



EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION SERVICES

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR REMUNERATION IN THE FTSE 350

MARKET DATA AND THE 2025 AGM SEASON

SEPTEMBER 2025

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This report provides the latest market data and trends on executive director remuneration in the FTSE 350.

This year's AGM season occurs amid ongoing debate around the UK market's approach to executive pay. Some question whether the current approach to both the structure and quantum of executive packages undermines UK-listed companies' ability to compete in global talent markets.

Key trends emerging from this debate include:

- Greater quantum increases
- Increased transparency on pay benchmarking
- Emergence of hybrid long-term incentives
- Linking of bonus deferral to share ownership requirements

These trends are covered in our recent report, [The Big Tent Discussion on Executive Pay – Two Years In](#) and their impact on the UK market is reflected in the analysis that follows.

The debate around the UK's approach to executive pay is set to continue and it will be important for remuneration committees to stay abreast of these evolving market developments. This report, offering the most up-to-date view of UK market practice, is designed to support that effort.

Should you wish to discuss any aspect of the data shown, its implications for your business or to request more specific data cuts or analysis, please reach out to your A&M contact.

	DAVID TUCH MANAGING DIRECTOR +44 794 916 9944 dtuch@alvarezandmarsal.com
	JAMES HARRIS MANAGING DIRECTOR +44 786 129 4374 james.harris@alvarezandmarsal.com
	JEREMY ORBELL PRINCIPAL +44 734 148 6140 jorbell@alvarezandmarsal.com
	ALEX GARDNER SENIOR DIRECTOR +44 739 339 7996 alex.gardner@alvarezandmarsal.com



KEEPING YOU UPDATED WITH THE LATEST AVAILABLE DATA

This report provides the very latest snapshot of market practice in the FTSE 350 highlighting the key trends observed during the 2025 AGM season.

It includes data from all companies in the FTSE 100 and FTSE 250, **with year-ends up to and including 31 March 2025**. The analysis is based on the constituents of those indices as at 30 June excluding investment trusts and companies without executive directors.

Further detail on the breakdown of those companies and our methodology is included in the Appendix.

MARKET SNAPSHOT



SALARY


73% of companies reported a lower all-employee increase vs last year with median **down** from **4.5% to 3.5%**

4.5%
↓
3.5%

35% of CEO increases were discounted relative to the wider workforce, whilst 45% were made at a similar level ($\pm 0.5\%$). This marks a significant change from the prior year, **when 55% were discounted**.

FTSE 350 CEO
Salary increases:

■ Median to upper quartile
■ Lower quartile to median



PENSION

Almost all companies now align executive pension provision with the wider workforce

Median pension contribution: 10% of salary (FTSE 100) / 7% of salary (FTSE 250)

INCENTIVE OUTCOMES

Incentive outcomes were similar to last year

Median CEO outcome	FTSE 100	FTSE 250
Bonus	79%	69%
PSP	74%	57%

Table shows outcomes as a % of max

TOTAL COMPENSATION

2025 Median CEO single figure:	FTSE 100 £4.6m	FTSE 250 £1.8m
2024 Median CEO single figure:	FTSE 100 £4.1m	FTSE 250 £1.9m


A slight increase in FTSE 100 CEO single figure from last year, FTSE 250 remains broadly similar

INCENTIVE OPPORTUNITIES

22% of companies increased CEO incentive award levels for the year ahead usually through the long-term incentive

This has resulted in an increase in the FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 market levels (see chart below)

PSP award levels (% of salary)



Median incentive levels at the FTSE 350:

Median award levels	FTSE 100	FTSE 250
Bonus	200%	150%
PSP	330%	200%

Table shows award levels as a % of salary.

INCENTIVE STRUCTURE

PSPs remain the predominant long-term incentive structure in the FTSE 350 despite a continued reduction in prevalence (c.75%, decreased vs c.80% last year)

11 new 'hybrid' schemes have increased their prevalence to c. 10% vs. 5% last year.

