with respect to that, and we'd ask the Court to adjourn that to the January 16th omnibus hearing date.

THE COURT: All right. It will be adjourned.

MR. FOLEY: Your Honor, Item Number 3 is the motion for relief from stay filed by Reverend Funches. We were here on that a month or so ago, and set it down for a preliminary hearing today.

We're trying to work through some timing of when certain testing might occur with respect to the products involved in this accident. We're working with counsel to try to figure out what makes sense in that regard. What we have agreed to do, Your Honor, is simply combine the preliminary and final hearing for the January 29th hearing date.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. HUDSON: Good morning. Lisa Hudson of Sands Anderson here on behalf of the Funches family; and actually, this Court joined orally at our last hearing the Ollaway family. So I'm here on both

regards. And Doug is correct. We did agree to set this for final hearing 1-29 at 10, and are working to resolve as much as possible.

And Your Honor, if I might have a brief indulgence, I have with me Ashley Burgess today of my firm who has been admitted recently to this Court, and wanted to welcome him and introduce him to the Bar. He was admitted to practice in 2004; and will be joining the fun of LandAmerica, Circuit City and Movie Gallery with the business and bankruptcy team at Sands Anderson.

THE COURT: Very good. Welcome to the Court.

MR. BURGESS: Good morning, Your Honor.

MS. HUDSON: Thank you.

MR. FOLEY: Your Honor, the next item on the docket is Item Number 4. This is a debtors' motion to retain DJM Realty Services, LLC. We are working through an informal response filed by the Committee. We think we can work it out. We actually will spend the afternoon -- what's left of the afternoon -- to try to work it out with them and see if we can't submit an order without actually setting this down for another hearing; however, if we can't resolve it in the next day or so, Your Honor, we would contact the Court to have it set at the next

available hearing date. But we think we can work through it today.

THE COURT: Very good.

MR. FOLEY: Your Honor, Item Number 5 is -- and 6 relate to a stipulation that we have Chase Credit Card, Chase Bank USA, which is the issue of the co-branded credit card for Circuit City stores.

Your Honor, most of the relief that we think the stipulation provides for is consistent with the customer programs order that Your Honor entered on the first day. Basically, what is being protected here is Chase's rights with respect to set-off and recoupments as to any returns, charge-backs, adjustments, and other credit related to cardholder agreements.

What this stipulation also provides is for a reserve that they can establish with respect to money that they would otherwise have to pay us in January.

There's been no objections to the form of the order or the motion and -- acceptable, we'd like to submit it to the Court after the hearing.

THE COURT: It will be received.

MR. FOLEY: Thank you. With respect to Item Numbers 7 and 8, Your Honor, these are employment

applications with respect to E & Y that further clarifies the scope of their tax advisory services that they're providing to the company, as well as the retention of KPMG, which is the company's auditors. They also provide certain advice with respect to the tax refund claim with the IRS.

We've spoken to the Office of the United

States Trustee, and we'd like to submit orders after
with his endorsement.

THE COURT: It will be approved.

MR. FOLEY: Thank you, Your Honor.

With respect to Item Number 9, Your Honor, this is our motion to retain certain professionals in the ordinary course of business under 327(e).

Your Honor, there's approximately 35 professionals. We tried to keep the list as small as possible. There is a procedure set forth in there as to how they get compensated. There is a cap on monthly spend with respect to these professionals. There are procedures for amending it to the extent we need to add professionals or take some off.

Again, we have consulted with the Office of the United States Trustee. There has been no objection to this motion. We would ask the Court to

enter the order that we will submit after the hearing.

THE COURT: It will be approved.

MR. FOLEY: Your Honor, Item Number 10 is our motion to reject certain personal property leases pertaining to vehicles and equipment at leased store locations that are going through the closing process right now that are no longer necessary.

Your Honor, there has been no objection to the motion. And we would ask to be able to submit an order after the hearing.

One clarification with respect to the order that we'll be submitting, Your Honor. We did agree to carve out certain leases pertaining to General Electric. And so, the order that we submit will not go forward with this motion as to them.

THE COURT: All right. With that amendment, it will be approved.

MR. FOLEY: Your Honor, Mr. Galardi will address Items 11 through 17 on the balance of the agenda.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Foley.

MR. GALARDI: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. GALARDI: Your Honor, I'll take 11 and 12

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together, but I want to do a step back. This is the time and place for the final hearing on the debtors' proposed DIP financing order. Your Honor, we have received a number of objections from many, many parties; including landlords and other taxing authorities. My understanding is we have resolved all of those objections. I'll never know until somebody comes up behind me, but we believe we have resolved all of them.

One of the most significant objections, Your Honor, just to sort of put it in the context, was the one that was not filed by the Creditors'

Committee. And I know Your Honor was aware of that.

Your Honor, first, business has been -- and Mr. Cullam (phonetic) is in the courtroom today; and, if called as a witness, would testify to a number of the facts that I am going to lay out for Your Honor so Your Honor understands the need for the final order, as well as the need for the document to be filed under seal, as well as the amendments so that we can put that in context.

Your Honor, just briefly: Since entering into the bankruptcy case, the debtors' performance -- as I think all retailers has -- has been off significantly. The original budget had sales off 20

percent, and they have gone more to 43 to 48 to 50 percent. Unfortunately, the business is not performing for the holidays, probably due to the general economic. Your Honor is familiar and reads the papers about Best Buy and our competitors having similar circumstances.

In that context, and with performance falling off, the other aspect of the model that Your Honor had seen was that in January we were hopeful that vendors would come along and provide certain trade They have been slow coming. Some vendors have supported; others have not. So the model was -- as all models -- a projection of what we hoped to do to get through what I called a bridge to somewhere -- a sale, an exit, a vendor-supported plan. And the idea was to give us roughly 60 days to a date that we all targeted as January 16th whereby we would either get a subordinated facility of about 75 million dollars -- there was some discussion of that -- or come up with a vendor plan, Though performance is off, or something like that. it is still our hope that we continue to do that.

The Committee, after being informed -- and we've had many meetings with the Committee -- expressed its concern in an informal objection to us

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that they gave us a draft for. And I'll say seven of the concerns that they had -- there were probably more than that -- but there were seven major concerns.

First, Your Honor will recall that we entered into an agreement that the first day rolled up all of the pre-petition debt into a post-petition debt. And the debtors had taken the position that that was appropriate under the circumstances both for practical purposes, and because we believe that the lenders were over-secured. Notwithstanding that, the Committee had an objection to the roll-up, and we had some standstill agreements during this period of time with respect to that.

The second, Your Honor -- and I think I emphasized this in the first day, and it was in our first meeting with the Committee -- I guess the slogan for the case is: You're paying 30 million dollars for a 50 million dollar availability. They had expressed the same concerns. Now, we've had our stories about that and why it really isn't exactly that, but that was a second concern that the Committee had expressed loud and clear.

Third, the Committee -- as Committees

generally do -- wanted a longer investigation period

with respect to evaluate the security interests of the bank group, the time periods, and things of that sort. Obviously, every Committee has a concern with the debtors' 506(c) waiver, which was included in it. In addition, especially in the context of the roll-up, the Committee had expressed its concern that the banks were taking not just the collateral they had pre-petitioned, but expanding their collateral to include such things as lease proceeds, FF&E, Canada. And that was a concern that the Committee had expressed. And so have other people, but I think it's easier to focus on that.

In addition, as we had talked about the first day, the Committee had concerns about the need to have a 75 million dollar sub-debt facility; and, indeed, what that facility would be could itself hamper trade terms from vendors, because you would just simply further subordinate ordinary trade credit. There was that concern.

And then finally, the Committee also had concerns about the timing of bid solicitations in the plan. It was a relatively short timeframe; and we had gotten, since the Committee was formed, certain indications from landlords that they might be willing to consider not only the

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initial extension of time. We had meetings in New York with the Committee about this, and unfortunately we didn't come to an agreement originally. And so, we began discovery, I guess it was last week -- again, adjourning off the Committee's deadline to file an objection.

Your Honor, with the amendments before Your Honor today that we have filed, as well as the motion under seal, we have resolved the Committee's objections. Again, as any resolution, obviously, they wished for some more things; the bank wished for some less things or more things. But we think we've resolved a fair settlement that's embodied in the amendment.

In particular, Your Honor, from a factual standpoint, as Mr. Cullam would testify, as we sit here today, whether we had done a first-day roll-up or a roll-up to this hearing, by now all of the pre-petition debt would have been rolled up. So that issue sort of died of its own accord. Although the Committee had retained its rights to always challenge that roll-up, today we are not having that contested.

Your Honor, with respect to the cost and availability factor, and given the performance, this

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was a negotiation. And the Committee has now 1 2 agreed -- and we would still seek the approval of -and it was still approved on the first day -- the fees paid; however, Your Honor, we believe we now have some additional substantial availability. 5 6 Though not obvious, what has been removed is the minimum availability covenant. In the original DIP financing agreement, as of December 20th, we had to 8 9 have minimum availability of 75 million dollars. 10 The next two weeks were 50 million dollars, and then 11 at a low in the week of January 12th, 35 million dollars. 12

So essentially, whether you want to call it a block or a covenant, we would have butted against those terms. The banks have agreed in the amendment that we have put forth, and for which we seek approval today, that those covenants no longer apply. There's still a 10 percent minimum availability covenant, but there is not the 75, 50, and 35 block.

In addition, Your Honor, the banks have consented to extend the investigation period of the Committee to March 1st, 2009.

The Committee has agreed that they do not object now to the 506(c) waiver.

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And importantly, Your Honor -- and this is good for the estate -- the banks and the Committee and we have agreed that there will be no liens granted on the FF&E that was originally part of the additional collateral and bootstrap collateral that the banks were taking. And in addition, there is a sharing of Canadian proceeds between this estate and the banks. The banks also took a lien on Canadian assets. It will have no affect -- I think counsel for the monitor is here -- it will have no affect on how the mechanics work in Canada. It only has an effect for this estate, and what the proceeds from any sale or proceeds that are to go to pay down the debt will have with respect to this estate.

And then finally, as Your Honor knows, we have addressed various timing issues with respect to where this business is going. As I had mentioned -- and the reason that we had filed the motion under seal is that we are seeking a bridge to somewhere. We are in negotiations. As Mr. Cullam -- if called as a witness -- would testify, we continue to pursue a plan with vendors, although that has not gone as fast as we would like it to. We are, in fact, pursuing still sale of all of our assets.

And so, we continue to pursue that. As part

of this, we have asked now for Your Honor to approve the amendment that sets up various timelines for achieving certain of our goals with this restructuring. We have asked Your Honor to grant a motion to file an amendment, a side letter under seal. We would ask Your Honor to do that. That's obviously -- as Your Honor probably has read, it's confidential and sensitive information, and may affect the ultimate value that we get for these assets. So we think it's important that that motion be granted.