95% of companies operate bonus deferral, typically **33–50%** for three years.

The trend of linking bonus deferral to shareholding requirements continues. **22%** of **FTSE 350** companies with bonus deferral now make deferral conditional on the level of shareholding

PERFORMANCE MEASURES

Profit, cash, revenue, ROCE and TSR remain key financial metrics.

Measures linked to sustainability, customer and people are most common non-financial measures.


Most commonly 3–5 metrics in a bonus and 2–4 metrics in a PSP.

IN-EMPLOYMENT SHAREHOLDING REQUIREMENTS

CEO median: **FTSE 100** **400%** **FTSE 250** **200%**




Increase from prior year in the FTSE 100 as requirements were increased when incentive levels were increased




AGM VOTING

Notable increase in ISS opposition to the DRR:



Large increase in 'low' votes vs prior year:



ISS opposition to remuneration policies has increased materially in recent years, with around **20%** of the market receiving an 'Against' recommendation

'Low' votes on policies have almost doubled in FTSE 250 to **20%** but dropped to **6%** in FTSE 100

BASE SALARY

The salary analysis in this section is based on the latest disclosed salary for the forthcoming financial year.

BASE SALARY INCREASES

Wider workforce


The relativity between executive director salary increases and those of the company's wider workforce has been a key theme in recent years and remains an important reference point.

This year, the average all-employee increase has continued to fall, reflecting a more benign inflationary environment.

Executive Directors

For many years prior to 2022, it was established market practice for executive director salary increases to align with the average increase awarded to the company's wider workforce (typically c.2%–3%, reflecting prolonged periods of modest UK inflation).

In each of the past two years, as average employee increases have trended above historic norms, most



companies adopted a ‘discounted’ approach for executive director salaries (i.e. where their percentage increase was below the wider workforce average) in line with shareholder expectations for restraint.

This year, setting executive director increases in line with the employee average has re-emerged as the most common approach:


- FTSE 100: increased from ~30% to 50%
- FTSE 250: increased from ~25% to 40%

It can also be seen that in the FTSE 100, around 30 percent of increases were above the employee average which represented an increase from last year. This trend

was not seen in the FTSE 250, where discounting remained more common than in the FTSE 100.

Common themes in support of above-employee increases included low market positioning, recent strong performance, and an increase in size and complexity of the business due to M&A activity. Large increases were often part of a multi-phase rebalancing exercise to address the issues raised. Other companies also referenced global competitiveness, and this was most often done with reference to the US or US-dominated sectors. For almost all of these companies, a detailed rationale was provided, no objections were raised by the main shareholder voting agencies and the DRR vote was passed without significant shareholder dissent.


CEO salary increase vs. workforce





The following chart illustrates market practice across the full FTSE 350, showing both the average employee increase and the CEO increase (with each bar and associated marker representing one company). It

suggests that ‘discounting’ the CEO salary is more common in those companies where the workforce increase is towards the upper end of the range of market practice (e.g. above c.4%).



Executive Director base salary increases

FTSE 100		
CEO	2024	2025
Upper quartile	4.5%	5.6%
Median	4.0%	3.0%
Lower quartile	3.0%	2.5%
CFO	2024	2025
Upper quartile	4.8%	4.2%
Median	4.0%	3.0%
Lower quartile	3.0%	2.5%

FTSE 250		
CEO	2024	2025
Upper quartile	5.0%	4.0%
Median	3.5%	3.0%
Lower quartile	2.0%	2.0%
CFO	2024	2025
Upper quartile	5.0%	4.0%
Median	4.0%	3.0%
Lower quartile	2.0%	2.0%

Executive Director base salary levels

CEO		Lower quartile	Median	Upper quartile
	FTSE 100	£860k	£1,010k	£1,285k
	FTSE 30	£1,350k	£1,410k	£1,500k
	FTSE 31-100	£820k	£910k	£1,020k
		Lower quartile	Median	Upper quartile
	FTSE 250	£570k	£665k	£800k
	FTSE 250 (Top Half)	£625k	£725k	£845k
	FTSE 250 (Bottom Half)	£520k	£590k	£660k