And in addition, Your Honor, we no longer face that hurdle. As part of the quid pro quo for that schedule, we no longer face that January 16th or 17th deadline to have a subordinated loan facility.

So we believe that with those amendments,

Your Honor, two things are very important: One,

that the company will have adequate availability to

be able -- that we have adequate availability to get

to the 16th -- and, indeed, maybe even later than

the 16th -- to be able to continue to explore the

restructuring alternative.

Two, that we have a consensual DIP, except for I guess -- I've been passed a note -- that one

of the objections may still be outstanding, but it doesn't go to these terms -- that we have a consensual DIP that the Committee and the banks and we have all agreed to. We have a structure and a timeframe for proceeding with the restructuring of these cases, all of the avenues that we are going down, and that we have adequate availability.

And, indeed, Your Honor, without approval of the facility today, we would have no further financing. And there's clearly an immediate need for financing, as we make purchases every day; we pay bills every day; we pay employees every day. we would face -- though we don't need to say immediate and irreparable harm in the context of the final order, but the financing is in the best interest of the creditors and the estates. believe that it is supported by the Committee, and the bank group has negotiated in good faith with respect to the modifications that it has made. Again, Your Honor, we had a meeting -- and I think it's important to point out that many of the issues are required 100 percent lender consent. So that is a very difficult thing in this time to have financing. So we are happy to still have that financing. And then with the help of the required

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lenders led by the agent B of A, the elimination of that minimum availability or clean-down covenant has significantly given us more certainty that we'll be able to explore our restructuring alternatives through the middle of January, and make some determination as to where this case is going.

Your Honor, the one objection that is outstanding here -- and we may just need a little bit more time -- is the objection of Navarre, who is a consignment vendor. And we don't dispute it is -- that there are consigned goods. They have also made a motion for adequate protection. We may be able to resolve that separately. I don't think it goes to: We need a DIP. It's more it goes to: What adequate protection can be provided through a consigned lender in the modern age of centralized cash management and reserving rights. We propose a stipulation.

Your Honor, I could certainly put Mr. Cullam on the stand to address that; but I think, if called as a witness, he could verify the facts set forth in the final order. It is the result of arm's length negotiations. I think we can rest on the record.

And I don't know if there's parties that have an objection, or other people who have comments. I

leave it to Your Honor as to how you'd like to proceed with the rest of the final DIP hearing.

THE COURT: All right. Thanks. Does any party wish to examine the proffered witness for the debtor? All right. The proffer will be accepted.

Does any party wish to speak in opposition to the motion to approve the DIP financing?

MR. COLEMAN: Your Honor, if I may briefly,
I'd like to be heard on this. Ken Coleman of Allen
and Overy. We represent Alvarez and Marxel, the
monitor appointed in the Canadian proceeding. I
don't have an objection, per se, but I do have some
comments that I'd like to express to Your Honor, and
have on the record.

As I indicated at the last hearing, you know, we do appreciate the difficult circumstances of the U.S. company, and the difficult retail environment, and the pressure that everybody is under in this case to try to effect a restructuring.

The fact of the matter is that the monitor in the Canadian proceeding is the only party that can consider the interests of the Canadian unsecured creditors without any conflict of interests. The Canadian company InterTAN does not have the ability -- does not have an independent board of

directors that can look solely to the interests of the Canadian creditors. It's a function of the corporate governance of the system. And those are the facts that we have. And that's why there's additional pressure on the monitor to pay attention to the interests of those creditors. Yet the monitor has been excluded from this process that has led to this amendment.

I think Your Honor is aware of the extraordinary nature of the relief that was available in Canada in connection with the post-petition financing. For the first time, the Canadian subsidiary was joined with the U.S. parent in terms of its assets being directly available to support this financing. So therefore, what occurs in the U.S. does have a direct impact on the Canadian creditors. Again, we appreciate that the parties are trying to accomplish a number of things here in a fairly short order, and in a very difficult environment.

We think that this amendment -- while we appreciate Mr. Galardi's comments that there should be no impact on the Canadian creditors -- this amendment, specifically in Section 5(b) -- which we only received for the first time yesterday

afternoon -- doesn't say that. It suggests that after -- it says that after payment of specific charges set forth in the Canadian initial order, 50 percent of the proceeds go to pay the DIP loan, and the balance goes to the U.S. estate. Now, there may well be -- depending on how the facts unfold and how the Canadian sale process unfolds -- there may well be Canadian unsecured creditors who are cut out of those proceeds. Now, if that's not the intention, that's fine. And there are words that can be used to fix that.

But my point in rising today, Your Honor -in addition to express our concern about this
process, my point in rising specifically is to
suggest to Your Honor that matters pertaining to
this amendment, matters that affect the priorities
of the Canadian court order, and the application of
the proceeds of the sale of Canadian assets, ought
to be addressed in the first instance by Justice
Morawetz in the Canadian court; and that this Court
should not today approve the amendment in those
respects as they affect Canada.

Justice Morawetz has been alerted to the hearing today and to these provisions, and it is my understanding that a hearing is being scheduled

before him tomorrow to consider this. And what we don't want to create is a sense that this Court has somehow approved matters that relate to Canadian priority and the application of Canadian assets, when, in fact, out of deference to the Canadian court whose order is really at stake here, that Court ought to first consider those issues.

And frankly, there are concerns in Canada expressed both last night and this morning about various representations that were made to obtain the financing in Canada on the first day: That the terms were in inviable, that there was no time to consider alternatives. And, indeed, there have been substantial changes and substantial negotiations over the past six weeks or so in which we just have not been involved. And we think that -understanding the circumstances that the parties are under -- we think that we need to be involved in that process so that we don't confront situations where we're presented at the last minute with what appears to be a fait accompli, which has a very direct and material impact on Canadian creditors.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

24 Mr. Galardi?

25 MR. GALARDI: Yes, Your Honor. Two things.

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I think this may be more just a language issue; but first, Your Honor, I want to be clear: We are not asking Your Honor to do anything to change any order -- the financing order in Canada; nor are we saying that by doing this order we're going to turn around in Canada and say, Well, this Court approved it. That wasn't the intention of this.

Your Honor, there is an order -- and

Mr. Berman is familiar with it, and I am somewhat
familiar with it -- in Canada whereby there is a
charge, a payment, and then there is some money
that's been set aside for the unsecured creditors in
Canada. And then the banks would get their rights,
which were agreed to in the order that is before
Judge Morawetz.

All this order says, that when the banks begin to take on that second part after the charges and everything goes, is that they're sharing 50 percent of that with this estate. It's not changing anything in that original order; nor was it our intention to do so. Mr. Berman can certainly describe that. If the language doesn't make that clear, I understand.

Again, I'm not standing on the fact -- they clearly have a voice in this case. They're not a

party in interest in the sense of standing as a creditor. But I do want to make it absolutely clear: We are not asking this Court to say this is an order, and has binding effect on Canada, or changes anything about the Canadian order whatsoever. That is not our intention here. And we can work through with the monitor in this language. Obviously, I wasn't aware of a hearing tomorrow. But the idea is whatever the banks had with respect to the Canadian collateral, all it's done is said, We'll give 50 percent back to the estate. No change of that Canadian order.

THE COURT: After payment of Canadian --

MR. GALARDI: After all of the agreed -- in the Canadian first day order and the other financing order, there was charges. There was this. And there was a separate negotiation with the monitor to allow a pot of money remain before the banks collect on their lien above that for the unsecured creditors. We have not altered that bucket whatsoever. We have simply given the banks -- which the Committee pointed out -- the banks were a getting a part of their collateral, and they have agreed to share. That's essentially what this provision of 5(b) was intended to capture.

1 THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. COLEMAN: Your Honor, I appreciate those comments, but just so that I'm clear: The Canadian order has six charges -- or as we would understand it, priorities or carve-outs. Our difficulty is that there may well be Canadian unsecureds who are not paid after those six priorities are dealt with. There are caps on each of those six priorities.

What this language purports to do is that after you -- after the proceeds fall through that waterfall of six priorities, the banks get half of the remaining proceeds -- the DIP lender gets half of those proceeds -- and the U.S. estate -- presumably for the benefit of the U.S. unsecureds -- gets the balance of the proceeds. So our concern is not the six prior claims, but rather the Canadian unsecureds who would be paid, if at all, from the Canadian estates -- so, if you will, the seventh bucket. That's the problem with this.

Now, we're happy to work on the order -- the language for the amendment, because the way it's drafted, it talks in terms not of the sharing of a lien or a claim, but rather a sharing of proceeds. So if a sharing of proceeds is not the intention, but rather an assignment of the lien or an

assignment of the claim, you know, we can work with that wording. But just so that I'm clear with Your Honor, our difficulty is, if you will, the seventh bucket, not the prior six.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. BERMAN: Your Honor, David Berman for the DIP lenders.

What we were trying to accomplish here, Your
Honor -- just so you understand the buckets that
have been referred to in a little more detail -- is
there are some priority Canadian claims,
administration expenses, directive charges which
will be paid first from the collateral. The lenders
have also made a direct loan to the Canadian
borrower to fund its operations. After those
priority charges are paid, the direct loan gets
paid. That's really the first four levels.

The fifth level was a carve-out that was requested by counsel in Canada of 25 million dollars for Canadian creditors to make sure that the Canadian creditors had some recovery before the cross guarantee of Canada was to apply, and the money to come to pay the U.S. debt.

After a second hearing on December 5th, that carve-out was increased. So it's 25 million, plus

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any unused portion of the first priority carve-out.

2 So it could potentially be 40 or 45 million dollars.

3 So it's after the carve-outs, the banks paid its

direct loan. The court order says that at that

5 point in time the bank can get paid on its cross

6 guarantee with any remaining proceeds, if any.

And in our negotiations with the Committee and the debtors, what we were saying is, Okay, we're entitled to all of those proceeds until the U.S. debt is paid off. What we'll do is we will -- rather than applying them all to the U.S. debt, we'll leave some in the estate for the creditors.

So we're not changing the order. We're just saying the money we get, rather than applying it all to the debt, some is going to stay in the estate.

And that is really what we're trying to accomplish here.

MR. GALARDI: Your Honor, let me also just put my color on it. This is really a marshaling argument in some -- and this was one of the Committee's concerns. The banks always have a lien in inventory. We believe the inventory will be sufficient to pay it off. In this uncertain environment, they took a couple of other pots of collateral, including the Canadian collateral. As

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Mr. Berman has just described, nothing has changed as to what the banks have taken. But the Committee was concerned that, Well, okay, you really don't need that extra collateral if you're going to be paid by the inventory.