CFO		Lower quartile	Median	Upper quartile
	FTSE 100	£550k	£645k	£800k
	FTSE 30	£800k	£830k	£890k
	FTSE 31-100	£525k	£595k	£670k
		Lower quartile	Median	Upper quartile
	FTSE 250	£400k	£450k	£515k
	FTSE 250 (Top Half)	£425k	£485k	£530k
	FTSE 250 (Bottom Half)	£360k	£405k	£445k

PENSION AND BENEFITS

PENSION

Over 99% of FTSE 350 now align the CEO pension (or cash allowance) with the rate available to the wider workforce. The median pension contribution in the FTSE 100 has remained constant year-on-year. In the FTSE 250, the median has reduced slightly, from 8% to 7% mainly due to changes in the index constituents.

Executive Director Policy

	Lower quartile	Median	Upper quartile
FTSE 100	8%	10%	12%
FTSE 250	5%	7%	10%



BENEFITS

Benefits typically comprise a car or car allowance, life insurance and health-related benefits. Where relevant, they may also extend to cover relocation support. There has been little change in the median value of benefits when compared to last year. As the value of individual benefits is not always disclosed, the following tables present the total value of benefits as reported in the 'single figure' of total remuneration:


CEO		Lower quartile	Median	Upper quartile
	FTSE 100	£21k	£42k	£102k
	FTSE 30	£45k	£95k	£138k
	FTSE 31-100	£19k	£30k	£66k
		Lower quartile	Median	Upper quartile
	FTSE 250	£7k	£19k	£36k
	FTSE 250 (Top Half)	£9k	£20k	£38k
	FTSE 250 (Bottom Half)	£7k	£15k	£32k
CFO		Lower quartile	Median	Upper quartile
	FTSE 100	£7k	£17k	£31k
	FTSE 30	£15k	£32k	£65k
	FTSE 31-100	£3k	£16k	£24k
		Lower quartile	Median	Upper quartile
	FTSE 250	£4k	£14k	£21k
	FTSE 250 (Top Half)	£4k	£14k	£20k
	FTSE 250 (Bottom Half)	£5k	£14k	£24k

INCENTIVES

INCENTIVE OUTCOMES

The charts below illustrate CEO incentive outcomes for the most recent reporting year compared to the previous four.

In the FTSE 100, the data show only a relatively minor year-on-year change. In the FTSE 250, annual bonus outcomes are broadly in line with last year, while PSP outcomes are slightly lower.




DISCRETIONARY REDUCTIONS

The chart below shows the discretionary adjustments applied to annual bonus outcomes and the reasons behind those reductions or increases.

Around 10% of FTSE 350 companies made a discretionary adjustment to the annual bonus, down on 13% last year. These adjustments varied widely, with the most substantial resulting in no bonus being paid at all. Such reductions were typically applied when the financial targets had been missed and any additional bonus linked to non-financial performance was reduced to zero. However, in some cases, companies reduced the total bonus to zero even when financial performance targets had been achieved. These decisions were typically driven by an assessment of the 'wider shareholder' or 'wider stakeholder' experience. Poor safety performance was another common reason for applying a discretionary reduction to the bonus, although

the scale of reduction was usually smaller in these cases. There were three examples of positive discretion in the annual bonus. In the first, the company argued that the CEO had overseen a significant turnaround and record performance since appointment, which ISS found sufficiently compelling and supported. The second argued that company performance had suffered because of a prolonged takeover, negatively impacting sales, and adjusted performance targets to reflect this. ISS did not support this, although it should be noted that the same company also used positive discretion to fully vest the LTIP award. In the third, the formulaic bonus outcome of nil resulted from the revenue growth underpin being missed when profit performance had exceeded the stretch target. The Committee therefore increased the bonus to the threshold level and this received ISS support.