So we had a long discussion back and forth about what kind of -- for the collaterals, where would you first look. What Mr. Berman and the Committee and the debtors have agreed is essentially that we are not going to look to the FF&E anymore. Fine. That's marshaling. You still look to the inventory. You always had, because that was the deal.

And I understand the monitor may not like the deal that was originally -- thinking that there might have been more for them up there. But there's an order up there that says the banks have 100 percent of those proceeds after the charges.

What Mr. Berman has done to resolve a

Committee objection here -- which we think is

perfectly appropriate -- is essentially said, That's

fine. If I took 100 percent, my debt goes down 100

percent. If I take 50 percent, my debt only goes

that. But the money still coming into the estate is

still to benefit -- whether it goes directly to pay

down the secured, or whether it comes into this estate as free cash for either the unsecureds or administrative claims is really largely irrelevant. The money was going to benefit this estate in either way, which is why we think this particular B, one, is very critical to us; two, it's critical to the Committee because it was a way to resolve essentially a marshaling argument. And since the estate -- the company of the estate had already negotiated through Canadian counsel and through the Canadian order, they had this above the 25. We don't think there's a change.

Now, we understand that they may go back to court there and say, We didn't know that there was something more we could have gotten -- which is what this argument is about. Canada is now saying -- the monitor is saying -- well, look we took 25; but if the bank is willing to give 50 away, why couldn't we get 35 or 45?

I understand that they may not like this result, but that's not a reason to stop this amendment. It's quite consistent with the order. They can make the argument in equity up there. I'm not asking Your Honor to say, Judge Morawetz, don't decide this issue. Don't look at this issue.

You're free to look at it. But this is entirely consistent with the order. And if the monitor has a problem with the deal they cut because they thought, Maybe I could have gotten some more, that can be brought before Judge Morawetz. But this is really still estate property. Whether it goes to pay the debt directly or it becomes funds and we make a marshaling argument is really irrelevant. They were going to this estate or for the benefit of this estate under the Canadian order.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. COLEMAN: Your Honor, I'm happy to leave this with Justice Morawetz for tomorrow, but that is not -- that is not our position. We're not here saying, There's more to be had, and we'd like to have it.

We disagree that the wording in this amendment accomplishes what Mr. Galardi says it accomplishes. We do believe that this wording does purport to affect the priorities in the initial order, and we think that Justice Morawetz should have first crack at that issue.

THE COURT: Well, I certainly agree that the Canadian Court should administer the property of the Canadian company. But as I understand the way that

this is working, these are the proceeds that come from the order that's already been entered in the Canadian Court governing that. And it's just a matter of how it flows from that. And if the Court amends the order in Canada, then, you know, this Court won't interfere with that. The Canadian Court can certainly do that.

MR. COLEMAN: Well, Your Honor, part of the problem with this wording is if 50 percent of the proceeds of the sale of the Canadian assets were sufficient with other recoveries to pay off the balance of the loan, the remaining 50 percent would nonetheless go to the U.S. estate for payment to the U.S. unsecured creditors; whereas, under the previous regime, those funds would go to the Canadian estate and be distributed to the U.S. estate as an equity distribution, if at all.

THE COURT: Well, hasn't just -- the lender just assigned 50 percent of its lien to this estate?

MR. COLEMAN: Again, Your Honor, this doesn't say that. This talks about how the proceeds of the sale will be distributed. And it talks about 50 percent of the proceeds of the sale going to the DIP lender, and the remaining proceeds of the sale going to the U.S. estate. This doesn't have any effect on

the DIP lender's lien or claim. It just says,
you'll get 50 percent of the proceeds.

Now, they have other sources of recovery.

And undoubtedly there is a marshaling argument that relates to all of this, which is unavoidable once you have co-borrowers and cross-collateralization.

But the problem with the focus on pure proceeds rather than the claim -- it would be one thing if the lenders were saying, We are assigning to the U.S. estate 50 percent of our lien. But that's not what they're doing.

Again, Your Honor, I'm happy not to be the tail wagging the dog on this issue here; but that's not what this wording says.

THE COURT: Have you proposed language to Mr. Galardi that would be acceptable?

MR. COLEMAN: That's part of the problem with the process, Your Honor. We haven't had a chance to. We just got this yesterday afternoon, despite requests previously to be allowed into this process. We're happy to propose language.

MR. GALARDI: Your Honor, there's a simple answer, I think, to doing that. Clearly, a sentence in our order that says nothing is intended by any of the amendments to modify or change any of the terms

of the Canadian order makes this language largely irrelevant to them. And that's what I'm going to suggest, is ultimately a paragraph in here.

THE COURT: And that would be acceptable to the Court. I think that --

MR. GALARDI: Then we don't have to -- and we can work on language. But as long as this order says clearly we're not trying to amend a Canadian order by way of a back door or otherwise, by amendment or otherwise, I'm not sure that -- I think this objection then can be overruled. And Judge Morawetz can look and have whatever -- if it alters it, he can interpret that. I think that's totally appropriate. Thank you.

MR. BERMAN: Your Honor, just for clarification in terms of what the DIP lenders were believing that they were agreeing to is that we're giving 50 percent of what we were entitled to receive from Canada after the payment of the direct loan and the other charges to the estate.

So in the example that was given, if we only need 50 percent of the proceeds to -- we would only need 50 percent of the proceeds to satisfy the U.S. debt, then we get 50 percent. The other 50 percent stays in Canada. And we take the 50 percent we

receive and split it with the estate.

So we're not trying to -- or at least the DIP lenders aren't trying to get more than we were otherwise entitled to under the order. It's just: How were those proceeds used? And we're basically agreeing to release part of our collateral to the estate.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. FEINSTEIN: Your Honor, Reverend
Feinstein for the official Creditors' Committee.

I can confirm what Mr. Galardi and Mr. Berman said about the nature of our negotiations in that under the interim DIP, and under the DIP financing agreements, the lenders were to get substantial additional collateral -- new leases, a pledge of the unpledged entered in the Canadian subsidiary, and FF&E. As a part of the horse trading of negotiating a consensual DIP resolution -- as Mr. Galardi pointed out -- one of the items that was ceded by the bank, as Mr. Berman described it, was giving up half of what they were entitled to under the Canadian order.

So there is no -- let me confirm: There is no effort to modify the Canadian order at all. And frankly, I'm quite concerned to hear that there is

now some emergency proceeding in Canada to amend that order in a way that might undermine the deal that we struck here today, essentially on no notice to this Creditors' Committee, which would be fundamentally affected by any change. I just want to express that concern on the record, and ask that we be included in any proceedings of this type that go forward in Canada tomorrow.

With respect to the remainder of the resolutions, let me just -- I'll confirm what Mr. Galardi laid out, that the efforts by the Committee to negotiate -- and we did, as Mr. Galardi said, meet in New York with the banks and with the debtor, and have engaged in fairly round-the-clock negotiations over the last several weeks -- have resulted in a number of important protections from the Committee's standpoint.

First, with regard to the roll-up, there is now language in the final order that makes it clear that if any successful challenge is brought, that the roll-up will be rolled back to the extent that there are defects in the liens, and things like that.

We do have some concern about the size of it being relative to availability. With the

elimination of the minimum availability covenant,

there is now substantial more liquidity for the

debtor to operate as we go forward.

The challenge period has been moved out so that we can all focus on restructuring this business and maximizing value for creditors.

The additional collateral issue, again, has been addressed by the ceding of half the bank's recovery out of the Canadian proceeding, as well as by not having a lien on the FF&E.

We also thought it was important to eliminate the 75 million dollar sub-debt facility requirement. That would have created a number of issues. That's gone.

Lastly, two points that Mr. Galardi didn't raise: We made it clear in this order that the Super Priority claim that's being afforded to the banks cannot be satisfied out of avoidance actions or the items of collateral that have been freed up, if you will -- the Canadian collateral, the FF&E. And finally, we added a reporting provision for the payment of banks' professional fees, that they provide invoices to the Committee of the U.S. Creditors. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

- MR. COLEMAN: Just one last point, Your
 Honor, if I may.
 THE COURT: Yes.
- 4 MR. COLEMAN: I'm wearing out my welcome. I
 5 read body language almost as well as English.

There's no intention to create emergency
hearings to anyone's surprise. If we had been
involved in the process, all of this could have been
avoided. Notice of that hearing is going out today.

One issue that we think is enormously
helpful -- the one way to approach these problems
that we think is enormously helpful is if the courts
are in communication with each other. And we're
happy to provide your chambers with Justice
Morawetz's phone number if Your Honor feels that a
conversation of that nature would be helpful to get
us over this hump.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. COLEMAN: We'll do that today. Thank you very much.

THE COURT: I'm going to request Mr. Galardi include the language that you just mentioned in the order to clarify that -- you know, affecting any order that's been entered in the Canadian court.

And with that, then, did any other party wish

to be heard on the motion to approve the DIP financing?

>>: Good morning, Your Honor. Alan Notfeld
(phonetic) on behalf of Navarre.

We filed an objection to the DIP order, and then we also filed a motion for adequate protection. The relief in the motion and the relief requested in the objection are kind of parallel. So I just wanted to get an affirmative motion before the Court; and, in particular, in light of the fact that the DIP hearing was continued last time, and we didn't have an opportunity to be heard.

The DIP order does now provide for a carve-out for goods that are not properly in the estate. And that would include goods such as the Navarre property that has been delivered to the debtors on consignment. We appreciate that; but in our minds, that's the easy part.

The more difficult part is: What happens with the proceeds from the sale of those goods? And the DIP order in our minds does not sufficiently address those proceeds. And as a result, we feel the effect of that is that some rights that Navarre has under the bankruptcy code; namely, under Section 363(c), are taken away because when the debtors sell

the consigned goods and they receive the proceeds of those, the proceeds get mixed in with the debtors' accounts which are subject to the blanket lien by the DIP lenders, and Navarre's rights to segregation and its other rights in those proceeds can be lost.

As briefed in our papers, Navarre and the debtors are party to a consignment agreement. And under the ECC, that consignment agreement is treated as a purchase money security interest. I won't go into all the specifics, but we feel we have sufficiently laid out the steps that we took to perfect that security interest.

I note that the debtors in their response and no other party has objected to the validity of the steps that were taken; and, as such, the validity of the consignment lien and the consigned goods. And I also note that that's sufficiently covered in the order right now.

With respect to the proceeds, we also look to the UCC, and the UCC basically grants a lien on proceeds that are from the sale of inventory that's subject to a purchase money security interest to the extent they're identifiable. And we think there is a slight difference here between the goods on consignment that were sold pre-petition and the

goods on consignment that were sold post-petition, but they ultimately get us to the same place.

With the goods-pre petition, essentially we would have a lien on the proceeds to the extent that those proceeds are identifiable. And as briefed in our papers, the courts look at the lowest intermediate balance, that it appears that the burden here is initially on the secured party to establish that where funds were co-mingled -- which we suspect was the case here -- that they can be traced, applying the lowest intermediate balance test and the minimum information available to us. The total dollar value of these goods is about 2.3 million, and the debtors' cash balances on hand appears to have dropped no lower than 90 million based on their public filings with the SEC. times, they seemed to be closer to 300 million in the past year. It's really difficult for us to pinpoint exactly what was on hand as of the petition date, but we think it was well in excess of 2.3 And we think that we've, at a minimum, million. demonstrated -- you know, established a prima facie case that there are identifiable proceeds from the sale of Navarre's consigned goods. We also note that there was no objection to those claims in our

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1 motion.

For post-petition, the analysis is slightly easier. Basically, when the goods are sold and the proceeds hit the debtors' account, at that moment in time they're identifiable proceeds; and, as such, they're Navarre's cash collateral. And Section 363 kicks in, and Navarre would be afforded the rights under the Bankruptcy Code.

Either way, the outcome is the same. To the extent you have your identifiable pre-petition proceeds or your post-petition proceeds, it's cash collateral. And it cannot be used without Navarre's consent which they have not asked for and we have not granted, or without the court order upon a motion and a notice of hearing. And they have not done that, either.

So basically, what we're left with is a DIP order that does sufficiently establish that the debtors aren't trying to take any -- that the DIP lenders -- sorry -- are not trying to take any liens in consigned goods. But it does not, in our minds, sufficiently establish how the proceeds will be treated. And the effect that we see it is that it will enable the debtors to use cash collateral of Navarre without consent, and in violation of the

provisions of the bankruptcy code.

What we would ask --

THE COURT: But the order doesn't say that, though; does it? The order doesn't say that they can use your cash collateral?

>>: The order does not say that they can use our cash collateral, but the order -- but what's going to happen is that when the proceeds hits the debtors' accounts, the order which gives the DIP lender the lien on all the debtors' assets, including their account, is going to, in essence, have that effect.

And upon information and belief, the balances in the accounts are going to be swept on a daily basis, and used to establish the daily -- and so, those proceeds will then be used to pay down the DIP lender's loan; and they will, in essence, be used.

THE COURT: So what does your objection go to? The cash management system that they've got in place, or does it go to the DIP financing order?

>>: Well, we don't have a problem with the debtors obtaining their DIP financing. We think that that's in the best interest for everyone. We would just ask that the order recognize that to the extent that Navarre has a lien on the proceeds, that

it get afforded the proper treatment, and that those proceeds get segregated in accordance with section 363(c)(2).

THE COURT: Well, given the cash management system they have in place, how are they going to segregate that? Because you're right. I mean, everything is going to be swept into the centralized account and such. But if there's a carve-out for goods that are not property of the estate, why can't that just apply to the proceeds, as well?

>>: Meaning that those proceeds would go
into a separate account?

THE COURT: No. They would just be deemed to be not property of the bankruptcy estate, and not subject to the bank's loans. Doesn't that solve the problem?

>>: I guess that solves the problem as long as we don't -- as long as we can be sure that we don't find ourselves down the road a month or two from now, and have there be insufficient cash to pay those monies to the secured creditors in a liquidation scenario, and basically have a situation where the debtor hasn't already spent that money. And that's the real concern.

THE COURT: Okay.

>>: So now, just to address your question on how it would work mechanically, I think with respect to the pre-petition -- the sales from the pre-petition goods that were on hand as of the petition date, as well as the sales that have occurred post-petition up until today, that's just a number. I would submit that you could just do a one-time payment into a segregated account, and then those funds are blocked, and they're protected from the debtors using them and from Navarre being harmed.

With respect to sales going forward, we understand that is a little bit more challenging.

We're open to working with the debtor. It would seem to me, given the technology today, that they could run an inventory report at the end of every day; and whatever the dollar amount of the sales for Navarre's goods are, just have those funds be wired over into the segregated account before the sweep occurs, and then there would be no harm.

THE COURT: How are you paid right now?

>>: Right now under the consignment -- well,

I'm not sure how they're getting paid right now.

Prior to the petition date the way it worked is they

would sell the goods, and then there would be

periodic reporting on a weekly basis. And then there would be payments that would follow the delivery of those reports.

THE COURT: And is that still happening?

>>: I don't know that it has happened to the

full extent. I think there have been some small
payments received, but they're not in line with the
dollar amount of goods that have been sold.

THE COURT: Okay.

>>: But again, we would submit that segregation of the funds is the best method -- and the method that's mandated by the Bankruptcy Code -- to protect Navarre's interest in the cash collateral.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

>>: Thank you.

17 THE COURT: Mr. Galardi?

MR. GALARDI: Yes, Your Honor. Actually, partially why I thought we could resolve most of this was under the Navarre agreement, the first thing I want to point out is there is no obligation to segregate. So although they have -- and we don't dispute the consignment. Mr. Feinstein and I have already dealt with Panasonic.

So what we had proposed to Navarre -- I think

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we have no problem with the post-petition. We give the weekly reports. And, indeed, although we give weekly reports now and they get paid monthly, we were going to do what we do with Panasonic at the end of the week with the reconciliation: Pay them over the proceeds and essentially unwind the consignment. And that sort of takes care of the modern cash management system of centralized cash management, because even though the funds are collected, if we pay them regularly, we do a reconciliation, any disputes that come back to the Court, we can unwind the post-petition. We need to fix what the petition date is.

Your Honor, with respect to the pre-petition, that's where we actually have the biggest concern.

Clearly, we sold goods prior to the bankruptcy. And some of those goods have not been paid for. The issue here is whether or not they actually have to establish their burden, or we establish a reserve for that. At this point, we would object to the establishment of a reserve. Rather, they should have to carry their burden.

As Your Honor knows, one, whether we did a roll-up or otherwise, those proceeds have been in the account, that account was paid off in full, and

we borrowed. So there isn't going to be an argument of whether their lien attached or they lost that lien by intermingling, and we actually have to have a factual hearing on with witnesses as to the lowest common denominator -- if that's the approach -- and whether those proceeds are still their property.

Clearly, the unsecured Creditors' Committee

-- as they would have with Panasonic last hearing -want to weigh in on that issue as to whether they've
lost the lien because of comingling and centralized
cash management. Clearly, given that they didn't
require segregation of proceeds in their agreement,
clearly because we had a roll-up, and clearly
because we paid off our debts, there are significant
factual issues as to that.

So with respect to post-petition, we have no objection to going back to the petition date, doing a weekly report and reconciliation, and paying them at the end of the week out of that. That eliminates sort of the administrative insolvency at the end of the day problem. They don't have to hold the bag for 30 days. We should do that reconciliation and turn over the proceeds.

With respect to the pre-petition, we oppose any request for them to get adequate protection for

pre-petition. We don't think they've established the fact of the lowest common denominator. We'll gladly have a hearing on whether or not those liens attached, or whether those liens are lost, and that money is simply property of the estate as a result of events that have transpired for the last 30 to 45 days.

But I think from a DIP perspective we can clearly give adequate protection in the form of weekly reports and turning over proceeds on a weekly basis subject to reconciliation -- with this Court having authority, if there is a dispute about the reconciliations, to come back on an expedited basis to resolve any weekly reporting or reconciliation issues.

THE COURT: And that's how you handled it with Panasonic?

MR. GALARDI: That's exactly how we handled it with Panasonic, with everybody reserving their rights to assert the pre-petition claim as a secured claim.

And obviously, it's the least involvement by the lenders, because they don't want to have an argument of conversion. So if it turns out they can prove it, the lenders will make the payment. If it

turns out that there is no liens, then it is

property of the estate; and that eliminates a lot of

the cost of having the lenders subject to a

conversion.

And that's what we did with Panasonic with the Committee, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. FEINSTEIN: Just briefly, Your Honor.

Yes, I want to confirm the Committee would be supportive of the arrangement going forward to sell down the remaining consigned inventory, to have periodic reporting, and to turn over the proceeds of newly-sold merchandise on a rolling basis.

But with respect to the pre-petition, we don't think that Navarre has satisfied what will be a substantial burden, which is to trace their proceeds; and that they're not entitled to adequate protection on that basis.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

>>: Your Honor, I would just like to note with respect to the post-petition -- the proposal of the post-petition payment of proceeds, I have not -- we discussed this with the debtor late last week and over the weekend. I have not been able to confirm with my client, due to their unavailability this

weekend, as to whether or not that would be acceptable, but I believe it would be. That seems like a fair arrangement. I would certainly recommend it to them.

With respect to the pre-petition -- the sales from pre-petitioned goods -- we would just note that we did affirmatively tee this issue up in our motion for adequate protection. This is really the first we're hearing that -- you know, that people would need -- you know, need to respond to and determine whether or not Navarre has carried its burden with respect to identifying those proceeds. We believe at a minimum we've made a prima facie case on that issue. So we would submit that we have met our burden there.

Notwithstanding that, we understand the fact that everyone wants to get this order entered, and that the Committee would -- you know, may want some more time. And we would be willing to give additional time, perhaps in the form of continuing the motion for adequate protection as it relates to the pre-petition receivables, until this Court's next omnibus hearing date; however, what we would like in the interim -- or what we would request -- is that that sum of money just gets segregated and

put aside pending a determination so in the event we find ourselves in a liquidity crisis one month from now, we're not harmed because we agreed to continue a hearing where we had already kind of teed it up and properly noticed it, and no one responded.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

The Court will find that the proposal for weekly reconciliations to provide adequate protection to Navarre in connection with the post-petition DIP financing order; with regard to the pre-petition amounts, the Court will continue the asset protection issue to the next omnibus date. There will be no requirement of the debtor to segregate funds, however.

>>: Your Honor, if I may just have one clarification: To the extent that the motion for adequate protection is continued with respect to pre-petition sales, and the debtor has already responded, is there -- would there be an expectation that there would be additional briefing on the subject, or could we just have that addressed at the next --

THE COURT: Only if the parties want to have additional briefing. I will read what you filed.

>>: Okay. Thank you.

THE COURT: You'll need to be prepared to

2 present evidence, though.

>>: Okay.

MR. GALARDI: And Your Honor, my understanding would be that that would be the hearing -- the next omnibus hearing would be January 16th for that issue.