One use of positive discretion is not shown in the chart as the bonus was increased from a nil outcome and a % increase cannot be calculated.

Discretionary reductions to PSP awards are applied more rarely than to annual bonuses and were only made to the PSP awards vesting to 3% of FTSE 350 CEOs. In most cases, the formulaic vesting outcome was not considered to reflect underlying performance and discretion was then exercised to make a reduction. In two cases, positive

discretion was used to provide 100% vesting from a formulaic outcome of nil. These cases are very unusual and were made to align vesting with the Remuneration Committee's assessment of underlying performance. Both exercises of positive discretion were not supported by ISS.

INCENTIVE OPPORTUNITIES



Increases to incentive opportunities

22% of FTSE 350 companies increased the incentive opportunity for the CEO for 2025. The proportion of FTSE 100 companies increasing CEO incentive opportunities was marginally lower than in the FTSE 250. Most companies (46%) made increases via the long-term elements, with 34% via the bonus and 20% increasing both elements.

Common factors in the rationale for increases included incentive opportunities lying below market benchmarks,

strong individual performance in role, a long period of time since prior increases, the ability to attract executives in an uncertain economic environment with talent shortages, and the need to incentivise the achievement of strategic goals. For CFO roles, additional rationale for increases included aligning the CFO's incentive opportunity with the CEO's, and reflecting an increase in role and responsibility.

The chart below sets out the CEO increases made for 2025.





Note: each line represents one company. Charts exclude incentive increases made by banks, many of which rebalanced their packages from fixed to variable pay following the removal of the variable pay cap. LTIP opportunities and increases shown on a 'PSP equivalent' basis (see Appendix and Methodology).



Recent increases have started to impact the upper quartile annual bonus and PSP level for CEOs in the FTSE 100 and FTSE 250.

For CFO roles, annual bonus levels have been impacted less with only a rise in the median at the FTSE 100, but median PSP levels have increased.



Executive Director annual bonus opportunities, % salary

CEO		Lower quartile	Median	Upper quartile
	FTSE 100	200%	200%	235%
	FTSE 30	200%	225%	280%
	FTSE 31-100	175%	200%	200%
		Lower quartile	Median	Upper quartile
	FTSE 250	150%	150%	200%
	FTSE 250 (Top Half)	150%	150%	200%
	FTSE 250 (Bottom Half)	150%	150%	150%
CFO		Lower quartile	Median	Upper quartile
	FTSE 100	150%	200%	200%
	FTSE 30	200%	200%	240%
	FTSE 31-100	150%	175%	200%
		Lower quartile	Median	Upper quartile
	FTSE 250	125%	150%	150%
	FTSE 250 (Top Half)	150%	150%	175%
	FTSE 250 (Bottom Half)	125%	150%	150%



Executive Director PSP normal award, % salary

CEO		Lower quartile	Median	Upper quartile
	FTSE 100	250%	330%	450%
	FTSE 30	375%	490%	550%
	FTSE 31-100	250%	300%	350%
		Lower quartile	Median	Upper quartile
	FTSE 250	175%	200%	295%
	FTSE 250 (Top Half)	200%	200%	300%
	FTSE 250 (Bottom Half)	150%	185%	225%

CFO		Lower quartile	Median	Upper quartile
	FTSE 100	225%	275%	370%
	FTSE 30	300%	375%	450%
	FTSE 31-100	200%	250%	300%
		Lower quartile	Median	Upper quartile
	FTSE 250	150%	200%	250%
	FTSE 250 (Top Half)	175%	200%	250%
	FTSE 250 (Bottom Half)	150%	165%	200%

CEO 'premium'

The tables below show the proportion of the market setting the CEO award level above that of the CFO, for both the annual bonus and the PSP. The proportion of the market

providing a CEO 'premium' has increased slightly year-on-year.