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. GALARDI: And Your Honor, we did file an objection. We thought we had raised this issue; obviously didn't do it as forcefully. So we may want to supplement it. And I'm sure the Committee may want to supplement it, as well. So I would expect that to be the case.

Your Honor, I don't believe that there are any other objections to the DIP, and I don't believe there are any objections to our motion to file documents under seal. So we would ask that Your Honor approve those, and then work on a revised order to address both the Navarre issue and the monitor's issue long the lines that I described to the Court to make sure that the language actually works for those purposes. But we would ask Your Honor to approve the financing and the motion to file the documents under seal.

THE COURT: Any party wish to be heard in connection with either matter?

>>: One last point of clarification, Your

Honor. Would this -- in connection with this order,

would that be -- would there have to be a separate

notice and hearing to approve a settlement as it

relates to the treatment of -- and payment of a

post-petition sale?

THE COURT: No. We'll just include that in the language of the order.

>>: All right. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. It will be approved.

MR. GALARDI: Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor, that -- I believe that, then, takes us to Matter 13 on the agenda for the 10 a.m. hearing, which is the debtors' supplemental motion to pay certain sales, trusts and other taxes.

Your Honor, as you may recall, on the first day we got authority to pay various sales use and other taxes. We then determined that because we had -- the filing was a week later, perhaps, than we first ran that budget, there was an additional funding that we had sought approval to pay. The Creditors' Committee had objected to that motion.

As Your Honor may recall, that motion, among

other reasons, asserted that we should be authorized to pay sales use and taxes because they were trust fund taxes, or there were other reasons for paying those. The Committee objected, and put us to our proof on trust fund taxes. Again, we had said there were other grounds.

After going through a long state-by-state analysis with the Committee, we agreed with the Committee on six states not being trust fund taxes. And so, therefore, we had the authority with the Committee's consent to go pay all the other taxes. There's about six jurisdictions that are not trust fund taxes. And given the need for liquidity that we were facing at this time, we have agreed with the Committee to not seek to pay those taxes during this period of time.

Those jurisdictions, Your Honor, are Arizona under the Arizona Statute 42-508; Arkansas under the Statute ACA 2652-501; California we do not believe is a trust fund state; the District of Columbia, which is 47-2002; Hawaii, which is HRS 237-13; and Michigan, which is MCLA 205-52.

Your Honor, I read those into the record because what we have done with the Committee is entered into a stipulation that essentially provides

for the following: That we are authorized, and indeed have paid, the taxes with respect to the other jurisdictions; that we and the Committee agree that the taxes for those jurisdictions under the statutes that we have listed -- which we believe are the statutes by which the taxes would be due and payable -- are not trust fund taxes. We're asking Your Honor to enter the stipulation that says that they are not trust fund taxes.

And to give Your Honor an idea of why that's important: One, if it's a trust fund tax, it's not property of the estate. So we want to make sure we've covered. Also, because a lot of these taxes have fiduciary obligations behind them, we want to be ordered not to pay them, and Your Honor to make a finding that they're not trust fund taxes, because if they were, we have to pay them.

So we entered into a stipulation where we're asking Your Honor to make a finding, along with us and the Committee, that they're not trust fund taxes. At the same time, the stipulation essentially provides a negative notice to those jurisdictions with a right to challenge that. And so, you know, it's an interim finding based upon our review of this statute that these are not required.

They're not required to be taken out of the proceeds. There are various reasons in each of these statutes that we've come to the same conclusion as the Committee that they're not trust fund taxes. The stipulation is that we will not be paying those, but we give the jurisdictions the notice provision. And if they want to take the position that they are trust fund taxes; and, therefore, not property of the estate, they come back. So it's not that we're asking Your Honor to make a final ruling on that.

With that stipulation, Your Honor, we would resolve the Committee's objections. The money would be held in advance subject to further order of the Court. If Your Honor says they're trust funds, then they can be paid. And then we've reserved our right as the debtors. If there were other business reasons -- for example, if the taxes, penalties, etcetera, are greater than our borrowing under the DIP, we've still reserved our rights, because there may be other reasons which were set forth in our first-day motion. But at this point, to get to the next stage of this case at the beginning of January, we've agreed with the Committee not to pay these taxes. And that's what our stipulation provides.

of to this motion. We'd ask Your Honor to approve.

We can submit a stipulation that we and the

Committee have been working on to authorize the

payment of all other taxes, and not pay these taxes

subject to Your Honor's authority; and then finding

that they're not trust fund taxes; and then putting

it out on negative notice.

THE COURT: What was the notice period that you'll be giving for the jurisdictions?

MR. GALARDI: I believe it is -- I think we set it up for the January 16th hearing. So it's January 6, Your Honor, that they would have to object by.

THE COURT: And that notice would go out when?

MR. GALARDI: If Your Honor enters the order today, we would get it out the next day. So it's -- if we get the stipulation approved, we'd give notice of the stipulation and serve it on them on the 22nd -- 23rd.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. FEINSTEIN: Your Honor, I just want to make it clear that this isn't simply our agreement. We wanted a stipulated order for the reasons that

Mr. Galardi articulated, because it's been our consistent view that trust funds can be paid out because they're not property of the estate; but otherwise, we were opposed to the payment of any pre-petition taxes, including priority taxes.

And in regard to the other arguments about fiduciary responsibilities, and criminal, and so forth, you know, it's our view that the automatic stay prohibits efforts to collect these taxes directly or indirectly; and that there is no basis at this point on the record shown to pay these pre-petition taxes, and the stipulated order would reflect that.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Mr. Galardi, I would like to extend the notice period --

MR. GALARDI: We were just going to say that.

THE COURT: -- because of the holidays and such to the 13th; give the jurisdictions one extra week.

MR. GALARDI: That's fine, Your Honor. We were just mentioning with the holidays we think that's the right thing. So we'll change the stipulation to the 13th.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. GALARDI: Your Honor, again, the only burden will be ultimately -- because I assume if they brief, we'll probably want to respond. But if that's fine with Your Honor with that schedule, it's perfectly fine with us.

THE COURT: That's fine with me. I realize that.

MR. GALARDI: Thank you, Your Honor. We will finalize that stipulation, and make that change, and submit it to resolve that issue.

THE COURT: With that change, it will be approved.

MR. GALARDI: Thank you.

Your Honor, the next motion on the agenda was the Committee's motion for privileged information.

So I'll turn the podium over to Mr. Feinstein.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. FEINSTEIN: Thank you, Your Honor.

We filed the -- what has become a customary motion now in light of the amendment in BAPCPA to Section 1102(b) to provide some limitations to what would otherwise be an open-ended statutory obligation on the Committee's part to share all information with creditors at large. There is a protocol that dates back to the Revco case that's

been followed by Judge Tyson, Movie Gallery, and other Courts around in the country.

In response to the motion, we have received informal comment from the debtor, informal comment from the Office of the United States Trustee, and one written objection.

The debtor -- and we have a couple of wording issues that we may deal with after the hearing -- nothing that I think I would view as material, but tinkering with one or two sentences.

With respect to the comments received by the Office of the United States Trustee, through inadvertence that I'll take responsibility for, the provision in the order providing for creditor challenge to withholding of information was omitted. We've included it in a black-lined copy that I can hand up to the Court. And it follows the Revco protocol. We understand that that resolves the concerns of the Office of the United States Trustee.

That leaves the filed objection of the United States of America on behalf of the IRS. I want to address the several arguments in there briefly; first, with the observation that the IRS is not a beneficiary of Section 1102(b). This was a provision intended to deal with information flow to

1 general unsecured creditors.

With that said, there are several points raised by the IRS. One which we've dispensed with is the notion of a challenge to the withholding of information with the additional language that we have put back in. We don't view that as being a live issue anymore.

So that leaves the arguments that remain, which are, number one, that the information protocol, according to the IRS, creates some new Debtor/Creditors' Committee privilege to unilaterally withhold information. And I guess a related argument is that if the information is to be withheld, the IRS wants us to maintain a privilege log.

Addressing both of these points: First, there is no new or different privilege that is being established here. The Revco protocol makes it very clear that in order for a Committee to function, it simply can't be required to turn over all information to all creditors on demand; otherwise, a creditors' committee would never get any information, and committees couldn't perform their statutory functions. So the Revco protocol has developed a methodology for dealing with what is

already a fairly conventional definition of confidential information, and a definition of privileged information that follows attorney-client and attorney work product privilege. There are no new privileges or categories of information being created here, but simply an approach to dealing with these existing categories of information in a sensitive way that allows the Chapter 11 process to function. So we don't view the argument that there is an attempt to create a new debtor committee privilege as having any merit. It's simply factually untrue.

With respect to the management of the information, what the IRS has asked for is that if information is to be withheld, that a log of confidential information be maintained. Your Honor, it is -- it would be a tremendous burden on the process for either the debtor or the Committee or both to keep a log of every communication between the debtor and the Committee, between the Committee and its counsel, and otherwise. As it is, it's difficult doing time in six-minute increments, but to stop and make a log of every communication ever had would grind the process to a halt. We've got very important and challenging work to do in this

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case and in other cases. And the issue of a log has to my knowledge never been raised in the three years since BAPCPA was enacted. And we would oppose -- and grafting onto the Revco protocol -- an additional requirement that would really bog down the process.

The last argument raised by the IRS is that -- is a criticism of the Committee's website. Granted, it's not there for amusement or entertainment. It's there for information. And it does have the essential information regarding what's on the Court's docket, the major matters in a case, calendar, deadlines for filing a claim. It's not clear what else the IRS would like to see in the website. We're happy to take suggestions, but we do think that what's on there is consistent with the Revco protocol. We have also counsel's contact information in case creditors have questions, which is also in the Revco protocol, so that if information that a creditor wants to learn about the case isn't found on the website, they can always call me or one of my colleagues, and we can answer it.

So we would ask that that objection also be overruled. Thank you.

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MR. GALARDI: Your Honor, part of the debtors' perspective -- and we join the Committee, and we're fine with U.S. Trustees -- we have to remember we still are an SEC reporting company. And I think that cannot be lost in the information that we give. We've been struggling with the Committee on confidentiality agreements. They have agreed to keep everything confidential. And frankly, with the kind of massive material and the timing of all of this, we don't stamp everything confidential. We treat it as confidential. And I'm sure Your Honor from practice understands that if we had to sit there and stamp, review, and say confidential, highly confidential.

So we're comfortable working out our issues with the Committee. But given that we are a public company -- though our stock is not still listed -- it's still a concern for this board. So we agree with the Committee that we can do what we can do here, but it would be an incredible burden to make us stamp everything, give it to the Committee. It would just kill the discussions, which -- as Your Honor is aware of the time frame -- have to take place on an expedited time frame, and cannot be slowed down, because it would be a detriment to all

of the unsecured creditors. But we will provide as much information as we can to the Committee on that.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. STEIN: Good afternoon. Your Honor, Richard Stein on behalf of the Internal Revenue Service.

I think the major reason -- well, I know the major reason that I filed this objection is that as the initial order -- proposed order stood, there was absolutely no provision for any type of review or appeal from a decision by the Committee and/or the debtor that something was confidential, and that -- or privileged; and, therefore, go away. Don't bother us. Nobody can review it. It was a unilateral act, and that is -- was not contemplated by what they referred to as the Revco protocol, and didn't seem to exist in any of the large cases since Revco that had been reported.

The -- I do have a problem -- I understand the requirements of secrecy -- well understand the requirement of secrecy and confidentiality both in terms of the SEC, and clearly in terms of information that I obtain through my position with the Internal Revenue Service.

I think, however, that what we have in this

situation -- and maybe we're arguing semantics -- is a difference between information that goes to the Committee and an unsecured creditor makes a request, which I view as something akin to an informal discovery request, and the obligation of the party refusing to disclose information to identify the information and the type of information that they are refusing to disclose so that there can be some sort of rational basis for analyzing the alleged confidentiality or the alleged privilege.

I mean, we're not dealing here with a parent saying to a child, No, you can't do that. Why can't I do it? Because I said so.

Well, you've got to have some sort of give and take, and some sort of assertion of a privilege. I mean, Judge Payne in the case of -- in the Infineon case went into a very long -- which is cited in my objection -- went through a very long description of what the -- what type of -- when one is asserting either a privilege or refusing to disclose what is asserted to be confidential information, the type of description of the information that is being withheld, what type, so that there can be some sort of identification.

Now, in the revised -- or the draft of the

revised order that I was provided shortly before

9:30 this morning, there is language in that order
that says that the Committee -- on page 5 of the
order it says, "Nothing herein shall be deemed to
preclude the requesting creditor from requesting, or
the Committee objecting to such request, that the
Committee provide the requesting creditor along" -I believe that's a typo and it should be a log -"or other index of information specifically
responsive to the requesting creditor's request that
the Committee deems to be confidential or
privileged."

So they're saying, Well, we could or we couldn't, but that's not: They need to. And in discussions with the Committee's counsel -- or co-counsel -- there was some question of the revised order deals with the creditor asking, and then the creditor and the Committee and the debtor get together and have a discussion. And then at some point if we can't get something resolved, we come to the Court and we say, Your Honor, we want the information, but we don't know what information they have. The creditor is going to come to you and say, We don't know what information they have that they're not giving us, because they haven't given us

a description of what it is.

So all I think that is required is that when the denial -- when there is a denial of the disclosure of information, that the type of information -- if it's a document, that there be a description of the document provided, the authority -- or the privilege or the assertion of confidentiality, why it is, just like we were in any formal type of discovery situation. I think that that's -- that's imperative.

Now, with respect to my last objection, I'm not the only person who ever has raised in the large context of these types of proposals the fact that what the Committee -- when you read the motion and the proposed order absent any kind of Court review, which now has been resolved, and absent some sort of maintenance and provision for a description of the information -- a general description of the information that is being withheld, so that, you know, if they tell me it's entirely possible that if you assert the attorney-client privilege and you have some description of -- you know, a general description, no problem. But if you just say it's privileged or it's confidential, there's no way of anybody analyzing it.

But I'm not the only one who has ever stated that what they're proposing on their website is simply that which is available on the Court's CM/ECF filing. And that's all I was saying, is that the way the motion and the proposed order was initially proposed, it's: We're not going to give you anything; and our website is giving no more information than what's already available.

THE COURT: What do you want on the website? I don't want anything on the MR. STEIN: What I really want is -- perhaps the website. objection was inartfully drafted. Perhaps I shouldn't have had a number 7, and simply included that in my -- in paragraph 5 or paragraph 6 where I'm talking about the maintenance of privilege and the opportunity for judicial review. It's just that the Committee says what we -- you know, everything that is given to us is confidential, because when you read the definition of what constitutes confidential information, it's anything that's non-public. Well, the only things that are non-public are obviously sale prices, stuff readily available to the media, or -- as what was pointed out to me by co-counsel for the Creditors' Committee -- is stuff that's on the Court website.

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- Well, now they're giving no more than that. That's all I was saying.
- 3 THE COURT: All right. I understand.
- MR. STEIN: But I think that there is clearly
 a need for some sort of description of either
 privileged --

THE COURT: Well, now there is a provision, though, for creditor challenge, as I understand, in the black-lined version. And can't we take care of the description issue, if there is a challenge, on a case-by-case basis?

MR. STEIN: Well, I think we can. I think, though --

THE COURT: Wouldn't that be more appropriate than putting it into this order?

MR. STEIN: Well, it's in this order in that -- it's sort of in the order; and then once again sort of not in the order at the discretion of the Committee or the debtor in that nothing in here shall preclude the requesting creditor from asking the Committee to provide. It doesn't say that the Committee has got to provide it.

THE COURT: No. But if they don't, can't the creditor come to me, then, and say: We want you to provide it in this case because we have a specific

1 need for it?

MR. STEIN: But how do I know? What I'm saying is, yes, any creditor could certainly come to Your Honor and say, The Committee has said we can't provide you information because it's confidential.

And you say to me, Mr. Stein, what information is it that you are asking for that they have refused to disclose to you? Give me a description of it.

Your Honor, I have no idea what information it is or a description of the document, because they haven't given that to me. That's all I'm saying. If there's going to be judicial review of a decision, then there needs to be some sort of description of the item that is not being disclosed so that Your Honor, as well as the party, can analyze whether or not there may, indeed, be a very valid assertion there, and then there is no need.

But if you don't have that description, then initially the creditor can't make the analysis, and certainly the creditor has no ability to articulate to the Court what document it is that they're asking for, because it hasn't -- even in the most general terms -- been described.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

1 MR. STEIN: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. FEINSTEIN: A couple of points, Your

3 Honor.

The Revco protocol language, which we have now included, does say that the requesting creditor can ask for a lot. Your Honor's suggestion of a case-by-case approach -- which is in the Revco protocol -- really makes the best sense, because when you think about it, if a creditor asked me for a log with respect to Navarre, I would have three emails and an attachment. If a creditor asked for everything regarding the DIP financing, I'd have to shut down all of our work for the next week and try to create a log, which is, you know, the sender, the recipient, the subject matter, and so forth. It would be unworkable.

So this approach allows the Committee in the first instance to decide whether or not that's feasible. If the Committee says, No, the creditor has the right to come to you, to put the shoe on the other foot would really create an undue burden on the Committee than to ask Your Honor for relief from an obligation, and a court order to create a log.

The other thing I would note is the citation to the Infineon case. It's a pre-BAPCPA case; but

more importantly, it's an actual litigation case --

two parties to a litigation fighting over Rule 26.

We're in a much different environment where, you

4 know, under 1102 we're supposed to provide

information. And we simply don't think that the

Rule 26 structure and privilege log applies.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

The Court also doesn't think that the Rule 26 structure applies. Just the give and take that the Committee has to do in connection with a Chapter 11 case doesn't lend itself to that kind of a procedure. And the Committee necessarily has to have access to information that is going to be confidential, and kept that way. I'm very familiar with the protocol; and the Court will approve it as amended.

MR. FEINSTEIN: Thank you, Your Honor. We'll submit an order later today.

THE COURT: Thank you.

And the objection of the Internal Revenue Service is overruled.

MR. GALARDI: Thank you, Your Honor. Moving to matter Number 15 on the agenda, it's the motion for relief from the automatic stay by US Signs.

I'll turn the podium to them. And Mr. Fredericks

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will be handling that.

- THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
- MR. HUDSON: Good morning, Your Honor.
- Richard Hudson on behalf of US Signs.

Your Honor, this is a motion for relief from the automatic stay. Just a little background, Your Honor: US signs is a company out of Texas. It did some work with the debtor, Circuit City, and has a store in New Jersey.

A little background on the issue: They supply labor and materials to the debtor. As you know, 362 prevents the filing or creation of a lien on the property of the debtor once the filing occurs.

Now, there is an exception to this which -in which if the -- based on the lien statute of the
estate, if the filing occurs -- relates back to the
first supplied material, it's not deemed to violate
the stay. Based on our reading of the New Jersey
statute, it does not relate back; and, therefore, we
wanted to be cautious, and go ahead and file this
and ask for relief.

Now, in the first instance, it's important for us to understand that Circuit City is not the owner of this property. They do have a leasehold

interest. However, for all intents and purposes,
we're not sure whether or not by the very filing of
the bankruptcy it terminated that lease; and
therefore, it has a -- they terminated their
interest in that property.

Also, the second thing is the nature -
THE COURT: Well, filing this bankruptcy

doesn't terminate a lease. If it's a lease, the

debtor would have a right to either assume or reject

the lease.

MR. HUDSON: Well, that's my second point,
Your Honor. From my understanding, the debtor very
well may be rejecting this lease, as far as we know.
I have not seen this on the list of -- based on the
debtors' filings to assume this particular property.
For all we know, this lease will terminate by itself
by the end of December. However, in either case, it
would be based on the terms of the lease. And I'm
not sure what the terms of the lease are. I don't
believe the lease was ever recorded.

Our primary interest in filing this lien is not simply against the leasehold interest. We plan on arguing that the landlord may have benefited from the labor and materials supplied to this property, as well. So our claim is not solely against the

leasehold, but the freehold estate as well. And that's an argument we plan on making in the appropriate circuit court in New Jersey. The right of US Signs to assert this is clear on that point.

Now, Your Honor, also the -- it's also important to understand that the importance of this filing -- of preserving our rights under New Jersey law. We have 90 days to file. I believe the last filing -- the last supply of material was October 3rd. We have until the beginning of the year to file our -- to file our lien, as well as to file a complaint to establish the validity of the lien.

As I've stated in my motion, we are not attempting to foreclose on this property or to sell the property in any way. We're seeking to preserve our rights, and preserve our rights only. And it's under New Jersey law in which we will -- we can establish not just the validity and priority of the lien, but the amount of the lien as well. It's US Sign's priority to -- or at least our prerogative to do so. And the debtor has a right to challenge that -- so does the landlord -- in which case we can argue -- make our case that the landlord may have benefited from the materials, as well.

THE COURT: Do you intend to put on evidence?

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MR. HUDSON: Your Honor, we do intend on putting on evidence.

THE COURT: Today?

MR. HUDSON: Not today. Not today. Our interest in this proceeding here is to seek -- show that cause exists to lift stay so that we can pursue our rights under New Jersey law in the appropriate court in New Jersey.