% of companies setting CEO bonus opportunity above CFO		% of companies setting CEO PSP award level above CFO	
FTSE 100	FTSE 250	FTSE 100	FTSE 250
49%	40%	76%	52%
Prior year: 45%	Prior year: 41%	Prior year: 73%	Prior year: 49%

INCENTIVE STRUCTURES

Bonus deferral

95% of the FTSE 350 operate some form of bonus deferral. For 14% of these companies, the deferred amount is calculated by reference to a threshold (e.g. level of salary or bonus outcome).

For the remainder, deferral is a fixed percentage of the bonus, as shown in the charts below. As can be seen, most companies deferred between one third and one half of the bonus, with the most common deferral period being three years. Just under one third of companies defer for a period less than three years, although this is less common in the FTSE 100 than in the FTSE 250.




Linking deferral to shareholding requirements

The linking of bonus deferral to shareholding requirements has been a trend over the last two years. This is done by reducing the amount of bonus which must be deferred (in


some cases to zero), but only where the executive has already met their shareholding requirement. The logic behind this is that bonus deferral as a means of building long-term shareholding becomes unnecessary when a sufficiently large holding already exists.

The practice is more widely embedded in the FTSE 100 than the FTSE 250, as set out below.

Prevalence of companies linking bonus deferral to shareholding requirements



Prevalence of companies linking bonus deferral to shareholding requirements




How companies link deferral to shareholding requirements in the FTSE 350

Most companies which link deferral to executive shareholding have adopted one of the following approaches when the shareholding requirement is met:

- **Reduce bonus deferral**
(typically by halving the deferral requirement)
- **Remove bonus deferral entirely**


Both of the above approaches are triggered when the shareholding requirement is met. Some companies have set this trigger at a higher level, for example at 1.2x or 2x the shareholding requirement. Other companies have adopted a 'two stage' approach where deferral is reduced at a certain shareholding level, and then removed at a higher shareholding level.

How companies link deferral to shareholding requirements in the FTSE 350



LONG-TERM INCENTIVE STRUCTURE

The chart on the right sets out the prevalence of long-term incentive structures across the FTSE 350. PSPs remain the dominant structure, although there have been some notable changes in the year. The main change has been the increase in the prevalence of hybrid plans from 7% last year to 13% this year in the FTSE 100, and from 3% to 8% in the FTSE 250.



Changes to incentive structure

The most notable trend has been the accelerating rate of adoption of a hybrid structure to replace PSPs, with companies often citing greater alignment to the North American talent market as a supporting rationale. The number of hybrids in the FTSE 350 has now almost doubled. The number of companies moving from PSPs to RSUs was similar to those moving from RSUs to PSPs, indicating that both incentive structures remain relevant.

25% of new FTSE 350 Remuneration Policies during 2025 changed the incentive structure

Changes to incentive structures in the FTSE 350

Previous structure	New structure
PSP	Hybrid (PSP + RSU)
PSP	Hybrid (PSP + RSU) ¹
PSP	Hybrid (PSP + RSU)
PSP	Hybrid (PSP + RSU)
PSP	Hybrid (PSP + RSU)
PSP	Hybrid (PSP + RSU)
PSP	Hybrid (PSP + RSU)
PSP	Hybrid (PSP + RSU)
PSP	Hybrid (PSP + RSU)
PSP	Hybrid (PSP + RSU)
PSP	Hybrid (PSP + RSU) ²
PSP	RSU ¹
PSP	RSU
Bonus + PSP	RSU ³
RSU	PSP ¹
RSU	PSP ¹
RSU	PSP ¹
RSU	RSU + One-off LTIP
PSP	VCP
PSP	VCP
No LTIP	Single Plan
No LTIP	Triennial "RSU"

1. No change to LTIP "target" level
2. US executives only
3. Reduction to overall target level

Note: changes at banks have not been included. Many banks reduced fixed pay and increased variable elements of pay following the removal of the variable pay cap. Each row represents the change made to structure by one company.

Hybrid incentives


Hybrids now represent almost 10% of FTSE 350 market practice. As shown above, adoption has been greater in the FTSE 100 than in the FTSE 250.