It's a two-step process: We file the lien.

We then file our complaint to enforce that lien, and
to establish the validity of the lien in state
court.

THE COURT: You want to assert a mechanic's lien?

MR. HUDSON: Exactly. And that's where the evidence will be put on. Now, the debtor, as well as the landlord, will be free to challenge that. They can challenge whether or not we have a valid lien once the lien is filed. They can then challenge whether or not the amount of that lien is appropriate. They can also challenge whether or not the -- they can challenge the priority of the lien, as well.

THE COURT: Well, don't you have to establish, in order to get relief from the stay, one

of the elements under 362-D to either cause, or one
the other elements to show that you have the
title to relief?

MR. HUDSON: Yes, Your Honor. And we do believe that cause exists.

THE COURT: What is the cause?

MR. HUDSON: Well, we -- right now, as far as we know, this is -- may not be property of the debtors' estate, as well as the fact that we're not seeking a lien solely on the property of the debtors' estate. It's also on the freehold estate, as well.

THE COURT: But I'd have to have evidence of that, wouldn't I, in order to rule on that?

MR. HUDSON: Well, we believe that merely making that statement entitles us to at least establish that in the state court proceeding; and in doing so, be able to -- the debtor can certainly make that argument in the state court proceeding that we're not entitled to a lien. But we do believe that at that point that's the proper proceedings to handle that matter.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Let me hear from the debtor.

MR. FREDERICKS: Good morning, Your Honor.

Ian Fredericks of Skadden Arps on behalf of the debtors.

I think -- I think first I'd just like to point out, I believe under the bankruptcy code this would just be a preliminary hearing. And the Court is free to schedule a final hearing, which the debtors would not have an objection to, on the 16th.

I think the second point is: Factually everything you just heard is not one supported by an affidavit, and there's no evidence before you. We don't believe that US Signs has established cause to lift the stay. All the information I have is that this lease has not been rejected yet; and so, it still is property of the estate. Thus, by them filing a mechanic's lien against the property would directly impact the estate.

Frankly, we just don't feel that cause has been established; and, thus, the motion should be denied. If the movement would like to move it over to January 16th, we're certainly open to doing that.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. FREDERICKS: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you wish to move it to January

16 so you can have an opportunity to put on

25 evidence?

MR. HUDSON: Your Honor, we would love to do that; however, the issue -- as I stated in my motion -- was that by January 16th our rights -- our lien rights to file a lien would expire.

THE COURT: Well, I can't grant your motion today because I don't have any evidence. So you have an opportunity -- you can either -- either I can deny it today, or I can move it to a final hearing on the 16th.

MR. HUDSON: We'd love to present evidence at that time; however, you know, as I said, our lien rights and my client will be irreparably harmed by doing so.

We do believe that we have established that even though it's a leasehold estate, the owner possibly could have benefited from this, as well.

And had we known that we were required to file an affidavit to that effect, we very well may have done so; however, we didn't believe that this was the proper forum to do so.

THE COURT: All right. So are you asking me to continue it to the 16th or not?

MR. HUDSON: Yes, Your Honor. We --

THE COURT: Okay. We'll carry -- put that down for final hearing on the 16th.

Do you wish to be heard?

>>: Your Honor, actually, the landlord, the missing piece, I'm here on behalf of North Playing Field BF, LLC.

And on Friday, we filed a motion to compel those post-petition obligations, and set that for 1-16 at 10. So I believe the momentum of what's happening here to have this continued to a final hearing on 1-16 at 10 would address what we filed Friday, December 19th, with regard to this same property and US Sign's motion -- and other mechanic's liens, candidly, against those properties could all be addressed properly then.

THE COURT: I'm going to set it down for the 16th. If for some reason this becomes moot between now and then, you can always withdraw it.

MR. FOLEY: Your Honor, the last item on the morning agenda is Item Number 17. This is our motion to reject certain executory contracts.

THE COURT: We've already resolved Number 16 earlier when we heard the --

MR. FOLEY: The Navarre matter.

THE COURT: -- the DIP financing.

MR. FOLEY: That's correct, Your Honor.

This is our motion to reject certain

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executory contracts with executive employees -
former executive employees, Your Honor. There's

been a couple of objections filed.

There is one individual who would be represented by Mr. Shaia, who called earlier this week -- last week asking for additional time to file a response. We've agreed as to Patrick Longgood, who was one of the counter-parties to a contract in the motion, to provide Mr. Shaia until December 29th to file a responsive pleading if he so chooses; and that this motion as to that individual will go forward on January 16.

Your Honor, I guess -- we're requesting relief -- it's pretty straightforward -- in the motion. I guess it's probably better to let the objectors raise their arguments first. I don't think there's any dispute as to the fact that the two agreements in question are pre-petition. To the extent they are executory -- and we don't think they are -- we think it's proper to reject them and effectuate the pre-petition claim status from any breach resulting from rejection under 365(g) and 502(g)(1).

But if Your Honor concludes that these are not executory contracts and can't be rejected,

they're still pre-petition contracts. And a

breach -- to the extent it gives rise to any claim

at all, it's a pre-petition claim, which is really

what we're trying to seek to establish here, Your

Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Very good.

MR. MILLER: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. MILLER: Actually, good afternoon. I apologize. Mike Miller with the law firm of Christian Barton on behalf of two objecting counter-parties to the contracts. One is Mr. Jeffrey Leopold, who is in the courtroom with me. And the other gentleman is Mr. James Wimmer, who is also in the courtroom with me today, Your Honor. Thank you for your time.

Before I forget, Mr. Foley indicated that to the extent that the Court determines that the contracts are not executory, they're still under their view pre-petition contracts such that they would be pre-petition claims. And that is not in their motion, Your Honor. To the extent that the Court determines they are not executory today subject to rejection, I would like to have the opportunity at a later date to address those issues

with respect to whether or not there are post-petition obligations such as administrative claims because there are payments that come due under those post petition.

Your Honor, we submit that the contracts are not executory. As you know, a contract is executory if performance is due to some extent on both sides. This circuit, in the Lubrizol case, adopted the Countryman test, which states that a contract is executory if the obligations of both the debtor and the non-debtor party are so far unperformed that the failure of either party to complete the performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performancy of the other.

Mr. Wimmer's contracts are not executory.

Mr. Leopold's contract is actually a severance agreement. He was terminated effective July 18th by agreement with Circuit City, and it was a severance agreement. And that contract is attached as an exhibit to my objection on behalf of Mr. Leopold.

And there is not one single obligation that Mr. Leopold has to perform. The only remaining obligations under that contract are the debtors' obligations to continue to make severance payments.

1 He is entitled to an additional six months, roughly \$55,000, in severance payments. But there is no 2 3 obligation of Mr. Leopold such that non-performance would constitute a breach. There isn't even 4 5 non-compete obligations in that agreement. Mr. Leopold's only obligation was to give the 6 7 debtors a release of any and all claims, which he has done. So there are no obligations on behalf of 8 Mr. Leopold. And it's very, I believe, cut and dry 9

and, therefore, not subject to rejection.

To the extent that there are additional payments that come due post petition, we can argue for another day, if Your Honor pleases, as to whether or not they're pre-petition or post-petition obligations subject to an administrative expense claim.

under the Countryman test that it's not executory;

Your Honor, we also submit that Mr. Wimmer's employment agreement --

THE COURT: If it's not a contract, then he would be a creditor; right?

MR. MILLER: He would be a creditor, correct, Your Honor. The question is when the payments become due, and whether they're post-petition obligations or pre-petition obligations. But you're

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right; if it's not -- it wouldn't be an executory contract, he would be a creditor.

THE COURT: And just help me: What is the argument that says that it would possibly be a post-petition obligation if it was an agreement that was entered into pre-petition?

MR. MILLER: There are cases that suggest that post-petition payments, even though they are part of a pre-petition contract or obligation, if the payments come due post petition, those payments can be an administrative expense claim.

THE COURT: That's what you would like the opportunity to brief?

MR. MILLER: Your Honor, I would. And, Your Honor, on the expedited nature of the relief requested, this was filed on a Friday night.

Objections were due the following Thursday. I didn't get it until Tuesday, frankly. I know there are a number of -- former employees in the courtroom that actually didn't get served with the rejection motion until after the deadline to respond. It just so happens that Mr. Wimmer and Mr. Leopold had contacted me prior. My office monitors all the pleadings that are filed in the case. And we saw it and filed an objection as quickly as we could within

the time frames required.

Your Honor, we also submit that Mr. Wimmer's agreement, which is an employment agreement and they also seek to reject, is a termination letter that was dated November 7th, three days before the bankruptcy filing. Mr. Wimmer, after service in the Air Force, started employment with Wards in 1968 at the age of 22. He is the longest tenured employee. He has been with the company for almost 40 years. It will be 40 years in May of 1999. As a result of his -- or pardon me, May of 2009.

As a result of his long, tenured service to the company, and his faithful performance under the agreements, he has earned significant benefits under his employment contract. And we're not talking about an insignificant sum here. Specifically, his employment contract provides that he is entitled to approximately \$433,000 as a severance payment -- not an insignificant amount of money to Mr. Wimmer and his family.

Mr. Wimmer's only remaining obligation under his employment agreement, frankly, is to work another 15 days. He is terminated effective January 9th. The letter that came out to him on November 7th, three days before they filed, asked him to

remain with the debtor until January 9th. So he's got roughly 18 days left to perform, if you will, under the employment agreement.

In addition, under the employment agreement, which was dated his most recent one -- he's had several over the last 40 years -- was dated December 4th, 2003. And under that employment agreement -- actually, the debtors only need to give him 30 days notice where they terminate without cause, and all of his severance obligations -- which are a contingent obligation -- mature. So the fact of the matter is if you looked at the 30 days that was only required under the contract, his rejection motion came after the anniversary date of his employment contract.

We submit that the roughly 18 days that the debtor have asked him to serve until January 9th -- in fact, part of his service is to assist with the store closings -- is not material, and is not executory under the Countryman test. That remaining 18 days after 40 years of service is not material. On the other hand, the debtors' severance obligations of \$433,00, roughly, are very material to Mr. Wimmer and to his family.

Your Honor, in the event that you determine

that Mr. Wimmer or Mr. Leopold's agreements are, in fact, executory -- still, and again, I just don't see how Mr. Leopold's agreement could ever be determined to be executory -- but if Mr. Wimmer's employment agreement and the 18 days remaining under that employment agreement are material such that this Court determines that they are executory, we would submit that the Court should nevertheless deny the debtors' motion to reject the contract, because any perceived benefits to the estate -- which are minimal -- are greatly outweighed by the detrimental effect to Mr. Wimmer and his family.

The same goes for Mr. Leopold, in our opinion, because of the detrimental effect of \$55,000 to Mr. Leopold, and the minimal benefit that would provide to the estate and the general unsecured creditors. But --

THE COURT: You're suggesting that I should require the debtor to assume the contract?

MR. MILLER: In the event that Mr. -- in the event that you determine that they are executory, I submit that you should deny their motion to reject because of the effect it will have.

And I know that great deference is given to the debtors' business judgment under the Business

Judgment Rule in Lubrizol and other cases of that ilk; however, it's not without its limitations. In Track Auto, Judge Adams said that you have to look at the totality of the circumstances to all constituencies, not just to the creditors' estate, and not just to the unsecured creditors; but also to the non-debtor contracting party and the other constituencies.

In Track Auto, Judge Adams stated that the better reason viewed is to evaluate a debtors' business judgment by considering the input -- pardon me, the impact of the debtors' decision on a variety of parties, as well as the impact on the debtors' estate; i.e., a judicial review of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the debtors' proposal.

Your Honor, the debtors' petition that they filed on November 10th indicated that their liabilities are 2.3 billion dollars. The payment to Mr. Wimmer is \$433,000. That is less than two one-hundredths of a percent of their total liabilities. Mr. Wimmer has worked for this company for 40 years to earn these benefits. And he will not be able, I'm sorry to say, at the age of 62, to ever make up this money. This is not a situation in the market -- in the economic times we are in where

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we are all losing money in our 401(k)s and so forth because we invested in the market, and as a result some younger people such as myself hopefully will see that turn around in my lifetime. These are contractual benefits that Mr. Wimmer earned through his dedicated service to the company over 40 years. And at the age of 62, he will not make this up. And he and his wife and family have depended upon and relied upon his severance benefits under his employment agreements in their long-term financial planning for their family.

It's ironic, because had he left the employment of the company a year or two ago and start receiving these benefits, he would have been paid out these benefits in the course -- the normal course of the contract. But as someone who is dedicated and stayed on -- they asked him to stay on. They tried to give him retention bonuses for staying on. They have asked him to stay on to help with closed stores. The ultimate irony is he is going to be penalized for doing so.

And if you look at the totality of the circumstances, as the Track Auto case suggests, the detrimental effect to Mr. Wimmer and his family -- and to Mr. Leopold -- greatly outweighs the minimal

impact it will have to the debtors' estate. Again, we're talking about 2.3 billion in liabilities.

433,000 -- I know that argument cuts against me in that I'm arguing it's not an insignificant amount; but to the debtors' estate by comparison, it is insignificant as compared to the effect it will have

on Mr. Wimmer and his family.

Finally, Your Honor, the Lubrizol case also says that the debtors' business judgment should not be granted where it is taken in bad faith, or is an abuse of that discretion. And Your Honor, I appreciate counsel's efforts to rehabilitate this debtor and reorganize this debtor. But when we were here on December 5th, there was an impassioned plea made by counsel to the debtors to allow severance payments to be made to the roughly 580 employees, I believe it was, that were laid off on November 7th -- the same day Mr. Wimmer received his termination notice -- on the grounds that it was important for employee morale to keep the people in corporate headquarters, their heads in the game, and the importance of the news in the community in terms of treating their employees well. I can quote from the arguments that were made by counsel to the debtors at that hearing. And I won't -- I won't

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repeat all of them, Your Honor. But they proffered that Mr. Markem (phonetic) would testify that many of the people had given significant time and effort, and in some instances had worked their lives at Circuit City.

Well, in nobody's case is that more true than Mr. Wimmer. He has worked his entire professional life, since getting out of the Air Force at the age of 22, for Circuit City. And if you're going to do that to the employee who is the most loyal employee in the history of the company -- again, he is the longest tenured employee -- to me, that suggests that would not be good for employee morale. And on December 5th they were here saying we need to do this for employee morale; and today they're seeking to reject the employment agreement of their most loyal, tenured employee. And I'd submit that's in bad faith, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. FOLEY: Your Honor, you did hit on the relevant facts that are important here, that these are pre-petition contracts; that as of the petition date, they were executory. With respect to Mr. Wimmer, I don't think that's even disputed that it was executory as of the petition date.

With respect to Mr. Leopold, there are certain non-disclosure agreements in his contract that the Court may or may not find to be material.

And we certainly have no intention of enforcing them post-petition. But as of the petition date, there are sufficient obligations running both ways with Mr. Leopold's contract to render that executory. We think it's subject to rejection of 365; and under the Business Judgment Rule, ought to be rejected.

We're talking about a \$126,000 payment with respect to that contract. Also -- and that contract was July 18th, 2008.

With respect to Mr. Wimmer's situation, just to correct a factual assertion by counsel,
Mr. Wimmer was unfortunately one of the people that was laid off on November 7th before the filing. And that November 7th letter was the letter laying him off. And he is a recipient of the warnack (phonetic) payment that Your Honor has approved. He is not working for the company right now. He hasn't worked for the company since November 7th. He is not working on any store closing arrangements, but he is receiving payments.

So we did all we could for this individual, as we did with the other employees that counsel

referenced. That's what we're talking about. These aren't -- these weren't special severance payments made. He's talking about the warnack money that Your Honor approved, actually, over the Committee's objection.

So we did what we could for these employees, Your Honor. And we believe both of these contracts are subject to rejection under 365, and the Court ought to approve the motion with respect to them.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

The Court is going to find that the contracts are executory. Mr. Miller, I am going to give you the opportunity, though, to brief the issue regarding whether they're post-petition obligations with the debtor or pre-petition. So I will withhold that portion of the ruling until I've gotten your papers, and any reply that either the debtor or the Committee wish to make to them.

MR. MILLER: Your Honor, a point of clarification. I understand that you're saying that the contracts are executory. Is Your Honor ruling today on whether or not you're going to approve the debtors' motion to reject the contract?

THE COURT: Yes, I'm going to approve the motion to reject the contracts. Under the Business

Judgment Rule, I think that's up to the debtor to 1 I don't think this Court can force the debtor 2 to accept contracts. I think the debtor can come in 3 and request that. I think there is a legitimate business reason to do the rejection. But the consequences of the rejection is what I'm going to give you the opportunity to brief, because you said you had some law that you wanted me to look at about whether or not these might be post-petition obligations of the debtor. 10 11 MR. MILLER: Thank you, Your Honor. 12 appreciate it. 13 THE COURT: All right. Does that take care 14

of everything that's on the morning agenda?

MR. FOLEY: Yes, Your Honor. I know it's almost 1:00. I don't know how long you'd like to take a break for.

THE COURT: Let's --

19 Your Honor, can I speak to this issue 20 before you move on?

21 On the rejection? THE COURT:

22 Yes.

23 THE COURT: Yes. Who are you?

24 Thank you, Your Honor. My name is

Victor Engesser (phonetic). I was an employee of 25

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- 1 Circuit City for 17 years. I did not receive notice
 2 of this motion or this hearing until Saturday,
 3 December the 20th; and, therefore, did not have a
 4 chance to object. I would like to request that I
 5 have that opportunity to file an objection.
 - THE COURT: That will be granted. What I'll do is I'll carry your objection orally today over to the next omnibus date, which would be the 16th of January. And I think we start at 10:00 that day.

MR. FOLEY: We do, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What I would suggest is you need to file a written objection, and then they can respond. You can also talk to them and see if you can work it out.

MR. FOLEY: Your Honor, could we have that objection filed at the same time as Mr. Longgood's, which will be December 29th, the same as Mr. Shaia's client.

THE COURT: Are you able to get it filed by the 29th?

>>: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. That will be fine.

Yes, ma'am?

>>: Hello. My name is Lee Ann Moore, also formerly employed with Circuit City. And I also

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didn't get the notification until Saturday. 1 request that I be allowed to make that objection and 2 file --THE COURT: Your name again, ma'am? Lee Ann Moore. 5 THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Moore, the Court will receive your oral objection. And I will do the same thing: File a formal objection by the 29th of December, and we'll carry this over -- your objection over to the 16th. 10 Okay. Great. Thank you. 11 MR. FOLEY: And for the record, Your Honor, 12 we will do that for anybody else that we hear from 13 14 before we submit the order, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Are there 15 any other employees in the courtroom? 16 Sir, if you would just state your name on the 17 record. 18 19 My name is David Katchiatti (phonetic). THE COURT: And we'll do the same for you, 20 sir. 21 I was laid off on November the 7th, and 22 we were -- was not aware of what's going on here. 23 was told by an HR employee on Friday that this was 24 occurring, and that we were not being paid our 25

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vacation pay, PTO; and that we have the right to
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           come down here to file a complaint.
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                  THE COURT: All right. So what you need to
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           do is file your objection by the 29th of December,
           and I'll carry this over -- your objection over to
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           the 16th of January.
                       Thank you, sir.
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                  >>:
                  THE COURT: All right. Mr. Foley, I think
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           what I'd like to do is to recess until 1:30.
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                  MR. FOLEY: Okay.
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                  THE COURT: And then we'll resume.
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                  MR. FOLEY: Thank you, Your Honor.
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               (Recess, 1:00 p.m. to 1:39 p.m.)
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1 CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER 2 3 I, Lisa M. Blair, hereby certify that 4 I, having been duly sworn, was the court reporter in the 5 United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division, on December 22, 2008, at the time of the hearing herein; further, that the foregoing is a true and accurate record of the testimony 9 and other incidents of the hearing herein. 10 Given under my hand this 9th day of 11 January, 2009 12 13 14 Lisa M. Blair, RPR 15 Notary Public for the State of Virginia at Large 16 17 My Commission expires: 18 October 31, 2012 Notary registration #: 253150 19 20 21 22

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January 9, 2009

Our File No.: 08.3424

Delivered Via Facsimile

Ogilvy Renault LLP Suite 3800 Royal Bank Plaza, South Tower 200 Bay Street P.O. Box 84 Toronto ON M5J 2Z4

Attention: Orestes Pasparakis

Dear Mr. Pasparakis:

Re: Bank of America, N.A. / Circuit City Stores Inc. and InterTAN Inc.

We acknowledge receipt of your letter dated January 9, 2009 addressed to my partner, Fred Myers. Your statement as to what was said at the December 23, 2008 hearing before Justice Morawetz is not consistent with our recollection. In any event, we intend to proceed with a motion on January 14, 2009. Once we determine what relief will be sought we will advise you of same.

Should you have any questions, please contact me.

Yours very truly,

GOODMANS LLP

L. Joseph Latham

LJL/nw

cc: Marc Wasserman

Fred Myers

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