Although alignment with typical practice in the US talent market is often a factor, many companies present a broader case in support of their hybrid approach. For example, including elements that promote both retention and shareholder alignment, as well as performance, provides a more balanced overall framework. Companies



also often note that a hybrid improves the consistency of LTI structure which is cascaded below board level.

Most hybrids are a combination of PSP and RSU awards. The typical balance between PSP and RSUs in each hybrid award at the FTSE 350 is shown in the charts below. We have shown the balance at 'max' which assumes that the full PSP award will vest.

**PSU / RSU mix in hybrid awards at the FTSE 350
SHOWN AT 'MAX'**




PERFORMANCE MEASURES




Number of measures

Annual bonus



LTIP



A&M's 2025 Target-Setting Toolkit


For comprehensive market analysis of performance targets for both annual bonus and LTIP, check out [A&M's 2025 Target-Setting Toolkit](#).



The prevalence of Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) measures has increased significantly in recent years. Currently, around 75% of FTSE 350 companies have an element related to ESG in the annual bonus, and around 65% include such an element in the LTIP. The typical weighting for ESG in both the annual bonus and LTIP is 10%.

Following this period of rapid adoption, a minority of companies are starting to place less emphasis on ESG in the annual bonus. This year, 31% of FTSE 350 companies reduced the weighting in the annual bonus or removed the ESG element entirely, whilst 22% did so in the LTIP. However, the majority of companies maintained the ESG element at the same weighting in the bonus or LTIP.


Change in ESG weighting at the FTSE 350



Median weighting is 10% in both the bonus and LTIP

TOTAL COMPENSATION – “SINGLE FIGURE”

The charts below show the total compensation for the most recent reporting year compared with the prior reporting year, for incumbents who served for a full financial year.



The tables below set out the total compensation for the latest reporting year, drawn from the disclosed 'single figure' of total remuneration.

CEO		Lower quartile	Median	Upper quartile
	FTSE 100	£3,070k	£4,510k	£6,130k
	FTSE 30	£4,660k	£6,100k	£10,530k
	FTSE 31-100	£2,450k	£3,640k	£5,120k
		Lower quartile	Median	Upper quartile
	FTSE 250	£1,270k	£1,810k	£2,680k
	FTSE 250 (Top Half)	£1,580k	£2,110k	£3,050k
	FTSE 250 (Bottom Half)	£1,060k	£1,340k	£1,750k
CFO		Lower quartile	Median	Upper quartile
	FTSE 100	£1,640k	£2,350k	£3,380k
	FTSE 30	£2,890k	£4,170k	£5,870k
	FTSE 31-100	£1,490k	£1,880k	£2,710k
		Lower quartile	Median	Upper quartile
	FTSE 250	£900k	£1,160k	£1,610k
	FTSE 250 (Top Half)	£1,000k	£1,340k	£1,900k
	FTSE 250 (Bottom Half)	£730k	£970k	£1,170k

SHAREHOLDING REQUIREMENTS

In-employment shareholding requirements

In place at 98% of FTSE 100 and 99% of FTSE 250 companies. The FTSE 100 median has increased year-on-

year in part due to companies increasing shareholding requirements when increasing LTIP award levels.

CEO

	Lower quartile	Median	Upper quartile
FTSE 100	300%	400%	500%
FTSE 30	400%	500%	565%
FTSE 31-100	300%	300%	400%
	Lower quartile	Median	Upper quartile
FTSE 250	200%	200%	300%
FTSE 250 (Top Half)	200%	200%	300%
FTSE 250 (Bottom Half)	200%	200%	200%

CFO


	Lower quartile	Median	Upper quartile
FTSE 100	200%	300%	350%
FTSE 30	300%	390%	440%
FTSE 31-100	200%	250%	300%
	Lower quartile	Median	Upper quartile
FTSE 250	200%	200%	230%
FTSE 250 (Top Half)	200%	200%	250%
FTSE 250 (Bottom Half)	200%	200%	200%

Post-cessation shareholding requirements

Almost all FTSE 350 companies operate a post-cessation shareholding requirement.

Investment Association guidance recommends that companies retain the required in-employment shareholding requirement for a period of two years post-cessation. Adherence to this guidance is noticeably higher in the FTSE 100 (79%) than in the FTSE 250 (64%).

Where companies are non-compliant, this typically involves a ‘tapering’ of the requirement (e.g. it falls to 50% of the in-employment requirement after one year). However, approaches vary as set out in the chart below.




2025 AGM SEASON

VOTING AGENCY RECOMMENDATIONS

The charts below show the proportion of 'Against' recommendations from the UK's most influential voting

agency (ISS) for both Remuneration Policies and DRR voting, in the FTSE 100 and FTSE 250.





On Remuneration Policies, opposition from ISS increased from the previous year across both the FTSE 100 and 250, with continued focus on material increases to quantum, particularly when combined with a transition to a 'hybrid' long-term structure. Notably, ISS opposed ten of the eleven proposed transitions to a 'hybrid' long-term structure on the basis that the transition was accompanied by an increase in quantum. Excluding policies to introduce hybrids, ISS support in 2025 was 80% (FTSE 100) and 75% (FTSE 250). Where increases to proposed quantum were considered moderate or well supported, but with no change to structure, ISS recommended in favour.

On DRR voting, opposition from ISS grew significantly and particularly in the FTSE 100, reversing a trend which saw year-on-year decreases from 2021. Key reasons for recommending against included:

- Inadequate disclosure of performance targets
- Material base salary increases
- Insufficient response to prior shareholder dissent
- Incentive outcomes not being aligned with performance

AGM VOTING OUTCOMES

The following charts show the proportion of the market receiving a 'low' vote (i.e. 80% or below support) for both Remuneration Policies and DRR voting in the FTSE 100 and FTSE 250.



APPENDIX

METHODOLOGY

Sample


For pay data, the sample consists of the FTSE 100 and 250 constituents as at 30 June 2025, with year ends between 1 April 2024 and 31 March 2025, excluding investment trusts and companies without executive directors. Further details on the sample are set out below:

FTSE 100 market caps			
	Lower quartile	Median	Upper quartile
FTSE 100	5,800	9,190	29,600
FTSE 30	33,590	43,900	68,570
FTSE 31-100	5,190	6,560	9,740

FTSE 250 market caps			
	Lower quartile	Median	Upper quartile
FTSE 250	810	1,290	2,000
Top Half	1,400	1,900	2,600
Bottom Half	580	770	950

Spot market cap on 30 June 2025 in GBP million

Industry breakdown of the FTSE 100 and 250



For AGM voting and ISS analysis, the sample is the same but excluding companies with year-ends before 1 September 2024. This is to focus on companies with AGMs taking place in 2025.

Base salary

Increases refer to the upcoming financial year for incumbents remaining in the same role. For example, for a company with a January 2025 year end, the CFO salary increase is the one to be applied during the period 1 February 2025 to 31 January 2026. Increases linked to a rebalancing of the package have been excluded.

Benefits and pension

Pension contributions are based on the policy pension contribution rate or cash allowance. Benefit values are based on the single figure disclosure.

Incentive outcomes

Incentive outcomes have been shown for the annual bonus and PSP and not for other long-term incentives, e.g. single incentive plans and restricted shares (RSUs). Annual bonus outcomes for 2024 relate to financial years ending in the period 1 April 2024 to 31 March 2025. PSP outcomes relate to awards with a performance period ending in the period 1 April 2024 to 31 March 2025.

Incentive opportunities

Annual bonus and long-term incentive (LTI) opportunities have been presented as a percentage of base salary, rounded to the closest 5%.

Annual bonus opportunities relate to the annual bonus for the upcoming financial year, and LTI opportunities relate to the LTI awards due to be granted in the upcoming financial year. The opportunities shown do not relate to the maximums set out in company policy tables.

Annual bonus opportunities represent the maximum annual bonus payout, which includes any deferred portion, and any portion delivered in cash or shares.

LTI award opportunities are calculated on a 'PSP equivalent' basis at

grant. This means that PSP opportunities are shown assuming that the maximum number of shares vests and those shares are valued at the date of grant of the award. As for RSU and option awards, we represent them in the data set using a PSP award of equivalent fair value. For example, an RSU award of 100% of salary is represented in the data set as a PSP award opportunity of 200% of salary. When RSU award opportunities are shown in isolation, the above conversion rate is not applied.

Single incentive plans have been excluded from annual bonus and LTI opportunity statistics.

Incentive structure

Statistics for annual bonus and LTI are shown as a percentage of companies with an annual bonus or with an LTI, as appropriate. Companies without an annual bonus or LTI are not included.

Performance measure statistics relate to annual bonus and PSP awards, including PSP awards which form part of a hybrid, and not to other incentive plans. The performance measures are those for the next annual bonus period and the next PSP grant. When counting the number of performance measures, we have only counted those bonus elements which have a specific weighting in the company's forward-looking disclosure.

Single figure

Single figure data is shown for executives who have served in the same role throughout the latest financial year at their company. Some executives in the sample may not have been in role long enough to receive the vesting of a long-term incentive award. As a result, the figures presented may understate the level of remuneration that could be expected when an executive has been in place long enough to have a long-term incentive award vesting each year.

Historical comparisons

Where FTSE 100, FTSE 250, or FTSE 350 data are presented for a previous year, they relate to the companies in the relevant index on 30 June of that year. However, for base salary year-on-year comparisons, these have been shown using a matched sample.

ABOUT A&M

YOUR STRATEGIC PARTNER FOR EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

Our growing UK Executive Compensation Services advisory practice comprises four senior practitioners with over 100 years' combined experience, supported by a team of both experienced professionals and graduates.

We can provide a full suite of services, advice and support to remuneration committees and HR or reward teams as shown below.



ABOUT A&M

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One of our market differentiators is that we are a 'senior practitioner-led' practice, meaning that our Managing Directors and Principal take a more 'hands-on' and visible role in client relationships than is often the case in other consulting practices. As a strategic partner to the business, our approach is as follows:

BESPOKE ADVICE, TAILORED TO THE BUSINESS



Our objective is to help clients design and implement remuneration that is tailored for their business, rather than market standard that 'ticks the boxes.'

COLLABORATIVE...



As a strategic partner, we aim to work closely in partnership with management teams to understand key objectives, priorities and constraints, which inform our ability to provide tailored and balanced advice.

...BUT INDEPENDENT AND TRANSPARENT



At the same time, we always recognise our ultimate accountability to provide an independent and objective view to the remuneration committee. At all times, we act with integrity and transparency in our interactions with stakeholders.

FACILITATE STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING



We help the committee assess options strategically in the context of the board's 'risk appetite,' and are recognised for a pragmatic and commercial approach that balances key stakeholder perspectives.

OPTIMISE OUTCOMES



Once decisions are made, we provide effective support to optimise stakeholder outcomes. We add value through all stages of the shareholder engagement process – developing strategy, creating effective materials, and interpreting feedback.

COMING SOON...

A&M'S NED FEES REPORT



The 2025 update to our comprehensive analysis of Non-Executive Director fees will be published later in 2025.

Follow the link for our [2024 report](#).





DAVID TUCH
MANAGING DIRECTOR

+44 794 916 9944
dtuch@alvarezandmarsal.com



JAMES HARRIS
MANAGING DIRECTOR

+44 786 129 4374
james.harris@alvarezandmarsal.com



JEREMY ORBELL
PRINCIPAL

+44 734 148 6140
jorbell@alvarezandmarsal.com



ALEX GARDNER
SENIOR DIRECTOR

+44 739 339 7996
alex.gardner@alvarezandmarsal.com



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